Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly

Faculty/Professorship: Economic Theory  
Author(s): Planer-Friedrich, Lisa; Sahm, Marco  
Publisher Information: Bamberg : Otto-Friedrich-Universität
Year of publication: 2022
Pages: 33-42
Source/Other editions: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21 (2020), S. 33-42 - ISSN: 1573-7012, 1566-1679
is version of: 10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3
Year of first publication: 2020
Language(s): English
Licence: Creative Commons - CC BY - Attribution 4.0 International 
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-539411
We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.
GND Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Unternehmen; Effizienz
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms
DDC Classification: 650 Management & public relations  
RVK Classification: QP 150   
Type: Article
Release Date: 3. June 2022

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