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Efficient incentives with social preferences
Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph (2024): Efficient incentives with social preferences, in: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory, Toronto: The Econometric Society, Jg. 19, Nr. 3, S. 975–999, doi: 10.3982/te5335.
Faculty/Chair:
Author:
Title of the Journal:
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory
ISSN:
1555-7561
1933-6837
Publisher Information:
Year of publication:
2024
Volume:
19
Issue:
3
Pages:
Language:
English
DOI:
Abstract:
We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.
GND Keywords: ; ; ;
Anreiz
Sozialverhalten
Präferenz
Bayes-Verfahren
Keywords: ; ; ; ; ;
Mechanism design
social preferences
Bayesian implementation
participation constraints
participation stimulation
money pump
DDC Classification:
RVK Classification:
Type:
Article
Activation date:
December 12, 2024
Project(s):
Versioning
Question on publication
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https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419