The notion of moral action seems to be paradoxical, since such an action should be at the same time subjective (if the subject has to be responsible of it) and objective (if it has to account for normativity and moral obligation). This issue was at the center of e recent debate concerning “the new morality”, and involved also a theological mainstream. This essay considers the critical evaluation of new morality proposed by Dario Composta, both on the theological and on the philosophical level. The new morality rests on a conception of the subject and of human action which depends on Heidegger’s philosophy. Composta shows that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot account for our moral experience, and he proposes as an alternative, by contrast, the Thomistic perspective, which he develops in order to tackle current issues. The essay claims that Composta’s proposal offers a persuasive explanation of the relation between subjectivity and normative objectivity in human action.