Voting behavior under outside pressure : promoting true majorities with sequential voting?





Faculty/Professorship: Work and Organisational Psychology  
Author(s): Otto, Philipp E.  ; Bolle, Friedel
Title of the Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN: 1432-217X, 0176-1714
Publisher Information: Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer
Year of publication: 2022
Volume: 58
Issue: 4
Pages: 711-740
Language(s): English
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
Abstract: 
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.
GND Keywords: Wahlverhalten
Keywords: Voting behavior, pressure on voters, equilibrium
DDC Classification: 150 Psychology  
RVK Classification: CW 9500   
Peer Reviewed: Ja
International Distribution: Ja
Type: Article
URI: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/57077
Release Date: 9. December 2022