In this chapter, I trace the theory and practice of Ottoman and Turkish parliamentary procedure by focusing on the history of the parliaments’ internal regulations (Nizamname-i Dahiliye). The internal regulations of the Ottoman lower chamber (Meclis-i Mebusan) (in sessions 1876–1878 and 1908–1920) were inherited by the Great National Assembly of Turkey (1920–), which only replaced them with a new set of regulations in 1927. I trace such cases of rule violation and contextualize them in the broader context of Ottoman and Turkish political and parliamentary history. I also discuss the various changes made, showing how they reflect the struggles between parliaments and other constitutional powers.

An increase in parliamentary powers was usually followed by serious conflicts with the executive, which would then drastically curb the chamberʼs de facto competences. Initially, violations of the internal rules were mostly committed by other constitutional institutions, such as the sultan and the sultanic governments. During the period of transformation from empire to nation-state, however, the deputiesʼ faithfulness with the internal regulations decreased massively. I argue that these violations can be explained as results of two diverging yet parallel trends: the first was a drive towards a de jure strengthening of parliament vis-à-vis other constitutional institutions. The second may be described as the de facto prevailing of an authoritarian spirit in the guise of parliamentarism.