Strategic CSR in Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly

Faculty/Professorship: Economic Theory  
Author(s): Planer-Friedrich, Lisa; Sahm, Marco  
Title of the Journal: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
ISSN: 1573-7012, 1566-1679
Publisher Information: Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V
Year of publication: 2020
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Pages: 33-42
Language(s): English
DOI: 10.1007/s10842-020-00335-3
We examine the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Cournot competition between two firms that differ in their marginal costs of production. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. We show that the more efficient firm chooses a higher CSR level, reinforcing its dominant position. If there are sufficiently large fixed costs of CSR, only the more efficient firm will engage in CSR.
GND Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Unternehmen; Effizienz
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, cournot duopoly, asymmetric costs, heterogenous firms
DDC Classification: 650 Management & public relations  
RVK Classification: QP 150   
Type: Article
Release Date: 3. March 2022