

Observations on the State of Comparative Administration Research in Europe — Rather Comparable than Comparative

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This article tries to review public administration research undertaken in Europe since about 1980. As there is little comparative research, an attempt is made to systematize comparable research along three dimensions: organization structures (macro and micro), meta-policymaking as it refers to budgeting and planning procedures, and research about personnel and personnel policy. It is observed that neo-conservative reform policies in the Anglo-American countries have had a noticeable impact on the orientation of academic research. Subsequently, these policies not only affected macro-structures by privatization and decentralization measures, but also gave meta-policymaking a characteristic turn, quite as it tried to induce a more managerialist role understanding in the civil service. It is argued in favor of more basic research and the institutionalization of administrative monitoring on the national level as well as stronger cooperation on the international level to advance comparative research beyond secondary analysis of the incidentally comparable.

When the editors of *Governance* outlined the policy of this journal four years ago (Campbell and Peters 1988a), they emphasized the need to study “comparative executive politics” in a theoretical framework which abandoned or surpassed the politics-administration dichotomy. This objective rested on the careful inspection by Guy Peters of the internationally available literature; he had stated a lack of cross-national comparative studies of public bureaucracies (Peters 1988, 8-24). On the other hand, Peters himself (1989) provides an example of comparing administrative science material on a variety of topics across nations. This seeming contradiction dissolves, if a distinction is made between research that is **comparative by design** involving data collection in two or more countries, and research based on secondary analyses of national studies of **comparable** approach and design, which Peters basically undertook. It might not come as a surprise then that the basic result of this survey is, that during recent years little comparative research was undertaken **in Europe**; for internationally comparative (and cooperative)

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work is — after all — time-consuming. However, there are a number of studies in the various national settings in Europe which are similar in approach and produced comparable material.

Although I ought to demonstrate the comparability of the findings, I can, within the limits of this survey, only indicate their common research orientation and put forward some tentative generalizations. Moreover, the following observations are necessarily selective owing to language barriers; this holds in particular for my attempt to review comparable material and less so for comparative research, which is more likely to be published in English.

As a **heuristic device** for reviewing the most important formal aspects comparative administrative research can be expected to investigate, **four subfields** are to be separated with which administrative sciences, despite their heterogenous disciplinary foundations,¹ are in general dealing:

- **Organizational structures** as the result of assignment and reform of public tasks and decision-making competences to and within an administrative system; declaring certain functions public or private has a bearing on the state-society delineation and is often a constitutional matter as might be the reallocation of tasks between central and peripheral subsystems of the overall public sector. Questions referring to these macro-structural aspects are to be distinguished from more traditional studies of individual agencies, departments or more broadly upon specific levels of government (national, regional and local).
- The budget and **budgeting** as an institutionalized process can be separated as a second dimension of public bureaucracies, since they at the same time consume and transfer monetary resources that depend on the size of individual units as well as of the overall public sector and respond to political programs and the relative flow of resources from the economic environment.
- Institutionalized tools and procedures of **decision-making**, e.g., planning and evaluation techniques, that attempt to rationalize information processing and decision-making involved in policy or program development and its implementation, can be regarded as a third dimension.
- **Personnel and personnel policy** is the fourth dimension affecting through the kind of expertise and acquired role understanding the mode in which problems are perceived, programs and budgets planned and implemented.²

Of course, this distinction is highly analytical, as e.g., budgeting and planning are occasionally technically and substantively interrelated;

also, the structural and the personnel dimensions are strongly interdependent as tasks and professional expertise tend to be matched. Talking about administrative science on a meta-level might justify these crude categories; turned substantively, they are just factors of production, but do not generate an adequate picture of the processes and problems of administrative systems. In this respect public administration is probably best conceptualized in cybernetic terms, based on the familiar input-conversion-output-impact-feedback model. Public administration to varying degrees is related to all of these phases of the policy cycle; for instance, the ministerial bureaucracy in most countries of the western world is preoccupied with producing inputs for the political system and converting inputs originating there into programs. The production of administrative outputs is rather a matter of implementing agencies, which, in turn, are being controlled by the ministerial bureaucracy. At the boundaries of the administrative system there are thus interactions taking place with the political as well as with the socio-economic system of a society in dealing with cases and delivering services. Although the policy cycle basically consists of information processing and decision-making according to programs, this survey is not dealing with substantive policy aspects or types of programs as distinguished since Theodore Lowi suggested his first typology; it largely neglects the field of policy analysis and is — according to an agreement with the editors — rather confined to the formal aspects of public administration mentioned above.

MACRO-STRUCTURES UNDER INVESTIGATION

During the last decade public administration in a number of western countries was besieged by political reformers inspired by policies to redress the boundaries of “the state” and to withdraw “the state” from society. This movement is in its structural implications for public administration comparable in scale only to the territorial reforms of local governments carried through worldwide since the 1960s. Neo-conservative policies during the 1980s had programmatically and fiscally motivated academically (by public-choice theory) legitimized macro-organizational targets and implications.

Privatization

Besides deregulation and curbing public spending as the most important devices initiated, **privatization policies** were to transfer entire agencies to private law status and to sell them to the public hoping that public goods would be provided by the market. While genuine privatization

apparently most radically took place in Britain, other countries have restricted their organization policy to contracting-out and transferring public agencies to private law status without giving up financial control (Kristensen 1987). Comparative empirical research about the extent of this process and the implications for governance, though, is scarce; besides national accounts (for example Caisse 1989; König 1989a), the converging privatization policies in Britain, the US and France were put in international perspective (Henig, Hamnett and Feigenbaum 1988) not merely on the national, but also on the level of local governments showing that privatization in general followed late and had to be pressured by central government. Further, Hood, Dunsire and Thomson (1988) made the important distinction between staffing and program cutbacks in their comparison of British "Thatcherism" and Australian "Fraserism," concluding among other things that program retrenchments are more difficult to achieve and that even staffing cutbacks on one level may be set off by increases on the other. Maybe, it is yet too early to expect scientific assessments of these policies; it might be doubted, though, that governments will ever have their privatization policies thoroughly evaluated as to distributive effects, the quality and reliability of services, and — what tends to be completely overlooked — public control of mere mutations to private law corporations, which exempt business operations from (local) parliamentary scrutiny.

One reason why these structural and quantitative changes at the margin of the public sector did not yet attract closer comparative administrative science attention, is possibly the problem encountered in determining the overall size of the public sector in the various countries, itself an object of comparative research (Rose 1985b; Peters 1988, 26-60; Rowat 1990). These analyses as well as diverging official national statistics³ reveal that variations in the size of national public services can as well be the result of incompatible official definitions of who belongs to the public service as they could reflect different public or private organization of services. During the 1980s the share of the public service in the total labor force tended to be above 20% in the Scandinavian countries, France and the United Kingdom, and amounted to roughly 16% in the United States, Italy and Germany (Hauschild 1991, 86). If these differences are not statistical artifacts, the program approach suggested by Richard Rose (1985a) could be one way to explain national variations of public service size and of aggregate expenditures as a function of the developmental stage of the welfare state. Comparatively surveying not merely recently privatized, but also the entire range of enterprises under public control could provide another yardstick for assessing the significance of privatization policies in various countries. Whatever the result, changes induced by privatization poli-

cies in western nations will appear marginal compared to the scale of restructuring of the public sector presently going on in Eastern Europe.

Whereas the privatization discussion predominantly adopted the perspective from within the public sector, thematically related research about "third sector" (non-profit) organizations has emerged as a new comparative topic (Anheier and Seibel 1990). In indicating alternative voluntary provisions of public goods and substitutive relationships between the public and private sectors, analyses of the function of third-sector-organizations is not only suited to complement government policies and to comfort anti-etatist citizen movements. This research could also considerably contribute to our understanding of the problems incurred in societies presently undergoing transition from totalitarian to liberal democratic regimes. For, they normally have destroyed voluntary associations and bureaucratized their functions.

Decentralization

Besides changes in the state-society relationship owing to deregulation and privatization, the macro-structure has become more decentralized in yet another respect in a number of European countries today than it was in the 1970s. Moving along the centralization-decentralization continuum towards the center of government, the configuration of subsystems (regions, Länder) and national government has attracted research attention, since the re-allocation of tasks, financial resources, and ultimately political power between center and subsystems became a political issue too, motivated once more partly by fiscal concerns, partly by a strategy of conflict displacement. In this respect, Hesse and Benz (1988; 1990) elaborated parallels in decentralization policies between the federal fabric in Germany, "new federalism" in the US as well as decentralization policies in unitary states like France and Britain, emphasizing both central "modernization" goals and regional resistance as important factors accounting for changes in the vertical configuration. This interest in decentralization revitalized to a certain extent research conducted in the 1970s about the functions of the intermediate, **regional level** of administration in France, Italy and Germany (Mayer 1976), a tier of administration which has no equivalent in a number of European countries, including Great Britain. However, research about **regionalism** in Europe and **devolution** in Britain (Morgan 1986), although thematically related to shifts in the vertical division of powers in federal systems and the possibilities of decentralized regional administration, is primarily concerned with cultural identity and regional political self-determination of distinct ethnic groups in Spain, France, Italy, Belgium or the UK.

Local Government

Studies in **state-local government** relations fit into this strand of research, have been equally intensively conducted by national researchers and are being internationally discussed in specialist circles.⁴ Their common denominator is the **local perspective** and the problem of political (and juridical) as well as financial autonomy of the subsystems vis-à-vis ever increasing centrally regulated or generated public tasks. Frequently local problems result from the very decentralization and privatization policies of the center. Curbing central government programs, for example in housing policy, or changing labor market policy tends to generate policy problems local governments have to cope with. And it is often here where the "third sector," if existing, gains its importance. How much is left of local government autonomy under these circumstances of problem overload and fiscal stress is as difficult to measure as the formal status of self-government becomes blurred in cross-national perspective. Danziger (1991), in a study including some European countries, showed that the fiscal management strategies applied by local governments vary with their position in unitary or federal states, the latter giving local governments more flexibility in improving their financial situation. Overall, administration policy particularly in unitary states tends to transform local authorities from administrative agencies to self-governing communes, a process that has induced comparative discussion in Scandinavia (Ståhlberg 1990; Rose 1990).

The vertical reallocation of functions onto the local level of administration is, however, not just a response to the fiscal problems of the 1980s, but partly the aftermath of the **territorial local government reforms** that occurred in almost all European countries in the two decades between 1960 and 1980. Their results were well documented (Rowat 1980; Gunlicks 1981) and inspired some comparative theorizing about the relation of these reforms to the expansion of the welfare state (Dente and Kjellberg 1988). Comparable research about specific consequences of the amalgamation and professionalization process the reforms involved was undertaken in a number of countries, e.g. about the management implications of the reforms in Britain (Greenwood et al. 1980) — an aspect generally of primary concern to local government experts and practitioners in Europe as well as in the US (Watson and Montjoy 1991). In West Germany, the assessment of this secular reform process, which reduced the number of local governments from 24,000 to 8,500, was undertaken in a comprehensive research project comprising the problems of efficiency and political legitimacy;⁵ in taking local democracy as their vantage point, some of these studies followed the tradition of the community power studies produced in the US in the 1960s and

thus tried to compensate academically for the dominating effectiveness orientation that guided reform practice.

Furthermore, research was occupied with governance problems in **metropolitan areas**, documented e.g. in the voluminous literature on Greater London or recently on Istanbul (Heper 1989); a thorough cross-national comparison of this particular aspect of local government was already produced for the 1983 International Administrative Science Congress (Wagener 1985) pointing out the vast number of structural arrangements for administratively coping with the problems of highly agglomerated areas.

Certainly, comparative cross-national research about local government is in general a formidable task and has led to a good deal of specialization within administrative science. Even though it is much easier to determine the position of cities and municipalities in any of today's political systems than in the feudal fabric of medieval continental Europe, particularly deserving might therefore be a recent comparative inquiry into typical constellations in local government's internal structures and external relations to state bureaucracy (Humes 1991); as to local government in Europe Humes distinguishes four models that partly influenced developments overseas: the French model of dual supervision through the ministry of interior's chain of command and the specialized ministerial departments' local engagement in service delivery; the German model of local government autonomy and subsidiarization by Länder governments; the British model of functional regulation by the center, and the dual subordination to state and party bureaucracies typical for the (former) Soviet Union. Internally the power structure of local governments is obviously best comparable with respect to the position of the chief executive. This, however, depends partly on features of the local government constitutions, which vary strongly in federal systems.

Reducing the Complexity of Macro-Analyses

As the problem of the **overall distribution of power** between state and society or within the public sector is involved in the analysis of vertical relationships, national discussions are ultimately about the political constitution of a country, and cross-national comparisons taking into account these contexts seem to be beyond the grasp of most researchers. Although previously these macro-structural aspects were predominantly dealt with by constitutional experts, they have increasingly attracted more attention from social scientists in recent years. Though, often the complexity and dynamics of a single administrative system

are already so difficult to comprehend that cross-national comparisons of certain structural elements or processes taking into account the multiplicity of contextual variables is discouraged.⁶ This would be even more so if macro-oriented research dealt more systematically with **dependent variables** on the output-side. Thus, it is hardly surprising that one finds collections of **country reports** (Rowat 1988) rather than analytically comparative studies of macro-structures. Another strategy to reduce this complexity might be recognized in the **renaissance of the state concept** even outside the European continent in analyses of the interrelationship of the public and private spheres of life, or in the assessment of the overall functions and size of the public sector; it obviously helps to abstract from the internal fragmentation of the administrative machinery and suggests a monolithic actor. To reduce this complexity instead by establishing a clear **theoretical focus**, is rare. While to some researchers the process itself of redressing the vertical balance of power was of interest, e.g. as a matter of implementing a structural reform policy (or inhibiting it — depending on the frame of reference), others try to assess the systemic functioning of the (reformed) macro-system by looking, for instance, for blocks and traps in multi-level joint decision-making (Scharpf 1988) or contemplating the problem-solving, steering, guidance, innovative or whatever capacity of the macro-system. Methodologically though, this ultimately functionalist approach is bound to face the validity problem well-known from output-research, if going beyond expert judgments at all. Apparently studies of problems in certain **policy areas**, e.g. the economic policy functions of local governments in Britain and Germany (Johnson and Cochrane 1979; Mayntz 1981) are preferred in reducing the increased complexity of our knowledge about the intricacies of the working of national administrative systems. In this study, organization structures, in particular the formal position of local government vis-a-vis central government, were inspected in accounting for differences in restrictions and in levels of performance. Still narrower in scope is the **case-study method**, employed in policy research about genesis, implementation and impact of individual programs. Certainly, concentrating on a **focal program** also brings to the fore a variety of institutions and actors (“networks”) trying to steer, to modify or to counteract a program; in this respect, implementation research has undoubtedly tremendously furthered insight into the contingencies of administrative decision-making, but it also tends to abstract from the **multifunctionality** of most agencies and sub-governments and the management problems originating from inherent goal conflicts and shortage of resources. Thus, the case study method does not contribute too much to a comprehensive understanding of administrative systems and, if applied in comparative

research, it occasionally ends with deliberations on specific national "administrative cultures" (Jann 1983).

ORGANIZATIONS STILL OF INTEREST

Despite the growing scientific interest paid to macro-structural aspects of administrative systems, traditional studies of **focal organizations** and their environment have continued to carry through. Of course, the executive **machinery of national government** was and still is of special interest to administrative scientists in general and political scientists in particular; however, even here one suffers from a drought of thoroughly comparative studies in line with the classical field of comparative government (Loewenstein 1967).

Since the situation of presidents and prime ministers in six European countries, Canada and the US was assessed with some emphasis on the **office of the head of government** (Rose and Suleiman 1980), functional aspects of central government as well as attempts at reform were analyzed for Switzerland, Britain and a number of oversea countries (Campbell and Peters 1988b). In addition, some country-specific studies have become available; owing to the increased attention paid to Prime Minister Thatcher's "presidential" style of government, structure and function of the cabinet office (Seldon 1990) and cabinet (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990) as well as of Whitehall in general (Hennessy 1989) have been particularly intensively analyzed. Beyond the studies contained in the volume by Rose and Suleiman (1980) very little research was done about comparable French (Thuillier 1982 on the cabinets ministeriels) or German institutions (on the chancellory König 1989b; Sprengkamp 1989), at least nothing as comprehensive as Colin Campbell's analysis of White House operations under various US presidents (Campbell 1986). Major reforms of central government structures were apparently not initiated in the European capitals — apart from applying the traditional staff solution with the policy and the efficiency units or rearrangements of departmental jurisdictions like merging the Civil Service Department and Treasury in Britain. Of course, redressing departmental boundaries not seldom occurs in other capitals too, if required by coalition arithmetic, but these reforms tend to go largely unnoticed (but see for Bonn Busse 1988; Pehle 1988). Unless one is confronted with such exceptional political figures like Prime Minister Thatcher, who above all set out to remold Whitehall, or Chancellor Adenauer in the formative years of the FRG, who engendered studies about his particular type of "chancellor democracy" (recently Niclauß 1988; critically Mayntz 1980), parliamentary governments obviously do not induce a research tradition similar to US presidential studies. The institution at

the apex is probably too strongly shaped by the constitution to pay much attention to the personality and style of the office incumbent, especially if her/his office duration is short. Indicatively, it needed the view from Washington of Colin Campbell's disciple Phyllis Berry (1989) to examine the organization of the German chancellor's office under Schmidt and Kohl. The more inviting this relative stability could be to explicitly comparative studies of structure and function of the most central institution. Rolf Kaiser (1990), in a brief report based on a survey in OECD countries, elaborated 12 functional imperatives the office of head of government has to respond to today and compared alternatives for internal structural differentiation: departmental "mirror organization" (e.g. in the chancellor's office in Bonn) and policy or program organization.

We are also missing comparative institutional studies about how (in particular new) **policy areas** like environmental affairs with their complex partial intervention programs or equal opportunity policies (for women) are organized on the level of national government in various European countries. An exception is the comparison of the institutionalization of EC affairs in the member states of the community (Wallace 1973; Pag 1987); this varies between structural alternatives are special EC departments, staff solutions and committee systems in countries where responsibilities are fragmented between foreign office and domestic policy departments.

The "**bureaumatic**" approach to government departments developed by Hood and Dunsire (1981) found a few followers (Dunleavy 1989; Peters and Hogwood 1988), but has not yet been applied in cross-national research, although quantitative data on bureaucratic elements should be relatively easy to collect from documents.

Closest to the center of national government and directly impinging on the internal aspect of governance are problems discussed in Britain under the acronyms of QUAGO and QUANGO. These **quasi-autonomous units**, decentralized from government ministries, constitute at the same time a means to make government departments more manageable as they pose the classic problem of political control and accountability. An Anglo-German project conducted by Hood and Schuppert (1988) compared these paragonovernmental units on different levels of the macro-structure in six European countries as to policy areas and rationale.

Studies of Reform Processes Missing

Finally, in recollecting what had occupied the international scientific community in the 1970s as far as administrative structures are concerned, it cannot be denied that in those days the very reform processes

and the **strategies of administrative change** stimulated comparisons (Leemans 1976; Caiden and Siedentopf 1982). Maybe, recent reforms of central government institutions are too incremental or ephemeral, compared to the spectacular decentralization and privatization policies in the overall public sector, to arouse research interest in these administrative policies from the point of view of organizational change. Or does the widespread skepticism, whether "organization matters" (but see Egeberg 1987) and reforms are just another expression of symbolic politics (March and Olson 1983), discourage renewed research interest? Be that as it may, government reforms 20 years ago probably appeared more spectacular because they were also related to innovations in the areas of budgeting and planning.

META-POLICYMAKING REORIENTED

Budgetary and policy planning processes are often two sides of the same coin, even if not procedurally integrated but constituting a two-track-system. Reconsiderations of existing decision-making patterns in the areas of budgeting and substantive policymaking (including the integration of both dimensions) can be viewed as attempts to rationalize decision-making processes within central institutions of polity and bureaucracy. This **meta-policymaking** (Dror 1968) did not produce major innovations during the last decade and experiments with new planning systems did not take place in Europe in recent years, unless one is prepared to interpret parts of Prime Minister Thatcher's Financial Management Initiative or the Next Steps program as the product of meta-policymaking. Less visible innovations nevertheless occurred in budgeting and related techniques in almost all countries of the western hemisphere. These procedural modifications of traditional budgeting techniques were partly a response to fiscal scarcity, but also concomitant measures for politically motivated devices to "withdraw the state from society." Allen Schick (1988, 1990) analyzed the various **budgetary adaptations to fiscal stress** in North America and Europe including less brutal measures than the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, for instance "creative accounting" in Britain. Indicatively, like DeVisscher (1989) in a survey of European countries, he did not report comparable changes of the German practice, nor has cutback management become a topic of scientific interest here as it did in Britain (Gray and Jenkins 1990). The particularities of these budgetary innovations in the 1980s become visible on the background of the classical analyses of the traditional budgetary process as carried out by Wildavsky (1964) for the US and Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) for Britain.⁷ On the other hand, they are still being contrasted with the ideal of the American Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System and its successors e.g. in Canada, or

with president Carter's Zero-Base-Budget. Rather than being investigated in international projects, these **budgetary innovations** abroad are frequently observed by foreign researchers and propagated at home, for instance by Langner (1983) and Rürup and Färber (1985) in the German case. One advantage even of individual reports about foreign models is the necessity to explain the political and constitutional context in which the budgetary system under consideration operates, while the comparison as such mostly remains rather implicit and is left to the knowledgeable reader. Often these works are written by or addressed to practitioners, and the more or less implicit three E's (efficiency, effectiveness, economy) prevail, whereas legitimacy or political control as alternative reference points tend to be missing. The exception to the rule is a recent German comparative analysis of budgetary systems in the US, Great Britain, Canada, France and Germany (Sturm 1989) showing among other things such a basic, but often not known fact how parliamentary rights vis-a-vis the executive vary in these countries as to their capability to influence revenue and expenditure alterations.

The efficiency orientation prevails particularly in even more technical aspects like **government accounting**. Nevertheless, even studies on this level of administrative practice can be theoretically interesting, once they are done in a comparative way, like a recent survey by Lüder (1989; Lüder et al. 1990), which was bound to take into account diverging historical, cultural and constitutional aspects in order to explain why public accounting takes on different forms in the US, Canada, France, Denmark, the Swiss cantons, and Germany.

Another strand of internationally comparative research is presently carried out about institutional aspects of **program evaluation** (Rist 1990). Two waves of institutionalization could be distinguished, a first in the 1960s concomitant with the installation of planning systems in the US, Sweden and Germany in economic boom periods and under reformist governments, and a second beginning at the end of the 1970s under adverse economic conditions, conservative governments and policies of retrenchment. With the exception of Germany, evaluation changed its primary function from improving to curtailing programs and tends to be more closely related to budgeting now than to program management (Derlien 1990a).⁸ Although comparative from the outset, these research efforts are, like in so many other cases, based on country reports as the empirical evidence, which only then are analytically compared in a summary chapter along theoretical dimensions laid down for the country reports. Such a compromise between a "sandwich"-reader compiling virtually uncomparable material between two covers and fully coordinated multi-country studies seems to be a viable solution for comparative research.

Less technical than those investigations might appear at a first glance and more appealing to the social scientist, are comparative analyses of the interaction between **science and politics** as differentiated subsystems with their own rationalities. In fact, there might be a substitutive relationship between the growing interest in the process of external scientific advice to government and the decreased practical interest in internal reforms to make the system more "intelligent." *Speaking Truth to Power* (Wildavsky 1979) or *Advising the Rulers* (Plowden 1987) is of course addressing a secular topic, which in former times used to be treated with a strong normative undertone with respect to the science system (value freedom) as well as the political system (technocratism). Since the late 1970s both positions have been replaced by a more pragmatic definition of the relationship. Among evaluation experts, the interaction problem was experiencing a renaissance under the heading of "non-utilization" (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980). The alternative perspective, that of the advised political or administrative system, was adopted in a collection of articles about the experience with institutionalized advice in a couple of countries (*Governance* 3.3 1989; Peters and Barker 1991). The scope of these treatises varies between broad historical accounts of institutionalized applied expertise (Wollmann 1989; Wagner and Wollmann 1986; Wagner 1989), and narrower analyses worrying about the status of "islands of excellence" (Dror 1986) and policy analysis within the bureaucracy (Bulmer 1988; Aberbach and Rockman 1989; Chelimsky 1990). Policy communities outside the bureaucracy or para-governmental think tanks, so widespread and politicized in Washington (Fischer 1991), are though largely missing in Europe (with the exception of Britain), play an inferior role in the policy process and/or cultivate value-freedom even if financed by political parties, for example in Germany (*The Economist* 1991).

Compared to research about administrative structures, studies dealing with improvements in meta-policymaking seem to be produced more frequently. This could be a reflection of the higher rate of innovation occurring in the "software" as opposed to the structural "hardware" of administrative systems.⁹ Also, there is apparently more international cross-fertilization among practitioners in this field.¹⁰

PERSONNEL AND PERSONNEL POLICY MOST INDUCIVE TO COMPARISONS

Obviously even more inviting to comparative administration research than innovations in meta-policymaking are the central actors in the politico-administrative system, the rulers and their top bureaucratic advisors. This is so not only for theoretical and methodological reasons,

but also because reform-minded politicians in a number of countries seem to have discovered the factor "P" in their efforts to come to grips with bureaucracy, instead of relying solely on organizational measures.

Civil Service Reforms

Recruitment, careers, motivation and orientation as conditioned by civil service systems and personnel policy have once again been exposed to criticism and ensuing reform pressures during the last decade, after the first, more analytically based, reform wave (Fulton Commission in Britain 1967; Studienkommission in Germany 1973) had ebbed. The civil service came under political attack in Britain (since 1979) as well as in the US (since 1978), and reforms have spread to Canada (Program 2000), Australia, New Zealand and even France in the 1980s. Ongoing civil service reforms and their consequences were analyzed for the US (Ingraham and Ban 1984; Newland 1988), France (Fortin 1988; Rouban 1989), Britain (Fry 1988; Rose 1988; Wilson 1991), and Canada (Aucoin 1988).

These recent civil service reforms, which in some countries are part of the broader strategy of administrative change emphasizing decentralization and privatization, have been observed, although partly not on a comparative basis, by contributors to this journal and in a symposium of the IPSA research committee 27, edited by Kenneth Kernaghan (1991). As far as these reforms in some countries are related to the policies of economizing the public sector, this journal provided the platform for a civil service centered comparative discussion of "managerialism" in the English-speaking countries. This discussion, apart from documenting and explaining parallel developments and differences between Britain and the US (Pollitt 1990), is strongly applied in its orientation in that it critically points out potential unforeseen consequences or even evaluating the actual results of interventions in the civil service structure. In particular in the countries of the British Commonwealth, to which the concept of "managerialism" applies best, questions of role definition (budgetary responsibility and political accountability) in a more decentralized structure are raised. Of utmost practical concern seem to be payment questions and the declining attractiveness of the civil service in Britain (Rose 1988) and even in France (Bodiguel and Rouban 1988; Montricher 1991), as it had been in the US since the introduction of merit pay and with increasing politicization (Levine 1988). Leaving the higher civil service for an economic career is more likely today, owing to the managerialist role model and to relative pay deficiencies, where the social status of the civil service is losing its former exclusiveness. Motivational reactions ("exit, voice, and loyalty")

of civil servants toward a changing working climate and impaired civil service morale as results of these policies have been compared in the respective countries (Peters 1991). These accounts, valuable as they are as measures of civil service spirit at a given time, occasionally though do not distinguish enough between the rhetoric of civil service policy, its reception in the service and its **lasting effects** on the basic features of the system. As to the UK, Fry (1988) stated a good deal of stability despite the Thatcher reforms and Wilson (1991) envisages a return to the pre-Thatcher civil service likely.

In a broader sense "bureaucratic morality" was addressed (Dwivedi and Olowu 1988) as a universal problem, although it might be questioned whether indications of misconduct and corruption, besides other morally questionable forms of conduct that can be distinguished (Dunsire 1988), have really increased in recent years. As far as statistics about disciplinary measures taken in the civil services are publicly available, they should be carefully analyzed before scientifically joining the public chorus for bureaucrat-bashing. Nevertheless, there seems to be some concern in certain countries, as problems of civil service ethics were compared in particular for the US and France (Toinet 1988; Rohr 1991).

Party-Politicization

Another actual trend that induced comparable research is the tendency to **party-politicize** the senior civil service in Europe and abroad. Contrary to the topics just mentioned, research about the extent and spread of party-politically motivated recruitment, promotion and purge in top administrative ranks, is primarily, though not exclusively theoretically oriented, as it relates to the bureaucrat-politician relationships. The topic was brought up internationally by administrative science in the early 1980s after a few government changes in Europe (Bodiguel 1983; Fortin 1984). However, comparative research revealed that the phenomenon was not new in most countries concerned and in particular in consociational democracies (Meyers 1985; Ståhlberg 1987). Apart from the representation of different ethnic, religious or language groups it might fulfill in societies with strong cleavages, party-politicization can be viewed as a strategy of domination patronage, thus inviting discussion in the context of the classical problem formulated by Max Weber about how bureaucracies can be prevented from becoming politically self-controlling. Of particular interest to some of the researchers was the question of what happens to top bureaucrats after a **government change** (Derlien 1988; Bourgault and Dion 1989; 1990; Cole and Caputo 1979; Brown 1982; Lowery and Rusbult 1986). Political streamlining of the bureaucracy in one way or the other, through purges at the top, re-

shuffling or selective promotion seems to be the rule after government change or in presidential succession in the US. Although today we are quite well informed about the extent of the phenomenon in a number of countries, we know less about its impact on the motivation of civil servants and the preservation of professional expertise in the government bureaucracy. External recruitment and the resulting decreased chances of promotion seems to impair motivation, while it cannot be excluded that it opens career civil service systems to new ideas. But even in a relatively closed career system, where all major parties can rely on a reservoir of followers within the apparatus like in Bonn, party-politicization is increasingly being criticized (Mayntz and Derlien 1989). Excessive domination patronage, besides being normatively unacceptable, could potentially drive the executive branch into neo-patrimonialism (Roth 1987, 15-57) if exercised by one party over a longer period of time. On the other hand, politics could as well become bureaucratized; where civil servants are permitted to engage in political activities, which is the case in most European countries except Britain, they do so more frequently than the average citizen and frequently cross over from bureaucratic to political careers earlier (in Germany) or even later (France) in their professional life.

Differentiation or Hybridization?

The classical politics-administration dichotomy in its institutional reference to parliament and bureaucracy and with its normative emphasis of questions of responsibility and accountability is no longer regarded as an adequate description of the actual extent of functionally necessary interactions and communications taking place between both worlds. The government bureaucracy involved in policy-development and implementation of programs is anything but apolitical. Furthermore, as bureaucratization of politicians could well be the other side of politicizing the bureaucrats, the question ultimately had to be asked, whether actors belonging to one of these institutional subsystems still distinguish themselves from functionaries formally acting in the other arena; whether **differentiation** prevails or **hybridization** (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981) is to a certain extent depending on the kind of data used; research based on rather **objective data** about social background, career patterns or analysis of the time budget might maintain that both functionary types are still distinct, although in continental Europe there is a strong affinity between both elite groups owing to juridical training and civil service experience also on the part of politicians; if anything, it is they who undergo change and become bureaucratized. With respect to **subjective role understanding**, though, investigated in interview-

based research the bureaucratic elite apparently moved further away from the imaginary classical to the political bureaucrat (Putnam 1973) and developed a more pronounced functional political role understanding in a number of countries. This is difficult to prove empirically, as longitudinal studies even in individual countries are seldom undertaken (e.g. for Bonn, Mayntz and Derlien 1989).

Basic Research

Apart from research growing out of concern with practical reform questions or normative problems, the scientific community during the last two decades produced a remarkable body of knowledge about top civil servants (generally the only stratum of interest to academic researchers) in all major Western countries. This accumulation of findings might be unmatched in other areas of administrative science, although comparisons are rare even here, where the unit of analysis is the individual and not organization structures or decision-making practices. Following Armstrong's (1973) comparative review of the history of civil service elites in western Europe, some collected country-specific reports about the size, formal status and actual function of this stratum of "mandarins" were edited (Dogan 1975; Suleiman 1984b; Smith 1984; Siedentopf 1989; Lundquist and Ståhlberg 1983), from which one could gain information suitable for comparison of the basic structure and actual problems of the higher civil servants in the US, Canada, France, Britain, Italy, Scandinavia and Germany. Meanwhile corresponding comparative research about cabinet ministers has been completed (Blondel 1985; Blondel and Thiebault 1991) and a data stock is available which should invite comparison with what we know about the mandarins.

The theoretical interest of these collections was found first in the **functional relationship** and interaction between both sets of actors at the top, following the publication of the outstanding (not merely by design) comparative study by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981; see also Putnam 1973). Second, since the mid-1980s these impulses seem to have inspired researchers in some countries to embark on comparable national research about elite **social background** and **careers**, although from a different perspective and with peculiar national emphasis. While French research (Birnbaum et al. 1978; Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983) is strongly interested in the factors contributing to the formation of top civil servants as a social elite, Swiss investigations tend to compare social representativeness of federal and cantonal personnel stressing the more elitarian recruitment of the former (Urio, Baumann, Aragoni and Joye 1989; see also Klöti 1972). The monopoly of jurists and their supposedly closed civil service careers has been under scrutiny in Germany

(Derlien 1990b), and in Canada the mushrooming of economists in central government departments was investigated (Carroll 1990). In Britain, what the elite has studied is obviously less interesting, but where it was educated (Theakston and Fry 1989) is! Despite recent reform attempts, all European civil service systems have remained career civil service systems with considerable stress on the accumulation of expertise in office; to increase political loyalty to the government of the day, they have, however, become politicized by reshuffling, prematurely or temporarily retiring officials at the very top, depending on the options made available in the various civil service codes. The systems, however, are far from the "government of strangers" encountered in Washington due to frequent turnover of outsiders among the political appointees (Heclo 1977; Mackenzie 1987).

In this research, until recently, the use of survey data was rare; most data have been generated from the international "Bureaucrats and Politicians" study covering the early 1970s (Anton 1980; Eldersveld, Kooiman and van der Tak 1981). Rather "qualitative," partly historical in their approach and aiming at comprehensive analyses of the higher civil service system are French investigations (Birnbaum 1982; Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983) in line with Ezra Suleiman's classical study (1974; 1984a). What also deserves mention in this context is Campbell's and Szablowski's inquiry of the Canadian "Superbureaucrats" (1979), who ran Trudeau's central coordination and planning apparatus and contributed to the centralized "prime ministerial bureaucracy," a type of executive organization characteristic of most of the Commonwealth countries (Subramaniam 1988, 93). This link between personnel policy, role understanding and organizational (as well as situational) aspects was also underlying Colin Campbell's (1983) comparative study of key executives under stress in Ottawa, Washington and London. Both studies, by the way, might have initiated the remarkable growth of Canadian research on matters of the civil service elite.

A lot of these investigations contain comparable material, which is not so surprising considering that the unit of analysis are individuals and their attributes, not complex structures or twisted procedures. Cross-national comparisons even in secondary analyses are, however, still the exception, although most national reports are written with a view across the borders to the most important reference countries, such as the latest report by Bourgault and Dion (1991), who concluded that the Canadian Deputy Ministers tended to include more women, were younger at the time of appointment and less party-politicized than in most European countries.

As to the presentation of comparable studies, it might be justified to state that *Governance* frequently provided the forum where the latest studies were published and symposia held. Nevertheless, it has to be

admitted, that comparative analyses, irrespective of the data base: qualitative or quantitative, biographical or attitudinal are still the exception even in this much researched area of administration. The first results of the on-going replication of the international "Bureaucrats and Politicians" project (Aberbach et al. 1990a; 1990b), display some initial material in two-country comparisons between the US on the one hand and Japan or Germany on the other. How all these data can be theoretically digested above the purely descriptive level, remains to be seen. We must at least develop and agree on some typologies describing the dimensions of role-understanding or factors influencing bureaucrat-politician relationships; Aberbach et al. (1981) in their introduction as well as Peters (1988, ch. 5) and Campbell (1988) showed promising attempts.¹¹ I doubt, though, that there is much room for alternative or additional theorizing beyond what Max Weber had already elaborated in his sociology of political domination, of which the so-called theory of bureaucracy is just one aspect; as "political domination means administration in everyday life," we shall probably not encounter more than simple variations of the old theme of power and control between bureaucrats and politicians unless we turn to devising some measure of system performance that could be affected by how well bureaucrats and politicians get along with one another in various structural and constitutional settings.

CONCLUSION

Three empirical observations can be derived from my necessarily selective sample of research about comparative public administration research in Europe. First, comparative administration studies are still a rare species, but national studies pursuing comparable research interests are quite frequent. Second, in the subfields of public administration I have distinguished, comparable research is traditionally carried through on meta-policymaking and personnel, while investigations of structural change or reforms of individual organizations is less frequently found; a novelty is the increased research interest in matters related to the macro-structure of administrative systems. Third, this recent research as well as the thematic re-orientation of studies in meta-policymaking and administrative personnel is strongly inspired by the administrative reform policies of the 1980s to which public administration research was responding.

Reform Policy and Paradigm Formation

Despite the imbalance of national research and internationally comparative projects, there is undoubtedly more comparable research today in

the subfields of macro-structure and personnel than there was 20 years ago. Partly, this might result from uniform administrative policies in the major Western countries in the 1980s, similar to the boom evoked in the policy science literature in the early 1970s by the reformist policies of the 1960s and the concomitant attempts at public planning. Obviously, administrative science as an ultimately applied discipline heavily follows the tide of practical administrative problems and reforms. My impression is, furthermore, that during the decade 1965–75 administrative science primarily analyzed empirical developments or suggested models for reforms taking place within subsystems or on certain levels of the executive apparatus. The focus was on individual administrative institutions, and in the field of public planning the emphasis was on planning techniques and planning organization. Thus, organization theory seems to have played a much more important role 20 years ago than since the 1980s, when practical concerns and scientific attention changed and problems of the overall public sector and its delineation from the socio-economic environment gained prevalence. Privatization and de-regulation policies induced the revival of the 19th century concept of “the state” even in Anglo-American countries without a “state tradition” (Dyson 1980) or more exactly: without a tradition of state philosophy. The emergence of this new paradigm gave research about administrative structures a macro-scopic turn and organization theory broadened to interorganizational analysis encompassing networks of institutions in the macro-system, partly public and partly societal (private).

This broader scope, though, did not exclude that developments occurred on the micro-level in particular in the subsectors of budgeting, evaluation and personnel. The overall re-orientation toward a state-society demarcation yet accentuated practical developments even in these subfields in a peculiar way: “rolling back the frontiers of the state” not merely led to decentralization and privatization policies, but also turned program budgeting into cutback-management, moved program evaluation towards auditing and expected civil servants to function like managers. The intrusion of micro-economic thinking into public affairs has shaped administration policy, i.e. policy toward administration, in a number of Western countries challenging public administration as a discipline. Maybe this is much too sweeping a generalization; it helps, though, to understand why research orientations have shifted in a number of countries since the late 1970s and why we encounter some cross-nationally comparable research. It is comparable to the introduction in the 1960s of decision-making techniques and management models from the business world. As it had turned out that neither cost-

benefit-analysis nor the various "management by" techniques were satisfactorily applicable to public sector decision and leadership problems, the new economic thinking — this monetarization of public affairs competing with their bureaucratization ("market vs. hierarchy") — was met with considerable academic skepticism from the beginning.

Limitations of Reform-centered Research

However, the new paradigm of administrative reform and research did not capture all European countries equally (Castles 1990); thus, Gerald Caiden in his latest survey on administrative reform has hardly anything to report about Europe except Great Britain (Caiden 1988). For instance in Germany, Thatcherism, although carefully observed, hardly inspired administrative reforms; as a federal system with political autonomy of local governments also and a long tradition of Quangos and Quagos as well as private law public enterprises, changes in the center-periphery-relations¹² or the gradual transformation of the federal postal service into private telecom corporations (1988) did not create categorically new structures but just modified the already well known. On the other hand, the newly acquired task of privatizing the east German state economy through the creation of the biggest industrial holding in the world (Treuhand-Anstalt), which commands of 8000 firms, is too new and unique a topic to invite (comparative) research. Likewise, there is no bureaucrat-bashing or desire to remold the civil service, but the task is to extend its traditional principles to the eastern part of the country (Derlien 1991). Other European countries with their specific administrative problems might as well escape international scientific attention unless they somehow relate to the mainstream Anglo-Saxon discussion. A bit more detachment from what is going on at the reform front, and increased emphasis on basic research would be welcome to fledgling comparative administration research.

Fragmentation of Administrative Research

Also, the neo-conservative wave of administrative policies did not have an equal bearing on all disciplines involved in administrative research. Decentralization and the resulting changes in the macro-system apparently constitute rather the leitmotif of political scientists in Europe referring to the Anglo-American discussion, while other disciplines (jurists and organization theorists) carried on with "normal science" in their national communities dealing on the micro-level with changes of

the executive structure of privatized agencies or investigating alienation on the part of the public and the officials. Although relatively more comparable research appears to be done in the areas of personnel and of meta-policymaking than about administrative structures, this should not lead us to the conclusion that these dimensions are sufficiently investigated. For, if we accounted also for the situation of clerical personnel or policemen, their pay and work satisfaction, or the relative importance of civil service unions and co-determination procedures (both well established in the Scandinavian countries and in Germany), the seeming consolidation of international research in the personnel sector would instantly disappear. As long as the administrative sciences, in Europe often working in a multi-disciplinary than interdisciplinary manner, are not even integrated in the national academic world, an account of cross-nationally comparable research remains necessarily selective. On the other hand, comparative research will be dominated by those subdisciplines that most closely cooperate on the international level, i.e. the social sciences.

But even in the social sciences hardly anybody would have expected that internationally comparative administration research had flourished in Europe during the last decade. Nevertheless, the body of comparable national material has considerably broadened since the 1970s. It is much easier today than it was 20 years ago to paint an adequate picture of the central government apparatus with its variations between Washington, London, Ottawa, Paris or Bonn¹³. We know how White House and Whitehall are structured and what sort of personnel keeps the machinery running. Administrative reform policies are almost instantly communicated around the globe today, whereas in the early 1970s, for instance, the most authoritative works about the PPBS were published in Germany only five years after the death of this experiment.

This increase of comparable studies is all the more remarkable, as within political science the **spread of substantive policy studies** might have siphoned off some of the water that in former times rinsed (comparative) administration research (Peters 1988, 12 f.). Also, policy studies might have played down formalized aspects of decision-making; the foundation of new policy studies journals in the 1980s obviously pushed the journal *Policy Science* into marginality. Formal relations between institutions tend to be neglected, too, by adopting the network-metaphor as organizational boundaries are de-emphasized by looking for policy communities. On the other hand, by implicitly dealing with the institutional context of policies, implementation studies broadened the scope of administrative research to encompass interrelations of institutions in the macro-structure. And policy studies could well complement the increased research about executive personnel.

Limitations of Comparable Research

The distinction I have made in this essay between comparative and comparable research is, admittedly, somewhat awkward, for **ex-post comparisons** of national reports are facing limitations of the possibility and the reliability of such endeavors. Unless guided by a pre-established analytical framework, such as one set by conference organizers or based on established typologies, the material presented is necessarily selective due to what appears practically relevant in a country and theoretically interesting to us. Secondly, the interpretation of the material and the explanation of cross-national variations has to take into account the contexts of the findings, which is not always a simple task to come to grips with. As to research, which is **comparative by design**, we should be realists. I think, we cannot expect comparative projects to be launched every 10 years or so covering the various dimensions of public administration. Such an encyclopedic endeavor would be unmanageable in every respect.

The recent concern with macro-aspects of the administrative system hardly means that we have advanced in comprehensive cross-national research comparing not just features like autonomous agencies, but entire systems. National administrative macro-systems constitute unique configurations which are already inherently difficult to understand. Comparative research of national administrative systems is therefore likely to be composed of countrywise descriptions with little explicit cross-national analysis. An example is Rowat's (1988) in other respects remarkable collection of reports that covers 20 countries grouped by the editor into the categories of Commonwealth, Nordic, Western European, and other developed democracies (US, Israel, Japan). On this level of analysis one can probably at best expect rough typological results in line with the Weberian comparative (developmental) bureaucracy tradition; but it is hardly exciting to learn from the summaries that bureaucracies in developed countries grew in size (personnel) since World War II as the welfare state expanded, that the rule of law prevails and that parliaments are facing problems in controlling the bureaucracy.

Institutionalizing Comparative Administration Research

The consolidation and accumulation of knowledge, after a comparative base-line study has been carried through in one of the identified sub-fields, could be achieved in textbooks reviewing the field from time to time, as shown (Putnam 1976; Peters 1989; Campbell et al. 1990). Otherwise the accumulation of comparative knowledge would remain the personal affair of individual researchers and would have to be accom-

plished ever anew unless some sort of **institutionalization** is provided, be it by establishing study groups carrying on a certain research tradition, fostering journals with a comparative orientation or by carefully synthesizing textbooks with an analytically focused (and not merely country-specific, sourcebook) approach. This would at least ease the accumulation of comparable knowledge, though this is difficult enough to achieve even in the national scientific community, as Houston and Delevan (1990) have shown for the US in an assessment of publications in the *Public Administration Review*. Advancing comparative research through institutionalization would all the more require a **national research infrastructure** in our field that would allow the **continuous collecting of data** about developments of the administrative system in various respects and thus make launching specific international projects to a certain extent superfluous, while at the same time encouraging cooperation and comparison almost on a routine basis. To me it is a miraculous contradiction in the development of empirical social science research that we continuously monitor events in the environment of the politico-administrative system, most prominent in public opinion and electoral studies, but have not yet started to create an equivalent data base to illuminate the black box of the state apparatus or to find out in more detail what officials and citizens feel and think about it.¹⁴ This state of affairs is not just reflecting the peculiar methodological problems of administrative research, e.g. the access problem, and the lack of interest of the bureaucracy in being continuously monitored, but it is partly an indicator of the relative underdevelopment of administrative research within the social sciences and, in some countries, of the inferiority of social scientists to jurists or economists in advising administration policy. Given a national research infrastructure permitting empirical monitoring, the international network of cooperation could much more effectively be used in comparative research than is the case at present.

In fact, considering these practical constraints and the methodological problems of comparative administration research (Aberbach and Rockman 1988), it is remarkable that comparative studies were produced at all. Some were sponsored by international social science foundations or emanated from international scientific associations,¹⁵ while comparable research was invited to journal symposia. Besides the positive development of the *International Review of Administrative Sciences* in recent years, it is the merit of *Governance* to have brought together much of the comparable material quoted in this survey. Yet these are international journals, partly with a heavy influence of the Anglo-American world towards which European comparisons are oriented. Furthermore, it might be maintained without exaggeration that comparative research

and the academic discussion aiming at cross-national comparisons is rather stimulated by colleagues from North America than by Europeans. Indicatively, there is so far neither systematic research about the bureaucracy of the European Community — besides the bulk of literature on EC policy — or of member states like Portugal and Greece, where soon illness will be attested to during vacations or the number of children be certified for the tax office — immediately binding for decisions in all the other member states. Nor is there such a thing as a European Review of Public Administration (with the possibility to choose EUROPA as an attractive abbreviation).

Although presently difficult to organize and to carry through, comparative research should nevertheless be the ultimate goal; that it is not an idle theoretical (middle range) game played in the ivory tower — a premise I have not put into question here — but that it also has a potential for practical application is demonstrated by the tremendous problems the East European states and the Soviet Union in particular are facing after the breakdown of the communist empire: comparatively scrutinized models for restructuring the public sector, e.g. alternative kinds of federalism, as well as for constructing national and local governments and reshaping the public service are obviously desperately needed, and monitoring of the implementation and transfer processes of western administrative models should be prepared. If one wants to avoid the disruptive process of learning by doing in public affairs, the wheel should not be invented anew in those countries.

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Notes

1. This rather multidisciplinary than interdisciplinary science is institutionalized in many continental European countries as an appendix to public law and less frequently as a subdiscipline of economics or as a branch of social, in particular, political science as in the Anglo-American countries.
2. The macro-micro distinction could serve as a further principal dimension cross-cutting these four functions: planning, policy development, budgeting, or personnel policy could be viewed from a macro-theoretical perspective, too, because they involve interactions and resource flows (information,

- money, people, legitimating beliefs) between the administrative system and its various environmental sectors. The macro-micro distinction will, however, be applied only to research on administrative structures.
3. Even OECD and EUROSTAT data on the public service are occasionally not fully comparable, although they are based on official national statistics (Hauschild 1991, 85).
 4. For instance, in the IPSA research committee on local government chaired by Helmut Wollmann (Berlin), and in an ECPR workgroup organized by Finn Bruun (Aarhus/ Denmark).
 5. The results were published in the 1980s in a series of the Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden, edited by Hans-Joachim von Oertzen and Werner Thieme.
 6. One reason why it is so difficult to reach a consensus in the European Community about further steps toward a political union is, apart from basic national concerns, probably a lack of understanding of federalism, local self-government and the principle of subsidiarity for allocating functions to higher echelons.
 7. Comprehensive treatments of national budgeting systems are surprisingly rare (Likierman 1988; Zuncker 1972), possibly because the field is dominated by practitioners.
 8. Consequently this research group organized within the International Institute of Administrative Sciences is investigating presently the link between evaluation, auditing and budgeting.
 9. I spare the growing body of literature about informatization in public administration.
 10. Transfer of ideas is most likely if specialists organize in international associations like INTOSAI, the association of supreme audit institutions.
 11. The insiders will also be gratefully remembering John Power's so far unpublished taxonomies.
 12. For example, the problems encountered in Britain in establishing the prison system as an agency independent of the home office in London do not occur in a federal system where prison management has never been a task of central government.
 13. In declining order due to the availability of publications in English.
 14. I do not believe we have to develop a conceptual frame of reference and typologies, before embarking on data collection. Both activities rather go hand in hand.
 15. The investigations conducted by Mayntz and Johnson (1981; 1979) and Rose (1985b) were funded by the Anglo-German Foundation; Hood and Schuppert (1988) were stimulated by the European Consortium of Political Research, and the Changes-in-the-Executive Study II, coordinated by Aberbach and Rockman, is associated with the IPSA research committee 27.

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