Sahm, MarcoMarcoSahm0000-0002-6528-65512019-09-192018-06-2820171545-2921https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/44021I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalized Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two ma in results. First, in symmetric contests, a higher common level of the agents ́ risk aversion will lead to lower aggregate effort if it comes along with an increase in downside risk aversion. Second, in many asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is also more downside risk-averseengarticlehttp://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2017/Volume37/EB-17-V37-I2-P99.pdf