Kumulative Dissertation, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, 2024

This cumulative dissertation contains three articles. The first article concerns the small but growing sub-field of Contest Theory, i.e., Game Theory applied to contests. The key question addressed here is the optimal design of a primary, i.e., the competition within a political party. The second article looks at firms’ decision to disclose relevant product information or to remain silent when consumers are not perfectly rational, e.g., when they are inattentive. In the third article, I analyze the broader picture of the links between secondary (used) and primary (new) markets. All topics cover competition between economic agents; whether in a contest, a seller-buyer relationship or the broader perspective of multiple economic agents buying and selling products across different markets. In the first article, the individuals’ degree of rationality plays a minor role, i.e., individuals are assumed to be perfectly rational. In the remaining articles, the traditional modeling is extended by behavioural assumptions.