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Stochastic stability for roommate markets
Klijn, Flip; Klaus, Bettina; Walzl, Markus (2008): Stochastic stability for roommate markets, in: Journal of economic theory : JET, Amsterdam: Elsevier, Jg. 145, Nr. 6, doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.006.
Author:
Title of the Journal:
Journal of economic theory : JET
ISSN:
0022-0531
Publisher Information:
Year of publication:
2008
Volume:
145
Issue:
6
Pages:
Series ; Volume:
Research memorandum / METEOR ; 08,010
Language:
English
Remark:
We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core.
Type:
Article
Activation date:
September 24, 2014
Permalink
https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/19290