Daske, ThomasThomasDaskeMarch, ChristophChristophMarch0000-0002-6564-28432024-12-122024-12-1220241555-75611933-6837https://fis.uni-bamberg.de/handle/uniba/105419We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of \textit{at least three} agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.engMechanism designsocial preferencesBayesian implementationparticipation constraintsparticipation stimulationmoney pump330article10.3982/te5335