Research on women’s political representation has repeatedly shown that female legislators represent women’s interest more strongly than their male colleagues. However, a growing body of literature shows that the parliamentary behavior of female members of parliament (MPs) and the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of women is affected by a number of institutional variables. This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing the effect of the electoral incentive structure on the substantive representation of women. Drawing on the Competing Principals Theory, it is expected that female legislators more frequently act on behalf of women if their re-election does not depend on the representation of local interests in electoral districts. The empirical analysis uses the German mixed electoral system and analyzes the representation of women’s issues in oral and written parliamentary questions tabled in the German Bundestag between 2005 and 2013. The results of a hurdle regression model show that female MPs are more likely to concentrate on the representation of women’s interests if their re-election is secured and if they do not have to fight for additional local votes from their district.