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To Draw a Line:
National Identities and their Political Consequences

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1990, Eric Hobsbawm (1992) postulated that the era of nationalism and nation states would soon be over, as the political, economic, cultural, and even linguistic boundaries of nations became increasingly porous in the face of increasing globalisation. According to Hobsbawm (1992: 191f.), nations and nationalism will play only a minor role in the "new supranational structuring of the globe". For individuals, he also predicted that nations would lose their meaning for them. Nationality would become just one social category among others to which individuals would belong and with which they would identify. More than three decades later, we "live in an increasingly interdependent world" (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2011: 1), where we share common challenges such as international terrorism, climate change, and pandemics, and where international political, economic, and social ties are flourishing and becoming increasingly important (Triandafyllidou 2020: 793). Nevertheless, nation states, nationalism, and national identification continue to play a crucial role in organising the world politically, economically, and socially. Responses to global challenges are primarily provided by nation states, which prioritise national interests (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2011: 1). The principles of nationalism – autonomy, independence, and sovereignty of nations – continue to guide economic and political decisions in the international arena (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2011: 1). At the same time, nationalist positions have recently regained ground dramatically in national politics. This recent resurgence and the successes of far-right parties[1] emphasising national exclusivity (Mudde 2007; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019) have arguably even been driven by increased global migration flows, increasingly liberalised citizenship policies, and growing global economic and political interdependence (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2006, 2012; Milner 2021; Walter 2021; cf. Cools et al. 2021; cf. Scheiring et al. 2024). They demonstrate the continuing relevance of national identity for individuals. This relevance of the nation to the individual, and particularly the political consequences of this relevance, is the focus of this cumulative dissertation.

[1] In line with Golder (2016), the term 'far-right' is used throughout the dissertation as an umbrella term that includes 'radical' and 'extreme' right-wing parties and movements.

1. *Research Questions, Research Agenda & Structure of the Dissertation*

Bridging research on national identity, social psychology, and voting literature, I investigate the effect of national identity on political preferences and political behaviour. I thereby focus on two key aspects of this relationship at the individual level: the overall relationship between national identity and political preferences, and the translation of this relationship into political behaviour. However, due to the lack of consensus in national identity research on how to define and measure national identity, as well as on which dimension(s) of national identity best explains far-right attraction, addressing the question of who is attracted to or repelled by far-right positions inevitably requires first addressing this conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research.

To address this conceptual-methodological gap and to answer the research questions of *who* is particularly attracted or repelled by far-right parties on the basis of national identity, and of *when* this relationship translates into political behaviour, my research programme comprises of six main areas: (i) Proposing a new person-centred approach to identify how citizens conceptualise their national in-group, while (ii) addressing national identity's multidimensionality and (iii) investigating the relationship between the individual dimensions of national identity and political preferences. Building on the findings of these first three steps, the research programme also covers (iv) examining whether national identity builds the breeding ground for voting decisions and (v) investigating the temporality of the overall relationship between national identity and voting. Furthermore, the latter includes (vi) testing for the role of political elite discourses and mass media reporting, while testing for both salience and directed messages in the information environment.

To explore and investigate national identity, I (i) propose a new exploratory person-centred approach that focuses on the conceptions of nationhood, that is, the ways in which citizens conceptualise their national in-group. This first step of my research programme builds on classical national identity research (Meinecke 1970; Smith 1992; Brubaker 1994; Kohn 2005) as well as recent methodological advances (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016, 2022; Helbling et al. 2016; Trittler 2017, Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*, *b*). While classical national identity research has already focused mainly on how citizens

conceptualise their national in-group to explain anti-immigrant attitudes, the studies relied on the distinction between *ethnic* and *civic* conceptions of nationhood, which was originally derived from state-level analyses (Meinecke 1970; Brubaker 1994; cf. Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; cf. Helbling et al. 2016). As this distinction has proven to be insufficient to fully capture the complexity of national identity at the individual level (Pehrson et al. 2009; Wright et al. 2012; Reijerse et al. 2013), the more recent inductive approaches have introduced person-centred methods that are sensitive to the underlying conceptions of nationhood and are thus better suited to capture the conceptions of nationhood than the traditionally used factor analysis. While the studies using cluster analysis (CA) show that individuals select and arrange membership criteria differently, thereby identifying different conceptions of nationhood beyond the ethnic-civic dichotomy (e.g., Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*; Trittler 2017), they are limited to few country samples due to the time-consuming method. In contrast, studies using latent class analysis (LCA) include larger samples, but have so far relied on a maximal definition of national identity by including national attachment, pride, and chauvinism in addition to conceptions of nationhood (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021). This approach has been heavily criticised, both empirically and methodologically, for combining the distinct dimensions of national identity into a single model (Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*, *b*). Building on the discrepancies between the approaches and the criticisms that have been raised against them, I propose to use person-centred methods in a large comparative cross-national study, while focusing on the classically used conceptions of nationhood. This focus is based primarily on the repeatedly found close relationship between conceptions of nationhood and anti-immigrant attitudes, and on social identity theory, which posits that distinction between groups is a prerequisite for the devaluation of outsiders (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979). Arguably, individuals with narrower conceptions of nationhood are likely to set higher thresholds for accepting immigrants as compatriots, making them more likely to perceive larger parts of (immigrant) societies as threatening and increasing their chances of favouring parties that offer exclusionary policies. Narrow conceptions are also expected to increase the sensitivity to nationalist or immigration-related issues through heightened threat perceptions, which may also increase their activation potential for political behaviour. Across countries, time, different survey instruments, and all empirical studies in this cumulative dissertation, I

identify four meaningful types of conceptions of nationhood that represent the selective sum of different membership boundaries that citizens use to conceptualise their national in-group. The identified conceptions of nationhood cluster roughly from exclusionary to inclusionary, with two types representing a general emphasis on most criteria (exclusionists) and a general rejection of most available criteria (pluralists) for distinguishing the national in-group from others, and two types employing different distinct patterns of membership conceptions, that either emphasising assimilation expectations in exchange for national membership (assimilationists) or employing rather low thresholds for in-group membership and focusing on securing social participation within the national society (integrationists).

Having identified the types of conceptions of nationhood, in the second research step, I (ii) address the multidimensionality of national identity by investigating the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and the remaining dimensions of national identity: namely awareness and affect, which represent mere identification (*awareness*) and emotional consequences of national membership, such as closeness, pride, and feelings of national superiority (*affect*) (Citrin et al. 2001). While awareness refers to the act of identifying with a nation and acknowledgement of one's group membership, the affect dimension refers to the emotional consequences of identification, expressed through feelings of closeness, pride, and superiority, which are anchored in the acknowledgement of group membership (Citrin et al. 2001: 74; Weldon 2006: 333; Helbling et al. 2016: 746). Awareness represents a necessary precondition for identification. The affective dimension (pride and chauvinism) determines the degree of in-group affection, favouritism, and salience of belonging, while the content dimension (conceptions of nationhood) determines to whom this favouritism is allocated (Wright 2011 *a*). I show that the identified conceptions of nationhood are indeed differently correlated with the other two dimensions of national identity. Having more exclusionary conceptions thereby is strongly positively associated with higher levels of national attachment and stronger national affects such as national pride and national chauvinism. In contrast, having more open conceptions of nationhood is consistently negatively related to the other two dimensions of national identity.

In the third step, I (iii) examine how the theoretically distinct dimensions of national identity are related to political preferences regarding immigrants, immigration, and

globalisation, which have previously been found to influence preferences for far-right parties (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Stockemer et al. 2018; Steiner et al. 2024). Controlling for demographic and socio-economic characteristics, such as educational level, work status, age, and gender, I find that conceptions of nationhood are likely to shape the relationship between national identity and these political attitudes. National attachment shows only a marginal association with political attitudes. The results for the affective dimension of national identity are inconclusive. While general political pride does not result in conclusive results, the political pride sub-dimension is mainly negatively related to all attitudes tested, and the national-cultural pride sub-dimension is only positively related to anti-globalisation positions. It is only national chauvinism, another sub-dimension of the affective dimension, which is based on perceptions and feelings of national superiority, that is consistently positively related to all the attitudes tested. The most conclusive results, however, are obtained for the conceptions of nationhood. Having exclusionary conceptions of the national in-group is consistently and clearly positively associated with out-group hostility and anti-globalisation positions. In contrast, having more inclusionary conceptions is consistently negatively related to anti-immigrant, anti-immigration, and anti-globalisation positions. Relating conceptions of nationhood to actual vote choice, while controlling for strength of attachment alongside a wide range of confounders, conceptions of nationhood remain substantially relevant to the relationship. Taken together, the findings on the multidimensionality of national identity and the effect of each dimension on political preferences suggest that although the dimensions of national identity are related to attitudes in different ways, some aspects of national identity are more likely to occur together, which in turn strengthens the relationships between certain national identities and out-group hostility.

Building on the identified conceptions of nationhood and their influence on political attitudes closely related to far-right voting, I (iv) investigate their role in electoral decisions. This includes investigating the overall relationship between national identity and voting decisions. It also entails (v) examining the temporality of this relationship and investigating potential activating factors. In line with social psychological theories, I argue that while the conceptions of nationhood may provide a breeding ground for political decisions, they require external activation to become behaviourally relevant (Monroe et al. 2000; Stets and Burke 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004; Carter 2013; Schnakenberg 2013).

Testing this argument, I (vi) examine the role of the information environment in activating national identity for voting. In general, the presence of issues of immigration, integration, nationalism, or national boundaries is expected to act as a catalyst, prompting individuals to reflect on their national identity and consequently increasing the relevance of national identity in decision-making. This, in turn, is expected to increase the likelihood that national identity will influence voting behaviour and that voters vote in accordance with their national identity. Previous studies have shown that an increase in the prominence of immigration-related issues is generally associated with concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dunaway et al. 2011; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; McLaren 2017; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and (far-right) voting (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Dennison 2020; Damstra et al. 2021; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). I argue that the presence of these issues increases the relevance of national identity in voting for the different conceptions of nationhood *specifically*. Works on the activating potential of national identity has so far suggested that voters with restrictive national identities have been activated by Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric (Sides et al. 2019; Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021), that deep-seated nativism has been mobilised by the presence of the populist far-right AfD in the 2017 German national elections (Schulte-Cloos 2022), and that a nationalist backlash in Britain has been enforced by regional trade shocks of foreign products (Steiner and Harms 2021). However, evidence for the activation hypothesis is scarce. To test this hypothesis, I use the content of political elite discourse and mass media outlets. Both are assumed to contribute to the information environment of voters by providing situational cues[2] that may foster national identity to guide political behaviour. Specifically, I test whether the discursive processing of immigration and nationalist issues by political elites, as well as immigration-related issue salience in the mass media, serve as situational cues for reflecting on national boundaries and activating national identity to influence voting accordingly. In both studies, an increase in national- or immigration-related issues in the information environment particularly strengthens the link between those holding exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and far-right voting. However, the relationship is not necessarily limited to the far right. When the national in-group and immigration-related

[2] I use the term "situational cues" to refer to content and meanings of a (social) situation, which may also be referred to as "situational factors" (e.g., Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013) or "situational triggers" (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2004) in the social psychological literature.

issues are prominently discussed in the public, national identity may become more relevant to all members of society. An increase in the salience of immigration-related issues in the media is also found to increase the likelihood that individuals with more inclusive views will shift towards left-wing parties that advocate for integration and multiculturalism in response to immigration issues. Nevertheless, those with narrower conceptions are found to be particularly susceptible to this activation, which then is expressed in their political behaviour. Regarding the role of directed messages, I find that exclusionary political elite discourse has a reinforcing effect on the relationship between those with narrow exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and far-right voting preferences over time.

Figure 1 illustrates the addressed relationships between national identity, political attitudes, and political behaviour in an integrative concept. It furthermore indicates which aspect of this relationship each study in the dissertation focuses on. Study 1 (Chapter 2) is concerned with the development of the explorative and person-centred approach on conceptions of nationhood and addresses the multidimensionality of national identity. It does so by focusing both on the interrelatedness of the theoretically distinct dimensions of national identity as well as their relationship to political attitudes closely related to far-right voting. Study 2 (Chapter 3, written in collaboration with Christian S. Czymara) builds on the findings of the first study and addresses the question of when national identity is particularly relevant for voting. This study concentrates on the role of political elite discourses in activating exclusionary national identity for far-right voting. Study 3 (Chapter 4) further complements the first two studies by, first, confirming the existence of the previously identified conceptions of nationhood despite using a different item battery with different scales to measure membership boundaries, second, by using panel data that allows for the analysis of intra-individual changes due to changes in the information environment, third, by broadening the scope to encompass the activation potential of inclusionary conceptions of nationhood, and finally, by introducing media issue salience to the study of national identity activation.

Figure 1: Schematic structure of the aspects of the national identity-political behaviour relationship addressed in this dissertation.



In sum, this cumulative dissertation sheds light on the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research, the question of who is particularly attracted or repelled by far-right parties based on different conceptions of nationhood, and furthermore demonstrates that the information environment of voters plays an important role in activating national identity to become behaviourally relevant. It thereby tackles the temporality of the relationship between national identity and voting, showing that the influence of national identity depends on the content of public debates. Overall, it shows that conceptions of nationhood play a pivotal role in determining who is attracted to far-right parties based on national identity. It furthermore underlines that the accommodation of far-right positions on immigration issues by political elites across all parties, as well as the presence of immigrants and immigration in the mass media, is important and far and foremost benefits far-right parties not just generally, but specifically. As this dissertation rests mainly on bridging national identity research, social psychology and voting literature, I will introduce the main concepts and definitions and present the theoretical framework, before discussing the empirical findings and their significance.

2. Theoretical Framework & Literature Review

The first research question seeks to determine *who is attracted to the far right based on national identity.* I argue that national identity, and in particular the way individuals conceptualise their national in-group, influences both the attraction to and repulsion from far-right parties. Far-right parties are usually characterised by nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (cf. Mudde 2007; Rooduijn et al. 2019) and have been found to particularly attract voters with lower education, economically vulnerable voters, and voters with anti-immigrant positions (Arzheimer 2009; Stockemer et al. 2018, 2021). National identity in turn plays a persistently important role in particularly explaining anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*, Jones and Smith 2001 *a*; Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011 *b*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Hochmann et al. 2016) and has therefore recently been used to explain the appeal of far-right parties in electoral decisions (Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021; Thompson 2021). However, the literature on the relationship between national identity and voting is limited. This is partly due to the lack of consensus on how to define national identity. Definitions vary considerably (comparing Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021; Pesthy et al. 2021; Steiner and Harms 2021; Thompson 2021; Schulte-Cloos 2022). Some scholars view conceptions of nationhood as the essence of national identity and as a key driver of political attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Helbling et al. 2016; Mader et al. 2021; Thompson 2021, Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*). Other scholars adopt a multidimensional definition of national identity that integrates conceptions of nationhood, national attachment and national affects (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Soehl and Karim 2021). Before relating national identity to voting, therefore, it is therefore necessary to first define national identity. In what follows, I seek to define the core concepts of my dissertation, before positioning national identity in the far-right voting literature, reviewing the current state of national identity research and proposing a new approach to capturing national identity at the individual level, and finally, focusing on social psychological theories to explain the temporality of the overall relationship between national identity and voting.

2.1 Defining Core Concepts

2.1.1 Far-Right Populism

Far-right (populist) parties are primarily characterised by nativism, which is combined with authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Golder 2016). At the core, they centre around the imagined community (Anderson 1983) of 'the nation', which serves as a conceptual anchor for most of their ideological features (Mudde 2007: 16). Essentially, far-right populist movements and parties advocate for nationalism[3], the ideology that seeks to align a cultural nation and a political entity within a territorial nation-state (Gellner 1983) and that sees members of this imagined community as entitled to political participation, representation, and social welfare benefits. The nationalism of far-right populists, however, is rooted in a nativist understanding of the national in-group, which imposes restrictive cultural criteria, such as religion, ethnicity, or culture, to define the national in-group (Mudde 2007: 18f.). In substance, "nativism [is] an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (person and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde 2007: 18). Both their authoritarianism, which favours a strictly ordered society based on perceived 'natural' differences, with an emphasis on law and order and severe punishment for deviant behaviour, and their populism, which views society as divided into 'the pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' who betray the people, are closely linked to this nativist core (Mudde 2007: 22f). Put together, the far right is united by an ethno-nationalist understanding of the nation, considering non-natives, deviants, and those who are not legitimately entitled to the benefits of citizenship in nativist terms, as well as those that are perceived to jeopardise the national in-group as threats. Accordingly, most of the policy propositions of far-right parties and policy proposals and demands of far-right movements and voters reflect this ideology. This includes anti-immigration positions (Rydgren 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008; Abou-Chadi 2016), sceptical positions on European integration (Vasilopoulou and Zur 2024), populist positions on

[3] Nationalism in this case refers to the ideology that is intertwined with the political project of a cultural and political congruence of nation states. Nationalism, however, can also be "[…] understood as an aggressive, supremacist and uncritical attitude towards the nation […]" (Mußotter 2022: 2177). In the latter case, nationalism is a form of the affective dimension of national identity.

corruption (Mudde 2016), the promotion of traditional gender roles, and anti-LGBTQIA+ positions (Blee 2020).

Based on these defining elements, and particularly in line with the nativist ideology of far-right parties, the alignment between individuals' and parties' conceptions of nationhood appears to be an important factor in attracting far-right voters. However, conceptions of nationhood are only one core dimension of national identity. The following section discusses this multidimensionality of national identity and the consequences of national identity being linked to the powerful source of identification, the nation-state.

2.1.2 National Identity[4]

National identity is both a facet of individual's identity and a collective trait of national communities. At the individual level, national identity is a multidimensional psychological concept that includes identifying with the nation, distinguishing between in-group and out-group members, and having feelings directed towards the in-group (Citrin et al. 2001; Abdelal et al. 2009). National identity, moreover, is the only group-based identity that is linked to a powerful, stable, and distinctive institutional frame. The nation-state regulates legal membership criteria and confers significant rights and obligations on its members, including political participation and representation, and social welfare benefits (Koopmans et al. 2005). Both, the multidimensionality of national identity at the individual level and its specific position between the individual and the collective guide the theoretical-conceptual and empirical works of this dissertation.

At the individual level, belonging to a nation provides individuals with a sense of who they are in relation to others, a sense of purpose, and a sense of home (Hjerm 1998 *a*). Identification with a nation encompasses three dimensions: (i) the individual's *awareness* of being a part of the national in-group, (ii) an *affective* dimension that includes the (emotional) consequences of identification (e.g., pride, feelings of closeness or superiority, patriotism, nationalism), and (iii) the *content* dimension that encompasses the symbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 2002) that individuals use to distinguish between compatriots and others (Citrin et al. 2001, but also Weldon 2006; Helbling et al. 2016).

[4] The following chapter presents a revised version of the text from study 1 of this dissertation, published as "May, A. C. (2023). And if they don't dance, they are no friends of mine: Exploring boundaries of national identity. Nations and Nationalism, 29(2), 579–597. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12926".

The latter two dimensions have previously been associated to anti-immigrant attitudes. The affective dimension may include feelings of national pride and patriotism (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), which do not necessarily entail out-group hostility (Ariely 2020). However, this affective dimension can also include national chauvinism, which involves perceptions of national superiority (Citrin et al. 2001: 74f., Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*: 343) and nationalism in the sense of an "aggressive, supremacist and uncritical attitude towards the nation" (Mußotter 2022: 2178 see also Mußotter, 2022 for an overview on the conceptual (inter)relatedness of nationalism and patriotismsm). Consequently, the affective dimension has been associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Blank and Schmidt 2003). The content dimension, in contrast, focuses on the "particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive - ideas about its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relation to other nations" (Citrin et al. 2001: 75f.). This dimension concerns the way in which citizens distinguish between compatriots and others. By determining who is accepted as an in-group member, these distinctions serve as important preconditions for anchoring solidarity, social cohesion, and legitimacy of the membership (Miller 1997; Wright et al. 2012). Previous research has therefore focused primarily on this dimension of national identity and found that particularly ethnically charged narrow conceptions of nationhood are closely linked to hostile attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*, Jones and Smith 2001 *a*; Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011 *b*; Hochmann et al. 2016; Trittler 2017), which, again, are a key factor in far-right voting (e.g., Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2008, 2009; Abou-Chadi et al. 2022). Some scholars have even argued that this content dimension alone is the essence of national identity (Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*, but also Abdelal et al. 2009). Other researchers have argued for a broader, multidimensional definition of national identity (Citrin et al. 2001; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021) that includes the three dimensions of awareness, affect, and content together. Without giving preference to any definition, I argue for retaining the conceptually distinct dimensions in the analysis. Although the dimensions are interrelated, they are conceptually distinct, may be shaped differently, and may also influence attitudes independently (e.g., Lubbers and Coenders 2017). Nevertheless, given the well-established link between conceptions of nationhood and anti-immigrant attitudes, the centrality of nativist conceptions in Mudde's (2007) definition of far-right populism, as well as the social psychological

argument that distinction is a necessary condition for out-group hostilities (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979), I expect the content dimension to play a decisive role in shaping far-right voting preferences and thus voting decisions.

Conceptions of nationhood are found to vary considerably at the individual level (Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Trittler 2017). How individuals distinguish between compatriots and others is largely dependent on socialisation, individual experiences, and even cognitive abilities (Weldon 2006; Abdelal et al. 2009; but also cf. Almond and Verba 1963; Sears 1993; Brubaker 1994; Sears et al. 1999; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). But also, how nation states conceptualise their members is expected to influence conceptions of nationhood of citizens. National identity is inevitably linked to the nation-state, which provides its citizens with guaranteed access to participation, representation, and social welfare, but also with institutionalised conceptions of nationhood through its citizenship policies (Brubaker 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005: 7). Building on these considerations, the following sections focus on far-right voting explanations and situate national identity within them.

2.2 National Identity and the Attraction of Far-Right Parties

To explain the success of far-right parties, a large body of literature offers various demand- and supply-centred explanations (e.g., Rydgren 2007, 2018; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Golder 2016; Schulte-Cloos 2022). In essence, the majority of explanations converge on anti-immigrant positions and anti-establishment populism, coupled with a desire to return to traditional values and protect the nation from external political, social, or cultural influences (cf. Rydgren 2018). Despite the close relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigrants, and the prominent role of the nation in far-right ideologies, there has been surprisingly little research on the influence of individual national identity in explaining far-right voting behaviour. In what follows, I aim to address this gap by examining the relationship between national identity and far-right voting.

Demand-side explanations are primarily concerned with economic and cultural *grievances* caused by macro-level modernisation processes and globalisation (Rydgren 2007; Golder 2016; see Ivarsflaten 2008). These grievances are seen as leading to

demands for political representation of traditional values, anti-immigrant attitudes, and a preference for an authoritarian and populist political style. According to the post-material backlash hypothesis, the opposition to post-materialistic values such as multiculturalism as well as gender and racial equality is the result of both a globalised and post-industrial economy, and the dissolution of traditional political and social ties, which puts pressure on particularly anxious, angry, and isolated individuals (see Golder 2016). Drawing on realistic group conflict approaches (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999) and relative deprivation (cf. Walker and Pettigrew 1984; Walker 1999), economic grievances may arise from (perceived) competition with out-group members over scarce resources such as labour, housing, or welfare benefits. This competition supposedly increases demands to reduce competition from immigrants, especially among the most economically vulnerable: the less educated and unskilled workers, and male voters who seek the same jobs as most immigrants (see Rydgren 2007: 250). Economic grievances are furthermore seen to be amplified by the exposure to financial crises, income inequality, unemployment, trade shocks, and redistribution caused by global capital mobility (Rydgren 2007; Golder 2016). Building mainly on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979), cultural grievances are based on individuals' identification with individuals similar to them and the psychological need for positive self-esteem which causes in-group favouritism and the rejection of members of out-groups. In the case of far-right voters, the national in-group is hypothesised to fear losing their social status in the face of increased immigration. This is expected to increase the concerns over globalisation and the influx of strangers (Golder 2016). Consequently, both economic and cultural grievances may result in anti-immigrant attitudes. The majority of empirical studies concur with this conclusion, indicating that anti-immigrant attitudes are one of the main individual-level drivers of far-right support (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; e.g., Rydgren 2007; Arzheimer 2008, 2009; Ivarsflaten 2008; Stockemer et al. 2018; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020; Abou-Chadi et al. 2022).

Supply-centred explanations, in contrast to demand-centred explanations, emphasise the role of *political opportunity structures* in explaining the success of far-right parties. These structures include favourable electoral rules, party competition settings, the issue salience of core far-right issues, the political cleavage structure, as well as short-term macro-level changes, such as immigrant shares or unemployment in a country

(Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Rydgren 2007; Golder 2016). These explanations may also include the overall supply of far-right ideologies and messages offered by these parties (Rydgren 2007). Firstly, a disproportional party system, which systematically weakens the success of smaller parties, is seen to hinder far-right parties. However, far-right parties are no longer small parties in most countries, which weakens the explanatory power of electoral rules nowadays (Golder 2016). Secondly, the convergence of mainstream parties or centre-right parties towards the centre is anticipated to create a political opening for far-right parties on the right-wing of the political spectrum. However, the empirical evidence for this expectation is mixed. Overall, by now, far-right parties have taken issue ownership of immigration issues (e.g., Van Der Brug and Berkhout 2015; Abou-Chadi 2016; Damstra et al. 2021). Consequently, centre-right parties that adopt a more right-wing stance and prioritise far-right issues are likely to increase the overall salience of these issues, which subsequently enhances the probability of far-right parties securing votes (Lochocki 2018; e.g., Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020; Abou-Chadi et al. 2022; Krause et al. 2023). Thirdly, the newly emerged integration-demarcation cleavage structure has been identified to structure the political landscape, dividing parties and voters into those who favour globalisation and those who oppose it (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; Teney et al. 2014; Helbling and Jungkunz 2020; Steiner et al. 2024). The intensification of globalisation has led to a growing divergence between political parties and voters on the question of national closure versus denationalisation. The two opposing poles are reflected in the cultural conflicts of integration versus demarcation concerning immigration (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; Helbling and Jungkunz 2020), as well as political and economic conflicts of supporting and welcoming international connectedness versus defending national sovereignty against external interference (Milner 2021). Finally, the ideologies and messages offered by the far right play a significant role in their successes. Consequently, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism are central in appealing to voters (Rydgren 2007).

The relationship between national identity and far-right voting here may be twofold. Firstly, research on national identity and far-right voting agree that the way individuals distinguish between compatriots and others is a key factor in explaining attitudes towards immigrants (Hjerm 1998 *a*; Kunovich 2009; Helbling et al. 2016; Hochmann et al. 2016; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lindstam et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021; Thompson

2021). National identity is expected to influence the way people perceive the world (Brady and Kaplan 2009: 34) and, like right-wing parties, to derive their issue positions from their conceptions of nationhood (cf. Golder 2016: 480; Bonikowski 2017: 188). By setting high barriers to national membership, individuals with narrower conceptions of nationhood are expected to perceive larger parts of (immigrant) societies as different from their national in-group. This perception of differences is likely to increase the perceived competition over scarce resources and social status. Those who perceive immigrants as a threat to the country's culture, shared values, or the welfare state, are expected to hold anti-immigrant attitudes, which will consequently influence their voting behaviour in favour of far-right parties. Again, the degree to which immigration is seen as threatening should depend on the narrowness of their idea of national identity.

Secondly, far-right populist party positions reflect higher barriers to nationhood, as seen in their nativist definitions of legitimate in-group members. These definitions may also develop political potential. When voters disagree with existing citizenship policies that represent the institutionalised definitions of the national in-group, these policies are open to discussion and change (Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta 2014; Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck 2019: 425). Competing conceptions of nationhood as a motive for voting are theoretically anchored in the theory of issue voting (Downs 1957), which suggests that people vote for the party that best aligns with their own position on a given issue (cf. Mader et al. 2021: 641). In the case of far-right parties, which have been found to employ nativist, ethnonational exclusionary definitions (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Golder 2016), they should align with voters' exclusionary conceptions of nationhood. However, voting for parties based on one's idea of national identity requires knowledge of one's own position as well as of the parties' position of the issue. This direct relationship, further, can only become effective if the issue is individually salient (cf. Campbell et al. 1960; Mader et al. 2021). Hence, voters need to hold concrete conceptions of nationhood that align with the conceptions offered by the parties and that are consciously available.

2.3 The Missing Conceptual–Methodological Link in National Identity Research[5]

Before moving on to identity activation, there are a few points to be made concerning the missing conceptual-methodological link in national identity research. As there is no consensus on how to capture national identity, it is important to address the conceptual and empirical questions of how national identity is understood and how it can be captured. Only then can we begin to investigate who is attracted to or repelled by far-right parties.

Particularly linking national identity to anti-immigrant attitudes has a long tradition in national identity research. Yet, most of this research rests on the ethnic-civic dichotomy of nationalism, which resulted from the analysis of state-level resources (Meinecke 1970; Smith 1987, 1991; Brubaker 1994; Kohn 2005; cf. Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; cf. Helbling et al. 2016). In accordance with the *jus sanguinis*-principle of citizenship, individuals holding ethnic conceptions are expected to favour objected, ascribed and thus exclusionary criteria, such as descent, blood relations and nativity. In contrast, and in accordance with the *jus soli*-principle granting citizenship via birthplace, individuals holding civic conceptions are expected to place importance on more voluntaristic criteria, such as birthplace and law-abidingness (cf. Jones and Smith 2001 *a*; Wright et al. 2012; Helbling et al. 2016). Especially the ethnic conceptions are repeatedly related to immigrant hostility (e.g., Jones and Smith 2001 *a*, *b*; Kunovich 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Hochmann et al. 2016; Filsinger et al. 2021). Using factor analysis techniques, most studies identify two dimensions of national identity. Unfortunately, along with the problematic deduction of individual-level national identity from state-level resources (cf. Reijerse et al. 2013), placing criteria in either dimension is often theoretically and empirically ambiguous, resulting in inconsistent factors structures (Kunovich 2009; Wright et al. 2012, and comparing Jones and Smith 2001 *a*; Berg and Hjerm 2010; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Hochmann et al. 2016; Hadler and Flesken 2018; Ariely 2020; Filsinger et al. 2021). These dimensions are then often highly correlated, which limits their explanatory power for policy positions (Janmaat 2006; Wright et al. 2012: 471; Hochmann et al. 2016). As this approach has been found to be limited in capturing the

[5] The following chapter presents a revised version of text passages from study 1 of this dissertation, published as "May, A. C. (2023). And if they don't dance, they are no friends of mine: Exploring boundaries of national identity. Nations and Nationalism, 29(2), 579–597. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12926".

complexity of individual-level national identity, in line with the new person-centred directive in national identity research (Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Trittler 2017; Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck 2019), I argue that individuals select, employ and arrange criteria based on underlying images of their national in-group beyond the ethnic-civic dichotomy. In fact, both Helbling et al. (2016: 752) using an additive scale and Hjerm (1998 *a*: 341) using cluster analysis have demonstrated that either few or no respondents favoured ethnic criteria without also embracing civic criteria. Their works furthermore suggest a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptions. Trittler (2017), Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), and Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck (2019) have further shown that membership criteria are understood and interpreted differently based on the underlying images of the national in-group. Consequently, using inductive person-centred methods, such as cluster analysis or latent class analysis, enables the identification of response patterns, which, in turn, can uncover how citizens understand, employ, and arrange membership criteria based on these underlying images. Using these methods (Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Trittler 2017; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021), the approaches have been either limited by few country samples (Hjerm 1998 *a*, *b*) or have gone one step further and considered national identity in the previously discussed multidimensionality (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021). In addition to the conceptual problems of conflating the distinct dimensions of national identity (Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*, *b*), combining the multiple dimensions risks leaving the sub-dimensional structure unobserved, hinders identifying the effects of each dimension on political attitudes and behaviour, and finally, possibly introduces risks of model sparseness. In addition to the multidimensional understanding of national identity, studies have also suspected a combination of strength attachment and national chauvinism (Garand et al. 2020), national pride and ethnically charged conceptions of nationhood (Lubbers and Coenders 2017), overall nativism (Schulte-Cloos 2022), a strong national attachment (Steiner and Harms 2021), or specific combinations of all these aspects (Bonikowski et al., 2021) to explain far-right voting. However, empirically, exclusionary conceptions outperform other dimensions in explaining attitudes associated with (Hjerm 1998 *a*) and far-right voting itself (Lubbers and Coenders 2017). To investigate the relationship between national identity and voting, I propose to bridge the classical national identity research that focuses solemnly on

membership boundaries but rests upon the ethnic-civic framework, with recent inductive person-centred approaches, that have been either limited by few country samples or took the person-centred initiative one step too far.

2.4 Activation of National Identity[6]

Given the stability of national identity, and especially the way individuals distinguish between compatriots and others (Mader and Schoen 2023 also: see below), we might expect a constant influence of national identity and, in particular, conceptions of nationhood on political preferences and voting. However, voting, especially for the far-right, is highly volatile. This puzzle of stable national identity and volatile far-right voting suggests a temporality in the overall relationship. The second main research question addresses this puzzle by asking *when the relationship between national identity and voting preferences translates into voting behaviour?* To address this question, I draw upon social psychological theories of social identity, self-categorization, and social cognition (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979; Stryker 1980; Hogg and Turner 1987; Stryker and Serpe 1994; Hogg et al. 1995; Bandura 2001), and particularly the idea of identity activation, which posits that identities can be activated by situational cues (Monroe et al. 2000; Stets and Burke 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004; Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013; Schnakenberg 2013). The following subsections discuss the psychological mechanism by which identities become behaviourally relevant to voting decisions and the role of individuals' information environment in this activation process. The latter includes a brief discussion of the role of political elite messages and mass-media content in activating identities for political behaviour through directed messages and issue-salience.

2.4.1 Activation of Identities

Social psychological theories agree that identities require activation to become behaviourally relevant (Stets and Burke 2000: 231; Carter 2013: 204) and that activation is largely situational (Monroe et al. 2000; Stets and Burke 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004;

[6] The following chapter presents a revised version of the ideas and text developed in study 2, published as "May, A. C., & Czymara, C. S. (2024). Careless whisper: Political elite discourses activate national identities for far-right voting preferences. Nations and Nationalism, 30(1), 90–109. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12985" and study 3, published as "Ready or not. National Identity, Vote Choice, and Mass Media: Evidence from Germany." under review as in Political Psychology.

Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013; Schnakenberg 2013). Activation, here, is the process of prioritising one identity over others to guide behaviour. Identities are typically organised hierarchically, with only a few held in consciousness at a given time (cf. Aquino et al. 2009) and with some identities having *a priori* priority over others across situations (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1994). Situational cues that fit identity-related content, however, increase the likelihood that an identity will be prioritised and thus guide (political) perceptions and behaviour (Haslam et al. 1999; Stets and Burke 2000; Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013). Due to constantly varying social situations, which present different social cues, individuals constantly shift back and forth between guiding identities (cf. Huddy 2013: 533ff). These shifts have consequences: Previous survey experiments found that identity priming – hence bringing identities to the fore – affects issue positions (Sniderman et al. 2004; Transue 2007; Jackson 2011). Even when respondents simultaneously belonged to groups that would have benefited from the opposing policy position, they chose the position that benefited the group that had previously been primed (Transue 2007). Hence, identities not only develop political potential, but they also concretely affect policy positions depending on which identity is accessible within the working self-concept. In line with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979) and the realistic group conflict paradigm (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999), voters will choose the policies that benefit their in-group, whether in terms of positive self-esteem or (perceived) competition over scarce resources such as jobs or economic well-being (McLaren 2003; Sniderman et al. 2004). Yet, which of the group memberships is used as a reference depends on the prior activation through situational cues.

In the hierarchical network of identity, person-based (e.g., moral identity) and role-based (e.g., mother and student) identities take a higher position, facilitating their accessibility and likelihood to guide behaviour across situations. Group-based identities such as national identity, in contrast, are supposedly lower in this hierarchy and, thus, require explicit activation through situational cues (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1994; Stets and Burke 2000). In the case of national identity, the presence of issues such as immigration, integration, globalisation, and achievements in sports, science, or the nation's impact on the international political arena may represent situational cues well-suited to bring national identity to the fore, as they increase attention to nation-related content. The presence of these issues should increase the attention for all members of society.

However, individuals with narrower conceptions of nationhood are expected to perceive larger segments of society as outsiders and potential competitors, making them more sensitive to situational cues regarding boundaries of the nation. Exclusionary positions should furthermore increase the sensitivity of those with narrow conceptions even more, as here the content and meaning of situational cues and of exclusionary identity should align more easily. The overall position of national identity within the individual's self-concept may further amplify its activation potential, particularly for those strongly identifying with the nation. Finally, as meanings attached to an identity not only influence the processing of information, but have concrete behavioural consequences in line with these meanings (Monroe et al. 2000: 423f.), those with narrower conceptions are expected to become increasingly hostile. The following chapter discuss one major context in which situational cues are provided.

2.4.2 The Information Environment

To become behaviourally relevant, situational cues need to bring national identity to the forefront of thinking. The presence of issues related to the national in-group or immigration-related issues are argued to be such a catalyst for these processes, triggering reflection on the national in-group and thus increasing the likelihood of the influence of national identities on voting behaviour. Particularly directed messages, such as exclusionary messages, are expected to be more easily aligned with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood, thereby increasing the activation potential of these exclusionary national identities.

Previous research on the activation of national identity has argued that immigration issues in political communication (Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021) or macro-level changes, such as the European financial and migration crisis (Schulte-Cloos 2022) or globalisation (Mader et al. 2021; Steiner and Harms 2021), influence the relevance of national identity for far-right voting. While some have suggested that particularly the processing of these issues by political elites contributed to the increased salience of national issues in the public sphere and influenced voting patterns related to national identity (Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021), others argue that contextual changes are driving the activation of national identities in voting. I argue that political elites and mass media outlets play a central role in shaping the broader 'information environment' (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009: 518),

which consists of information conveyed by a variety of sources, including mass media (Meltzer et al. 2021), social media (Bail et al. 2018), interpersonal communication, and political elite discourse (cf. Schmitt-Beck 2003).

Both political elites and mass media outlets shape national discourses. While political elites inform the public about social and political circumstances, interpreting and contextualising arguments, and thus affecting people's understanding of reality (Chong and Druckman 2007), mass media is the dominant source of information about political actors, issues, and policies (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016). It is an important gatekeeper in the selection, dissemination and amplification of the messages and narratives the political elites offer (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). The mass media moreover influences both politicians' and citizens' perceptions of current social problems, challenges and public opinion through their coverage of issues (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016). However, political elites are also considered to drive public discourse by providing frames, arguments, and narratives processed in the media (cf. Hellström 2008; Flores 2018). Thus, political elites contribute to the contextual aspect of a country's information environment at a given time (Czymara 2020: 1215).

Research on the relevance of the information environment in general confirms that increased salience of immigration-related topics is associated with concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dunaway et al. 2011; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; Helbling et al. 2015; McLaren 2017; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and (far-right) voting (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Dennison 2020; Damstra et al. 2021; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). However, these studies largely disagree on the role of the content, tone, or direction of the messages prevalent in the information environment, as well as on the interplay between mass media, political elite discourse and other contextual or individual factors. Some argue that the way issues are framed affects the understanding and evaluation of issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Negative messages are found to play a decisive role in negative immigrant perceptions (Dunaway et al. 2011; Schemer 2012; Schlueter and Davidov 2013), while positive messages about immigration are found to have opposite effects (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Schemer 2012). Concerning the role of political elite messaging, picking up immigration-related issues and adopting exclusionary positions of the far-right, is found to particularly benefit far-right parties (Lochocki 2018: 60; Krause et al. 2023),

arguably by removing taboos and bringing far-right issues on the agenda (cf. Arzheimer 2009). Others also found that undirected immigration-related issue salience has a stable increasing effect on concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Czymara and Dochow 2018) as well as voting for anti-immigrant parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007). However, to put these findings into perspective, media coverage focuses primarily on the negative aspects of immigration (Hopkins 2010; Esses et al. 2013; Eberl et al. 2018), making it difficult to distinguish between frequency and tone effects (Hopkins 2010), or directed message effects, respectively . I argue that the mere presence of immigration issues alone can act as a catalyst, prompting individuals to reflect on their national identity and consequently increasing the likelihood that national identity will influence voting behaviour by highlighting in-group/out-group boundaries. Using issue salience in this way may ultimately underestimate the effects of negative immigration-related issue positions.

Summarising the arguments on how national identity and far-right voting are connected, some individuals are assumed to be more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes because of their narrow and therefore exclusionary conceptions of nationhood. Consequently, they are more likely to be attracted to far-right parties that offer restrictive policies towards immigrants, based on their national identity. However, to become behaviourally relevant, national identity is hypothesised to require external activation by situational cues. Both mass media content and political elite discourse are considered to convey such cues that increase the relevance of national identity. Cues that increase the relevance of national identity include issues related to in-group/out-group boundaries, such as immigration- or nation-related issues. Thereby, both the prominence or salience of such issues and directed messages, such as exclusionary positions, are expected to act as a catalyst for national identity activation by reminding individuals of their national membership and the boundaries of this membership. Given that individuals hold different conceptions of

nationhood, I expect that the activation potential will differ accordingly. Those who hold more exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are likely to be more sensitive to the prominence of immigration- and nation-related issues, and moreover to be appealed by a prevalence of exclusionary positions in the information environment, given that their national identity-related knowledge structure more easily aligns with exclusionary cues. Taken together, I assume that national identities are generally activated by the presence of immigration- or nation-related issues, but that the different conceptions of nationhood are affected *specifically* by changes in the information environment. An increased salience of relevant social cues or prominence of exclusionary positions that furthermore align with narrow conceptions of nationhood, are thus expected to benefit far right parties the most. Once more, increased salience of immigration- or nation-related issues may similarly enhance the relevance of national identity for those with more open conceptions. These individuals are, in turn, expected to favour more inclusionary policies and left-wing parties. Overall, an investigation of the relationship between different conceptions of nationhood and voting in changing information environments may assist in elucidating the temporality of the relationship between national identity and voting, as well as in identifying the relevant determinants the explain the volatility of far-right voting. Again, due to the lack of consensus on how to capture national identity, the following empirical section begins with addressing the conceptual-methodological issues in national identity research and proposing a new approach while addressing national identity's multidimensionality. This is followed by an investigation of the overall relationship between national identity and voting behaviour, and an examination of the determinants of the temporality of the relationship. This includes an examination of both the role of political elite discourse and issue salience in mass media outlets, and a contrast of the roles of issue salience and directed messages in these channels in shaping national discourse.

3. Empirical Studies & Findings

To address the questions of *who* is attracted to far-right parties based on national identity and *when* this relationship translates into political behaviour due to changes in the information environment, I propose a six-step empirical approach. This includes initially addressing the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research by (i) exploring

conceptions of nationhood at the individual level, addressing the multidimensionality of national identity by (ii) investigating how dimensions of national identity are interrelated, and (iii) relating the single dimensions of national identity to attitudes that explain far-right voting. Building on the findings of these preceding steps, I (iv) examine whether conceptions of nationhood can be found to influence voting decisions, (v) investigate how this relationship changes based on changes in the informational environment, and (vi) research the roles of different content and senders in this environment. The following sections discuss the findings to the steps.

3.1 Closing the Conceptual-Methodological Gap in National Identity Research (Study 1)

To address the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research, I initially focused on how citizens conceptualise their national in-group. I thereby adopted a strictly person-centred perspective in a comparative framework. Subsequently, the relationship between the dimensions of national identity and their relationship to political attitudes is examined. The primary objective of Study 1 (Chapter 2) is to address the conceptual-methodological gap. However, Study 3 (Chapter 4) replicates the findings on conceptions of nationhood by using alternative survey data that employ different scales and item batteries in comparison to those employed in Study 1. Consequently, it also contributes to this first research aim.

3.1.1 Conceptions of Nationhood

Across all three studies of the cumulative dissertation, I identify four substantially similar conceptions of nationhood across countries, time, and different survey instruments.[7] To uncover the underlying conceptions, I investigated how respondents arrange, select, and understand national membership criteria. To identify common patterns of membership criteria arrangements across respondents, I employed latent class analysis (LCA) and a

[7] The GLES short-term campaign panel (GLES 2019) differs significantly in terms of the included criteria included, item wordings, and scale used. I therefore had to select membership criteria items to include based on their discriminatory value in the latent class analysis. The selected items also represent the criteria Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck (2019) identified in their qualitative research in Germany as the most commonly used criteria when asked about what defines the German national in-group. I also included these items with the 5-point Likert-scale in the analysis. This scale helped to identify a fifth type, which represents those who are largely indifferent to the membership criteria (or the survey question in general).

subsequent bootstrap log-likelihood ratio test (BLRT). As the conceptions may be influenced by country-specific path-dependent institutional frames, such as citizenship policies, I used cluster analysis (CA) to identify similar patterns across country-year samples. The individual-level data for the analyses stemmed from three consecutive rounds of the National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group 1998, 2012, 2015), surveyed in 1995, 2003, and 2013 and two rounds of the European Values Study (EVS 2020 *a*, *b*), surveyed in 2008 and 2017, as compiled by the ONBound-project (Bechert et al. 2020). Furthermore, in Study 3 (Chapter 4) I used the 2017 Short-term Campaign Panel of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2019). Membership boundaries are measured in all six survey waves by asking respondents to rate the importance of membership criteria to describe the national in-group.

I specifically identify two conceptions of nationhood that can be best characterised by a general emphasis on (exclusionists) or a general rejection of most membership criteria (pluralists), while types between these extremes express selective boundary-making patterns that reveal distinct conceptions of nationhood (assimilationists, integrationists). Those holding exclusionary conceptions tend to prioritise most membership criteria for defining the national in-group. As this also includes nativist criteria, citizens with these conceptions are likely to reject immigrants as part of their national community. In contrast, those with pluralist conceptions tend to reject most criteria for defining the national in-group, except for democratic convictions (GLES) and respecting laws and institutions (ISSP, EVS). Consequently, they are seemingly more comfortable with diversity while embracing inclusion and participation. Both the exclusionary and pluralist conceptions are consistently identified across countries and studies. The prevalence of the intermediary assimilationist and integrative conceptions appears to vary depending on the country samples or available items in the surveys. Those holding assimilationist conceptions of nationhood represent moderate exclusionist conceptions. They also utilise membership criteria setting a high bar to national membership, although they notably diverge in their rejection of religion and descent as defining elements of the national in-group. Members of this type are expected to accept second-generation immigrants to their national in-group, provided that they are willing to integrate culturally, emotionally, and ideationally. Those holding integrationist conceptions, in turn, represent a moderate version of pluralist conceptions. They tend to prioritise criteria that facilitate societal

participation, while expecting immigrants to integrate to a certain degree. This type is primarily found in Europe and North America and reflects achievable criteria of liberalised citizenship policies. As they do not rely on exclusionary nativist criteria, they are expected to be more immigrant-friendly.

3.1.2 Addressing Multidimensionality

To address the multidimensionality of national identity, I first examined the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and both the attachment and affect dimensions. I then investigated how these three dimensions influence political attitudes associated with far-right voting. To investigate the relationship between the conceptions and attachment and affect, I incorporated measures of national attachment, general and domain-specific pride, and national chauvinism, which are also commonly used in the multidimensional approaches to national identity (cf. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021). To explore how all three dimensions influence political attitudes, I conducted regression analysis of national identity dimensions on attitudes towards immigrants, immigration policies and globalisation. The empirical analyses employed the 2003 and 2013 ISSP waves, selected for their comprehensive membership criteria battery and included measures on the other national identity dimensions and political attitudes, consistent with prior research on the relationship between national identity and political attitudes (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016).

The analyses indicated that individuals with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood tend to exhibit higher levels of national attachment, national chauvinism, general national pride, and the subdimensions 'political' and 'natio-cultural' (Hjerm 1998 *a*) national pride. Conversely, a pluralist conception of nationhood is consistently negatively correlated with all aspects of national attachment and national affect. Assimilationist or integrationist conceptions are found to be consistently positively correlated with national attachment, general national pride and the political subdimension of national pride. However, integrationist conceptions are far less positively related to national attachment and general pride, than the more exclusionary types, namely exclusionists and assimilationists. Nevertheless, integrationist conceptions are strongly positively correlated with political national pride, which is based on state-related components, such as political institutions, the economy, and social security systems. In terms of national-cultural pride, both

integrationist and assimilationist conceptions exhibit only weak negative associations. National chauvinism, which represents an extreme form of national affects, is only positively correlated with exclusionary conceptions. Conversely, the more moderate exclusionary conceptions, assimilationist conceptions, show no significant relationship to national chauvinism at all. Both more open integrationist and pluralist conceptions, are clearly negatively correlated to chauvinism. Put together, the identified conceptions of nationhood exhibit different and complex relationships to other dimensions of national identity. This underscores the importance to retain these conceptually distinct dimensions in analyses.

Using linear regression analysis, I examined the impact of each dimension of national identity on attitudes linked to far-right voting, specifically anti-immigrant, anti-immigration, and anti-globalisation attitudes (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Stockemer et al. 2018; Steiner et al. 2024). The findings indicate that conceptions of nationhood appear to be pivotal in shaping the relationship between national identity and these issue positions. Exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are strongly positively related to all anti-immigrant sentiments and most positions against immigration and globalisation. Conversely, assimilationist conceptions appear not to be xenophobic or communitarian, but to strongly oppose equal rights for immigrants and illegal immigration. Both more open types are largely negatively related to anti-immigrant, anti-immigration, and anti-globalisation attitudes. Nevertheless, those with integrationist conceptions tend to espouse more immigrant-friendly positions and a more open approach to cultural globalisation. Regarding the other dimensions of national identity, only national chauvinism, the extreme form of national affect that rests on the perception of national superiority, consistently shows a strong positive correlation with all tested attitudes. All other forms of national affect and national attachment remain only weekly related to the tested issues. The political national pride subdimension even displays divergent effects from the other affect subdimensions, namely general pride and national chauvinism. National pride is consistently negatively correlated with anti-immigrant, anti-immigration, and anti-globalisation attitudes. In conclusion, only the conceptions of nationhood offer clear relational patterns to attitudes associated with far-right voting. Previous multidimensional approaches have conflated the distinct dimensions of national identity, resulting in the identification of some types that not only show strikingly similar profiles in membership criteria arrangements

(Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Soehl and Karim 2021), but also expose similar effects on anti-migration attitudes (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) and far-right voting (Bonikowski et al. 2021). I argue that the conceptions of nationhood may be the driving force in explaining particularly anti-immigrant attitudes. This assumption is consistent with previous studies (Hjerm 1998 *a*; Lubbers and Coenders 2017) that posit that the content dimension may serve as the most effective explanation for out-group hostility.

Overall, the person-centred approach, thus, offers a solution to the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research, while offering a good empirical anchor for the investigation of national identity-based voting.

3.2 Who is particularly attracted to far-right parties based on national identity?

Building on the findings of this first study, individuals with narrower and thus more exclusionary conceptions of nationhood may be more likely to reject immigrants as part of their national in-group. This makes them presumably more likely to vote for parties offering strict immigration policies. Moreover, they employ several criteria, including nativist criteria, to delineate the national in-group, which is, furthermore, expected to align with the nativist ideology of far-right parties. Individuals with exclusionary conceptions also tend to exhibit higher levels of national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism, which have also been found in earlier research to increase the voting potential for the far-right (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Steiner and Harms 2021). Thus, those with exclusionary conceptions are expected to be particularly likely to vote for the far right. Conversely, those with more inclusive conceptions do not exhibit higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes nor align with nativist ideology. They are thus expected to be less likely to vote for parties that advocate for restrictive immigration policies.

Using the conceptions of nationhood, as identified in the ISSP, EVS, and GLES data, I find in Study 2 (Chapter 3) and Study 3 (Chapter 4) that exclusionary conceptions are indeed associated with a preference for far-right parties. Yet, the strength and consistency of this relationship is not as pronounced as previously assumed, when considering the discussed findings. The investigation of a European subsample of the ISSP

and EVS waves surveyed between 1995 and 2017, reveals that a large proportion of respondents holds exclusionary conceptions of nationhood. However, only few expressed a preference[8] for a far-right[9] party in the sample. The GLES data, collected one year prior to the 2017 German nation election, however, indicates that voters with different conceptions of nationhood exhibit distinct voting patterns. Those with more open conceptions tend to favour left-wing parties that advocate for multiculturalist positions on immigration, whereas those with more exclusionary conceptions tend to favour the far right and its exclusionary issue positions. The divergence between the two studies on the overall relationship between conceptions and nationhood and far-right voting already indicates the presence of a third moderating factor that explains the volatility of the relationship. Following the concept of identity activation, the prevalence of nationalist or immigration-related issues in public discourse may prompt reflection on national boundaries, thus increasing the probability of voting based on national identity. While the first study covers a long time-period in which nationalist and immigration-related issues were occasionally relevant in public discourse, the second study draws on data collected during an electoral campaign in which immigration-related issues were prominently discussed. The subsequent section examines the volatility of the relationship between national identity activation for voting and the factors that influence it.

3.3 When do national identities affect political behaviour?

To investigate the temporality of the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting preferences, I rely on the concept of identity activation, which posits that identities require activation by situational cues that fit an identity's meanings in order for this identity to become behaviourally relevant (cf. Monroe et al. 2000; Stets and Burke 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004; Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013). Immigration and nationalist issues raised by political elites (Study 2) or in the mass media (Study 3) are thereby argued to serve as such social cues that increase the relevance of national identities for political behaviour.

[8] Due to different questions across surveys, the harmonised variable included voting in the next election for (ISSP 1995, ISSP 2003, EVS 2008), has voted in the last election for (ISSP 2013) or prefers (EVS 2017) a far-right party.
[9] Parties are classified as "far right" based on the PopuList dataset (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

I identify the activation of national identity for voting behaviour in two separate studies. In the initial study (Study 2), I employed manifesto data from the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al. 2021 *a*, *b*) to assess the extent to which nationalist- and immigration-related issues were present in the political elite communication across parties, representing situational cues in the information environment. This cross-country comparative analysis of the European subsample surveyed between 1995 and 2017 in the five harmonised ISSP and EVS waves revealed that an increase in the prevalence of exclusionary political elite discourse is associated with an increase in far-right voting. Nevertheless, an increasingly exclusionary political elite discourse is found to reinforce the relationship between exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and voting for the far right. The second study (Study 3) shifted the focus to the role of mass media content. The data on immigration-related news retrieved from LexisNexis was used to construct an immigration-related issue salience measure based on the approach of Czymara and Dochow (2018). Consistent with the previous study, an increased immigration-related issue-salience was found to significantly increase the positive relationship between exclusionary conceptions and far-right voting. Additionally, the national identity activation was found to be not limited to the right. As the salience of immigration issues in the information environment increases, the relevance of national identity to guide political behaviour also increases for those holding more open conceptions. In times of high immigration-related issue salience, they are found to have an increased likelihood of voting for the Greens, which offered multicultural policy positions on immigration issues. Consequently, the changes in the information environment appear to affect those who hold more pronounced conceptions of nationhood. Those holding exclusionary conceptions are thereby found to be particularly sensitive to these changes, arguably due to the perception of larger parts of (immigrant) society as outsiders and thus as potentially threatening. The following sections discuss the findings in more detail.

3.3.1 Cross-Country Perspective: The Influence of Political Elite Discourse on National Identity Activation (Study 2)

Building on the identified conceptions of nationhood in the ISSP and EVS data, we (together with Christian S. Czymara) explored how political elite discourse activates exclusionary conceptions of nationhood for far-right voting. Combining the harmonised cross-sectional data from ISSP and EVS with manifesto data from the Manifesto Project dataset

(Volkens et al. 2021 *a*, *b*), we use country-fixed effects modelling with cluster-robust standard errors to estimate within-country effects of political elite discourse. We identify a strong, positive, and statistically significant interaction of political discourse[10] and conceptions of nationhood. In our study, we tested for the effects of both the presence of nativist and immigration-related issues as well as of directed exclusionary political elite discourse. Both factors were found to increase the likelihood of voting for the far-right in general, and particularly among those with exclusionist conceptions of nationhood. However, an increase in exclusionary political elite discourse was identified as the driving force behind this relationship. The findings confirm that the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting is relatively weak when nationalist or immigration-related issues are not prominent topics in public discourse. It was not possible to detect any significant differences in the probability of far-right voting preferences between exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and other conceptions in periods where these issues have not been discussed. Instead, the relationship becomes relevant when these issues are prevalent in the political discourse. As this was found to be especially true for instances where parties across the political spectrum adopted exclusionary positions, we confirm previous findings which argue that far-right parties benefit from an overall exclusionary climate created through mainstream parties picking up on far-right positions (Lochocki 2018; Krause et al. 2023). Consequently, parties that are not far right are likely to hurt themselves when they employ such far-right positions.

The results add to the puzzle of who is particularly affected by a more exclusionary climate in the information environment based on conceptions of nationhood. However, the analysis is limited by the pooled cross-sectional data and thus cannot test intra-individual changes. Furthermore, we have assumed stability in conceptions of nationhood, with conceptions being triggered by political elite discourses to affect voting behaviour. However, national identity may also be shaped by external factors (cf. Helbling

[10] To identify exclusionary political discourse, we combined positive statements about the *national way of life*, which include restrictive positions on immigration, with negative statements about *multiculturalism*, which include calls for assimilation, as defined by the Manifesto Project. To identify inclusionary political elite discourse, in our robustness checks we combined negative statements about the *national way of life* with positive statements about *multiculturalism* and generated a measure of salience that combines exclusionary and inclusionary statements. For the measures, we take the values of the variables for each election, weighted by the respective party's vote share to account for higher visibility of parties with higher vote shares.

et al. 2016). To address these obstacles and open questions, the empirical analysis discussed below relies on panel data and intra-individual changes in voting behaviour based on changes in the information environment. By also shifting the perspective to the role of mass media content in activating national identity, it also introduces one of the most important actors in the information environment into the analysis of national identity activation for political behaviour.

3.3.2 Intra-Individual Perspective: The Influence of Mass Media on National Identity Activation (Study 3)

This study used the Short-Term Campaign Panel of the 2017 German Longitudinal Election Study, which was conducted in the months leading up to the 2017 German national election, combined with data on mass media content in Germany[11]. The study focused on intra-individual changes in voting intentions based on conceptions of nationhood and the salience of immigration-related issues in the mass media. Regarding the conceptions of nationhood, individuals with exclusionist and assimilationist conceptions are overall significantly more likely to vote for the far-right AfD and significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties (SPD, Greens, and the Left). More open conceptions, that is holding integrationist or pluralist conceptions, thereby tend to be positively related to left-wing voting. Overall, an increased salience of immigration-related issues is found to particularly benefit parties on the fringes of the political spectrum, which includes especially those offering policies on immigration, such as the AfD, but as well the Greens and the Left, which offered multicultural stances on immigration issues. Finally, both conceptions of nationhood and immigration-related issue salience are found to interact. Individuals with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are already likely to vote for the AfD, but an increase in immigration-related issue salience strengthens this relationship, again confirming the activation hypothesis. The same is true for open types and voting preferences for the Greens. As the models are based on intra-individual changes in voting intentions, the results point to the potential for vote switching due to a changed information environment based on conceptions of nationhood. The findings furthermore highlight that parties

[11] The articles have been retrieved from LexisNexis (www.lexisnexis.de) by using a specific search string to identify the relevant articles. The outlets include the right-wing Die Welt and the left-wing Taz daily newspapers and the two widely circulated magazines Der Spiegel and Der Stern. The immigration-related issue salience measure is constructed using factor analysis. The factor scores represent the media salience on a given day. The approach was entirely based on previous works by Czymara & Dochow (2018).

offering alternative left-wing issue positions and thus solutions to immigration issues may also benefit from an increased salience of immigration-related issues. Again, the activation of exclusionary conceptions for far-right votes through an increased salience of immigration-related issues in the media has been found to be particularly strong, while the activation potential of inclusionary conceptions for left-wing parties was comparatively limited.

As strength of identification has been hypothesised to affect the accessibility and thus the activation potential of identities, all models in this study included national attachment as a confounder. Previous versions of this study also included analyses of interaction effects between media salience and national attachment in general, and separately for the different conceptions of nationhood. None of these interactions reached significance. Hence, a stronger national identification is not found to heighten the potential of identities being accessed and played out in situations. Conversely, also in a previous version of the manuscript, using data on panellists that participated in both the 2013 and 2017 GLES' Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2016, 2019), I investigated the stability of conceptions of nationhood and national attachment over time. [12] I hereby find, in line with Mader and Schoen (2023), that while the evaluation of the importance of most membership criteria remained stable over time, national attachment varies. The attachment dimensions, thus, may be rather subject to changes in the information environment, instead of affecting the accessibility of national attachment.

Taken together, the findings of the studies on the activation potential of national identity support the overall link between national identity and voting behaviour. Furthermore, they argue for the relevance of the information environment in presenting voters with situational cues for this relationship to be played out. The relationship, thus, depends on levels of issue salience and directed content in the information environment. The previous study examined a longer time frame, multiple elections, and country samples and found that national identity only plays a role if political elites become more exclusionary. It concluded that the relationship between national identity and voting is otherwise rather latent and insignificant. The subsequent study focused on a single election campaign in

[12] The analysis included three available waves, fielded in August 2013, October2016 (main sample) / July 2017 (later recruited sample), and October 2017.

which immigration had already been extensively discussed, given that immigration had been a significant concern among the German public since mid-2015 due to the so-called 'migration crisis'. Nevertheless, despite this party already being favoured by those holding exclusionary conceptions, increased immigration-related issue salience even increased this relationship, indicating the activation effect.

4. Structure of the Dissertation

Study 1 (Chapter 2) focuses on the development of the explorative and person-centred approach on conceptions of nationhood. In this study, I identify ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making across 42 countries and more than 25 years using data from three rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (ISSP Research Group 1998, 2012, 2015) from 1995, 2003 and 2013, as well as two rounds of the European Values Study (EVS) (EVS 2020 *b*, *a*) from 2008 and 2017, compiled by the ONBound project (Bechert et al. 2020). Combining latent class analysis (LCA) and cluster analysis (CA), I identify four ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood. Overall, the results close the conceptual-methodological gap between classical approaches and recent inductive approaches to national identity and demonstrate that national identity is a cross-cultural phenomenon with distinct types. Investigating the interrelatedness of the dimensions of national identity, I find that conceptions of nationhood, which represent the content dimension of national identity, are related differently to national attachment, and affects towards the nation, such as national pride, and national chauvinism. In this study, I also examine the relationship between the dimensions of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants, immigration, and globalisation. The results of this analysis demonstrate that the attitudes commonly linked with far-right voting are closely related to exclusionary conceptions of nationhood. Thus, individuals who hold exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are more likely to be attracted to far-right positions and therefore may be more inclined to vote for far-right parties.

Study 2 (Chapter 3) builds upon the findings of the first study by investigating the empirical puzzle of rather stable national identities and volatile voting behaviour for far-right parties. The study shifts the focus to political behaviour and addresses the second main research question of *when* national identity is particularly relevant for voting.

Together with Christian S. Czymara, we concentrate specifically on the political preferences and behaviour of those individuals with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood that have been identified in the first study. While previous studies have suspected the activation of national identities through situational cues, we are the first to test the activation hypothesis in a European context and by combining individual-level and contextual-level data. We combine the individual-level data of the European subsample repeatedly surveyed across the five waves of ISSP and EVS with contextual data on the voter's information environment. Using data from the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2022), we test for national identity activation by anti-immigrant and pro-national positions in the manifestos of the major parties. Using manifesto data serves as proxy for issues and positions brought forward by parties in their electoral campaigns. Among the 127,000 individuals sampled from 26 European countries we find that those who hold exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are overall more likely to vote for far-right parties. We also identify a correlation between far-right voting and increasingly exclusionary rhetoric among political elites across all parties. Using multi-level modelling and within-country estimators, we furthermore demonstrate that the relationship between exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and far-right voting is significantly stronger when a country's political elites become more exclusionary. In sum, we show that the otherwise loose relationship between exclusionary national identity and far-right preferences is significantly stronger in times of exclusionary discourse across parties. We thus confirm findings of previous studies showing that catering to far-right issues first and foremost benefits far-right parties, while other parties are likely to hurt themselves by adopting exclusionary rhetoric (e.g., Lochocki 2018; Krause et al. 2023). However, we show that this strategy does not only benefit far-right parties generally, but that catering far-right issue positions specifically activated those voters with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood.

Study 3 (Chapter 4) further advances these previous two studies by using panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study' (GLES) 2017 Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019) that is combined with a measure of media salience of immigration-related news based on news articles provided by LexisNexis. It complements the previous study by confirming the existence of the previously identified types despite using a different item battery with different scales to measure membership boundaries. Using panel data, I also confirm the assumed stability of conceptions of nationhood while showing

that national attachment is volatile and thus subjected to contextual changes. Again, national identity's influence on voting decisions is found to depend on the salience of immigration-related issues in the media. These findings are particularly strong, again, for those individuals who hold exclusionary conceptions of nationhood and voting for the far-right AfD. Furthermore, in addition to examining the link between exclusionary national identities and far-right voting, the study also finds those with more inclusive conceptions of nationhood to prefer left-wing parties that advocate for more inclusive policies on issues of immigration, integration, and national belonging. Finally, by shifting the focus from political elites to the role of mass media content, I introduce the main mediator between politicians and citizens to the research on national identity activation. Using panel data, this study complements existing research on the activation hypothesis by examining indications of vote switching among individuals during an electoral campaign in which immigration-related issues were vividly discussed.

5. Contributions

The dissertation was designed to investigate the research questions of *who is attracted to far-right parties* based on national identity and of *when this relationship translates into political behaviour.* Before answering these questions, however, I argued for the necessity of a new approach to capture national identity. On a more general level, the findings contribute to a better understanding of the nation-based roots of the attraction of far-right parties, as well as to a better understanding why some citizens are seemingly fundamentally less susceptible to vote for these parties. Furthermore, the findings contribute to a better understanding of the instability of far-right successes, as well as of the contributing factors of their successes. Finally, I propose a new way of capturing national identity that surpasses conceptual and methodological issues of previous research. Combining national identity research, social psychology, and voting literature, my dissertation advances these fields in several ways:

Firstly, I propose a new approach to address the conceptual-methodological gap in national identity research. The person-centred approach to national identity's content dimension consequently acknowledges the theoretical position of national identity between the individual- (e.g., socialisation, experiences, and cognitive abilities) and the

country-level (e.g., top-down incorporation of institutionalised frames and bottom-up assumptions of collectively shared conceptions). Classical research on individual-level national identity has relied conceptually on the ethnic-civic dichotomy, which was originally derived from state-level resources and thus risks ecological fallacy. Empirically, this research has relied on factor analysis techniques, which, while often resulting in a two-dimensional structure roughly representing ethnic vs. civic conceptions, have proven inadequate for capturing national identity of individuals (Pehrson et al. 2009; Wright et al. 2012; Reijerse et al. 2013), not least through inconsistent content of the identified conceptions across studies (Kunovich 2009; Wright et al. 2012, and comparing Jones and Smith 2001 *a*; Berg and Hjerm 2010; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Hochmann et al. 2016; Hadler and Flesken 2018; Ariely 2020; Filsinger et al. 2021). More recent approaches have moved away from this approach, but have been constrained by few country samples due to the demanding application of cluster analysis techniques (Hjerm 1998 *b*; Trittler 2017) or by considering national identity in its multidimensionality (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Alemán and Woods 2018; Soehl and Karim 2021). Conflating the theoretically distinct dimensions (Eger and Hjerm 2022 *a*) thereby risks masking the different associations of the different dimensions of national identity with different political attitudes and behaviours (Eger and Hjerm 2022 *b*). My approach (i) overcomes the problems of these previous approaches and offers an empirical way to capture the individual-level complexity of national identity, while acknowledging historical path-dependent country-level differences that also affect individual-level national identity. The approach thereby yields (ii) a new categorical typology of conceptions of nationhood that highlights the need to move beyond the ethnic-civic dichotomy in capturing national identity at the individual level. The approach also shows that (iii) national identity differs between members of national societies, while being to some extent universalistic: Where there is a nation, there are also people who are willing to use all available means to erect high barriers to the national in-group, but also those who erect low barriers to the national community. The findings challenge a deterministic relationship between the national path-dependent institutional frames represented by citizenship policies and the individually understood, used, and arranged criteria of national membership. Yet, the empirical approach allows for the recognition and identification of country-specific peculiarities in the conceptions of nationhood that may have resulted from these frames. Overall, I find national policy

frames to matter – yet differently for different citizens. Addressing the multidimensionality of national identity highlights (iv) the importance of retaining the theoretically distinct dimensions of national identity, that have been conflated in previous research. While some conceptions of nationhood are more likely to coincide with national attachment and national chauvinism (exclusionist conceptions), other conceptions are less directly related to the other dimensions. Conceptions of nationhood (v) emerged, moreover, as the main driver of the relationship between national identity, political attitudes, and voting behaviour. National identity's dimensions and their subdimensions are found to have different and even sometimes opposing effects on attitudes and consequently voting behaviour. It is therefore necessary to analyse them separately.

Secondly, in relation to voting literature, my findings (i) highlight and provide empirical evidence for the role of national identity as a basis for far-right voting. Moving beyond the questionable ethnic-civic dichotomy, which has often led to inconclusive findings on the role of national identity in voting due to the highly correlated dimensions, paves the way for the inclusion of the surprisingly underrepresented factor of national identity in voting theories. The identified conceptions of nationhood (ii) confirm Mudde's (2007) assumption that not national identification per se does explain the attraction of far-right parties. Rather, it is the far-right ideology, which is based on nativist ideas of the nation, that resonates with and attracts primarily those who hold specific conceptions of nationhood. Mudde defines nativism as a political ideology that is based on the perception of a nativist population, which may be defined by ethnic, religious, or other cultural elements. The findings of my research, however, diverge slightly from those presented by Mudde and expand upon them in a specific manner. The exclusionary conceptions, which are found to be drawn to the far-right, do include nativist criteria, such as having national ancestors, into their national in-group definition. I argue for more complex underlying conceptions to guide the selection and combination of membership criteria, including nativist criteria. For example, language proficiency may be interpreted by those with exclusionist conceptions as an ethnocultural characteristic representing cultural heritage and national belonging in a quasi-ethnic nativist way (cf. Hjerm 1998 *a*, Wright 2011 *b*, 2019), while those with more open conceptions may interpret language proficiency in purely participatory terms, because it is comparatively easy to achieve and enables social participation (cf. Janmaat 2006; Yogeeswaran and Dasgupta 2014; Wright 2019). Furthermore,

I (iii) demonstrate that the relevance of national identity for voting is conditional on the prior activation. This activation is shown to be induced by changes in the information environment of individuals and may encompass heightened salience of national in-group or out-group issues, or exclusionary elite rhetoric. Consequently, both intensified news reports on immigration and parties picking up on far-right issues, are likely to have unintended consequences that mainly benefit far-right parties. Finally, the findings add (iv) to the puzzle of who is affected by these changes specifically. Previous research found that mass media shapes threat perception of immigrants and concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dunaway et al. 2011: 919; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; McLaren 2017; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and accordingly (far-right) voting (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Dennison 2020; Damstra et al. 2021; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). Mainstream parties are also found to increase the salience of far-right issues by picking up these issues, which, in turn, is found to particularly benefit the far right (Lochocki 2018; Krause et al. 2023). My findings do support these findings, while showing that these changes in the information environment affect those with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood specifically. However, (v) left-wing parties are also shown to benefit from a heightened salience of immigration-related issues, based on national identity. Parties offering left-wing alternative solutions to immigration issues are found to win votes among those with more open conceptions due to an overall increased relevance of national identity. These findings are consistent with those on the polarising effect of anti-immigrant violence, which is suspected to draw attention to immigration issues for all members of the nation and cause those with pro-immigrant attitudes to be mobilised against the far right (Eger and Olzak 2022).

Finally, by combining individual-level survey data with contextual data on the information environment in the two studies on national identity activation, Christian S. Czymara and I are, to our knowledge, the first to (i) specifically test the activation potential and contextual determinants of this activation of national identity. While previous research suspected elite rhetoric to activate national identity and remained mainly in the US context of the 2016 Trump election (e.g., Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021), we test for this assumption in a large-scale comparative setting across 25 European countries. Furthermore, (ii) by including data on mass media content, I introduce another hitherto neglected important factor contributing to individual's

information environment into the research on national identity activation. Overall, while identity activation research has largely relied on (survey) experimental data (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2004; Transue 2007; Aquino et al. 2009; Jackson 2011), (iii) I confirm the identity activation hypothesis by using real-life data. Although these are not experimental data that allow the identification of causal mechanisms in a controlled setting, the repeated identification of national identity effects in both cross-country and panel data studies provide sufficient evidence to suggest the existence of national identity activation. Here, in contrast to Aquino et al. (2009) (iv), I find that the activation potential is not affected by an *a priori* higher position of identities within the working self-concept. Testing for the role of national attachment, I find no significant interaction effect of the strength of national identity and increased issue saliences on political behaviour. I conclude that the knowledge structures attached to national identity, which are represented by the conceptions of nationhood, shape the activation potential. It is argued that exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are more sensitive to issues concerning nation issues and boundaries because of their narrow understandings of compatriots, which increases the likelihood of perceiving larger parts of (immigrant) societies as threatening. Both empirical studies support this line of reasoning and show that those with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are particularly affected and further drawn to the far right when these issues are prevalent in the information environment. Finally, regarding the role of some identities being hypothesised as likely to be active across social contexts, I can confirm (v) that national identity is a rather latent identity that does not affect behaviour across social situations. In contrast, national identity requires explicit activation by situational cues to become behaviourally relevant.

6. Limitations & Avenues for Future Work

Although my research contributes to conceptualising national identity, understanding its role and conditions for voting behaviour, it has limitations, which fortunately open new roads for future research. Firstly, there is a need to better understand the determinants of identity formation and identity stability. I demonstrated that the content dimension of national identity plays a significant role in shaping political attitudes and is likely to influence voting behaviour. In line with Mader and Schoen (2023), this dimensions is

furthermore shown to be rather stable. However, evidence for this stability is limited to findings from Germany and across a rather short time span. In the future, I intend to investigate further the cross-national, regional, and individual-level determinants of identity formation that may explain the emergence of the identified types, as well as the determinants of change. Here, changes in the information environment are argued to primarily increase the relevance of national identity conceptions. However, it could be also argued that exclusionary political elite discourses lead voters to (re-)formulate their images of the national in-group (cf. Helbling et al. 2016). Furthermore, individuals are expected to adjust their positions to better fit the position of a party with which they identify (Lenz 2009). Individuals may also derive their conceptions of nationhood from experiences with state institutions, such as citizenship policies (cf. Almond and Verba 1963). In times of high immigration-related issue salience, the policies that regulate national membership might be more prominently discussed, which may affect individuals' reflections and thus how they conceptualise their national in-group. Future research may seek to ascertain the impact of top-down processes of policy frames, such as citizenship policy reforms.

Concerning available data of national identity research, secondly, much of my research relied on cross-country comparative data, which may potentially mask country-level peculiarities. Even though in all studies the examination of conceptions of nationhood is carried out separately for each country-year sample, both the item batteries available and the methods used are conducive to a comparative approach. Further investigation of country-level differences and peculiarities will undoubtedly deepen our understanding of national identity construction. In addition, thirdly, the item batteries primarily used in quantitative research do not fully encompass the variety of membership criteria. Consequently, the findings are limited to the available batteries. To date, the studies identified the different types of national boundary making across five different item batteries, which produced fairly similar results. However, combining qualitative and quantitative studies would undoubtedly further benefit our understanding of how individuals distinguish between compatriots and others in detail.

Fourthly, while my findings offer empirical evidence on the activation of national identities for political behaviour, they are limited using the information environment as a proxy for actual contact with and perception of the situational cues that are thought to activate national identities for political behaviour. This is particularly alarming as only a

very limited proportion of media consumption is political news consumption. To address this, future research should control for the actual perception by employing survey experiments that aid to confront individuals with concrete situational cues. Fifthly, as my studies relied on exclusionary political elite discourse, which have been combined with inclusionary elite discourse to mimic issue salience in these discourses, and immigration-related issue salience in the media, I leave room for further investigation. The role of directed messages versus mere issue salience in the information environment, the contrast of in-group versus out-group appeals in identity activation and the interplay between the content and the sender of messages warrant further investigation. Finally, I do not consider the possibly reinforcing effects of political elite communication and mass media content together. Future research should consider the interplay of the various sources of the information environment to activate national identity for voting, which may also include real-life events, such as increased immigration or global trading.

Moreover, my research concentrated predominantly on natives. However, national societies are becoming more diverse, and increasingly liberalised citizenship policies are integrating a growing proportion of immigrant societies into the national ingroup, ultimately giving them the right to choose their political representation. Studying national identity patterns of citizens with immigrant descent, taking both into account multinational socialisation as well as immigrants' perspectives on determinants of belonging to the host societies, should ultimately also benefit the research on identity formation.

Finally, transferring the results to test the activation hypothesis for other politically relevant social identities could deepen our understanding of the mechanisms and meaning of social identities in politics. This would also provide opportunities for future research on cross-pressure settings. Explaining party preferences by the voters' social group affiliations has a long tradition in electoral research. However, in an increasingly diverse and mobile society, the range of social affiliations underpinning political preferences has widened, potentially creating cross-pressures between different social identities. This raises the question of which of the many group-based identities has behavioural consequences: how and under what conditions do social identities guide political decision-making?

7. *Concluding Remarks*

In light of Hobsbawm's (1992) prediction that the era of nationalism, nation states, and national identity is nearing its end, it can be concluded that the relevance of the nation to the individual is not always apparent. However, there are instances where national identity can be seen to have a significant political impact. This is particularly pertinent to those with rather narrow and exclusionary conceptions of the national in-group, but it can also guide the political decision-making of those with more inclusive conceptions of the national in-group. In order for national identity to become relevant, affect political behaviour, and determine the selection of political parties based on conceptions of nationhood, issues that touch upon the national in-group and its boundaries in the information environment of individuals need to be prevalent. I identify both political parties and mass media content to play a significant role in increasing national identity's relevance for voters. As particularly those with exclusionary conceptions are further drawn to the far right in times of high prevalence of nationalist or immigration-related topics, catering to far-right issues and framing news as immigration-related, both actors might unintentionally boost the voter potential of far-right parties. In turn, the successes of these parties demonstrate the continuing relevance of national identity to individuals. However, demonstrating that national identities influence political attitudes and can be activated for political behaviour opens the possibilities for other identities, such as those of workers, religious groups, or those of rural versus urban populations, to be activated and consequently to affect vote choices, which may increase the voter potential of other parties than the far right.

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Chapter 2: *And if they don't dance, they are no friends of mine*: Exploring boundaries of national identity.

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Abstract: National identity is widely used to explain anti-immigrant attitudes and thus the appeal for right-wing (populist) parties. Yet, consensus on how to capture national identity is lacking. This article identifies ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making across 42 countries and more than 25 years beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy and addresses the multidimensionality of national identity. Using latent class analysis and cluster analysis, four ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood are identified and shown to be differently related to national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism. Overall, the results close the methodological–empirical gap between classical approaches and recent inductive approaches to national identity and demonstrate that national identity is a cross-cultural phenomenon with distinct types.

Keywords: large-scale comparison, latent class analysis, national boundary making, national identity, nationhood

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1. Introduction

National identity plays an important role in explaining social cohesion, trust, and in particular anti-immigrant sentiments and has therefore also been used to explain the appeal of right-wing (populist) parties (e.g., Bonikowski et al., 2021; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm 1998a; Hochmann et al., 2016; Jones & Smith 2001a; Kunovich, 2009; Mader et al., 2021; Wright, 2011a). Yet, consensus on how to capture national identity is lacking.

Most quantitative research relating national identity to openness and hostility towards outsiders relies on the dichotomy of ethnic versus civic conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker, 1994; Kohn, 2005; Smith, 1991). These conceptions differ in how national boundaries are defined. Whereas ethnic conceptions emphasise ascriptive membership criteria (e.g., ancestry), civic conceptions emphasise voluntaristic criteria (e.g., adherence to shared values). However, this dichotomy, which was originally derived from the analysis of state-level resources (Meinecke, 1970; cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), has proven to be insufficient to fully capture the complexity of individual national identity (Pehrson et al., 2009; Reijerse et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012). More recent advances have therefore introduced person-centred methods like cluster analysis (CA) and latent class analysis (LCA). Findings from research using CA demonstrate that individuals select and arrange membership criteria beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy and that these patterns of national boundary making—or rather the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood—influence attitudes towards outsiders (e.g., Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a). Studies using a multidimensional approach to studying national identity beyond membership criteria have found that conceptualisations of nationhood *together* with national attachment, pride, and chauvinism compose certain types of nationalism that influence attitudes (e.g., Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016) and attraction to right-wing (populist) parties (Bonikowski et al., 2021). While studies using CA have been limited to few country samples, studies employing LCA in the multidimensional approach of national identity have recently been heavily criticised, both conceptually and empirically, for combining multiple distinct dimensions of national identity into one model (Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, 2022b). Overall, there is a lack of a strictly person-centred

analysis which would identify patterns of national boundary making as well as the theoretically distinct dimensions of nationalism in a large-scale comparative setting.

Building on previous approaches and findings, this paper explores the ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making based on the membership criteria measure typically used by researchers. By using person-centred methods, this approach uncovers underlying conceptualisations of nationhood and thus overcomes the ethnic–civic dichotomy. A comparative analysis examines which concepts of nationhood are held by citizens and whether these concepts can be generalised. Finally, I address national identity's multidimensionality by analysing the relationship of these patterns of national boundary making with national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism.

Combining LCA and CA to analyse a large-scale harmonised comparative data spread across more than 25 years and 42 countries, I demonstrate the existence of four unique types beyond the ethnic–civic distinction: exclusionists, assimilationists, integrationists, and pluralists. Specifically, assimilationists and integrationists express selective boundary making patterns which uncover distinct conceptualisations of nationhood. Exclusionists and pluralists can be characterised by an overall emphasis in the case of exclusionists or an outright rejection of membership criteria in the case of pluralists. The results support the assumption that membership criteria items are differentially selected, arranged, and even understood by respondents based on the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood that they have. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between dimensions of national identity show that being exclusionary in particular is positively correlated with national attachment, general and domain-specific national pride, and national chauvinism. Conversely, being a pluralist is consistently negatively correlated with dimensions of national sentiment. Being in favour of assimilation and integration is both positively correlated with the political subdimension of national pride, but not with national chauvinism.

2. What Constitutes National Identity?

Being a member of a nation gives individuals a sense of who they are in relation to others, a purpose, and a feeling of home (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337). National identity relates to three

conceptual dimensions: awareness, affect, and content (Citrin et al., 2001). While awareness of belonging to a nation-state, mediated by official documents and developed during socialisation, forms the basis for identification, content and affect are two conceptually independent and potentially volatile dimensions.

The content dimension revolves around the "particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive - ideas about its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relation to other nations" (Citrin et al., 2001, p. 75f; also Abdelal et al., 2009). This dimension entails the concepts of nationhood and, consequentially, the way boundaries are drawn between national in-group members and outsiders. These boundaries enable actors to recognise each other as one social group and to distinguish themselves from others (Abdelal et al., 2009, pp. 20f, 23; Bail, 2008; Helbling et al., 2016, p. 746). Distinction, in turn, is a key precondition for the devaluation of outsiders and thus hostile attitudes (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979, on Social Identity Theory). Though nations are based on the inherent assumption of shared characteristics and differences relative to others (cf. Anderson, 1983; Citrin et al., 2001, p. 73; Guibernau, 2004, p. 134; Wright et al., 2012, p. 469), it is not implied that all individuals of a nation base their conceptualisations of nationhood on the same membership criteria (Abdelal et al., 2009; Citrin et al., 2001; Hjerm, 1998b). Depending on the criteria that individuals use to distinguish between who belongs and who does not, "others" are different people (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337). In other words, those who are recognised as outsiders, and thus devaluated, are dependent on the underlying conceptualisation of nationhood.

The affect dimension entails the (emotional) consequences of identification, expressed through feelings of closeness, pride, and feelings of superiority that are anchored in the acknowledgement of group membership (Citrin et al., 2001, p. 74; Helbling et al., 2016, p. 746; Weldon, 2006, p. 333). Both national pride and national chauvinism are varieties of this affective dimension. Although pride describes positive attachment to the nation and is often linked to patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) without being necessarily linked to out-group hostility (cf. Ariely, 2020, p. 267), national chauvinism includes perceptions of national superiority (Citrin et al., 2001, p. 74f; Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, p. 343) and thus has been linked to nationalism (see Mußotter, 2022, for an overview on the conceptual [inter]relations) and repeatedly associated with anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003).

Although some scholars argue for a broader multidimensional definition (e.g., Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Citrin et al., 2001) including all of the dimensions listed above, others argue that the content dimension by itself is the essence of national identity (e.g., Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, but also Abdelal et al., 2009). Without giving preference to any definition, I argue for retaining the conceptually distinct dimensions, because, although they may be interrelated, they are conceptually different, may be shaped divergently, and have also been shown to affect attitudes independently (cf. Lubbers & Coenders, 2017, p. 101f). Awareness represents a necessary precondition for identification. The affective dimension (pride and chauvinism) determines the degree of in-group affection, favouritism, and saliency of belonging, whereas the content dimension (concepts of nationhood and boundary making) governs to whom this favouritism is allocated to (cf. Wright, 2011b).

3. *The Missing Conceptual-Methodological Link in National Identity Research*

3.1 The ethnic-civic dichotomy in national identity research

National identity research has long been dominated by the analysis of membership boundaries in the realm of the ethnic–civic dichotomy. This dichotomy, which resulted from the analysis of legal and popular culture documents, public education, and ideological histories of nation-states (Meinecke, 1970; cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010), distinguishes between the Western European and especially French "civic nationalism" on the one hand and Eastern European and German "ethnic nationalism" on the other. Whereas civic nationalism ties membership to place of birth in accordance with the *jus soli* principle of citizenship, ethnic nationalism underpins citizenship policies with blood relations in line with the *jus sanguinis* principle. Accordingly, ethnic national *identity* is assumed to be based on restrictive ethnocultural and ascribed specific characteristics, for example, ancestry and blood relations, nativity, religion, and culture. Likewise, civic national *identity* is assumed to be more open due to being based on more voluntarist or achievable principles, such as birthplace, and political community in particular as well as respect for legal norms (Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Janmaat, 2006; Jones &

Smith, 2001a, 2001b; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Wright, 2011a; Wright et al., 2012). This dichotomy has thus come to be viewed as responsible for explaining differences in acceptance of fewer (ethnic) or larger (civic) proportions of immigrant societies.

Empirically, this dichotomy, along with the conceptually and theoretically problematic deduction of individual national identity from legal texts and historic path dependencies (cf. Reijerse et al., 2013), has been proven inadequate for the analysis of individual national identity. Using variable-centred methods, like factor analysis, many studies indeed confirmed the existence of two factors, mostly labelled as ethnic (-ascribed/objectivist) and civic (-voluntarist) (Helbling et al., 2016; Hochmann et al., 2016; Jones & Smith, 2001a, 2001b; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Yet, along with a high correlation of factors and small differences in their exploratory power concerning policy positions (Janmaat, 2006; Wright et al., 2012, p. 471; cf. Hochmann et al., 2016, p. 73), the ambiguities concerning the content that constitutes the factors resulting in inconsistent factor structures across studies are striking (Ariely, 2020; Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Wright et al., 2012; cf. Hadler & Flesken, 2018; cf. Hochmann et al., 2016, cf. Jones & Smith, 2001a; cf. Kunovich, 2009; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). Adding to this, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) demonstrate a lack of cross-country comparability within the ethnic–civic framework. Opposing the dichotomy, alternative approaches find no (Helbling et al., 2016, p. 752) or only very few (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 341, 1998b) respondent(s) that only favour ethnic criteria alone and hence suggest a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptions. In sum, the contradictions point to underlying conceptualisations of nationhood that influence how individuals understand, employ, and combine criteria beyond the ethnic–civic distinction.

Conceptually, the way in which citizens understand nationhood is expected to be much more complex than the ethnic–civic dichotomy suggests (cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). How conceptualisations of nationhood are incorporated by individuals depends on socialisation and individual experiences (Abdelal et al., 2009; Weldon, 2006; cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; cf. Sears, 1993; cf. Sears et al., 1999; see Hjerm, 2001, on the effects of education). Individuals arrange and employ boundaries depending on their situation and access to available repertoires offered by, for example, citizenship policies, historical models, or elite discourses (Trittler, 2017a, p. 371). Rosenberg and Beattie (2019) have additionally outlined the role of

cognitive skills used when processing and incorporating available narratives and integrating them into a coherent national identity. Additionally, as native-born citizens are typically not confronted directly with or taught about the legal requirements of citizenship, univocal incorporation is hindered. In sum, conceptions of nationhood are expected to be rather vague and latent. Interpretations of survey items in empirical analysis capturing national identity thus only reflect these underlying conceptions.

3.2 Ambiguities of surveyed items

The conceptual ambiguity of surveyed membership criteria items intended to capture individual national identity is striking. Together, these ambiguities underline the conceptual pitfalls of the ethnic–civic dichotomy and indicating a demand for methods better suited to the individual-level complexity and dynamic of national identity. One of the more striking examples is the membership criterion of *language*. Language is often included among institutionalised citizenship requirements. Command of the national language is a comparatively easily accomplished skill enabling individuals to take part in the national community and can thus be seen as a civic criterion (Janmaat, 2006, p. 56; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014, p. 195; Wright, 2019, p. 473). Simultaneously, language is interpreted as an ethnocultural feature representing cultural heritage and thus an indicator of quasi-ethnic differences (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 336; Wright 2011a, p. 473, 2019, p. 839). Hence, the discriminatory value of this item regarding the ethnic–civic dichotomy is comparatively low. Similarly, the criterion of *birthplace* may be interpreted as proof of national kinship and thus nativity *or* as a mere civic prerequisite in the sense of *jus soli*, granting membership to children of migrants (Jones & Smith, 2001a). Being member of a majority *religion* can function as a boundary marker for rigid religious or cultural identities concerning religious denominations, *or* it could represent a belief system evolving around basic integrational and solidary values and norms, for example, charity, freedom, and tolerance (Trittler, 2017b, p. 710). Additionally, holding *citizenship* can mean very different things across different citizenship regimes (Wright 2011a, p. 839, 2011b, p. 603). *Feelings of belonging* as well as *living in the country for most of one's life* fails to fit the ethnic–civic dichotomy at all (Wright, 2011b, p. 603). It is only the criteria of national *ancestry* and the *respect of laws and institutions* that clearly tap into the ethnic–civic dichotomy, with

ancestry and kinship representing the *jus sanguinis* principle of blood relation and law abidance representing commitment to civic principles.

The methodological problems of unambiguously placing items in either ethnic or civic categories coupled with the conceptual–theoretical problems of deduction from country-level derivates to the individual level that lead to divergent interpretation suggest a need for researchers to overcome the ethnic–civic dichotomy when studying citizens' conceptions of nationhood. Consequently, recent advances in national identity research introduced person-centred methods that are sensitive to individual-level underlying conceptualisations of nationhood and directly address these issues.

3.3 A new person-oriented path for national identity research

By examining response patterns, recently introduced person-centred methods (e.g., Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a) allow for the discovery of the underlying conceptualisations of nationhood.

Using the membership criteria measures and thus applying a narrow definition of national identity, CA applications by both Hjerm (1998a, 1998b) and Trittler (2017a) show that individuals understand and combine criteria differently, with a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptualisations of national identity. Similar to Helbling et al. (2016, using factor analysis and mean scaling), both Hjerm and Trittler find exclusionary types of national identity to employ all available criteria. Moreover, they found that these types are correlated with xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants. Their analyses, however, were limited to Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden.

While CA detects types using the membership criteria measures, LCA enables large-scale comparisons of patterns of national identity. Applying a multidimensional definition of national identity that combines "indicators of national identity with measures of national patriotism, chauvinism and identification with the nation" (Eger & Hjerm 2022a, p. 342), previous studies using LCA identify four types of national identification: *Ardent* nationalists are reportedly most attached to the nation and display high pride and high chauvinism while being the most exclusionary class concerning conceptions of nationhood. In contrast, the *disengaged* are less restrictive and less engaged with

nation-oriented idioms and practices. *Restrictive* nationalists show moderate emotional affect towards the nation while holding exclusionary conceptualisations. *Creedal* nationalists are emotionally attached to the nation while having less restrictive demands for fellow national members. In particular, both the ardent and restrictive types seem to resonate with negative attitudes towards immigrants (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016).

Empirically, the large number of items the models used in the multidimensional approach is associated with sparseness, which potentially explains why these previous models fail to fit the data in terms of absolute fit (cf. Eger & Hjerm 2022a, 2022b). Moreover, use of the multidimensional approach can lead to the internal structure of dimensions remaining unobserved. Additionally, effects of single dimensions on attitudes cannot be differentiated. In fact, previous results show that two of the inductively identified types of national identity show "striking similarities in demographic profiles" (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, p. 17), similar effects on especially anti-migration attitudes (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016), similar prevalence in geopolitically challenged states (Soehl & Karim, 2021), and even strikingly similar profiles of membership criteria (cf. Bonikowski, 2016, p. 19; cf. Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, p. 11; cf. Soehl & Karim, 2021, p. 10). Therefore, the way membership criteria are employed may be the driving force in explaining antimigrant attitudes. Equally, single dimensions may even have opposing effects, as demonstrated by Hjerm (1998a), who finds political national pride negatively related to xenophobia, possibly contradicting findings of this multidimensional approach.

Together, results of CA (Hjerm, 1998b; Trittler, 2017a) and LCA (Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Larsen, 2017), in connection with other alternatives to classical factor-analysis techniques (e.g., Helbling et al., 2016) and qualitative research (Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019), indicate, first, that the ethnic–civic dichotomy does not hold when capturing individual conceptualisations of nationhood. Second, whereas Helbling et al. (2016, p. 752) as well as CA results in general suggest a continuum from liberal to restrictive conceptions of nationhood, the person-centred approaches additionally demonstrate the existence of distinct conceptualisations (Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Hjerm, 1998b; Trittler, 2017b) that divergently employ and arrange criteria (and nation-oriented idioms). Furthermore, specific conceptualisations seem to coincide differently with national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism. Yet, what has been missing is a strictly

person-centred perspective on boundary making itself in a large-scale comparative setting.

This paper contributes to closing the missing conceptual–methodological link in national identity research by first focussing on national boundary patterns from a person-centred perspective in a comparative framework and then by examining the relationship between the dimensions of national identity. In doing so, it aims to understand the conceptualisations *citizens* have of their national in-group and whether these conceptions can be generalised across countries and time. National identity, however, is as a concept inevitably stuck between individual identification processes and institutionalised national boundaries. To analyse national identity, national frames must be considered together with individual processes.

4. National or Individual Differences in National Identity?

This paper specifically focusses on citizens conceptualisations of nationhood, thought it must be acknowledged that national identity is not merely individual. It is inherently linked to a powerful source of identification, the nation-state, a constant reminder for every individual of their membership and the relevance thereof (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) through birth certificates, passports, and the rights and duties of citizenship. Likewise, citizenship policies offer a formal frame of the conceptualisations through clear-cut definitions of the features and characteristics which ought to be shared by its members, guaranteeing access to participation, representation, and to social welfare (Brubaker, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 7). Hence, national identity research should include a collective perspective (cf. Kunovich, 2009).

From a legal–historical perspective, citizenship policies represent historically path-dependent shared notions of nationhood (Brubaker, 1994; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017). Shared experiences among members of national societies during the process of nation-state building are responsible for large-scale country-specific conceptualisations of nationhood, which still shape how individuals imagine their national in-group. Simultaneous bottom-up (from shared experiences to common policies) and top-down (from institutional frames to individual perceptions) processes suggest not only

homogenously shared conceptualisations within countries but also differences across countries due to different historic experiences. The perspective moreover implies individuals strictly incorporate what the legal frames offer. Yet, although citizenship policies are institutional frames that influence individuals, the extent to which they shape individual national identities varies. The relationship is neither deterministic nor unidirectional, but dynamic. The incorporation of images of the nation offered by the nation-state depends on socialisation, individual experiences, and cognitive abilities (Abdelal et al., 2009; Weldon, 2006; cf. Almond & Verba, 1963; cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; cf. Sears, 1993; Sears et al., 1999). Citizenship policies, historical models, and elite discourses only represent publicly available repertoires of the socially constructed categorisation. How individuals arrange and employ criteria depends on their situation and access to available repertoires (Trittler, 2017a, p. 371). Expecting national identity to be constructed identically across countries, previous approaches may overlook country-level mechanisms at work.

There are few points to emphasise before discussing the analysis. First, even though national identity is hypothesised as being different on the individual level, national identity is nonetheless expected to be affected in part by national frames, for example, those set by citizenship policies. Hence, national identity types ought to be similar in some respect (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337) within countries, possibly displaying country-specific peculiarities. Second, nations do share common basic principles and citizenship policies have in fact converged over time across (European) countries (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010, p. 580; cf. Vink & Bauböck, 2013, p. 623; see Koopmans et al., 2012, on specific policy fields). Brubaker (1994, p. 2412, note 9) notes "popular understandings may be much more similar" than elite understandings or policies. Thus, aggregate conceptualisations of national identities might also be similar across countries (despite inter-individual differences within countries). Third, policies are a snapshot of the conceptualisations of the national in-group of political majorities (cf. Bail, 2008; cf. Knoth, 2015) and are subject to change, in the event that the majorities change (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Therefore, the inclusion of multiple country samples over time may result in different within-country structures for different points in time.

Consequently, my analysis uses explorative methods that allow for the detection of latent conceptions of nationhood. It thus (i) allows for criteria to be arranged beyond

ethnic or civic terms thereby bypassing the problem of item ambiguity. Concentrating (ii) on national boundary patterns serves to close the gap between classical approaches explaining hostility towards outsiders with the ethnic–civic distinction and recent inductive approaches that applied these methods to a multidimensional understanding of national identity. To acknowledge country-specific path dependencies and possible time-variant effects on how membership criteria are arranged, (iii) country-year samples are analysed separately in this research. Addressing the question of whether the images can be generalised across countries, (iv) subsequent analyses of the within-country-year results are conducted within survey waves leading to ideal-typical derivates of national identity reflecting possible similarities across countries. Addressing the multidimensionality, further analyses examine (v) the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and attachment, pride, and chauvinism.

5. Data and Methods

To investigate the conceptions of nationhood, I primarily use data from the National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 1998, 2012, 2015) surveyed in 1995, 2003, and 2013 and, for comparisons, the European Values Study (EVS, 2020a, 2020b) surveyed in 2008 and 2017, as compiled by the ONBound-project (Bechert et al., 2020). The ISSP National Identity Module and the EVS offer stable question and item wordings over a long period of time and across many countries. Membership boundaries are measured by asking respondents to rate the importance of different criteria to describe the national in-group. Though doubt has been expressed as to whether ISSP captures the full range of membership criteria (Janmaat, 2006, p. 69; Reijerse et al., 2013, p. 616), inductive research shows that the ISSP items indeed are among those criteria commonly mentioned by individuals (ancestry, language, nativism, citizenship, living, and law abiding) to define their national in-group. In qualitative studies, only religion and feelings of belonging appear rarely, whereas stereotypical personality traits and cultural aspects are frequently mentioned (cf. Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019). Despite these shortcomings, the ISSP item battery remains one of the best sources for national identity research and is hence used as main subject of the analyses. The question and surveyed criteria across survey programmes read as follows (Table 1):

Table 1. Item availability across study waves

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is …	ISSP 1995	ISSP 2003	ISSP 2013	EVS 2008	EVS 2017	
to have been born in [COUNTRY]	X	X	X	X	X	*born*
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	X	X	X			*citizenship*
to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one´s life	X	X	X	X		*lived*
to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	X	X	X	X	X	*language*
to be a [RELIGION]	X	X	X			*religion*
to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	X	X	X	X	X	*laws*
to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	X	X	X			*feel*
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestors		X	X	X	X	*descent*
to share [NATIONAL] culture					X	*culture*

Apart from the *descent* item, all items have been queried in all three ISSP waves. Due to the missing item, the 1995 wave, like EVS, is used for comparisons and cross-validations only. To avoid bias by earlier national belonging and residence, if available, I reduced the dataset to those respondents holding citizenship status of the respective country. After excluding country samples (South Africa in 2013 and Bulgaria and Latvia in 2003) due to different scaling or missing items within waves, the pooled dataset comprises a total of 164 country-year observations. To avoid model sparseness, the 4-point Likert scale was dichotomised to indicate support or rejection of criteria. Arguably, because boundaries demarcate the national in-group from outsiders, considering one criterion as even "fairly important" implies that this criterion is used for boundary making. Aiming for these boundaries, reducing complexity outweighs the informational depths in this case. Weights were used where applicable.

The empirical analysis includes five elements: First, national identity is conceptualised as prone to individual-level socialisation, experiences, and cognitive abilities and, hence, allowed to differ within countries. Using LCA and a subsequent bootstrap loglikelihood ratio test (BLRT) of the results serves this individual-level perspective. LCA identifies classes of respondents that share similar response patterns and thus allows for the surveyed items to be understood differently. Hence, LCA detects how the criteria are arranged, selected, and thus interpreted by the respondents. Finding a solution that fits the data best is crucial. What this could mean may diverge (cf. the debate between Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, 2022, and Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, 2022b). Empirical identifications of the best LCA solutions may rely on information criteria […] (e.g., Akaike information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, adjusted Bayesian information criterion, and consistent Akaike information criterion) or likelihood tests (e.g., naive chi-square difference test, Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test, and BLRT) […] (Nylund et al., 2007), with the BLRT being "approximately valid" (Dziak et al., 2014, p. 536) and outperforming other likelihood tests, especially in cases where, as here, sample sizes are relatively large ($N > 1000$) and in simple few-item ($N \leq 8$) structured models (Nylund et al., 2007, p. 554). The following analysis has been conducted using the LCA Plugin for STATA by Lanza et al. Version 1.2.1 (Collins & Lanza, 2009; Lanza et al., 2018). Models with up to eight latent classes were considered and fit to the data. The models are not restricted. General model specifications were held constant across all LCAs. As BLRT tests for absolute model fit, I chose this path. Absolute model fit tests the goodness of correspondence between data and the fitted model (Eger & Hjerm, 2022a). Subsequent BLRT tests were performed using the LCA bootstrap Stata function (Version 1.0) by Huang et al. (2016).

Second, theories of historical path-dependent country-level determinants guide the decision to analyse each country separately for the initial analysis. Third, because country-level institutional frames possibly affecting individual-level national identity may change over time (e.g., Germany changed from *jus sanguinis* in 2000) and political climates through public debates might change, these initial analyses are carried out separately for each country-year sample. Fourth, the subsequent analyses identify ideal-type derivates of individual-level national identities across countries. Therefore, the results of the previous steps are submitted to a CA routine. CA exploratively identifies "natural

groupings" (clusters) of observations by their structural composition (Bock, 1985) and offers various options as well. For the analyses the question of which cluster technique might be best is secondary. The goal was to find those patterns of national identity most stable *across* clustering techniques within the pooled results of the initial country-year analyses performed by LCA and BLRT. Therefore, four clustering methods across varying randomised dataset sorting were used successively. Classes that overlapped within all modifications of the CA were considered most stable and thus to represent ideal-typical derivates of national identity conceptions. Because not all countries were sampled in each wave, results of the CA may be influenced by varying prevalence of certain types due to the specific country selection. In particular, European countries are more frequently included in the surveys, which may increase the influence of the patterns of national boundary making prevalent in Europe on the results. Though the analysis strategy detected comparable and meaningful ideal-typical derivates, we should consider this pitfall when interpreting the results.

Finally, the multidimensionality of national identities is addressed by including measures of attachment, general and domain-specific national pride, and chauvinism and then examining correlations among these dimensions.

6. Results

The empirical strategy reveals four important main findings. First, across countries and time, four meaningful classes are found repeatedly. These ideal types of national identity can be differentiated in terms of number, degree, and combination of supported and rejected characteristics used for national boundary making. Second, the internal structure of national identity types varies across countries. Not only does the number of classes vary within countries but also the existence of ideal types and size of each type varies across countries and time points. Third, the types can be structured from inclusive to exclusive. Whereas two types either support or reject most or all criteria, the other two types express clear-cut conceptions of nationhood. Fourth, the identified types relate differently to other dimensions of national identity.

6.1 Ideal-typical patterns across countries and time

Figure 1 plots profile plots of the identified national identity types within the three ISSP survey waves. Lines connecting the dots serve for orientation and do not imply causal relations. Grey areas plot the standard deviations based on all countries within the survey. Values between 0.8 and 1 indicate very high conditioned probabilities and high within-class homogeneity of identified types. Put differently, all members of this type agree on the importance of the criterion with a probability larger than 0.8. Accordingly, values below 0.2 indicate high probability of rejecting the criterion with high homogeneity within classes. Values between 0.2 and 0.8 only indicate tendencies concerning the importance of items (0.2 to 0.4: weak rejection and 0.6 to 0.8: weak agreement on importance). Values closer to 0.5 suggest strong internal heterogeneity concerning the characteristic in question. Figure 1 only plots ideal types composed of classes that unambiguously clustered together, even though subtypes emerged through CA (see Figures A1.1-A1.3).

Type 1 (Exclusionists): The first and most striking class (upper left plot) is characterised by very high probabilities to perceive any membership criterion as important. Except for *religion*, the conditioned probabilities of this type are above 0.85 on average, indicating incredibly high agreement on the importance of all asked characteristics. Because respondents of this class show the most closed and strict perception of the national in-group, this type is labelled "exclusionists." The exclusionist type emerges across all countries and survey waves with only one exception (Ireland 2003[13]), ranging from 17% (Finland 2013) to above 85% (Venezuela 2003 and Philippines 2003 and 2013). These latter countries thus display rather homogeneous conceptions of nationhood, whereas most European countries show stronger internal divides.

Type 2 (Assimilationists): The second type (upper right plot) resembles the first one in some respect, though rather strikingly differs concerning the characteristics of *religion* and *ancestry* which are rejected as defining elements of the national in-group. *To*

[13] Irish respondents were asked about the importance of "speaking Irish," whereas, in other multilingual countries respondents were asked about the importance of speaking any of the official languages. Consequently, because Irish is only spoken by a minority, in 2013, Irish data fail to fit the data in terms of absolute fit; in 2003, Irish exclusionists are excluded from the ideal types, and in 1995, where no assimilationists are present, exclusionists eventually emerged, yet again with less importance placed on the language item.

be born in country and *lived in country* are only moderately supported. This type is only found in 2003 and 2013, as it only differs strongly in terms of the *ancestry* item that was not asked in 1995. In total, this type can be found in three quarters of the remaining 61 country years. In some countries (Hungary and the Philippines 2003), this is type is less than 5%, whereas in others (e.g., Netherlands, Switzerland, and Slovenia), this class exceeds the first one with above 40%.

This type is labelled "assimilationists," because individuals in this group reject strictly nonvoluntary aspects and characteristics (*ancestry* and *religion*) while putting some pressure on ideational (*speak language*, *respect laws, and institutions*), emotional (*feelings*) integration, and some sort of legal and cultural naturalisation (*citizenship* and *lived*). By somewhat supporting *born* and *lived in country* on average, this group at the same time supports a strict bar for membership. Members of this type would probably accept second-generation migrants to their national in-group—should they be willing to integrate culturally, emotionally, and ideationally.

Type 3 (Integrationists): The third type (lower left plot) is defined by clear support for *language*, *respecting laws*, *and institutions* and rather supporting *citizenship* and *feelings* of national identification. *Being born, religion*, and *ancestry* are clearly rejected, and *having lived* is neither clearly supported nor rejected. This type therefore represents elements of national identity that are classically seen as civic elements. The profile of this type somewhat implies a willingness to integrate and requires an emotional bond. To *speak the language* and to *respect laws and institutions* thereby also offer the possibility to take part in the society and ensure a basic ability to interact. This type therefore is labelled "integrationists." It occurs especially in European and North American countries. Integrationists range from 8% (Slovenia 2003) to 51% (Canada 1995) of respondents.

Figure 1: Profile plots of national identity types within ISSP 2013, ISSP 2003, and ISSP 1995



Note: Figure contains mean scores and standard deviations of types identified by latent class analysis and cluster analysis within ISSP waves across all countries present in sample.

Interestingly, this type best represents the legal formalistic group as identified in the qualitative study by Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck (2019). The supported items of *language*, *laws*, and commitment/willingness as represented by *feelings* are usually those criteria regulated in citizenship policies. The integrationists thus emphasise the requirements migrants must fulfil when applying for citizenship. Additionally, conditioned probability values of this type are different in those items that are usually the concern of citizenship policies and which therefore also vary across countries (e.g., required time spent in country or varying language levels).

Type 4 (Pluralists): Compared with the other three types, this type (lower right plot) is best characterised by its rejection of most characteristics to define compatriots. It therefore represents the type most opposite to the exclusionist type 1. Only *language* and *respect laws and institutions* seem to matter for some of the members of this type. In accordance with Hjerm (1998a, 1998b), this type is called "pluralists," because these respondents care only about the two minimal criteria of societies and are comfortable with a higher degree of diversity: While commonly agreed upon laws and political institutions form the very basis of modern states, a shared and commonly understood language facilitates societal discourses, creates the feeling of belonging together, and is the key to individual participation. Overall, pluralists repeatedly appear across the samples, though the size of this class is rather small in most countries (e.g., Denmark 2013: 1.49% and The Netherlands 2003: 1.93%). However, there are countries which also display medium-sized pluralist classes, for example, Slovakia 2003 (16.36%) and Spain 2013 (11.26%).

Overall, identified ideal types vary between 1995 and 2013. Although in 1995, only three types can be identified due to the missing *ancestry* item, in 2013, a fifth type emerged that can be described as purely formalistic type that accepts other through *birthplace*, *lived*, *language*, and *citizenship*. However, this type comprises less than 8% within countries and has no manifestation in other survey years.

6.2 Country-level variations

Though the ideal types emerged in the comparative analyses of country-year samples, country-specific classes differ in internal structure of types, size, and overall presence of types. Figure 2 (see also Appendix A2 in the Supporting Information) illustrates the

varying proportions for the ISSP 2013. Particularly, European countries tend to display differentiated national identities, whereas in the Philippines, India, Turkey, Russia, Mexico, Hungary, but as well as Spain and Portugal, large proportions of exclusionists are prevalent, indicating high homogeneity within these countries. Potentially, these large classes may be explained by peculiar histories of nation-state building, education, socialisation, or prevalent public discourses.

Country-level peculiarities can be further illustrated by subtypes of exclusionists (Appendix A1, Supporting Information) that are mainly distinguished by their stance on *religion*. Whereas the exclusionists' subtype A (e.g., found as the only exclusionists' type in Russia, Israel, Turkey, and the United States in 2013) places high importance on belonging to the majority *religion*, subtype B (e.g., found in Sweden and Estonia in 2013) represents the other end of the spectrum, which may indicate a higher relevance of religion in the former countries.

The residual classes are quite large in some countries, for example, Japan, Latvia, Czech Republic, and Germany. First, the additional formalistic type, which could only be identified in 2013, belongs to this residual class. Then again, this class could indicate country-specific peculiarities not prevalent in other countries and thus not picked up by the CA. It is equally possible that respondents in the residual category did not display a coherent national boundary pattern or that their response pattern slightly diverged from the core ideal types and has been thus excluded by the rather strict analytical strategy. To rule out the latter possibility, an additional analysis that plots the residual classes with ideal types based on simple distance measures has been carried out (see Appendix A3 in the Supporting Information). Thereby, in Germany, though missing in 2013, one type (with 30.5% of respondents) could be sorted to the assimilationist. The same applies to the relatively large (over 15%) Belgian, British, Hungarian, Norwegian, and Spanish assimilationists in 2013. As exclusionists and assimilationists are relatively similar, some CA routines might have sorted those to the exclusionist type. For this type, meanwhile, especially differences due to the *religion* item for some countries led to exclusion of a subtype (Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovakia in 2013 with at least 35% of respondents). Overall, large portions of the residual types are explained by the overly strict application of CA, supporting the overall approach and results. Ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making that rely on the selection and arrangements of membership boundaries

can be detected across countries. However, real country-specific peculiarities also emerged. For example, whereas exclusionists in Georgia 2013 (18.25%) and to a lesser extent in Japan (36.66%) reject *birthplace*, in Lithuania (13.15%), *respecting laws* is clearly rejected. All the remaining residual types diverge due to criteria not homogeneously agreed upon.

Figure 2: Distribution of ideal types by countries in ISSP 2013



Note. Figure contains representation of ideal types within country samples.

To conclude, ideal-typical patterns of national boundary making beyond the ethnic–civic dichotomy are prevalent across countries and time, though with slight divergences (concerning especially the relevance of *religion* but also in terms of country-specific nuances). Popular understandings are found to be much more similar across borders while being different within national borders at the same time.

6.3 Robustness checks

For cross-validation, the initial LCAs were submitted to an alternative process relying on relative fits of information criteria instead of BLRT. The results show overwhelming

similarities between the ideal types found in terms of class profiles. Since the BLRT favours solutions with more classes in case absolute and relative fit indices differ, especially class sizes change because respondents with less clear profiles get excluded from the identified types. Overall, especially proportions of exclusionists stayed about the same. See Appendix A4 in the Supporting Information for a full discussion and comparisons.

Conducting LCA including BLRT and subsequent CAs for country samples of the EVS 2008 and EVS 2017 furthermore supports the findings obtained using the ISSP data. Though the item batteries differ, results show striking similarities. Appendix A5 in the Supporting Information discusses the results in detail.

6.4 Addressing multidimensionality

To address the multidimensionality of national identity, I took the relationship between the dimensions to the test. I thus included measures on national attachment, general and domain-specific pride, and national chauvinism (see Table A6.1). The selection resembles those items included in the multidimensional approach (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). National attachment and general national pride are measured with one question. Because there is no consensus on subdimensions of national pride, I tested individual items in separate models using an additive measure containing all 10 domain-specific pride items and factor scores obtained through an explorative factor analysis yielding dimensions previously identified by Hjerm (1998a). The factors are, first, political pride, which is based on pride in state-related areas, such as political institutions, the economy, and social security systems, and, second, natio-cultural pride, which is based on pride in nation-related areas, such as history, cultural practices, and achievements. For the national chauvinism battery, I also included single items, an additive measure, and factor loadings. For chauvinism, only one factor could be identified.

Figure 3 plots the coefficients of the bivariate regressions of the typology and all other dimensions. All values have been standardised from 0 to 1. While being an exclusionist is positively related with all dimensions, including subdimensions of pride and all single measures contributing to the dimensions' concepts, being a pluralist is negatively correlated with all (sub)dimensions and all measures, except one (*being ashamed of country* of the chauvinism battery). Being an integrationist or an assimilationist is positively

correlated with attachment, general pride, and the political pride dimension. Among the integrationists, those that place high importance on those membership criteria reflecting legal requirements of integration, again, express their closeness to the state by demonstrating the highest values for the political dimension of national pride. Concerning the natio-cultural dimension of pride, both types show only weak negative associations. However, they differ in terms of national chauvinism: While the integrationists are negatively related with chauvinism, the values for assimilationists are not significant.

Figure 3: National identity typology and national attachment, pride, and chauvinism



Overall, only exclusionists are positively associated with chauvinism, making this type the most nationalist overall. Stated differently, those who have a narrow conception of the nation also identify more strongly with the nation, feel more pride in relation to their nation, and express more feelings of national superiority.

7. Discussion

The conceptions of nationhood comprise the prerequisites to which solidarity, social cohesion, and legitimacy are anchored (Miller, 1997; Wright et al., 2012). The membership criteria determine who is accepted as part of the nation and who is excluded. Moreover, if individual conceptions of the national in-group collide with policies in place, the characteristics legally defining the national community are open for change. The growing success of right-wing (populist) parties stressing restrictive politics of exclusivity illustrates the political potential of the membership criteria. This research elucidates how citizens across countries construct the lines between compatriots and others.

Using explorative methods while retaining the conceptually distinct dimensions of national identity, the work seeks to close the conceptual–methodological gap in national identity research. The application of explorative methods has been driven by theoretical considerations of national identity's position between individual-level (e.g., socialisation, experiences, and cognitive abilities) and country-level factors (e.g., top-down incorporation of institutionalised frames) and previous findings of inconsistent factor structures of classical research in the realm of ethnic versus civic conceptions and person-centred approaches suggesting more complex structures. The identified types can be classified from inclusive (pluralists who reject most criteria) to exclusive (exclusionists who attach importance to almost all criteria), with two types emphasising only specific criteria when drawing boundaries between the national in-group and compatriots: Some tend towards integrative measures (integrationists), and the others prefer assimilation (assimilationists). Empirically, the approach, unlike previous applications of LCA, withstands the criteria of absolute fit and thus produced tenable results within country-year samples, which furthermore supports the conceptual distinctiveness of national identity dimensions. Analysing the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and national attachment, pride, and chauvinism, the subsequent analyses underline national identity's multidimensionality and highlights the necessity to retain the dimensions. To shed some more light on the distinctiveness, I carried out additional regression analyses, which results are discussed in detail in Appendix A7 in the Supporting Information. These results furthermore underline the necessity to retain the dimensions of national identity as a factor in

the research because they seem to be related to openness and hostility towards outsiders in a distinct way.

The results also support the findings of within-country differences in the understanding of national belonging. Individuals employ and arrange criteria differently when thinking of compatriots and drawing a line to differentiate from others (Bonikowski, 2013, 2016; Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019, Hjerm, 1998a, 1998b, Trittler, 2017b). Thus, the results reject a deterministic relationship between national frames and individually employed images and underline theories of individual-level factors of identify formation. If we compare the results at the country level, the countries are similar in terms of the presence and almost identical profiles of types. The former is especially true for Central European countries, which points towards possible structural similarities or possibly present elite discourses shaping individuals' incorporation of national identity concepts (cf. Helbling et al., 2016, on elite discourses). Hence, national frames matter—yet differently for different individuals. Furthermore, the results confirm the hypothesis of popular understanding being much more similar than elite discourses suggest (Brubaker, 1994, p. 2412, note 9). In particular, the extremely homogeneous exclusionist type illustrates the similarities, and the areas between exclusionists and pluralists as well as the residual classes reveal country-specific peculiarities. By being able to identify types of national boundary making across survey instruments, countries, and time, the present results confirm that national identity is to a certain degree a universalistic principle: Where there is a nation, there are also people who are willing to use all available means to set high barriers. At the same time, the pluralists assemble those willing to set low barriers to the national community. We should thus invest further research capacities in explaining the differences from both an individual-level perspective and macrolevel influences.

Conceptually, the findings support the rejection of transferring the mutually exclusive ethnic–civic dichotomy from country-level observations on the individual level. Exclusionist images do coincide with both previously defined ethnic and civic national identity criteria. The type coincides with the "multiple national identity" type by Hjerm (1998*a, b*). Helbling et al. (2016, p. 752) put it "[…] virtually no respondents who favour ethnic conceptions of identity do so without embracing civic ideas also." This may lead to the assumption that ethnic notions drive exclusionary views or that exclusionary

views necessarily include ethnic elements. Indeed, requiring descent puts individuals in the exclusionist type. Broadening the application of Hjerm's (1998*a, b*) and Trittler's (2017*a*) findings, the approach here followed their initiative on a large-scale longitudinal comparison, leading to an ideal typology with comparable substantive results. Whereas Hjerm (1998*a, b*) did not include the full range of ISSP items resulting in two types representing the classical distinction *among* his identified types, Trittler (2017a) teased out more than four types including all available items. While her additional types illustrate country-specific features that may explain the residual class in the present work, the types presented here open the perspective on generalisable types of national identity.

Finally, the approach presented here allows for comparative research on the influence of institutionalised repertoires of nationhood together with individual factors, questions of identity formation and determinants of change, and particularly effects of concepts of national identity on political attitudes and behaviour beyond the classical distinction that have been shown as inadequate for individual-level national identity research.

Despite these advantages, quantitative research almost always entails limitations. Here, first, though the approach of using LCA together with CA produces relatively stable ideal types across countries, time, and survey instruments, CA also falsely excluded classes from these types due to its strong restrictions (and possibly falsely included others). Being sensitive to the country selection and thus prevalence of certain types, the CA may have furthermore missed those types that are less common in the researched countries. However, most residual classes only slightly diverged, and real cross-country peculiarities only emerged in Lithuania, Georgia, and Japan, which supports the overall approach. Though the types emerged across country samples, the results may also be biased by the overrepresentation of European countries, which influences especially the CA. However, in most countries, at least three types emerged, which supports the assumption of national identity as universalistic principle across cultural contexts. Future research might well reconsider the approach and either reconstruct types based on the findings presented here or perhaps need to further refine the granularity of the methods. Another limitation encountered was those respondents who could not be assigned to any of the four types. Apart from those classes that fall prey to the strict procedure, remaining respondents may represent those without any consistent views on the national in-group, or they might represent further country-specific identities. Lastly, qualitative research (Ditlmann & Kopf-

Beck, 2019) has revealed additional criteria people use to draw lines, for example, cultural elements and stereotypical traits. Quantitative research should consider these contributions to broaden and re-evaluate the construction of item batteries measuring the content dimension of national identities used in quantitative research.

8. Conclusion

Analysing membership boundaries across countries, time, and survey instruments, this work details the different dominant patterns of national identity boundary making using an inductive approach. The key findings are, first, that national identity is an international cultural phenomenon with various distinct types. Second, national frames do influence individual-level boundary making, yet the top-down relationship is far from being deterministic. Third, results yield a rejection of ethnic versus civic principles as short-sighted because they have assumed congruence between national frames and individuals. Fourth, especially when explaining antimigrant attitudes, it is imperative to address the dimensionality of national identity.

Despite the limitations discussed above, we can draw several key implications from the present findings: Future research in this field should acknowledge that the times of ethnic versus civic national identities as exploratory powerful categories are finally over and move towards approaches better suited to capture individuals' national identity. We thus need better theoretical explanations for individual-level mechanisms of national socialisation and incorporation of national frames. In turn, we also need to acknowledge the possibility of individual-level notions of nationhood affecting the political processes. Including national boundary making in models of political attitudes and behaviour seems worthwhile, especially when explaining preference for right-wing parties but also when focussing volatility of policies concerning national boundaries.

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Supporting Information

Appendix A1: Profile Plots of Subtypes (ISSP)

The figures presented here show subtypes of the national identity typology. Similar subtypes have been merged to one type, as the aim of the paper was to identify ideal-typical representations across countries. Only in 2013 one additional type emerged that did not quite resemble one of the other. It thus was kept but not merged to others. The interpretation of the plotted lines is identical to Figure 1 in the manuscript. High conditioned probabilities indicate high probabilities to support items by respondents identified as part of the type. Low conditioned probabilities thus indicate low support for the relevance of the respective criteria.

Figure A1.1 Profileplot of conditioned probabilities of subtypes, ISSP 2013



Figure A1.2 Profileplot of conditioned probabilities of subtypes, ISSP 2003



Figure A1.3 Profileplot of conditioned probabilities of subtypes, ISSP 1995



Appendix A2: Distribution of Types Across Country Samples

Table A2.1 reports the distribution of each type across country samples. Subtypes have been merged here to report the percentages. Figures A2.2 and A2.3 show the distribution.

Table A2.1 Distribution of Types by Countries and Survey Waves

Country *Year*	*Exclus.*	*Assimil.*	*Integrat.*	*Plural.*	*Residu.*	*Add. Type 2013*
2013						
Belgium	39,68		23,17	5,50	25,63	6,03
Croatia	55,82		13,25	9,14	21,79	
Czech Republic	26,97	10,81		3,13	54,43	4,66
Denmark	37,43	30,93	26,70	1,49	0,16	3,29
Estonia	29,43	20,57	28,51	1,84	19,66	
Finland	17,16	46,27	19,82		16,75	
France	41,48	25,08	28,35		2,08	3,01
Georgia	57,30			2,34	38,49	1,87
Germany	18,09		19,14	3,83	50,74	8,21
Hungary	62,84			2,20	34,97	
Iceland	40,15		44,77		15,08	
India	68,15				27,13	4,72
Israel	35,44	16,46		15,61	32,49	
Japan	21,06			5,96	66,04	6,94
Korea (South)	38,11		11,15	4,91	45,83	
Latvia	20,42	15,69		2,19	54,67	7,04
Lithuania	56,14	18,52		4,80	17,51	3,03
Mexico	66,31			4,94	21,97	6,78
Norway	40,97	29,41	22,49		7,13	
Philippines	95,73					4,27
Portugal	67,76	14,99	10,88		6,37	
Russian Federation	66,80			3,71	27,24	2,25
Slovakia	45,97		14,20	5,89	31,00	2,94
Slovenia	35,52	36,23		4,04	21,39	2,83
Spain	62,32			11,26	26,42	
Sweden	21,19	24,86	35,45		18,50	
Switzerland	31,40	49,26		1,57	17,76	
Taiwan	25,87	46,47		2,92	20,70	4,05
United Kingdom	50,06		22,55	2,83	24,56	
United States	31,70	30,02	24,45		13,83	
Country *Year*	*Exclus.*	*Assimil.*	*Integrat.*	*Plural.*	*Residu.*	
2003						
Australia	37,59	32,81	20,90		8,70	
Austria	62,14	29,63			8,23	
Canada	46,20	28,15	24,44		1,21	
Chile	76,33	17,28		1,21	5,18	
Czech Republic	71,64		10,70	2,67	14,99	
Denmark	48,33	24,39	23,10	3,19	0,99	
Finland	49,89	27,24	12,73		10,14	
France	32,92	27,11	33,17	2,69	4,12	
Germany	39,19	26,95	13,06	4,03	16,76	

Table A2.1 continued

Country	*Exclus.*	*Assimil.*	*Integrat.*	*Plural.*	*Residu.*
Hungary	54,16	2,64			43,19
Ireland				2,13	97,87
Israel	41,71	8,29			50,00
Japan	61,80			4,45	33,76
Korea, Republic of (South)	66,39			2,66	30,95
Netherlands	19,68	46,80	30,63	1,93	0,96
New Zealand	71,80		21,49	2,69	4,03
Norway	40,26	25,93	29,66	1,22	2,94
Philippines	87,25	5,17		2,08	5,50
Poland	70,24	15,97		3,84	9,95
Portugal	78,70	13,82		1,19	6,28
Russian Federation	75,54	18,20		2,35	3,91
Slovakia	40,30			16,36	43,34
Slovenia	44,12	43,01	7,54	2,21	3,13
Spain	81,71	7,79		5,17	5,33
Sweden	27,31	35,24	31,81		5,64
Switzerland	38,94	45,53		9,15	6,38
Taiwan	38,36	19,16		4,12	38,36
United Kingdom	39,93	34,24	13,63	6,16	6,04
United States	65,58	8,99	25,34		0,09
Uruguay	56,08	34,07			9,85
Venezuela	95,17	3,78		1,05	
Hungary	54,16	2,64			43,19
Ireland		64,25		2,13	33,62
Israel	41,71	8,29			50,00
Japan	61,80			4,45	33,76
Korea, Republic Of (South)	66,39			2,66	30,95
Netherlands	19,68	46,80	30,63	1,93	0,96
New Zealand	71,80		21,49	2,69	4,03
Norway	40,26	25,93	29,66	1,22	2,94
Philippines	87,25	5,17		2,08	5,50
Poland	70,24	15,97		3,84	9,95
Portugal	78,70	13,82		1,19	6,28
Russian Federation	75,54	18,20		2,35	3,91
Slovakia	40,30			16,36	43,34
Slovenia	44,12	43,01	7,54	2,21	3,13
Spain	81,71	7,79		5,17	5,33
Sweden	27,31	35,24	31,81		5,64
Switzerland	38,94	45,53		9,15	6,38
Taiwan	38,36	19,16		4,12	38,36
United Kingdom	39,93	34,24	13,63	6,16	6,04
United States	65,58	8,99	25,34		0,09
Uruguay	56,08	34,07			9,85
Venezuela	95,17	3,78		1,05	

Country *Year*	*Exclus.*	*Assimil.*	*Integrat.*	*Plural.*	*Residu.*
1995					
Australia	5,21	51,32		43,47	
Austria	17,37	66,36		16,26	
Bulgaria	14,97	69,42		14,43	1,18

Table A2.1 continued

Country	*Exclus.*	*Assimil.*	*Integrat.*	*Plural.*	*Residu.*
Canada	15,32	31,58		51,08	2,02
Czech Republic	9,61	73,16		13,87	3,35
Germany	20,24	42,52		37,24	
Hungary	53,83	46,17			
Ireland	49,13	48,31			2,55
Italy	22,62	67,03		10,35	
Latvia	5,08	69,92		25,00	
Netherlands	14,81	52,40		32,78	
New Zealand	12,00	68,41		19,59	
Norway	0,74	73,56		25,69	
Philippines	17,17	82,83			
Poland	19,76	65,61		12,79	1,84
Russian Federation	25,38	61,77		9,37	3,48
Slovakia	9,04	66,31		24,66	
Slovenia	9,58	61,67		25,94	2,81
Spain	0,59	77,90		12,02	9,48
Sweden	6,59	46,46		46,95	
United Kingdom	7,39	65,32		21,18	6,11
United States	7,86	63,97		24,82	3,35

Figure A2.2 Distribution of Ideal Types by Countries. ISSP 2003



Figure A2.3 Distribution of Ideal Types by Countries. ISSP 1995



Appendix A3: Investigating the Residual Classes

Since the CA process has been very strict, calculating the overall distance from the residual types to the identified types within one survey wave, yields the assumption that the process indeed has been too strict, while it also helps to identify country-specific peculiarities. The following graphs are only an extract from the whole sample of 87 country-years. The other graphs are available upon request.

Case 1: Un-identified assimilationists

Figure A3.1 Types the emerged in Germany 2013



The case of Germany represents those cases, where Type 2 (Assimilationists) was not identified in 2013, but large proportions of the residual type are absorbed by this type. The same can be found in 2013 for: Belgium (24.32 %), Iceland (4.54 %), India (2.62 %), Georgia (5.23 %), Great Britain (15.15 %), Hungary (25.05 %), Mexico (11.14 %), Norway (29.51 %), Russian Federation (24.1 %) and Spain (19.95 %); and in 2003 for: Hungary (21.39 %), Slovakia (24.06 %), and Venezuela (3.78 %).

Case 2: Unidentified exclusionist subtypes

The case of Czech Republic represents those cases, where subtypes of Type 1 (Exclusionists) were excluded the same can be found in 2013 for: Japan (1.32 %); Latvia (43.7 %), Slovakia (46.25 %).

Figure A3.2 Types the emerged in Czech Republic 2013



Case 3: Country-Specific Peculiarities

Georgia, Lithuania and Japan display very specific country-level peculiarities by rejection birth-place (Georgia, Japan) or respecting laws and institutions (Lithuania) as important membership criteria within the exclusionist type which is usually characterized by placing importance on mainly all criteria.

Figure A3.3 Types the emerged in Georgia 2013



Figure A3.4 Types the emerged in Japan 2013



Figure A3.5 Types the emerged in Lithuania 2013



Appendix A4: Comparisons of Fit Statistics and Class Profiles Across LCA Solutions

The following tables contrast the latent class analysis results that have been fit for each country sample. Here. only ISSP 2013 results are shown in detail. Results for ISSP 2003 and ISSP 1995 are available upon request.

The first table of each country samples includes information criteria (AIC =Akaike information criterion. CAIC = consistent AIC. BIC = Schwarz Bayesian information criterion and adjBIC = adjusted BIC) as well as additional relative goodness-of-fit statistics (Log-likelihood = log-likelihood of the fitted model. df = degrees of freedom. G^2 = G2 deviance statistic and Iter = iterations needed for the model to converge). Information criteria "are used for comparison across several plausible models where the lowest value of a given IC indicates the best model" (Nylund et al. 2007: 545). Values indicating best solution by each IC, are printed in grey. As pointed out by Eger and Hjerm (2021) they help to find the relative fit of the considered models. Furthermore, ICs usually contradict. They are thus can only reduce the considered LCA-solutions (Collins and Lanza 2009). To identify the solution that best fit the data, a bootstrap likelihood ratio test (BLRT) is considered as best procedure to choose (Nylund et al. 2007). For BLRT each LCA k-class model is compared with an alternative k+1 class model. As soon as the p-value that is provided by the BLRT is not significant anymore, no difference between the models can be detected. Thus. the k-class model is selected as best fit.

The second table of each country samples reports class profiles (conditioned probabilities) of each class identified. Only LCA models that have been supported by either relative fits or by the absolute fits are reported for comparisons. Based on the cluster analysis process, similar classes across solutions within country samples are tagged with the identified ideal types. Since for the article, the selection of best fitted models was based on the absolute fit, LCA solutions printed in bold represent those solutions reported as results throughout the paper. These solutions that have been identified by the relative fits are printed in italic.

Belgium

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-7035.85	2077.37	2129.66	2121.66	2096.24	247	2061.37	6	0.001996
2	-6311.16	646.00	757.12	740.12	686.11	238	612.00	78	0.001996
3	-6168.33	378.33	548.28	522.28	439.68	229	326.33	178	0.001996
4	-6118.63	296.94	525.71	490.71	379.51	220	226.94	464	0.001996
5	-6082.48	242.64	530.24	486.24	346.46	211	154.64	506	0.065868
6	-6071.55	238.78	585.21	532.21	363.83	202	132.78	1192	0.576846
7	-6064.79	243.25	648.50	586.50	389.53	193	119.25	3366	0.477046
8	-6058.02	247.71	711.80	640.80	415.23	184	105.71	3023	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
4	0.9902	0.9997	0.9816	0.9123	0.4366	0.9308	0.9680	0.9678	Exclus.	Exclus.	705	37.60
4	0.9150	0.9690	0.8814	0.8153	0.0291	0.8429	0.8126	0.4332	Assimil.	Assimil.	626	33.39
4	0.2200	0.7346	0.5918	0.9097	0.0482	0.9827	0.8294	0.0920	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	438	23.36
4	0.0596	0.1028	0.0109	0.6429	0.0815	0.4970	0.1781	0.1045	Plural.	Plural.	106	5.65
5	***0.9899***	***0.9997***	***0.9803***	***0.9071***	***0.3973***	***0.9495***	***0.9603***	***0.9516***	***Exclus.***	***Exclus.***	***757***	***40.37***
5	***0.9914***	***0.9343***	***0.8170***	***0.8740***	***0.0089***	***0.9931***	***0.8210***	***0.2776***	***Assimil.***	***Assimil.***	***456***	***24.32***
5	***0.0241***	***0.7417***	***0.6095***	***0.8982***	***0.0538***	***0.9814***	***0.8336***	***0.1123***	***Intigrat.***	***Intigrat.***	***442***	***23.57***
5	***0.0756***	***0.0896***	***0.0037***	***0.6570***	***0.0783***	***0.5026***	***0.1780***	***0.0978***	***Plural.***	***Plural.***	***105***	***5.60***
5	***0.8550***	***0.9767***	***0.9152***	***0.5850***	***0.0738***	***0.0429***	***0.7071***	***0.6256***	***Other***	***Other***	***115***	***6.13***
6	0.9886	0.9999	0.9974	0.9065	0.4004	0.9486	0.9578	0.9413	Exclus.	Exclus.	754	40.21
6	0.9629	0.9336	0.8093	0.8731	0.0012	0.9920	0.8238	0.2911	Assimil.	Assimil.	455	24.27
6	0.0161	0.7294	0.6147	0.8961	0.0406	0.9798	0.8286	0.0718	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	433	23.09
6	0.0736	0.0883	0.0029	0.6561	0.0775	0.5013	0.1735	0.0990	Plural.	Plural.	105	5.60
6	0.8543	0.9768	0.9112	0.5832	0.0729	0.0412	0.7063	0.6308	Other	Other	114	6.08
6	0.4285	0.8758	0.1244	0.9984	0.6031	0.9985	0.9963	0.9809			14	0.75

Croatia

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4597.78	1944.78	1992.01	1984.01	1958.60	247	1929	4	.001996
2	-3906.04	579.30	679.66	662.66	608.67	238	545	44	.001996
3	-3795.57	376.36	529.86	503.86	421.28	229	324	96	.001996
4	-3772.87	348.96	555.59	520.59	409.43	220	279	232	.001996
5	-3750.03	321.28	581.05	537.05	397.30	211	233	227	.007984
6	-3734.87	308.96	621.86	568.86	400.53	202	203	522	.2654691
7	-3725.60	308.43	674.46	612.46	415.55	193	184	1424	.4790419
8	-3717.83	310.88	730.04	659.04	433.55	184	169	689	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9370*	*0.9981*	*0.9484*	*0.9915*	*0.8727*	*0.8778*	*0.9984*	*0.9519*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*454*	*45.58*
3	*0.0530*	*0.0563*	*0.0857*	*0.1584*	*0.1889*	*0.4348*	*0.1668*	*0.0454*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*102*	*10.24*
3	*0.4185*	*0.7333*	*0.4598*	*0.8269*	*0.3265*	*0.6468*	*0.7963*	*0.4795*			*440*	*44.18*
4	0.9327	0.9937	0.9349	0.9913	0.8742	0.8755	0.9993	0.9472	Exclus.	Exclus.	457	45.88
4	0.0389	0.0625	0.0845	0.1690	0.1923	0.4316	0.1591	0.0498	Plural.	Plural.	106	10.64
4	0.0151	0.6360	0.2747	0.8874	0.4252	0.7784	0.9274	0.5006			175	17.57
4	0.6479	0.7870	0.5729	0.7818	0.2379	0.5637	0.7130	0.4533			258	25.90
5	0.9266	0.9949	0.9349	0.9902	0.8696	0.8783	0.9989	0.9552	Exclus.	Exclus.	467	46.89
5	0.3656	0.9895	0.5347	0.9084	0.2191	0.9960	0.8070	0.1752	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	145	14.56
5	0.0344	0.0709	0.0875	0.1873	0.1834	0.4480	0.1640	0.0293	Plural.	Plural.	106	10.64
5	0.6771	0.6988	0.5623	0.7411	0.2609	0.3650	0.7104	0.5489			167	16.77
5	0.0111	0.4667	0.1824	0.8522	0.5171	0.6950	0.9256	0.6594			111	11.14
6	**0.9479**	**0.9996**	**0.9805**	**0.9951**	**0.9166**	**0.9432**	**0.9996**	**0.9594**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**380**	**38.15**
6	**0.3827**	**0.9949**	**0.5423**	**0.9114**	**0.2298**	**0.9936**	**0.8041**	**0.1575**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**132**	**13.25**
6	**0.0135**	**0.0343**	**0.0291**	**0.1304**	**0.1729**	**0.4578**	**0.1148**	**0.0179**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**91**	**9.14**
6	**0.5428**	**0.5333**	**0.5374**	**0.6146**	**0.1930**	**0.3317**	**0.5161**	**0.3032**	**Other**	**Other**	**105**	**10.54**
6	**0.7808**	**0.9170**	**0.6703**	**0.9247**	**0.5510**	**0.5425**	**0.9641**	**0.8968**			**176**	**17.67**
6	**0.0064**	**0.4182**	**0.1569**	**0.8194**	**0.4872**	**0.7009**	**0.9029**	**0.6226**			**112**	**11.24**
7	0.9503	0.9995	0.9779	0.9976	0.9107	0.9347	0.9997	0.9490	Exclus.	Exclus.	416	41.77
7	0.1129	0.8597	0.4264	0.9468	0.2679	0.9984	0.9669	0.1724	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	90	9.04
7	0.0302	0.0477	0.0314	0.1454	0.1838	0.4689	0.1257	0.0084	Plural.	Plural.	94	9.44
7	0.4472	0.0387	0.6339	0.5873	0.1130	0.1990	0.5937	0.3971			52	5.22
7	0.0106	0.4194	0.1042	0.7773	0.5483	0.6439	0.8473	0.7204			82	8.23
7	0.6606	0.9735	0.5532	0.7853	0.2062	0.6500	0.5423	0.1130			114	11.45
7	0.7432	0.9107	0.6564	0.8939	0.5309	0.5570	0.9537	0.9386			148	14.86

Czech Republic

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-6355.85	1875.51	1927.85	1919.85	1894.43	247	1859.51	5	.001996
2	-5698.11	578.02	689.24	672.24	618.23	238	544.02	64	.001996
3	-5601.89	403.60	573.69	547.69	465.09	229	351.60	198	.001996
4	-5572.81	363.44	592.42	557.42	446.22	220	293.44	1134	.001996
5	-5547.69	331.19	619.04	575.04	435.26	211	243.19	3600	.001996
6	-5527.94	309.68	656.42	603.42	435.04	202	203.68	1263	.011976
7	-5513.97	299.74	705.36	643.36	446.38	193	175.74	2145	.8802395
8	-5509.35	308.52	773.01	702.01	476.45	184	166.52	4172	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9854*	*0.9894*	*0.9736*	*0.9910*	*0.3915*	*0.8798*	*0.9944*	*0.9649*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*1137*	*60.29*
3	*0.2847*	*0.2197*	*0.1189*	*0.5613*	*0.1272*	*0.3750*	*0.2683*	*0.1644*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*109*	*5.78*
3	*0.6917*	*0.9020*	*0.6623*	*0.9657*	*0.1310*	*0.7889*	*0.8265*	*0.3679*			*640*	*33.93*
4	0.9776	0.9847	0.9802	0.9907	0.4579	0.9397	0.9961	0.9632	Exclus.	Exclus.	1052	55.78
4	0.5182	0.8548	0.5959	0.9827	0.1501	0.9315	0.8464	0.2708	Assimil.	Assimil.	300	15.91
4	0.3533	0.3222	0.1830	0.5720	0.1583	0.3490	0.3073	0.2108	Plural.	Plural.	130	6.89
4	0.9735	0.9933	0.8336	0.9819	0.0510	0.5938	0.8894	0.6782			404	21.42
5	0.9739	0.9846	0.9809	0.9893	0.4852	0.9366	0.9952	0.9586	Exclus.	Exclus.	1057	56.04
5	0.4843	0.8463	0.5814	0.9977	0.1324	0.9080	0.8354	0.2649	Assimil.	Assimil.	302	16.01
5	0.0818	0.0632	0.0589	0.5650	0.0250	0.3352	0.1875	0.0909	Plural.	Plural.	75	3.98
5	0.7252	0.6965	0.4405	0.6085	0.3061	0.4066	0.5075	0.4058			70	3.71
5	0.9973	0.9977	0.8558	0.9995	0.0110	0.6623	0.9234	0.7097			382	20.25
6	0.9656	0.9833	0.9804	0.9896	0.5032	0.9421	0.9929	0.9694	Exclus.	Exclus.	1076	57.05
6	0.5732	0.9522	0.6742	0.9998	0.1589	0.9306	0.7852	0.0121	Assimil.	Assimil.	220	11.66
6	0.3648	0.5598	0.3555	0.8995	0.0840	0.7557	0.9245	0.5412	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	103	5.46
6	0.0904	0.0696	0.0676	0.5369	0.0369	0.3254	0.0473	0.0368	Plural.	Plural.	64	3.39
6	0.8462	0.7644	0.5110	0.6173	0.3278	0.3247	0.2908	0.2820			56	2.97
6	0.9859	0.9971	0.8554	0.9952	0.0235	0.6831	0.9500	0.7809			367	19.46
7	**0.9665**	**0.9835**	**0.9885**	**0.9891**	**0.5720**	**0.9539**	**0.9897**	**0.9770**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**509**	**26.99**
7	**0.5231**	**0.9344**	**0.6375**	**0.9994**	**0.1830**	**0.9897**	**0.8252**	**0.0219**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**204**	**10.82**
7	**0.3724**	**0.5564**	**0.3647**	**0.8802**	**0.1134**	**0.7048**	**0.8902**	**0.5267**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**109**	**5.78**
7	**0.0939**	**0.0584**	**0.0697**	**0.5309**	**0.0391**	**0.3200**	**0.0361**	**0.0301**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**59**	**3.13**
7	**0.9963**	**0.6985**	**0.3305**	**0.1075**	**0.5364**	**0.3290**	**0.2538**	**0.2654**	**Other**	**Other**	**27**	**1.43**
7	**0.8089**	**0.9541**	**0.7248**	**0.9998**	**0.0345**	**0.4100**	**0.2714**	**0.2112**	**Other**	**Other**	**61**	**3.23**
7	**0.9779**	**0.9914**	**0.8777**	**0.9934**	**0.0724**	**0.7466**	**0.9805**	**0.8077**			**917**	**48.62**

Denmark

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4713.93	1738.17	1787.38	1779.38	1753.97	247	1722	5	.001996
2	-4031.83	391.97	496.53	479.53	425.53	238	358	56	.001996
3	-3976.76	299.84	459.76	433.76	351.17	229	248	129	.001996
4	-3951.09	266.49	481.77	446.77	335.59	220	196	643	.001996
5	-3932.77	247.86	518.49	474.49	334.72	211	160	461	.0339321
6	-3921.26	242.84	568.82	515.82	347.47	202	137	1146	.1097804
7	-3911.77	241.85	623.19	561.19	364.25	193	118	2632	.1736527
8	-3904.10	244.52	681.22	610.22	384.69	184	103	1374	.

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9804*	*0.9997*	*0.9374*	*0.9864*	*0.5410*	*0.9750*	*0.9931*	*0.9562*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*519*	*40.71*
3	*0.5532*	*0.8590*	*0.7143*	*0.9745*	*0.0713*	*0.9549*	*0.9104*	*0.2205*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*416*	*32.63*
3	*0.0564*	*0.5157*	*0.2095*	*0.8405*	*0.0410*	*0.9370*	*0.6877*	*0.0073*			*340*	*26.67*
4	0.9808	0.9998	0.9402	0.9909	0.5413	0.9779	0.9963	0.9549	Exclus.	Exclus.	518	40.63
4	0.8752	0.8730	0.4986	0.7891	0.1217	0.8054	0.4295	0.2684	Assimil.	Assimil.	57	4.47
4	0.5230	0.8513	0.7384	0.9971	0.0656	0.9797	0.9909	0.2207	Assimil.	Assimil.	353	27.69
4	0.0095	0.5186	0.2234	0.8491	0.0400	0.9374	0.6943	0.0010			347	27.22
5	0.9851	0.9999	0.9494	0.9906	0.5705	0.9770	0.9959	0.9722	Exclus.	Exclus.	472	37.02
5	0.8848	0.8668	0.5013	0.8192	0.1155	0.8124	0.3903	0.2441	Assimil.	Assimil.	55	4.31
5	0.0115	0.5803	0.3018	0.9280	0.0336	0.9655	0.7716	0.0013	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	333	26.12
5	0.0071	0.1828	0.0102	0.0381	0.0911	0.6230	0.2384	0.0348	Plural.	Plural.	19	1.49
5	0.6336	0.8817	0.7647	0.9899	0.0873	0.9778	0.9970	0.3058			396	31.06
6	**0.9803**	**0.9999**	**0.9888**	**0.9924**	**0.5581**	**0.9771**	**0.9954**	**0.9508**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**478**	**37.49**
6	**0.6906**	**0.9779**	**0.2236**	**0.9534**	**0.2202**	**0.9507**	**0.9994**	**0.5484**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**102**	**8.00**
6	**0.6031**	**0.8269**	**0.9906**	**0.9836**	**0.0303**	**0.9732**	**0.9972**	**0.2113**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**293**	**22.98**
6	**0.0586**	**0.5927**	**0.2647**	**0.9323**	**0.0343**	**0.9704**	**0.7729**	**0.0007**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**341**	**26.75**
6	**0.0058**	**0.1713**	**0.0091**	**0.0307**	**0.0902**	**0.6250**	**0.2472**	**0.0307**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**19**	**1.49**
6	**0.8513**	**0.8843**	**0.5220**	**0.8324**	**0.1101**	**0.7866**	**0.0965**	**0.2158**	**Other**	**Other**	**42**	**3.29**
7	0.9808	0.9999	0.9763	1.0000	0.5544	0.9819	0.9950	0.9523	Exclus.	Exclus.	483	37.88
7	0.5977	0.8195	0.9939	0.9806	0.0285	0.9715	0.9988	0.2010	Assimil.	Assimil.	294	23.06
7	0.6171	0.9703	0.2654	0.9993	0.1930	0.9582	0.9993	0.4633	Assimil.	Assimil.	95	7.45
7	0.0508	0.5799	0.2582	0.9243	0.0312	0.9716	0.7680	0.0005	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	330	25.88
7	0.0055	0.1780	0.0074	0.0245	0.0936	0.6026	0.2277	0.0387	Plural.	Plural.	19	1.49
7	0.8248	0.8714	0.5126	0.8752	0.0842	0.8129	0.0894	0.1681	Other	Other	44	3.45
7	0.9921	0.9976	0.5387	0.1310	0.4456	0.6114	0.8474	0.8744			10	0.78

Estonia

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3056.79	836.34	882.35	874.35	848.94	247	820	8	.001996
2	-2790.86	322.48	420.25	403.25	349.26	238	288	76	.001996
3	-2751.64	262.03	411.55	385.55	302.99	229	210	279	.001996
4	-2734.41	245.57	446.86	411.86	300.71	220	176	157	.005988
5	-2720.10	234.95	488.00	444.00	304.27	211	147	352	.007984
6	-2706.55	225.85	530.66	477.66	309.34	202	120	700	.2355289
7	-2698.85	228.45	585.02	523.02	326.13	193	104	954	.9760479
8	-2695.88	240.52	648.85	577.85	352.37	184	99	710	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.1247*	*0.6605*	*0.3409*	*0.9366*	*0.0353*	*0.9411*	*0.9875*	*0.1979*			*373*	*43.63*
3	*0.3574*	*0.2484*	*0.3252*	*0.5331*	*0.3073*	*0.5281*	*0.7169*	*0.2062*			*48*	*5.61*
3	*0.8970*	*0.9792*	*0.9141*	*0.9822*	*0.2119*	*0.9371*	*0.9871*	*0.7148*			*434*	*50.76*
4	0.2011	0.2487	0.4105	0.1571	0.2534	0.7842	0.7801	0.0469			43	5.03
4	0.7405	0.0417	0.1066	0.8866	0.3409	0.0833	0.6797	0.6432			17	1.99
4	0.9048	0.9799	0.9174	0.9807	0.2122	0.9377	0.9860	0.7141			429	50.18
4	0.1281	0.6740	0.3409	0.9737	0.0423	0.9276	0.9820	0.2082			366	42.81
5	0.9344	0.9994	0.9415	0.9912	0.3451	0.9832	0.9998	0.8410	Exclus.	Exclus.	261	30.53
5	0.7878	0.9015	0.8087	0.9547	0.0020	0.8602	0.9655	0.4530	Assimil.	Assimil.	201	23.51
5	0.1617	0.2224	0.4080	0.1341	0.2751	0.7956	0.7712	0.0488			42	4.91
5	0.0658	0.6591	0.3046	0.9756	0.0542	0.9370	0.9831	0.1996			334	39.06
5	0.7231	0.0235	0.0252	0.8594	0.3629	0.0783	0.6611	0.5906			17	1.99
6	**0.9611**	**0.9995**	**0.9507**	**0.9902**	**0.3434**	**0.9830**	**0.9998**	**0.8468**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**256**	**29.94**
6	**0.8237**	**0.8992**	**0.7987**	**0.9426**	**0.0014**	**0.8542**	**0.9657**	**0.4447**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**179**	**20.94**
6	**0.0698**	**0.9976**	**0.3641**	**0.9994**	**0.1046**	**0.9517**	**0.9773**	**0.2645**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**248**	**29.01**
6	**0.1037**	**0.2719**	**0.3797**	**0.2136**	**0.6498**	**0.6999**	**0.4251**	**0.0569**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**16**	**1.87**
6	**0.7411**	**0.0193**	**0.0214**	**0.8407**	**0.3557**	**0.0703**	**0.6710**	**0.6081**			**18**	**2.11**
6	**0.0806**	**0.2330**	**0.3113**	**0.8289**	**0.0003**	**0.9159**	**0.9996**	**0.1436**			**138**	**16.14**

Finland

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4921.93	247	1974.15	2022.88	2014.88	1989.47	1958	5	.001996
2	-4196.00	238	540.30	643.84	626.84	572.84	506	52	.001996
3	-4073.54	229	313.37	471.74	445.74	363.15	261	142	.001996
4	-4045.86	220	276.02	489.20	454.20	343.03	206	452	.001996
5	-4026.49	211	255.27	523.27	479.27	339.51	167	645	.00998
6	-4014.11	202	248.52	571.34	518.34	349.99	143	619	.0758483
7	-4004.50	193	247.30	624.94	562.94	366.00	123	1249	.2874252
8	-3997.11	184	250.52	682.97	611.97	386.45	109	912	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.5029*	*0.8937*	*0.5704*	*0.9054*	*0.0558*	*0.9485*	*0.8709*	*0.1764*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*568*	*47.29*
3	*0.0393*	*0.1419*	*0.0268*	*0.5035*	*0.0058*	*0.8264*	*0.4649*	*0.0414*			*203*	*16.90*
3	*0.9932*	*0.9802*	*0.9663*	*0.9574*	*0.4721*	*0.9521*	*0.9515*	*0.9179*			*430*	*35.80*
4	0.0588	0.8177	0.4028	0.9243	0.0188	0.9700	0.8608	0.0172	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	246	20.48
4	0.8354	0.9301	0.7241	0.9021	0.1090	0.9315	0.8781	0.4185			387	32.22
4	0.0550	0.1097	0.0266	0.4597	0.0065	0.8056	0.4312	0.0540			203	16.90
4	0.9959	0.9898	0.9983	0.9727	0.6108	0.9697	0.9793	0.9841			365	30.39
5	0.9914	0.9879	0.9984	0.9637	0.6991	0.9731	0.9780	0.9694	Exclus.	Exclus.	203	16.90
5	0.7628	0.8838	0.0325	0.7695	0.1425	0.9715	0.8691	0.3693	Assimil.	Assimil.	141	11.74
5	0.0181	0.8176	0.4322	0.9288	0.0148	0.9632	0.8525	0.0138	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	242	20.15
5	0.0379	0.0796	0.0274	0.4583	0.0066	0.7981	0.4170	0.0490			199	16.57
5	0.8750	0.9440	0.9909	0.9552	0.0663	0.9203	0.8885	0.4750			416	34.64
6	**0.9943**	**0.9876**	**0.9987**	**0.9570**	**0.7035**	**0.9670**	**0.9756**	**0.9951**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**207**	**17.24**
6	**0.7383**	**0.8752**	**0.0554**	**0.7563**	**0.1428**	**0.9716**	**0.8626**	**0.3602**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**142**	**11.82**
6	**0.0193**	**0.8148**	**0.4263**	**0.9325**	**0.0122**	**0.9742**	**0.8524**	**0.0055**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**239**	**19.90**
6	**0.7891**	**0.8422**	**0.9776**	**0.7833**	**0.0035**	**0.5375**	**0.6999**	**0.4965**			**41**	**3.41**
6	**0.8806**	**0.9616**	**0.9676**	**0.9950**	**0.1037**	**0.9995**	**0.9321**	**0.4693**			**375**	**31.22**
6	**0.0317**	**0.0758**	**0.0165**	**0.4559**	**0.0065**	**0.7996**	**0.4144**	**0.0437**			**197**	**16.40**

France

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-5868.65	1672.38	1724.86	1716.86	1691.44	247	1656	7	.001996
2	-5210.83	374.76	486.27	469.27	415.26	238	341	125	.001996
3	-5156.65	284.40	454.93	428.93	346.33	229	232	222	.001996
4	-5120.23	229.55	459.12	424.12	312.92	220	160	858	.001996
5	-5098.25	203.60	492.20	448.20	308.41	211	116	466	.011976
6	-5085.91	196.91	544.54	491.54	323.16	202	91	1272	.1776447
7	-5078.18	199.45	606.11	544.11	347.14	193	75	1518	.4011976
8	-5072.32	205.74	671.43	600.43	374.86	184	64	4106	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.9809	0.9969	0.9564	0.9949	0.3411	0.9847	0.9835	0.9325	Exclus.	Exclus.	839	43.74
3	0.4377	0.8567	0.5680	0.9695	0.0309	0.9794	0.9068	0.1321	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	1039	54.17
3	0.0546	0.1116	0.2058	0.4357	0.1006	0.7634	0.4758	0.0144			40	2.09
4	0.9694	0.9984	0.9775	0.9973	0.3904	0.9876	0.9926	0.9734	Exclus.	Exclus.	803	41.87
4	0.0286	0.8204	0.4815	0.9775	0.0383	0.9822	0.9284	0.1000	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	612	31.91
4	0.0749	0.1181	0.2227	0.3462	0.1129	0.7236	0.3896	0.0090			39	2.03
4	0.9774	0.9121	0.7073	0.9633	0.0284	0.9742	0.8901	0.2839			464	24.19
5	*0.9855*	*0.9994*	*0.9802*	*0.9967*	*0.4030*	*0.9847*	*0.9905*	*0.9954*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*783*	*40.82*
5	*0.9953*	*0.9366*	*0.5326*	*0.8243*	*0.0424*	*0.9163*	*0.4915*	*0.3019*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*70*	*3.65*
5	*0.0299*	*0.7923*	*0.4142*	*0.9675*	*0.0342*	*0.9759*	*0.9029*	*0.0619*	*Intigrat.*	*Intigrat.*	*580*	*30.24*
5	*0.0147*	*0.0159*	*0.2296*	*0.2704*	*0.0970*	*0.7088*	*0.3769*	*0.0079*			*30*	*1.56*
5	*0.7713*	*0.9114*	*0.7632*	*0.9999*	*0.0469*	*0.9935*	*0.9993*	*0.3014*			*455*	*23.72*
6	**0.9766**	**0.9977**	**0.9909**	**0.9975**	**0.3687**	**0.9840**	**0.9910**	**0.9740**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**799**	**41.66**
6	**0.6097**	**0.9210**	**0.4561**	**0.9571**	**0.0685**	**1.0000**	**0.9998**	**0.3789**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**229**	**11.94**
6	**0.9155**	**0.8707**	**0.9873**	**0.9999**	**0.0015**	**0.9805**	**0.9985**	**0.0254**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**254**	**13.24**
6	**0.0362**	**0.7826**	**0.4694**	**0.9816**	**0.0274**	**0.9719**	**0.8916**	**0.0043**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**546**	**28.47**
6	**0.9956**	**0.9445**	**0.5484**	**0.8452**	**0.0330**	**0.8810**	**0.0562**	**0.2934**	**Other**	**Other**	**58**	**3.02**
6	**0.0179**	**0.0127**	**0.2229**	**0.2763**	**0.0953**	**0.7355**	**0.4013**	**0.0291**			**32**	**1.67**

Georgia

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4839.11	1692.96	1743.21	1735.21	1709.79	247	1677	4	.001996
2	-4321.70	676.13	782.90	765.90	711.90	238	642	81	.001996
3	-4232.63	516.00	679.30	653.30	570.70	229	464	174	.001996
4	-4149.36	367.47	587.29	552.29	441.11	220	297	212	.001996
5	-4128.11	342.96	619.31	575.31	435.54	211	255	525	.001996
6	-4108.39	321.52	654.39	601.39	433.03	202	216	584	.003992
7	-4090.70	304.15	693.55	631.55	434.60	193	180	911	.7265469
8	-4084.37	309.47	755.40	684.40	458.86	184	167	1211	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	Per cent
4	0.8950	0.9697	0.9640	0.9970	0.9337	0.9335	0.9982	0.9595	Exclus.	Exclus.	968	66.67
4	0.1772	0.1407	0.1636	0.1000	0.2338	0.3180	0.4410	0.3745	Plural.	Plural.	61	4.20
4	0.8420	0.9969	0.9203	0.7758	0.1079	0.8679	0.5777	0.2638			63	4.34
4	0.2220	0.5194	0.5513	0.9323	0.6751	0.8166	0.9841	0.7758			360	24.79
5	*0.9736*	*0.9991*	*0.9817*	*0.9970*	*0.9495*	*0.9488*	*0.9998*	*0.9733*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*799*	*55.03*
5	*0.2480*	*0.0284*	*0.1968*	*0.0145*	*0.1372*	*0.1253*	*0.1835*	*0.3476*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*32*	*2.20*
5	*0.4307*	*0.7105*	*0.7825*	*0.9864*	*0.8012*	*0.8474*	*0.9904*	*0.8539*			*432*	*29.75*
5	*0.0532*	*0.2979*	*0.1429*	*0.6989*	*0.4753*	*0.7607*	*0.9408*	*0.6370*			*123*	*8.47*
5	*0.8303*	*0.9964*	*0.9063*	*0.7541*	*0.1263*	*0.8635*	*0.5946*	*0.2814*			*66*	*4.55*
6	0.9224	0.9990	0.9809	1.0000	0.9623	0.9484	0.9997	0.9813	Exclus.	Exclus.	843	58.06
6	0.2424	0.0846	0.2016	0.0270	0.1532	0.1345	0.2409	0.3510	Plural.	Plural.	40	2.75
6	0.8712	0.9987	0.9989	0.9242	0.0052	0.8426	0.0777	0.0093	Other	Other	28	1.93
6	0.4323	0.4687	0.7557	0.9997	0.9332	0.7428	0.9887	0.9278			170	11.71
6	0.0303	0.2628	0.2158	0.7583	0.4639	0.8135	0.9517	0.6654			118	8.13
6	0.5875	0.9448	0.7805	0.8981	0.5533	0.9118	0.9720	0.6800			253	17.42
7	**0.9945**	**0.9743**	**0.9693**	**0.9999**	**0.9466**	**0.9522**	**0.9999**	**0.9712**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**856**	**58.95**
7	**0.2427**	**0.0404**	**0.1984**	**0.0105**	**0.1273**	**0.1250**	**0.1945**	**0.3448**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**35**	**2.41**
7	**0.8544**	**0.9990**	**0.9991**	**0.9202**	**0.0043**	**0.8389**	**0.0656**	**0.0053**	**Other**	**Other**	**28**	**1.93**
7	**0.6048**	**0.5658**	**0.6869**	**0.9573**	**0.9534**	**0.3832**	**0.9308**	**0.8890**			**72**	**4.96**
7	**0.7617**	**0.9295**	**0.7570**	**0.8112**	**0.3997**	**0.9293**	**0.9753**	**0.5560**			**76**	**5.23**
7	**0.0273**	**0.2737**	**0.1368**	**0.7122**	**0.4691**	**0.7716**	**0.9440**	**0.6343**			**120**	**8.26**
7	**0.0468**	**0.7248**	**0.8283**	**0.9997**	**0.7818**	**0.9875**	**0.9996**	**0.8781**			**265**	**18.25**

Germany

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-6364.19	2099.62	2150.74	2142.74	2117.32	247	2084	5	.001996
2	-5613.42	616.06	724.69	707.69	653.68	238	582	78	.001996
3	-5483.25	373.73	539.86	513.86	431.26	229	322	228	.001996
4	-5455.25	335.74	559.37	524.37	413.18	220	266	585	.001996
5	-5435.72	314.68	595.82	551.82	412.04	211	227	522	.001996
6	-5417.28	295.79	634.44	581.44	413.07	202	190	597	.0419162
7	-5406.27	291.77	687.92	625.92	428.96	193	168	1236	.0299401
8	-5394.76	286.75	740.41	669.41	443.85	184	145	1394	.241517

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9453*	*0.9941*	*0.9753*	*0.9989*	*0.4685*	*0.9571*	*0.9789*	*0.8698*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*587*	*36.26*
3	*0.4196*	*0.8642*	*0.6004*	*0.9763*	*0.1532*	*0.9336*	*0.7291*	*0.1272*	*Intigrat.*	*Intigrat.*	*877*	*54.17*
3	*0.0396*	*0.1223*	*0.1138*	*0.6379*	*0.1287*	*0.7801*	*0.1969*	*0.0434*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*155*	*9.57*
5	0.9326	0.9943	0.9902	0.9994	0.5667	0.9868	0.9962	0.8939	Exclus.	Exclus.	574	35.45
5	0.1576	0.8220	0.5650	0.9974	0.0893	0.9991	0.8217	0.0654	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	456	28.17
5	0.0564	0.2096	0.1706	0.6756	0.1286	0.7556	0.2106	0.0513	Plural.	Plural.	197	12.17
5	0.6795	0.9989	0.4616	0.9259	0.4854	0.9246	0.5895	0.1566			98	6.05
5	0.8851	0.9236	0.8678	0.9999	0.0064	0.8448	0.8081	0.4418			294	18.16
6	0.9400	0.9954	0.9931	0.9996	0.5721	0.9851	0.9976	0.9007	Exclus.	Exclus.	545	33.66
6	0.1414	0.8453	0.6066	0.9960	0.1345	0.9999	0.9951	0.0999	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	372	22.98
6	0.0744	0.0054	0.0215	0.3753	0.1318	0.6987	0.2182	0.0815	Plural.	Plural.	69	4.26
6	0.0570	0.5755	0.3507	0.9289	0.1247	0.8615	0.2507	0.0302			220	13.59
6	0.9046	0.9210	0.8606	0.9999	0.0071	0.8554	0.8041	0.4284			333	20.57
6	0.8983	0.9992	0.4558	0.9181	0.4943	0.9471	0.5583	0.1820			80	4.94
7	0.9371	0.9923	0.9951	0.9996	0.5788	0.9867	0.9989	0.9074	Exclus.	Exclus.	573	35.39
7	0.1243	0.9991	0.5432	0.9887	0.1715	0.9911	0.9962	0.0854	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	278	17.17
7	0.0721	0.0048	0.0109	0.3863	0.1307	0.7078	0.2141	0.0872	Plural.	Plural.	69	4.26
7	0.0995	0.0226	0.6052	0.9765	0.0010	0.8938	0.9959	0.0607			83	5.13
7	0.8858	0.9323	0.8574	1.0000	0.0419	0.8684	0.8100	0.4281			337	20.82
7	0.0730	0.5970	0.3513	0.9195	0.1402	0.8693	0.0197	0.0235			201	12.42
7	0.9766	0.9991	0.4273	0.9089	0.5182	0.9549	0.5460	0.1855			78	4.82
8	**0.9326**	**0.9863**	**0.9982**	**0.9987**	**0.6687**	**0.9886**	**0.9978**	**0.8791**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**293**	**18.10**
8	**0.9170**	**0.9876**	**0.8899**	**1.0000**	**0.0112**	**0.8816**	**0.9964**	**0.5731**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**495**	**30.57**
8	**0.2182**	**0.9992**	**0.5620**	**0.9886**	**0.1424**	**0.9997**	**0.9960**	**0.0753**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**310**	**19.15**
8	**0.0814**	**0.0046**	**0.0085**	**0.2874**	**0.1348**	**0.6757**	**0.2216**	**0.0998**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**62**	**3.83**
8	**0.7656**	**0.8917**	**0.6692**	**0.9626**	**0.1799**	**0.8728**	**0.0358**	**0.2489**	**Other**	**Other**	**133**	**8.21**
8	**0.0050**	**0.5022**	**0.2737**	**0.9105**	**0.1393**	**0.8790**	**0.0152**	**0.0109**			**201**	**12.42**
8	**0.1737**	**0.0303**	**0.6075**	**0.9773**	**0.0009**	**0.8795**	**0.9969**	**0.0680**			**95**	**5.87**

8	**0.7365**	**0.9989**	**0.0275**	**0.8303**	**0.9702**	**0.8886**	**0.8933**	**0.2309**		**30**	**1.85**

Hungary

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3206.13	1066.46	1113.69	1105.69	1080.28	247	1050	5	.001996
2	-2850.93	374.07	474.43	457.43	403.44	238	340	84	.001996
3	-2793.30	276.81	430.31	404.31	321.73	229	225	222	.001996
4	-2777.87	263.94	470.57	435.57	324.41	220	194	204	.0938124
5	-2766.79	259.78	519.55	475.55	335.80	211	172	891	.8522954
6	-2761.13	266.47	579.37	526.37	358.04	202	160	1739	.4251497
7	-2753.82	269.84	635.87	573.87	376.96	193	146	1402	.4191617
8	-2747.29	274.79	693.95	622.95	397.45	184	133	1468	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.9707	0.9942	0.9854	0.9738	0.6960	0.9669	0.9989	0.9981	Exclus.	Exclus.	629	63.15
3	0.1781	0.1208	0.2659	0.7866	0.2724	0.5273	0.8244	0.6694			111	11.14
3	0.8112	0.9648	0.8294	0.9742	0.1757	0.7156	0.9316	0.7222			256	25.70
4	***0.9716***	***0.9945***	***0.9856***	***0.9733***	***0.6982***	***0.9664***	***0.9985***	***0.9987***	***Exclus.***	***Exclus.***	***629***	***63.15***
4	***0.2531***	***0.2711***	***0.4064***	***0.4540***	***0.3352***	***0.4400***	***0.1605***	***0.4162***	***Plural.***	***Plural.***	***22***	***2.21***
4	***0.8059***	***0.9645***	***0.8242***	***0.9763***	***0.1769***	***0.7206***	***0.9389***	***0.7221***			***255***	***25.60***
4	***0.1598***	***0.0565***	***0.2327***	***0.8780***	***0.2536***	***0.5405***	***0.9996***	***0.7483***			***90***	***9.04***
5	0.9694	0.9960	0.9879	0.9671	0.9665	0.9644	0.9978	0.9931	Exclus.	Exclus.	395	39.66
5	0.0887	0.1650	0.3462	0.3354	0.2446	0.4412	0.0795	0.3332	Plural.	Plural.	15	1.51
5	0.0797	0.0137	0.2173	0.8564	0.2500	0.4958	0.9996	0.7591			79	7.93
5	0.9071	0.9960	0.9765	0.9998	0.0319	0.8414	0.9995	0.8756			353	35.44
5	0.7298	0.8509	0.6284	0.9344	0.2707	0.6885	0.8567	0.6653			154	15.46

Iceland

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3907.79	1108.70	1156.41	1148.41	1123.00	247	1093	5	.001996
2	-3496.63	304.37	405.74	388.74	334.75	238	270	76	.001996
3	-3448.03	225.17	380.22	354.22	271.64	229	173	190	.003992
4	-3432.49	212.10	420.81	385.81	274.64	220	142	405	.0978044
5	-3422.28	209.68	472.06	428.06	288.31	211	122	1206	.4690619
6	-3415.07	213.26	529.31	476.31	307.97	202	107	1582	.3253493
7	-3408.00	217.11	586.83	524.83	327.90	193	93	548	.5968064
8	-3402.92	224.97	648.35	577.35	351.84	184	83	2653	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	*%*
3	0.9502	0.9841	0.9039	0.9959	0.5210	0.9092	0.9852	0.9346	Exclus.	Exclus.	467	44.18
3	0.3305	0.9260	0.5384	0.9671	0.0896	0.9252	0.9367	0.2185	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	505	47.78
3	0.1331	0.5059	0.1008	0.6021	0.0424	0.6328	0.6740	0.0911			85	8.04
4	**0.9480**	**0.9964**	**0.9077**	**0.9973**	**0.5885**	**0.9424**	**0.9999**	**0.9414**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**426**	**40.30**
4	**0.3171**	**0.9348**	**0.5443**	**0.9672**	**0.0928**	**0.9364**	**0.9493**	**0.2123**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**475**	**44.94**
4	**0.1013**	**0.5153**	**0.0848**	**0.6310**	**0.0446**	**0.6564**	**0.6898**	**0.0662**			**108**	**10.22**
4	**0.9582**	**0.8642**	**0.8124**	**0.9630**	**0.0406**	**0.6531**	**0.8076**	**0.8108**			**48**	**4.54**
5	*0.0370*	*0.8459*	*0.5083*	*0.9877*	*0.0485*	*0.9458*	*0.9992*	*0.0801*	*Intigrat.*	*Intigrat.*	*275*	*26.02*
5	*0.4669*	*0.9990*	*0.3201*	*0.9020*	*0.1671*	*0.8730*	*0.8527*	*0.2998*			*136*	*12.87*
5	*0.9423*	*0.9962*	*0.9194*	*0.9965*	*0.8674*	*0.9443*	*0.9999*	*0.9401*			*246*	*23.27*
5	*0.1078*	*0.4124*	*0.1102*	*0.5254*	*0.0410*	*0.5831*	*0.6082*	*0.0828*			*57*	*5.39*
5	*0.8594*	*0.9470*	*0.8908*	*0.9994*	*0.0099*	*0.8866*	*0.9558*	*0.7157*			*343*	*32.45*

India

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-5198.01	1731.49	1782.13	1774.13	1748.72	247	1715	6	.001996
2	-4772.05	897.58	1005.19	988.19	934.18	238	864	62	.001996
3	-4652.37	676.21	840.78	814.78	732.19	229	624	121	.001996
4	-4600.83	591.13	812.67	777.67	666.48	220	521	313	.005988
5	-4576.37	560.21	838.72	794.72	654.94	211	472	1989	.00998
6	-4543.00	511.48	846.95	793.95	625.59	202	405	431	.1676647
7	-4531.11	505.70	898.15	836.15	639.19	193	382	2189	.011976
8	-4507.66	476.80	926.21	855.21	629.66	184	335	1236	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	*%*
4	0.9936	0.9748	0.9443	0.8583	0.7552	0.9638	0.9929	0.9636	Exclus.	Exclus.	1068	70.03
4	0.9612	0.9998	0.9857	0.9956	0.3595	0.5973	0.0942	0.3143	Other	Other	78	5.11
4	0.9056	0.2487	0.7254	0.2944	0.5814	0.4368	0.3062	0.5630	Other	Other	64	4.20
4	0.7307	0.9838	0.3517	0.1271	0.2102	0.7791	0.8551	0.5602			315	20.66
5	*0.9943*	*0.9771*	*0.9473*	*0.8635*	*0.7571*	*0.9622*	*0.9890*	*0.9627*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*1079*	*70.75*
5	*0.9990*	*0.9999*	*0.9913*	*0.9985*	*0.3025*	*0.5947*	*0.0399*	*0.2235*	*Other*	*Other*	*56*	*3.67*
5	*0.8365*	*0.5404*	*0.6847*	*0.3770*	*0.5451*	*0.4777*	*0.3842*	*0.5607*	*Other*	*Other*	*142*	*9.31*
5	*0.6929*	*0.9884*	*0.3924*	*0.1318*	*0.2150*	*0.9592*	*0.9013*	*0.6333*			*223*	*14.62*
5	*0.9996*	*0.9940*	*0.0087*	*0.0043*	*0.0058*	*0.0139*	*0.9561*	*0.2591*			*25*	*1.64*
6	**0.9922**	**0.9762**	**0.9577**	**0.8477**	**0.7523**	**0.9619**	**0.9916**	**0.9627**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**1040**	**68.20**
6	**0.9710**	**0.9999**	**0.9940**	**0.9986**	**0.3317**	**0.6016**	**0.0733**	**0.2798**	**Other**	**Other**	**72**	**4.72**
6	**0.8563**	**0.5365**	**0.6796**	**0.3154**	**0.5548**	**0.4975**	**0.3359**	**0.5220**	**Other**	**Other**	**116**	**7.61**
6	**0.9997**	**0.9954**	**0.0068**	**0.0037**	**0.0043**	**0.0624**	**0.9560**	**0.2270**			**25**	**1.64**
6	**0.6385**	**0.9996**	**0.9954**	**0.0799**	**0.0069**	**0.9581**	**0.9995**	**0.1185**			**40**	**2.62**
6	**0.6852**	**0.9779**	**0.0285**	**0.1909**	**0.2547**	**0.9369**	**0.8993**	**0.8259**			**232**	**15.21**
8	0.9911	0.9999	0.9975	0.8374	0.9916	0.9813	0.9726	0.9615	Exclus.	Exclus.	782	51.28
8	0.9999	0.9999	0.9991	0.9990	0.2099	0.8476	0.0065	0.0036	Other	Other	27	1.77
8	0.7239	0.9780	0.4175	0.0564	0.2746	0.9821	0.8594	0.6169			310	20.33
8	0.8364	0.8611	0.8491	0.8250	0.4702	0.2390	0.5673	0.7365			129	8.46
8	0.9999	0.9434	0.8672	0.9388	0.4624	0.9945	0.9998	0.9599			213	13.97
8	0.9997	0.9672	0.0069	0.0025	0.0118	0.0076	0.9438	0.3048			33	2.16
8	0.9996	0.0096	0.9985	0.0275	0.9969	0.9596	0.2242	0.9979			6	0.39

Ireland:

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4700.34	1530.00	1578.01	1570.01	1544.60	247	1514	5	.001996
2	-4261.03	669.38	771.40	754.40	700.40	238	635	106	.001996
3	-4151.17	467.66	623.69	597.69	515.11	229	416	120	.001996
4	-4123.20	429.71	639.76	604.76	493.59	220	360	555	.001996
5	-4097.37	396.05	660.10	616.10	476.35	211	308	540	.001996
6	-4079.07	377.45	695.52	642.52	474.18	202	271	724	.003992
7	-4063.50	364.31	736.39	674.39	477.46	193	240	620	.007984
8	-4050.54	356.39	782.48	711.48	485.97	184	214	938	.0159681

(no absolut fits)

Israel

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-5458.83	1535.62	1584.22	1576.22	1550.81	247	1520	5	.001996
2	-4925.07	486.11	589.38	572.38	518.38	238	452	65	.001996
3	-4870.84	395.64	553.59	527.59	445.01	229	344	260	.001996
4	-4845.43	362.81	575.44	540.44	429.26	220	293	576	.005988
5	-4830.37	350.69	617.99	573.99	434.23	211	263	677	.0379242
6	-4817.89	343.73	665.71	612.71	444.36	202	238	845	.2794411
7	-4808.61	343.18	719.83	657.83	460.89	193	219	620	.237525
8	-4799.39	342.74	774.06	703.06	477.54	184	201	681	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.7422	0.9709	0.9810	0.9842	0.9001	0.9483	0.9738	0.8066	Exclus.	Exclus.	462	39.09
3	0.4416	0.8962	0.7877	0.8144	0.4783	0.9537	0.8630	0.1696	Assimil.	Assimil.	392	33.16
3	0.3934	0.3410	0.3724	0.4276	0.3485	0.5185	0.4095	0.2136	Plural.	Plural.	328	27.75
4	0.8526	0.9804	0.9670	0.9741	0.8886	0.9386	0.9632	0.7750	Exclus.	Exclus.	464	39.26
4	0.5392	0.9195	0.7249	0.7422	0.1747	0.9857	0.7686	0.1585	Assimil.	Assimil.	257	21.74
4	0.3859	0.3351	0.3835	0.4282	0.3722	0.4989	0.4249	0.2088	Plural.	Plural.	318	26.90
4	0.0665	0.8570	0.9031	0.9518	0.9145	0.9713	0.9975	0.3235			143	12.10
5	*0.8166*	*0.9857*	*0.9755*	*0.9774*	*0.8985*	*0.9510*	*0.9712*	*0.7981*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*462*	*39.09*
5	*0.5814*	*0.8950*	*0.7074*	*0.7408*	*0.1622*	*0.9973*	*0.7409*	*0.1710*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*266*	*22.50*
5	*0.1334*	*0.2694*	*0.3745*	*0.3640*	*0.3314*	*0.5511*	*0.4302*	*0.1673*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*206*	*17.43*
5	*0.1455*	*0.8500*	*0.8811*	*0.9256*	*0.8609*	*0.9483*	*0.9956*	*0.2559*			*148*	*12.52*
5	*0.9729*	*0.4988*	*0.4084*	*0.5637*	*0.4875*	*0.3006*	*0.3915*	*0.3309*			*100*	*8.46*
6	**0.9808**	**0.9151**	**0.7216**	**0.8160**	**0.6769**	**0.7208**	**0.7342**	**0.5489**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**107**	**9.05**
6	**0.7806**	**0.9894**	**0.9970**	**0.9891**	**0.9042**	**0.9761**	**0.9905**	**0.8031**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**420**	**35.53**
6	**0.5205**	**0.9697**	**0.7124**	**0.7327**	**0.0507**	**0.9943**	**0.7447**	**0.1019**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**195**	**16.50**
6	**0.2930**	**0.3414**	**0.3818**	**0.0409**	**0.3876**	**0.4857**	**0.4136**	**0.1372**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**185**	**15.65**
6	**0.4366**	**0.0970**	**0.3384**	**0.9898**	**0.2316**	**0.5540**	**0.4052**	**0.2942**			**109**	**9.22**
6	**0.1024**	**0.8288**	**0.8541**	**0.9194**	**0.8391**	**0.9446**	**0.9640**	**0.2213**			**166**	**14.04**
7	0.9550	0.8405	0.7021	0.8097	0.6501	0.6427	0.6744	0.5760	Exclus.	Exclus.	80	6.77
7	0.7363	0.9914	0.9867	0.9808	0.9008	0.9734	0.9848	0.8170	Exclus.	Exclus.	445	37.65
7	0.5500	0.9522	0.7039	0.7332	0.0441	0.9981	0.7331	0.1318	Assimil.	Assimil.	207	17.51
7	0.2890	0.3437	0.3806	0.0569	0.3847	0.4840	0.4093	0.1326	Plural.	Plural.	182	15.40
7	0.1899	0.8775	0.8480	0.9032	0.7951	0.9334	0.9642	0.0099			157	13.28
7	0.0139	0.0398	0.4545	0.9524	0.7762	0.9979	0.9901	0.8277			20	1.69
7	0.4356	0.0766	0.3203	0.9833	0.1947	0.5095	0.3383	0.2362			91	7.70
8	0.9448	0.7909	0.7593	0.8234	0.5730	0.6657	0.6494	0.5968	Exclus.	Exclus.	83	7.02
8	0.7368	0.9952	0.9832	0.9797	0.9034	0.9725	0.9865	0.8401	Exclus.	Exclus.	449	37.99
8	0.5414	0.9434	0.6864	0.7209	0.0565	0.9987	0.7354	0.1159	Assimil.	Assimil.	211	17.85
8	0.1843	0.2579	0.4614	0.2805	0.2927	0.5485	0.4219	0.1302	Plural.	Plural.	194	16.41
8	0.5983	0.0117	0.0966	0.9932	0.1832	0.4096	0.2372	0.3016			37	3.13
8	0.0116	0.0306	0.4588	0.9629	0.7743	0.9981	0.9902	0.7875			23	1.95
8	0.2493	0.9011	0.8574	0.8970	0.8200	0.9308	0.9749	0.0116			152	12.86
8	0.6970	0.5754	0.0214	0.0203	0.7369	0.2123	0.3501	0.1236			33	2.79

Japan

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-5115.13	1609.32	1658.12	1650.12	1624.71	247	1593	6	.001996
2	-4531.79	460.64	564.33	547.33	493.33	238	427	65	.001996
3	-4473.77	362.59	521.16	495.16	412.58	229	311	444	.001996
4	-4444.67	322.39	535.87	500.87	389.69	220	252	515	.001996
5	-4418.14	287.33	555.70	511.70	371.93	211	199	520	.001996
6	-4400.79	270.64	593.90	540.90	372.55	202	165	621	.007984
7	-4387.42	261.89	640.04	578.04	381.10	193	138	696	.8762475
8	-4382.24	269.53	702.57	631.57	406.05	184	128	1485	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.1930	0.4519	0.0876	0.1658	0.0016	0.3448	0.6353	0.2159	Plural.	Plural.	115	9.50
3	0.5838	0.8753	0.6128	0.7126	0.0453	0.6512	0.8224	0.4149			576	47.56
3	0.9739	0.9850	0.9446	0.9879	0.4786	0.8901	0.9976	0.9941			520	42.94
4	0.2364	0.3809	0.0382	0.0296	0.0008	0.1615	0.5103	0.2080	Plural.	Plural.	79	6.52
4	0.9897	0.9567	0.7083	0.7075	0.0314	0.5677	0.7753	0.4274			272	22.46
4	0.1618	0.7570	0.4595	0.6559	0.0416	0.6990	0.8629	0.3668			310	25.60
4	0.9618	0.9795	0.9366	0.9879	0.4815	0.9035	0.9977	0.9928			550	45.42
5	0.2066	0.2975	0.0520	0.0453	0.0007	0.0980	0.4886	0.2006	Plural.	Plural.	67	5.53
5	0.1030	0.7331	0.3844	0.5928	0.0447	0.7108	0.8487	0.3343			278	22.96
5	0.9713	0.9838	0.9301	0.9845	0.5763	0.9502	0.9967	0.9931			484	39.97
5	0.9883	0.9975	0.4912	0.3370	0.0525	0.5762	0.6789	0.3977			142	11.73
5	0.8495	0.9187	0.8864	0.9987	0.0058	0.5993	0.9103	0.6095			240	19.82
6	0.9726	0.9822	0.9386	0.9834	0.7077	0.9567	0.9950	0.9938	Exclus.	Exclus.	266	21.97
6	0.1926	0.2772	0.0172	0.0299	0.0006	0.0989	0.4924	0.1916	Plural.	Plural.	73	6.03
6	0.9860	0.9594	0.7724	0.5348	0.0585	0.4689	0.3528	0.1848	Other	Other	84	6.94
6	0.1099	0.6402	0.5123	0.6537	0.0308	0.6868	0.8121	0.2265			195	16.10
6	0.8720	0.9509	0.9331	0.9511	0.0093	0.6902	0.9801	0.7389			410	33.86
6	0.5347	0.9599	0.0619	0.4454	0.0553	0.6816	0.9086	0.5606			183	15.11
7	***0.9968***	***0.9913***	***0.9503***	***0.9823***	***0.7086***	***0.9613***	***0.9979***	***0.9917***	***Exclus.***	***Exclus.***	***258***	***21.30***
7	***0.1897***	***0.2728***	***0.0270***	***0.0258***	***0.0005***	***0.0821***	***0.4775***	***0.2068***	***Plural.***	***Plural.***	***73***	***6.03***
7	***0.9917***	***0.9649***	***0.7564***	***0.5276***	***0.0643***	***0.4754***	***0.3602***	***0.1869***	***Other***	***Other***	***85***	***7.02***
7	***0.2791***	***0.6652***	***0.6039***	***0.9938***	***0.7860***	***0.7680***	***0.7758***	***0.9384***			***16***	***1.32***
7	***0.5455***	***0.9688***	***0.0448***	***0.4025***	***0.0493***	***0.6753***	***0.9212***	***0.5930***			***121***	***9.99***
7	***0.8575***	***0.9477***	***0.9175***	***0.9514***	***0.0010***	***0.6893***	***0.9782***	***0.7428***			***444***	***36.66***
7	***0.1311***	***0.6599***	***0.4746***	***0.6253***	***0.0006***	***0.6899***	***0.8229***	***0.1742***			***214***	***17.67***

Korea. Republic of (South)

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4856.02	1591.94	1641.19	1633.19	1607.78	247	1576	4	.001996
2	-4337.40	572.70	677.36	660.36	606.36	238	539	75	.001996
3	-4232.82	381.55	541.61	515.61	433.02	229	330	187	.001996
4	-4197.97	329.85	545.31	510.31	399.13	220	260	432	.001996
5	-4176.45	304.81	575.69	531.69	391.92	211	217	909	.003992
6	-4162.16	294.23	620.51	567.51	399.16	202	188	931	.0618762
7	-4151.76	291.44	673.12	611.12	414.18	193	167	2209	.8642715
8	-4147.61	301.13	738.22	667.22	441.69	184	159	1609	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9940*	*0.9946*	*0.9147*	*0.9980*	*0.7491*	*0.9220*	*0.9895*	*0.9980*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*660*	*51.48*
3	*0.1518*	*0.2446*	*0.0940*	*0.3644*	*0.1499*	*0.5490*	*0.5860*	*0.2717*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*111*	*8.66*
3	*0.7829*	*0.9345*	*0.6262*	*0.8439*	*0.2199*	*0.7769*	*0.9376*	*0.4957*			*511*	*39.86*
4	0.9941	0.9936	0.9077	0.9944	0.7789	0.9257	0.9879	0.9851	Exclus.	Exclus.	672	52.42
4	0.2985	0.7247	0.4371	0.7967	0.3422	0.8479	0.9613	0.4534	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	191	14.90
4	0.1967	0.2448	0.0751	0.2298	0.0556	0.4032	0.3997	0.2028	Plural.	Plural.	78	6.08
4	0.9900	0.9876	0.6950	0.8562	0.1076	0.7360	0.9310	0.5283			341	26.60
5	0.9921	0.9928	0.9090	0.9896	0.9636	0.9200	0.9815	0.9725	Exclus.	Exclus.	509	39.70
5	0.3732	0.7408	0.4111	0.7633	0.3597	0.8455	0.9475	0.4313	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	217	16.93
5	0.0536	0.1403	0.0620	0.2059	0.0402	0.4107	0.4033	0.1558	Plural.	Plural.	62	4.84
5	0.9921	0.8937	0.5452	0.5557	0.0198	0.3219	0.6232	0.4916	Other	Other	61	4.76
5	0.9778	0.9998	0.7839	0.9593	0.0209	0.8526	0.9988	0.6789			433	33.78
6	**0.9903**	**0.9903**	**0.9155**	**0.9939**	**0.9056**	**0.9210**	**0.9837**	**0.9932**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**489**	**38.14**
6	**0.0359**	**0.7335**	**0.4796**	**0.9254**	**0.2762**	**0.8141**	**0.9527**	**0.3863**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**143**	**11.15**
6	**0.0290**	**0.1448**	**0.0618**	**0.1708**	**0.0120**	**0.3884**	**0.4112**	**0.1644**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**63**	**4.91**
6	**0.9653**	**0.8569**	**0.5090**	**0.5298**	**0.0069**	**0.2264**	**0.6233**	**0.4830**	**Other**	**Other**	**48**	**3.74**
6	**0.6033**	**0.6032**	**0.2020**	**0.3157**	**0.5456**	**0.9984**	**0.8888**	**0.5178**			**52**	**4.06**
6	**0.9978**	**0.9951**	**0.7463**	**0.9423**	**0.1407**	**0.8449**	**0.9839**	**0.6316**			**487**	**37.99**
7	0.9879	0.9896	0.9155	0.9930	0.9298	0.9200	0.9829	0.9975	Exclus.	Exclus.	497	38.77
7	0.0838	0.7247	0.4476	0.9115	0.2206	0.8342	0.9997	0.4299	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	134	10.45
7	0.0323	0.1943	0.0666	0.2175	0.0046	0.3945	0.4132	0.1574	Plural.	Plural.	68	5.30
7	0.9923	0.8723	0.5465	0.5680	0.0064	0.3175	0.6462	0.4922	Other	Other	53	4.13
7	0.2698	0.8836	0.9941	0.9957	0.9773	0.7365	0.5113	0.0322			8	0.62
7	0.9983	0.9975	0.7520	0.9487	0.1415	0.8551	0.9966	0.6506			479	37.36
7	0.5874	0.5859	0.1795	0.2662	0.6168	0.9987	0.8750	0.4924			43	3.35

Latvia

LCA	Log-likelihood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3272.49	1153.05	1199.16	1191.16	1165.75	247	1137	5	.001996
2	-2922.83	471.74	569.71	552.71	498.72	238	438	71	.001996
3	-2877.33	398.74	548.57	522.57	440.00	229	347	182	.001996
4	-2836.99	336.06	537.76	502.76	391.61	220	266	260	.001996
5	-2816.93	313.94	567.50	523.50	383.76	211	226	745	.011976
6	-2803.25	304.58	610.00	557.00	388.69	202	199	711	.1417166
7	-2793.52	303.11	660.40	598.40	401.50	193	179	872	.0538922
8	-2783.46	301.00	710.15	639.15	413.67	184	159	1313	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified LCA solutions form. (incriteria)*	N	%
4	*0.3864*	*0.6187*	*0.7059*	*0.9952*	*0.0819*	*0.9343*	*0.9915*	*0.1916*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*162*	*18.73*
4	*0.2837*	*0.0107*	*0.4144*	*0.2414*	*0.1230*	*0.5214*	*0.6559*	*0.2169*			*78*	*9.02*
4	*0.9371*	*0.8955*	*0.8108*	*0.6809*	*0.1051*	*0.5085*	*0.5870*	*0.3313*			*86*	*9.94*
4	*0.9098*	*0.9861*	*0.9896*	*0.9887*	*0.3815*	*0.9499*	*0.9997*	*0.8785*			*539*	*62.31*
5	0.5969	0.9909	0.7761	0.9993	0.0794	0.9547	0.9764	0.0927	Assimil.	Assimil.	162	18.73
5	0.1108	0.0098	0.0134	0.0718	0.0751	0.0149	0.3500	0.1687	Plural.	Plural.	23	2.66
5	0.2635	0.0249	0.6548	0.7160	0.1276	0.8767	0.9232	0.2108			119	13.76
5	0.8967	0.9865	0.9866	0.9887	0.3936	0.9465	0.9994	0.9407			463	53.53
5	0.9304	0.7956	0.7794	0.6242	0.1026	0.4567	0.5766	0.3499			98	11.33
6	**0.9330**	**0.9838**	**0.9841**	**0.9844**	**0.9357**	**0.9854**	**0.9999**	**0.9324**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**177**	**20.46**
6	**0.3393**	**0.6489**	**0.6542**	**0.9995**	**0.0945**	**0.9462**	**0.9837**	**0.0948**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**136**	**15.72**
6	**0.1098**	**0.0100**	**0.0092**	**0.0166**	**0.0024**	**0.0106**	**0.2077**	**0.0082**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**19**	**2.20**
6	**0.9478**	**0.9893**	**0.7617**	**0.6010**	**0.1353**	**0.4539**	**0.4484**	**0.2635**	**Other**	**Other**	**61**	**7.05**
6	**0.4048**	**0.0169**	**0.6104**	**0.5204**	**0.1489**	**0.6983**	**0.8453**	**0.3317**			**94**	**10.87**
6	**0.8732**	**0.9912**	**0.9840**	**0.9844**	**0.0062**	**0.9059**	**0.9893**	**0.7751**			**378**	**43.70**
7	0.9336	0.9840	0.9840	0.9844	0.9357	0.9866	0.9999	0.9346	Exclus.	Exclus.	175	20.23
7	0.3659	0.6614	0.6392	0.9996	0.0927	0.9375	0.9976	0.1018	Assimil.	Assimil.	139	16.07
7	0.1003	0.0070	0.0078	0.0136	0.0021	0.0091	0.2086	0.0070	Plural.	Plural.	19	2.20
7	0.9971	0.9729	0.0749	0.1521	0.0674	0.3046	0.4300	0.1434			15	1.73
7	0.3982	0.0086	0.6155	0.5246	0.1505	0.7032	0.8405	0.3257			94	10.87
7	0.8722	0.9910	0.9827	0.9799	0.0072	0.9071	0.9996	0.7812			374	43.24
7	0.9119	0.9973	0.9987	0.7696	0.1497	0.5382	0.4352	0.3399			49	5.66
8	0.3005	0.5301	0.6344	0.9995	0.0695	0.9164	0.9992	0.1498	Assimil.	Assimil.	140	16.18
8	0.0955	0.0066	0.0070	0.0103	0.0018	0.0077	0.2123	0.0068	Plural.	Plural.	19	2.20
8	0.9366	0.9255	0.6668	0.6474	0.0226	0.3060	0.4873	0.0044	Other	Other	42	4.86
8	0.9904	0.9956	0.7081	0.0439	0.9744	0.8465	0.1661	0.8064			6	0.69
8	0.9370	0.9848	0.9901	0.9946	0.4882	0.9992	0.9999	0.9908			381	44.05
8	0.9606	0.8852	0.9994	0.8902	0.1041	0.0396	0.9013	0.9450			43	4.97
8	0.3726	0.0067	0.5854	0.4392	0.1720	0.7374	0.8168	0.3041			71	8.21
8	0.7875	0.9991	0.9491	0.9615	0.1464	0.9989	0.9526	0.4836			163	18.84

Lithuania

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4095.46	1496.54	1545.12	1537.12	1511.70	247	1481	6	.001996
2	-3639.39	602.41	705.63	688.63	634.63	238	568	157	.001996
3	-3536.66	414.95	572.82	546.82	464.23	229	363	143	.001996
4	-3500.94	361.51	574.01	539.01	427.84	220	292	243	.001996
5	-3473.81	325.25	592.40	548.40	408.64	211	237	416	.0219561
6	-3461.10	317.84	639.63	586.63	418.28	202	212	1406	.1377245
7	-3451.32	316.27	692.70	630.70	433.77	193	192	1088	.0359281
8	-3440.65	312.92	744.00	673.00	447.48	184	171	1008	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	*%*
3	*0.9975*	*0.9932*	*0.9971*	*0.9990*	*0.8676*	*0.9752*	*0.9998*	*0.9769*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*487*	*41.34*
3	*0.2600*	*0.3254*	*0.0716*	*0.5796*	*0.3197*	*0.3380*	*0.3589*	*0.3274*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*104*	*8.83*
3	*0.6789*	*0.9567*	*0.7431*	*0.9796*	*0.3853*	*0.7387*	*0.8886*	*0.6507*			*587*	*49.83*
4	0.9978	0.9926	0.9970	0.9987	0.8982	0.9710	0.9998	0.9607	Exclus.	Exclus.	544	46.18
4	0.2660	0.3373	0.0767	0.5846	0.3199	0.3392	0.3583	0.3382	Plural.	Plural.	106	9.00
4	0.7588	0.9813	0.8171	0.9971	0.6853	0.6473	0.0716	0.2562	Other	Other	50	4.24
4	0.6716	0.9559	0.7384	0.9791	0.3163	0.7587	0.9998	0.7216			478	40.58
5	0.9946	0.9919	0.9832	0.9974	0.8544	0.9947	0.9954	0.9455	Exclus.	Exclus.	672	57.05
5	0.5303	0.9447	0.7274	0.9845	0.2470	0.9779	0.9998	0.7030	Assimil.	Assimil.	215	18.25
5	0.2267	0.3183	0.0650	0.5766	0.3220	0.3396	0.3556	0.3329	Plural.	Plural.	106	9.00
5	0.8770	0.9558	0.7022	0.9565	0.4455	0.0198	0.8599	0.7069	Other	Other	152	12.90
5	0.6956	0.9992	0.8199	0.9995	0.6675	0.9305	0.0623	0.0108	Other	Other	33	2.80
6	**0.9947**	**0.9914**	**0.9832**	**0.9977**	**0.8635**	**0.9937**	**0.9952**	**0.9470**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**667**	**56.62**
6	**0.5508**	**0.9530**	**0.7432**	**0.9813**	**0.2458**	**0.9837**	**0.9999**	**0.7039**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**220**	**18.68**
6	**0.3205**	**0.3385**	**0.0854**	**0.3033**	**0.2216**	**0.2354**	**0.2020**	**0.1930**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**57**	**4.84**
6	**0.6837**	**0.9985**	**0.7988**	**0.9996**	**0.6589**	**0.9358**	**0.0459**	**0.0081**	**Other**	**Other**	**36**	**3.06**
6	**0.8733**	**0.9532**	**0.6970**	**0.9549**	**0.4399**	**0.0158**	**0.8553**	**0.7012**	**Other**	**Other**	**155**	**13.16**
6	**0.0474**	**0.2590**	**0.0138**	**0.9731**	**0.4648**	**0.5052**	**0.5889**	**0.5504**			**43**	**3.65**
7	0.9857	0.9883	0.9726	0.9956	0.9462	0.9956	0.9952	0.9355	Exclus.	Exclus.	544	46.18
7	0.2350	0.2719	0.0568	0.4990	0.3414	0.3345	0.0187	0.2357	Plural.	Plural.	69	5.86
7	0.7185	0.9995	0.8042	0.9996	0.6284	0.8431	0.0381	0.0071	Other	Other	39	3.31
7	0.8462	0.9352	0.7153	0.9615	0.7736	0.0309	0.7831	0.8401	Other	Other	75	6.37
7	0.9665	0.9965	0.8413	1.0000	0.0248	0.7752	0.9999	0.7425			257	21.82
7	0.0213	0.8943	0.7246	0.9821	0.2314	0.9972	0.9990	0.6483			136	11.54
7	0.4196	0.6346	0.1088	0.7695	0.2724	0.3488	0.9928	0.5991			58	4.92
8	0.9806	0.9883	0.9714	0.9943	0.9876	0.9973	0.9951	0.9344	Exclus.	Exclus.	565	47.96
8	0.2319	0.2455	0.0619	0.4710	0.3291	0.3122	0.0086	0.1963	Plural.	Plural.	67	5.69
8	0.8543	0.9385	0.7127	0.9617	0.7837	0.0364	0.7914	0.8389	Other	Other	71	6.03
8	0.7149	0.9996	0.8016	0.9996	0.6284	0.8469	0.0415	0.0054	Other	Other	39	3.31
8	0.1408	0.5290	0.1259	0.9105	0.3712	0.5907	0.9158	0.7720			48	4.07
8	0.0187	0.9137	0.7769	0.9799	0.1952	0.9978	0.9996	0.6164			108	9.17
8	0.7763	0.8411	0.0142	0.5489	0.1035	0.0472	0.9341	0.2200			19	1.61
8	0.9608	0.9932	0.8532	1.0000	0.0207	0.8011	0.9999	0.7690			261	22.16

Mexico

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3941.47	2012.49	2060.00	2052.00	2026.59	247	1996	4	.001996
2	-3176.30	500.15	601.11	584.11	530.12	238	466	35	.001996
3	-3094.80	355.14	509.56	483.56	400.99	229	303	100	.001996
4	-3070.55	324.66	532.53	497.53	386.37	220	255	481	.0139721
5	-3056.70	314.94	576.27	532.27	392.52	211	227	323	.003992
6	-3042.16	303.86	618.64	565.64	397.31	202	198	432	.8423154
7	-3036.67	310.90	679.13	617.13	420.21	193	187	850	.011976
8	-3025.13	305.81	727.50	656.50	430.99	184	164	1787	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9934*	*0.9942*	*0.9817*	*0.9850*	*0.7695*	*0.9041*	*0.9962*	*0.9801*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*692*	*67.05*
3	*0.0286*	*0.1114*	*0.1466*	*0.3506*	*0.1668*	*0.4503*	*0.3434*	*0.1577*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*101*	*9.79*
3	*0.7702*	*0.8145*	*0.6760*	*0.6514*	*0.2216*	*0.6510*	*0.7745*	*0.4719*			*239*	*23.16*
4	0.9908	0.9926	0.9789	0.9830	0.7670	0.9036	0.9958	0.9786	Exclus.	Exclus.	696	67.44
4	0.0280	0.0624	0.0285	0.1479	0.1724	0.1691	0.1033	0.0818	Plural.	Plural.	48	4.65
4	0.0682	0.4355	0.4540	0.6201	0.2133	0.7716	0.7416	0.4052			108	10.47
4	0.9842	0.8668	0.6968	0.6376	0.1900	0.5981	0.7400	0.4304			180	17.44
5	0.9921	0.9929	0.9787	0.9890	0.7725	0.9022	0.9928	0.9771	Exclus.	Exclus.	697	67.54
5	0.8437	0.7949	0.7674	0.5823	0.1902	0.7091	0.9949	0.5589	Assimil.	Assimil.	144	13.95
5	0.0634	0.0569	0.0260	0.1427	0.1596	0.1395	0.1089	0.0795	Plural.	Plural.	51	4.94
5	0.9929	0.9906	0.5967	0.7073	0.2192	0.4671	0.3524	0.2793	Other	Other	53	5.14
5	0.0296	0.3490	0.3683	0.6360	0.2091	0.7816	0.6473	0.3557			87	8.43
6	**0.9991**	**0.9998**	**0.9860**	**0.9853**	**0.7640**	**0.9021**	**0.9949**	**0.9742**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**685**	**66.38**
6	**0.8304**	**0.7787**	**0.7936**	**0.5265**	**0.0339**	**0.7482**	**0.9990**	**0.5208**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**115**	**11.14**
6	**0.0723**	**0.0528**	**0.0203**	**0.1527**	**0.1781**	**0.1283**	**0.1043**	**0.0899**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**51**	**4.94**
6	**0.9962**	**0.9984**	**0.6002**	**0.7079**	**0.2244**	**0.4668**	**0.4275**	**0.3050**	**Other**	**Other**	**70**	**6.78**
6	**0.0135**	**0.3546**	**0.3641**	**0.5990**	**0.1277**	**0.7863**	**0.6117**	**0.2846**			**79**	**7.66**
6	**0.6350**	**0.6330**	**0.6066**	**0.9188**	**0.9761**	**0.7236**	**0.9578**	**0.8915**			**32**	**3.10**

Norway

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4640.69	1530.37	1580.55	1572.55	1547.14	247	1514	5	.001996
2	-4011.20	289.39	396.02	379.02	325.02	238	255	81	.001996
3	-3970.29	225.57	388.65	362.65	280.06	229	174	356	.001996
4	-3945.96	194.92	414.46	379.46	268.27	220	125	816	.0658683
5	-3935.04	191.08	467.07	423.07	283.30	211	103	1695	.4011976
6	-3928.16	195.32	527.76	474.76	306.40	202	89	1223	.5209581
7	-3922.97	202.93	591.82	529.82	332.87	193	79	1617	.0918164
8	-3916.21	207.41	652.75	581.75	356.20	184	65	1636	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.9973	0.9945	0.9602	0.9948	0.4315	0.9912	0.9570	0.9735	Exclus.	Exclus.	629	43.68
3	0.5031	0.9180	0.7583	0.9832	0.0850	0.9798	0.9043	0.2189	Assimil.	Assimil.	528	36.67
3	0.0394	0.7222	0.1651	0.9286	0.0184	0.9509	0.7157	0.0052	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	283	19.65
4	***0.9932***	***0.9978***	***0.9974***	***0.9962***	***0.4517***	***0.9947***	***0.9684***	***0.9774***	***Exclus.***	***Exclus.***	***592***	***41.11***
4	***0.4906***	***0.9576***	***0.8885***	***0.9936***	***0.0714***	***0.9833***	***0.9477***	***0.1398***	***Assimil.***	***Assimil.***	***425***	***29.51***
4	***0.0432***	***0.7381***	***0.1947***	***0.9385***	***0.0270***	***0.9567***	***0.7380***	***0.0025***	***Intigrat.***	***Intigrat.***	***325***	***22.57***
4	***0.8031***	***0.8555***	***0.4815***	***0.9519***	***0.1399***	***0.9594***	***0.7853***	***0.6625***			***98***	***6.81***
5	0.8294	0.6877	0.4177	0.9137	0.1495	0.9470	0.7170	0.4480			52	3.61
5	0.1084	0.9060	0.6125	0.9999	0.0727	0.9795	0.9334	0.0866			454	31.53
5	0.9554	0.9997	0.9218	0.9922	0.0070	0.9828	0.9336	0.6783			527	36.60
5	0.9880	0.9936	0.9905	0.9952	0.8163	1.0000	0.9783	0.9463			279	19.38
5	0.0110	0.6605	0.1419	0.8915	0.0056	0.9458	0.6096	0.0018			128	8.89

Philipines

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-2149.29	861.61	910.28	902.28	876.87	247	846	5	.001996
2	-1833.02	247.07	350.51	333.51	279.51	238	213	49	.001996
3	-1809.81	218.66	376.85	350.85	268.26	229	167	516	.1956088
4	-1801.00	219.04	431.98	396.98	285.81	220	149	472	.3632734
5	-1793.68	222.39	490.09	446.09	306.33	211	134	1785	.2814371
6	-1786.39	225.82	548.28	495.28	326.93	202	120	1271	.9600798
7	-1783.49	238.02	615.24	553.24	356.30	193	114	1738	.6347305
8	-1779.31	247.66	679.64	608.64	383.11	184	106	2348	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
2	*0.9825*	*0.9873*	*0.9617*	*0.9859*	*0.8956*	*0.9358*	*0.9974*	*0.9913*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*1114*	*93.38*
2	*0.6987*	*0.6353*	*0.5110*	*0.5644*	*0.4834*	*0.4607*	*0.5478*	*0.3828*			*79*	*6.62*
3	**0.8705**	**0.9104**	**0.6609**	**0.8111**	**0.7721**	**0.8354**	**0.9989**	**0.9086**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**120**	**10.06**
3	**0.9939**	**0.9919**	**0.9940**	**0.9998**	**0.9066**	**0.9435**	**0.9958**	**0.9956**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**1022**	**85.67**
3	**0.6469**	**0.5670**	**0.5267**	**0.5658**	**0.3973**	**0.3232**	**0.3133**	**0.1903**	**Other**	**Other**	**51**	**4.27**

Portugal

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3091.43	902.28	949.32	941.32	915.91	247	886	4	.001996
2	-2766.76	270.92	370.89	353.89	299.90	238	237	67	.001996
3	-2745.22	245.86	398.75	372.75	290.17	229	194	296	.001996
4	-2729.18	231.78	437.59	402.59	291.43	220	162	1752	.003992
5	-2714.30	220.00	478.74	434.74	295.00	211	132	659	.0419162
6	-2704.05	217.51	529.17	476.17	307.84	202	112	883	.4291417
7	-2697.76	222.93	587.51	525.51	328.60	193	99	1162	.7005988
8	-2693.85	233.11	650.61	579.61	354.12	184	91	5000	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
2	0.4172	0.7331	0.5641	0.9232	0.1007	0.8183	0.8484	0.3425	Assimil.	Assimil.	320	32.89
2	0.9789	0.9947	0.9360	0.9822	0.5169	0.9375	0.9993	0.9453			653	67.11
3	0.6277	0.9170	0.6691	0.9541	0.1187	0.8424	0.9066	0.4221			276	28.37
3	0.0636	0.2788	0.3809	0.8601	0.1099	0.7676	0.7575	0.3258			76	7.81
3	0.9862	0.9935	0.9516	0.9820	0.5562	0.9462	0.9998	0.9787			621	63.82
4	0.0698	0.6744	0.5976	0.9991	0.1581	0.8831	0.8939	0.4379	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	169	17.37
4	0.9890	0.9930	0.9375	0.9826	0.5542	0.9501	0.9989	0.9591			649	66.70
4	0.8901	0.9189	0.6974	0.9234	0.0212	0.7733	0.8958	0.3928			127	13.05
4	0.1051	0.3189	0.0317	0.5193	0.0838	0.6026	0.4939	0.0861			28	2.88
5	*0.9969*	*0.9947*	*0.8197*	*0.9894*	*0.2195*	*0.8399*	*0.9999*	*0.8623*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*355*	*36.49*
5	*0.9875*	*0.9897*	*0.9825*	*0.9766*	*0.7244*	*0.9996*	*0.9978*	*0.9761*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*301*	*30.94*
5	*0.8938*	*0.8460*	*0.6914*	*0.8672*	*0.0041*	*0.7937*	*0.8035*	*0.1555*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*123*	*12.64*
5	*0.0476*	*0.6948*	*0.6105*	*0.9994*	*0.1501*	*0.8797*	*0.8971*	*0.4542*	*Intigrat.*	*Intigrat.*	*169*	*17.37*
5	*0.0339*	*0.3098*	*0.0211*	*0.5388*	*0.0966*	*0.5897*	*0.5132*	*0.1184*			*25*	*2.57*
6	**0.9852**	**0.9908**	**0.9772**	**0.9773**	**0.7155**	**0.9997**	**0.9978**	**0.9759**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**331**	**34.02**
6	**0.9933**	**0.9926**	**0.8500**	**0.9879**	**0.1952**	**0.8072**	**0.9999**	**0.9935**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**329**	**33.81**
6	**0.9753**	**0.9194**	**0.8152**	**0.8399**	**0.0021**	**0.6109**	**0.7022**	**0.1530**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**35**	**3.60**
6	**0.6227**	**0.8961**	**0.6027**	**0.9770**	**0.1729**	**0.9983**	**0.9995**	**0.2525**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**146**	**15.01**
6	**0.0122**	**0.5983**	**0.6215**	**0.9997**	**0.1121**	**0.8102**	**0.8381**	**0.5260**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**106**	**10.89**
6	**0.0977**	**0.3131**	**0.0183**	**0.5356**	**0.0924**	**0.6237**	**0.5121**	**0.0753**			**26**	**2.67**

Russian Federation

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4800.05	1934.45	1984.95	1976.95	1951.53	247	1918	5	.001996
2	-4140.29	632.94	740.25	723.25	669.24	238	599	67	.001996
3	-4028.92	428.21	592.32	566.32	483.72	229	376	100	.001996
4	-4000.21	388.79	609.71	574.71	463.52	220	319	209	.007984
5	-3984.66	375.69	653.41	609.41	469.64	211	288	244	.0998004
6	-3971.97	368.31	702.84	649.84	481.47	202	262	1047	.4710579
7	-3964.43	371.21	762.55	700.55	503.59	193	247	981	.1976048
8	-3955.21	370.79	818.93	747.93	522.39	184	229	3410	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.9775	0.9928	0.9789	0.9920	0.8831	0.9616	0.9977	0.9994	Exclus.	Exclus.	1009	67.36
3	0.1429	0.1260	0.0596	0.1395	0.1466	0.1958	0.0796	0.0707	Plural.	Plural.	47	3.14
3	0.7284	0.7705	0.7259	0.7431	0.4876	0.7135	0.8043	0.5592			442	29.51
4	*0.9814*	*0.9946*	*0.9792*	*0.9921*	*0.8914*	*0.9600*	*0.9974*	*0.9979*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*1008*	*67.29*
4	*0.1348*	*0.1721*	*0.0689*	*0.1761*	*0.1528*	*0.2389*	*0.0860*	*0.0860*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*52*	*3.47*
4	*0.8801*	*0.8715*	*0.7629*	*0.6990*	*0.6896*	*0.5797*	*0.0504*	*0.3903*	*Other*	*Other*	*80*	*5.34*
4	*0.6989*	*0.7504*	*0.7314*	*0.7636*	*0.4357*	*0.7576*	*0.9990*	*0.6203*			*358*	*23.90*
5	**0.9813**	**0.9943**	**0.9792**	**0.9920**	**0.8903**	**0.9599**	**0.9960**	**0.9980**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**1008**	**67.29**
5	**0.1634**	**0.1862**	**0.0642**	**0.2021**	**0.1746**	**0.2441**	**0.0816**	**0.0935**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**56**	**3.74**
5	**0.8703**	**0.8143**	**0.9567**	**0.8492**	**0.4886**	**0.0523**	**0.0456**	**0.4253**	**Other**	**Other**	**34**	**2.27**
5	**0.6953**	**0.7465**	**0.7292**	**0.7620**	**0.4376**	**0.7574**	**0.9795**	**0.6174**			**361**	**24.10**
5	**0.9485**	**0.9978**	**0.6533**	**0.5587**	**0.8747**	**0.9982**	**0.0725**	**0.3223**			**39**	**2.60**
6	0.9847	0.9994	0.9900	0.9898	0.8846	0.9624	0.9962	0.9983	Exclus.	Exclus.	976	65.15
6	0.1615	0.1928	0.0616	0.1990	0.1636	0.2435	0.0811	0.0860	Plural.	Plural.	54	3.60
6	0.8647	0.8190	0.9505	0.8455	0.4633	0.0294	0.0354	0.4268	Other	Other	34	2.27
6	0.7265	0.7431	0.6611	0.8754	0.9656	0.7784	0.9573	0.7062			181	12.08
6	0.9483	0.9992	0.6690	0.5492	0.8366	0.9983	0.0767	0.3048			40	2.67
6	0.6879	0.7558	0.7773	0.6943	0.0278	0.7535	0.9996	0.5824			213	14.22

Slovakia

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4066.51	1484.93	1533.30	1525.30	1499.89	247	1469	5	.001996
2	-3543.56	457.05	559.82	542.82	488.83	238	423	55	.001996
3	-3478.46	344.84	502.03	476.03	393.45	229	293	275	.001996
4	-3456.82	319.55	531.15	496.15	384.98	220	250	857	.003992
5	-3440.04	304.00	570.02	526.02	386.26	211	216	989	.4131736
6	-3431.85	305.63	626.05	573.05	404.71	202	200	1138	.3033932
7	-3423.18	306.27	681.11	619.11	422.18	193	182	1181	.1616766
8	-3413.99	305.89	735.14	664.14	438.62	184	164	1782	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	*%*
3	*0.9848*	*0.9999*	*0.9891*	*0.9983*	*0.7910*	*0.9415*	*0.9966*	*0.9766*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*661*	*57.58*
3	*0.2837*	*0.4278*	*0.2253*	*0.6291*	*0.3481*	*0.3538*	*0.4269*	*0.2249*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*125*	*10.89*
3	*0.8429*	*0.9253*	*0.8079*	*0.9840*	*0.2369*	*0.6422*	*0.9076*	*0.6536*			*362*	*31.53*
4	0.9784	0.9997	0.9819	0.9973	0.9827	0.9334	0.9917	0.9600	Exclus.	Exclus.	531	46.25
4	0.5893	0.7270	0.5478	0.9125	0.3057	0.5908	0.7788	0.4300	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	206	17.94
4	0.1970	0.3363	0.1157	0.4349	0.3835	0.1788	0.1658	0.1579	Plural.	Plural.	57	4.97
4	0.9573	0.9928	0.9353	0.9999	0.0462	0.7218	0.9709	0.8206			354	30.84
5	**0.9773**	**0.9997**	**0.9811**	**0.9966**	**0.9892**	**0.9317**	**0.9921**	**0.9567**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**531**	**46.25**
5	**0.5274**	**0.6687**	**0.4828**	**0.9064**	**0.2775**	**0.6098**	**0.9124**	**0.4840**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**164**	**14.29**
5	**0.2306**	**0.3756**	**0.1360**	**0.4757**	**0.3912**	**0.2129**	**0.1273**	**0.1715**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**68**	**5.92**
5	**0.8969**	**0.9974**	**0.9073**	**0.9638**	**0.3679**	**0.4822**	**0.0720**	**0.1608**	**Other**	**Other**	**34**	**2.96**
5	**0.9568**	**0.9936**	**0.9336**	**0.9999**	**0.0515**	**0.7244**	**0.9829**	**0.8151**			**351**	**30.57**
6	0.9772	0.9993	0.9853	0.9968	0.9857	0.9353	0.9917	0.9679	Exclus.	Exclus.	532	46.34
6	0.2439	0.4012	0.1276	0.4692	0.3932	0.2403	0.1410	0.1820	Plural.	Plural.	69	6.01
6	0.8788	0.9980	0.8969	0.9631	0.3783	0.4911	0.0831	0.1390	Other	Other	30	2.61
6	0.4607	0.5011	0.5023	0.9275	0.2469	0.4663	0.8990	0.5260			104	9.06
6	0.9529	0.9914	0.9419	0.9996	0.0900	0.7039	0.9794	0.8373			362	31.53
6	0.7376	0.9968	0.4975	0.9101	0.3285	0.9743	0.9925	0.3572			51	4.44

Slovenia

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4277.78	1584.44	1631.61	1623.61	1598.21	247	1568	5	.001996
2	-3718.25	483.37	583.62	566.62	512.63	238	449	66	.001996
3	-3621.51	307.90	461.22	435.22	352.64	229	256	165	.001996
4	-3592.10	267.09	473.47	438.47	327.31	220	197	178	.007984
5	-3577.11	255.11	514.56	470.56	330.81	211	167	300	.0179641
6	-3563.79	246.46	558.99	505.99	337.66	202	140	581	.6367266
7	-3557.49	251.86	617.45	555.45	358.54	193	128	876	.49501
8	-3551.50	257.88	676.54	605.54	380.05	184	116	1037	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9310*	*0.9796*	*0.9456*	*0.9923*	*0.5265*	*0.8757*	*0.9993*	*0.8708*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*342*	*34.58*
3	*0.5080*	*0.8634*	*0.6146*	*0.9545*	*0.0635*	*0.8201*	*0.8581*	*0.2121*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*452*	*45.70*
3	*0.0328*	*0.0938*	*0.0686*	*0.5416*	*0.0603*	*0.6396*	*0.5433*	*0.1502*			*195*	*19.72*
4	0.9308	0.9769	0.9474	0.9919	0.5286	0.8747	0.9990	0.8763	Exclus.	Exclus.	346	34.98
4	0.5173	0.8938	0.6099	0.9563	0.0643	0.8231	0.8608	0.2095	Assimil.	Assimil.	441	44.59
4	0.1120	0.2450	0.0590	0.2130	0.0041	0.0464	0.0253	0.0419	Plural.	Plural.	47	4.75
4	0.0182	0.0194	0.1148	0.6513	0.0760	0.8089	0.6976	0.1879			155	15.67
5	0.9243	0.9739	0.9401	0.9919	0.5142	0.8781	0.9987	0.8633	Exclus.	Exclus.	354	35.79
5	0.4716	0.8845	0.6046	0.9621	0.0544	0.8807	0.8894	0.1717	Assimil.	Assimil.	403	40.75
5	0.0684	0.2114	0.0546	0.2259	0.0034	0.0666	0.0213	0.0374	Plural.	Plural.	45	4.55
5	0.9696	0.9952	0.5773	0.8376	0.0892	0.0390	0.4406	0.4172	Other	Other	28	2.83
5	0.0231	0.0308	0.1166	0.6524	0.0782	0.8003	0.6955	0.1970			159	16.08
6	**0.9213**	**0.9710**	**0.9409**	**0.9959**	**0.5308**	**0.8741**	**0.9976**	**0.8941**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**352**	**35.59**
6	**0.5932**	**0.9312**	**0.6846**	**0.9514**	**0.0666**	**0.8966**	**0.9267**	**0.1785**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**359**	**36.30**
6	**0.0394**	**0.1819**	**0.0757**	**0.2273**	**0.0117**	**0.1422**	**0.0144**	**0.0097**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**40**	**4.04**
6	**0.9802**	**0.9949**	**0.5575**	**0.8239**	**0.0875**	**0.0593**	**0.4250**	**0.4002**	**Other**	**Other**	**28**	**2.83**
6	**0.0427**	**0.3481**	**0.2561**	**0.9985**	**0.0449**	**0.8165**	**0.7438**	**0.1744**			**154**	**15.57**
6	**0.0531**	**0.0061**	**0.0042**	**0.1245**	**0.1217**	**0.7556**	**0.6757**	**0.2547**			**56**	**5.66**

Spain

LCA	Log-likelihood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4618.60	2231.82	2280.05	2272.05	2246.63	247	2216	4	.001996
2	-3715.19	443.00	545.47	528.47	474.48	238	409	36	.001996
3	-3644.06	318.74	475.48	449.48	366.89	229	267	145	.001996
4	-3623.03	294.67	505.66	470.66	359.49	220	225	332	.0798403
5	-3612.17	290.97	556.21	512.21	372.45	211	203	1353	.00998
6	-3598.96	282.53	602.03	549.03	380.68	202	177	1369	.0459082
7	-3588.03	278.68	652.43	590.43	393.50	193	155	2128	.1157685
8	-3578.99	278.59	706.60	635.60	410.08	184	137	1896	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	0.9779	0.9959	0.9864	0.9873	0.5172	0.8858	0.9959	0.9707	Exclus.	Exclus.	687	60.90
3	0.0893	0.0487	0.3104	0.6485	0.0831	0.5287	0.3029	0.2175	Plural.	Plural.	177	15.69
3	0.6605	0.8520	0.6902	0.9254	0.0572	0.7486	0.6908	0.3605			264	23.40
4	**0.9757**	**0.9933**	**0.9870**	**0.9872**	**0.5137**	**0.8835**	**0.9951**	**0.9735**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**703**	**62.32**
4	**0.1012**	**0.0478**	**0.0188**	**0.5930**	**0.1132**	**0.5812**	**0.2279**	**0.1982**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**127**	**11.26**
4	**0.1729**	**0.2024**	**0.9926**	**0.8400**	**0.0122**	**0.4867**	**0.5442**	**0.3433**			**73**	**6.47**
4	**0.7183**	**0.9342**	**0.6490**	**0.9294**	**0.0632**	**0.7760**	**0.7037**	**0.3267**			**225**	**19.95**
5	*0.0935*	*0.0139*	*0.0141*	*0.5868*	*0.1101*	*0.5749*	*0.2268*	*0.1987*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*125*	*11.08*
5	*0.1758*	*0.2169*	*0.9950*	*0.8427*	*0.0125*	*0.4897*	*0.5427*	*0.3405*			*77*	*6.83*
5	*0.9621*	*0.9844*	*0.9734*	*0.9863*	*0.0265*	*0.8337*	*0.9838*	*0.8704*			*421*	*37.32*
5	*0.6301*	*0.9134*	*0.5197*	*0.9013*	*0.0830*	*0.7579*	*0.5995*	*0.2744*			*142*	*12.59*
5	*0.9772*	*0.9968*	*0.9864*	*0.9862*	*0.9324*	*0.9234*	*0.9943*	*0.9803*			*363*	*32.18*
6	0.1075	0.0670	0.0085	0.7096	0.1782	0.9967	0.3497	0.2245	Plural.	Plural.	76	6.74
6	0.1154	0.0139	0.1360	0.4467	0.0292	0.0315	0.1202	0.2311			59	5.23
6	0.6720	0.9852	0.4857	0.8936	0.0661	0.7369	0.6166	0.2461			126	11.17
6	0.2307	0.3054	0.9961	0.9040	0.0271	0.5826	0.5595	0.3292			83	7.36
6	0.9767	0.9970	0.9858	0.9860	0.9427	0.9235	0.9940	0.9789			363	32.18
6	0.9625	0.9853	0.9722	0.9860	0.0262	0.8357	0.9818	0.8726			421	37.32
7	0.0680	0.0551	0.0065	0.7025	0.1780	0.9981	0.3492	0.2003	Plural.	Plural.	73	6.47
7	0.6535	0.7208	0.7123	0.7827	0.0691	0.5540	0.3162	0.4244			95	8.42
7	0.5942	0.9967	0.4101	0.9881	0.0814	0.8673	0.7439	0.1416			72	6.38
7	0.0488	0.1307	0.9977	0.9402	0.0026	0.5660	0.6810	0.2565			52	4.61
7	0.9555	0.9811	0.9650	0.9849	0.0387	0.8366	0.9941	0.8640			418	37.06
7	0.0698	0.0076	0.1344	0.4328	0.0174	0.0214	0.1154	0.2000			55	4.88
7	0.9773	0.9977	0.9857	0.9855	0.9465	0.9247	0.9944	0.9815			363	32.18
8	0.1219	0.0697	0.0077	0.6991	0.2324	0.9971	0.4704	0.2824	Plural.	Plural.	42	3.72
8	0.5689	0.7237	0.7988	0.9067	0.0841	0.6033	0.0577	0.4015			70	6.21
8	0.6217	0.9815	0.3441	0.9406	0.0701	0.8218	0.7536	0.1570			76	6.74
8	0.0691	0.1133	0.9975	0.9783	0.0018	0.5717	0.7086	0.2459			54	4.79
8	0.9489	0.9789	0.9644	0.9832	0.0636	0.8338	0.9957	0.8508			422	37.41
8	0.3668	0.2267	0.5064	0.0774	0.0020	0.0262	0.4428	0.4354			29	2.57
8	0.9780	0.9983	0.9865	0.9856	0.9478	0.9270	0.9947	0.9841			362	32.09
8	0.0080	0.0054	0.0087	0.5910	0.0208	0.3351	0.0140	0.0837			73	6.47

Sweden

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3635.50	1349.64	1397.17	1389.17	1363.76	247	1334	6	.001996
2	-3116.25	329.13	430.13	413.13	359.14	238	295	48	.001996
3	-3063.55	241.74	396.22	370.22	287.64	229	190	269	.001996
4	-3038.79	210.22	418.16	383.16	272.00	220	140	239	.00998
5	-3025.16	200.97	462.38	418.38	278.63	211	113	253	.0139721
6	-3013.83	196.29	511.17	458.17	289.84	202	90	1084	.3133733
7	-3007.28	201.19	569.55	507.55	310.63	193	77	1569	.3253493
8	-3001.70	208.04	629.86	558.86	333.36	184	66	3807	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.0955*	*0.8437*	*0.2804*	*0.9824*	*0.0449*	*0.9896*	*0.7765*	*0.0112*	*Intigrat.*	*Intigrat.*	*553*	*53.48*
3	*0.0724*	*0.2789*	*0.0429*	*0.5877*	*0.0178*	*0.8410*	*0.4373*	*0.0309*			*104*	*10.06*
3	*0.9728*	*0.9642*	*0.9164*	*0.9959*	*0.2205*	*0.9699*	*0.9355*	*0.5999*			*377*	*36.46*
4	0.9715	0.9627	0.9146	0.9929	0.3079	0.9647	0.9576	0.9750	Exclus.	Exclus.	230	22.24
4	0.6618	0.9568	0.7657	0.9999	0.0763	0.9797	0.8658	0.0056	Assimil.	Assimil.	289	27.95
4	0.0072	0.7341	0.1471	0.9718	0.0326	0.9902	0.7063	0.0116	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	465	44.97
4	0.1451	0.2844	0.0393	0.2065	0.0280	0.6970	0.4956	0.0473			50	4.84
5	0.9726	0.9851	0.9400	0.9916	0.3071	0.9800	0.9802	0.9796	Exclus.	Exclus.	221	21.37
5	0.6605	0.9550	0.7674	0.9999	0.0771	0.9799	0.8676	0.0115	Assimil.	Assimil.	289	27.95
5	0.0102	0.7275	0.1445	0.9744	0.0317	0.9888	0.6997	0.0094	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	466	45.07
5	0.1465	0.2955	0.0311	0.0234	0.0314	0.6909	0.5212	0.0011			47	4.55
5	0.7564	0.4578	0.3469	0.9988	0.2835	0.5791	0.5004	0.9486			11	1.06
6	**0.9731**	**0.9847**	**0.9405**	**0.9924**	**0.3058**	**0.9794**	**0.9783**	**0.9504**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**220**	**21.28**
6	**0.6325**	**0.9392**	**0.9803**	**0.9999**	**0.0540**	**0.9717**	**0.8792**	**0.0030**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**258**	**24.95**
6	**0.1393**	**0.9970**	**0.1164**	**0.9691**	**0.0595**	**0.9859**	**0.7918**	**0.0161**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**368**	**35.59**
6	**0.7364**	**0.4003**	**0.3215**	**0.9990**	**0.2769**	**0.5649**	**0.4629**	**0.9645**			**12**	**1.16**
6	**0.0151**	**0.3225**	**0.1488**	**0.9988**	**0.0158**	**0.9999**	**0.5672**	**0.0016**			**130**	**12.57**
6	**0.1238**	**0.2556**	**0.0327**	**0.0158**	**0.0257**	**0.6979**	**0.5148**	**0.0009**			**46**	**4.45**

Switzerland

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3803.71	1108.50	1155.91	1147.91	1122.50	247	1092.50	5	.001996
2	-3397.44	313.97	414.72	397.72	343.73	238	279.97	84	.001996
3	-3342.51	222.10	376.19	350.19	267.61	229	170.10	225	.0339321
4	-3330.16	215.40	422.83	387.83	276.67	220	145.40	504	.0179641
5	-3318.04	209.16	469.93	425.93	286.19	211	121.16	630	.3113773
6	-3310.72	212.53	526.64	473.64	305.31	202	106.53	724	.2854291
7	-3303.71	216.52	583.96	521.96	325.05	193	92.52	666	.3413174
8	-3298.00	223.08	643.87	572.87	347.37	184	81.08	2713	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9664*	*0.9879*	*0.9381*	*0.9781*	*0.6550*	*0.9570*	*0.9974*	*0.9233*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*337*	*33.07*
3	*0.4446*	*0.8512*	*0.7338*	*0.9845*	*0.1415*	*0.9634*	*0.8868*	*0.1309*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*546*	*53.58*
3	*0.0627*	*0.3216*	*0.2936*	*0.8322*	*0.1060*	*0.9143*	*0.4889*	*0.0588*			*136*	*13.35*
4	0.9656	0.9873	0.9368	0.9793	0.6582	0.9587	0.9978	0.9367	Exclus.	Exclus.	336	32.97
4	0.4844	0.8648	0.7494	0.9808	0.1486	0.9530	0.8816	0.1321	Assimil.	Assimil.	512	50.25
4	0.1883	0.2000	0.0276	0.3078	0.1437	0.5700	0.0314	0.0071	Plural.	Plural.	16	1.57
4	0.0144	0.3839	0.3555	0.9174	0.0989	0.9852	0.6204	0.0753			155	15.21
5	**0.9704**	**0.9889**	**0.9416**	**0.9792**	**0.6659**	**0.9586**	**0.9977**	**0.9519**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**320**	**31.40**
5	**0.5055**	**0.8858**	**0.7405**	**0.9817**	**0.1643**	**0.9998**	**0.9127**	**0.1427**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**502**	**49.26**
5	**0.1829**	**0.1958**	**0.0128**	**0.3082**	**0.1402**	**0.5781**	**0.0297**	**0.0054**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**16**	**1.57**
5	**0.0323**	**0.4091**	**0.3777**	**0.9239**	**0.0928**	**0.9891**	**0.6270**	**0.0739**			**157**	**15.41**
5	**0.4873**	**0.7406**	**0.9928**	**0.9745**	**0.1073**	**0.2901**	**0.6190**	**0.1721**			**24**	**2.36**

Taiwan

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-7637.40	2070.52	2123.09	2115.09	2089.67	247	2055	5	.001996
2	-6935.49	684.72	796.41	779.41	725.40	238	651	108	.001996
3	-6803.10	437.92	608.76	582.76	500.15	229	386	142	.001996
4	-6748.90	347.53	577.50	542.50	431.30	220	278	304	.001996
5	-6724.21	316.16	605.26	561.26	421.47	211	228	297	.005988
6	-6706.89	299.50	647.74	594.74	426.35	202	194	1799	.0339321
7	-6695.09	293.91	701.27	639.27	442.30	193	170	1198	.9700599
8	-6690.59	302.90	769.41	698.41	472.84	184	161	2497	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
4	*0.9508*	*0.9632*	*0.9566*	*0.8946*	*0.5338*	*0.9273*	*0.9733*	*0.9394*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*613*	*31.60*
4	*0.7333*	*0.9533*	*0.7777*	*0.7822*	*0.0672*	*0.9322*	*0.9723*	*0.2076*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*806*	*41.55*
4	*0.1362*	*0.1768*	*0.1717*	*0.3284*	*0.1062*	*0.3221*	*0.4428*	*0.1099*	*Plural.*	*Plural.*	*79*	*4.07*
4	*0.0321*	*0.3891*	*0.4353*	*0.5237*	*0.0365*	*0.9769*	*0.9913*	*0.0972*			*442*	*22.78*
5	0.9706	0.9774	0.9682	0.9074	0.5437	0.9801	0.9998	0.9548	Exclus.	Exclus.	559	28.81
5	0.7295	0.9539	0.7810	0.7850	0.0657	0.9560	0.9844	0.1949	Assimil.	Assimil.	783	40.36
5	0.1211	0.0879	0.0759	0.2656	0.0732	0.2541	0.3854	0.0483	Plural.	Plural.	58	2.99
5	0.7441	0.8517	0.7953	0.7506	0.3486	0.4958	0.7443	0.6966			82	4.23
5	0.0324	0.3816	0.4268	0.5200	0.0364	0.9650	0.9784	0.0961			458	23.61
6	0.9958	0.9897	0.9696	0.9058	0.5504	0.9716	0.9976	0.9632	Exclus.	Exclus.	505	26.03
6	0.7157	0.9458	0.7911	0.7884	0.0708	0.9997	0.9829	0.2231	Assimil.	Assimil.	851	43.87
6	0.1204	0.0598	0.0875	0.2574	0.0777	0.2327	0.3669	0.0604	Plural.	Plural.	50	2.58
6	0.8523	0.9982	0.7037	0.7142	0.0082	0.1579	0.8094	0.4291	Other	Other	78	4.02
6	0.0312	0.3725	0.4102	0.5076	0.0215	0.9532	0.9756	0.0893			413	21.29
6	0.5628	0.6758	0.8457	0.8463	0.8398	0.7187	0.8125	0.7540			43	2.22
7	**0.9930**	**0.9871**	**0.9705**	**0.9085**	**0.5447**	**0.9764**	**0.9970**	**0.9517**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**505**	**26.03**
7	**0.7081**	**0.9412**	**0.7821**	**0.7817**	**0.0661**	**0.9998**	**0.9816**	**0.2204**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**907**	**46.75**
7	**0.1275**	**0.0652**	**0.1185**	**0.2350**	**0.0841**	**0.1978**	**0.4251**	**0.0551**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**57**	**2.94**
7	**0.8532**	**0.9989**	**0.7085**	**0.7107**	**0.0034**	**0.1144**	**0.8110**	**0.4385**	**Other**	**Other**	**79**	**4.07**
7	**0.6274**	**0.7282**	**0.8374**	**0.8110**	**0.9469**	**0.6715**	**0.7974**	**0.8127**			**43**	**2.22**
7	**0.0214**	**0.3890**	**0.3132**	**0.1642**	**0.0013**	**0.9994**	**0.9677**	**0.0672**			**188**	**9.69**

Turkey

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-5518.51	3836.28	3887.52	3879.52	3854.10	247	3820	4	.001996
2	-3977.59	772.44	881.32	864.32	810.32	238	738	26	.001996
3	-3867.43	570.12	736.65	710.65	628.05	229	518	139	.001996
4	-3788.83	430.92	655.09	620.09	508.90	220	361	138	.001996
5	-3765.92	403.10	684.92	640.92	501.14	211	315	478	.003992
6	-3745.37	380.00	719.45	666.45	498.08	202	274	733	.001996
7	-3726.93	361.11	758.21	696.21	499.25	193	237	598	.011976
8	-3714.02	353.30	808.04	737.04	511.49	184	211	1147	.0199601

(no absolut fits)

United Kingdom

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G²	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-3095.32	1174.22	1220.14	1212.14	1186.73	247	1158	5	.001996
2	-2699.06	399.70	497.27	480.27	426.29	238	366	70	.001996
3	-2620.00	259.58	408.80	382.80	300.24	229	208	183	.001996
4	-2595.06	227.70	428.57	393.57	282.43	220	158	345	.0139721
5	-2582.31	220.20	472.73	428.73	289.00	211	132	501	.0598802
6	-2572.20	217.98	522.17	469.17	300.85	202	112	356	.3812375
7	-2565.45	222.48	578.32	516.32	319.42	193	98	1505	.6367266
8	-2560.68	230.95	638.44	567.44	341.97	184	89	806	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	*%*
3	*0.9917*	*0.9840*	*0.9824*	*0.9999*	*0.4505*	*0.9286*	*0.9626*	*0.9693*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*446*	*52.78*
3	*0.0644*	*0.2381*	*0.0666*	*0.6881*	*0.1162*	*0.5430*	*0.2238*	*0.0744*			*59*	*6.98*
3	*0.6497*	*0.8723*	*0.7271*	*0.9724*	*0.0588*	*0.8802*	*0.7439*	*0.1525*			*340*	*40.24*
4	0.9869	0.9997	0.9863	1.0000	0.5113	0.9504	0.9873	0.9751	Exclus.	Exclus.	416	49.23
4	0.3896	0.9183	0.5587	0.9785	0.0595	0.9915	0.7870	0.0241	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	136	16.09
4	0.0819	0.2189	0.1506	0.7052	0.1117	0.4949	0.2369	0.0889			67	7.93
4	0.9289	0.8626	0.8890	0.9746	0.0667	0.8043	0.7365	0.4229			226	26.75
5	**0.9840**	**0.9996**	**0.9821**	**1.0000**	**0.4956**	**0.9486**	**0.9862**	**0.9634**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**424**	**50.18**
5	**0.5093**	**0.9674**	**0.6537**	**0.9732**	**0.0090**	**0.9987**	**0.8710**	**0.0335**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**191**	**22.60**
5	**0.0847**	**0.1060**	**0.0096**	**0.2881**	**0.0034**	**0.3520**	**0.1490**	**0.1015**	**Plural.**	**Plural.**	**24**	**2.84**
5	**0.1373**	**0.5002**	**0.3116**	**0.9997**	**0.1990**	**0.7310**	**0.4032**	**0.0834**			**78**	**9.23**
5	**0.9628**	**0.8388**	**0.9021**	**0.9671**	**0.0609**	**0.7753**	**0.6904**	**0.4404**			**128**	**15.15**
6	0.9802	0.9998	0.9921	1.0000	0.5174	0.9418	0.9877	0.9901	Exclus.	Exclus.	433	51.24
6	0.3155	0.9697	0.6093	0.9592	0.0029	0.9984	0.8599	0.0294	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	78	9.23
6	0.0855	0.0968	0.0070	0.2819	0.0027	0.3448	0.1470	0.1038	Plural.	Plural.	24	2.84
6	0.9893	0.8912	0.8522	0.9999	0.0868	0.9216	0.7814	0.3791			218	25.80
6	0.8916	0.7452	0.9961	0.8105	0.0038	0.2247	0.5533	0.5330			18	2.13
6	0.1215	0.4897	0.3110	0.9998	0.2002	0.7292	0.3904	0.0764			74	8.76

United States

LCA	Log-likeli-hood	AIC	CAIC	BIC	adjBIC	df	G^2	Iter	p (BLRT)
1	-4409.37	1708.15	1756.77	1748.77	1723.35	247	1692	5	.001996
2	-3742.07	391.54	494.86	477.86	423.86	238	358	71	.001996
3	-3658.30	242.01	400.02	374.02	291.44	229	190	273	.001996
4	-3634.68	212.77	425.48	390.48	279.31	220	143	391	.1536926
5	-3625.29	211.99	479.40	435.40	295.64	211	124	861	.3592815
6	-3618.28	215.97	538.08	485.08	316.73	202	110	3002	.3792415
7	-3612.03	221.46	598.27	536.27	339.33	193	97	1623	.3512974
8	-3606.46	228.32	659.82	588.82	363.30	184	86	4580	

LCA	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To have [countrys' nat.] ancestry*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (BLRT)*	*Type identified across LCA solutions (inform. criteria)*	N	%
3	*0.9570*	*0.9976*	*0.9862*	*0.9999*	*0.9269*	*0.9928*	*0.9973*	*0.9904*	*Exclus.*	*Exclus.*	*382*	*32.24*
3	*0.8404*	*0.9887*	*0.8682*	*0.9885*	*0.3132*	*0.9256*	*0.8540*	*0.2760*	*Assimil.*	*Assimil.*	*482*	*40.68*
3	*0.1536*	*0.8122*	*0.2021*	*0.8012*	*0.1458*	*0.8786*	*0.6920*	*0.0157*			*321*	*27.09*
4	**0.9510**	**0.9979**	**0.9826**	**0.9999**	**0.9729**	**0.9970**	**0.9989**	**0.9873**	**Exclus.**	**Exclus.**	**376**	**31.73**
4	**0.9458**	**0.9834**	**0.9605**	**0.9931**	**0.2989**	**0.9136**	**0.8634**	**0.3582**	**Assimil.**	**Assimil.**	**356**	**30.04**
4	**0.2922**	**0.9991**	**0.3412**	**0.9472**	**0.2864**	**0.9697**	**0.8201**	**0.0745**	**Intigrat.**	**Intigrat.**	**290**	**24.47**
4	**0.1482**	**0.6552**	**0.2054**	**0.6894**	**0.0541**	**0.8003**	**0.5949**	**0.0009**			**163**	**13.76**
5	0.9503	0.9973	0.9824	1.0000	0.8647	0.9993	0.9942	0.9829	Exclus.	Exclus.	444	37.47
5	0.9844	0.9793	0.8339	0.9782	0.2775	0.9976	0.8588	0.0084	Assimil.	Assimil.	280	23.63
5	0.0624	0.9790	0.3884	0.9704	0.3377	0.9598	0.8275	0.0938	Intigrat.	Intigrat.	237	20.00
5	0.9965	0.9998	0.8875	0.9997	0.2729	0.6868	0.7696	0.6310			49	4.14
5	0.1613	0.7009	0.1975	0.6904	0.0450	0.8126	0.6094	0.0007			175	14.77

Appendix A5: Contrasting ISSP and EVS results

Comparing ISSP and EVS in terms of identified ideal types was inspired by constant critique put forward towards the ISSP items. Since both datasets use the same question wording with different items, a comparison was the obvious thing to do. Below the table A4.1 shows the item availability across study waves. The analysis of the EVS datasets was conducted in the same way as it has been conducted for the ISSP waves, including dichotomization of scales (from four-point Likert-scales to support/reject of membership criteria), excluding respondents without citizenship, same LCA settings and BLRT setting, and lastly same strict CA rules.

Even though, the items across survey waves differ, table A4.2 shows remarkable resemblances of types across them. The table plots the conditioned probability of members of each type to support or reject each item asked in the respective wave, indicating the identified ideal types hold even across these circumstances.

Table A5.1 Item Availability across Study Waves

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. *How important do you think each of the following is …*	ISSP 1995	ISSP 2003	ISSP 2013	EVS 2008	EVS 2017
to have been born in [COUNTRY]	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	*X*	*X*	*X*		
to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one´s life	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	
to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*
to be a [RELIGION]	*X*	*X*	*X*		
to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*
to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	*X*	*X*			
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestors		*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*
to share [NATIONAL] culture					*X*

Table A5.2 Conditioned Probability of Merged Ideal-Types and Subtypes across Study Waves

To have [country's' nat.] ancestry	*To be [country's] maj. religion*	*To share [national] culture*	*To have been born in [country]*	*To have mostly lived in [country]*	*To speak the [country's] language*	*To have [country's] citizenship*	*To feel like [country's national.]*	*To respect [country's] inst. & laws*	*dataset*
Exclusionists									
0,9523	**0,6696**		**0,9604**	**0,9506**	**0,9735**	**0,9866**	**0,9917**	**0,9376**	**ISSP 2013**
0,9187	0,8117		0,9525	0,9348	0,9531	0,9794	0,9798	0,9393	ISSP 2013
0,9451	0,4800		0,9706	0,9610	0,9813	0,9919	0,9903	0,9467	ISSP 2013
0,8951	**0,5374**		**0,9683**	**0,9439**	**0,9569**	**0,9796**	**0,9772**	**0,8855**	**ISSP 2003**
0,9298	0,6792		0,9733	0,9475	0,9489	0,9944	0,9846	0,9071	ISSP 2003
0,7706	0,0400		0,9483	0,8888	0,8874	0,9260	0,9539	0,7818	ISSP 2003
	0,4310		**0,9296**	**0,9047**	**0,9326**	**0,9525**	**0,9495**	**0,8904**	**ISSP 1995**
	0,6467		0,9565	0,9756	0,9775	0,9905	0,9912	0,9610	ISSP 1995
	0,0796		0,9189	0,7975	0,8540	0,9136	0,8741	0,8166	ISSP 1995
0,8940			**0,9121**	**0,8700**	**0,9613**			**0,9016**	**EVS 2008**
0,9157			0,9578	0,9404	0,9862			0,9620	EVS 2008
0,8145			0,7446	0,6120	0,8700			0,6801	EVS 2008
0,8958		**0,9539**	**0,9415**		**0,9662**			**0,9649**	**EVS 2017**
Assimilationists									
0,2712	**0,1074**		**0,6570**	**0,7286**	**0,9349**	**0,9061**	**0,9221**	**0,9444**	**ISSP 2013**
0,3424	**0,2117**		**0,6518**	**0,7787**	**0,8667**	**0,8239**	**0,8650**	**0,8715**	**ISSP 2003**
0,1126	0,1489		0,5056	0,7786	0,8915	0,7955	0,8126	0,9164	ISSP 2003
0,5541	0,2130		0,9281	0,7442	0,8976	0,9257	0,9061	0,8256	ISSP 2003
Integrationists									
0,1570	**0,1163**		**0,1790**	**0,4448**	**0,9514**	**0,8374**	**0,8668**	**0,9283**	**ISSP 2013**
0,0577	**0,1023**		**0,1172**	**0,2947**	**0,9041**	**0,7146**	**0,7104**	**0,9348**	**ISSP 2003**
0,0511	0,1325		0,1208	0,3840	0,9412	0,8525	0,9008	0,9795	ISSP 2003
0,0708	0,0569		0,1273	0,1295	0,8559	0,5554	0,4821	0,8847	ISSP 2003
	0,1422		**0,1922**	**0,4631**	**0,8890**	**0,7300**	**0,8697**	**0,9379**	**ISSP 1995**
	0,1207		0,2051	0,3034	0,8561	0,8275	0,8090	0,9678	ISSP 1995
	0,1702		0,1753	0,6708	0,9318	0,6033	0,9487	0,8990	ISSP 1995
0,2656			**0,2639**	**0,5754**	**0,9254**			**0,9244**	**EVS 2008**
0,1965			0,2781	0,5503	0,9308			0,9307	EVS 2008
0,5713			0,2011	0,6868	0,9013			0,8962	EVS 2008
0,1260		**0,8912**	**0,2666**		**0,9260**			**0,9172**	**EVS 2017**
Pluralists									
0,1204	**0,1594**		**0,1340**	**0,1012**	**0,2550**	**0,1553**	**0,2119**	**0,3564**	**ISSP 2013**
0,0875	**0,1344**		**0,0891**	**0,1042**	**0,3602**	**0,1229**	**0,1931**	**0,4170**	**ISSP 2003**
	0,0912		**0,2200**	**0,1351**	**0,1630**	**0,1991**	**0,3121**	**0,2787**	**ISSP 1995**
0,1441			**0,1235**	**0,0994**	**0,2637**			**0,3898**	**EVS 2008**
0,0455		**0,1062**	**0,1507**		**0,1881**			**0,2643**	**EVS 2017**

Appendix A6: Relation of National Identity Dimensions

To analyse the relationship between further dimensions and the concepts of nationhood, I included measures of national attachment, general and domain-specific pride, and national chauvinism. The dimensions are measured with the following questions:

Table A6.1 Question Wording of National Identity Measures

			Questions and Items	Scale
Attachment			*How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]?*	*Very close* *Close* *Not very close* *Not close at all*
National Pride	General		*How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?*	*Very proud* *Somewhat proud* *Not very proud* *Not proud at all*
	Domain-Specific	Natio-cultural	*How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following?* *the way democracy works* *its political influence in the world* *[COUNTRY's] economic achievements* *its social security system* *its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society* *its scientific and technological achievements* *its achievements in sports* *its achievements in the arts and literature* *[COUNTRY's] armed forces* *its history*	*Very proud* *Somewhat proud* *Not very proud* *Not proud at all*
		Political		
National Chauvinism			*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?* *d. Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries* *a. I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world* *b. There are some things about [COUNTRY] today that make me feel ashamed of [COUNTRY]** *c. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]* *e. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.*	*Agree strongly* *Agree* *Neither* *Disagree* *Disagree strongly*

* Values have been reversed for the analysis

All measures, with exception of general pride, are available in all ISSP waves. The same measures also have been used by Bonikowski & DiMaggio (2016) in their multidimensional model, also

except for general pride. Since there is no consensus in the literature about dimensions of national pride, in separate models, I tested for single items, an additive measure that includes all domain-specific pride items and factor scores of the previous explorative factor analysis that resulted in the two factors, Hjerm (1998a) identified. One is labelled as "political" dimension, and the other is labelled as "natio-cultual" dimension. For the national chauvinism battery, I also tested for single items, an additive measure and factor loadings. For chauvinism, only one factor could be identified. All values have been rescaled to 0 and 1.

Figure A6.2 plots coefficients of the single linear regressions of conceptions of nationhood on national attachment, general pride, the additive domain-specific pride scale, the political and natio-cultural dimensions of domain-specific pride, and both the additive chauvinism scale and chauvinism factor for 2003 and 2013 exemplarily. The plots indicate that especially exclusionism is positively related with all other dimensions, while pluralists are consistently negatively related. For assimilationists and integrationists, the relationship is especially positive concerning attachment and pride, apart from natio-cultural pride. Interestingly, while for integrationists pride in the political realm is expressed more strongly, integrationists are, if at all, negatively related to both natio-cultural pride and chauvinism.

Figure A6.2 Multidimensionality



Figure A6.3 comprises all pride-related indicators. Again, while Exclusionists and pluralists show more clear patterns in being positively (Exclusionists) or negatively (pluralists) related with all other dimensions of national identity, for assimilationists and integrationists the patterns are less clear: Both types are positively related with all political dimension items while showing especially pride in the social security system and democracy of their countries across the two years. Concerning the natio-cultural dimension, the relation shifts over time. While in 2003, if at all, both types are related positively with all items of this dimension, in 2013 especially pride in *achievements in sports* change direction of the relationship, while for integrationists only *science* stays positively related and for integrationists only *history* and *science* remain positive. However, overall, the coefficients of the dimensions are smaller in 2013 than in 2003, which may be caused through again country-selection between the waves or an overall decrease in pride.

Figure A6.3 National Pride



Figure A6.4 reports the relationship between the ideal types and measures of chauvinism. Here, again, Exclusionists are positively related with all measures, while pluralists are overall negatively related with chauvinism. Again, assimilationists and integrationists are in the middle of these two, with assimilationists leaning towards slight positive relation and integrationists towards negative relations with national chauvinism.

Comparing the results with the multidimensional approach of Bonikoswki and DiMaggio (2016) (and others that reproduced the results), two types (*ardent* and *restrictive*) resemble the Exclusionists. Concerning national pride, both types also have a rather high probability to feel pride in all domains of the country and have similar profiles concerning national chauvinism. However, the support for the latter is not consistent over all items. Yet again, I also find Exclusionists to be more strongly related with single items of national chauvinism. Concerning the other end of the spectrum, B&Ds *disengaged* in respect to membership criteria resemble the ideal type of pluralists. While the disengaged are moderately related with pride items, pluralists are clearly negatively related with both pride and chauvinism. The last type identified by B&D are *creedal* nationalists, which especially find *citizenship*, *language abilities*, *feelings of attachment* to the nation, and *respect of laws and institutions*, and therefore resemble integrationist identified here. Both creedal nationalist and pluralists show moderate to stronger emotional affects in both studies.

Taken together, the identified types indeed share some features identified by B&D in their multidimensional approach, e.g., higher likelihood of exclusionary conceptions to occur with emotional affects and national chauvinism. However, by distinguishing the dimensions and concentrate on single aspects, more types emerged and especially effects of those single dimensions on attitudes can be analysed.

Figure A6.4 National Chauvinism



Appendix A7 Relation of National Identity and Political Attitudes

I conducted linear regressions to see whether which dimensions of national identity matter for political attitudes. I thereby contrast my results to the typology that has been based on a multidimensional understanding. Like B&D, I analysed the relationship of national attachment, conceptions of nationhood, national pride and hubris with attitudes concerning immigrants, immigration policies and globalization. The dependent variables are selected based on those attitudes used by Bonikowksi and DiMaggio (2016). The dependent variables have been rescaled so that high values refer to anti-migrant and anti-globalization attitudes. National identity´s dimensions are measured and constructed identical to A6, to measure attitudes, the following are used:

Table A7.1 Question Wording of Attitudes towards Immigrants, Migration Measures and Globalization

Attitudes towards Immigrants		*There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [COUNTRY]. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?* *Immigrants increase crime rates.* *Immigrants are generally good for [COUNTRY'S] economy.** *Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].* *Immigrants improve [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY] society by bringing new ideas and cultures.* *[COUNTRY's] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.*	*Agree strongly* *Strongly* *Neither* *Disagree* *Disagree strongly*
Attitudes towards Migration Measures		*Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens.** *[COUNTRY] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.* *Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education3 as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens.**	
Attitudes towards Globalization		*Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between [COUNTRY] and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?* *[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.* *For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.** *[COUNTRY] should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.* *Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].* *[COUNTRY'S] television should give preference to [COUNTRY] films and programs.*	

* Values have been reversed for the analysis

On the individual-level, I account for demographic and socio-economic characteristics that can influence national identity and political attitudes. Since less educated, younger, male and

economically vulnerable individuals due to higher likelihood to compete for resources and feel threated by immigrants (cf. Arzheimer 2009; cf. Stockemer et al. 2021) as well have been shown to affect attitudes towards globalization (cf. Ariely 2011; cf. Ceobanu & Escandell 2010), I control for education, work status, a non-linear age effect, and gender.

Figure A7.2-A7.4 plot beta-coefficients of the full models, that is all national identity dimensions regressed on all political attitudes, while controlling for demographic and socio-economic characteristics. What is striking, is that, if at all, national attachment and general pride are only related to a small degree with all attitudes. The political pride dimensions, though, is negatively related to all attitudes (with exception of "*immigrants increase crime rates*", which is not significant), while the natio-cultural dimension only is consistently positively related with anti-globalization attitudes, apart from "*institutions should not enforce global solutions*". National chauvinism, a concept that rests on perceptions of national superiority, is consistently positively related with all tested items.

Concerning the conceptions of nationhood, especially Exclusionists and integrationists stick out. The former is strongly positively associated primarily with anti-immigrant and with most anti-migrant measures and anti-globalization. The latter is strongly negatively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and both additional attitudes groups. Interestingly, this type is more strongly negatively related with anti-migrant attitudes, and especially international influences in the country ("Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land" and "TY should prefer national films and programs"), than pluralists.

Put together, although the dimensions of national identity are related to attitudes in different ways, some aspects of national identity are more likely to occur together, which in turn strengthens the relationships of certain national identities and hostility. While Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) could also show associations between their types and these attitudes, the approach here allows to compare the effects single dimensions have. In the full models, especially national attachment has little to no relation to the attitudes, while pride is divergently related, even slightly negatively related, as shown by Hjerm (1998a). Hence, the dimensions might also have opposite effects. However, exclusionism and national chauvinism are likely to occur together and both are positively related to anti-immigrant attitudes.

Figure A7.2 Associations between National Identity Dimensions and Attitudes towards Immigrants



Figure A7.3 Associations between National Identity Dimensions and Attitudes towards Migration Measures



Figure A7.4 Associations between National Identity Dimensions and Attitudes towards Globalization



Chapter 3: *Careless Whisper*: Political elite discourses activate national identities for far-right voting preferences.

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Abstract: While exclusionary national identities are widespread among Europeans, relatively few people vote for the far right in most countries. Thus, an exclusionary identity in many cases does not lead to voting for the most nativist types of parties. We explain this empirical puzzle by showing that these identities need to be activated to become behaviourally relevant. To this end, we analyse longitudinal comparative data of over 135,000 individuals across more than 26 years and 26 countries combining different survey programmes and manifesto data. We use latent class analysis to show that over half of respondents hold exclusionary conceptions of nationhood. Moreover, this type of national identity predicts voting far right. Using multi-level modelling and within-country estimators, we further demonstrate that this relationship is significantly stronger when a country's political elites across all parties become more exclusionary. Taking the activation hypothesis to the test in a European context, we conclude that the effect of national identity is conditional on its prior activation.

Keywords: elite discourses, far right, longitudinal analysis, national identity, voting behaviour

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1. Introduction

In the 2016 US election, Donald Trump put American nationalism and the threat of immigration at the top of his campaign agenda and succeeded. Specifically, the prominence of anti-immigration rhetoric supposedly activated a specific American national identity as an important driver of vote choice in this election (Bonikowski et al., 2021; Garand et al., 2020; Sides et al., 2019; Thompson, 2021). In the European context, similar arguments may be made regarding right-wing parties such as *Rassemblement National* (FR), *Legal Nord* (IT) or *Alternative für Deutschland* (DE), which argue for the (re-)nationalisation of politics in the face of increasing globalisation and migration flows. Picking up on this reasoning of latent national identities becoming behaviourally relevant through the discourses of the political elite, we test the *activation hypothesis* in the European context in a longitudinal comparative analysis.

Previous research has repeatedly found ethnically charged, exclusionary conceptions of nationhood to be associated with anti-immigrant sentiments (e.g., Helbling et al., 2016; Hjerm, 1998a; Kunovich, 2009; Trittler, 2017; Wright, 2011; Wright et al., 2012), which, in turn, are related to far-right voting (Arzheimer, 2008, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; e.g., Abou-Chadi et al., 2022). Paradoxically, though exclusionary national identities are consistently prevalent, right-wing voting is less frequent (see below) than one would assume given that right-wing parties are usually the most nativist and anti-immigrant. The key question is thus *when* national identity is especially salient. While few works concern the role of national identity in voting at all (Bonikowski et al., 2021; Garand et al., 2020; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Mader et al., 2021; Pesthy et al., 2021; Thompson, 2021), evidence for the mechanism is to our knowledge scarce. So far, analyses have been mainly limited to the American context that relied on Trump's ethno-nativist rhetoric as an activating factor, without explicitly testing for this relationship (Bonikowski et al., 2021; Garand et al., 2020; Thompson, 2021), to analyses of municipal-level data suggesting latent nativist potentials in Germany (Schulte-Cloos, 2022) or to aggregated survey data measuring public opinion, which increased the relevance of national identity in voting decisions (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017). Drawing on social–psychological reasoning and works on political messaging, we use contextual data and analyse the role of exclusionary political elite discourses in activating national identities

in voting decisions. We argue that both national identity and exclusionary political elite discourses have the potential to influence far-right voting preferences but that the combination of the two is particularly potent.

Public opinion on immigration correlates with the way political elites frame and discuss immigration-related issues (Bohman, 2011; but see Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Heizmann & Huth, 2021; Mitchell, 2021; Schmidt-Catran & Czymara, 2023). At the same time, mainstream parties can have a catalysing effect on accommodating radical right-wing issues and, in consequence, increase support for such parties (Krause et al., 2023; Lochocki, 2018). We combine both arguments by showing that the political climate in a country *in general* affects the likelihood of voting preferences for a far-right party *specifically*. Advancing works in the American context, we analyse the role of national political party elites that embrace exclusionary issues in activating national identities. Building on recent developments in national identity research (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016, 2022; Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, 2022b; May, 2023), we analyse how specific conceptions of nationhood drive this relationship.

We test whether exclusionary political elites increase the link between individual exclusionary national identity conceptions and far-right voting preferences based on comparative longitudinal data over more than 25 years. To this end, we analyse a rich dataset that harmonises various multi-national survey programmes compiled by the ONBound project (Bechert et al., 2020) and manifesto data from the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al., 2021b) from 1995 to 2020. Our analysis combines latent class analysis (LCA) on the individual level and within-country estimators on the national level. We show that, first, exclusionary national identity is widely prevalent in many European countries and correlates with far-right voting. Second, voters are more likely to choose far-right parties when political elites in general become more exclusionary. Third, we find that the effect of national identity is conditional on its prior activation through political elites: The within-country effect of anti-immigrant and pro-national discourses on far-right voting preferences is particularly strong among those with an exclusionary national identity. Put differently, those with a narrow image of their national in-group are significantly more likely to vote for a far-right party if national political elites are more exclusionary. We conclude that otherwise latent national identities are activated through

political elites across parties, which thereby leads to perhaps unintended negative consequences for social cohesion, political systems and society at large.

2. Arguments

2.1 National identity conceptions and far-right voting preferences

Far-right parties are usually characterised by nativism and authoritarianism (cf. Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn et al., 2019). We follow Golder (2016) and use the term 'far right' as umbrella term, including 'radical' and 'extreme' right-wing parties. Individual-level predictors of support for such parties include lower education, economic vulnerability and anti-immigrant views (cf. Arzheimer, 2009; cf. Stockemer et al., 2018). Especially anti-immigrant views are closely related to specific conceptions of nationhood. Yet, this important aspect of political identity has only been sparsely researched as one of the drivers of the success of far-right parties (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017).

Classical national identity research links conceptions of nationhood to issue positions that influence voting. Most of this research builds on the distinction of ethnic versus civic nationalism that has been derived from state-level resources, for example, legal documents, public education and ideological histories of nation-states (Brubaker, 1994; cf. Helbling et al., 2016; Kohn, 2005; Meinecke, 1970; cf. Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Smith, 1987, 1991). Transferring the distinction to the individual level, individual-level civic conceptions are defined by placing importance on voluntaristic criteria, such as law-abidingness. In contrast, individuals holding ethnic conceptions are expected to favour objected, ascribed and thus exclusionary criteria, such as descent, blood relations and nativity (cf. Helbling et al., 2016; cf. Jones & Smith, 2001; cf. Wright et al., 2012). Especially the latter has been found to be related to hostile policy positions towards immigrants (Hjerm, 1998a; Jones & Smith, 2001; Kunovich, 2009; Wright, 2011; e.g., Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Filsinger et al., 2021; Hochmann et al., 2016; Mader et al., 2021), which are connected to far-right voting (Arzheimer, 2008, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Stockemer et al., 2018; e.g., Abou-Chadi et al., 2022; Mason et al., 2021). Specific forms of nationalism affect anti-migrant attitudes that, in turn, translate into right-wing voting. Ethnic national identity has been found to be positively related to both the Trump

vote in the 2016 US election (Thompson, 2021) and votes for Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany between 2015 and 2017 (Mader et al., 2021; Pesthy et al., 2021). In addition to studies on conceptions of nationhood (that are, e.g., based on descent, birthplace, language proficiency etc.), others find that the strength of identity (Garand et al., 2020), or both general national pride and ethnically charged conceptions (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017), play a crucial role for right-wing votes. Bonikowski et al. (2021, p. 530) highlight the specific combinations of domain-specific pride, national chauvinism, strength of identification and the classically used conceptions that 'provided a crucial base of support for Donald Trump […]'.

Building on these findings, we theorise that national identity builds a basis for far-right voting. Because of the questionable validity of the ethnic–civic distinction in national identity, however, we move beyond this distinction. This is because, first, it is conceptually problematic to infer an individual's national identity from policies (cf. Reijerse et al., 2013). Second, ethnic and civic identities are empirically highly correlated and thus hardly differ in their exploratory power concerning policy positions (Janmaat, 2006; Wright et al., 2012; cf. Hochmann et al., 2016). Third, placing measured criteria in either category is often theoretically and empirically ambiguous (comparing results of Ariely, 2020; Berg & Hjerm, 2010; Hadler & Flesken, 2018; Hochmann et al., 2016; Jones & Smith, 2001; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010; Wright et al., 2012). In line with a new person-oriented directive in national identity research (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Ditlmann & Kopf-Beck, 2019; Hjerm, 1998b; Trittler, 2017), we argue that conceptions of nationhood are more complex, because individuals employ and combine criteria based on underlying images beyond this distinction. In fact, Helbling et al. (2016, p. 752) and Hjerm (1998a, p. 341) find that either only a few respondents or no respondents favour ethnic criteria without also embracing civic criteria, suggesting a continuum from inclusive to exclusive conceptions, while Trittler (2017), May (2023) and Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) demonstrate differently understood criteria based on these underlying images.

Additionally, we argue to retain the theoretically distinct dimensions (cf. Eger & Hjerm, 2022a, pp. 3ff.) of national identity that have been merged in more recent works (Alemán & Woods, 2018; Bonikowski et al., 2021; Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016; Soehl & Karim, 2021). National identity includes (i) the individual's awareness of being

part of a nation, (ii) an affective dimension (e.g., pride and national chauvinism) resulting from this identification and (iii) a content dimension (Citrin et al., 2001) that encompasses national boundary-making and thus the conceptions of nationhood. This latter dimension describes the criteria used to distinguish between compatriots and others and, thus, determines who is recognised as part of the in-group (Bail, 2008; Helbling et al., 2016, p. 746; Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). We expect the content dimension to drive the relationship. Who is considered an 'outsider' depends on the criteria one applies (Hjerm, 1998a, p. 337). Distinction, in turn, is a key precondition for the devaluation of others (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979, on Social Identity Theory [SIT]). Voters who perceive immigrants as a threat to the country's culture, shared values or the welfare state will be more likely to vote for the far right. Crucially, the degree to which immigrants are recognised as outsiders and as threatening should depend on the narrowness of the idea of the national in-group. Supporting our decision, previous works find that exclusionary conceptions are strongly related to national attachment, pride and chauvinism (May, 2023) and that conceptions of nationhood outperform the other dimensions in strength when analysing the effect of different dimensions on right-wing voting (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017) and attitudes connected to right-wing voting (Hjerm, 1998a).

Taken together, we expect that voters with a narrower and thus more exclusionary definition of national identity are more likely to hold attitudes that align with far-right parties. Just as right-wing parties derive their positions from nationalist and anti-migration stances (Golder, 2016, p. 480), voters are also expected to derive their policy positions from their national identity and associated negative attitudes towards foreigners (Bonikowski, 2017, p. 188), making far-right voting more likely for those individuals. We hypothesise that:

> Hypothesis 1: Those with an exclusionary national identity are more likely to vote far-right. *(National Identity-Hypothesis)*

2.2 Political elite discourses and far-right voting

From a cross-national perspective, issues of national identity and immigration are often prominently discussed in European societies. Political elites are one of the key players in

these national discourses around immigration-related issues. By providing information about ethnic minorities, political elites play a key role in shaping discourses (Flores, 2018). They inform the public about social and political circumstances, interpret and contextualise arguments, and can thus affect people's understanding of reality (Careja, 2015; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Following Czymara (2020), we define political elite discourses as 'the sum of political elites' frames, arguments, and narratives' and as a 'contextual character, in the sense that they are a feature of a country at a certain time point' (p. 1215). Voters are directly or indirectly exposed to political information, for example, through mass media consumption (Meltzer et al., 2020), social media (Bail et al., 2018), interpersonal communication (Schmitt-Beck, 2003) or other sources. In other words, information and arguments put forward in elite discourses constitute an information environment to which individuals in a given context are exposed. Thus, such an information environment can influence individual perceptions, attitudes and behaviour beyond direct consumption. This does not imply, however, that everyone is similarly receptive of such information. In fact, our core argument is that these discourses resonate more with those holding an exclusionary identity.

Interestingly, Bohman and Hjerm (2016) show that the rhetoric of the radical right itself has little impact on public opinion. Instead, theories that see preferences on issues fixed among the electorate explain increase and decrease in vote shares for far-right parties based on whether other parties take up their electorates' demands for stricter immigration policies (Arzheimer, 2009). In contrast to the hypothesis that far-right parties are winning votes when no other party satisfies these demands, some scholars argue that the catering of these issues by other parties causes the far right to gain votes (Lochocki, 2018; e.g., Krause et al., 2023). By taking radical right-wing positions, established parties may remove taboos, which eases far-right vote choices. Furthermore, by putting issues on the political agenda by taking a position, voters may evaluate their own positions and include the issue in the decision-making process (Arzheimer, 2009). Empirically, it has been shown that political messaging of established parties on immigration issues are a sufficient condition for far-right vote gains (Lochocki, 2018, p. 60). Moreover, far-right parties are found to benefit more overall from positional shifts towards far-right issues by mainstream parties (Krause et al., 2023).

Our contextual argument concerns a country's discursive climate *overall*. While some scholars argue that public issue attention affects parties' issue priorities in their campaign programmes (Klüver & Spoon, 2016), only relatively popular parties seem to engage in 'riding the wave' of virulent issues (Wagner & Meyer, 2014). Meanwhile, party positions appear to be unresponsive to voters' policy shifts (O'Grady & Abou-Chadi, 2019) and, overall, have been found to lead public opinion (Hellström, 2008), for example, through the media picking up on highlighted issues of electoral programmes (Merz, 2017). Taken together, increased salience of immigration-related topics in the electorate seems to motivate parties to take a stand on these issues, which in turn increases exclusionary and inclusionary positions (dependent on party positions) offered to the public overall. In connection with those on the far right benefitting from positional shifts towards their stances, we hence argue that the combined discourses of *all* political parties might lead to perhaps unintended consequences for far-right voting preferences. This is our second hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 2: Increasing exclusionary political elite discourses in a country are associated with a higher probability to vote for the far right. (*Elite Discourse Hypothesis*)

2.3 The activation of identities through elite discourses

So far, we have hypothesised that national identity and exclusionary elite discourses affect far-right voting independently. Yet, national identity is a rather stable feature of individuals (cf. Mader & Schoen, 2023) in modern democracies and is therefore likely to have a continuous impact on voting decisions of the far right. In contrast, far-right voting is less stable and has only recently increased. Findings from the US presidential election in 2016 specify the relationship further. Studies (Bonikowski et al., 2021; Garand et al., 2020; Mason et al., 2021; Thompson, 2021) suspect Donald Trump to have played a crucial role in activating a nationalist base through 'intense immigration rhetoric' (Garand et al., 2020, p. 15), meaning the congruence between specific long-held ideas in the population and his ideas, respectively (Bonikowski et al., 2021). We test this activation hypothesis beyond the specific Trump context.

Social–psychological theories agree that, in order to become behaviourally relevant, identities require activation (Carter, 2013, p. 204; Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 231). Activation is theorised as a function of *situational factors*, for example, the *fit* of an identity's meanings with a situation and the *accessibility* of these meanings within the self-concept, creating *centrality* or *salience* of an identity (Carter, 2013, p. 206; Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 230). Identity Theory (IT) emphasises the organisational structure of identities in a *salience hierarchy* in which lower identities are less likely to guide activity across situations (Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 12f citing Stryker, 1980, and Stryker & Serpe, 1994). In contrast to person-based (e.g., moral identity) and role-based (e.g., mother and student) identities, group-based identities such as national identity are rather low in this hierarchy and, thus, require explicit activation through situational factors and social cues that align with individually held meanings attached to the nation. Elite discourses provide such social cues. Exclusionary political elite discourses have thereby been shown to foster the salience of national identity for individuals (Helbling et al., 2016). Crucially, persons with narrow images of the national in-group should be most affect by such discourses, since their individually held images and the meanings of the exclusionary elite rhetoric align easily. In turn, the discourses should increase the significance of national identity for these individuals specifically.

Emphasising the categorisation processes of the self and others as well as the inherent positive in-group evaluation of this process, SIT furthermore emphasises the possibility of re-categorisation and the consequences of activated identities. In a survey experiment, respondents who belonged to a smaller ethnic group and an overriding national group preferred the policy positions that would benefit the group that had been previously primed through the questionnaire's wording (Transue, 2007). Hence, identities not only develop political potential but also affect policy positions dependent on which identity is primed. In accordance with SIT, voters will generally select the option that most benefits the group to which they belong. Yet, which of these groups is used as a reference depends on the activation.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric among political elites contributes to the overall salience of national identity. We expect that the priming effect increases for individuals with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood because meanings concerning national boundaries align. Moreover, since these individuals are more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat

and favour those policies benefiting 'their' national in-group, anti-immigrant rhetoric should increase the attraction of stricter migration policies and, thus, of far-right parties. Our final hypothesis regards this interplay between individual views on national identity, national political elite discourses and far-right voting:

> Hypothesis 3: The relationship between exclusionary national identity and far-right voting is conditional on its prior activation through highly prevalent exclusionary political elite discourses. (*Activation Hypothesis*)

3. Data and Methods

We use data from the ONBound project, which combines harmonised data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1998, 2012, 2015) and the European Values Study (EVS, 2020a, 2020b). Since we are interested in voting, we only include natives and individuals older than 18. After listwise deletion of missing data based on the variables in our model (see below), our analysis is based on 127,409 respondents observed in 26 countries and 26 years, with a total of 104 country-years. Table A1 in the Supporting Information shows the final samples sizes for each country in each year after data cleaning.[14]

3.1 Outcome

To classify parties as far-right, we draw upon the definition of the PopuList project that classifies parties as 'far-right' (Rooduijn et al., 2019). Since we harmonise data over various programmes, we created a binary variable with value 1 if a respondent indicates to vote in the next election for (ISSP 1995, ISSP 2003, EVS 2008), has voted in the last election for (ISSP 2013) or prefers (EVS 2017) a far-right party and 0 otherwise. As we combine these different concepts, we refer to our outcome as a far-right voting preference.

[14] All code is freely accessible at https://www.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/NTEXG.

3.2 Individual-level predictor: National identity

Based on recent advances (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016) recommending person-centred methods to analyse individually held images of the national in-group, we follow May (2023) and employ LCA together with cluster analysis (CA) in a cross-country design.

ISSP and EVS measure conceptions of national identity by asking respondents to rate the importance of different criteria for being truly 'national' on a 4-point Likert scale. The survey programmes differ only in the surveyed criteria, which are as follows (Table 1):

Table 1: Item availability across study waves

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is …	*ISSP 1995*	*ISSP 2003*	*ISSP 2013*	*EVS 2008*	*EVS 2017*	
to have been born in [COUNTRY]	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*born*
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	*X*	*X*	*X*			*citizenship*
to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one´s life	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*		*lived*
to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*language*
to be a [RELIGION]	*X*	*X*	*X*			*religion*
to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*laws*
to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	*X*	*X*	*X*			*feel*
to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestors		*X*	*X*	*X*	*X*	*descent*
to share [NATIONAL] culture					*X*	*culture*

Figure 1 plots the results for each survey. Since the variables have been dichotomised to represent either support or rejection of any criterion, values closer to 1 indicate very high conditioned probabilities and high within-class homogeneity. Thus, all members of this type agree on the importance of the criteria with a probability larger than .8.

Accordingly, values closer to 0 indicate that the respective criterion is rated as at least ‘not very important’ but yields also high homogeneity within the classes. Consequentially, all members of a respective type agree on the rejection of this characteristic to describe the national in-group with a probability of less than .2. Values between 0.2 and 0.8 only indicate tendencies concerning the importance of items (0.2–0.4: weak disagreement; 0.6–0.8: weak agreement). Values close to 0.5 suggest strong internal heterogeneity concerning the criterion's importance. Note that lines connecting the points do not imply trends or causal relations.

Figure 1: Representations of national identity by survey wave



Even though items vary across the survey waves, we identify comparable types across all five survey waves. Particularly, in each wave, we identify one type (indicated by red areas within the radial plots) that places high importance on each surveyed criterion, except for religion. We call this type the *exclusionary identity*, since respondents belonging to this type set high barriers to national membership. This type consistently appears with a very clear response pattern and thus displays a coherent national identity. Below, we test the relationship of this type to the far right and its interaction with political

elite discourses, since we argue that those with narrow conceptions set high barriers to the national in-group are more likely to prefer far-right parties that offer harder stances on migration.

3.3 Country-level predictor: Exclusionary political elite discourse

To capture an exclusionary political elite discourse, we use data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP, version 2021a; Volkens et al., 2021b). The CMP offers quantitative content analyses of election manifestos for parties competing in democratic elections after World War II in OECD nations, including EU member states and several other countries (Volkens et al., 2021b, p. 2). The content analysis of party manifestos is done through manual coding performed by trained humans working with a fixed set of coding rules. Party manifestos content analyses are particularly suited to capturing the political stances of parties because manifestos represent parties as a whole, cover long time periods, allow comparisons within and between parties and countries and are replicable (see Dancygier & Margalit, 2020, p. 743). In particular, coders of the CMP quantify how much of a manifesto is devoted to certain pre-defined topics (Klingemann et al., 2006), theoretically ranging from 0% (issue not mentioned in a manifesto) to 100% (no other issues mentioned in a manifesto). These measures are based on the same coding instructions for all countries and are thus particularly well suited for cross-national comparative research (Bohman, 2011; Careja, 2015; Schmidt & Spies, 2014). We use the statements of party manifestos to proxy for the positions of political elites belonging to each party, whose arguments often have high visibility (Helbling et al., 2016, p. 752). Our measure reflects the prominence of exclusionary issues on the agenda (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 265). Research on the cross-validation of the CMP data and expert surveys conclude that both approaches measure party positions similarly (Marks et al., 2007; Netjes & Binnema, 2007). Moreover, using CMP has the advantage of bypassing endogeneity bias due to party signals reacting to other parties' positions (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 265).

We combine two items from the CMP data: first, *positive* statements about a *national way of life* (per601), which cover ‘Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals’ and include appeals to patriotism, national pride or nationalism, as well as ‘Statement *[sic]* advocating the restriction of the process of

immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants', and second, *negative* statements about *multiculturalism* (per608), which include 'The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration' and 'Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt [its] culture and fully assimilate' (Volkens et al., 2021a). For our final measure of an exclusionary political elite discourse, we take the values of these two items for each party in each election, weighted by with the respective party's vote share to account for the fact that an argument is likely to be more visible in the national discourse if it comes from a more popular party. Similar to Helbling et al. (2016) and Czymara (2020), we generate the country-specific mean for the two weighted items and sum them up. Finally, we standardise the variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, so that the coefficient represents the change in the outcome associated with the movement of one standard deviation of the predictor. Since individual-level variables and the CMP are not always measured within the same year, we matched respondents reporting retrospective voting decisions with CMP values of the respective previous election. Missing values for years without national elections were interpolated using values of the previous elections.

3.4 Controls

It might be that political elites primarily address actual immigration developments and that people turn to far-right parties during times of high immigration (cf. Arzheimer, 2009). Because we are interested in the effect of discourses beyond the influence of actual immigration, we control for national immigration rates as measured by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2021), which includes data on refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons. To the best of our knowledge, other datasets on migration unfortunately do not include data prior to 1998 for all countries included in our analysis or only provide data for every 5 years. Thus, we decided to use harmonic annual data covering the whole time period for all countries. We standardise these numbers by total population size. Second, it is possible that political elites turn to immigration issues in times of economic hardship as a scapegoating strategy. Following realistic conflict theory, some people are also more likely to vote far right during such times (cf. Arzheimer, 2009; cf. Golder, 2016). To account for the national state of the economy, we control for unemployment rates (as per cent of total labour force) and gross domestic product per capita (based on purchasing power parity and the 2017 international

US dollar). We take these data from the World Development Indicator database (World Bank Data, 2021).

On the individual level, we account for demographic and socio-economic characteristics that can influence national identity and voting. Far-right vote choices are more likely for less educated, younger, male and economically vulnerable individuals due to a higher likelihood to compete for resources and feeling threatened by immigrants (cf. Arzheimer, 2009; cf. Stockemer et al., 2021). In contrast, religiosity (Siegers & Jedinger, 2021) and union affiliation (Mosimann et al., 2019) can have an 'immunising' effect on far-right voting decisions. Thus, we control for education, work status, a non-linear age effect, gender, church attendance and union membership. Table 2 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics for the variables in our model.

3.5 Statistical model

We employ country-fixed effects modelling with cluster-robust standard errors to estimate within-country effects of political elite discourses. These estimates are not plagued by omitted variable bias due to time-constant aspects on the country level (Bell et al., 2019; Fairbrother, 2014; Schmidt-Catran et al., 2019), which include stable differences in political or legal factors, such as the citizenship policies or historic path dependencies mentioned above. We employ fixed effects linear probability models. Results are similar for non-linear (logistic) probability models.

We are particularly interested in the question of whether an exclusionary political elite discourse has a stronger effect on far-right voting preferences for individuals who hold a nationalistic, exclusionary identity. To test this hypothesis, we use the cross-level interaction estimator developed by Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2019). That is, we do not only interact the variables political elite discourse and identity but also country dummies with both the variables political elite discourse and the identity variables. These additional interaction terms absorb all potential between-country variances. Thus, this estimator provides a genuine within-estimator for the cross-level interaction term as well. This means that the interaction effect uses only variation within countries over time that, again, is not plagued by unobserved heterogeneity on the country level.

Table 2: Descriptives.

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Outcome					
Far-right voting	127,409	0.07	0.25	0	1
Country level					
Exclusionary political elite discourse	127,409	0.04	1.02	-0.96	5.22
Immigration	127,409	1.21	2.56	0	16.79
GDP	127,409	38.94	14.17	9.36	69.10
Unemployment	127,409	7.95	4.17	2.55	24.44
Individual level					
National identity	127,409	0.53	0.50	0	1
Age	127,409	48.89	17.53	18.00	112.00
Education					
No formal education	127,409	0.02	0.16	0	1
Primary education	127,409	0.11	0.31	0	1
Lower secondary education	127,409	0.24	0.43	0	1
Upper secondary education	127,409	0.31	0.46	0	1
Post-secondary, non-tertiary education	127,409	0.06	0.24	0	1
Tertiary education	127,409	0.26	0.44	0	1
Work status					
Paid work	127,409	0.55	0.50	0	1
In education	127,409	0.05	0.22	0	1
Unemployed	127,409	0.07	0.25	0	1
Permanently sick or disabled	127,409	0.02	0.13	0	1
Retired	127,409	0.25	0.43	0	1
Community service or military service	127,409	0.00	0.02	0	1
Housework, looking after children	127,409	0.05	0.23	0	1
Gender	127,409	0.54	0.50	0	1
Union Membership	127,409	0.81	0.40	0	1
Church Attendance					
Once or several times a week	127,409	0.14	0.35	0	1
One to three times a month	127,409	0.10	0.30	0	1
Several times a year, only on special holidays	127,409	0.19	0.39	0	1
Once a year or less frequently	127,409	0.24	0.43	0	1
Never, practically never	127,409	0.33	0.47	0	1

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive overview

A striking 53% of respondents hold an exclusionary national identity (see Table 2). Seemingly in contrast, merely 7% in our data prefer a far-right party. This implies that, although highly prevalent in Europe, an exclusionary identity correlates with far-right voting far less than one would usually expect. In the models below, we test our hypothesis that these identities need to be activated.

Figure 2 shows trends in exclusionary political elite discourses in European countries over time. First, countries differ significantly in their average level of exclusionary discourses among political elites. While Scandinavian countries tend to exhibit little exclusionary discourse at all time points, such discourses tend to be more prevalent in Eastern Europe. Second, there are differences in trends. While lines are almost flat for Spain and Italy, there is a clear upward trend for Latvia and Denmark. The highest value of all countries, however, is Hungary in 2018, after an inflow of refugees to Europe, a development that lad to particularly negative attitudes among Hungarians (Czymara, 2021).

Figure 3 plots the average probability of far-right voting preferences on the aggregate level against a country's level of exclusionary political elite discourses for each time point. We see a clear positive correlation: The average probability is larger in a country during times when political elites are more exclusionary. An extreme case is, again, Hungary in 2018, where the average probability reached 47.2%. One explanation for this is that Hungary is one of the few cases where the largest (and governing) party, Fidesz, is classified as far right. The bivariate correlation between average far-right voting probability and exclusionary elite discourses amounts to .46. This correlation is to a large degree driven by Hungary. Removing Hungary also leads to a positive, but lower, correlation of .24.

To test these relationships more thoroughly and to examine whether the impact of an exclusionary political elite is stronger for natives with an exclusionary national identity, we now turn to the longitudinal fixed effects models.

Figure 2: Trends in exclusionary political discouses.



Figure 3: Far-right voting preferences and political elite discourses in Europe.



4.2 Longitudinal fixed effects models

The results of the fixed effects models are shown in Table 3. Model M1 includes the two main predictors: national identity on the individual level and political elite discourse on the country level. We see that both have a clear and statistically significant positive effect on the probability to prefer voting for a far-right party. Holding exclusionary conceptions of the national in-group is associated with a 4-percentage point increase of the probability of voting preference for a far-right party ($p < .001$). Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation of the exclusionary political discourse variable is associated with a 5% increase of far-right voting probability ($p < .001$). Adding country-level controls reduces the within effect of political elite discourse to 4 points, while the difference between those with an exclusionary national identity and others remains similar, as model M2 shows. In model M3, adding control variables on the individual level does not change these coefficients at all. Table A2 in the Supporting Information includes the coefficients of all variables.

Table 3. Fixed effects models.

	M1	M2	M3
Individual level			
National identity	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls			✓
Country level			
Political elite discourse	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls		✓	✓
Constant	0.05**	-0.12**	-0.15**
	(0.01)	(0.0 5)	(0.05)
Observations	127,409	127,409	127,409
R^2	0.106	0.112	0.117
AIC	-3122.48	-4063.52	-4700.88
BIC	-3093.22	-4004.99	-4515.53

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

To test whether the effect of exclusionary political elites differs for exclusionary national identity, we estimated the respective cross-level interaction. Figure 4 plots the results of the interaction by showing the association between political elite discourses and the predicted probability of far-right voting preferences depending on national identity.

Even after netting out unobserved effect heterogeneity on the country level, there is a strong and statistically significant interaction effect of 2.2 percentage points ($p < .001$). There are practically no differences in the probability of far-right voting preferences between exclusionary identities and non-exclusionary identities in country-years with little exclusionary political elites. The predicted differences amount to merely 1.4 points ($p = .019$) when elite discourses are at their minimum value (−1). This difference strongly increases when political elites are very exclusionary (6): For the maximum value of political elite discourse, the difference predicted by the model is 15.9 percentage points and clearly significant ($p < .001$, although the confidence intervals are widened due to a smaller number of observations for these levels, as shown in Figure 4).

Figure 4. Effect of exclusionary political elite discourse conditional on national identity.



In sum, both exclusionary national identity conceptions and exclusionary political elite discourses are positively related to far-right voting preferences. Both aspects also interact, with the exclusionary rhetoric of political elites fostering the relationship between exclusionary national identity and far-right voting.

4.3 Robustness checks[15]

Figures 2 and 3 show that Hungary has very high values regarding both our dependent and independent variables and could thus be viewed as an outlier. Although we believe that such strong cases also provide important information on the association of interest, we re-estimated the interaction model without Hungary to test the robustness of our findings. Interestingly, the interaction difference becomes slightly more pronounced when Hungary is excluded, amounting to 20 points ($p < .001$). Thus, we conclude that Hungary is indeed an influential case in our data but that it is not driving our results.

A major objection against the theoretical model we proposed to explain the correlation between elite discourses and voting is reverse causality. It is also plausible that parties change their rhetoric in response to prior shifts in public opinion (although our discourse variable is constructed such that it always precedes our voting measure). If this is true, our choice to weight discourses by party success might be particularly problematic, because electoral success is the result of public opinion. To counter this objection, we ran the models with an unweighted discourse measure in which each party's stance contributes equally to the national context variable. While we are convinced that the weighted version of the variable is better suited to capturing the actual political climate in a given context, we obtain similar results if we use the unweighted measure. Similar to our findings above, the interaction remains significant, with an interaction difference of 20 points ($p < .001$) and an overall interaction effect of 2.1 percentage points.

Third, one can argue that far-right voting preferences are mainly possible in contexts in which a far-right party exists in the first place. Accounting for this in our dataset is complex because survey waves do not always overlap with elections and because our outcome includes questions on prospective voting and questions on general party preferences. To proxy the existence of a far-right party for a country at a given point in time, we re-estimated the models including only country-waves where *at least one respondent* chose a far-right party, assuming that if there was a far-right party, at least one surveyed person would choose it. Two-thirds of our respondents belong to a country-wave where at least one respondent exhibited a far-right voting preference. However, this strategy is

[15] For all robustness checks, regression tables are available in the Supporting Information Part I.

likely overly conservative because the number of far-right voters might be too low in several countries to be included in the surveyed population by chance. Far-right voting is not very common overall and is additionally subject to social desirability bias. In any case, the results reported above are stable to this sample decision: Both the individual-level national identity effect and the macro-level exclusionary discourse within effect remain similar in size and statistically significant at $p < .001$. The same is true for the interaction, which remains at roughly 15 points ($p < .000$). As an even more conservative test, we experimented with models that drop contexts in which fewer than 100 respondents voted far right. This dramatically reduced our number of cases, as it drops 80 country-waves. Even in this extreme case, however, our results remain similar: The interaction term ranges from 0.021 to 0.024 and is always significant at least $p < .01$.

Fourth, one might argue that activation results from general issue salience, not exclusionary rhetoric only. When using mere issue salience as our predictor (defined as the sum of weighted exclusionary and inclusionary discourses), the estimate is positive and significant. Even though the effects of exclusionary and inclusionary discourses go in opposite directions, an increase in issue salience may activate reflections about the national in-group with different effects for types of national identity. However, the salience measure is composed of weighted inclusionary and exclusionary positions, with inclusionary positions taking up much less space within the party manifestos. The salience effect is thus largely driven by exclusionary stances. When exclusionary and inclusionary discourses are modelled as separate variables in the same model, the estimate of exclusionary discourses is positive and significant ($p < .001$), while the estimate for inclusionary discourse is negative but not statistically significant ($p = .451$). Hence, it is mainly exclusionary political elite discourses that play a role, not inclusionary ones.

Fifth, one might question the CMP as a proxy for exclusionary discourses. Dancygier and Margalit (2020) provide an alternative operationalisation that explicitly codes party manifesto positions on immigration issues and thus offers measures that are closer to exclusionary discourses. Re-running our analysis with these data yields similar conclusions to our main analysis: Again, exclusionary party positions correlate with far-right preferences, and again, this is particularly strong for respondents with an exclusionary identity (interaction = 0.32, $p = .001$). Despite the great benefit of being directly connected to immigration, we ultimately decided against this dataset after careful

consideration, because its coverage of parties and elections is much more fragmentary than the CMP data. Concretely, using the data of Dancygier and Margalit (2020) would mean that, after listwise deletion, we would be left with less than half of countries (11 vs. 26), a third of country-years (36 vs. 102) and merely 12% of parties (190 vs. 1603). Yet, the fact that our main argument replicates with this data source that has been coded completely independently from the CMP increases our confidence in our findings.

Sixth, we estimated linear probability models for our binary outcome. Re-estimating models with logistic regression leads to the same conclusions: With an odds ratio of 1.07, the interaction is substantial and statistically significant ($p = .006$). Thus, the link function does not affect our conclusion.

Finally, the classification of far-right parties is not always perfectly clear. As an alternative measure, we use the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2021) classification scheme for our outcome (however, there is a 96.3% overlap between both classifications in our data). ParlGov categorises parties as 'right-wing' based on their position in the classical two-dimensional economic (state/market) versus cultural (liberty/authority) left–right scheme. The coefficients are smaller with this outcome (national identity effect = 2.2 points and exclusionary discourse effect = 1 point), but both remain positive and statistically significant at $p < .001$. The interaction term also remains statistically significant at $p = .004$.

5. *Discussion and Conclusion*

Our results show that exclusionary identities are prevalent in Europe, whereas far-right voting is less frequent. It thus appears that the connection between such identities and far-right voting is far weaker than one might assume based on their ideological overlap. We can however explain this empirical pattern: Identities need to be activated to become relevant for voting.[16] This happens through national political elites who employ exclusionary rhetoric. Based on the most extensive data available, we show that both national identity and political elite discourses influence far-right voting preferences across countries

[16] Although there are of course other aspects that influence voting decisions, not everyone with an exclusionary identity becomes activated in an exclusionary discursive context.

and time in Europe. Within-country estimates demonstrate that the otherwise loose relationship of exclusionary identity and far-right preferences is significantly stronger in times of exclusive elite discourses across parties. Conforming to Krause et al. (2022) and Lochocki (2018), this implies that far-right parties benefit from an overall exclusionary political climate, in which national boundaries are on the political agenda. Consequently, it appears that parties that are not far right are likely to hurt themselves when they use such rhetoric. Our results add to the puzzle of who is particularly moved by a more exclusionary climate and show that individuals with narrow conceptions of nationality, who account for more than half of the respondents, are more likely to be affected and driven towards right-wing parties, translating to enormous voter potential for the far right. Political elites who use exclusionary rhetoric might thus cause unintended negative social and political consequences. Additionally, we showed that narrow conceptions of national identity are more likely to align with far-right positions and thus are prone to being activated through exclusionary discourses.

While we offer important insights on the mobilising potential of elite rhetoric on voting, our study has limitations. First, we argued that political elite discourses primarily trigger existing national identity conceptions into relevance, not that they trigger them into being. However, it could be that exclusionary political elite discourses lead voters to (re-)formulate their images of the national in-group (cf. Helbling et al., 2016). Adding to this point, individuals can also draw their conceptions of the national in-group from experiences with state institutions, such as citizenship policies (Almond & Verba, 1963). In times of exclusionary debates, those policies might be more prominently discussed. Future research may test the impact of top-down processes of policy frames such as Germany's policy reform in 2000. Second, the presence and success of right-wing parties overall increases the salience of far-right issues and thus may motivate other parties to deal with the issue. Third, because we harmonise data across different survey programmes, our outcome combines voting intentions, past voting and party preferences. Although we assume that these aspects are highly correlated, combining them into a single measure is not ideal from a methodological point of view. Fourth, while we observe the same set of countries over time, we are limited to pooled cross-sections on the respondent level. Individual-level panel data would be ideal for testing our argument that national identity is activated by political elites. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any panel data that include the

relevant items to analyse this and certainly not across countries. Finally, future research could analyse the relationship between other types of national identity, other kinds of political elite rhetoric and other voting behaviour.

Despite these limitations, we highlight the role of both national identity and political elite discourses and their interplay for far-right voting preferences in Europe. Exclusionary national identities are widespread in Europe and offer huge electoral potential for far-right parties. But exclusionary national identities become especially relevant in times of high prevalence of exclusionary discourses by the overall discursive climate in a country. Thus, when it comes to taking more exclusionary positions in the hope of gaining votes, it is likely that the far right benefits most.

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Supporting Information

Part I: Overview of micro-level datasets

We primarily use the harmonization syntax provided by the ONBound project that harmonizes micro- and macro-level sources related to national and religious identities. To include religiosity and union membership, we used the ONBound infrastructure and added syntax that harmonizes church attendance and union membership.

Table A1. Size of analysed country-year samples (after list-wise deletion of missing values of included variables).

	1993	1995	1996	2003	2004	2005	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2017	2018	2020
Austria		948			904		1,428								1,519	
Bulgaria			1,046				1,424							1,400		
Croatia							1,298			944			991	1,380		
Czech Republic		616		1,043			1,535					1,716		1,407		
Denmark					1,188		1,425			1,233				3,055		
Estonia							1,244			771					1,136	
Finland				1,156				1,006		1,120				1,124		
France				736			1,421				1,801				1,757	
Georgia							1,467				1,476				2,160	
Germany		1,714			1,166		1,911						1,594	1,867		
Hungary		965		915			1,407		925						1,441	
Iceland								724				951		1,526		
Ireland			947		775		460									
Italy		384						1,412							2,171	
Latvia							1,193					818				
Lithuania							1,419				1,149				1,397	
Netherlands			1,828	1,535			1,43							2,249		
Norway		1,263		1,299			959						1,359		1,004	
Poland	1,414					1,267	1,416							1,293		
Portugal					1,205		1,444			945						1,115
Slovakia			1,347		888		1,346				1,110			1,372		
Slovenia				966			1,296			970				1,006		
Spain		1,069		1,046			1,356			860				1,112		
Sweden		1,129		1,018				968	962					1,091		
Switzerland				909			989			995		1,007		2,583		
United Kingdom		924		696				1,592				777			1,615	

Part II: Results & Robustness Checks

Table A2. Fixed effects models on far-right voting

	M1	M2	M3
Individual level			
National Identity (Reference=Others, 0)			
Exclusionists	0.038***	0.039***	0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age			0.002***
			(0.000)
Age²			-0.000***
			(0.000)
Education (Reference=No formal education,0)			
Primary education			0.005
			(0.007)
Lower secondary education			0.014
			(0.008)
Upper secondary education			0.015*
			(0.007)
Post-secondary, non-tertiary education			0.011
			(0.009)
Tertiary education			-0.009
			(0.008)
Gender (Reference=Female,0)			
Male			-0.022***
			(0.003)
Union Membership (Reference=No member,0)			
Currently member			0.013***
			(0.003)
Church Attendance (Ref.=Once/several times a week,1)			
One to three times a month			-0.012
			(0.007)
Several times a year, only on special holidays			-0.010
			(0.007)
Once a year or less frequently			0.000
			(0.008)
Never, practically never			-0.006
			(0.009)
Country level			
Political elite discourse	0.048***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Immigration		0.001	0.001
		(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP		0.004***	0.005***
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Unemployment		-0.002	-0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.047***	-0.116*	-0.150**
	(0.004)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Observations	127409	127409	127409
R2	0.106	0.112	0.117
AIC	-3122.48	-4063.52	-4700.88
BIC	-3093.22	-4004.99	-4515.53

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Model M1 includes main predictors, Model M2 additionally includes country-level controls, and Model M3 includes both micro- and macro-level controls.

Table A3. Interaction effect models on far-right voting

	Main Inter-action Model	RC 1: Without Hungary	RC 2: Un-weighted	RC 4a: Inclus. dis-course only	RC 4a: Salience	R5: Alter-na-tive Dis-course Measure (IPM)	RC 6: Logistic Model (Odds-Ratios)	RC 7: Alter-native Outcome, ParlGov
Political elite discourse								
Exclus. discourse	0.005 (0.031)	0.009 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.011)			-0.007 (0.013)	0.902 (0.419)	0.019 (0.026)
Inclus. dis-course				-0.054*** (0.013)				
Salience					-0.031 (0.042)			
National Identity (Ex-clusionists)	0.030 (0.019)	0.027 (0.017)	0.038 (0.020)	0.056* (0.026)	0.029 (0.018)	0.008 (0.017)	1.350 (0.272)	0.038 (0.021)
Interaction National Identity x Political elite discourse								
Exclus. discourse	0.022*** (0.005)	0.030** (0.009)	0.022** (0.007)			0.022** (0.007)	1.071** (0.027)	0.009** (0.003)
Inclus. dis-course				0.004 (0.006)				
Salience					0.023*** (0.006)			
Country-level controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Individual-level controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.186* (0.081)	-0.124 (0.067)	-0.183 (0.079)	-0.369*** (0.077)	-0.220** (0.082)	-0.036 (0.119)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.085 (0.066)
Observations	127409	121756	127409	127409	127409	43293	100795	127409
R^2	0.133	0.095	0.133	0.127	0.132	0.070	0.174	0.066
Pseudo R								
AIC	-6871.01	-22967.6	-6839.61	-6015.4	-6816.14	-8570.39	49252.8	-67918.3
BIC	-6041.82	-22171.4	-6000.67	-5186.21	-5986.95	-8275.41	49919.2	-67089.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; RC1-RC7 are robustness checks. Numbers refer to the respective paragraph in the manuscript.

Table A4. Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model (Identity at Discourse)

	dy/dx	95% confidence in-terval	
National Identity (Reference=Others, 0)			
National Identity (Exclusionists)			
at Political elite discourse = -.957 (min)	0.014* (0.006)	0.002	0.026
at Political elite discourse = 5.218 (max)	0.151*** (0.027)	0.097	0.204

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Differences of National Identity at minimum and maximum of Political Elite Discourse

Table A5. Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model (Discourse Effects)

	dy/dx	95% confidence interval	
Political elite discourse			
at National Identity (Others)	0.029***	0.014	0.045
	(0.008)		
at National Identity (Exclusionists)	0.051***	0.033	0.070
	(0.009)		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Discourse Effects for Exclusionists versus Other National Identity Types

Table A6: Fixed-Effects Models of Robustness Checks (RC1-RC7)

	Main Interaction Model	RC 1: Without Hungary	RC 2: Unweighted	RC 4a: Inclus. discourse only	RC 4b: Salience	R5: Alternative Discourse Measure (IPM)	RC 6: Logistic Model (Odds-Ratios)	RC 7: Alternative Outcome, ParlGov
Political elite discourse								
Exclus. discourse	0.036***	0.039***				0.010	1.023	0.010***
	(0.007)	(0.010)				(0.008)	(0.067)	(0.002)
Inclus. discourse				-0.001				
				(0.005)				
Salience					0.036***			
					(0.008)			
National Identity (Exclusionists)	0.039***	0.037***	0.040***	0.040***	0.039***	0.041***	1.917***	0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.153)	(0.005)
	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.150**	-0.124**	-0.177***	-0.221***	-0.149**	-0.189	0.000***	-0.087*
	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.121)	(0.000)	(0.035)
Observations	127409	121756	127409	127409	127409	43293	100795	127409
R^2	0.117	0.075	0.113	0.110	0.116	0.058		0.055
Pseudo R							0.157	
AIC	-4700.88	-20525.1	-4100.79	-3635.67	-4586.42	-8018.82	50185.4	-66514.5
BIC	-4515.53	-20340.6	-3915.44	-3450.32	-4401.07	-7853.98	50537.7	-66329.1

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A7. Fixed-Effects Models with varying sample restrictions (RC3)

	Min 1 Resp.	Min 10 Resp.	Min 20 Resp.	Min 30 Resp.	Min 40 Resp.	Min 50 Resp.	Min 60 Resp.	Min 70 Resp.	Min 80 Resp.	Min 90 Resp.	Min 100 Resp.
Political Elite Discourse	0.035***	0.035***	0.034***	0.031***	0.030**	0.028**	0.028**	0.027**	0.025*	0.019	0.021
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
National Identity (Exclusionists)	0.057***	0.059***	0.060***	0.063***	0.065***	0.067***	0.068***	0.070***	0.072***	0.075***	0.077***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	-0.187*	-0.205*	-0.237**	-0.287**	-0.282*	-0.368**	-0.359*	-0.357**	-0.370	-0.327	-0.304
	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.207)	(0.243)	(0.260)
Observations	85916	81438	78454	74100	68748	66291	63082	61058	54959	49618	45919
R^2	0.094	0.090	0.088	0.087	0.084	0.083	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.083	0.082
AIC	29759.5	32219.2	33602.4	34828.8	36068.2	36391.6	36752.9	36627.5	35787.1	34139.4	33144
BIC	29937.3	32396	33778.6	35003.9	36241.8	36564.5	36924.9	36798.9	35956.5	34306.8	33310

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A8. Interaction effect models with varying sample restrictions (RC3)

	Min 1 Resp.	Min 10 Resp.	Min 20 Resp.	Min 30 Resp.	Min 40 Resp.	Min 50 Resp.	Min 60 Resp.	Min 70 Resp.	Min 80 Resp.	Min 90 Resp.	Min 100 Resp.
Political Elite Discourse	0.018	0.015	0.021	0.015	0.014	0.001	0.002	-0.123	-0.113	-0.200***	-0.205***
	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.112)	(0.040)	(0.039)
National Identity (Exclusionists)	0.026	0.026	0.025	0.025	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.026	0.043	0.042
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Interaction	0.023***	0.023***	0.021***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.021***	0.023**	0.024**
National Identity x Political elite discourse	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	-0.223*	-0.258*	-0.270*	-0.336**	-0.340**	-0.417*	-0.419*	-0.506***	-0.480	-0.403**	-0.415**
	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.138)	(0.279)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Observations	84301	79823	76839	72485	67133	64676	61991	59967	52710	47369	44547
R^2	0.106	0.102	0.099	0.098	0.094	0.092	0.091	0.091	0.092	0.097	0.097
AIC	29141	31594.3	32998	34272	35539.6	35883.6	35911.2	35742	34044	32335.4	31528
BIC	29720.3	32132.9	33506.8	34740.8	35977.1	36301.1	36317.8	36120.1	34381.1	32624.6	31789.1

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Chapter 4: *Ready or not*: National Identity, Vote Choice, and Mass Media: Evidence from Germany.

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Abstract: Exploiting the increased prominence of debates on immigration, right-wing parties often frame and campaign against immigrants as a threat to national societies. Research on national identity has shown that these parties are particularly successful among those who have an ethnically charged, exclusionary conception of nation. National identity, however, tends to be rather latent and stable, while far-right voting is much more volatile. Explaining a temporal influence of national identity on political behaviour, social-psychological theories argue that identities need to be activated to become behaviourally relevant. The main argument of this article is that the presence of immigration-related news in the mass media can serve as such a situational factor for thinking about the nation and thus increase its salience for electoral behaviour. Combining individual-level panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study's Sort-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019) with a measure of media salience of immigration-related news in news articles, this study is the first to examine whether national identity can be activated for political behaviour through the salience of immigration-related issues in the mass media using panel data.

Keywords: national identity, identity activation, voting, media salience

1. Introduction

Over the past decades, immigration issues had a profound impact on voting behaviour in advanced democracies (Dennison and Geddes 2019; Dennison 2020). Particularly, far-right (populist) parties benefited from the immigration issue's prominence (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Damstra et al. 2021; Krause et al. 2022). By advocating nativist and restrictive positions on immigration, they largely appeal to anti-immigrant attitudes in the electorate (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2008, 2009; Stockemer et al. 2018; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020; Abou-Chadi et al. 2022), which is closely linked to exclusionary national identity (e.g., Hjerm 1998 *a*; Kunovich 2009; Wright 2011; Wright et al. 2012; Helbling et al. 2016; Hochmann et al. 2016; Trittler 2017). But national identity is rather latent and stable (Mader and Schoen 2023) and should therefore have a continuous effect on attitudes and voting, whereas (far-right) voting tends to be more volatile. The key question is, thus, *when* national identity influences voting decisions (Bonikowski et al. 2021). Accounting for the temporal influence of national identity on voting, previous research suggested that political elites play a crucial role in activating national identity by increasing the salience of immigration issues (Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021; Schulte-Cloos 2022; May and Czymara 2024). Complementing this research on national identities' activation, I focus on the role of mass media content as a key activating factor. The mass media is the primary source of information for citizens regarding political actors, issues, and policies (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016), and additionally serves as a gatekeeper for political elites' messages (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). Thus, immigration-related issues in the mass media alone may influence the relevance of national identity for voting decisions.

Drawing on national identity research, social-psychology, and public discourse, I examine whether national identity can be activated for electoral behaviour by immigration-related issue salience in the mass media. According to national identity research, narrow conceptions of nationhood are strongly associated with hostility towards immigrants (Hjerm 1998 *a*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Trittler 2017) and an increased propensity to vote for far-right parties (Bonikowski et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021). To account for changes in this relationship over time, social-psychological theories claim

that identities require activation by situational cues to become behaviourally relevant (Monroe et al. 2000; Stets and Burke 2000; Sniderman et al. 2004; Carter 2013; Schnakenberg 2013). Thereby, the presence of immigration issues in the media may act as such situational cue, prompting individuals to reflect on their nationhood and consequently increasing the likelihood that national identity will influence voting behaviour. The salience of immigration-related issues in public debates has been consistently shown to generally increase both the prevalence of anti-immigrant attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and far-right voting (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison 2020). I argue that this salience affects those with narrow conceptions specifically. The effect, however, is not necessarily limited to the right. As the importance of immigration increases, the relevance of national identity should increase for all members of society. Therefore, those with more open conceptions of nationhood should be more likely to vote for left-wing parties that offer more integrative immigration policy positions.

By combining individual-level panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study' (GLES) 2017 Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019) with contextual data on immigration-related news articles provided by LexisNexis, I examine (i) whether divergent conceptions of nationhood form the breeding ground for voting decisions, (ii) whether, and (iii) under which conditions these conceptions are specifically susceptible to activation by short-term changes in the salience of immigration-related news in the mass media.

Germany is a very interesting case to study. Despite being a textbook example of ethnic nationalism that underpins citizenship policies with blood-relations in line with the *jus sanguinis* principle, Germany underwent a hotly debated metamorphosis at the turn of the millennium. Germany's inclusion of more civic elements, such as granting citizenship to the descendants of immigrants, and the debates surrounding naturalization tests, has drawn attention to the issue of national in-group perceptions. Notably, the 2017 federal elections were particularly interesting as they marked the first major success of the country's right-wing party in a national parliamentary election. In this election, immigration and the so-called 'migrant crisis' were among the top political issues for most voters in 2017 (see Appendix A1.1) and had a significant impact on voting behaviour (Wagner and Lichteblau 2022). Thus, Germany in 2017 provides an excellent opportunity to test

the activation hypothesis of national identities being activated through immigration-related issue salience.

This study demonstrates that situational cues, such as the presence of immigration-related issues in the mass media, impact the relevance of national identity for voting decisions, particularly benefitting parties on the fringes of the political spectrum. However, individuals with exclusionary conceptions are more affected by this activation, who are notably drawn to the far right. The findings provide initial evidence of the activation potential of social identities for political behaviour and emphasizes the key role of content and knowledge structures associated with identities.

2. Arguments

2.1 National Identities, Anti-Immigrant Attitudes, and Voting

Explaining anti-immigrant attitudes and the appeal of far-right parties, national identity research finds that the way individuals differentiate between compatriots and 'others' plays a key role (Hjerm 1998 *a*; Kunovich 2009; Helbling et al. 2016; Hochmann et al. 2016; Lubbers and Coenders 2017; Lindstam et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021; Thompson 2021). Intergroup differentiation is a prerequisite for the devaluation of outsiders and the development of outgroup hostility (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1979). In particular, ethnically charged, exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are found to explain anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Hjerm 1998 *b*; Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009; Wright 2011), which are among the main individual-level predictors of far-right voting in electoral studies (Arzheimer 2008, 2009; Stockemer et al. 2018; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020; Mason et al. 2021; Abou-Chadi et al. 2022).

The ethnic-civic dichotomy of national identity (Smith 1991; Brubaker 1994; Kohn 2005) argues that differentiating between compatriots and 'others' is either based on voluntaristic criteria (civic), such as law-abidingness, or ascriptive criteria (ethnic), such as blood relations and descent (Jones and Smith 2001; Wright et al. 2012; e.g., Helbling et al. 2016). Ethnic conceptions are inherently restrictive and exclusionary. Therefore, immigrants (or their descendants) are often perceived as outsiders and

culturally and economically threatening (cf. Lindstam et al. 2021). This fosters anti-immigrant attitudes and support for political parties that offer anti-immigrant issue positions, as shown for Trump in the 2016 US election (Thompson 2021) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany between 2015 and 2017 (Mader et al. 2021; Pesthy et al. 2021). Recent research challenges the ethnic-civic dichotomy, indicating that ethnic and civic conceptions often coincide, particularly among individual with anti-immigrant attitudes (Hjerm 1998 *a*; e.g., Helbling et al. 2016; Lindstam et al. 2021; Mader et al. 2021) and among far-right parties (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014). The conceptions of nationhood are moreover found to be more complex and to range from inclusive to exclusionary (Hjerm 1998 *b*, *b*; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Helbling et al. 2016; Trittler 2017; May 2023). Particularly, the way individuals arrange and combine membership boundaries uncovers the underlying conceptions, which are found to drive attitudes towards immigrants (Trittler 2017).

Against this backdrop, exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are expected to account for anti-immigrant attitudes and, consequently, voting for parties that advocate issue positions on immigration that are in line with these conceptions. However, the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting should not be limited to the right. Eger and Olzak (2022), for example, find a polarising effect of anti-immigrant violence. As these acts of violence draw attention to immigration issues for all members of the nation, those with pro-immigrant attitudes are mobilised against the far-right. Mader et al. (2021) also find that both right-wing and left-wing parties in Germany are associated with different conceptions of nationhood. Similarly, while successful right-wing parties are found to offer exclusionary conceptions of nationhood (by combining ethnic and civic criteria) (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014), left-wing parties are also found to offer concrete and alternative conceptions to their voters (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). In line with these findings, data from the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2022) shows that particularly the AfD, the Left and the Greens offered positions on the national in-group and immigrants in the 2017 federal election (see Appendix A1.2 in the Supporting Information). In contrast, the manifestos of the other main parties contained few positions on immigration. While the AfD offers restrictive positions on immigration and demands cultural assimilation in their party manifesto, both left-wing

parties offer positive stances on multiculturalism, which may make them more attractive to voters with more inclusive and open conceptions of nationhood.

Based on these findings, I hypothesise that:

> *H1 (Direction of Effects 1): Individuals with more exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are more likely to vote for parties that offer anti-immigrant issue positions.*

> *H2 (Direction of Effects 2): Individuals with more inclusionary conceptions of nationhood are more likely to vote for parties that offer immigrant-friendly issue positions.*

2.2 Activation of (National) Identities: Social-Psychological Perspectives

Explaining the inconsistency of rather latent and stable national identity and more volatile voting behaviour, various contextual factors are thought to increase the importance of national identity to the point of shaping electoral decisions (Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Steiner and Harms 2021; Thompson 2021; Schulte-Cloos 2022; May and Czymara 2024). The general assumption is that national identities are rarely explicitly relevant in political contexts. However, the presence of globalisation or immigration issues is assumed to highlight national boundaries and, consequently, increase their relevance in voting. Put differently: Contextual factors are expected to *activate* national identity's potential to influence political behaviour.

Social psychological theories suggest that identities require activation to become behaviourally relevant, and that this activation is largely situational (c.f., Stets and Burke 2000). Due to different social situations, individuals constantly shift between guiding identities (Brewer and Weber 1994; Aquino et al. 2009; Huddy 2013: 533ff.). These shifts have consequences: In a survey experiment, respondents preferred policy positions that benefited either their ethnic group or their larger national group, depending on which group had been previously primed through question wording (Transue 2007). This suggests that identities not only develop political potential, but influence the decision between competing policy preferences, depending on which identity has been primed. Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1979) and Realistic

Group Conflict paradigm (Blumer 1958), individuals tend to select the option that benefits their in-group the most, either in terms of positive self-esteem, or (perceived) competition over scarce resources such as jobs and economic well-being (McLaren 2003; Sniderman et al. 2004). Yet, the group used as a reference depends on activation.

Activation, here, is the process of prioritising one identity over others to guide behaviour. The prioritisation of identities depends on the fit between a given situation and the meanings individuals attach to an identity, as well as the overall accessibility of these meanings within the self-concept (Stets and Burke 2000: 230; Aquino et al. 2009; Carter 2013: 206). Although certain identities have an *a priori* higher position in the hierarchical network of identities (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1994) and are therefore more easily accessed across situations, others that are lower in this network require explicit activation through situational cues. In contrast to person-based (e.g., moral identity) and role-based (e.g., mother, student) identities, group-based identities, like national identity, are relatively low in this network of identities and therefore require explicit activation (Stets and Burke 2000). In this case, it is essential that the knowledge structures associated with identities and social cues align to guide behaviour. The attached meanings, thereby, influence the processing of information and, moreover, guide the behavioural consequences (Monroe et al. 2000: 423f).

Taken together, group-based identities can influence decisions and behaviour, depending on the alignment of identity-related knowledge structures and the situational cues present in specific social situations. In the case of national identity, knowledge structures are represented by the conceptions of nationhood. Globalisation and immigration in public discourse can act as situational cues that bring national identity to the fore by reminding individuals of their national boundaries. Having narrower conceptions is expected to increase sensitivity to situational cues because larger parts of society are perceived as 'others' and potentially threatening to the national in-group. The overall position of the national identity within an individual's self-concept should further increase the activation potential, so that those with a strong national attachment are potentially more affected by situational cues.

> *H3 (Activation Hypothesis): The relationship between national identity and vote choices is conditional on the activation through situational* cues.

2.3 Mass Media, Issue Salience, and Voting

Even though the mass media have long been discussed as important driver of both threat perception of immigrants and anti-immigrant attitudes (Czymara & Dochow, 2018), immigration-related issue salience in the mass media has been overlooked in previous studies as potentially activating national identity for political behaviour. The mass media, positioned between the political system and the public (Wettstein & Wirth, 2017, p. 262), is an important gatekeeper in the exchange of information between politicians and the public that influences perceptions of issue importance, attitudes, and (voting) decisions (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2016).

According to agenda-setting and priming literature, by discussing immigration issues, the media position immigration as an important issue (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007 citing McCombs and Shaw 1972; Dunaway et al. 2011) and shape perceptions of immigrants by bringing pre-existing issue-related knowledge structures to the forefront of thinking, making them accessible in decision-making (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11). As conflicts over immigration relate to belonging, national identity, sovereignty, and solidarity (Hutter and Kriesi 2022), the presence of immigration issues in the news is likely to cause individuals to reflect on the boundaries of their national in-group, activating existing out-group stereotypes and feelings of competition. The increased salience of national identity then ultimately increases the likelihood of voting according to national identity. Again, the mechanism should be a function of the pre-existing knowledge structures associated with the nation, with those who hold more exclusionary views likely to be more sensitive to news about immigration.

Studies show that an increase in the prominence of immigration-related topics is linked to concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dunaway et al. 2011: 919; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; McLaren 2017; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and (far-right) voting (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Dennison and Geddes 2019; Dennison 2020; Damstra et al. 2021; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). The studies agree on the relationship between media coverage and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, but diverge on the impact of news content, tone, or direction, as well as the interaction between mass media and other contextual or individual factors. Some argue that framing influences the understanding and assessment of issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

Negative news is thereby found to shape perceptions of immigrants as problematic or threatening (Dunaway et al. 2011; Schemer 2012; Schlueter and Davidov 2013), while positive news about immigration has the opposite effect (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Schemer 2012). In contrast, others suggest that undirected issue salience of immigration has a stable and increasing effect on concerns about immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Czymara and Dochow 2018) and voting for anti-immigrant parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007). However, media coverage is found to focus mainly on the negative aspects of immigration (Hopkins 2010; Esses et al. 2013; Eberl et al. 2018), making it difficult to distinguish between frequency and tone effects (Hopkins 2010). Overall, individuals who are more educated and better informed, as well as progressives and centre-left voters, are less likely to be influenced by immigration-related news (Dunaway et al. 2011; Schemer 2012; Czymara and Dochow 2018). The impact of immigrant shares and unemployment varies across countries (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dunaway et al. 2011; Schlueter and Davidov 2013).

Overall, the mass media are found to influence the perception of immigrants, which, again, ultimately touches upon national boundaries. Immigration-related issue salience in the media, thus, may provide the situational cues that activate national identity for political behaviour. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 reads as follows:

> *H4 (Issue Salience): The relationship between national identity and vote choices is conditional on immigration-related issue salience.*

3 Data and Methods

The individual-level data used in the analysis stems from the German Longitudinal Election Study's Short-term Campaign Panel (GLES 2019), fielded between October 2016 and October 2017. Due to missing data, the analysis is based on seven of the eight waves that cover one year prior to the German federal election and two weeks immediately afterwards. The frame population is restricted to the non-probability Respondi online panel members selected based on age, gender, and education. The target population includes all German citizens eligible to vote in the 2017 election. The sample consists of a main sample, which started in October 2016, and a refresher sample, which started in July 2017

and fully merged with the main sample at the fifth wave. To reduce bias based on other national origin, the sample is limited to individuals with a long socialisation in Germany (holding German citizenship and both parents being born in Germany). The final sample includes 69,363 observations from 14,020 individuals after listwise deletion of cases with missing values for the included variables. Appendix A2 in the Supporting Information provides an overview of all included variables, their distribution, and the data structure, as not all variables (e.g., socio-demographics and national identity) were surveyed in each panel wave, which also varied in length and intervals between the waves. The media data was sourced from LexisNexis, which provides full text press information that were selected using a subject specific search string.

3.1 Outcome: Vote Intentions

To analyse the impact of immigration-related news on the activation of national identity for vote choice, I combine questions on intended vote choice and questions on early voters' vote choice from the pre-election waves with the retrospectively reported vote choice in the final wave. I created a binary variable (0 not voting for party, 1 voting for party) for the six main parties in Germany.

3.2 Conceptions of Nationhood

To identify conceptions of nationhood, I used items from the membership boundary question that asks respondents to rate the importance of membership criteria for being considered a true German. The item selection is based on the qualitative research by Ditlmann and Kopf-Beck (2019) in Germany and includes being born in Germany, having German ancestors, living most of one's life in Germany, sharing German manners and customs, speaking accent-free German, and having democratic beliefs. To identify conceptions of nationhood, I used Latent Class Analysis (LCA) by using the LCA Plugin version 1.2.1 for STATA (Collins and Lanza 2009; Lanza et al. 2018). After considering up to ten classes, the five-class solution was identified as the best fit to the data, with no significant improvement in the information criteria (BIC, AIC, CAIC, adjusted BIC) beyond that point.

Figure 1 shows the results of the LCA. The values indicate the probabilities of members of a class choosing a scale option for the surveyed criteria. High values indicate high probabilities and high within-class homogeneity. For example, when asked how important 'being born in Germany' is for being German, the probability of choosing 'very important' exceeds 0.9 for the exclusionists. Thus, members of this class have an over 90 per cent probability of choosing 'very important' as their answer.

Members of the first type, which I call the 'Exclusionist', who make up 16.21% (N=2,273) of the sample, have very narrow conceptions of nationhood. With conditioned probabilities above 0.75 to rate all the surveyed criteria as at least 'somewhat important' but mostly 'very important', such individuals set very high barriers to national membership and are very likely to use all available criteria to exclude 'others' from their national in-group. In doing so, they base their conceptions on both ethnic (e.g., German ancestry) and civic (e.g., having democratic beliefs) criteria. In line with the *Direction of Effects* – hypotheses, I expect individuals with these exclusionary conceptions of nationhood to favour the far-right party AfD, as the far-right party family offers a combination of ethnic and civic elements of national in-group definitions (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014). Given the narrow conceptions, members of this type categorise a large proportion of immigrants as outsiders, which should furthermore increase their sensitivity to immigration-related news. Therefore, an increase in the salience of immigration issues in the media should further increase their likelihood of voting for the AfD.

The second type, called 'Assimilationist', represents 33.42% (N=4,685) of the sample. Members of this type also attach importance to most of the membership criteria. However, they are more likely to choose the 'somewhat important' response, which makes them less rigid in their views. Furthermore, members of this type are more likely to place more importance on ideational and cultural integration (e.g., sharing German manners and customs and having democratic beliefs) and some form of naturalisation (e.g., being born in Germany). As ancestry, language proficiency, and residence are also seen as important in-group markers, members of this type would probably be more likely to accept second-generation immigrants into their national in-group if they are willing to integrate culturally and ideationally. Accordingly, in the 2017 election, in which only the AfD offered assimilationist policy positions alongside narrow in-group positions,

members of this type would also be expected to favour the far-right party. However, due to their less rigid conceptions of nationhood, the role of national identity as a voting motive is likely to be weaker and less likely to be activated by an increase in immigration-related issue salience.

Figure 1: Conceptions of Nationhood



Thirdly, members of the 'Indifferent' type, who make up 12.86% (N=1,803) of the sample, remain largely indifferent to the membership criteria. They are therefore not expected to be influenced in their voting by national identity or an increased immigration-related issue salience. This type serves as reference category in the following analyses.

Next, members of the 'Integrationist' type tend to reject nativist criteria, while placing a strong emphasis on democratic values and cultural-ideational integration (e.g., sharing German customs, and speaking accent-free German). To some extent, members of this type probably prefer and expect immigrants to be willing and able to participate in and interact with German society. I expect members of this type to prefer parties that offer integrative immigration policies, i.e. mainly the Greens and the Left. This type represents 25.18% (N=3,530) of the sample.

Finally, members of the 'Pluralist' type are strongly opposed to particularly nativist criteria and require of co-nationals only the basis of social coexistence, namely a belief in democratic principles. As members of this type tend not to demand cultural integration, they are likely to be more comfortable with higher levels of diversity. Therefore, I expect parties with positive positions on multiculturalism, like the Greens, and the Left, to be favoured by individuals with pluralistic conceptions of nationhood. But, based on their clear profile, they are arguably more consolidated in their conceptions of nationhood, which makes their in-group/out-group boundaries easier accessible in an environment of high salience of immigration-related issues. This type represents 12.33% (N=1,729) of the sample.

3.3 Media-Salience of Immigration-Related News

Following Czymara and Dochow (2018), the immigration-related issue salience measure is based on an exploratory factor analysis of variables counting the number of articles in the two German non-tabloid national newspapers (the conservative *Die Welt* and the left-wing *taz.die tageszeitung*) and two weekly news magazines with the highest circulation in Germany (*Der Spiegel* and Stern) for the past 21 days. The full-text articles were extracted from LexisNexis using a keywords search. The factor scores, that represent the media salience on a given day, are merged with the individual level based on the date of

the interview. A detailed description of the immigration-related issue salience measure can be found in the Appendix A2.4 in the Supporting Information.

The measure does not distinguish between positive and negative immigration-related news. Since immigration-related news is mostly negative overall (Eberl et al., 2018), the effect of immigration-related issue salience may, at best, underestimate the effect of negative news.

3.4 Confounders

I account for socio-demographic characteristics that may influence national identity, voting behaviour, and perception of media salience. Less educated, younger, male, and economically vulnerable individuals are found to favour parties with restrictive positions concerning immigration (Arzheimer 2009; Stockemer et al. 2021). Religious denomination (Siegers and Jedinger 2021) and religiosity (Arzheimer and Carter 2009), in contrast, are found to 'immunize' voters against far-right voting. Furthermore, rural-urban residence has been shown to influence voting in Germany (Deppisch et al. 2022). I therefor control for time-constant education level, subjective class membership, a non-linear age effect, gender, rural-urban residence, religiosity, and religion. As the panel was surveyed in an election year, to capture intensified party campaigning and communication as well as increased attention to national politics, I also include a linear time variable representing days until the election based on the respondent's specific interview date, with the value taking on 0 for the post-election wave.

Socio-psychological theories furthermore suggest that the *a priori* positioning of identity may influence the relationship between conceptions of nationhood, voting preferences, and their activation potential. I therefore also control for the position of national identity within the individual's self-concept. I additionally control for exposure to the included media outlets by including media consumption. Since issue-specific knowledge (Schemer 2012) and educational attainment (Czymara and Dochow 2018) are likely to decrease the media effects, I also control for political knowledge and political interest in addition to educational level.

3.5 Statistical Model

For the analyses I use hybrid random effects models with clustered standard errors at the individual level. Hybrid models have the advantage of decomposing within- and between-individual effects of all time-varying variables by including unit-specific means and de-meaned variables of these variables. The use of a hybrid model thus has the advantage of obtaining an unbiased within-individual effect equivalent to a fixed-effect estimate while also allowing for the inclusion of time-constant predictors, such as different conceptions of nationhood, in the models (Andreß et al. 2013; Schunck 2013). The within-effects represent the changes within individuals with respect to the dependent variables, in this vote switching. To adjust for any time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the state level that may be correlated with the dependent variable and that vary across states, such as immigration history and urbanisation, I include state dummies.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive Overview

A large proportion among the Exclusionists and Assimilationists in the sample clearly lean towards the right-wing AfD, while the picture is less clear for both open types and voting preferences for the Left and the Greens. However, vote switching is comparatively low with roughly 20 percent, with votes for the AfD being the most stable. This implies, that voting for the AfD is already quite popular among those with exclusionary conceptions, making the activation effects less likely to be identified throughout the analysis. In addition, over the period included in the dataset, media salience does not vary considerably across panel waves, which may cause additional problems. For an overview, please refer to the Appendix A2.5 in the Supporting Information.

Figure 2 plots the average probability of voting preferences against media salience at the aggregate level for all major German parties. The relationship between media salience and likelihood of voting varies considerably across parties. While parties in the centre are negatively related to the salience of immigration-related issues (-0.19 for Social Democrats (SPD), -0.48 for Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and -0.32 for Liberals

(FDP)), the correlation is positive for parties on the fringes of the political spectrum (0.08 for the Left, 0.43 for AfD and 0.59 for Greens). The latter are, thus, more likely to benefit from an increased salience of immigration-related issues in the media, while the centre parties seem to lose. To test the relationships in more detail, and to examine whether the effect of media salience is stronger for individuals with different conceptions of nationhood, we now turn to longitudinal models.

Figures 2. Voting preferences and media salience in Germany 2017.



4.2 Direct Effects

Table 1 reports the direct effects of conceptions of nationhood and media salience on vote choice for all parties. Having more exclusionary conception of the national in-group significantly increases the likelihood of voting for the AfD, while significantly decreasing the likelihood of voting for left-wing parties (SPD, Greens, and the Left). Conversely, more inclusive conceptions of nationhood significantly increase the likelihood of voting for the Greens and the Left, while decreasing the likelihood of voting for both AfD and CDU. Compared to all conceptions of nationhood effects, having exclusionary conceptions has the largest effect size in predicting voting for the AfD. Having exclusionary

conceptions increases the likelihood of choosing the AfD by almost 15 per cent (*p<.001*), in reference to the reference category Indifferents. In contrast, the effect sizes of more open conceptions predicting left-wing vote choices range only between 2.3 (*p<.01*) (integrationists choosing the Left) and 8.5 per cent (*p<.001*) for the Left among pluralists. Effect sizes of both moderate types (assimilationists, integrationists) are, as expected smaller than both conceptions with clear-cut profiles (exclusionists, pluralists). Centre parties are largely unaffected by conceptions of nationhood, except for a significantly smaller likelihood of pluralists choosing the centre-right parties CDU/CSU or FDP.

Table 1: Hybrid-effects models on vote choices

	CDU/CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens	The Left	AfD
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	-0.004	0.009	0.013**	0.023***	0.039***	0.038***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Media Salience (between)	-0.029	0.053	0.001	0.020	0.010	0.084*
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.027)
State-Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	0.005	-0.032**	-0.007	-0.018**	-0.039***	0.149***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Assimilationists	0.019*	-0.007	0.005	-0.003	-0.013	0.040***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Indifferents (=Ref.)						
Integrationists	-0.008	0.006	0.005	0.040***	0.023**	-0.024***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Pluralists	-0.040***	-0.005	-0.017*	0.052***	0.085***	-0.050***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Controls						
Socio-demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.049	0.096**	0.009	0.020	0.410***	0.192***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.215	0.234	0.177	0.180	0.195	0.168
sigma_u	0.307	0.299	0.205	0.200	0.248	0.268
rho	0.671	0.622	0.571	0.552	0.617	0.718

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Regarding the Direction of Effects-hypotheses, the findings give confidence to further investigate the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting. With open types preferring left-wing parties and more restrictive types preferring the far right,

we see a pattern of the expected directional effects. However, in line with previous findings, the relationship between narrow conceptions and voting is particularly strong for the far right. See Appendix B1 in the Supporting Information for a stepwise inclusion of control variables and a comparison of fixed, effects, and the presented hybrid effects models.

In these basic models, immigration-related issue salience also plays a significant role in shaping voting preferences. Accounting for individual differences, an increase in the media salience factor increases the likelihood of voting for parties on the fringes of the political spectrum: Greens, the Left, FDP and the AfD. Hence, major parties at the centre (which also did not offer substantial positions on immigration) seem to be unaffected by increased media-salience of immigration issues. A 1-unit increase in the media salience factor predicts an increase of 3.8 percentage points ($p<.001$) in voting for the AfD and of 3.9 percentage points ($p<.001$) for the Left. For comparison, moving one unit to the right on the left-right continuum (measured on an 11-point scale) increases the probability of voting the AfD by 0.5 percentage points and decreases the probability of voting the Left by 1.2 percentage points (see robustness checks & Appendix C in the Supporting Information). In conclusion, immigration-related issue salience in the media has a moderate and positive effect on switching to the Greens, the Left, the FDP and the AfD, in contrast to when immigration-related issues are less prominent. The following focuses on the interaction between conceptions of nationhood and the salience of immigration-related issues for voting.

4.3 Two-Way Interaction Models

To examine the potential impact of media salience on the directional effects of conceptions of nationhood, I estimated two-way interaction models. Figures 3.1-3.6 plot the relationships between media salience and the predicted vote probabilities for the six parties based on different conceptions of nationhood. Given the difficulty of plotting and interpreting predictive margins for hybrid models (Schunck 2013), the plots use random effects models. Fortunately, the effect sizes and significance levels are very similar between the within-individual effects of the hybrid models and those of the random effects models (see Appendix B2 in the Supporting Information).

The results support the assumption that the effects of conceptions of nationhood are conditional on the immigration-related issue salience, which, again, is particularly true for the exclusionists and voting for the AfD. Here, the interaction effect of individuals with exclusionary conceptions and immigration-related issue salience is statistically significant and reaches 5.7 percentage points ($p<.001$). For those with exclusionary conceptions, the probability of voting for the far-right AfD significantly differs from the reference category by 11 points ($p<.001$) when immigration-related issue salience is at its minimum (-0.2). When immigration-related issue salience reaches its maximum (0.8), the predicted difference in the model amounts to 18.4 percentage points ($p<.001$). Individuals with assimilationist views do not differ substantially from the reference category when the salience of immigration-related issues is minimal, as the difference is only 1.9 points ($p=0.05$). However, the difference increases to 5.9 percentage points ($p<.001$) when immigration-related issue salience reaches its maximum, indicating a moderating effect of immigration-related issue salience on the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting for the AfD. At the other end of the spectrum, changes in the media salience have only a minimal impact on voting preferences for the Left, but substantially increase the likelihood of voting for the Greens among open types. Pluralists are significantly more likely to vote for the Left. However, the predicted difference between Pluralists and the reference category increases from 9.0 to 9.1 percentage points (both $p<.001$) between the minimum and maximum immigration-related issue salience. While these results indicate that media salience does not moderate the relationship between conceptions of nationhood and voting for the Left, the main effect of media salience remains strong and statistically significant at 4.7 percentage points ($p<.001$) for the Left. However, when immigration issues salience is at its minimum, both Pluralists and Integrationists practically do not differ from the reference category in their probability of voting for the Greens. For Integrationists and Pluralists, the difference to the reference category changes from being weakly or not substantially different by 1.5 percentage points ($p=.15$) and 2.7 percentage points ($p<.05$) respectively, when the immigration-related issue salience is at its minimum, to 5.9 percentage points ($p<.001$) and 7.2 percentage points ($p<.001$) when immigration-related issue salience is at its maximum. Media salience, thus, appears to also have a moderating effect on open conceptions of nationhood and voting for the Greens. Put together, the effect of increased media attention to immigration-related issues is not

substantial for all individuals. It is, however, particularly substantial for those with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood that are increasingly drawn to the far-right when immigration-related issues are salient in the media. Also, those with open conceptions are more drawn to the Greens in times of increased media attention to immigration issues.

Figures 3.1-3.6: Interaction effects of conceptions of nationhood and media salience on vote choices



The findings generally support the Activation-Hypothesis, which proposed that the relationship between national identities and voting is conditional on activation through external factors. Activation is thereby proposed to increase the likelihood of

voting in accordance with the voting preferences associated with the conceptions of nationhood. Indeed, an increased immigration-related issue salience in the media increases the preferences for the AfD among those with exclusionist conceptions and for the Greens among those with more open conceptions. Furthermore, the Issue Salience-Hypothesis, which proposes that immigration-related issue salience is a key situational cue to increase the relevance of national identity in voting, can also be supported by these findings.

4.4 Robustness Checks[17]

Using hybrid random-effects models with unbalanced data (i.e., missing time points for some respondents) can lead to rather large differences between the estimated within-effects of the hybrid models and the desired unbiased FE estimates (Andreß et al. 2013: 165). Therefore, I additionally estimated both hybrid- and FE- models with those who participated in all panel waves. Despite losing roughly 40 percent of the sample, both main effects and the within-individual interaction effects are substantially stable and even increase slightly in the models.

Secondly, both left-right ideological position and party identification are considered stable and latent factors that play a crucial role in explaining vote choices. Party identification explains attitudes, as well as perceptions of issues and candidates (Campbell et al., 1960), while left-right self-placement captures voters' ideological position (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; De Vries et al. 2013). Nevertheless, it is important to note that both are endogenous to national identity and anti-immigrant positions (Van Der Brug and Harteveld 2021). Therefore, establishing a clear causal direction between national identity and party identification (cf. Mader et al. 2021) or left-right self-placement is not possible. To address this issue, I have included both party identification and left-right self-placement as additional controls in my models. Even with this conservative approach of including the potential moderating variables for the influence of the concept of national identity, the interaction results remain essentially similar. In other words, despite

[17] For all robustness checks, detailed descriptions and regression tables are available in the Supporting Information Appendix C.

controlling for party identification and left-right self-placement, conceptions of nationhood retain their explanatory value.

Thirdly, it may be questioned whether the same mechanisms are at work in East and West Germany. National identity is partly influenced by the available repertoires provided, such as citizenship policies, and conceptions of nationhood may differ due to the different political regimes between 1949 and 1990. Additionally, subnational identities may also influence the proposed relationship. When splitting the sample into East and West Germany, similar results to the models above were obtained. The distribution of conceptions is equal between East and West Germans, with the Left and the AfD being more popular and the Greens less popular among East German voters. The effect sizes, however, differ in the split samples, while the overall findings are replicated. While the interaction effect of exclusionary national identity conceptions and media salience for the AfD remains at 5.1 per cent ($p<.001$) in the west and even increases to 7.7 per cent ($p<.01$) in the east, the activating effect of immigration-related issue salience on conceptions of nationhood is only stable for the Greens in West Germany.

5 Conclusions

National identity is often associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and voting, especially for far-right parties. However, national identity tends to be latent and stable, and should therefore have a continuous impact on voting preferences, while the vote for the far right has increased significantly over the last decade. To explain the temporality of the relationship, social-psychological theories suggest a situational relevance of identities in guiding behaviour. Regarding national identity, I argued that national identity is a breeding ground for voting preferences, with individuals who hold exclusionary conceptions favouring parties that offer restrictive immigration policies and those who hold open conceptions favouring left-wing parties, and that this relationship becomes particularly strong when national identity becomes relevant to the individual. To increase the relevance of national identity, I argued that media content may play a role by increasing the salience of immigration-related issues, which stimulates reflection on national boundaries.

The results of this article provide several important insights into the relationship between national identity, immigration-related issue salience in the media, and voting preferences. First, confirming the findings of previous studies, voters with different conceptions of nationhood have different voting preferences, with open types preferring left-wing parties, and exclusionary types preferring the far-right. Second, the salience of immigration-related issues in the media seems to benefit parties on the fringes of the political spectrum (FDP, Greens, the Left, and AfD). The media effects in the hybrid panel models that are driven by intra-individual changes, suggest that in periods of high salience of immigration-related issues, there is an increased likelihood of switching to parties that offer different solutions to immigration-related issues. Third, the combination of the two components is particularly potent. Individuals with exclusionary conceptions of nationhood are already likely to vote for the AfD, but increased immigration-related issue salience furthermore strengthens the relationship, confirming the activation effect. The same is true for open types and voting preferences for the Greens. However, also the moderate exclusionary type is more likely to favour the Greens in times of high immigration-related issue salience. As the Greens offer multicultural approaches to immigration, the results potentially highlight the need for alternative positions on immigration, far from the far right. For the Left, in contrast, increased media salience does benefit the Left, but the effects do not substantially differ for different conceptions of nationhood.

While the study offers insights on the activation hypothesis, the study is limited in several ways. In addition to mass media content, events such as the so-called "migration crisis" and, as suspected by previous work (Garand et al. 2020; Bonikowski et al. 2021; Thompson 2021; Schulte-Cloos 2022; May and Czymara 2024), political elite rhetoric may also have the potential to independently increase the importance of national identity for voting decisions. Particularly party communication and campaigning may additionally influence changes in voting preferences (c.f. Johann et al. 2018). Future research may want to test the proposed relationship aloof from electoral campaigns to better disentangle party communication on immigration-related issues and news media effects. For now, I argue that especially during electoral campaigns, mass media are an important gatekeeper that provide citizens with information on politics (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016; Banducci et al. 2017). Finally, the effects attributed to priming and thus activation may be also attributed to learning effects (Lenz 2009), which

include learning about prominent issues and related party positions on these issues, and thus altering either issue positions or party preferences. Although learning effects cannot be completely ruled out, I argue that voters were well-informed about immigration and related party positions before participating in the panel. This makes priming and subsequently activation more likely. The immigration issue has been prominently discussed in the public since late 2015, and the AfD had already established itself as an anti-immigrant party by mid-15 (Arzheimer and Berning 2019).

In conclusion, this paper emphasises the interrelatedness of conceptions of nationhood, media salience, and national identification in shaping voting preferences. Conceptions of nationhood do form the breeding ground for voting decisions. The relationships are moreover found to be activated by immigration-related issue salience in the media. The combination of the two is found to be particularly potent for the support of the AfD. The study is the first to test the activation hypothesis using panel data and offers valuable insights into the (short-term) dynamics of voter behaviour based on social identities and opens avenues for future research in understanding the interplay between identity, media, and political preferences.

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Supporting Information

Appendix A Descriptives

Appendix A present contextual information on the 2017 German Federal Election, embeds the study in this context (A1) and presents an overview and background information on the data used in the study (A2). The data for the study stems from the main study GLES Short-term Campaign Panel 2017 (GLES, 2019) and the news articles provided by Nexis (www.lexisnexis.com) for the main analyses, and the Manifesto Project Dataset (Lehmann et al., 2022a, 2022b) for hypothesis building.

Appendix A1 The 2017 German Federal Election: Context and Background

Appendix A1.1 Most Important Problems in GLES Short-term Campaign Panel 2017

Figure A1.1 and Table A1.1 put the 2017 German election into perspective. They highlight the relevance of immigration-related issues had during the 2017 electoral campaign in Germany among the electorate. Immigration as problem include mentions of foreigner crime, immigration, integration, integration of Muslims, restrict immigration, asylum (incl. "refugee crisis", refugees, asylum applications, deportation), immigration of "economic refugees", alienation, immigrant shares, social benefits for foreigners). Across waves, migration is ranked as the first or second most important current problem by more than 60% of respondents.

Figure A1.1 Percentage of immigration as first or second most important problems.



Table A1.1: Immigration as Most or Second Most Important Problem.

In your opinion, what is the most/second most important problem facing Germany today? Immigration …

Wave	... is not the most/second most important problems	.. is				Total
		… the most important problem	… the second most important problem	… the most and second most important problem	Total	
1	28,82	53,43	15,36	2,38	71,18	100
3	37,79	40,87	19,54	1,80	62,21	100
4	39,07	37,53	21,85	1,55	60,93	100
5	35,49	40,83	22,04	1,64	64,51	100
6	33,50	41,49	23,27	1,73	66,50	100
7	36,31	38,51	23,50	1,68	63,69	100
8	35,44	39,69	22,95	1,92	64,56	100

Note: without missing values.

Appendix A1.2 Party Positions in 2017 (Based on Manifesto Data)

In contrast to the electorate, the parties have devoted comparatively little of their manifestos to migration-related issues. Figure A1.2 illustrates the proportion of party manifestos dedicated to issues related to the *National Way of Life* (positive or negative), including pro- and anti- immigration statements, and the proportion dedicated to *Multiculturalism* (positive or negative), including statements on assimilation or diversity. The first column of plots displays the total number of statements dedicated to the overall topics. The subsequent two columns represent the proportions dedicated to either general statements of these topics or their sub-dimensions (Anti-Immigration, Pro-Immigration, Assimilation, Diversity).

According to the Manifesto project (Lehmann et al., 2022a), positive Statements on the *National Way of Life* include „Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals." and „Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants.". Negative Statements include "Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history." and "Statements favouring new immigrants; against restrictions and quotas; rejection of the 'boat is full' argument. Includes allowing new immigrants for the benefit of the manifesto country's economy". (Lehmann et al., 2022b, p. 27f).

Positive Statements on *Multiculturalism* include „Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions." and "Statements favouring the idea that immigrants keep their cultural traits; voluntary integration;

state providing opportunities to integrate." while negative statements include "The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society." and "Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt the manifesto country's culture and fully assimilate. Reinforce integration." (Lehmann et al., 2022b, p. 28f.).

Figure A1.2: Shares of Party Manifestos devoted to Immigration-Related Issues



Note: Panels on the left represent the sum of panels on the middle and the right.

Appendix A2 Data Structure, Included Datasets and Variables

Appendix A2.1 Timing of panel waves and measured variables



* Socio-demographics include: gender, education, subjective class-membership, age, denomination, religiosity, living area (rural/urban), political knowledge

** Refresher Sample joined the sample from wave 4 onwards

Appendix A2.2 Construction of Generated Control Variables

Positioning of National Identity within Self-Concept: I transformed Likert-scale ratings of attachment to geopolitical entities (municipalities, state, Germany, European Union, Europ) into a ranking variable reflecting the position of Germany's position within the individual's self-concept. For respondents with multiple time points, the mean rank of national identity was calculated from the available data.

Media Consumption: The variable takes the highest value (4) in case the respondent did read political news in both newspapers and either the online or offline version of both news magazines at least once within the past week before the interview.

Political Knowledge: The variable represents an additive index of three questions asking for the 5%-threshold for parties to send representatives to the Bundestag, which vote decides how many seats each party gets in parliament, and who elects the Chancellor in Germany. The variable that the highest value (3) if all questions were answered correctly.

Appendix A2.3 Distribution of variables

Table A2.3.1 Distributions of time-constant variables

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Individual-Level Predictors					
Conception of Nationhood					
Exclusionists	14,020	0.16	0.37	0	1
Assimilationists	14,020	0.33	0.47	0	1
Indifferents	14,020	0.13	0.33	0	1
Integrationists	14,020	0.25	0.43	0	1
Pluralists	14,020	0.12	0.33	0	1
Individual-Level Confounders					
Positioning of National Identity	14,020	2.75	1.21	1	5
Education					
Lower secondary education	14,020	0.06	0.25	0	1
Upper secondary education	14,020	0.50	0.50	0	1
Post-secondary non-tertiary education	14,020	0.09	0.29	0	1
Short-cycle tertiary education	14,020	0.10	0.30	0	1
Bachelor's or equivalent level and above	14,020	0.23	0.42	0	1
Work status					
Paid work	14,020	0.61	0.49	0	1
In education	14,020	0.06	0.24	0	1
Unemployed	14,020	0.05	0.21	0	1
Retired	14,020	0.22	0.42	0	1
Else	14,020	0.06	0.25	0	1
Gender	14,020	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	14,020	48.57	14.57	18	89
Subjective Class Membership					
Lower class	14,020	0.08	0.26	0	1
Working class	14,020	0.17	0.38	0	1
Lower-middle class	14,020	0.28	0.45	0	1
Middle class	14,020	0.39	0.49	0	1
Upper-middle class	14,020	0.07	0.26	0	1
Upper class	14,020	0.00	0.07	0	1
Living Area (rural-urban)	14,020	3.36	1.49	1	5
Religiosity	14,020	2.06	1.13	1	5
Denomination					
No confession	14,020	0.47	0.50	0	1
Protestants	14,020	0.29	0.45	0	1
Catholics	14,020	0.22	0.42	0	1
Other Religion	14,020	0.02	0.15	0	1
Political Knowledge	14,020	1.67	1.05	0	3

Table A2.3.2 Distributions of time-varying variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
Dependent Variables					
Vote Choice CDU/CSU					
overall	0.19	0.39	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.34	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.19	-0.67	1.04	T-bar = 4.94743
Vote Choice SPD					
overall	0.18	0.39	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.33	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.21	-0.67	1.04	T-bar = 4.94743
Vote Choice FDP					
overall	0.08	0.27	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.23	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.16	-0.77	0.94	T-bar = 4.94743
Vote Choice Greens					
overall	0.08	0.28	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.23	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.16	-0.77	0.94	T-bar = 4.94743
Vote Choice The Left					
overall	0.13	0.33	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.28	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.17	-0.73	0.98	T-bar = 4.94743
Vote Choice AfD					
overall	0.13	0.33	0	1	N = 69363
between		0.3	0	1	n = 14020
within		0.15	-0.73	0.98	T-bar = 4.94743
Contextual Predictor					
Media Salience					
overall	0.46	0.24	-0.20	0.96	N = 69363
between		0.10	-0.11	0.96	n = 14020
within		0.23	-0.06	1.13	T-bar = 4.74888
Individual-Level Confounders					
Media Consumption					
overall	0.65	1.06	1	5	N = 69363
between		0.94	1	5	n = 14020
within		0.50	-2.78	4.08	T-bar = 4.74888
Political Interest					
overall	2.44	0.98	1	5	N = 69363
between		0.95	1	5	n = 14020
within		0.35	0.05	5.73	T-bar = 4.74888
Individual-Level Controls (Robutsness Checks)					
Left-Right Self-Placement (1=left, 11=right)					
overall	5.51	2.25	1	11	N = 37760
between		2.01	1	11	n = 11699
within		0.80	-2.49	13.51	T = 3.22763
Party Identification: CDU/CSU					
overall	0.29	0.45	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.43	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.15	-0.51	1.09	T = 3.22763

Table A2.2.2 (continued)

Party Identification: SPD					
overall	0.26	0.44	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.41	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.17	-0.54	1.06	T = 3.22763
Party Identification: FDP					
overall	0.06	0.233	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.215	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.107	-0.74	0.86	T = 3.22763
Party Identification: Greens					
overall	0.10	0.30	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.278	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.12	-0.70	0.90	T = 3.22763
Party Identification: the Left					
overall	0.14	0.35	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.32	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.14	-0.66	0.94	T = 3.22763
Party Identification: AfD					
overall	0.11	0.31	0	1	N = 37760
between		0.30	0	1	n = 11699
within		0.11	-0.69	0.91	T = 3.22763

Appendix A2.4 Immigration-Related Issue Salience in the Media

Following Czymara and Dochow (2018), the media salience measure is based on articles provided by Nexis, which have been identified using the search string, also developed by Czymara and Dochow (2018):

> "(*migrant* or *migration* or *flücht* or *flucht* or *ausländer* or *asyl*) and (*deutschland* or *bundesrepublik* or *brd) and (*integration* or *abschieb* or *abgeschob* or *einbürgerung* or *aufenthaltsgenehm* or *ausländerkriminalität* or (*kriminalität* w/5 (*wander* or *migrant* or *flücht* or *ausländer* or *fachkr* or (*qualifi* w/3 (*wander* or *migrant* or *flücht* or *ausländer*)) or (*arbeit w/3 (*wander* or *migrant* or *flücht* or *ausländer*)) or (*beruf w/3 (*wander* or *migrant* or *flücht* or *ausländer*)) or ((*terror* or *anschlag*) w/5 *islam*) or zwangshochzeit or zwangsheirat or *parallelgesellschaft* or *kopftuch* or *ehrenmord* or *hassprediger* or *burka* or (*islam* or *muslim* w/5 (*wander* or *migrant* or *flücht* or *ausländer*))".

According to Czymara and Dochow (2018, p. 385) "this search string identifies articles which simultaneously include (i) at least one of several terms directly referring to immigration, (ii) the term 'Germany' or synonyms, and (iii) at least one of several terms more broadly connected to immigration."

The results than have been reduced to entries from the taz.die Tageszeitung, Welt, Spiegel, Stern for offline articles between 01 May 2013 and 31 December 2017. The time span represents both German Longitudinal Election Study's Short-term Campaign Panels 2013 (GLES, 2016) and 2017 (GLES, 2019). After deleting all duplicates, letters from the readers, table of contents, and short news, the results were submitted to an exploratory factor analysis.

The salience measure is obtained by an exploratory factor analysis of the counting variables indicating the number of extracted articles in each of the four outlets for the past 21 days, with single days as units of analysis. The factor values represent the media salience on the specific days. Higher values indicate higher media salience of immigration-related issues. Cumulating counts for the past 21 days thereby ensures that the topic was salient for long enough to be discussed and remembered at the time of the interview. The factor has an eigenvalue of 2.85. Factor loadings and uniqueness values (in brackets) of the outlets are: Die Welt: 0.92 (0.16), taz.die tageszeitung: 0.87 (0.25), Der Spiegel: 0.83 (0.30), Stern: 0.75 (0.44).

Figure A2.4.1 illustrates the number of articles dealing with immigration (green bars) and the corresponding values of the daily media salience measures based on 21 days prior (black line) for the 2017 Shor-term Campaign panel. Though media salience varies quite some bit, the largest changes take place between wave 1 and wave 2. Hence, the media salience values that are merged with respondents based on the date of interview may cause some problems in the models due to small variances.

Figure A2.4.1 Immigration-related articles and media salience measure across panel waves 2017.



Figure A2.4.2 illustrates that the panel waves that have been used for the study took place exactly after the highest immigration-related issue salience in the media. Particularly in the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016 immigration-related issues played a major role in the German media. Although these topics have also been prominent during the second half of 2016 and 2017, the respondents of the GLES panel study 2017 were likely to have been exposed to immigration-related issues in the media before joining the panel study.

Figure A2.4.2 Immigration-related articles and media salience from 2013 to 2021



Appendix A2.5 Vote Switching

Figure A2.5.1 illustrates the overall voting behaviour and vote switching behaviour across all waves. Please note that in wave 4 the refresher sample joined the sample which changes the proportions of vote intentions in the graph. Furthermore, from wave 6 on, for respondents that already voted by mail no values for their vote intentions are available. With the exception of a sudden increase in vote intentions in favour of the SPD due to the so called "Schulz effect" – the nomination of Martin Schulz as candidate for chancellor on January 29th 2017, no major changes in the voting intentions occurred throughout the panel due to external shocks in the electoral campaign. Luckily, due to the missing media exposure data in wave 2 (fielded in February/March 2017), the panel models are not biased by this sudden increase from wave 1 to wave 2. Overall, the Schulz effect did not prove to be durable (Wuttke & Schoen, 2019), which is also shown in the figure below. With wave 3, the next wave included in the sample, vote intentions for the SPD have already "normalized". Besides this spike, voting behaviour and vote switching did not change drastically before or during the electoral campaigns. Additionally, the figure underlines the rather small proportion of respondents that switched between parties in the sample. Overall, of all respondents, 21.56% switched from one party to another party.

Figure A2.5.1 Vote Switching across Panel Waves.



Figure A2.5.2 illustrates voting preferences and vote switching behaviour by conceptions of nationhood in the sample. Especially parties at the centre are preferred by both moderate types (Assimilationists, Integrationists). Both open types (Integrationists, Pluralists) lean towards left-wing parties, and both exclusionary types (Exclusionists, Assimilationists) – and Exclusionists in particular – clearly lean towards the far-right *AfD*. Overall, vote switching is comparatively low. Of all vote intentions in the dataset and across waves, switching to another party occurs in only roughly 20 percent. Thereby, votes for the *AfD* are the most stable.

Figure A2.5.2: Vote Switching by Types and Parties



Note: Bars indicate all voting preferences for each party across panel waves by conceptions of nationhood, coloured parts indicate those vote preferences that are a switch *to* the party from one panel wave to the other.

Table A2.5.1: Share of vote switching to party of all voting intentions by voters of a party by conceptions of nationhood

	Exclusionists	Assimilationists	Indifferents	Integrationists	Pluralists
CDU/CSU	10.92	10.57	12.19	12.16	12.56
SPD	9.86	9.98	11.01	10.12	9.57
FDP	14.56	14.26	16.71	13.92	13.26
Greens	11.22	12.18	11.18	11.75	12.29
The Left	14.15	12.51	12.99	11.62	11.81
AfD	9.42	9.88	11.49	10.68	12.72

Appendix A2.6 Immigration-related Party Positions in the 2017 Election

Figure A2.6 plots the party positions as rated by voters of all parties. The figure shows that in the 2017 election, voters of all parties (including voters of the AfD itself) agreed that the AfD's position on immigration is the most restrictive. AfD voters also ranked all other parties as more open to immigration than voters of any other party.

Figure A2.6: Party Positions on Immigration Issues, rating by party voters



Appendix B Main Models

In all models, "Socio-Demographics 1" includes gender, education, subjective class membership, work status and a squared age term. "Socio-Demographics 2" includes the variables for religious denomination, religiosity, and subjective assessment of the living area as rural or urban.

Appendix B1 Direct Hybrid Effects Models

Table B1.1 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for CDU/CSU

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	-0.089**	-0.087**	-0.043	-0.041	-0.032	-0.029
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						✓
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	0.020	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.008	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Assimilationists	0.043***	0.037***	0.036***	0.026**	0.021*	0.019*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	0.007	0.004	0.004	-0.007	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Pluralists	-0.045***	-0.043***	-0.044***	-0.052***	-0.039***	-0.040***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Pos. of National Identity		0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.210***	0.184***	0.175***	0.058**	0.017	0.049
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.215	0.215	0.215	0.215	0.215	0.215
sigma_u	0.317	0.317	0.317	0.312	0.307	0.307
rho	0.685	0.685	0.685	0.678	0.672	0.671

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1.2 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for SPD

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	-0.019***	-0.019***	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	0.028	0.025	0.059*	0.048	0.048	0.053
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	-0.026**	-0.019	-0.019	-0.028**	-0.028**	-0.032**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Assimilationists	-0.004	0.002	0.002	-0.004	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	0.011	0.014	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Pluralists	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.003	0.005	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Pos. of National Identity		-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.172***	0.201***	0.195***	0.115***	0.080***	0.096**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.234	0.234	0.234	0.234	0.234	0.234
sigma_u	0.306	0.305	0.305	0.303	0.302	0.299
rho	0.631	0.630	0.631	0.628	0.626	0.622

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1.3 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for FDP

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	-0.023***	-0.023***	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Media Salience (between)	-0.038	-0.036	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Assimilationists	0.018**	0.013*	0.012*	0.007	0.006	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	0.016*	0.014*	0.013*	0.007	0.007	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Pluralists	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.015*	-0.013	-0.017*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pos. of National Identity		0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until Election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.090***	0.071***	0.063***	0.009	0.004	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.178	0.178	0.177	0.177	0.177	0.177
sigma_u	0.207	0.207	0.207	0.205	0.205	0.205
rho	0.576	0.575	0.576	0.572	0.572	0.571

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1.4 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for the Greens

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	0.037***	0.037***	0.023***	0.023***	0.023***	0.023***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Media Salience (between)	0.038	0.035	0.019	0.023	0.022	0.020
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	-0.038***	-0.028***	-0.027***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.018**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Assimilationists	-0.010	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	0.047***	0.051***	0.051***	0.044***	0.044***	0.040***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pluralists	0.071***	0.068***	0.068***	0.056***	0.057***	0.052***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Pos. of National Identity		-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.016***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until Election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.054***	0.094***	0.097***	0.094***	0.075***	0.020
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.020)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
sigma_u	0.204	0.203	0.203	0.201	0.201	0.200
rho	0.562	0.560	0.560	0.556	0.555	0.552

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1.5 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for the Left

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	0.005	0.005	0.040***	0.040***	0.040***	0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	0.009	0.006	0.046	0.028	0.023	0.010
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	-0.039***	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.031***	-0.028***	-0.039***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Assimilationists	-0.020**	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	0.028***	0.032***	0.031***	0.033***	0.032***	0.023**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pluralists	0.109***	0.106***	0.105***	0.108***	0.099***	0.085***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Pos. of National Identity		-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.016***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until Election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.112***	0.154***	0.146***	0.176***	0.203***	0.410***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195
sigma_u	0.260	0.259	0.259	0.254	0.252	0.248
rho	0.639	0.638	0.639	0.629	0.624	0.617

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B1.6 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for the AfD

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Contextual Level						
Media Salience (within)	0.025***	0.025***	0.039***	0.038***	0.039***	0.038***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Media Salience (between)	0.069*	0.075**	0.091***	0.090***	0.088**	0.084**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Bundeslaender-Dummies						
Individual Level						
Conceptions of Nationhood						
Exclusionists	0.180***	0.159***	0.159***	0.157***	0.159***	0.149***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Assimilationists	0.058***	0.039***	0.039***	0.043***	0.045***	0.040***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)						
Integrationists	-0.018**	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.018**	-0.019**	-0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pluralists	-0.049***	-0.043***	-0.043***	-0.036***	-0.041***	-0.050***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Pos. of National Identity		0.032***	0.032***	0.031***	0.031***	0.033***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Controls						
Days until Election			✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1				✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2					✓	✓
Media Consumption						✓
Political Interest						✓
Political Knowledge						✓
Constant	0.056***	-0.023	-0.026	0.023	0.057**	0.192***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Observations	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.168
sigma_u	0.276	0.274	0.274	0.271	0.270	0.268
rho	0.730	0.727	0.727	0.723	0.721	0.718

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B2 Comparing Fixed, Random, and Hybrid Models

Table B2.1 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for CDU/CSU

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	-0.004	-0.005	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Media Salience (within)			-0.004
			(0.005)
Media Salience (between)			-0.029
			(0.029)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	0.006		0.005
	(0.011)		(0.011)
Assimilationists	0.019*		0.019*
	(0.009)		(0.009)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	-0.007		-0.008
	(0.009)		(0.009)
Pluralists	-0.040***		-0.040***
	(0.010)		(0.010)
Pos. of National Identity	0.011***		0.010***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.016	0.210***	0.049
	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.215	0.215	0.215
sigma_u	0.307	0.337	0.307
rho	0.671	0.711	0.671

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2.2 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for SPD

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	0.010	0.010	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Media Salience (within)			0.009
			(0.005)
Media Salience (between)			0.053
			(0.030)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	-0.030**		-0.032**
	(0.010)		(0.010)
Assimilationists	-0.007		-0.007
	(0.009)		(0.009)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	0.007		0.006
	(0.010)		(0.010)
Pluralists	-0.004		-0.005
	(0.011)		(0.011)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.012***		-0.012***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.099***	0.208***	0.096**
	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.234	0.234	0.234
sigma_u	0.299	0.328	0.299
rho	0.622	0.664	0.622

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2.3 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for FDP

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	0.013**	0.013**	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Media Salience (within)			0.013**
			(0.004)
Media Salience (between)			0.001
			(0.020)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	-0.007		-0.007
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Assimilationists	0.005		0.005
	(0.006)		(0.006)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	0.005		0.005
	(0.006)		(0.006)
Pluralists	-0.016*		-0.017*
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Pos. of National Identity	0.008***		0.008***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.000	0.094***	0.009
	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.019)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.177	0.177	0.177
sigma_u	0.205	0.227	0.205
rho	0.571	0.620	0.571

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2.4 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for the Greens

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	0.023***	0.023***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Media Salience (within)			0.023***
			(0.004)
Media Salience (between)			0.020
			(0.021)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	-0.018**		-0.018**
	(0.006)		(0.006)
Assimilationists	-0.003		-0.003
	(0.006)		(0.006)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	0.040***		0.040***
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Pluralists	0.052***		0.052***
	(0.009)		(0.009)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.016***		-0.016***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.027	0.066***	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.020)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.180	0.180	0.180
sigma_u	0.200	0.227	0.200
rho	0.552	0.614	0.552

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2.5 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for the Left

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	0.039***	0.041***	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Media Salience (within)			0.039***
			(0.005)
Media Salience (between)			0.010
			(0.025)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	-0.035***		-0.039***
	(0.008)		(0.008)
Assimilationists	-0.012		-0.013
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	0.025**		0.023**
	(0.008)		(0.008)
Pluralists	0.089***		0.085***
	(0.011)		(0.010)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.017***		-0.016***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.345***	0.133***	0.410***
	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.030)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.195	0.195	0.195
sigma_u	0.248	0.282	0.248
rho	0.617	0.676	0.617

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2.6 Hybrid, random, and fixed effects models on vote choices for AfD

	Random effects	Fixed effects	Hybrid effects
Contextual Level			
Media Salience	0.038***	0.038***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Media Salience (within)			0.038***
			(0.004)
Media Salience (between)			0.084**
			(0.027)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level			
Conceptions of Nationhood			
Exclusionists	0.155***		0.149***
	(0.010)		(0.010)
Assimilationists	0.042***		0.040***
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)			
Integrationists	-0.022**		-0.024***
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Pluralists	-0.045***		-0.050***
	(0.007)		(0.007)
Pos. of National Identity	0.032***		0.033***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Controls			
Days until Election	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 1	✓	✓	✓
Socio-demographics 2	✓	✓	✓
Media Consumption	✓	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓	✓
Political Knowledge	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.125***	0.111***	0.192***
	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.029)
Observations	69363	69363	69363
sigma_e	0.168	0.168	0.168
sigma_u	0.268	0.299	0.268
rho	0.718	0.760	0.718

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B3 Interaction Models: Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience

Table B3.1 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for CDU/CSU

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		-0.009	-0.011	-0.010
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
				between-effects
				0.033
				(0.063)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	0.007		0.031
		(0.014)		(0.046)
	Assimilationists	0.020		0.079*
		(0.012)		(0.039)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	-0.010		0.009
		(0.012)		(0.042)
	Pluralists	-0.056***		-0.025
		(0.013)		(0.045)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	0.000	0.001	0.001
		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	0.001	0.003	0.003
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	0.005	0.006	0.006
		(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	0.028	0.029	0.029
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			-0.051
				(0.096)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			-0.127
				(0.082)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			-0.034
				(0.087)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			-0.037
				(0.094)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.018	0.210***	0.020
		(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.039)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.215	0.215	0.215
sigma_u		0.307	0.337	0.307
rho		0.672	0.711	0.672

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3.2 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for SPD

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		0.027*	0.028*	0.027*
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
				between-effects
				0.058
				(0.082)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	-0.023		-0.039
		(0.013)		(0.052)
	Assimilationists	0.001		0.001
		(0.012)		(0.045)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	0.016		0.006
		(0.012)		(0.048)
	Pluralists	0.012		-0.002
		(0.015)		(0.054)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
		(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	-0.021	-0.021	-0.021
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.036*
		(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			0.017
				(0.110)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			-0.017
				(0.095)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			0.000
				(0.101)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			-0.006
				(0.113)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.092***	0.208***	0.093*
		(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.046)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.234	0.234	0.234
sigma_u		0.300	0.329	0.300
rho		0.622	0.664	0.622

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3.3 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for FDP

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		0.008	0.008	0.008
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
				between-effects
				0.005
				(0.048)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	-0.008		-0.034
		(0.009)		(0.032)
	Assimilationists	0.001		0.019
		(0.008)		(0.029)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	0.006		0.014
		(0.009)		(0.030)
	Pluralists	-0.023*		-0.024
		(0.010)		(0.034)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	0.003	0.002	0.002
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	0.009	0.010	0.010
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	0.013	0.013	0.013
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			0.057
				(0.067)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			-0.030
				(0.061)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			-0.019
				(0.062)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			0.014
				(0.070)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.002	0.094***	0.007
		(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.028)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.177	0.177	0.177
sigma_u		0.205	0.227	0.205
rho		0.571	0.620	0.571

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3.4 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for the Greens

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		-0.000	-0.002	-0.001
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
				between-effects
				0.023
				(0.051)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	-0.017*		0.002
		(0.008)		(0.028)
	Assimilationists	-0.017*		0.001
		(0.008)		(0.028)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	0.023*		0.028
		(0.009)		(0.034)
	Pluralists	0.035**		0.048
		(0.011)		(0.042)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	0.031**	0.032**	0.032**
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	0.037**	0.037**	0.037**
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	0.037*	0.038*	0.038*
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			-0.042
				(0.058)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			-0.009
				(0.060)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			0.024
				(0.071)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			0.009
				(0.090)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.038*	0.066***	0.019
		(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.029)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.180	0.180	0.180
sigma_u		0.200	0.226	0.200
rho		0.553	0.612	0.553

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3.5 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for the Left

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		0.045***	0.049***	0.047***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
				between-effects
				-0.073
				(0.068)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	-0.025*		-0.081
		(0.010)		(0.042)
	Assimilationists	-0.010		-0.072
		(0.009)		(0.037)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	0.026**		0.016
		(0.010)		(0.040)
	Pluralists	0.091***		-0.001
		(0.013)		(0.052)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	-0.025*	-0.027*	-0.027*
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	-0.004	-0.006	-0.006
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	0.001	-0.002	-0.002
		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			0.088
				(0.087)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			0.124
				(0.076)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			0.014
				(0.083)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			0.189
				(0.109)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.342***	0.133***	0.448***
		(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.042)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.195	0.195	0.195
sigma_u		0.248	0.282	0.248
rho		0.618	0.676	0.618

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3.6 Hybrid, random, and fixed effect interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for the AfD

		Random-effects	Fixed-effects	Hybrid model
Contextual Level				within-effects
Media Salience		0.014	0.013	0.014
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
				between-effects
				0.078
				(0.065)
Individual Level				
Conceptions of Nationhood	Exclusionists	0.128***		0.216***
		(0.012)		(0.051)
	Assimilationists	0.026**		-0.001
		(0.009)		(0.039)
	Indifferents			
	Integrationists	-0.027**		-0.030
		(0.008)		(0.037)
	Pluralists	-0.048***		-0.035
		(0.009)		(0.037)
				within-effects
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	Exclusionists x Media Salience	0.055***	0.057***	0.057***
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience	0.033***	0.032***	0.032***
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
	Integrationists x Media Salience	0.011	0.012	0.012
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	Pluralists x Media Salience	0.010	0.011	0.011
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
				between-effects
	Exclusionists x Media Salience			-0.145
				(0.106)
	Assimilationists x Media Salience			0.087
				(0.084)
	Integrationists x Media Salience			0.013
				(0.078)
	Pluralists x Media Salience			-0.030
				(0.079)
Controls		✓	✓	✓
Constant		0.136***	0.112***	0.195***
		(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.039)
Observations		69363	69363	69363
sigma_e		0.168	0.168	0.168
sigma_u		0.268	0.297	0.268
rho		0.719	0.758	0.719

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B4 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Models

Differences of National Identity at minimum and maximum of Immigration-related issue salience in the media; dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.

Table B4.1 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, CDU/CSU

	dy/dx	95% conf. interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.007	-0.023	0.038
	(0.016)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.008	-0.015	0.031
	(0.012)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.019	-0.008	0.047
	(0.014)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.020*	0.000	0.041
	(0.010)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents)			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.011	-0.038	0.017
	(0.014		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.004	-0.026	0.017
	(0.011)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.061***	-0.092	-0.031
	(0.015)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.028*	-0.051	-0.004
	(0.012)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4.2 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, SPD

	dy/dx	95% conf. interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.02	-0.05	0.01
	(0.015)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.037**	-0.061	-0.013
	(0.012)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.004	-0.022	0.031
	(0.013)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.015	-0.037	0.007
	(0.011)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents)			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.02	-0.007	0.048
	(0.014)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.005	-0.028	0.018
	(0.012)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.019	-0.014	0.053
	(0.017)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.024	-0.051	0.002
	(0.014)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4.3 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, FDP

	dy/dx	95% conf.interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.009	-0.031	0.013
	(0.011)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.005	-0.020	0.011
	(0.008)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.00	-0.02	0.019
	(0.01)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.010	-0.004	0.025
	(0.007)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents), base level			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.006	-0.014	0.026
	(0.010)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.004	-0.011	0.019
	(0.008)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.025*	-0.048	-0.003
	(0.011)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.009	-0.026	0.008
	(0.009)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4.4 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, Greens

	dy/dx	95% conf.interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.017	-0.036	0.002
	(0.01)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.019*	-0.035	-0.003
	(0.008)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.024*	-0.042	-0.005
	(0.009)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.014	-0.002	0.03
	(0.008)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents), base level			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.015	-0.006	0.036
	(0.011)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.06***	0.041	0.078
	(0.009)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.027*	0.001	0.053
	(0.013)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.072***	0.05	0.095
	(0.012)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4.5 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, the Left

	dy/dx	95% conf. interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.02	-0.043	0.004
	(0.012)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.05***	-0.069	-0.031
	(0.01)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.01	-0.03	0.011
	(0.011)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.014	-0.032	0.003
	(0.009)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents), base level			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.027*	0.004	0.05
	(0.012)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.023*	0.004	0.042
	(0.01)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.09***	0.06	0.12
	(0.015)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.091***	0.066	0.117
	(0.013)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table B4.6 Average marginal effects of the Main Interaction Model, AfD

	dy/dx	95% conf.interval	
Conceptions of Nationhood (Exclusionists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.116***	0.09	0.143
	(0.014)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.184***	0.16	0.207
	(0.012)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Assimilationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	0.02	-0.000	0.039
	(0.01)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	0.059***	0.042	0.077
	(0.009)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Reference=Indifferents), base level			
Conceptions of Nationhood (Integrationists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.029**	-0.048	-0.011
	(0.009)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.016	-0.032	0.000
	(0.008)		
Conceptions of Nationhood (Pluralists)			
at Media Salience = -.2012 (min)	-0.05***	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.01)		
at Media Salience = 1.0138 (max)	-0.038***	-0.055	-0.02
	(0.009)		

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C Robustness Checks

The following analyses present the results of robustness checks. Robustness Checks RC1a (hybrid effects models) and RC1b (fixed effects models) include only respondents that participated in all 7 panel waves.

Robustness Checks RC2a-c include either Left-Right Self-placement of respondents (RC2a), Party Identification (RC2b), or both (RC2c) as additional controls. Left-Right Self-placement (RILE placement) is measured with the question “In politics people often talk of "left" and "right". […] And where would you place yourself?” using a 11-point Likert scale from 1(left) to 11(right). Party Identification refers to the party in the models, with taking the value of 1 if respondents identified with the party in question, and 0 if they did not identify with the party.

Robustness Checks RC3a and RC3b split the sample into East Germany (RC3a) and West Germany (RC3b). For the separate analyses, I only include respondents who were born in East or West Germany and who did not move between the two parts between their birth and the interview. I have also excluded Berliners from the analysis. While this strategy is fairly certain to distinguish between East and West Germans (which may mean spending adulthood, being born and raised, having parents from one part or the other, or being socialised in a predominantly East or West German environment after reunification), it may also introduce bias by ignoring reasons why people stayed or moved from one part to the other, or by including, for example, children born in the West but of parents socialised in the East. The results suggest that, although the effect sizes differ between East and West Germany, the overall findings can be replicated in both parts: (i) individuals with more exclusionary conceptions are attracted to the right-wing AfD, while (ii) those with more inclusionary conceptions are attracted to left-wing parties (with the Left being much stronger in the East due to the overall higher vote share for the Left in East Germany), and (iii) the exclusionary conceptions - right-wing voting preference effect is moderated by the salience of immigration-related issues in both parts.

Like all main models in the manuscript, all robustness check models include *a priori* positioning of national identity, education level, subjective class membership, a non-linear age effect, gender, rural-urban residence, religiosity, religion, political knowledge, political interest, media consumption, days until election and state dummies.

Appendix C1 Direct hybrid effects

Table C1.1 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for CDU/CSU

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	-0.012*	-0.013*	-0.020*	-0.015	-0.015	-0.018	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	-0.147*		-0.049*	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.021
	(0.064)		(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.058)	(0.033)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	0.003		-0.036**	0.006	0.005	0.025	-0.007
	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Assimilationists	0.030*		0.007	-0.001	-0.002	0.061***	0.002
	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	0.004		0.003	0.005	0.005	0.033	-0.025*
	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Pluralists	-0.044**		-0.015	0.009	0.009	-0.029	-0.051***
	(0.013)		(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Pos. of National Identity	0.012***		-0.000	-0.004	-0.004	0.001	0.013***
	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
RILE Position (within)			0.003*		0.003		
			(0.002)		(0.002)		
RILE Position (between)			0.038***		0.000		
			(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.240***	0.653***		
				(0.013)	(0.007)		
PID (between)				0.654***	0.239***		
				(0.007)	(0.013)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.089	0.218***	-0.096**	0.026	0.024	0.017	0.049
	(0.046)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.054)	(0.065)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.208	0.208	0.215	0.210	0.210	0.217	0.215
sigma_u	0.320	0.347	0.314	0.192	0.192	0.286	0.313
rho	0.702	0.735	0.681	0.454	0.454	0.635	0.680

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1.2 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for SPD

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	0.007	0.007	-0.024**	-0.019*	-0.019*	0.003	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Media Salience (between)	0.048		0.015	0.002	-0.001	-0.020	0.073*
	(0.064)		(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.054)	(0.034)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	-0.035**		-0.019	-0.016*	-0.010	-0.048**	-0.028*
	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Assimilationists	-0.006		-0.015	-0.017*	-0.015*	-0.033*	-0.004
	(0.012)		(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	0.011		-0.032**	-0.020**	-0.023**	0.004	0.007
	(0.012)		(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Pluralists	0.007		-0.061***	-0.020*	-0.027**	-0.021	-0.002
	(0.015)		(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.015***		-0.005	-0.005**	-0.004	-0.007	-0.013***
	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
RILE Position (within)			-0.003		-0.002		
			(0.002)		(0.002)		
RILE Position (between)			-0.033***		-0.006***		
			(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.270***	0.665***		
				(0.014)	(0.008)		
PID (between)				0.671***	0.270***		
				(0.007)	(0.014)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.078	0.209***	0.250***	0.095***	0.122***	0.175***	0.030
	(0.046)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.230	0.230	0.238	0.232	0.232	0.220	0.236
sigma_u	0.311	0.333	0.309	0.183	0.183	0.255	0.311
rho	0.647	0.678	0.627	0.385	0.384	0.573	0.635

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1.3 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for FDP

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	0.018***	0.017***	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.012	0.011*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	0.035		-0.025	-0.012	-0.009	0.081*	-0.009
	(0.044)		(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	-0.011		-0.023**	0.002	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.009)		(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Assimilationists	0.001		-0.002	0.013*	0.011*	-0.005	0.006
	(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	0.000		0.010	0.006	0.009	-0.003	0.006
	(0.009)		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Pluralists	-0.024*		-0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.008	-0.020*
	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Pos. of National Identity	0.009***		0.005**	0.006***	0.004**	0.010**	0.009***
	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
RILE Position (within)			0.002		0.001		
			(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)			0.014***		0.006***		
			(0.001)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.294***	0.775***		
				(0.021)	(0.014)		
PID (between)				0.781***	0.294***		
				(0.014)	(0.021)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	-0.034	0.091***	-0.050*	-0.010	-0.037*	-0.049	0.067
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.051)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.174	0.174	0.174	0.170	0.170	0.170	0.179
sigma_u	0.215	0.231	0.211	0.140	0.139	0.194	0.207
rho	0.603	0.637	0.595	0.405	0.403	0.565	0.572

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1.4 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for the Greens

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	0.025***	0.024***	0.024***	0.020**	0.020**	0.012	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	0.054		0.000	-0.013	-0.015	-0.038	0.020
	(0.046)		(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.024)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	-0.024**		-0.009	-0.006	-0.003	-0.014	-0.019*
	(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Assimilationists	-0.006		-0.004	-0.000	0.001	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.008)		(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	0.031***		0.032***	0.012*	0.010	0.036**	0.039***
	(0.009)		(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Pluralists	0.053***		0.037***	0.010	0.006	0.056***	0.051***
	(0.011)		(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.014***		-0.015***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.010**	-0.019***
	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
RILE Position (within)			0.001		0.001		
			(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)			-0.016***		-0.004***		
			(0.001)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.268***	0.621***		
				(0.019)	(0.012)		
PID (between)				0.624***	0.268***		
				(0.012)	(0.019)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.010	0.066***	0.091***	0.014	0.030	0.013	0.140
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.085)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.176	0.176	0.187	0.182	0.182	0.151	0.187
sigma_u	0.204	0.225	0.211	0.141	0.141	0.160	0.210
rho	0.573	0.620	0.561	0.375	0.374	0.531	0.557

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1.5 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for the Left

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	0.037***	0.038***	0.028***	0.030***	0.028***	0.057***	0.036***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Media Salience (between)	-0.030		-0.007	0.003	-0.006	0.033	-0.009
	(0.054)		(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.061)	(0.027)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	-0.051***		0.014	-0.004	0.011	-0.093***	-0.022**
	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Assimilationists	-0.021*		-0.001	-0.005	-0.000	-0.041*	0.002
	(0.010)		(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.007)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	0.021		-0.010	0.005	-0.003	0.006	0.035***
	(0.011)		(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Pluralists	0.086***		0.025*	0.028***	0.012	0.084**	0.095***
	(0.014)		(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.011)
Pos. of National Identity	-0.019***		-0.001	-0.006***	-0.001	-0.022***	-0.014***
	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)
RILE Position (within)			-0.012***		-0.009***		
			(0.002)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)			-0.062***		-0.018***		
			(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.270***	0.700***		
				(0.018)	(0.010)		
PID (between)				0.743***	0.267***		
				(0.009)	(0.018)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.484***	0.133***	0.715***	0.071***	0.172***	0.469***	0.311***
	(0.044)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.062)	(0.079)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.193	0.193	0.194	0.189	0.189	0.225	0.187
sigma_u	0.260	0.291	0.236	0.145	0.142	0.304	0.231
rho	0.645	0.693	0.597	0.371	0.360	0.645	0.603

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C1.6 Direct hybrid effects models on vote choices for AfD

	RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level							
Media Salience (within)	0.039***	0.039***	0.031***	0.022***	0.023***	0.053***	0.035***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Media Salience (between)	0.074		0.050*	0.013	0.020	0.107	0.111***
	(0.058)		(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.030)
Bundeslaender-Dummies	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Level							
Conceptions of Nationhood							
Exclusionists	0.169***		0.109***	0.021**	0.013*	0.178***	0.141***
	(0.013)		(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Assimilationists	0.043***		0.028**	0.010*	0.008	0.042*	0.038***
	(0.009)		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Indifferents (= Ref.)							
Integrationists	-0.021*		0.002	-0.003	0.003	-0.040*	-0.023**
	(0.009)		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Pluralists	-0.055***		0.009	-0.014**	-0.001	-0.060***	-0.046***
	(0.009)		(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Pos. of National Identity	0.033***		0.019***	0.013***	0.010***	0.038***	0.031***
	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)
RILE Position (within)			0.008***		0.005***		
			(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)			0.057***		0.014***		
			(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)				0.331***	0.832***		
				(0.021)	(0.009)		
PID (between)				0.864***	0.329***		
				(0.008)	(0.021)		
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.198***	0.113***	-0.036	-0.004	-0.055**	0.205***	0.109**
	(0.043)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.061)	(0.041)
Observations	51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e	0.166	0.166	0.159	0.153	0.153	0.187	0.162
sigma_u	0.271	0.300	0.260	0.147	0.145	0.296	0.259
rho	0.727	0.765	0.727	0.480	0.474	0.715	0.717

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C2 Interaction Effects Models

Table C2.1 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for CDU/CSU

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			-0.013	-0.014	-0.033	-0.024	-0.023	-0.018	-0.006
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Media Salience (between)			-0.066		-0.039	-0.064	-0.064	-0.098	0.089
			(0.135)		(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.124)	(0.074)
Individual Level									
	Conceptions of Nation-hood	Exclusionists	0.065		-0.045	-0.031	-0.032	0.004	0.048
			(0.089)		(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.093)	(0.053)
		Assimilation-ists	0.053		0.018	-0.024	-0.024	-0.015	0.095*
			(0.081)		(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.082)	(0.046)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integration-ists	0.046		0.007	-0.033	-0.032	-0.033	0.011
			(0.091)		(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.049)
		Pluralists	0.045		-0.007	-0.012	-0.011	-0.075	-0.017
			(0.094)		(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.094)	(0.053)
Pos. of National Identity			0.012***		-0.000	-0.004	-0.004	0.002	0.013***
			(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	-0.009	-0.009	-0.001	-0.009	-0.009	-0.017	0.003
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.017)
		Assimilation-ists x MS	-0.003	-0.003	0.010	0.008	0.008	-0.009	0.006
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.015)
		Integration-ists x MS	0.003	0.003	0.015	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.003
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.015)
		Pluralists x MS	0.021	0.021	0.041*	0.034	0.034	0.032	0.021
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.016)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	-0.129		0.019	0.084	0.084	0.042	-0.112
			(0.191)		(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.189)	(0.109)
		Assimilation-ists x MS	-0.048		-0.026	0.051	0.051	0.157	-0.198*
			(0.174)		(0.068)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.169)	(0.095)
		Integration-ists x MS	-0.091		-0.009	0.085	0.085	0.136	-0.075
			(0.196)		(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.169)	(0.102)
		Pluralists x MS	-0.201		-0.018	0.046	0.046	0.089	-0.078
			(0.202)		(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.189)	(0.110)
RILE Position (within)					0.003*		0.003		
					(0.002)		(0.002)		
RILE Position (between)					0.038***		0.000		
					(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.240***	0.239***		
						(0.013)	(0.013)		
PID (between)						0.654***	0.653***		
						(0.007)	(0.007)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			0.051	0.218***	-0.100*	0.051	0.049	0.062	-0.010
			(0.072)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.208	0.208	0.215	0.210	0.210	0.217	0.215
sigma_u			0.321	0.347	0.314	0.192	0.192	0.287	0.314
rho			0.703	0.735	0.681	0.454	0.454	0.636	0.681

Table C2.2 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for SPD

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			0.033*	0.032*	-0.011	-0.009	-0.009	0.043	0.021
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.014)
Media Salience (between)			0.105		0.029	0.073	0.070	-0.275	0.140
			(0.171)		(0.071)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.173)	(0.091)
Individual Level									
Conceptions of Nationhood		Exclusionists	-0.006		-0.003	-0.007	-0.000	-0.166	-0.009
			(0.099)		(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.098)	(0.062)
		Assimilationists	0.080		-0.032	0.018	0.019	-0.165	0.041
			(0.091)		(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.094)	(0.051)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integrationists	-0.040		-0.009	0.039	0.035	-0.161	0.038
			(0.094)		(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.099)	(0.053)
		Pluralists	0.040		-0.034	0.010	0.002	-0.147	0.038
			(0.113)		(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.119)	(0.059)
Pos. of National Identity			-0.015***		-0.005	-0.005**	-0.004	-0.007	-0.013***
			(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	-0.018	-0.018	0.002	0.007	0.008	-0.023	-0.012
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.018)
		Assimilationists x MS	-0.031	-0.031	-0.017	-0.019	-0.019	-0.039	-0.006
			(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.016)
		Integrationists x MS	-0.026	-0.025	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002	-0.061*	-0.008
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.016)
		Pluralists x MS	-0.051*	-0.051*	-0.042	-0.035	-0.035	-0.073*	-0.030
			(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.019)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	-0.062		-0.038	-0.021	-0.024	0.252	-0.038
			(0.212)		(0.093)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.200)	(0.130)
		Assimilationists x MS	-0.187		0.041	-0.077	-0.077	0.281	-0.095
			(0.197)		(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.194)	(0.108)
		Integrationists x MS	0.114		-0.052	-0.135*	-0.134*	0.350	-0.068
			(0.204)		(0.085)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.206)	(0.112)
		Pluralists x MS	-0.074		-0.060	-0.067	-0.066	0.268	-0.087
			(0.246)		(0.095)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.246)	(0.124)
RILE Position (within)					-0.003		-0.002		
					(0.002)		(0.002)		
RILE Position (between)					-0.033***		-0.006***		
					(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.270***	0.270***		
						(0.014)	(0.014)		
PID (between)						0.672***	0.666***		
						(0.007)	(0.008)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			0.051	0.210***	0.243***	0.064*	0.092**	0.291**	-0.000
			(0.085)	(0.008)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.093)	(0.068)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.230	0.230	0.238	0.232	0.232	0.220	0.236
sigma_u			0.311	0.333	0.309	0.183	0.183	0.255	0.311
rho			0.647	0.678	0.627	0.385	0.384	0.573	0.635

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C2.3 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for FDP

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			0.007	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.001
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.010)
Media Salience (between)			-0.050		-0.034	0.007	0.009	0.212*	-0.050
			(0.112)		(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.105)	(0.052)
Individual Level									
	Conceptions of Nation-hood	Exclusionists	-0.081		-0.046	0.030	0.023	-0.025	-0.055
			(0.063)		(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.072)	(0.036)
		Assimilationists	-0.014		-0.002	0.012	0.010	0.090	-0.015
			(0.062)		(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.060)	(0.033)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integrationists	-0.067		0.021	0.034	0.037*	0.084	-0.003
			(0.066)		(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.059)	(0.034)
		Pluralists	-0.080		-0.027	-0.030	-0.023	0.120	-0.043
			(0.069)		(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.061)	(0.039)
Pos. of National Identity			0.009***		0.005**	0.006***	0.004**	0.010**	0.009***
			(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	0.014	0.014	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.007
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.014)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.018	0.018	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	0.023	0.014
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)
		Integrationists x MS	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.005
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.012)
		Pluralists x MS	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.018	0.018	0.016	0.022
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.013)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	0.155		0.052	-0.065	-0.061	0.037	0.105
			(0.136)		(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.156)	(0.074)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.035		0.001	0.003	0.003	-0.201	0.046
			(0.134)		(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.129)	(0.067)
		Integrationists x MS	0.148		-0.025	-0.064	-0.064	-0.184	0.020
			(0.142)		(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.128)	(0.069)
		Pluralists x MS	0.122		0.056	0.057	0.056	-0.267*	0.049
			(0.149)		(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.126)	(0.080)
RILE Position (within)					0.002		0.001		
					(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)					0.014***		0.006***		
					(0.001)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.294***	0.294***		
						(0.021)	(0.021)		
PID (between)						0.781***	0.776***		
						(0.014)	(0.014)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			0.005	0.091***	-0.046	-0.018	-0.044*	-0.115*	0.084
			(0.056)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.174	0.174	0.174	0.170	0.170	0.170	0.179
sigma_u			0.215	0.231	0.211	0.140	0.139	0.194	0.207
rho			0.603	0.638	0.595	0.404	0.403	0.565	0.572

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C2.4 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for the Greens

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			0.006	0.006	-0.012	-0.010	-0.010	0.014	-0.000
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.011)
Media Salience (between)			0.090		-0.011	-0.011	-0.012	-0.032	0.022
			(0.106)		(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.089)	(0.062)
Individual Level									
Conceptions of Nation-hood		Exclusionists	-0.023		-0.004	0.001	0.005	0.002	0.014
			(0.059)		(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.045)	(0.033)
		Assimilationists	0.047		-0.014	-0.015	-0.013	0.018	-0.004
			(0.059)		(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.034)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integrationists	-0.000		0.014	0.014	0.012	0.008	0.025
			(0.065)		(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.039)
		Pluralists	0.106		0.054	0.044	0.040	0.047	0.044
			(0.081)		(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.072)	(0.050)
Pos. of National Identity			-0.014***		-0.015***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.009**	-0.019***
			(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	-0.014	-0.014	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.014	-0.004
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.013)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.022	0.022	0.042**	0.039*	0.039*	0.001	0.032*
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.013)
		Integrationists x MS	0.033*	0.033*	0.054**	0.042*	0.042*	-0.010	0.038**
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.014)
		Pluralists x MS	0.043*	0.043*	0.059**	0.046*	0.046*	0.023	0.040*
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.017)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	-0.002		-0.012	-0.016	-0.018	-0.035	-0.069
			(0.130)		(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.095)	(0.069)
		Assimilationists x MS	-0.115		0.023	0.033	0.033	-0.053	0.002
			(0.128)		(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.099)	(0.073)
		Integrationists x MS	0.068		0.043	-0.004	-0.004	0.058	0.030
			(0.142)		(0.059)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.136)	(0.083)
		Pluralists x MS	-0.117		-0.040	-0.077	-0.077	0.015	0.014
			(0.177)		(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.149)	(0.107)
RILE Position (within)					0.001		0.001		
					(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)					-0.016***		-0.004***		
					(0.001)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.267***	0.267***		
						(0.019)	(0.019)		
PID (between)						0.624***	0.621***		
						(0.012)	(0.012)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			-0.007	0.066***	0.095**	0.013	0.028	0.009	0.139
			(0.053)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.088)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.176	0.176	0.187	0.182	0.182	0.151	0.187
sigma_u			0.204	0.224	0.211	0.141	0.141	0.161	0.210
rho			0.573	0.618	0.561	0.375	0.374	0.533	0.558

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C2.5 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for the Left

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			0.036**	0.037**	0.028	0.028*	0.026	0.062**	0.046***
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.010)
Media Salience (between)			-0.004		-0.038	-0.047	-0.053	0.265	-0.176**
			(0.147)		(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.208)	(0.066)
Individual Level									
Conceptions of Nationhood		Exclusionists	-0.012		0.000	-0.028	-0.010	0.003	-0.108*
			(0.087)		(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.109)	(0.044)
		Assimilationists	-0.062		-0.031	-0.041	-0.035	0.081	-0.097**
			(0.077)		(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.108)	(0.037)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integrationists	0.112		-0.001	-0.016	-0.022	0.189	-0.016
			(0.087)		(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.114)	(0.041)
		Pluralists	0.069		-0.009	0.019	0.001	0.172	-0.059
			(0.113)		(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.143)	(0.054)
Pos. of National Identity			-0.019***		-0.001	-0.006***	-0.001	-0.023***	-0.014***
			(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.047	-0.019
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.013)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.007	-0.016	-0.010
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.011)
		Integrationists x MS	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.031	-0.014
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.012)
		Pluralists x MS	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.011	0.011	0.005	-0.003
			(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.017)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	-0.089		0.031	0.054	0.047	-0.202	0.180*
			(0.188)		(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.229)	(0.091)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.087		0.068	0.082	0.079	-0.257	0.209**
			(0.166)		(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.228)	(0.076)
		Integrationists x MS	-0.201		-0.021	0.048	0.044	-0.387	0.107
			(0.189)		(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.239)	(0.085)
		Pluralists x MS	0.041		0.077	0.020	0.025	-0.182	0.335**
			(0.248)		(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.294)	(0.114)
RILE Position (within)					-0.012***		-0.009***		
					(0.002)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)					-0.062***		-0.018***		
					(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.270***	0.267***		
						(0.018)	(0.018)		
PID (between)						0.743***	0.700***		
						(0.009)	(0.010)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			0.473***	0.133***	0.729***	0.093***	0.192***	0.361**	0.389***
			(0.077)	(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.110)	(0.085)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.193	0.193	0.194	0.189	0.189	0.225	0.187
sigma_u			0.261	0.290	0.236	0.145	0.142	0.304	0.231
rho			0.645	0.693	0.597	0.371	0.360	0.646	0.603

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C2.6 Hybrid interaction models of Conceptions of Nationhood and Media Salience on vote choices for AfD

			RC1a	RC1b	RC2a	RC2b	RC2c	RC3a	RC3b
Contextual Level									
Media Salience (within)			0.009	0.009	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.013	0.013
			(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.009)
Media Salience (between)			0.017		0.092	0.064	0.069*	0.033	0.118
			(0.091)		(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.103)	(0.072)
Individual Level									
Conceptions of Nation-hood		Exclusionists	0.229**		0.123**	0.043	0.032	0.254**	0.216***
			(0.085)		(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.098)	(0.057)
		Assimilationists	-0.034		0.063*	0.044*	0.041*	-0.020	-0.011
			(0.061)		(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.081)	(0.043)
		Indifferents (= Ref.)							
		Integrationists	-0.058		0.018	0.017	0.023	-0.130	0.000
			(0.061)		(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.069)	(0.040)
		Pluralists	-0.076		0.017	0.008	0.021	-0.129	-0.021
			(0.059)		(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.079)	(0.042)
Pos. of National Identity			0.033***		0.019***	0.013***	0.010***	0.038***	0.031***
			(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Interactions Conceptions of Nationhood x Media Salience	*Within Effects*	Exclusionists x MS	0.066***	0.066***	0.056**	0.055**	0.054**	0.077**	0.051***
			(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.015)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.034**	0.034**	0.036**	0.033**	0.032*	0.054*	0.029**
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.010)
		Integrationists x MS	0.023*	0.023*	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.030	0.010
			(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.010)
		Pluralists x MS	0.011	0.011	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.011
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.011)
	Between Effects	Exclusionists x MS	-0.133		-0.032	-0.049	-0.043	-0.158	-0.163
			(0.183)		(0.082)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.199)	(0.120)
		Assimilationists x MS	0.167		-0.079	-0.076	-0.075	0.133	0.104
			(0.134)		(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.171)	(0.093)
		Integrationists x MS	0.080		-0.035	-0.046	-0.045	0.192	-0.050
			(0.133)		(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.146)	(0.084)
		Pluralists x MS	0.047		-0.019	-0.050	-0.050	0.144	-0.051
			(0.130)		(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.166)	(0.090)
RILE Position (within)					0.008***		0.005***		
					(0.001)		(0.001)		
RILE Position (between)					0.057***		0.014***		
					(0.002)		(0.001)		
PID (within)						0.331***	0.329***		
						(0.021)	(0.021)		
PID (between)						0.864***	0.832***		
						(0.008)	(0.009)		
Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			0.224***	0.113***	-0.053	-0.025	-0.076**	0.249***	0.111*
			(0.053)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.069)	(0.050)
Observations			51173	51173	37760	37760	37760	16324	54932
sigma_e			0.166	0.166	0.159	0.152	0.152	0.187	0.162
sigma_u			0.271	0.297	0.260	0.147	0.145	0.296	0.259
rho			0.727	0.763	0.728	0.481	0.474	0.716	0.718

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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