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Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Sahm, Marco (2022): „Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players“. Basel doi: 10.3390/g13020024.
Faculty/Professorship:
Author:
Title of the Journal:
Games
ISSN:
2073-4336
Corporate Body:
Molecular Diversity Preservation International (MDPI)
Publisher Information:
Year of publication:
2022
Volume:
13
Issue:
2
Pages:
Language:
English
DOI:
Abstract:
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.
GND Keywords: ;  ;  ;  ; 
Spieltheorie
Auktionstheorie
Wettbewerb
Gewinn
Wahrscheinlichkeit
Keywords: ;  ;  ;  ;  ; 
Tullock contest
heterogeneous valuations
accuracy
discrimination
optimal design
all-pay auction
DDC Classification:
RVK Classification:
Peer Reviewed:
Yes:
International Distribution:
Yes:
Open Access Journal:
Yes:
Type:
Article
published:
October 31, 2022
Versioning
Question on publication
Permalink
https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202