Sahm, MarcoMarcoSahm0000-0002-6528-65512022-10-312022-10-3120222073-4336https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/56202I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.engTullock contestheterogeneous valuationsaccuracydiscriminationoptimal designall-pay auction330article10.3390/g13020024