Subjective Norm and the Privacy Calculus: Explaining Self-Disclosure on Social Networking Sites





Professorship/Faculty: Information Systems and Services  
Authors: Wirth, Jakob ; Maier, Christian ; Laumer, Sven
Title of the compilation: Proceedings of the 27th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)
Corporate Body: European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 27th, 2019, Stockholm-Uppsala, Sweden
Publisher Information: AISeL
Year of publication: 2019
Pages / Size: Online-Ressource
Language(s): English
URL: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2019_rp
Document Type: Conferenceobject
Abstract: 
The privacy calculus postulates that individuals disclose information when benefits outweigh privacy risks. Despite its wide applicability, research has also challenged the privacy calculus. It was shown that individuals disclose information even if benefits do not outweigh privacy risks. Two explanations have been provided: On the one hand, perceptions might lead to a miscalculation of benefits and privacy risks. On the other hand, additional concepts might alter the effect of benefits and privacy risks on disclosure. In this research study we provide a third explanation: We suggest subjective norm to be a factor which overlies the effect of benefits and privacy risk. Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure of individuals that other important referents around expect the individual to undertake a certain behavior. To integrate subjective norm into the privacy calculus, we use the theory of reasoned action as our theoretical lens. Based on a survey with 1,466 participants and a covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis, we can conclude that subjective norm has the strongest effect on disclosure. The results contribute to theory in the privacy domain, by questioning in how far the privacy calculus can be considered, without taking the environment into consideration.
Keywords: Theory of reasoned action, quantitative study, self-disclosure, subjective norm
Peer Reviewed: Ja
International Distribution: Ja
URI: https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/46331
Release Date: 31. August 2019