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Pasetto, Luca; Benzmüller, Christoph; Markovich, Réka

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# Formalizing Mental Privacy in LogiKEY

## Extended Abstract

Luca Pasetto  
 University of Luxembourg  
 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg  
 luca.pasetto@uni.lu

Christoph Benz Müller  
 University of Bamberg & FU Berlin  
 Bamberg & Berlin, Germany  
 christoph.benzmueller@uni-bamberg.de

Réka Markovich  
 University of Luxembourg  
 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg  
 reka.markovich@uni.lu

### ABSTRACT

Neurotechnology and AI are expanding how systems can access and influence mental states, raising concerns about *mental privacy*. Yet the legal status of a *right to mental privacy* remains unsettled: it is often treated as a special case of the right to privacy, while others argue it is grounded in freedom of thought, which protects against coercion to disclose or adopt beliefs. Despite the regulatory and technological stakes, it is unclear how these epistemic rights formally interact or how autonomous systems can reason about them. We address this by introducing a *Logic for Mental Privacy* (LMP) that integrates multi-modal formalizations of the right to privacy and freedom of thought as epistemic claim-rights. We mechanize LMP in Isabelle/HOL via shallow semantical embeddings in Higher-Order Logic within the LogiKEY framework, and use automated reasoning to study its normative consequences. A case study shows how access to cognitive data can steer belief formation while remaining compliant with duties on explicitly protected content, yielding an indirect compromise of freedom of thought and exposing a normative gap around mental privacy. Overall, we show how legal knowledge representation and automated reasoning can inform debates on neurotechnology governance and support the design and analysis of normative multiagent systems.

### KEYWORDS

Normative Multiagent Systems; Legal Knowledge Representation; Automated Reasoning; Modal Logic; Higher-Order Logic; LogiKEY; Mental Privacy; Freedom of Thought; Normative Positions

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Advances in neurotechnology and AI personalization are rapidly expanding what autonomous systems/agents can *access* and *infer* about human mental states, motivating calls for explicit *neurorights* to safeguard *mental privacy*, *mental integrity*, and *cognitive liberty* [14, 18, 29]. These concerns are increasingly reflected in policy developments, such as protections for neural data in privacy

regulation [10] and legal reforms connected to neurorights [11]. A central concept is *mental privacy*, described as the ability to control access to one’s thoughts and beliefs [8, 12, 28]. However, the *legal grounding* of a *right to mental privacy* remains unsettled. One view treats mental privacy as a special case of the broader *right to privacy* (control over access to personal information), while another emphasizes *freedom of thought* as a more appropriate anchor, protecting individuals against coercion to reveal or adopt particular beliefs [17, 27]. The practical implications of these positions differ: privacy protections are typically defeasible and scope-dependent, whereas freedom of thought is often characterized as absolute, but subject in practice to thresholds on what kinds of beliefs qualify for legal protection [17]. This conceptual uncertainty matters for normative multiagent systems, where compliance checking and normative reasoning are already non-trivial (e.g., [1, 9, 15, 23, 25]).

This work asks: *How can we formally represent and reason about mental privacy, and its interaction with the right to privacy and freedom of thought?*

We contribute (i) a multi-modal *Logic for Mental Privacy* (LMP) integrating formalizations of freedom of thought and right to privacy as Hohfeldian claim-rights; (ii) a mechanization of LMP in Isabelle/HOL [22] via *shallow semantical embeddings* in Higher-Order Logic (HOL) [2] within the LogiKEY framework for logic and knowledge engineering [3, 5, 16]; and (iii) a case study showing an *indirect* compromise of freedom of thought enabled by access to belief-relevant mental states, even when direct coercion on a protected belief does not occur.

## 2 FORMALIZING MENTAL PRIVACY

Our approach treats epistemic rights as *normative positions*, which are based on the doctrine of the legal theorist W.N. Hohfeld: a right-holder’s claim-right corresponds to correlative directed duties on relevant counterparties [13, 19, 26]. See Figure 1, taken from [19]. This perspective is well-suited for computational settings because such duties can be seen as explicit compliance targets (e.g., duties of an agent toward another agent) that can be checked against formal models of agent behavior (see details of the positions in [19–21]).




Figure 1: Hohfeldian atomic types of rights and correlatives

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**Logic for Mental Privacy (LMP).** Let  $A$  be a finite set of agents, with  $a, b \in A$ , and  $\Phi$  a set of propositional letters. We combine two multi-modal logics: (i) the logic for freedom of thought from [21], which features a doxastic modality  $B_a$  for belief, and (ii) the logic for the right to privacy from [20], which features an epistemic modality  $K_a$  for knowledge. The combined language also includes alethic necessity  $\Box$ , agency/STIT  $E_a$ , and directed obligation  $O_{a \rightarrow b}$ . The key expressivity gain is the ability to represent nested epistemic/doxastic statements: in order to formalize mental privacy, we need to express *knowledge about another agent's beliefs*.

**Freedom of thought as a claim-right.** We adopt the multi-modal formalization of freedom of thought of [21], in which forceful interventions are represented as actions that make certain doxastic attitudes impossible. For a protected proposition  $\phi$  (e.g., a serious political or philosophical belief), a (series of) claim-right(s) can be expressed by requiring each other agent  $b$  to have a duty toward  $a$  not to see to it that  $a$  cannot (possibly) believe  $\phi$ :

$$\bigwedge_{b \in A \setminus \{a\}} O_{b \rightarrow a} \neg E_b \neg \Diamond B_a \phi$$

This captures the intuition that freedom of thought is violated by *coercive* or *forceful* epistemic manipulation (not by mere persuasion), and it can be extended to the three possible attitudes of belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment.

**Right to privacy as a claim-right to control access.** We also adopt a multi-modal formalization of the right to privacy from [20]: the state/legislator establishes obligations on identified duty-bearers (e.g., a company) so that the right-holder can decide whether others obtain access to protected information.

**Right to mental privacy as privacy over epistemic states.** We then formalize mental privacy as a special case of the above privacy claim-right: instead of controlling others' knowledge of an external fact  $\phi$ , the right-holder  $a$  controls others' knowledge of  $a$ 's *beliefs* about  $\phi$ :

$$\bigwedge_{b \in A \setminus \{a\}} O_{c \rightarrow a} E_c \Diamond E_a \neg \Diamond K_b B_a \phi$$

This makes explicit how mental privacy is *privacy about epistemic states*. It also foregrounds one policy question at the center of the mental privacy debate: *which beliefs should be within scope?*

### 3 LOGIKEY MODELING

We mechanize LMP in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant using the LogiKEY framework for logic engineering<sup>1</sup>. LogiKEY relies on *shallow semantical embeddings* (SSEs), which encode the semantics of an “object logic” (here: LMP) within HOL. In the SSE, propositions become predicates over possible worlds (type  $\sigma := i \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ ), and modal operators are defined as higher-order terms (e.g.,  $\Box$  as quantification over accessible worlds). This allows us to reuse for LMP the mature HOL automation [4] available in Isabelle/HOL: *Sledgehammer* [6] to discharge proof obligations and derive consequences, and *Nitpick* [7] to find models or countermodels.

**Case Study.** We model an immersive platform, *Cerebra*, used by *Alice*. *Cerebra* can infer belief-relevant mental states from BCI signals and machine learning predictions. *Alice* believes  $p$  (“This

<sup>1</sup>The Isabelle/HOL source files of our encodings and case study can be found at <http://logikey.org/tree/master/2026-AAMAS-Data>.

**Table 1: Formulas assumed to hold at  $w_0$  and  $w_1$**

Assumptions	
$w_0$	$p, \neg q, \neg r$
$w_1$	$p, q, \neg r$
$w_0$	$B_a p, B_a((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r), \langle B_a \rangle q \wedge \langle B_a \rangle \neg q, \langle B_a \rangle r \wedge \langle B_a \rangle \neg r$
$w_1$	$B_a p, B_a((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r)$
$w_0$	$\neg K_c(B_a p), \neg K_c(B_a((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r))$
$w_1$	$K_c(B_a p), K_c(B_a((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r))$
$w_0, w_1$	$O_{c \rightarrow a}(\neg E_c \neg \Diamond(B_a r) \wedge \neg E_c \neg \Diamond(B_a \neg r) \wedge \neg E_c \neg \Diamond(\langle B_a \rangle r \wedge \langle B_a \rangle \neg r))$
$w_0, w_1$	$\neg E_c \neg \Diamond(B_a r) \wedge \neg E_c \neg \Diamond(B_a \neg r) \wedge \neg E_c \neg \Diamond(\langle B_a \rangle r \wedge \langle B_a \rangle \neg r)$
$w_0, w_1$	$(K_c(B_a p) \wedge K_c(B_a((p \wedge q) \rightarrow r))) \rightarrow (E_c \neg \Diamond(B_a \neg q) \wedge E_c \neg \Diamond(\langle B_a \rangle q \wedge \langle B_a \rangle \neg q))$

year is warmer than last year”) and also believes the conditional  $(p \wedge q) \rightarrow r$ , where  $q$  is “Last year was too cold” and  $r$  is “Climate change is acceptable”. *Alice* initially suspends judgment on  $q$  and  $r$ . *Cerebra* is forbidden to force *Alice*'s beliefs on  $r$ , which is protected under freedom of thought. *Cerebra* does not directly coerce *Alice* to believe  $r$ , but instead uses mental-state access to steer *Alice* into believing  $q$ ; *Alice* then concludes  $r$  via her own inference. This captures an *indirect* compromise of freedom of thought: the protected belief changes without a direct coercive act on that belief. Let  $a$  denote *Alice* and  $c$  denote *Cerebra*. We represent two salient worlds,  $w_0$  (before access/steering) and  $w_1$  (after access/steering), and encode the main assumptions as LMP formulas, see Table 1. Using Isabelle/HOL automation, we establish three key points:

(1) *The scenario is consistent.* Nitpick finds models satisfying the assumptions simultaneously.

(2) *A mental-privacy violation is derivable.* Mental privacy as modeled in Sect. 2 fails at  $w_1$ : *Alice* cannot prevent *Cerebra* from knowing her beliefs.

(3) *Freedom of thought is compromised without a direct violation.* At  $w_1$ , *Cerebra*'s steering blocks *Alice*'s disbelief and suspension on  $q$ . The protected belief on  $r$  arises via *Alice*'s own inference, so a compliance checker that looks only for direct coercion on protected beliefs would miss the harm.

### 4 CONCLUSION

We presented a logic-engineering approach to the right to mental privacy suited for normative multiagent settings: LMP combines two logics, and, hence, combines doxastic and epistemic modalities with agency and directed obligation to express claim-rights over *knowledge about beliefs*. Mechanized using the LogiKEY methodology [3, 5, 24] and Isabelle/HOL [22], the framework supports automated exploration of normative consequences through theorem proving and model finding. Our case study demonstrates how, within our formal language, access to belief-relevant mental states can enable *indirect* compromises of freedom of thought that evade detection when compliance checks consider only direct coercion on protected propositions. Beyond neurotechnology governance, the key methodological contribution is reusable: it shows how contested legal concepts can be reconstructed formally, and how automated reasoning can expose hidden gaps and design trade-offs.

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