Rational Choice and Asymmetric Learning in Iterated Social Interactions – Some Lessons from Agent-Based Modeling






Faculty/Professorship: Faculty of Social Sciences, Economics and Business Administration ; Political Theory  
Author(s): Klein, Dominik ; Marx, Johannes  ; Scheller, Simon
Title of the compilation: Demokratie und Entscheidung : Beiträge zur Analytischen Politischen Theorie
Editors: Marker, Karl; Schmitt, Annette; Sirsch, Jürgen 
Publisher Information: Wiesbaden : Springer VS
Year of publication: 2019
Pages: 277-294
ISBN: 978-3-658-24529-0
Language(s): English
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-24529-0_18
Abstract: 
In this contribution we analyze how the actions of rational agents feed back on their beliefs. We present two agent-based computer simulations studying complex social interactions in which agents that follow utility maximizing strategies thereby deteriorate their own long-term quality of beliefs. We take these results as a starting point to discuss the complex relationship between rational action couched in terms of maximizing utility and the emergence of informational inequalities.
Keywords: Rational Choice, Asymmetric Learning, agent-based simmulation, informational inequality
Peer Reviewed: Ja
International Distribution: Ja
Type: Contribution to an Articlecollection
URI: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/45910
Year of publication: 22. July 2019