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REPERCUSSIONS OF GOVERNMENT CHANGE
ON THE CAREER CIVIL SERVICE IN WEST GERMANY:
THE CASES OF 1969 AND 1982

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Federal Republic of Germany is known to have a very stable political system. Federal coalition governments (with the exception of 1957-1961) under Christian Democratic chancellors (1949-1969) were followed by Social Democratic chancellorships (1969-1982), before the Christian Democrats took over power again. The government changes of 1969 and 1982 are regarded as fundamental policy changes starting new eras after 20 and 13 years, respectively, of uninterrupted rule of the chancellor's party. (Bähring 1982; Bohnsack 1983). This governmental stability is accompanied by a high degree of formal civil service continuity typical for an almost closed career system. Taking factual and conscious involvement of senior career civil servants in politics as a matter of fact in the FRG, too (Putnam 1973; Steinkemper 1974; Mayntz/Scharpf 1975, 57; Johnson 1983, 188; Mayntz 1984), the question might be addressed, if and to what extent government transitions after long periods of political stability under conditions of a career civil service have repercussions on the administrative elite owing to attempts of the new government to politically control a bureaucracy, which has served another political master before.

Most generally speaking, political control over the bureaucracy can be achieved by (a mixture of) the following devices: commonly new governments will start with communicating their policy preferences and premises relying on the bureaucracy's loyalty to conform with the new expectations and, if necessary, intensifying supervision. In addition to the various information based control measures organisational (re-)arrangements can be introduced,

e.g. planning systems or staff units, to increase the control capacity of the political center. Furthermore, in support of communicated policy goals budgetary constraints may steer the discretion of the apparatus in executing a policy. Of no less importance, however, are personnel policy decisions taken by new governments in order to support the other control efforts. Measures of personnel policy will be the more drastic, the more bureaucrats have become factually and consciously involved in the policy process, adopted a rather political role understanding and overtly committed themselves to policy goals of the previous government. It can also be assumed, that repercussions are the more dramatic, the longer the predecessor government was in office and therefore in a position to carry through its own policy of domination patronage. This article analyses the measures of personnel policy taken after the installation of new governments in Bonn in 1969 and 1982, and will trace changes in the composition of the administrative elite evoked by political interventions in the top civil service during government transition.

In the next paragraph particularities of the German civil service system are to be elaborated, which indicate the range of personnel policy measures available and provide us with a framework to analyze what really happened in and to the administrative elite in Bonn after the two government changes.

Secondly, I shall describe the various processes, which made up the personnel policy of the new governments, and compare the personnel policy strategies and the situation to which they responded in the cases of a rather left-wing (1969) and a right-

wing (1982) coalition government taking over political power. Thirdly, information about the objective impact is presented that the individual personnel policy decisions had on the respective aggregate elite compositions. Did it matter and reflect the changes in substantive policy? Was it new wine in the old bottles of the civil service, i.e. can we observe mutations with respect to e.g. social background, training or party affiliation of the administrative elite in Bonn?

Finally, I shall return to the starting point of this issue and discuss some implications for the alteration of subjective role understanding maintained by scientific observers after the government change of 1969.

II. MECHANISMS OF PATRONAGE IN CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

Of course, we know that government changes do not leave the ministerial bureaucracy unaffected; programmatic policy changes induced by new governments stipulate moves in personnel policy to secure political loyalty and effective transmission of new policy goals, to counterbalance acquired preferences of the career service, or just to symbolize new policy goals by presenting new actors. Domination patronage in recruiting for and staffing of top administrative positions predominantly aims at politically controlling the ministerial bureaucracy and its very political capacity, whereas alimentation patronage (Weber 1919, Eschenburg 1961) might rather occur in field offices and lower ranks not under consideration here.

While domination patronage can be regarded as a universal phenomenon, the degree to which it can be practiced depends on the possi-

bilities the various national civil service regulations offer. In order to better understand what is to be described empirically in Section III, the following basic mechanisms of personnel policy, which can serve patronage motives, are to be distinguished, and their availability for the federal bureaucracy may indicate the setting in which the post 1969 and 1982 personnel policies had to operate.

Closedness of Career System

In closed career systems, which are characterized by completely internal recruitment for top positions and by their holders' having advanced through the career ladder from the bottom, the only mechanism to politically control staffing of sensitive posts is by selective promotion of candidates, who are assumed to be particularly capable (according to what criteria soever) to fulfil the job requirements - in the near or in the more distant future. Whereas a new government party, which has been in political opposition for several legislative periods, can only draw candidates from the internal reservoir of the grades below the respective post to be filled, governments, which have been in office or at least expect to be in office for a longer period of time, might try to separate goodies and badies, high-fliers and mediocre figures rather early in their career and build up a leadership reservoir. Opposition parties will necessarily be at a disadvantage to do so, even if they had the information to carry out informal performance appraisals: their favorites are unlikely to be promoted to the upper levels of the hierarchy, while another party rules.

As all western civil service systems including the German are to a high extent genuine career systems, selective promotion can be observed as a necessary requirement and a most pertinent mechanism in achieving political control and preventing the bureaucracy from becoming politically self-controlling. Even in the legendary British case, with its party politically extremely neutralized civil service, selective promotion overtly occurred after Mrs. Thatcher took over government (Fortin 1984; Rose 1984; Ridley 1985). The criteria of selection tend to evade formal performance appraisals and to encompass indicators of political conformity with the new government, be it by ideological conviction, general party sympathy or overt party membership. As the latter is formally allowed in the FRG, not surprisingly in 1971 19 per cent of the German higher civil service would have advised younger colleagues to become member of a political party in order to advance their career (Luhmann/Mayntz 1973, 245; Nolterike 1982, 162).

The German civil service code allows a first formal digression from a pure career system: people may be promoted into the next plus one position in the hierarchy ("jump-promotion"), if the - ultimately government controlled - independent Civil Service Commission agrees. A further mechanism to gear top career civil servants to the political requirements of the day is to re-shuffle them in order to move those looked at with suspicion into politically less sensitive positions within a department, while moving trustees into the vacancies. Rotation between departments in Bonn presupposes, however, the agreement of the office holders concerned and the ministries involved and, therefore, is less frequent than in the American Senior Executive Service after 1978. In other words, inamovibility is unknown merely within the jurisdiction of the de-

partment; dislocation, however, presupposes that the respective civil servant is offered a qualitatively equivalent position, a condition which limits the theoretical possibility to transfer people from the ministries into government agencies, which are small in number anyway, as administrative execution of federal programs is basically a matter of the individual states.

Finally, the tactical moves juridically available for a politically motivated personnel policy decisively depend on the number of vacancies enabling selective promotion or re-shuffling or both. Before other measures to increase the number of vacancies are outlined, it should be mentioned that organizational reforms not infrequently broaden the degree of freedom for patronage: after 1969 the federal bureaucracy experienced the establishment of staff units in a number of ministries in an effort to intensify systematic policy planning, positions which were occasionally filled by unorthodox recruitment.

Openness of Career System

Although in principle the German civil service is a closed career system, there are certain exceptions to the rule. The rigidity on the "input" side of the personnel system is loosened by the possibility to recruit candidates into federal ministries not merely from other federal ministries (rotation), but also civil servants from Länder and local government administrations, thus broadening the reservoir of potential recruits in particular for new government parties and their ministers, which normally have been in power somewhere in the federation during their opposition time in Bonn; the vertical separation of powers can provide a new government even after a long term in opposition with experienced top administrators whose loyalty has been proved elsewhere.

Furthermore, candidates from other elite sectors: industry, trade unions, or even politics may be recruited into every, not merely top administrative positions, if they promise to bring expertise into the system, which is normally not bred in the predominantly juridically trained German higher civil service. These candidates' qualifications are checked by the Civil Service Commission, and occasionally they are required to serve on a job one step below that originally applied for. But the majority of cases dealt with by the Civil Service Commission concerns the federal railways and the postal service, indicating that external recruitment is not a mechanism devised for politically motivated appointments; it may, however, be used for patronage purposes, too. An exception to this exceptional external recruitment procedure is the highest civil service position attainable: Secretaries of State, if externally recruited, need not be scrutinized by the Civil Service Commission. These occasional non-career civil servants must not be confused with American formally politically appointed top executives. All German federal civil servants, regardless of their background, from section head on up, i.e. Ministerialrat, Ministerialdirigent (head of subdivision), Ministerialdirektor (division head), and State Secretary are formally appointed by the Federal President on suggestion of the cabinet, to whom candidates are proposed by the individual ministers. ¹⁾

Flexibility of personnel policy and a certain degree of openness of the otherwise fairly closely knit career system is also achieved on the "output" side by retiring administrators before they reach the age of 65. This does not mean breaking tenure; retired civil

servants - regardless of the event leading to retirement - receive tenure and are covered by the civil service code. In the first category are those prematurely retired: in case of physical incapacity a federal civil servant may retire for medical reasons, if he wishes to, at the age of 61 if certified or at the age of 63 without a physician's certificate. Between 1969 and 1981 114 top federal civil servants retired prematurely. ²⁾

This figure can only be fully appreciated in relation to the second category of retirements, which is of special interest here: temporary retirement of so-called political civil servants. Political civil servants are expected to be in full accord with the political goals of government and (more importantly) can be temporarily retired at any point in time without further justification. This institution reaches back to the 1848 revolution in Prussia, when the government needed an instrument to safeguard political loyalty of top civil servants who inclined towards the political opposition parties in the diet or even held an opposition mandate (Kugele 1978). This instrument has been preserved and applied throughout German history since the 19th century, in particular after regime changes (1919, 1933) to carry out political purges (Derlien 1987).

The positions in the federal ministries having the status of political civil servants are naturally the highest one: Secretaries of State and Ministerialdirektoren, i.e. since the late 1960s about 25 and 100 persons, respectively, compared to roughly 200 subdivision and 1200 section heads. ³⁾ Between 1949 and 1983, 260 political civil servants were temporarily retired, among these about

every third Secretary of State (56) and every eighth Ministerialdirektor (87) who had been in office (Derlien 1984). The 114 premature retirements between 1969 and 1981 also refer to political civil servants and can be regarded to a certain extent as a functional equivalent to temporary retirement: whereas the latter presupposes the initiative of the politician, although his decision can be provoked, premature retirement is requested by the official and not infrequently preferred to an impending temporary retirement, because pension is normally higher in the first case and the chance to be re-activated after the age of 61 is low in case of temporary retirement, anyway.

With respect to the quantitatively small class of political civil servants within the administrative elite, the German system is similar to the French regulations and resembles the American practice of having political appointees. In contrast to the political appointee in Washington, the political civil servant in Bonn is in principle a career civil servant by recruitment and by staying in office after a change in government. As on the input side, despite the possibility of external recruitment, the German administrative elite is not at all - as we shall see in more detail - a "government of strangers" (Heclo 1977); on the output side temporary retirement is far from having traits of a spoils system. Nevertheless, systemically both aspects interact: the more top executives are temporarily retired in case of a change in government, the more vacancies can be created for selective appointment of supposedly particularly capable and loyal successors, whether they come from the internal or the external elite reservoir of a government. Therefore, the normally time consuming process of streamlining a career civil service (Cole/Caputo 1979, 407) can be accelerated

in the FRG by increasing turnover in top positions and thus engendering a "chimney-effect" for the ranks below the political civil servants.

Locating the German federal bureaucracy with respect to the mechanisms of domination patronage applicable somewhere between the British and the American system, one could call it a career system with loopholes: based on an almost closed career path it allows external recruitment and therefore changes in the composition of the administrative elite beyond the repercussions selective internal promotion can possibly produce. On the other hand, with the institution of the political civil servant the highest administrative elite positions can be legally politically purged without breaking with the principle of tenure. Thus normal fluctuation can be enhanced, and the vacancies in turn may be used to appoint politically loyal experts in order to gear the bureaucracy to the political program of the new government.

After having tried to elaborate the formal traits of the German career system and its potential for patronage, we can proceed to analyze the processes, in which the new federal governments in 1969 and 1982 have made use of the personnel policy devices available. In Sections III and IV I shall focus exclusively on the political civil servants, i.e. the two highest positions in the ministries with roughly 125 members composing the federal administrative elite at a given point in time. Tab. 1 contains the data of the almost 100 per cent sample we are dealing with; it also relates numbers of political civil servants to politicians before and after the two government changes under scrutiny. 4)

Tab. 1

Federal Politico-Administrative Elite

point in time position	1949 -1984	9/1969	6/1970	9/1982	6/1983
Ministers	121	20	16	17	17
Parliamentary State Secretaries	72	6	14	19	25
State Secretaries	155	27	25	24	24
Ministerial- direktoren	436	86	88	104	103
total	784	139	143	164	169

III. PURGE, RESHUFFLING, AND RECRUITMENT

As the mechanisms employable in the German federal ministries for domination patronage are not devised for the particular event of government change, a certain degree of turnover in personnel and fluctuation in positions has to be regarded as normal; naturally, fluctuation is induced by old age retirements, and premature as well as temporary retirements are not confined to years of government change, nor is reshuffling in and rotation between departments. Subsequent appointments to fill the vacancies, however, accumulate in years of government transition. The longitudinal analysis of the careers of the entire federal executive elite in office between 1949 and 1984 shows not only that the years of federal elections and government formation are outstanding in the number of appointments, naturally in particular with respect to the politicians, but also that 1969 and 1982 were revolutionary years at least in quantitative terms: 9,6 per cent (75) of the entire sample were appointed in 1969/70 and even 12,5 per cent (98) in 1982/83 (Tab. 2), followed by 1974 (first Schmidt government) with 42 (5,4

per cent) of the appointments, hardly less than in 1949/50 (6,3 per cent of the appointments) when the executive branch was being established.

Tab. 2
Appointments to Highest Positions

position period	Minister		parl. Secretary of State *		Secretary of State		Ministerial- direktor		total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
10/69-6/70	13	10,7	13	18,1	15	9,7	34	7,8	75	9,6
10/82-6/83	16	13,2	24	33,3	15	9,7	43	9,9	98	12,5
1949-1984	121	100	72	100	155	100	436	100	784	100

* in existence since 1967

That these years of government formation had extraordinary repercussions on the top positions in the career civil service is revealed by the fact that the highest percentage of appointments of incumbents of both ranks under consideration occurred in 1969 and 1982, too, and were relatively hardly less frequent than the appointment of ministers ⁵⁾. In general, appointments of political civil servants are closely related to appointments of politicians, as becomes apparent from the fact that 21 per cent of them compared to 41 per cent of the politicians were appointed in October, the month of the year when (with the exceptions of 1972 and 1983) federal elections took place and new governments were formed. Let us now look at the various mechanisms by which the civil service appointments were brought about.

Temporary Retirement

Of the 56 State Secretaries and the 87 Ministerialdirektoren temporarily retired between 1949 and 1983, 40,7 and 25,0 per cent

respectively, suffered this fate in 1969/70, while even 54,2 and 33,7 per cent, respectively, were reported after the government change in 1982 (Derlien 1984), if we again extend the period of transition into mid 1970 and mid 1983 (Tab. 3) accounting for the time it normally takes to implement the personnel policy of the new governments in Bonn: 50 per cent of the changes take place within the first week the new government is in office, while another 25 per cent follow during the first half of the next year.

Tab. 3

Temporary Retirement

rank \ period	1949-1984		10/69-6/70		10/82-6/83	
	cases	positions	cases	positions	cases	positions
State Secretary	56	155	11	27	13	24
% of positions	36,1		40,7		54,2	
Ministerialdirektor	87	436	27	88	35	104
% of positions	20,0		25,0		33,7	
total	143	591	33	115	48	125
% of positions	24,2		28,7		38,4	

Ministerialdirektoren had not been temporarily retired at all in the 20 years before 1969, whereas this had happened to 11 Secretaries of State (7,1 per cent), to 7 of these only during the Grand Coalition of Christian and Social Democrats (1966-1969). As the Social Democrats had controlled 6 ministries during this period, the purge following October 1969 was rather mild compared to the 1982 transformation, when the Christian Democrats returned into government after 13 years of opposition: now every second State Secretary and every third Ministerialdirektor, who had served in the social-liberal administration, was temporarily retired amounting to 38,4 per cent of the political civil servants, whereas in

1969 merely 28,7 per cent were concerned. The official documents, from which these figures are taken, contain additional information about temporary retirements in the secret services and the diplomatic corps, where 114 cases had occurred between 1949 and 1983: in executing Chancellor Brandt's new Ostpolitik only 30 diplomats were dismissed in 1969/1970 out of the 100 foreign office cases altogether! Although numbers are not available for 1982/1983, it is highly unlikely that diplomats were temporarily retired beyond the normal rates, as foreign minister and Vice-Chancellor Genscher stayed in office and foreign policy hardly changed. Typically those ministries which remained under the grip of a SPD minister in 1969 (6) and liberal ministers in 1982 (3) did not have to purge their top civil service ranks after government changes; a complete exchange of the two top ranks occurred only in the chancellor's office both in 1969 and 1982.

Normal Retirement

The turnover accompanying both government formations was, however, higher than these figures reflect. The natural fluctuation due to old age or premature retirement increased the total turnover. Therefore, the number of dismissals in 1969/70 did not have to be as high as it was in 1982/1983, because four times more top civil servants normally retired during the former transition than did in 1982/83. This different situation of the two government installations is reflected in the fact that the average age of civil servants leaving office was far higher in 1969 (Tab. 4 and Section IV), thus making normal retirement less likely in 1982 as a compensatory mechanism for "political" retirement.

Tab. 4
Average Age when Leaving Office *

time of exit rank	10/1969-6/1970	10/1982-6/1983
StS	57,2 s = 7,3	52,7 s = 6,4
MD	55,7 s = 8,2	52,5 s = 6,1
n StS	19	15
MD	27	44

* including rotations

Reshuffling

Fluctuation accompanying government transition further rises, when we take into account those people who are re-allocated to other positions, because in the eyes of the new government they no longer suit their former function. When inspecting merely horizontal mobility in and between departments without concomitant promotion, reshuffling of the top executives under consideration is hardly noticeable with 1 (StS) and 2 (MD) cases in 1969/70 and 0 (StS) and 6 (MD) cases in 1982/83. Reshuffling after government change was more frequently applied to positions below the ranks of political civil servants, in particular to departmental press officers and personal assistants to ministers and to both groups of State Secretaries, i.e. staff people who in Germany normally enjoy civil service status and are regarded as intimate trustees of their superiors, but cannot be removed after government change except by reshuffling them to less sensitive positions (Wagener/Rückwardt 1982). Within three weeks after the

new governments had come to power, 72 of these people were shifted to other positions in 1969 and 102 in 1982⁶⁾.

When looking at interdepartmental mobility at entering their highest rank and including combinations of rotation with promotion, we find 45 StS (29 per cent), but because of better intradepartmental promotion opportunities merely 36 MD (8,3 per cent) within 35 years. Tab. 5 reveals that these cases, as far as StS are concerned, are rather characteristic for the state of the predecessor than of the new governments, indicating bonds of loyalty and/or ossification having developed during political stability. Not surprisingly the number of interdepartmental rotations rather drops after government changes (with slight differences between the two cases in point).

Tab. 5

Interdepartmental Rotations

rank \ period	1949-1984		9/1969		6/1970		9/1982		6/1983	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
StS	45	29,0	9	33,3	2	8,0	10	41,7	6	25,0
MD	36	8,3	5	5,8	11	12,5	7	6,7	6	5,8
total	155	100	27	100	25	100	24	100	24	100
MD	436	100	86	100	88	100	104	100	103	100

(Interdepartmental) mobility, therefore, should rather be viewed as a precondition of advancing to the highest civil service positions in normal periods and thus as a trait of the career service. Compared to temporary retirements, reshuffling (with and without promotion) does not play an important role in politically purging the top ranks under consideration.

Recruitment

How were the vacancies filled, that were left by those who had naturally, prematurely or temporarily retired, resigned from the federal service ⁷⁾ or had been reshuffled? Where did the people come from who were recruited into these 49 positions (47,5 per cent) of 1969/70 and 58 positions (45,7 per cent) to be staffed in 1982/83?

Observers of the 1969/70 reverberations in the federal bureaucracy (Putnam 1973, 264; Steinkemper 1974, 30; von Beyme 1974, 104; Dyson 1979, 105; Aberbach et al. 1981, 71) noted an unusually high percentage of non-career recruits, who moved into leading departmental positions from other societal sectors. In fact, immediately before coming to Bonn 40 per cent of the newly appointed State Secretaries (6) and 11,8 of the division heads (4) had been working in private enterprises (3), as judges or professors (3), as functionaries of an interest group (3) or in politics (1). Compared to the overall figures for 1949-1984 the percentages of external recruits in 1969/70 are above the average of 17,4 per cent (27) State Secretaries and 5,7 per cent (25) Ministerialdirektoren. These 20,4 per cent of the new appointments, who were unorthodoxly recruited during the first months of the Social-Liberal government, were attributed by many an observer to a lack of followers in the bureaucracy after the long absence of the SPD from central government since 1929. Compared to the recruitment pattern of the Christian-Liberal government of 1982, however, the fact that every fourth of the recruits

originated outside the public sector, appears rather to be normal for fundamental government changes even after only 13 years of uninterrupted rule. Actually in 1982/83, almost the same 20,7 per cent (12) were externally recruited, however mostly Ministerialdirektoren (8) vis à vis 4 State Secretaries. If one neglects the fact that 5 of the 12 external recruits had been party or parliamentary faction employees (1970: 1 member of parliament), the only difference between the two government transitions with respect to external recruitment is the absence of public and political criticism in 1982!

Twenty per cent external recruitment among the new entrants in both cases, nevertheless, does not mean that 80 per cent were drawn from lower ranks of the federal ministries (Tab. 6). 6,1 (3) and 10,3 (6) per cent came into office by pure rotation after 1969 and 1982, respectively, as we saw in the previous section.

Tab. 6
Modes of Recruitment of New Entrants

Mode \ period	10/69-6/70		10/82-6/83	
	n	%	n	%
external recruitment	10	20,4	12	20,7
pure rotation	3	6,1	6	10,3
promotion from ministerial rank	26	53,1	26	44,8
promotion from federal agency	1	2,0	3	5,2
recruitment from Land, local government	6	12,2	8	13,8
re-activation	2	4,1	1	1,7
missing values	1	2,0	2	3,4
total	49	100	58	100

Merely 53,1 and 44,8 per cent were recruited by promotion from the ranks of the ministries in both periods. While this holds only for every fifth State Secretary (3) in each case, this normal recruitment pattern of a career service could be observed with almost every second of the division heads during the formation of both new administrations; there were, however, 5 and 3 cases of jump-promotions after 1969 and 1982, respectively. Re-activation of formerly temporarily retired office holders was extremely seldom in both cases, as in general internal competition for appointment is high and candidates might have become too old meanwhile.

What probably confused insiders and observers in addition to the rate of external recruitment in 1969/1970 is the fact that of those who were recruited from the civil service, some, in particular Secretaries of State, were not promoted within the federal civil service, but stemmed from Länder or even local government. Again, with 13,8 compared to 12,2 per cent, the recruitment pattern of 1982 not only resembles that of 1969, as it did with respect to external recruitment, but also considerably exceeds the long-term average of 7,1 per cent recruitment from Länder and local government.

In pulling the yarns together, the mixed character of the German career civil service should have become clear against the background of these exceptional years of government transition. On the one hand, both new governments continued working with the majority of political civil servants; on the other hand, 47,5 per cent of new appointments within 9 months after taking over power in 1969 and 45,7 per cent of turnover in 1982/83 are

extraordinarily high, although remarkably similar, rates not only in the longitudinal German perspective, but also for a civil service system which is unanimously regarded as a career system in the FRG. Its potential for political control is obviously rooted in the differentia specifica of political civil servants: their being exposed to the risk of temporary retirement. In addition, normal and premature retirements create enough vacancies to streamline the bureaucracy by targeted recruitment, while reshuffling is rather a mechanism to purge lower ranks. Among the recruitment mechanisms, internal promotion, typical for career systems, was most important, thus completing the administrative elite, in turn, up to three-fourths with officials who had been socialized in the Bonn bureaucracy. The civil service reservoir is, however, enlarged by recruiting experts from Länder and local governments. External recruitment, often viewed as the counterpart of temporary retirement, is less typical for the system, although used more frequently in periods of transition than under conditions of stability. With regard to the particulars of both government changes and their personnel policy, it must be stated that they rather resemble one another. While temporary retirement was practised slightly more often in 1982/83 due to a lower rate of normal retirement and the chancellor's party having not been a coalition partner like the SPD was before 1969, the recruitment patterns of both new governments were astonishingly similar. Nevertheless, the public repercussions and private irritations of the personnel policies differed markedly in both cases: while after 1969 "party politicization" soon became a topic (Derlien 1985), after 1982 the application of the legal opportunities of

the German civil service code to their full range was obviously regarded as normal; at least commentators in German professional journals did not raise their finger in warning again.

So far, we have looked at flow data, abstracting from the stock of half the administrative elite who remained in office. How did the inflow of new personnel affect the overall composition of the administrative elite after things had settled?

IV. IMPACT ON ELITE COMPOSITION

Undoubtedly, the turnover evoked by the government changes of 1969 and 1982 was striking compared to normal fluctuation in the ministerial career service. Was the impact on the composition of the administrative elite in Bonn exceptional, too? Comparing the old civil service elite with the new composition resulting from personnel turnovers by the middle of the year after the government had changed, we arrive at the following results.

Professional Life

Regarding the last but one position from which office holders were recruited, the number of persons not promoted from lower ranks within the ministries increases after governments have changed, while the percentage of those having attained their position by internal promotion or reshuffling correspondingly falls (Tab. 7).

Tab. 7
Previous Position of Office Holders

point in time previous rank position	1949-1984		9/1969		6/1970		9/1982		6/1983	
	StS n	MD %	StS n	MD %	StS n	MD %	StS n	MD %	StS n	MD %
in ministry	91 59,9	338 86,0	14 51,9	71 92,2	9 36,0	72 85,7	21 87,5	93 89,4	13 54,2	82 81,2
outside ministry	61 40,1	55 14,0	13 48,1	6 7,8	16 64,0	12 14,3	3 12,5	11 10,6	11 45,8	19 18,8
total	152 100	393 100	27 100	77 100	25 100	84 100	24 100	104 100	24 100	101 100
missing values	3	43	-	9	-	4	-	-	-	3

Thus, the fact that only 59,2 per cent (1969/70) and 55,1 per cent (1982/83) of the new entrants (Tab. 6) came into office by internal horizontal or vertical mobility, clearly affected the overall composition of the respective elites nine months after government change. Tab. 7 reveals a difference between the two cases under scrutiny: the old elite of 1969 to a higher extent than in 1982 had not been drawn from the ranks of the ministerial bureaucracy, but, for instance, every second State Secretary had already come into office from federal agencies, Länder, local government, or other sectors, presumably due to the advent of the Social Democrats in government in 1966. Furthermore, it is obvious, that unorthodox recruitment in general and in the two specific periods is typical for State Secretaries, while Ministerialdirektoren before as well as after government changes are overwhelmingly drawn from the internal reservoir of candidates, however slightly less in 1983 than in 1970.

Tab. 8
Type of Career

Career \ point in time / rank	1949-1984		9/1969		6/1970		9/1982		6/1983	
	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
uninterrupted civil service career	74	177	13	31	9	37	14	40	14	43
	48,4	51,0	48,1	56,4	36,0	55,2	58,3	39,6	58,3	41,7
deferred entrance into civil service	12	78	3	12	2	12	3	36	3	32
	7,8	22,5	11,1	21,8	8,0	17,9	12,5	35,6	12,5	31,1
mixed external and internal career	67	90	10	12	14	17	7	23	7	26
	43,8	25,9	37,0	21,8	56,0	25,4	29,2	22,8	29,2	25,2
not in civil service before	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	2	-	2
	-	0,6	3,7			1,5		2,0		1,9
total	153	347	27	55	25	67	24	101	24	103
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
missing observations	2	15	-	23	-	21	-	2	-	1

When analyzing the entire professional life of the various administrative elites by classifying careers after education had been completed (Tab. 8), we again notice the distinctiveness of State Secretaries: overall they are more likely to reveal a mixed career, i.e. to have changed sectors and spent more than four years outside the civil service before entering. In longitudinal perspective their professional distance to the career civil service was never greater than in mid 1970, and mixed careers of State Secretaries existed more often even in the old elite of the grand coalition in 1969 than they did in 1983. On the other hand, the share of Ministerialdirektoren who have gone through a closed, uninterrupted civil service career has almost not been affected by the two government changes; it has, however, been declining since 1969, in particular between 1970 and 1982, while the percentage of those whose entrance into the civil service was deferred up to four years after finishing education has grown. Tab. 8 furthermore indicates that the conservative 1983 government relied more heavily on State Secretaries with an uninterrupted civil service career than the 1970 government did and that it has stopped the downward trend of Ministerialdirektoren with an orthodox career. Nevertheless, at the same time mixed careers within this subsample existed slightly more often in 1983 than they did in 1982 and not less frequently than in 1970. This is not the only trend of the 1970s that was reversed by the personnel policy of Chancellor Kohl's government in 1982 (Tab. 9). During the 1970s appointment age of both ranks of political civil servants decreased, but rose after October 1982, as did the average

Tab. 9

Age at and Professional Life before Appointment (averages)

Period	1949-1984	9/1969	6/1970	9/1982	6/1983
appointment age					
StS	52,9	53,9	50,9	49,7	52,6
MD	52,5	51,7	50,8	49,2	51,8
years in professional life before app.					
StS	25,5	25,0	22,8	21,6	24,1
MD	24,8	24,3	24,0	21,4	23,2

number of years the elite had spent in professional life before appointed. These effects were clearly brought about by opposite personnel policies: whereas the Social-Liberal 1969 government had replaced officials who were 54,9 (StS) and 51,9 years old on average, when they came into office, by appointees aging 50,0 and 49,6 years, respectively, the new appointees of the Conservative-Liberal 1982 government were 53,1 (StS) and 54,2 (MD) years old when taking over office from their ousted predecessors, whose appointment age was merely 48,3 and 48,4 years. In other words: the rejuvenation of the 1970 elite was induced by appointing people aged below average, while the increased average appointment age of 1983 was due to a policy of appointing State Secretaries almost as old and Ministerialdirektoren 3,5 years older than their colleagues in the old 1969 elite. Obviously, parts of the elite in 1983 had to wait for promotion under the old government and were relatively deprived compared to their predecessors, who were 2 to 3 years younger (some of them even when leaving office). Sympathizers with the Christian Democrats had to be remunerated and/or the principle of seniority was possibly strengthened when the new government took over power.

Political Generations

The increased age of the 1983 administration is all the more astonishing, since the appointment age had continuously^u decreased since 1962 (with Secretaries of State 54,5 years old) and 1966 (Division Heads 53,8 years old). Robert Putnam had already indicated that the development of a more political role understanding in 1970 could have been related to a change in generations (Putnam 1973, 283). When trying to structure the age composition according to political generations, assuming political socialization to take place between the age of 15 and 21 (Fogt 1982), we arrive at Tab. 10.

Tab. 10

Distribution of Political Generations (per cent)

period of birth and socialization		1966	9/69	6/70	1974	1978	9/82	6/83	1984
Revolution and Crisis 1899-1904	StS	32,0	11,1	4,0	-	-	-	-	-
	MD	24,6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Stable Weimar Rep. 1905-1910	StS	44,0	37,0	20,0	-	-	-	-	-
	MD	52,2	47,1	29,6	5,2	-	-	-	-
Weimar Republic in Crisis 1911-1916	StS	16,0	25,9	12,0	4,0	4,0	-	-	-
	MD	20,3	23,7	28,2	19,8	6,7	-	-	-
establish.National-Socialism 1917-1922	StS	8,0	26,9	40,0	23,0	19,0	16,8	12,6	8,0
	MD	-	14,0	16,8	21,9	20,2	14,6	19,4	14,7
World War II 1923-1928	StS	-	7,4	20,0	38,5	38,5	45,8	45,8	36,0
	MD	1,5	9,8	17,9	34,4	39,4	41,8	42,8	44,1
Postwar Reconstruction 1929-1934	StS	-	-	4,0	34,5	27,0	25,0	37,5	48,0
	MD	1,5	5,6	7,7	16,7	25,0	30,1	28,1	30,4
establish.Adenauer era 1935-	StS	-	-	-	-	11,5	12,6	4,2	8,0
	MD	-	-	-	2,0	8,7	13,7	10,7	10,8
n	StS	25	27	25	26	26		24	25
	MD	69	86	78	96	104		103	102

Following four-years-intervals since 1966 and separating the situation before and after the two government changes we can observe historically older generations leaving and younger generations entering the administrative elite. The oldest generation, which in 1966 had made up one third of the State Secretaries and a quarter of the Ministerialdirektoren, in fact disappeared in a

relatively short span of time; already under the grand coalition in 1969 there were no division heads left and only one State Secretary was in office in mid 1970. Within 9 months, also the percentage of those having been politically socialized during the stable period of the Weimar Republic dropped considerably to one fifth and one third of the elite during the government transition of 1969/70, almost disappearing by 1974. While the vintages 1905-1910 had been the backbone of the late grand coalition, in mid 1970 they were reduced to one third of the division heads side by side with another third politically socialized during the critical years of the Weimar Republic; but the State Secretaries of the early Social-Liberal government were even younger and mostly composed of people who were brought up during established National-Socialism. This 40 per cent of State Secretaries born in 1917-1922 together with those having collected political experience during the critical years of the Weimar Republic, however, is part of the only two political generations who due to Nazi and war decimations never reached as high percentages of a given elite as all the other generations did.

By September 1982, only every sixth official was brought up before the second world war; it is the World War II political generation who now put their stamp on the administrative elite, while the post-war generations have by now gradually arrived at only every fourth or third position. During the 1982/83 government transition, the replacement of the World War II generation appeared to be retarded: even in 1984 44,1 per cent of the Ministerialdirektoren belonged to this political generation, while the "white vintages" (1927 ff.), who were not drawn to military service during World War II, did not further expand on the level of division heads,

nor did the youngest generation. Most generally speaking, the 1969 government transition accelerated the replacement of those born in 1910 and before, whereas the 1982 government change postponed the expansion of post 1929 Ministerialdirektoren; for State Secretaries, however, the pattern deviates. Taking the median of the respective elite composition, in mid 1970 they were the spearhead of the approaching generation 1917-1922, relatively far ahead the division leaders; in mid 1983, however, their percentage of the next (1923-1928) generation stayed close to that of the Ministerialdirektoren, before declining in 1984. The relatively high appointment age of the Kohl administration indicates the overproportional appointment of State Secretaries politically socialized during the postwar reconstruction period. I had to treat this point in more detail, as the presumably changing role understanding of 1970 was, among other factors, related to the observation of rapid generation change, a point which is to be touched upon later on.

Social Background

Owing to the law of increasing disproportionality (Putnam 1976, 22) the politico-administrative elite in the FRG was, of course, never socially representative of the population (von Beyme 1974; 1971, 261). Politicians as well as top bureaucrats originate predominantly from civil service homes and the entrepreneurial class; nevertheless, the elected Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries of State reveal more often (19,6 per cent) labor class backgrounds than the appointed political civil servants with 5 per cent and less in the long run, nor are politicians as highly self-recruiting

from the civil service and particularly its higher grades (Tab. 11). Although it is hardly imaginable that government changes could have intentionally affected the social composition of the administrative elite, there are nevertheless concomitant shifts in its social structure. Civil service status heritage among State Secretaries was unusually frequent in both of the old elites, in 1969 and in 1982. While the new administration in 1970 had turned this overrepresentation into a fairly balanced relation between civil service and entrepreneurial offsprings, the government by mid 1983 had achieved an overrepresentation of entrepreneurial social origin of State Secretaries, while at the same time preserving the high civil service self-recruitment of the few documented Ministerialdirektoren, which had been characteristic for the old 1982 administration, too. The 55,6 per cent of State Secretaries from entrepreneurial homes in 1983 corresponds to an exceptionally high 54,8 per cent of the politicians with the same social background. During the grand coalition in 1969 entrepreneurial origin of politicians was almost as high (54,2 per cent), but it was not as well atuned to the 60,9 per cent of State Secretaries with civil service background.

Tab. 11

Social Background of Administrative Elite (per cent)

point in time occup. of father	1949-1984			9/1969		6/1970		9/1982		6/1983	
	Politi- cians	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD
laborer	19,6	3,9	5,0	0,0	3,0	4,8	6,5	5,9	11,5	0,0	11,8
entrepreneur/ leading empl. functionary	37,7	42,9	39,0	39,1	42,4	42,8	45,2	29,4	19,2	55,6	17,6
civil servant	4,3	1,9	2,5	0,0	0,0	4,8	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,9
(higher c.s.:	34,1	47,5	49,1	60,9	48,5	42,8	41,9	58,8	69,2	38,9	64,7
other	21,0	41,7	45,8	47,8	42,4	28,6	35,5	35,3	57,7	27,8	52,9
	4,3	2,9	4,2	0,0	6,1	4,8	3,2	5,9	0,0	5,6	0,0
n	138	103	118	23	33	21	31	17	26	18	17

Religious Confession

A similar shift can be observed with respect to religious confession. In general politicians are for obvious reasons more representative than civil servants in this respect, too. However, while the Social-Liberal cabinets were overwhelmingly Protestant and even during the grand coalition in 1969, 61,1 per cent of the ministers belonged to this confession, Chancellor Kohl's cabinet displays a rather balanced composition with 52,9 (Ministers) and 51,2 (Parliamentary StS) per cent Catholics. Interestingly, these changing proportions spread to the administrative elite, whose majority in the long run was Protestant with 68 per cent of the State Secretaries compared to 55,1 per cent of the division heads. After 1969, Protestantism among the former grew to 85,7 in 1970 and 83,3 per cent in the last Social-Liberal administration, while the Ministerialdirektoren became increasingly Protestant from September 1969 (37,5 per cent) amounting to 62,2 per cent in 1982. Again a trend had been stopped by the conservative government taking over in 1982. Now Protestantism in both civil service groups sank below average and even into a minority position. By some miraculous elective affinity the Kohl government managed to match the 52,9 per cent of catholic ministers to exactly the same percentage among the State Secretaries.

Education

The educational level attained is higher among top civil servants than among politicians. While the percentage of university graduates among the politicians who were in office between 1949 and 1984 still amounts to 73,9 (Ministers) and 66,7 (PStS) per cent,

typically for top career civil servants 93,5 (StS) and 98,0 per cent (MD) have achieved a university degree; 67,1 and 65,8 per cent, respectively, were even awarded a doctor's degree. Whereas university training is a stable trait over time, the portion of dissertations by State Secretaries has fallen since the grand coalition (70,4 per cent) to 68 (6/1970) to 66,7 (9/1982) and even 50 per cent in mid 1983, when with 63,1 per cent the Ministerialdirektoren had almost regained their 66,2 per cent of doctoral theses of 1969 after having dropped slightly to 58,5 (6/1970) and 59,6 per cent (9/1982).

More subject to variation is the content of university training (Tab. 12).

Tab. 12
Subject Studied (per cent)

point in time subject	1949-1984		9/1969		6/1970		9/1982		6/1983	
	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD	StS	MD
law	60,0	64,2	63,0	73,1	45,8	66,7	66,7	64,1	75,0	62,1
economics	16,7	11,3	18,5	9,0	25,0	11,5	12,5	15,5	12,5	17,5
natural science	11,9	13,9	11,1	13,5	20,8	12,9	12,5	13,6	4,2	13,6
liberal arts, social scien.	8,1	8,3	3,7	1,5	0,0	5,2	4,2	5,8	8,4	4,9
no higher education	3,3	2,3	3,7	3,0	8,3	3,8	4,2	1,0	0,0	1,9
n	150	372	27	67	24	78	24	103	24	103

Law, the traditional curriculum for the German senior civil service, has lost some of its attractiveness for division heads since 1969; a parallel trend with State Secretaries did not develop, after education in law had sharply fallen by mid 1970, but regained importance in the last social liberal administration and rose to an unprecedented 75 per cent in 1983. Economists, natural scientists,

and two State Secretaries without university education compensated for the loss of jurists in 1970. This somewhat deviant qualification structure was, however, levelled out by the end of the third Schmidt government. With the Ministerialdirektoren, nevertheless, training in economics has gradually mushroomed into the monopoly of jurists.

Party Membership

As might have been expected, the most obvious effect of a change in government is on party political composition (Tab. 13). While we gained data from documents for 50 per cent of the Secretaries of State, the results for division heads are meager; it must be assumed that the actual portion of party members among them is higher than tab. 13 indicates (Derlien 1985).⁸⁾ Nevertheless, it can be stated that parallel to the changing party political composition of government also the overt party political structure of the civil service elite was altered as a result of purging and restaffing the respective positions. While in 1969 during the grand coalition both parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, had their followers in particular among the State Secretaries, the CDU/CSU members of this group disappeared within half a year, whereas the number of members of the now ruling SPD/FDP coalition among the State Secretaries increased. The same pattern can be found for 1982/83. While State Secretaries belonging to the former government party in each case were totally ousted, Ministerialdirektoren occasionally managed to survive politically.

Tab. 13
Party Membership

party	point in time	1949-1984	9/1969	6/1970	9/1982	6/1983
	rank					
CDU/CSU	StS	21	5	-	-	5
	MD	17	7	3	2	5
SPD	StS	29	7	11	8	-
	MD	26	6	11	16	7
FDP (liberal)	StS	9	1	5	1	-
	MD	11	2	1	5	3
explicit- ly none	StS	15	2	1	9	9
	MD	4	2	3	2	2
total	StS	74	15	17	18	14
	MD	58	17	18	25	10

As public discussion about party-politicization hypothesized a relationship between external recruitment and party membership, we tested this relationship but did not find any significant statistical association between a specific party and mode of recruitment, controlling for rank and period. Only when differentiating more roughly between party members and non-party members irrespective of a specific party, is there a slight statistical relationship for State Secretaries only between mode of recruitment (external vs. internal) and party membership (contingency coefficient 0.16). If not already by 1969, at least by 1982, the chancellor and his cabinet taking over political power obviously faced a large enough internal reservoir of sympathizers and even party members they were able to select for politically sensitive positions. Almost more important than the number of party memberships is the percentage of those explicitly declaring themselves not to be members of a party and an estimated 50 per cent of Ministerialdirektoren, who made their way without acquiring a party book

As a matter of course, in particular those State Secretaries, who publicly document their party affiliation, cannot assume they will be kept in office when the government of another party takes over the administration and looks for aides who are "in permanent consensus with the government's policy goals", as the civil service statute supposes political civil servants to be.

In trying to synthesize the repercussions both government transitions and their personnel policy strategies - partly unintentionally - effected, one can probably maintain that in both cases the composition of the administration was altered without changing the traditional features of the ministerial bureaucracy. Most obviously and intentionally in both cases purges and appointments produced a congruency of party membership of top executives with their political masters; probably as an unforeseen consequence religious confession adjusted to that of the politicians, as well. Furthermore, due to external recruitment, which was equally important in 1969 and in 1982, the professional structure of the samples was slightly altered for a transitory period. The cases differed, however, in other respects.

During the Social-Liberal coalition the civil service elite turned considerably younger and personnel policy accelerated the generation change. We also recognized a tendency to recruit more economists. Finally the 1970 administration tended rather to have members of mixed, external and internal career elements. This, however, could not alter the basic characteristics of the federal bureaucracy: predominantly juridical training and uninterrupted internal administrative careers.

In 1983 , the government composed of a rather old civil service elite, which slightly retarded generational change, had strengthened the tendency of the last Schmidt government to appoint preferably jurists, and in addition changed the character of the administrative elite by emphasizing the classical civil servant's uninterrupted internal career pattern.

V. CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated how the personnel policy measures available in the German civil service were applied after the two major changes in government the Federal Republic experienced in 1969 and 1982. The loopholes of the otherwise closed career system, external recruitment and temporary retirement, were used for selective recruitment and purgation of the administrative elite to an extent that is unknown in normal periods. Temporary retirement, furthermore, is quantitatively more important than non-career recruitment, in particular as new governments can draw loyal experts from their reservoir in Länder and local governments. Taking into account that some of those leaving Bonn after a government change, return to the Länder administration, one could say that vertical circulation of the administrative elite is even more important than horizontal circulation among different elite sectors in society.

Furthermore, it was shown what kind of effect personnel policy measures of new governments had. The administrative elite in Bonn, although distinctly different from their political masters in a number of respects, tends to become more similar to the

political elite with respect to training, religious confession and above all: political party membership. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind, that the two top ranks under investigation are quantitatively small and that even among these top administrators normal internal careers without open party allegiance characterize the majority of cases. In returning to the problem of conscious involvement of career civil servants in politics, a phenomenon empirically demonstrated for parts of the Bonn elite after the 1969 government change, the question arises if this phenomenon persisted in the 1970s and could still be observed in the 1980s. Assuming that the conscious involvement in politics, assuming that the "political bureaucrat" of Image III or even Image IV (Aberbach et al. 1981) evolved beside the "classical bureaucrat" after 1969, how could we explain this development and what are the prospects for the late 1980s? The generation change as such would hardly explain the new attitudes, because it brought into office a majority of people whom one would not expect to display a "democratic" role understanding, since their political socialization took place in darker years of German history, if it was not this very experience which served as a negative political frame of reference and helped to develop a more liberal role understanding. In any case, inferring role understanding from political generations would imply that the "political bureaucrat" had further spread in the recent administration. Putnam (1973, 283) furthermore suggested an age effect: "The younger the official, regardless

of party sympathies, the less likely he is to display the characteristics of a classical bureaucrat". This statement, however, refers to a sample completely different from ours: Putnam interviewed 37 Ministerialdirektoren only, while the majority of his cases were subdivision heads and "high-fliers". The State Secretaries in 1970, although younger than in 1983, would have been likely to hold a more traditional self-conception.

Thirdly, it could have been caused by a periodization effect, produced by the circumstances of the 1969 government change. Our findings, in fact, could be interpreted to substantiate this thesis: process and (to a lesser extent) impact of government change were remarkable. Even more outstanding, however, was the ferocity of public discussion about the 1969/70 personnel policy! It would probably not be absurd to attribute the 1970 findings to a certain extent rather to the public repercussions of personnel policy than to the actual impact, which most actors could hardly recognize objectively. If this had been the case, we would expect a less politicizing effect of the 1982 government transition, because bureaucrats had had their historical experience with government transitions (Lowery/Rusbult 1986, 52). The political role understanding of 1970 could, in addition, be a periodization effect in the sense that the Zeitgeist calling for democratization had evoked it. Views of the world just as government programs drastically changed by the early 1980s. Could problems of governability, fiscal crisis, terrorism, and a policy of withdrawal of the state from society have led to a resurrection of the classical bureaucrat? Whatever might be true, it should have become clear that at least politicians

are conscious of the political function the civil service elite plays and tailor their domination patronage accordingly within the limits the system sets. They do so not in order to bring about a specific role understanding, but to enforce commitment to their policy.

Footnotes

This article grew out of a research project, which is investigating social backgrounds and careers of the entire federal politico-administrative elite in office between 1949 and 1984. The project is financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and assisted by a grant from the University of Bamberg. For help in analyzing the data at a relatively early stage of the project I should like to thank Wolfgang Müller und Gerhard Pippig.

- 1) The cabinet, however, deals normally barely with the two highest ranks, often without discussion.
- 2) See Bundestags-Drucksache 9/933
- 3) In addition positions from grade A16 (Ministerialrat) upwards in the "services": foreign office, espionage and home intelligence.
- 4) In the research project another 119 division heads are analyzed who did not have the status of a political civil servant, but were Ministerialdirigenten and occasionally employees. For the sake of comparability they are excluded here together with another 38 Inspectors General of the Bundeswehr in the Defense Ministry.
- 5) Percentages of Parliamentary State Secretaries are higher, because the number of positions to be filled increased considerably in these very periods under consideration.

- 6) See Bundestags-Drucksache 6/107, p.1; steno.Bericht Bundestag 9, p. 7474 ff.
- 7) There were some cases in which federal civil servants immediately moved into Länder administrations, as happened in October 1982 when 3 State Secretaries took over positions in North Rhine-Westfalia. Without knowledge of the personnel files it is impossible to tell if they resigned in Bonn or were fired; these cases were classified as temporary retirements.
- 8) I should, however, prefer (as a methodological device) to stick to Wittgenstein's imperative: what we cannot speak of, we must be silent on.

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