March, ChristophChristophMarch0000-0002-6564-2843Sahm, MarcoMarcoSahm0000-0002-6528-65512019-09-192018-06-2820180167-2681https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44052We investigate how individual risk preferences affect the likelihood of selecting the more able contestant within a two-player Tullock contest. Our theoretical model yields two main predictions: First, an increase in the risk aversion of a player worsens her odds unless she already has a sufficiently large advantage. Second, if the prize money is sufficiently large, a less able but less risk averse contestant can achieve an equal or even higher probability of winning than a more able but more risk averse opponent. In a laboratory experiment we confirm both, the non-monotonic impact and the compensating effect of risk aversion on winning probabilities. Our results suggest a novel explanation for the gender gap and the optimality of limited monetary incentives in selection contests.engSelection contestRisk aversionCompetitive balanceGender gaparticle10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020