Voting behavior under outside pressure : promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

Faculty/Professorship: Work and Organisational Psychology  
Author(s): Otto, Philipp E.  ; Bolle, Friedel
Publisher Information: Bamberg : Otto-Friedrich-Universität
Year of publication: 2022
Pages: 711–740
Source/Other editions: Social Choice and Welfare, 58 (2022), 4, S. 711–740 - ISSN: 0176-1714
is version of: 10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
Year of first publication: 2022
Language(s): English
Licence: Creative Commons - CC BY - Attribution 4.0 International 
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-574417
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.
GND Keywords: Wahlverhalten
Keywords: Voting behavior, pressure on voters, equilibrium
DDC Classification: 150 Psychology  
RVK Classification: CW 9500   
Type: Article
Release Date: 20. December 2022

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