Mitigating the Problem of Manipulation in the ‘Adjusted Winner’ Procedure

Faculty/Professorship: Political Theory  
Author(s): Scheller, Simon
Title of the Journal: Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie
ISSN: 2627-3268
Publisher Information: Wiesbaden : Springer VS
Year of publication: 2017
Volume: 10
Pages: 111-140
Language(s): English
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-16714-1
The ‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure (AW) is a mechanism to reach fair agreements in bargaining situations over a fixed set of objects. A major shortfall of AW for both mediators and participants is that it relies on participants’ honesty, which makes it open for manipulation. In a general model of AW for two objects and continuous manipulation strategies, I show that (a) manipulation is always risky since potential losses are always larger than potential gains; and (b) there exists an equilibrium of symmetric manipulation and with equal threat of potential losses that leads to exactly the same outcome like truthful behavior. These findings imply that the problem of manipulation in AW is mitigated.
Keywords: Adjusted winner, Manipulation, Bargaining, Negotiation, Fairness
Type: Article
Year of publication: 23. November 2017
Awards: Promotionspreis der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg