Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?

Professorship/Faculty: Economic Theory  
Author(s): Sahm, Marco  
Title of the Journal: Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN: 1467-9779
Publisher Information: Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell
Year of publication: 2018
Pages: 18 ; Online-Ressource
Language(s): English
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12308
I examine sequential round‐robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player and each match is organized as a Tullock contest. A single prize is allocated to the player with the most matches won. I show that, depending on the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the players' ex ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs differ. Compared to tournaments with matches organized as all‐pay auctions, however, discrimination is weaker and partially reversed. Moreover, aggregate effort in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests is larger than in tournaments with all‐pay auctions. The fairness of round‐robin tournaments may be improved by an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex ante.
Peer Reviewed: Ja
International Distribution: Ja
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 28. June 2018