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Democratic Quality and Legitimacy in the TRU Countries

Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ursula Hoffmann-Lange

The TRI (now TRU) projects followed the development of democratization in seven countries across major world regions for close to a quarter of a century. As was explained in the Preface, five younger democracies identified as democratic forerunners in their respective regions were originally selected for the analysis. Our first study of the democratic transition process, conducted in the mid-1990s, justified the selection of those cases. The second study, done some 10 years later, confirmed the ongoing democratic consolidation, but also revealed deficits in the political culture of the new democracies. In retrospect, the present analysis intends to establish whether these deficits were “childhood diseases” that all new democracies face after transitions, or whether the weaknesses have intensified over time, indicating that the consolidation processes in those countries have come to a halt, or even have been reversed.

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Our analysis is conducted both at the macro-level (governmental/institutional) and the micro-level (individual citizens). In addition, the meso-level of major collective actors, such as anti-establishment parties, is also taken into account. This approach corresponds with Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's (1996) conceptualization of democratic consolidation, which distinguishes between these three levels. In this way, not only the initial high hopes—often based on some idealized notions of democracy—but also the “pains of the plain” relating to the actual reality become apparent.

The present volume reflects on the state of affairs in the countries of interest with their varying experiences since the major wave of transitions to democracy in 1989/1990. This period has been not only characterized by the vicissitudes of political life in each case—characteristic of all dynamic and, by their very nature, conflictual democracies—but has also witnessed the great common shock resulting from the demise of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in 2008 and the ensuing “Great Recession” (Van Beek and Wnuk-Lipinski 2012). Our cases withstood this and other crises more or less successfully, but they are now also confronted with continuing problems of globalization, including volatile international financial markets, international migration, increasing social inequalities and, not least of all, the anti-democratic, authoritarian and populist threat to the very bases of their democratic legitimacy.

For these reasons, it is time to take stock of the latest developments and consider their implications for the future. The current trends apply to the cases considered here, but in a larger sense they also apply to the regions the cases represent (see the relevant chapters in Part III below). Since our first study more differentiated and valid macro-data have become available, beyond the Freedom House and Polity IV scores on which the original case selection had been based. These data are, in particular, the World Bank “good governance” indicators (from 1996 onwards), the “Human Development Index” (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the “Varieties of Democracy” (V-Dem) dataset with a very rich longitudinal database going back to the beginning of the twentieth century and including almost all contemporary independent states.

The first section of this chapter is based on *macro-level* developments and on previous detailed case studies. This approach makes it possible to cover the differing kinds of authoritarian legacies in the new democracies and their overall development since the time of transition.

It also provides detailed patterns of the various dimensions of democracy at different points in time. Governance and performance aspects are included as well.

The second section, following James Coleman's (1990) general model of social explanations, deals with different aspects of the subjective perceptions of democracy at the *micro-level* as specified in the opening chapter by Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. The analyses are based on data from several waves of the "World Values Survey" and from surveys of parliamentarians conducted before and after the recent Great Recession.¹ On this basis, it is possible to both assess the impact of anti-democratic parties and social forces at the *meso-level*, which may present a threat to democratic legitimacy, and show the respective *elite perceptions*. All this, finally, leads to a number of conclusions and perspectives on further possible developments.

The overarching theoretical aim of the analyses is to identify the macro- and micro-factors that can explain both the resilience and vulnerability of democracies. Since Seymour Martin Lipset's early analysis (1959), it has become generally accepted that industrialization has eroded traditional ways of life in the Western world by creating new employment opportunities. The ensuing urbanization along with the expansion of mass education freed people from rigid social controls, clearing the way for secularization and the development of democratic and socialist movements. Tatu Vanhanen (2003) emphasized that social differentiation and, more generally, the distribution of power resources have been the driving force behind democratization by fostering a rapidly increasing division of labour, eroding traditional bonds of authority and thereby empowering people to pursue more independent lives. Therefore, socio-economic development, urbanization and literacy have to be considered as factors supporting the spread of democracy. Lipset's modernization theory has been discussed and empirically tested by many authors and has been, by and large, confirmed (Marks and Diamond 1992).

However, socio-economic modernization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic consolidation. Democracy may flourish even in societies with a low level of socio-economic development (as in India or Botswana), or it may break down in highly developed societies, as was the case during the first half of the twentieth century in Germany and Italy. The breakdown of democracy in the latter two countries was due to political parties failing to implement effective political

institutions; a high degree of political polarization and irreconcilable conflicts among major political parties; and an unwillingness on the part of crucial actors to mutually acknowledge the legitimacy of the other. The cited examples imply that political institutions and value orientations of both elites and citizens play an independent role in democratic development.

Political and socio-economic factors also play an important role in shaping political culture. In the short run, political and economic effectiveness enhance the political legitimacy of new democracies (“specific support” in Easton’s [1965] sense). In the longer run, once established, a civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963) bolsters the existing democratic institutions against temporary economic crises or poor government performance by decreasing the citizens’ inclination to blame the democratic institutions rather than the current government or outside forces (“diffuse support”).

MACRO-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTS

The history of transitions to democracy in the countries of interest here has been documented previously.² For the present purpose, it is important to note that the respective authoritarian regimes from which these countries transited to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s were highly diverse. They varied from the orthodox “hardline” communist system in East Germany and the “post-totalitarian” one in Poland (for these notions, see, e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996) to the military dictatorships of the “personalist” kind in Chile and the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” type in South Korea (e.g. O’Donnell 1973), and they included the special “racial oligarchy” (Huntington 1991) of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The military regime in Turkey after the coup in 1980 claimed to preserve the secular and reformist tradition of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk when faced with conservative and Islamist forces.

Regime transitions were concluded by “pacts” in Chile, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, and by complete “rupture” in East Germany.³ As a result, in four of the cases at least parts of the former elites were able to retain a relatively protected position (the military in Chile and Turkey) or were “transplanted” with at least some of their economic and social positions intact.⁴ Only in East Germany, under the special circumstances of the unification with the West, did an almost complete “replacement” occur.

Overall Longitudinal Trends

Developments since then are mirrored in Fig. 3.1 based on the V-Dem data for liberal democracies, defined as “...protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, a strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power” (Coppedge et al. 2015: 43). The components of this index will be further documented and discussed below.

Figure 3.1 provides a first glance at the overall picture. Beginning in 1980 as a base year for the authoritarian regimes in all transition cases, there are the relatively early and gradual transitions in Turkey and South Korea, followed by the abrupt transformations in Poland, Chile and, somewhat later, in South Africa. Some of the remaining problems and weaknesses of the new democracies are reflected in the relatively lower—and later even declining—scores for South Africa and Turkey. By contrast, scores for (initially West) Germany and, even more so, for Sweden remained stable at high levels. Only in more recent years, in particular during and in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, do some turbulences and declines in all the cases become apparent. To these we turn later.




Fig. 3.1 Liberal democracy index (Source <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/>. Last accessed January 12, 2017)

Table 3.1 TRU cases, liberal democracy index, regional comparisons 2014

East Asia	1.35	Korea	2.44
East Central Europe	2.22	Poland	3.09
EU	3.05	Germany	2.85
		Sweden	3.37
Latin America	2.10	Chile	3.14
MENA	0.92	Turkey	1.29
Southern Africa	1.65	South Africa	2.14

Source V-Dem data set

A closer look at the most recent data also reveals that our originally selected cases still are among the leading ones in their respective regions, with values for the liberal democracy index considerably higher than for regional averages, as shown in Table 3.1.

The reasoning behind the original case selection has been thus confirmed even by this newer and more elaborate data set. The only somewhat surprising figure is the one for Germany, which is below the EU average and is even lower than the figures for Poland or Chile. However, the mystery can be solved by looking at the specific components of the index. The components comprise all six elements of the “electoral democracy index,” which are: freedom of association, expanded freedom of expression, clean election index, access to alternative information sources, per cent of population with suffrage and elected executive index. They also include three “liberal” components: equality before the law, individual liberty and judicial and legislative constraints on the executive. The lower value for Germany disappears and, in fact, becomes higher than the values for Poland and Chile when the “elected executive index” as a component of the electoral democracy index has been removed. Ongoing debates about the merits of the two systems of democratic government indicate there is no reason to assume that presidential democracies are more democratic than parliamentary democracies (Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). For this reason, we have excluded the “elected executive index” component from the more detailed analysis below.

Detailed Patterns

When broken down by components, the specific strengths and weaknesses of each case become apparent. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.2 for South Africa

Dimensions of Liberal Democracy South Africa 1990, 1995




Fig. 3.2 Radar screen graph South Africa for “liberal democracy” 1990 and 1995 (*Note* The corners here signify the eight dimensions mentioned above. The V-Dem variable labels stand for: v2x_frassoc_thick = freedom of association; v2x_freexp_thick = expanded freedom of expression; v2xme_altinf = alternative sources of information; v2x_suffr = percentage of population with suffrage; v2xel_frefair = free and fair elections; v2xcl_rol = rule of law; v2x_jucon = judicial constraints of the executive; v2xlg_legcon = legislative constraints on the executive. The scale for the cobweb lines is indicated in the middle)

in the period of transition. The eight dimensions of “liberal democracy” (excluding the “elected executive index”) are rendered in a cobweb or radar screen graph. The corners signify the eight dimensions mentioned above. The scale for the cobweb lines is indicated in the middle.

It can be seen that after the first free and fair elections in April 1994 that were open to all racial groups, the democratic quality with regard to freedom of association, expanded freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, per cent of population with suffrage, equality before the law and judicial constraints on executive was greatly enhanced (dark line). However, this was less so for free and fair elections and legislative constraints on the executive in view of the ANC’s almost two-thirds majority in parliament.

When we look at the same dimensions for all TRU cases in 1995, a pattern emerges, as illustrated in Fig. 3.3.

This graph shows the somewhat reduced overall quality of democracy for Turkey, in particular with regards to the rule of law (light blue line in the interior), but also the already mentioned problems in South Africa (dark brown line). All other cases score relatively well on all the dimensions.

Twelve years later, but before the onset of the Great Depression, the overall picture is further improved with the rule of law in Turkey and free and fair elections in South Africa having been strengthened (see Fig. 3.4).




Fig. 3.3 TRU cases, dimensions of liberal democracy 1995




Fig. 3.4 TRU cases, liberal democracy 2007

Impact of the Great Recession

The consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis, often called the Great Recession—in contradistinction to the Great Depression following the 1929 Wall Street Crash—affected the TRU cases in varying degrees. In general, though, the Great Recession was a kind of natural experiment testing the democratic resilience of all the cases under consideration here (Du Plessis et al. 2015; Berg-Schlosser 2015; Hoffmann-Lange 2015). Its impact can be seen in Fig. 3.5.

Figure 3.5 shows that the economically most developed countries, Germany and Sweden, were also the most affected by the recession as indicated by the lowest GDP growth rates in this period. The other cases




Fig. 3.5 Impact of recession 2008–2010 (*Source* TRU data set, developed by Stan du Plessis 2015)

pared much better. If we look at the impact of the recession on the quality of democracy, it turns out that the state of liberal democracy, by and large, was not affected very much. The major exception is Turkey where a strong decline can be observed in the more recent period (see Fig. 3.6 for the latest available data in 2014).

In the case of Turkey, however, the trend applies in particular to the dimensions of the rule of law, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information and therefore cannot be attributed to the recession, which did not much affect Turkey. Clearly, other factors have been at work. The decline also precedes the coup attempt in July 2016 and the subsequent state of emergency. The change of the constitution to a strong presidential system points in the same direction.




Fig. 3.6 TRU cases, liberal democracy 2014

Governance and Performance

The overall institutional background of the state of democracy in the considered cases is also related to their actual governmental processes and performance in a functional sense. The World Bank data are the only ones covering this aspect more fully. In addition to the “voice and accountability” and “rule of law” dimensions, which, taken together, can also be interpreted as measures of liberal democracy (Berg-Schlusser 2015), they comprise four other indices: “government effectiveness” (i.e. the quality of the bureaucracy and public services), the “regulatory burden” (i.e. market-unfriendly policies like price and trade controls), “graft” (i.e. the exercise of public power for private gain) including

various forms of corruption, nepotism or clientelism, and “political stability” or its opposite, the extent of social unrest and violence.

The most recent values are presented in Table 3.2. The Gini index of income distribution, which has been added, together with the political stability or social unrest indicator, shed some light on the overall social situation in a country.

The graphs in Fig. 3.7 show the six governance indicators for our cases and their developments over time. They span the period starting in 1996 the first post-transition year for which such data are available; to early 2008, before the onset of the recession; to 2015 for which the latest data are available.

Again, the graphs in Fig. 3.7 are revealing. They show a rather stable situation in our two benchmark cases, Germany and Sweden, with relatively high scores on all of the dimensions. By contrast, South Africa has experienced a considerable decline over this period, in particular with regard to the control of corruption and government effectiveness and an increase in social unrest and violence. Turkey, the other more critical case, despite some earlier improvements, also demonstrates a decline in most indicators, especially in terms of political stability and increasing violence. Chile, Poland and South Korea have largely maintained their somewhat more mixed patterns, not yet reflecting the reversals under the PiS government in Poland after 2015, and the scandals concerning the incumbent president in South Korea in 2016.

Table 3.2 World Bank Governance Indicators, TRU countries 2015

<i>Country</i>	<i>Voice/ Acc.</i>	<i>Rule of law</i>	<i>Gov. Eff.</i>	<i>Reg. Qual.</i>	<i>Contr. Corr.</i>	<i>Pol. Stab.</i>	<i>Gini index</i>
Chile	0.99	1.33	1.08	1.35	1.26	0.40	50.5
Germany	1.43	1.78	1.74	1.67	1.82	0.71	30.1
Korea	0.67	0.95	1.03	1.16	0.49	0.10	N.A.
Poland	1.04	0.80	0.80	1.00	0.58	0.87	32.6
South Africa	0.63	0.06	0.27	0.30	0.04	-0.18	63.4
Sweden	1.60	2.04	1.81	1.81	2.25	0.97	27.3
Turkey	-0.37	-0.06	0.23	0.33	0.11	-1.28	40.2

Source <https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators>. Last accessed October 4, 2017




Fig. 3.7 Governance indicators TRU countries 1996–2015




Fig. 3.7 (continued)





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


Fig. 3.7 (continued)

Figures in Table 3.3 provide the relevant information about the actual *socio-economic performance* of the countries of interest. The figures are based on the latest Human Development Index (HDI), which is compiled annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Its three major components consist of an indicator of the average life expectancy at birth, which also reflects the overall nutrition, health and sanitary situation in a country; an indicator for the level of education (here measured by the mean years of schooling); and an indicator for the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (here expressed in US\$ calculated on the basis of purchasing power parities, PPP, for the year 2011).

The overall HDI has increased considerably for most of our cases with the notable exception of South Africa where a decrease in average life expectancy has been noted and can be attributed to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The other HDI components show positive developments for all the countries. The increase in life expectancy is particularly remarkable for Turkey. The increase in mean years of schooling is, somewhat surprisingly, highest in Germany and South Africa. Gross National Income per capita, in absolute figures, has increased most strongly in

Table 3.3 Human Development Index, major components, changes 1990–2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Turkey</i>
HDI rank 2014	42	6	17	36	116	14	72
HDI 2014	0.832	0.916	0.898	0.843	0.666	0.907	0.761
HDI 1990	0.699	0.801	0.731	0.713	0.621	0.815	0.576
HDI change	0.133	0.115	0.167	0.130	−0.045	0.092	0.185
Life expectation 2014, years	81.7	80.9	81.9	77.4	57.4	82.2	75.3
Life expectation 1990, years	73.7	75.4	71.7	70.9	61.5	77.6	63.1
Life expectation change	10.0	5.5	10.2	6.5	−4.1	4.6	12.2
Education 2014, years	9.8	13.1	11.9	11.8	9.9	12.1	7.6
Education 1990, years	8.1	8.8	8.9	9.7	6.5	10.5	4.5
Education change	1.7	4.3	3.0	2.1	3.4	1.6	3.1
GNI/cap. \$2014	21,290	43,919	33,890	23,177	12,122	45,636	18,677
GNI/cap. 1990 \$	8767	31,994	12,064	9915	9987	30,155	10,494
GNI/cap change \$	12,523	11,925	21,826	13,262	2135	15,481	8183
GNI change %	142.8	27.2	180.9	133.8	21.4	51.3	78.0

Source <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data-explorer>. Last accessed January 12, 2017

South Korea. The relative increases in Chile and Poland, where the GNI per capita more than doubled in the last 25 years, are also remarkable. South Africa with the lowest percentage increase is a laggard also in this respect.

The *perceptions of citizens* of these countries of the successes and failures in the respective cases and, in particular, aspects of political legitimacy including changes over time have to be seen against the political and socio-economic developments occurring since transitions to democracy took place.

MICRO-LEVEL PERCEPTIONS

This part of the chapter analyses micro-level developments and complements the macro-analysis for the seven TRU countries. The analysis is limited to a small number of crucial indicators showing support for democracy, expectations associated with democracy (free elections, civil rights, welfare provisions and a reduction in income inequalities), as well

as beliefs in the legitimacy of democracy. For the latter, four indicators are included: confidence in political institutions; confidence in political parties; the feeling that human rights are protected; and perceived deficits in the functioning of democracy.

In our analysis, the former *German Democratic Republic (GDR)* constitutes a special case because the transition to democracy in 1989/90 involved the unification of Germany and the adoption of the constitutional and legal framework of the West German Federal Republic. At the same time, the transition to democracy and a market economy was not as taxing on the East Germans as on citizens in the other post-communist countries. The much smaller population size of GDR, compared with West Germany, and the high level of socio-economic development in latter allowed bolstering the transition process by transferring billions of Euros to rebuild GDR's infrastructure and to subsidize its transition to a market economy. Yet despite huge public and private efforts over a period of the more than 25 years since the German unification, the economic product and salaries in the eastern section of the unified Germany still trail those in the western part. The unemployment rate in the east is also considerably higher.

Survey research confirms that the experience of the political and economic transitions, which affected deeply the personal lives of most East Germans, and persisting east–west disparities have left their mark on political culture. The differences in political orientations between the two parts of Germany confirm the relevance of relative deprivation for political dissatisfaction and indicate that Germans in the eastern part feel they have been treated unfairly.

Yet, despite the dramatic impact of post-unification changes, not least the long-lasting unemployment that was unknown under communist rule, a recent report shows that in the 25 years after German unification a remarkable convergence in value orientations has taken place between the two parts of Germany (Holtmann et al. 2015). Nevertheless, some marked differences remain. Especially notable is the higher level of dissatisfaction with politics, which manifested, among others, in the results of the 2017 elections to the German parliament (Bundestag), with much higher support for the Left party and the Right-wing populist *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* in the eastern states.

Historical experience makes possible two types of comparisons. On the one hand, former East German and Polish citizens can be compared to establish whether or not their common experience of communist rule

between 1945 and 1990 has had the same impact on their respective support for democracy. On the other hand, a comparison between German respondents from the eastern and western parts of the country can show the effect on political orientations of persistent regional disparities.

Database

Unfortunately, indicators for political culture, especially with regard to support for democracy and political legitimacy, are not as comprehensive as those for the macro-indicators. The only comparative database that includes all seven TRU countries is the World Values Survey (WVS). However, the WVS started out with a rather small number of countries. Only two of our countries (Korea and South Africa) took part in all six waves of the WVS, and another three (Chile, Sweden and Turkey) participated in five of the six waves. Nevertheless, all seven countries were included in the last two waves and provide information on recent developments, especially on whether the Great Recession had an effect on the value orientations and political perceptions of the citizens (Table 3.4).

The analysis covers the period from the mid-1990s up to the mid-2010s. The number of variables that can be used for assessing support for democracy and the legitimacy of the democratic institutions over

Table 3.4 Number of respondents in the seven TRU countries in different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS)

<i>WVS wave</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>West Germany</i>	<i>East Germany</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Turkey</i>
1. 1981–1982	0	0	0	970	0	1574	954	0
2. 1989–1990	1500	0	0	1251	901	2736	0	1030
3. 1996–1997	1000	1017	1009	1247	1153	2785	1009	1881
4. 1999–2001	1200	0	0	1200	0	2828	1015	3401
5. 2006–2007	1000	988	1076	1200	1000	2821	1003	1346
6. 2010–2013	1000	1032	1012	1200	966	3443	1206	1605
Total	5700	3037	3097	7068	4020	16,187	5187	9263

The years indicated in the table provide the actual range of years in which the different survey waves were conducted. They may differ from the periods provided on the website of the WVS which are based on all countries participating in each wave

Source World Values Survey, cumulated file

time is relatively small. The indicators used here were chosen for their theoretical relevance and for meeting the requirement of having been included in the two most recent waves of the WVS.

The availability of two surveys of parliamentarians (2007 and 2013) using WVS questions to assess the political orientations of MPs provides important insights into developments at the intermediary level and allows comparisons with the orientations of citizens. The availability of these data offers information about differences between the elites and the citizens, and shows the degree of polarization within party systems with respect to basic democratic values and the performance of the democratic political system.

The WVS uses two different kinds of scales, from 1 to 4 and from 1 to 10. For the sake of better comparability of the scores reported here, all values were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1. The resulting scores can roughly be interpreted as percentages of the maximum score. For determining the overall score for the citizens of all seven countries, a weight was used that standardizes the number of citizens within each country to 1000 and of MPs to 100, so that each country has the same influence on the overall result.

Support for Democracy

Support for a democratic political system is the most basic aspect of a civic culture. It shows whether the concept of democracy receives positive evaluations by the populations at large. However, since there is no universally accepted definition of democracy, a positive evaluation is not sufficient without knowing what people associate with democracy, especially since most dictators nowadays claim to be genuine democrats. Therefore, Larry Diamond has concluded that while “there is a broad desire for democracy in the world, stretching across regions,” there is also a “strong authoritarian temptation” outside of the West (Diamond 2008: 33). The simplest test for distinguishing between paying lip service to democracy and a deeper understanding of the essence of democracy is to contrast different types of political regimes and to ask respondents to rate them independently. In this way, the respondents are not forced to choose between democracy and authoritarian regimes, which may produce an unrealistically high share of affirmative answers in favour of democracy, given the latter’s social desirability.

In the WVS, respondents are asked to rate three different types of political systems: an autocratic system with a strong leader, a military regime and democracy.⁵ The mean evaluations for democracy confirm the high level of social desirability associated with the concept of democracy. For the most recent wave, the lowest means to be found are 0.63 in Korea, 0.66 in South Africa and 0.68 in Poland. Korea experienced a decline since the mid-1990s from 0.75 to 0.63. South Africa started out from a very high level of 0.81 that was upheld until wave 5 and then experienced a dramatic decline from 0.80 to 0.66. By contrast, Chile shows a steady increase from 0.71 to 0.83.

The mean evaluations of having an authoritarian system show that the differences between the countries are considerably higher for this indicator. The score for authoritarian systems was defined as the higher score for either autocratic leadership or military regime. Overall, autocratic leadership was considerably more popular than military regimes. In wave 6, it received a score of 0.43 overall compared to 0.29 for a military regime. Its lowest score was 0.24 in West Germany, its highest 0.56 in South Africa. The data confirm the existence of pockets of support for authoritarianism even in the two long-standing democracies, with a slight increase in recent years. Among the new democracies, support for authoritarian regimes has declined in Chile, Poland and Turkey, while it has increased in Korea and especially in South Africa. In the latter country, support for democracy and authoritarianism is now at the same level (0.66 and 0.64).

Support for democracy was defined as an unequivocal preference for democracy over an authoritarian system. The relevant calculation was done by subtracting the score for authoritarianism from the score for democracy and then recoding negative values into 0 and positive values into 1. Therefore, a value of 0 encompasses all respondents who have given an authoritarian system a higher or an equal rating. Figure 3.8 shows the share of respondents who indicated a preference for democracy, however small.

The time series goes back to the third wave of the WVS in the mid-1990s. It can be seen that the two consolidated democracies (including the eastern part of Germany) achieve 80% or more support for democracy. At the same time, we can observe a steady increase in Chile, which reaches 68.9% in wave 6. Poland, for which scores for the last two waves only are available, has slightly lower levels and shows a small increase. The three remaining countries display idiosyncratic




Fig. 3.8 Preference for democracy in the seven countries (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Percentage of respondents with a preference for democracy over autocratic leadership and military regime)

patterns. Turkey started out with 60% support for democracy, followed by a decline to 39% around the turn of the century and a rebound to 50% in the last two waves. Korea started out with close to 70% in the 1990s, but has since experienced a steady decline to about 45% in the last two waves. South Africa stands out as a special case. After the initial enthusiasm for democracy and a share of 69%, support for democracy has steadily declined, with a particularly severe drop between 2006 and 2013. These very different country-specific patterns become even more interesting once we include the results of the MPs later in the analysis.

Political Expectations

The evaluations of democratic and authoritarian regimes are rather general and do not provide information about what people expect from democracy. The last two waves of the WVS included a battery of four items asking respondents to evaluate which characteristics of a polity they thought were essential for a democracy. Two of the items dealt with

economic policy issues (state aid for the unemployed and a system of progressive taxes).

The other two of the four items addressed the fundamental principles of a liberal democratic order:

- People choose their leaders in free elections
- Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

The latter two items were included only in the last two waves of the WVS and show similar results.

Free elections were considered as somewhat more important with a range 0.84–0.77. This is not altogether surprising since civil rights are a more abstract concept than general elections and not all people understand that a free and democratic society depends on a guarantee of civil rights, minority protection and the rule of law. While support for general elections has been more or less constant in our seven countries—with the exception of South Africa where this support has declined from 0.81 to 0.67—slight but uniform erosion in support for civil rights can be observed even in the consolidated democracies (Fig. 3.9). The differences between the two established and the five Third-Wave democracies




Fig. 3.9 Essential for democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Average scores on a 10-point scale, rescaled to range 0–1)

have not narrowed, however. The short time period precludes any conclusions on whether this decline indicates a long-term trend or is rather a minor fluctuation. Overall, the relatively high scores for both indicators support the conclusion that citizens have by and large understood that free elections and the protection of civil rights are indispensable features of democracy.

The data also include several items asking for economic policy preferences. Since these items refer to the sociopolitical cleavage that traditionally has been the major conflict line within democratic party systems (cf. Lijphart 1999: 79–82),⁶ it makes sense to analyse the subjective importance of economic policy issues to find out to what extent demands for a strong role of the state in economic policymaking and the provision of welfare for the citizens are associated with democracy. Rather than using the items on progressive taxes and state aid for the unemployed, which have very low correlations with other political orientations and have been included only in waves 5 and 6 of the WVS, two other items were deemed more pertinent because they ask for more fundamental economic policy value orientations and have been already included in previous waves. Respondents were confronted with two sets of contradictory statements and were asked to indicate their own position on a 10-point scale:

- Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs. people should take more responsibility for themselves.
- Incomes should be made more equal vs. we need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts.

The first of these items addresses the conflict between individual self-reliance and government responsibility for the citizens' well-being. Figure 3.10 reveals interesting differences between the countries. Koreans put the highest demand on their government, indicating a rather widespread mindset of reliance on welfare provisions (“Versorgungsmentalität”). Sweden is the contrasting case, although demands for more government responsibility have markedly increased compared to the mid-1990s. There is a relatively large discrepancy between Germans in the eastern and western parts of the country, with the former putting a considerably higher emphasis on an active welfare state. This confirms the findings of many other studies (Holtmann et al. 2015: 180–182). However, the gap between the two




Fig. 3.10 Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs. people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Average scores on a 10-point scale, rescaled to range 0–1)

regions has narrowed somewhat over the period of observation primarily because scores in the western part of Germany have increased. The scores for Chile, South Africa and Turkey show fluctuations without any discernible trends.

Figure 3.11 provides the average scores for the item referring to income equity. The highest expectations for a reduction in income differences can be found in Chile, Germany (both in the east and west) and in Turkey. The German data reveal a slight upward trend, however, while the patterns for Chile and Turkey show fluctuation on a high level. Conversely, Korea and Poland show the lowest averages. While the Polish citizens started out from an extremely low level of 0.23, the scores have steadily increased, although they still remain the second lowest. It looks as if in Poland demands for income equality were initially associated with the communist rule and therefore enjoyed little support. Once Poland had gone through the shock of a rapid transition to a free market economy, Polish citizens seem to have come to the conclusion that inequalities have gone too far. Korea, by contrast, shows a fairly low level throughout and next to no change over time.




Fig. 3.11 Incomes should be made more equal vs. we need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Average scores on a 10-point scale, rescaled to range 0–1)

In Sweden, support for more income equality has considerably increased between the last two survey waves and has reached a mean of 0.57 in wave 6.

The South African data are a mystery. Income inequality is rather high in the country and has even slightly increased over the last decades (Gini Index 67.0 in 1999 and 70.0 in the 2010s; UNDP 2013). At the same time, despite the fact that South Africa is the poorest country in the study, the data show that South Africans are not particularly adamant in demanding government action against the existing income inequality. Support for more income equality has even declined over time from 0.60 to 0.43. Since the development is linear over four survey waves, data errors can be ruled out.

Political Legitimacy

Survey research uses a large number of indicators for measuring political legitimacy. There is a vast body of literature dealing with trust in political actors and confidence in political and societal institutions, emphasizing that these are important preconditions for legitimacy that determine the acceptance of government decisions by the citizens.

However, many studies have shown that over the last decades trust in politicians and confidence in political institutions have declined, especially in the most advanced democracies (e.g. Norris 1999; Pharr et al. 2000; Dalton 2006). There is an ongoing controversy about the causes of this decline. Critical social scientists and in particular the media tend to blame it on poor government performance, a host of political scandals and a lack of transparency in political decision-making. Others stress that the decline is the result of a value change in modern democracies. They assume that the value change is driven by the proliferation of higher education which, in turn, increases political sophistication and fosters a more critical attitude towards established politics, politicians and political parties (in particular Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This theory posits that low levels of political trust are not to be interpreted as a legitimacy deficit, but rather as a corollary of a mature democracy in which the citizenry closely monitors governmental activities and actively intervenes in policy decision-making; an example is John Keane's model of *monitory democracy* (2009, 2011).

Even if the presence of such sceptical democrats can be interpreted as an asset, rather than a threat to democracy, very low levels of confidence in political institutions indicate a distance to established politics. Such a distance may eventually endanger the compliance by citizens to observe governmental decisions without which no political regime, especially not a democratic one, can survive in the long run. Moreover, it would be naïve to expect that the great majority of citizens in new democracies are relieved that the previous authoritarian and repressive regime has been replaced by democratic institutions. Transitions to democracy are frequently plagued by intense conflicts of interest between contending political groups trying to take their chances. Without sufficient trust in the new political leadership and the democratic institutions, it will be very difficult for the democratic regime to find popular support for the difficult first steps to overcome the legacies of authoritarianism in society and politics. Therefore, low levels of confidence in political institutions are probably even more damaging in young than in established democracies.

From its inception, the WVS has included questions about confidence in a wide range of political institutions and societal organizations. A factor analysis of the degree of confidence in the central governmental institutions, i.e. national government and parliament, the civil service, the police and political parties confirm that these confidence ratings reflect a

single underlying dimension. The first principal component explains 58% of the total variance, and the scalability coefficient Cronbach's α is 0.82.

Nevertheless, confidence in political parties was treated separately for two reasons. Even though they are universal and necessary participants in democratic decision-making, political parties are not governmental institutions and do not have the right to take binding decisions. At the same time, effective competition among parties advocating different policies is indispensable. Still, confidence in political parties tends to be fairly low nearly everywhere because political parties are widely seen as pursuing particularistic interests.

Figure 3.12 provides the average scores for confidence in the four governmental institutions and shows considerable differences between the countries. The scores range between 0.35 and 0.70. The development over time is characterized by ups and downs without any uniform trend.

In Korea, the first survey was conducted when the country was still under military rule. Therefore, it seems likely that the very high score in that wave cannot be considered a true reflection of the actual confidence level.




Fig. 3.12 Mean confidence in governmental institutions (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Mean confidence in national government, national parliament, civil service and police. Average scores on a 4-point scale, rescaled to range 0–1)

The other five Korean scores fluctuate and are always below the arithmetical mid-point of the scale. Only Swedish scores and those for western Germany are fairly stable remaining above 0.45. Scores for citizens in the in eastern part of Germany started out at a considerably lower level in the mid-1990s, but have reached those of the Western counterparts in wave 6. The South African time series starts already under the authoritarian apartheid regime, but with considerably lower levels than in Korea. This result confirms that the apartheid regime—despite its repressive character—was less successful in keeping political dissatisfaction and protest at bay. At the time of the second survey, in 1990, the South African democratization process was still at its beginning, but confidence had markedly increased from 0.50 to 0.59. By 1996, South African democracy had reached its honeymoon peak with a score of 0.62, which remained at 0.59 and 0.57, respectively, in the next two waves, before it markedly declined to 0.46 by 2013. While this decline has been not as sharp as the erosion of support for democracy, it confirms that South African democracy is going through difficult times. The results for Chile and Poland are even less promising. Both countries started out with very high levels of confidence in democratic institutions, which rapidly evaporated and fell to only 0.42 (Chile) and 0.36 (Poland). Turkey, finally, started out with high levels of confidence in political institutions and even experienced a considerable improvement after the AKP took power in 2002. In the last WVS wave, Turkey came out on top among the seven TRU countries. This shows that the current Turkish system of government enjoys broad political support, although it only qualifies as *electoral democracy*, combining competitive elections with considerable deficits in civil rights and rights for the political opposition.

Compared to confidence in governmental institutions, confidence in political parties is much lower, even in the two established democracies. However, after a period of particularly low confidence around the turn of the century, we can observe an upward trend since the mid-2000s in six of the seven countries. Again, South Africa is the great exception in that respect, even if the level of confidence in political parties is still the second highest among the seven countries. Sweden has the highest stability in confidence ratings in both governmental institutions and political parties.

Among the few questions asking for assessments of political reality included in the WVS, one deals with the perceived democraticness of one's country and the other one with the degree to which human

rights are respected. The first question was only included in the last two waves of the WVS, the second one in the last three. Figure 3.13 provides the development of the average scores for the belief that human rights are respected since the turn of the century. While the figure for the importance attributed to the protection of human rights showed a slight decrease, the belief in the actual protection of human rights increased in all countries, except South Africa and Sweden.

A more direct measure of legitimacy was recently proposed by Bernhard Wessels (2016), which is the differential between the importance attributed to different aspects of democracy and the evaluation of how well these aspects are actually realized in the respondents' country. Such a differential can be calculated for the importance attributed to living in a democracy and the assessment of how democratically is the country actually governed by subtracting the score for the realization from the importance score. The deficits perceived by respondents with




Fig. 3.13 Share of respondents believing that individual human rights are respected in their country (Source World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 1–6. Percentage of respondents perceiving “a lot of respect” or “some respect” on a 10-point scale)




Fig. 3.14 Perceived deficit in the quality of democracy in respondents' country (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 5 and 6. Average scores for the importance of living in a democracy minus score for democrateness of the country, both measured on a 10-point scale, rescaled to range 0–1)

regard to democratic quality in their own country range from 0.16 to 0.35 in wave 5, and from 0.13 to 0.28 in wave 6 (Fig. 3.14). Again, the perceived deficit declined in the eastern part of Germany and in Turkey between waves 5 and 6, while the perceived deficit increased in Chile from 0.16 to 0.28 and in Korea from 0.24 to 0.28.

MESO-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES

Anti-System Parties

Changing popular attitudes also had an impact at the meso-level of aggregated political preferences and election results. Here, we pay particular attention to the largely anti-democratic and extremist parties on both the political right and left. The latest available national election results are presented in Table 3.5.

As Table 3.5 shows, fairly strong anti-democratic or, at least, anti-establishment parties have emerged in Germany and Sweden, our two democratic benchmark cases. This development is partly the result of the global financial crisis, which has affected these countries more than the other countries in our sample. The emergence of anti-establishment parties is

Table 3.5 Anti-establishment parties (latest election results)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Protest/radical left</i>	<i>Populist/radical right</i>	<i>Total</i>
Chile			dna
Germany, nat., 2017	9.2 (Linke)	12.6 (AfD)	21.8
EU 2014	7.4 (Linke)	7.1 (AfD)	14.5
Korea			dna
Poland, nat., 2015		8.8 (Kukiz, 15)	8.8
EU 2014		7.2	7.2
South Africa	6.4 (EFF)		6.4
Sweden, nat., 2014	5.7 (Vänsterp.)	12.9 (Swed.Dem.)	18.6
EU 2014	6.3 (Vänsterp.)	9.7 (Swed.Dem.)	16.0
Turkey 2015		11.9 (MHP)	11.9

Sources <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/>; Freedom House country reports

also a reflection of an increase in nationalist anti-European and anti-euro attitudes. More recently, the refugee crisis resulting from the war in Syria and international migration in general have also led to stronger nationalist and xenophobic reactions. This is also true for Poland. South Africa and Turkey have more specific radical left or radical right parties of their own. Chile and South Korea are the only countries in our study in which such political movements or parties have not been successful so far. In Chile, the two larger groupings of the centre-left Concertacion and the Conservative Alliance have alternated in government. However, the new electoral system of proportional representation introduced in 2015 replaced the “binominal system” in which the two top candidates in each district were elected at the disadvantage to smaller parties. The electoral amendment might change this situation in the future by allowing for a wider spectrum of parties in parliament. In South Korea, where parties are based more on regional and personal ties than on ideological orientations, no significant anti-system parties are represented in parliament.

Support for Democracy and Confidence in Governmental Institutions Among MPs and Citizens

The perceptions of members of parliament can be considered as another relevant meso-level factor since parliaments are representative political bodies with final decision-making power on legislation. The incumbents of leadership positions in parliament belong to the core political elite,

and even parliamentary backbenchers are part of an influential stratum of sub-elites. Therefore, their political value orientations are collectively representative of their parties' policy positions and reflect the degree of cooperative relations among the parliamentary parties and of consensus on the democratic political institutions.

In all seven countries, the great majority of MPs expressed a clear preference for democracy over authoritarian systems, which even increased between the 2006 and 2013 waves of the survey from 93.2 to 96.1%. This is true for all party groups represented in the seven parliaments. In each party group, more than 80% of MPs expressed a preference for democracy. The lowest shares were found among MPs of four political parties: the Conservative Alliance in Chile (82.6 and 96.0%), the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland (80.8 and 85.4%), the Democratic Alliance in South Africa (87.5 and 91.4%) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey (81.9 and 89.8%). The data confirm, however, that between the first and the second waves of the survey support for democracy increased even among MPs of these four parties. This result does not imply, of course, that the four parties necessarily engage in active advocacy of liberty and civil rights for citizens, but it still shows that nearly all of their MPs support basic democratic principles such as free, equal and fair elections and freedom of expression.

The results of the evaluation of democracy and authoritarian systems confirm the importance of an elite consensus on democracy as the best political system (Higley and Burton 2006). This becomes obvious once the national patterns of support for MPs and citizens are taken into account. The following country-specific graphs include three different measures of support for democracy: mean evaluation scores of democracy as good or bad, mean evaluations for having either an autocratic leader or a military regime—whichever received the more positive rating—and the percentage of respondents in each group who preferred democracy over an authoritarian regime. In addition to the average ratings of MPs and citizens, those of the subgroup of citizens with at least some university education have been included as well, since public opinion research has time and again confirmed that respondents with higher education are more supportive of democratic principles and also more tolerant of deviating opinions and behaviours (e.g. Hoffmann-Lange 2008; McClosky and Brill 1983).

We can distinguish four clear patterns in our seven countries. The first pattern is found in the two well-established democracies, Sweden and

Germany (Fig. 3.15 for Sweden). The pattern is characterized by a very high evaluation of democracy and low support for authoritarian rule. Both orientations are rather stable over time. Citizens with university education show a slightly higher positive evaluation of democracy and display less sympathy for authoritarianism, while MPs show a near-universal preference for democracy. Overall, the differences between the three groups (MPs, citizens and citizens with university education) are not very high.

The second pattern for Chile and Poland (Fig. 3.16 for Chile) shows an increase in support for democracy and a decline in support for authoritarian systems. Because support for authoritarian solutions is higher in those countries than in Sweden or Germany, the curve for the share of respondents with a clear preference for democracy is considerably below the one for a positive evaluation of democracy. This indicates that the consolidation of democracy does not only depend on a positive evaluation of democracy, but also relies on a rejection of authoritarian alternatives. Unfortunately, the MP data are limited to the last decade but confirm the important role of elites (MPs) for democratic consolidation.

The third pattern for Korea and Turkey (Fig. 3.17 for Korea) suggests that consolidation of democracy in these two countries is lagging behind Chile and Poland. While the average score for evaluation of democracy is not much lower than in Chile (Korea 0.63, Turkey even 0.83 in




Fig. 3.15 Evaluation of democracy and authoritarian alternatives: Sweden (Source World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 3–6, TRI and CMP surveys 2007 and 2013)




Fig. 3.16 Evaluation of democracy and authoritarian alternatives: Chile (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 3–6, TRI and CMP surveys 2007 and 2013)




Fig. 3.17 Evaluation of democracy and authoritarian alternatives: Korea (*Source* World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 3–6, TRI and CMP surveys 2007 and 2013)

wave 6), sympathy for authoritarian systems has remained considerably higher and has even increased somewhat since the first decade after democratization (Korea 0.50 and Turkey 0.56 in wave 6). Instead of diverging, the curves for the evaluation of democracy and for authoritarian systems have developed in parallel in Turkey and even somewhat converged in Korea. Therefore, the share of respondents who prefer democracy to authoritarian systems is only 45.5% in Korea and 50.4% in Turkey, showing that about half of the citizens do not really care one way or the other. At the same time, the figure shows a considerable gap between MPs and citizens. In both countries, support for democracy has been stable and high, while support for authoritarian regimes has considerably decreased.

South Africa is an exceptional case (Fig. 3.18). Even if we look at the independent ratings for democracy and authoritarian rule, the means are nearly indistinguishable and the percentage of respondents with a clear preference for democracy has declined to less than one-third among the citizens. Most of this decline occurred between the last two surveys, that is between 2006 and 2013. This is true for both ANC supporters and supporters of the major opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). As in the other six countries, the evaluations of citizens




Fig. 3.18 Evaluation of democracy and authoritarian alternatives: South Africa (Source World Values Survey, cumulated file, waves 3–6, TRI and CMP surveys 2007 and 2013)

with university education differ only marginally from those of the entire citizenry.

Generally, education as such seems to be of minor importance for regime preferences. As Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill (1983) and Shmuel Lock (1999) show, professional status is a more important factor. Therefore, most parliamentarians in our seven countries, as professional politicians, embrace the democratic rules of the game and accept elections and opposition parties even if they dislike them personally.

Additionally, confidence in governmental institutions was again used as an indicator of political legitimacy of democracy, this time at the meso-level. It is only slightly higher among the MPs than among the citizens, with an overall mean in the last survey wave of 0.62, while the average score of the citizens was 0.48. Compared to the very high support for democracy, confidence ratings show that the impartial functioning of the governmental institutions is not taken for granted even by MPs. However, the picture changes dramatically if we take into account whether the respondents belong to either the governing or the opposition parties. MPs of the governing parties indicate significantly higher levels of confidence (0.71) than those of the opposition parties (0.51). On the one hand, this differential indicates that the opposition parties fulfil their constitutional watchdog role vis-à-vis the government. On the other hand, however, we should theoretically assume that in countries with well-functioning democratic institutions not even MPs of the opposition parties expect that the current government will overstep its role and tamper with basic constitutional rights or use its power to secure unfair advantages for its party or parties. This is only true, however, in four of our countries. The differences between MPs of the governing and opposition parties are relatively small (between 0.10 and 0.17) in the two established democracies, Germany and Sweden, as well as in Chile and Korea. These differences are much more pronounced in Poland (0.30), South Africa (0.30) and Turkey (0.37), thus indicating a fair amount of scepticism on the part of the opposition parties regarding the intentions of these countries' governments.

The results for Turkey are particularly interesting because confidence in governmental institutions is even lower among the MPs of the opposition parties than among the citizens and has declined from 0.50 to 0.37 between the two survey waves. This rift has presumably deepened even further after the AKP government changed the system of government from parliamentary to presidential in the spring of 2017, whereby

the rights of the political opposition were severely curtailed. Moreover, in both Turkey and South Africa the same dominant party has been in power for a long time, the AKP since 2002, the ANC since 1994.

Confidence levels in Poland, likewise, indicate a low level of mutual trust between the governing and opposition parties, regardless of which parties control the government. Between the two survey waves, control of the government shifted from the Law and Justice Party (PiS) to the Civic Platform (PO)—and in 2015 back to the PiS—which involved a drop of institutional confidence among the PiS deputies from 0.63 to 0.31 and an increase among those of the PO from 0.38 to 0.68.

The figures in Table 3.6 show that differences in confidence ratings between supporters of government and opposition parties are much narrower among the citizens. The differences are of the same magnitude only in Chile. It can also be seen that the scores of respondents who failed to indicate a vote intention—with the exception of Turkey—are closer to the (lower) values of the supporters of opposition parties. Overall, the degree of confidence citizens have in governmental institutions is roughly equivalent to that of the MPs of the opposition parties.

Table 3.6 Confidence in political institutions among MPs and supporters of government and opposition parties in the most recent surveys

<i>Country</i>	<i>MPs</i>			<i>Citizens</i>			
	<i>Opposition parties</i>	<i>Parties in government</i>	<i>All MPs</i>	<i>Opposition parties</i>	<i>Parties in government</i>	<i>No vote intention indicated</i>	<i>All citizens</i>
Chile	0.61	0.78	0.69	0.40	0.57	0.40	0.42
Germany	0.59	0.69	0.64	0.51	0.59	0.49	0.53
Korea	0.48	0.62	0.56	0.43	0.53	0.42	0.46
Poland	0.37	0.67	0.51	0.35	0.42	0.32	0.36
South Africa	0.39	0.69	0.60	0.42	0.50	0.40	0.46
Sweden	0.69	0.83	0.76	0.52	0.63	0.52	0.56
Turkey	0.37	0.74	0.59	0.50	0.66	0.57	0.58
Total	0.51	0.71	0.62	0.45	0.56	0.43	0.48

Source CMP survey 2013, World Values Survey cumulated file, wave 6
Party support was measured by asking for the vote intention of the respondents

CONCLUSIONS

The above assessment of the quality and legitimacy of democracy in our seven cross-area cases over the last quarter century makes apparent a few distinct patterns.⁷

At the *macro-level*, the overall *liberal democracy index* shows high and relatively stable scores for Sweden, Germany and Chile. The once similarly high score for Poland has declined somewhat in recent years, whereas the already lower values for Korea and, in particular, South Africa have diminished even further. Turkey has clearly crossed the line towards a *hybrid* regime in the wake of the constitutional changes to a presidential system and the severe infringements imposed on the judiciary implemented in 2017, which have not been covered in our index.

In terms of *good governance*, as per the World Bank indicators, our two benchmark cases plus Chile stand out as having high and stable scores. Poland and Korea form a middle group, with South Africa and Turkey clearly at the bottom. Sweden, Poland and Germany also show high levels of social stability and more equitable income distributions. By contrast, political stability is lowest in South Africa and in Turkey. Chile and Korea are in a middle group with a high level of social inequality in the former.

Overall *socio-economic performance*, as reflected in the HDI and its changes, was highest in Korea and Turkey. Chile, Germany, Poland and Sweden are in a relatively satisfactory middle group. South Africa clearly performs worst in this regard. Thus, in this case no clear-cut relationship between improving economic performance and better values on the democracy scores can be detected.

Our *micro-level* analysis has shown South Africa to be the most dramatic outlier among our seven countries. Not only has support for democracy declined, but so has confidence in political institutions and political parties, even though South Africa started off at a particularly high level of enthusiasm for democracy. At the same time, political demands by South African respondents are lower than in the other countries; for instance, only a minority demand that income differences be reduced. This also implies that the discrepancy between expectations and their perceived realization is not as high as one could expect, given the poor performance of the South African government in fighting socio-economic and political inequality. Overall, we can conclude that the original enthusiasm for democracy has been dampened, but that

a majority of South African citizens seems to accept the deficiencies of their democracy with apparent indifference. Such an attitude may be, in part, due to the persisting loyalty to their party by ANC supporters. Notwithstanding such support, the continuing infighting does not bode well for the future of the ANC.

Support for democracy in Turkey and Korea has not taken very deep roots either. Turkish citizens are obviously pleased with the enormous economic progress their country has made since the AKP came to power in 2002. Confidence in the democratic quality of Turkey, governmental institutions and political parties improved over time. The recent referendum in support of President Erdoğan's constitutional changes replacing Turkish parliamentary democracy by a system of strong presidentialism showed that the government still enjoys majority support, although the reforms were only confirmed by a narrow margin. Likewise, Korean citizens consider a satisfactory standard of living as more important than democratic rights, suggesting that they accept democracy as long as the economy is doing well. At the same time, the quality of democracy is higher in Korea than in Turkey. In 2017, the corruption scandal surrounding president Park Geun Hye resulted in an early presidential election and a change in government, which indicates that democratic institutions and democratically minded political elites in Korea are strong enough to weather even a major political crisis.

Poland and Chile seem to have made substantial progress towards the development of a democratic political culture. Support for democracy has been on the rise, while support for authoritarianism has declined. Nevertheless, confidence in governmental institutions and political parties remains lower in these two countries than in the other five.

Although the results on political culture in the five new democracies—which are now no longer so new anymore—show some progress, their political culture is still lagging far behind Sweden and Germany, with the latter two countries enjoying consistently high citizen support for democracy. Meanwhile, the eastern part of Germany has almost caught up with its Western counterpart. This is probably due to the fact that the democratization of East Germany took place under much more favourable conditions, having been bolstered by huge financial transfers from West Germany for rebuilding the East German economy, infrastructure and welfare system. Nevertheless, satisfaction with democracy is still somewhat lower in the east. Similarly, Germans in that part of the country are more likely to vote for protest parties of the left and the right in

both state and federal elections. In this respect, the specific historical legacy of the forty years of communist rule and feelings of relative deprivation, compared to the better-off citizens in western parts of the country, come to the fore.

In all seven countries, MPs' *democratic orientations* and their levels of satisfaction with democratic institutions are much higher than those of the citizens. This finding confirms previous studies of political representation and does not seem terribly surprising since most members of parliaments are loyal members of established political parties. Still, this should not be considered as an entirely insignificant result. Many of the populist parties in both the well-established and newer democracies have publicly denounced existing liberal democratic institutions, with Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán going as far as to publicly advocate "illiberal democracy" as a superior alternative. So we cannot assume that elites are necessarily supportive of democracy.

At the same time, it cannot be concluded that only elites are the reliable guardians of democracy, as the theory of democratic elitism suggests (Best and Higley 2010: 9). The recent surge of *populist or authoritarian political parties and leaders* may rapidly change political landscapes in their countries (see again Table 3.5). Under such circumstances, widespread support for liberal democratic institutions, values and principles can immunize citizens against anti-democratic appeals by protest parties and may thus thwart those parties' intentions.

Ultimately, however, a democratic political culture is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the stability of a liberal democratic polity. As long as the elites are unified in their support for democratic institutions, liberal democracy can persist even in societies that lack broad citizen support. Yet resistance against attempts by some elite groups to curb civil rights and political checks and balances will be weaker in such societies, as can be observed currently in Turkey and Poland. Moreover, people may not realize soon enough what damage even seemingly slight constitutional changes may do and they may therefore not oppose such changes early enough. We have seen several examples of democratic countries turning into authoritarian regimes within a short time. Once an authoritarian rule and a system of political repression have been established, it may be too late for effective resistance. However, with the exception of Turkey, we do not consider the other still not fully consolidated democracies in our study to be in any imminent danger of succumbing to authoritarianism, but they are certainly

more vulnerable than the two well-established democracies. Therefore, continuous monitoring of political culture of both elites and citizens and guarding against populist extremism are a perpetual necessity in all democracies.

NOTES

1. The first MP survey was conducted in 2007 by the TRI team members and supported by various research foundations (see Van Beek [2010](#)). The second survey (CMP) was conducted in 2013 and supported by the Swedish Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, whose generous support is gratefully acknowledged.
2. See Preface for details.
3. For this distinction, see also O'Donnell et al. ([1986](#)).
4. For this term, see also Huntington ([1991](#)).
5. Question: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
 - Having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with parliament and elections.
 - Having the army rule.
 - Having a democratic political system.
6. It should be noted that Lijphart no longer included cleavages or issue dimensions in the second edition of his book that appeared in 2012. It is not clear if he believes that these have lost in importance or if he only disregarded them for the sake of theoretical parsimony. While it is obvious that especially the socio-economic cleavage plays only a small if any role in many of the Third-Wave democracies, it has retained its relevance in the older party systems of Europe and the Americas, although its importance has considerably declined for several decades, possibly with the exception of Sweden and Norway (cf. Hoffmann-Lange [2010](#)).
7. For an overview of our major results on both the macro- and micro-levels (see Table [3.7](#)).

APPENDIX

Table 3.7 Democratic quality, legitimacy and political demands in the TRU countries^a

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Chile</i>	<i>Germany^b</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Turkey</i>
<i>Macro-indicators</i>							
Liberal democracy score (V-Dem, 9 criteria, 2014)	3.14	2.85	2.44	3.09	2.14	3.37	1.29
Trend	→	→	↓	↓	↓	→	↓
Control of corruption (WB 2015)	1.26	1.82	0.49	0.58	0.04	2.25	0.11
Trend	→	→	→	↑	↓	→	→
Government effectiveness (WB 2015)	1.08	1.74	1.03	0.80	0.27	1.81	0.23
Trend	→	→	↑	↑	↓	→	↑
HDI 2014	0.832	0.916	0.898	0.843	0.666	0.907	0.761
HDI change 1990–2014	0.133	0.115	0.167	0.130	-0.045	0.092	0.185
Gini index	50.5	30.1	n/a	32.6	63.4	27.3	40.2
Trend	↓	↓		→	→	↑	→
<i>Legitimacy of democracy</i>							
Preference democracy (%)	68.9	83.6	50.0	66.3	27.3	81.7	50.4
Trend	↑	↓	↑	↑	↓	→	↑
Confidence in political institutions	0.42	0.53	0.46	0.36	0.46	0.56	0.58
Trend	↓	→	↓	↓	↓	→	↑
Perceived respect for human rights (%)	54.1	87.9	71.0	71.6	54.9	82.4	45.2
Trend	→	↑	↑	↑	→	↑	↑
Perceived deficit in democratic quality	0.28	0.20	0.28	0.33	0.13	0.21	0.26
Trend	↓	→	→	→	→	→	↑
<i>Political demands</i>							
Civil rights protect people's liberty	0.66	0.79	0.67	0.82	0.64	0.85	0.73
Trend	↓	↓	↓	→	↓	↓	↓
Government responsibility for public welfare	0.64	0.57	0.72	0.61	0.47	0.50	0.63
Trend	→	↑	→	↑	→	↑	↑
Incomes should be more equal	0.72	0.65	0.39	0.41	0.43	0.57	0.61
Trend	↑	↑	→	↑	↓	↑	→

^aBased on the most recent data available^bData for West Germans encompassing more than 80% of the German population; deviating results for East Germany are discussed in the text

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