

## THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER DIRECT ELECTIONS: A SIMULATION STUDY \*

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### ABSTRACT

This article presents an overview of a project designed to simulate the distribution of seats in the European Parliament after the first direct elections in 1978. First, the data base and some basic assumptions are described which pertain to electoral systems, voter behavior, and realignments in party systems. Some illustrative results of simulation runs are summarized which proceed from voter preferences as expressed in the most recent national general elections in the nine member countries of the European Community. These findings are analyzed for individual parties and parliamentary fractions as well as with the chances for forming majority coalitions in mind. Finally, the effects of some likely shifts in voting patterns are considered assuming that current national electoral systems will be applied in 1978.

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### Introduction

The focus of this article is on the distribution of seats in the first directly elected European Parliament among individual parties from the nine member countries of the European Community within predetermined national representations. This distribution is simulated from a number of assumptions about electoral systems, voter preferences, and

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realignments among national parties. We do not aim to predict which electoral system is likely to be applied in the first direct election of Spring 1978 or in subsequent elections. Neither do we want to forecast distributions in the popular vote or changes in voters' preferences or national party systems resulting from the political context of the direct election.

If one is willing to assume a specific distribution of votes and a specific procedure for translating votes into seats, it becomes possible to derive the resulting distribution of seats analytically and without a margin of error. Uncertainty thus pertains only to assumptions. The utility of such an enterprise for practical purposes accordingly depends upon whether the set of assumptions includes the most plausible and relevant ones

Earlier attempts to simulate the composition of the European Parliament after the first direct elections (Rose, 1975; Vido, 1975) were handicapped by the lack of information on the final total number of members in the new Parliament as well as on the number of seats accruing to each of the nine nations. Now this controversial issue has been settled by the agreement made between the nine in the Summer of 1976, the major obstacle to a study such as ours was removed. We therefore present an investigation of the distribution of seats in the European Parliament after the direct election which proceeds from the national representations as they are given in Table I [1].

This article will now summarize our study in three sections. The first section deals with the raw data. The second section presents an overview of our assumptions on electoral systems, changes in voter preferences, and conceivable alliances among parties. In the final section we

TABLE I

Composition of the European Parliament

Country	Seats prior to 1978	Seats after 1978	Population per Seat
Belgium	14	24	408,000
Denmark	10	16	317,000
Germany	36	81	763,000
France	36	81	651,000
Great Britain	36	81	693,000
Ireland	10	15	208,000
Italy	36	81	689,000
Luxembourg	6	6	60,000
Netherlands	14	25	564,000
Total	198	410	Mean 635,000

will selectively illustrate the kind of substantial findings produced by our simulation.

### The Data

The distribution of seats in the European Parliament was to be simulated on the basis of the results of the most recent national general election in each member country. As one of the electoral systems to be simulated was the plurality formula in single member constituencies, outcomes of recent national general elections had to be collected at a level of aggregation which permitted their conversion into a number of single member constituencies corresponding to the number of seats in the European Parliament allotted to each member nation. Available compilations of electoral statistics (Rokkan and Meyriat, 1969; Mackie and Rose, 1974) were thus inadequate for our purposes as they present election results only at the national level. Accordingly we had to collect the data required ourselves. The dates of the national elections from which our data base is drawn are given in Table II.

For those countries where the electoral laws allow the individual voter to cast more than one vote or — as in the case of France — require more than one voting act, we had to face the additional problem of deciding on the set of data to be used. For the Federal Republic of Germany the second votes (“Zweitstimmen”) were most appropriate because these votes exclusively determine the distribution of seats in the Bundestag among parties. In 1976 the electorate was well aware of this fact, and generally there was little split-ticket voting. French voting patterns in the second ballot can be analysed only within the national electoral system and within the present apportionment of constituencies so that

TABLE II  
Dates of Recent Elections in Nations of the European Community

Country	Date
Belgium	March 10, 1974
Denmark	January 9, 1975
Germany	October 3, 1976
France	March 4 and 11, 1973
Great Britain	October 10, 1974
Ireland	February 28, 1973
Italy	June 20, 1976
Luxembourg	May 26, 1974
Netherlands	November 29, 1972

we had to take the distribution of votes in the first ballot as our raw data. In the case of Ireland the same set of reasons applies. Only the Irish electoral law allows the indication of second, third, etc. preferences, and these preferences cannot be combined for regional units other than the original ones.

The electoral law of Luxembourg allows each voter to cast the same number of votes as there are seats to be allocated in each respective constituency. As the number of seats varies among constituencies we have a problem not of selection but of transformation. Assuming that in the election to the European Parliament each voter would have only one vote to cast we applied a weighting procedure by dividing the number of votes obtained by each party in each constituency by the average number of votes per ballot in this constituency.

For all countries except Italy data were available for regional sub-units small enough to permit the construction of single member constituencies in order to simulate a plurality formula. The smallest unit for which outcomes from the June 1976 election in Italy were available, however, were 94 provinces some of which by far exceeded the average size of the 81 constituencies which had to be apportioned. In order to create these 81 constituencies we had to resort to an approximation whenever necessary. Whenever a province had to be regionally subdivided, we split up the votes obtained by each party in this province according to the distribution of the party's votes in the elections to the Senate of 1972, for which results for smaller units are available. This approximation does *not* assume a relationship between voting patterns or even shares of votes in the elections to the Senate of 1972 and the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of 1976. It only requires that the votes obtained by each party in one election and in one province be distributed among the sub-regions of this province in accordance with the votes won in this province in the other election – regardless of relative vote shares in both elections. This, of course, is a testable assumption, and we have tested it with positive results at a higher level of aggregation for which complete data from both elections were available.

### Assumptions

Electoral systems, distributions of votes and their changes, and party configurations are our independent variables. Our simulation was based upon a series of assumptions on each of these variables, and the following sub-sections contain a summary of these assumptions.

## ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

All in all the effects of four different electoral systems were simulated: plurality in single member constituencies and proportional representation for all nine members of the European Community, for each nation the system adopted for its national parliamentary elections, and, finally, proportional representation at a regional level for Germany and Britain. Current national election systems were added to the former two systems as the first direct election in 1978 will be governed by electoral laws passed by each individual state which will probably adopt the major features of current national electoral systems. Proportional representation at the regional level is only simulated for Britain and Germany since these are the only countries where this kind of provision is being discussed – apart, of course, from those countries like Belgium, Ireland, and Italy where this kind of system is currently in use.

The system of plurality in single member constituencies does not by itself permit the translation of a given popular vote into a distribution of seats among the competing parties. Given a specific popular vote different apportionments of constituencies may produce variations in the distribution of seats. In order to grasp the partisan effects of different ways of setting up constituencies we assembled these constituencies in three ways. First, only geographical and demographic criteria were applied, and no deliberate partisan bias was introduced. Then constituencies were designed with the explicit aim of favouring either the major left wing or the major right wing party in each nation.

Proportional representation at the national level was simulated with six variants: Two electoral formulae (the d'Hondt method of highest averages and the electoral quotient method with surplus seats being distributed according to the method of largest remainders), each combined with three barrier clauses (0, 5, and 10 percent).

Five of the nine members of the European Community currently employ electoral systems which cannot be regarded as simple plurality or proportional representation. Three of these countries – Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg – apply proportional representation at the regional level. Belgian plans for redistricting for the direct election for the European Parliament are already known and we adopted them for our simulation. For Italy and Luxembourg, on the other hand, we have to remember that the effects of proportional representation at the sub-national level can only be preserved if the average size of constituencies is not significantly changed when applying this system to the lower number of seats in the European Parliament. This consideration implies that the sub-national apportionment of seats has to be abandoned in

the case of Luxembourg. For Italy, a similar straightforward solution is not available so that in the absence of some information on what the Italians are planning to do we decided to divide the country into constituencies in three different ways, varying their size as well as number.

France and Ireland currently have electoral systems which posed particularly severe obstacles to adaptation for the purposes of our simulation. In both cases one can use only part of the original data — first preferences in Ireland, the first ballot in France — as the remainder cannot be meaningfully interpreted in regional units different from the original constituencies. If we have to neglect part of the original data the only way out is to ascertain whether the overall effect of the national electoral system can be approximated by some alternative algorithm being applied to that subset of the data which can be utilized for our new constituencies too. In order to find such an approximation it is necessary to study historically how the national electoral systems of France and Ireland have translated that part of the votes we can use into seats. This was done with the result that the Irish election system can be approximated very closely by a proportional representation formula applied solely to first preferences. For France, we established and verified a simple decision rule to the effect that if we divide the French parties into bourgeois and leftist parties the candidate receiving the most votes within the stronger of the two groups of parties in the first ballot will be elected [2].

#### SHIFTS IN VOTER PREFERENCES

Shifts in voter preferences may be classified according to their extent, their direction, and the number of parties involved. Each swing between parties or groups of parties was simulated with three levels of intensity, i.e. with 2, 4, and 7 percent of the electorate shifting their preference either way. If one or both sides in such a process consisted of a group of parties, losses and gains were divided among the parties in this group according to their vote share within this group. For all nine nations, swings of the magnitude of 7 percent away from the result of the most recent national elections represent a rather extreme assumption, as empirically observed inter-election swings over the last two decades are way below this figure. Swings of 7 percent were nevertheless included in the analysis to take into account the fact that the context of the first direct election to the European Parliament might be drastically different from that of national parliamentary elections.

Depending upon party system, in our analysis swings were assumed to occur either between parties or between groups of parties. In two- or

three-party systems, i.e. Britain, Germany, and Ireland, swing between two parties is logically possible in six directions, all of which were simulated. In multi-party systems – which characterize the other six nations – four groups of parties were assembled along a left–right continuum, two groups on the left and two on the right. Appendix 2 shows into which group each party in each country was classified [3]. In multi-party systems only swings between left and right parties or groups of parties were simulated. For all variants of proportional representation this leaves eight directions of swing to be considered, as is illustrated in Table III.

As we shall see below, present party systems cannot be expected to survive if a plurality system is introduced. In that case we would expect the parties classified as "left" and "left centre" to join into one leftist block, and the parties classified as "right" and "centre right" to join and form a rightist block. Accordingly, only two directions of swing remain to be considered, i.e. from the left to the right and vice versa.

#### REALIGNMENTS IN NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS

For the direct election to the European Parliament, changes in national party systems have to be expected for two different sets of reasons. On the one hand, the reduced number of seats available to each nation compared to national legislatures will diminish the chances of smaller parties obtaining seats in the European Parliament. Regardless of electoral system, this will force the smaller parties to seek pre-election alliances with other parties of a similar ideological background. Therefore, we performed all simulation runs with and without such alliances for all those parties which by themselves failed to win at least one seat and for which a suitable partner could be found. It should be

TABLE III  
Directions of Swing Simulated for Multi-Party Systems

	Left	Left Centre	Centre-Right	Right
(1)	-			+
(2)		-		+
(3)	-		+	
(4)		-	+	
(5)		+	-	
(6)		+		-
(7)	+		-	
(8)	+			-

noted, incidentally that this kind of alliance can occur even without a formal agreement among parties if voters — facing the danger of wasting their votes — prefer to cast their votes in favour of ideologically related parties with a better chance of electoral success.

On the other hand, a plurality formula requires this kind of pre-election alliance not in order to secure “survival” in the European Parliament but in order to maximize the share of seats won by ideologically related parties. If all sides in the game behave according to this maxim, two blocks will crystallize. Whenever an unambiguous left–right continuum is encountered in a multi-party system a clear dividing line between the leftist and the rightist block can be drawn. In the two- or three-party systems of Britain, Germany, and Ireland such a prominent dividing line does not exist, and temporarily shifting alliances are conceivable. For these nations we therefore analysed two variants of block formation under a plurality system, i.e. the smaller parties — Liberals in Britain, Free Democrats in Germany, and Labour in Ireland — joining one of the two leading parties. These simulation results also grasp the two extreme situations which might occur in these three countries if the smaller parties’ voters deserted them in the absence of formal agreements.

### Some Illustrative Results

Combining the assumptions discussed in the previous sections — conceivably differentiating assumptions between individual nations — leads to an extraordinarily high number of possible distributions of seats in the European Parliament as a whole. Because of the diversity of individual results, a complete and rigorous evaluation of the effects of changes in a single assumption is obviously impossible. What we can do within space constraints is to provide an overview of how the application of different electoral systems affects the composition of the European Parliament when voter preferences in all countries of the European Community remain similar to those expressed in the most recent national parliamentary elections. Moreover, we want to look at the composition of the European Parliament assuming a number of shifts in voter preferences which now appear quite plausible.

A system of proportional representation would all in all bring 62 parties into the European Parliament. Their number would be reduced to 40 by a barrier clause of 5 percent. In Germany the right wing National Democrats, six French parties, two British, five Italian, and eight parties from the Netherlands would be affected. A barrier clause



of 5 percent would bring the number of deputies not belonging to any parliamentary fraction down to about a dozen whereas the relative position of the socialist fraction would improve.

The effects of pre-election alliances are harder to assess. Main beneficiaries would be the French Gaullists, and thus the fraction of European Democrats for Progress and the Communist parties. Both fractions could gain between five and eight seats at the expense of the Christian Democratic and particularly the Liberal fraction.

Because of British resistance to proportional representation, it is conceivable that in 1978 the traditional plurality formula would be applied in Britain whereas all other countries of the European Community would adopt one or the other variant of proportional representation. This, of course, would mortally wound the British Liberals who could not win a single seat; the British Conservatives would benefit only a little, whereas Labour could contribute an additional thirteen seats to the Socialist fraction.

It is highly likely that the first direct elections to the European Parliament will in each country be held under provisions similar to those governing national parliamentary elections. As these are variants of proportional representation in all countries save Britain and France, we have to focus upon these countries when we want to compare this parliament with one resulting from a universal application of proportional representation. The British plurality system would eliminate the Liberal Party from the European Parliament. The Liberal fraction would furthermore be hurt by the gains vis-à-vis proportional representation which the French Gaullists could expect from the French national electoral system. All in all the Socialist, the Christian Democratic, the Communist, and the European Conservative fractions would hardly be affected, but due to the Gaullists' victory the European Democrats for Progress would become the third largest fraction and the Liberal fraction would decline from this rank to that of the smallest one in the European Parliament.

With a plurality system the number of parties represented in the European Parliament would drop below thirty, and if voting blocks were formed it would even fall below twenty. The fractions of the European Conservatives and the European Democrats for Progress – largely composed of British, French, and Irish members – would obtain roughly the same number of seats as with the application of national electoral systems. In France the Liberal parties would suffer significantly, and they would be eliminated in Britain and Germany. The Liberal fraction, which under proportional representation would be the third largest fraction in the European Parliament, could not count upon

winning fifteen seats, which currently is the minimum number for establishing an independent fraction. This decline of the Liberals would benefit the British Labour Party and the Italian and German Christian Democrats. The most drastic increases, however, would be those of the Communists in Italy and France whereby the Communist fraction would grow to be the third largest fraction in the European Parliament.

If one assumes that a plurality formula would lead to a concentration of voters and parties the distribution of seats in the European Parliament *crucially depends upon the behaviour of former Liberal voters in the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain.* If these voters predominantly switched their preference to the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives the Socialist fraction would be weakened in Germany and Britain to the extent of having to give up its first place to the Christian Democratic fraction. There could even be a real danger of the Socialists obtaining less seats than the Communist fraction. If, on the other hand, former Liberal voters predominantly shifted their preferences to left-centre parties the Socialist fraction could obtain a dominating position in the European Parliament. The Christian Democratic fraction would suffer heavily from the losses of the CDU in Germany. The worst fate could befall the British Conservatives who could not be sure of getting enough seats to establish a parliamentary fraction of their own.

With a plurality system the most spectacular winner would be the Communist fraction, and especially so if the Italian Communists succeeded in attracting voters from the other Italian leftist parties. Such a process of unification on the left in Italy could cost the Christian Democrats there from 10 to 20 seats. Similarly notable changes in the distribution of seats can be observed for most countries of the Community when proceeding from proportional representation to a plurality system and on to a plurality system with pre-election formation of voting blocks. In the Federal Republic, for instance, the CDU/CSU would under proportional representation win 39 seats, the Social Democrats would win 35 and the Free Democrats 7 seats. With a plurality system the Christian Democrats would take 48 seats and the remaining 33 would go to the SPD. Assuming now that former voters of the Free Democrats would rather shift their vote than cast it for a party without any chance of winning a single seat we have from 30 to 60 seats for the Christian Democrats depending upon the assumptions which we wish to make on the behaviour of those formerly Liberal voters.

Let us now turn to the shares of seats of the present six parliamentary fractions and to the chances for establishing majority coalitions. With

voter preferences remaining unchanged the Socialist fraction would be the largest fraction in the European Parliament with the Christian Democrats ranking second with about 20 seats less. A plurality system in Great Britain combined with proportional representation in all other countries of the Community would guarantee a maximum of seats to the Socialist fraction and at the same time the widest gap in the number of seats between the Socialist and Christian Democratic fractions. Under a system of proportional representation the European Conservatives or the European Democrats for Progress would be the smallest fraction, if national electoral systems are adopted they will be replaced in that role by the Liberals. Generally speaking, the Liberal fraction is the one which can be the most severely hurt in the long run by the decision concerning which electoral system to adopt for direct elections to the European Parliament. National electoral systems could hurt it a lot, and a plurality system would be lethal. The only hope for the Liberals lies in proportional representation.

The only majority coalition which consists of only two fractions and seems to be consistently possible is that of the Socialist and Christian Democratic fractions. Only if, under a system of plurality, most formerly Liberal voters shifted to centre-right parties might this coalition not win a majority. In Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands this liaison would amount to a "grand coalition" of the major bourgeois and social democratic parties, so that this coalition is not very probable.

The second majority coalition which is possible with voter preferences remaining unchanged is that of the Christian Democrats with all the other non-Socialist fractions taken together, i.e. Liberals, European Conservatives, and European Democrats for Progress. This coalition could expect to win a majority only under national electoral systems or with proportional representation. If all countries were to adopt proportional representation with only Great Britain sticking to its plurality system or if with a universal plurality system a large share of formerly Liberal votes were to switch to left-centre parties, these four fractions together could not muster a majority in the European Parliament. This coalition would comprise more than two dozen parties from all nations of the Community with the common denominator of not being Social Democrat or Communist.

The probability of a popular front of Socialists and Communists winning a majority in the European Parliament is very low if voter preferences remain unchanged. Only if a plurality system were established and most formerly Liberal voters in Britain and Germany were to cast their votes in favour of a leftist block could this kind of coalition

TABLE IV  
The European Parliament in 1978 After Plausible Shifts in Voter Preferences

Countries	Parties								Total
	Left		Left Centre		Centre-Right			Right	
Belgium			PSB 7	WR/FDF 2	PSC 9	VU 2		PLB 4	24
Denmark	KP 2		SOZDEM 7	RADV 1	VENSTRE 4			FREM 2	16
Germany			SPD 35	FDP 7	CDU 39				81
France	PCF 17		PS 31		REF 1	RI 7	CDP 1	UDR 24	81
Great Britain			LAB 35	SDLP 1	CONS 41	SNP 2		UUUC 2	81
Ireland			LAB 2		FF 8	FG 5			15
Italy	PCI 32	DP 1	PSI 6	PSDI 1	PRI 1	DC 36	PLI 1	MSI 3	81
Luxembourg			OSL 2	SPL 1	CSL 2			DEM 1	6

Netherlands	CPN	PPR	PVDA	D 66	DS 70	KVP	VVD	AR	CHU	SGP	GPV	BP	25
	1	1	7	1	1	4	4	2	1	1	1	1	
Total	54		148			169			39		410		

FRACTIONS

Countries	Socialists	Christian Democrats	Liberals	European Conservatives	European Democrats for Progress	Communists	Others	Total
Belgium	7	11	4				2	24
Denmark	7		5		2	2		16
Germany	35	39	7					81
France	31	1	8		24	17		81
Great Britain	35			41			5	81
Ireland	2	5			8			15
Italy	7	36	2			32	4	81
Luxembourg	3	2	1					6
Netherlands	7	7	4			1	6	25
Total	134	101	31	41	34	52	17	410

For abbreviations see Appendix 1.

win a majority. With a universal plurality system or with the present national electoral systems a popular front could not count upon a majority even if it were to be augmented by the Liberal fraction. Under proportional representation such a coalition of Socialists, Communists, and Liberals would have a majority but because of the composition of the Socialist and the Liberal fractions this coalition does not seem to be very likely.

To sum up, we can say that establishing permanent and coherent majority coalitions in the European Parliament after the first direct elections will be very hard indeed if voter preferences remain roughly similar to those recorded in recent national parliamentary elections. It is therefore inappropriate to argue in favour or against specific electoral systems with the resulting opportunities for the formation of majority coalitions in mind. The present impossibility of establishing stable majority coalitions will transcend the direct elections if there are no major changes in voting patterns.

Finally, let us turn briefly to one of the numerous possible distributions of seats in the European Parliament which result from shifts in voter preferences. The distribution of seats we present is the one which, based upon current information and events, we would call the most probable after the first direct election. The following flows of voters between parties or groups of parties have been assumed for this particular case in each country: The distribution of votes in Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany is expected to remain similar to the most recent national parliamentary elections. In Belgium, we expect the centre-right parties to win two percent of the vote from left-centre parties. In Denmark, the centre-right parties are assumed to lose four percent of the popular vote to parties of the left centre, and in particular to the Social Democrats. The French electorate is expected to shift four percent of its vote from the Gaullist to the Socialist party. For Britain it seems reasonable to assume the Conservative party's vote share will grow by four percent at the expense of Labour. In Italy, finally, it seems conceivable that the left, especially the Communist party, will gain another two percent of the popular vote from the Democrazia Cristiana. Applying national electoral systems to these voting patterns leads to the distribution of seats among the parties and fractions in the European Parliament which is shown in Table IV.

Compared to actual distributions of votes in recent national elections we have to expect a moderate growth of the Socialist fraction due to over-compensation of British Labour losses by gains of the French Socialists. For the fractions of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals practically no changes occur. The Communist fraction will gain in

strength in Italy and – to a lesser degree – in France, whereas the British Conservative party will add its additional seats to its own fraction. If we are not mistaken the most prominent loser of the first direct elections will be the fraction of European Democrats for Progress which is dominated by the French Gaullists.

The opportunities for the formation of majority coalitions in this parliament are basically the same as have been discussed above for unchanged voting patterns. All in all, two majority coalitions are conceivable: A "grand coalition" between Socialists and Christian Democrats, and a popular front supported by the Liberal fraction. A "bourgeois" block composed of the four non-Socialist and non-Communist fractions would have exactly one half of the 410 seats and therefore have to look for additional support elsewhere.

Some of the assumptions leading to the distribution of seats in Table IV may be questionable upon closer examination. We take it for granted, however, that the first direct election to the European Parliament will bring no spectacular landslides either way. If we scale the distribution of seats in the present European Parliament from 198 seats to the new total of 410 seats and compare it to our prediction in Table IV we detect only one major difference: The Communist fraction will gain 19 seats, and a similar number of seats will be lost by the Liberal fraction. This finding is not as surprising as might seem at first glance as one might argue that the final agreement on the direct election would not have been reached if its results had been thought likely to depart radically from present national or partisan weights within the European Parliament.

## Appendix 1: Abbreviations

### BELGIUM

PLB:	Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès/Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang
PSB:	Parti Socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij
PSC:	Parti Social Chrétien/Christelijke Volkspartij
KP:	Parti Communiste Belge/Belgische Communistische Partij
VU:	Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie
WR/FDF:	Rassemblement Wallon/Front Démocratique des Francophones

### DENMARK

CD:	Centrum Demokraterne
FREM:	Fremskridtspartiet
KONS:	Det konservative Folkeparti
KP:	Danmarks kommunistiske Parti

KRISTFP:	Kristeligt Folkeparti
RADV:	Det radikale Venstre
RB:	Danmarks Retsforbund
SOZFP:	Socialistisk Folkeparti
SOZDEM:	Socialdemokratiet
VENSTRE:	Venstre, Danmarks liberale Parti
VSOZ:	Venstresocialisterne

## GERMANY

CDU:	Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union
FDP:	Freie Demokratische Partei
SPD:	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

## GREAT BRITAIN

CONS:	Conservative Party
LAB:	Labour Party
SDLP:	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SNP:	Scottish National Party
UUUC:	United Ulster Unionist Coalition

## FRANCE

CDP:	Centre démocratie et progrès
CNI:	Centre national des indépendants
FN:	Front national (de tendance fasciste)
LO/LC:	Lutte ouvrière/Ligue communiste
PCF:	Parti communiste français
PS:	Parti socialiste
PSU:	Parti socialiste unifié
REF:	Réformateurs
RI:	Républicains indépendants
UDR:	Union des démocrates pour la République

## IRELAND

FF:	Fianna Fáil
FG:	Fine Gael
LAB:	Irish Labour Party

## ITALY

DC:	Democrazia Cristiana
DP:	Democrazia Proletaria
MSI:	Movimento Sociale Italiano
PCI:	Partito Comunista Italiano
PLI:	Partito Liberale Italiano
PRI:	Partito Repubblicano Italiano
PSI:	Partito Socialista Italiano
PSDI:	Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
RAD:	Radicali
SVP:	Südtiroler Volkspartei



## LUXEMBOURG

COM:	Parti communiste
CSL:	Parti chrétien-social
DEM:	Parti démocratique
LCR:	Ligue communiste révolutionnaire
LIB:	Parti libéral
OSL:	Parti ouvrier-socialiste
SPL:	Parti social-démocrate

## NETHERLANDS

AR:	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij
BP:	Boeren-Partij
CHU:	Christelijk-Historische Unie
CPN:	Communistische Partij van Nederland
D 66:	Democraten '66
DS 70:	Democratische Socialisten '70
GPV:	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond
KVP:	Katholieke Volkspartij
PPR:	Politieke Partij Radikalen
PSP:	Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij
PVDA:	Partij van de Arbeid
SGP:	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij
VVD:	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

## Notes

- 1 Nine out of the 410 seats in the European Parliament were not included in the simulation as their distribution is largely insensitive to shifts in the popular vote. These 9 seats are 1 for Greenland, 3 for West-Berlin, 2 for the French Overseas Departments, and 3 for Ulster. The seat for Greenland was invariably assumed to go to the Danish Social Democrats, the CDU, SPD, and FDP were each assumed to get one seat from West-Berlin. The French Gaullists were assumed to win the 2 seats from the Overseas Departments. The Protestant Unionists were consistently assigned 2 and the Catholic Republicans 1 out of the 3 seats for Ulster (Lakeman, 1976).
- 2 For details see Rattinger, Zängle, and Zintl (1977), sections 4.2.4.5. (France) and 4.2.4.7. (Ireland).
- 3 It should be noted that party groupings are specific to the ideological spectrum encountered in each nation. If a party is classified as "right" this does not necessarily imply ideological affinity to another party being classified likewise in another country but only indicates that both parties' *relative* position within their national party systems is at the right end of the ideological continuum.

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## Appendix 2

### IDEOLOGICAL GROUPING OF PARTIES

	Left	Left-Centre	Centre-Right	Right
Belgium	KP	PSB WR/FDF	PSC VU	PLB
Denmark	SOZFP KP VSOZ	SOZDEM RADV RB	KONS VENSTRE CD KRISTFP	FREM
France	PCF LO/LC	PS PSU	REF CNI RI CDP	UDR FN
Italy	PCI DP RAD	PSI PSDI PRI	DC PLI SVP	MSI
Luxembourg	COM LCR	OSL SPL	CSL	DEM LIB
Netherlands	CPN PSP PPR	PVDA D 66 DS 70	KVP VVD AR CHU	SGP GPV BP

For abbreviations, see Appendix 1.