Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly




Faculty/Professorship: Economic Theory  
Author(s): Planer-Friedrich, Lisa; Sahm, Marco  
Publisher Information: Bamberg : Otto-Friedrich-Universität
Year of publication: 2022
Pages: 33-42
Source/Other editions: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21 (2020), S. 33-42 - ISSN: 1573-7012, 1566-1679
is version of: 10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3
Year of first publication: 2020
Language(s): English
Licence: Creative Commons - CC BY - Attribution 4.0 International 
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-539411
Abstract: 
We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.
GND Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Unternehmen; Effizienz
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms
DDC Classification: 650 Management & public relations  
RVK Classification: QP 150   
Type: Article
URI: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/53941
Release Date: 3. June 2022

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