Scheller, SimonSimonScheller0000-0003-4732-33522019-09-192017-11-2320172627-3268https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/42900The ‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure (AW) is a mechanism to reach fair agreements in bargaining situations over a fixed set of objects. A major shortfall of AW for both mediators and participants is that it relies on participants’ honesty, which makes it open for manipulation. In a general model of AW for two objects and continuous manipulation strategies, I show that (a) manipulation is always risky since potential losses are always larger than potential gains; and (b) there exists an equilibrium of symmetric manipulation and with equal threat of potential losses that leads to exactly the same outcome like truthful behavior. These findings imply that the problem of manipulation in AW is mitigated.engAdjusted winnerManipulationBargainingNegotiationFairnessarticle10.1007/978-3-658-16714-1