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The Impact of Immigration Policy on Social Cohesion in European Countries

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CATPCA	Categorical Principal Component Analysis
ESS	European Social Survey
IMPIC	Immigration Policy in Comparison Index
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
ISEI	International Socio-Economic Index
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

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Chapter 1. Framework chapter

This dissertation examines the impact that national immigration policies have on social cohesion in European countries. In doing so, it provides new ways of looking at the societal impacts of immigration policies. In this framework chapter, I present the research questions, theoretical approach, main findings, and overall contributions of the dissertation, as well as of the three articles that make it up. In the following pages, I place my research in the wider societal and scholarly context.

1.1 Introduction and research questions

In recent decades, European governments have often debated how to regulate immigration as the number of immigrants has increased. Whether immigration policies need to be restrictive to maintain social cohesion is often at the heart of these debates.

In these discussions, it is often assumed that too much immigration and weak immigration controls undermine a population's ability to feel connected to each other and to its political system by threatening its shared moral community. Politicians and migration scholars alike often offer restrictive immigration policies as political solutions, presenting them as necessary conditions for socially cohesive societies. Since around the 1960s, restrictive immigration policies have frequently been seen as a remedy for the alleged negative consequences of mass immigration on social cohesion (Bonjour 2014, 208–9; Doornik et al. 2009). These consequences are often described as citizens who feel politically alienated and socially and politically distrustful, as well as immigrants who are not sufficiently socio-economically and culturally integrated and thus could destabilize social cohesion (Bonjour 2014, 209; e.g., Collier 2013; Doornik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016; Goodhart 2004, 2013; Koopmans 2019).

This dissertation seeks to challenge the prominent assumption of restrictive immigration policies as a means of maintaining and enhancing social cohesion. As this dissertation argues, it is poorly understood whether, to what extent, and under what conditions, immigration policies affect social cohesion. The aim of this dissertation is thus to outline theoretical mechanisms through which immigration policies may influence cohesion as well as to test them systematically and empirically for a wide range of European countries.

Conceptually, the dissertation assumes that immigration policies can have an impact on social cohesion in a country by either affecting the *population as a whole* or *immigrants*.¹ Using this distinction as a functional heuristic, the dissertation develops and tests two theoretical mechanisms through which immigration policies may impact social cohesion: (a) ‘policy congruence effects’ on the population as a whole, and (b) ‘composition effects’ on immigrants. Both mechanisms are hypothesized to impact certain aspects of social cohesion, and they reflect common public discourse about the ways in which immigration policy is supposedly relevant to social cohesion.

In this dissertation, social cohesion is understood as a “state of affairs” in which members of a nation-state feel connected to each other *and* to the political system (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290; Schaeffer 2016, 8–9; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586). It consists of feelings of mutual trust and active social participation as well as trust in governing political institutions and political participation – and it is accompanied by a sense of solidarity. Thereby, the dissertation focuses on *social connectedness* and *political connectedness*, which I take to constitute the two dimensions of social cohesion (Chan, To, and Chan 2006; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017).²

What is the societal relevance of investigating the effects of immigration policy on social cohesion? Social cohesion is viewed by scholars and political stakeholders as a precondition for the welfare state (Collier 2013; Crepaz 2006; Goodhart 2004, 2013; Holtug 2010, 2021), democratic health (Putnam 1995, 2000), and the production of public goods (Koopmans, Lancee, and Schaeffer 2015, 2; Paxton 2002; Schaeffer 2016, 8; Schiefer et al. 2012, 13). It is not surprising, therefore, that political stakeholders place a high priority on maintaining social cohesion. In recent decades, governments and political parties have focused on a range of global and national developments that have the potential to undermine social cohesion, including social inequality (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2002), globalization (Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler 2019; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Golder 2016; Hobolt 2016), and increasing numbers of immigrants (e.g., Jeannet 2019). The current wave of nationalism, ‘Brexit’, and increased public support for the far right in countries such as Germany (Mayer

¹ Note that for the purposes of this dissertation, I define the ‘population as a whole’ as all citizens who hold the *legal citizenship* of the country in which they live. Furthermore, I define an ‘immigrant’ as a first-generation immigrant, that is, a person who was born outside the country in which he/she lives and has one or more parents who also meet this criterion, regardless of whether he/she has acquired legal citizenship of that country or not (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2608). To summarize this, for analytical purposes I take the ‘population as a whole’ to be legal citizens of the country in which they live, and ‘immigrants’ to be first-generation immigrants.

² Some authors refer to these two dimensions as horizontal and vertical connectedness, but I prefer the terms social and political connectedness for their simplicity.

2023), France (Lichfield 2023), and the Netherlands (Slawson 2023) are also manifestations of social and political distrust in institutions and can be linked to public dissatisfaction with how governments are handling increasing levels of immigration (e.g., Brady, Ferejohn, and Paparo 2020; Mader and Schoen 2019).

It is not surprising, therefore, that in recent years immigration policy has increasingly been seen by European governments as a policy instrument to limit the negative impact of immigration on social cohesion. A prominent assumption in political discourse is that social cohesion requires that all members of a society share, to some degree, the same cultural values and practices (Bonjour 2014, 209), which are often seen as national in character (McLaren 2015; Miller and Ali 2014), or in other words share a “moral community” (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586). Immigration restrictions, it is suggested, would be necessary to preserve these values and practices and thereby maintain social cohesion.

Two policy rationales associated with this assumption stand out and are addressed in this dissertation. First, by adopting more restrictive immigration policies, policymakers signal to those citizens who feel culturally alienated by immigration that their demands for greater political representation are being addressed, thereby discouraging further political alienation and disconnectedness among them. Second, immigrants who are unskilled and have brought with them a set of non-Western cultural and religious values and practices are often blamed for failing to integrate if they are unemployed or disengaged from social and political life (e.g., Bonjour 2014, 209; Doomernik et al. 2009, 11; Goodman 2014). Restrictions on immigration hold the promise to limit immigration to those groups of immigrants who are more skilled and culturally similar to the native-born, and thus more socially and politically connected.

Therefore, as this dissertation argues, immigration policy is politically assumed to influence social cohesion by affecting the population as a whole as well as immigrants, thereby contributing to maintaining and increasing the level of social and political connectedness in a country. There are, however, certain constraints on the efforts of governments in liberal representative democracies to restrict immigration. As presumed by the liberal paradox (Hampshire 2013; Hollifield 1992), liberal representative democracies must reconcile public demands for ‘representation’ with constitutional and corporate demands for ‘responsibility’ (Armingeon and Lutz 2019). In these efforts, governments have introduced selective immigration policies that filter (Beine et al. 2016; FitzGerald and Arar 2018, 388) the composition of immigration flows based on high skills and cultural similarity (e.g., Bonjour 2014; Doomernik et al. 2009; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Goodman 2014), as well as ‘policy mixes’ (Czaika, Bohnet, and Zardo 2021; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021) that prioritize publicly

avored humanitarian admissions over publicly less favored economic admissions (Crawley and Skleparis 2018).

Whether the aforementioned policy rationales and their theoretical assumptions hold in practice is not sufficiently understood. There is, particularly, a lack of empirical studies that examine the effects of immigration policy as ‘policy outputs’ on social cohesion. Immigration policies regulate who can be admitted and permitted to stay (Bjerre et al. 2015), and they are referred to here as policy outputs, namely concrete laws, regulations, and decisions (Knill and Tosun 2011, 496–97). Rather, most existing studies have looked at the effects of immigration ‘policy outcomes’ on social cohesion, thus focusing on the consequences resulting from the outputs (Easton 1965, 351). As a result, important research puzzles related to the causal relationship between immigration policy and social cohesion have been neglected by the research community.

First, there are unaddressed research puzzles regarding the potential effects of immigration policy on social cohesion through its impact on the population as a whole. There are conflicting theoretical assumptions in the literature about whether political trust, a key element of the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion, is (a) volatile enough to be affected by policies (Easton 1975; van der Meer and Zmerli 2017), and it is (b) unclear whether the public has sufficient knowledge about policies for them to actually influence their level of political trust (Achen and Bartels 2016). Additionally, it is (c) unclear whether asylum and labor migration policies (which are different immigration policy areas) affect political trust differently, given that there are conflicting theoretical views in the literature on whether attitudes toward different immigrant groups (such as asylum seekers and labor migrants) are related or differ (Jedinger and Eisentraut 2020; Meeusen et al. 2018; Meuleman et al. 2019; Meuleman and Billiet 2003). Despite these research puzzles on the relationship between immigration policy and political trust, existing empirical studies have so far only tested the effects of integration policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016) and immigration policy outcomes (Harteveld et al. 2018; Jeannet 2019; McLaren 2011; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015) on political trust, thereby neglecting the role of immigration policy outputs.

Second, there are unaddressed research puzzles regarding the potential effects of immigration policy on social cohesion through its impact on immigrants. It is often assumed that restrictive immigration policies can limit immigration flows to the group of immigrants with a greater integration potential (i.e., more highly skilled and culturally similar immigrants; Doomernik et al. 2009), thereby increasing those integration outcomes of immigrants that are

relevant for the level of social and political connectedness in a society (cf. Kesler and Demireva 2011). Nevertheless, in terms of research puzzles, it is (a) still debated how effective immigration policies are in limiting the composition of immigration flows to immigrant groups that are highly skilled and culturally similar to the native-born (Czaika and de Haas 2013; Helbling and Leblang 2018), and (b) whether social and institutional constraints in the host countries hinder the successful integration of immigrants, thereby reducing the potential positive effects of the policies on social cohesion (e.g., Doornik et al. 2009). Despite these research puzzles, the few existing studies in this area have mostly examined single policies, policy effects in a few countries, and focused on integration outcomes with indirect relevance to social and political connectedness (Cangiano 2014; Chiswick and Miller 2004; Cobb-Clark 2003; Constant and Zimmermann 2005; Goodman and Wright 2015; Guzi, Kahanec, and Mýtna Kureková 2023; Söhn 2013; Tani 2020; Taylor and Foster 2015).

Overall, there is a lack of systematic research that combines these two perspectives. In particular, there is need for research that examines how and to what extent immigration policies affect social cohesion through their effects on both the population as a whole and immigrants. There are, to my knowledge, only a few exceptions, but they are either theoretical in nature (Holtug 2010, 2021) or lack original empirical research (Collier 2013; Goodhart 2004, 2013).

The dissertation seeks to address this lacuna, examining immigration policy effects on the social and political connectedness of societies in European liberal democracies, focusing on both the overall population and immigrants.³ It aims to achieve this by applying different research methodologies, developing theoretical approaches, and focusing on a variety of indicators of social cohesion. Thereby, it intends to empirically shed light on the actual impact of different government immigration policies on social cohesion. In doing so, the dissertation seeks to establish in the relevant literature ‘policy congruence’ and ‘composition effects’ as two modes of how immigration policies can potentially impact social cohesion.

The general research question that this dissertation seeks to answer is: How and to what extent do immigration policies affect social cohesion in European democracies? Each of the three articles that make up this paper-based dissertation deals with a particular sub-question:

1. How and to what extent do restrictive immigration policies select immigrants with greater integration potential, and does this selection foster migrant integration?
2. To what extent do immigration policies explain variations in individual political trust?

³ Note that the focus of this dissertation are policy effects on the individual level, so that we can say something about the effect of country-level immigration policies on, for example, an individual’s level of political trust or political participation. Thus, the focus of the dissertation are not effects of immigration policies on, for instance, the aggregate level of political trust or political participation in a country.

3. To what extent do labor migration and asylum policies explain variations in individual policy support and political trust?

The three articles are interrelated and together enable me to answer the general research question. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the dissertation and its argument. **Article 1** focuses on immigrants and the ‘composition effect’ mechanism. Using a country-level index of immigration policy restrictiveness, the article examines for 22 European countries whether selectively restricting immigration flows to the group of immigrants with a greater integration potential increases immigrant integration, including integration outcomes that are indicative of the social and political connectedness dimension of social cohesion.

Articles 2 and 3 focus on the overall population and the ‘policy congruence’ mechanism. They together investigate certain conditions for immigration policies to affect the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion, which both articles measure as political trust. Using the same country-level immigration policy index as the previous article, **Article 2** comparatively examines for 23 European countries the extent to which a person’s level of ideological congruence with country-level immigration policies affects her level of political trust, and whether individual political informedness is a condition for this immigration policy effect.

Against the background of government efforts to prioritize humanitarian over economic admissions, **Article 3** tests the heterogeneous effects of labor migration and asylum policies on individual policy support and political trust in a single country, Germany. Its experimental design allows it to shed light on the causal link of immigration policy with individual policy support and political trust.

Each article addresses particular research puzzles about the impact of immigration policies on social cohesion, thereby helping to arrive at a more realistic assessment of the effect of immigration policies on social cohesion.

The rest of this framework chapter has the following structure. Subchapter 1.2 defines immigration policy and social cohesion, and Subchapter 1.3 identifies the conceptual and empirical gaps, thereby laying out the fundamental background of the dissertation. Subchapter 1.4 outlines composition and policy congruence effects as mechanisms through which immigration policies may impact social cohesion. Subchapter 1.5 outlines the research puzzles, methodology, and what the three articles and the overall dissertation contribute. Subchapter 1.6 provides a conclusion.




Figure 1: Visualization of the dissertation project.

1.2 Concepts

This subchapter presents the dissertation’s understanding of immigration policy (Section 1.2.1) and social cohesion as well as its constituent elements (Section 1.2.2).

1.2.1 Immigration policy

It is important to distinguish ‘immigration policy’ from ‘immigrant policy’. Both are seen as the two major forms of social closure in a nation-state (Helbling 2016, 28). While the former exists at the territorial border, the latter exists within the territory itself (Helbling 2016, 28). As

laid out in Helbling (2016, 28), Hammar (1990, 21) claims that there are three gates which regulate entry into Western European countries: entry, settlement, and full membership. These gates correspond to ‘immigration policies’ (i.e., entering a country), ‘integration policies’ (i.e., settling in a country), and ‘citizenship policies’ (i.e., becoming a full member of a country; see Helbling 2016, 28).

Existing at the territorial border, ‘immigration policies’ can be defined as all laws, regulations, and orders regarding the issuance of territorial admission and the legal residence of immigrants (Bjerre et al. 2015, 559; Schmid 2020, 1–2). The main legal channels of immigration – or, in other words, immigration policy areas or domains – consist of labor migration, family reunification, asylum and refugees, and co-ethnics (Bjerre et al. 2015; Messina 2007). For each policy area, ‘eligibility criteria’ and ‘entry conditions’ determine how hard it is for an immigrant to become a legal resident in a country. The ‘security of status’ and the ‘rights’ that come with a specific entry permit determine, for example, the length of stay and access to employment (Helbling et al. 2017).

In contrast, ‘immigrant policies’ exist within the territory itself and consist of ‘integration policies’ and ‘citizenship policies’. Integration policies regulate the rights and obligations of immigrants in a country with regard to their social, economic, and political participation (Helbling et al. 2016; Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2604; Koopmans et al. 2008, 9). They can be further subdivided into assimilation and multiculturalism policies, which stress that participation requires cultural adaptation to the native-born or the accommodation of cultural differences, respectively (Lutz 2017, 2). Furthermore, citizenship policies regulate access to citizenship in terms of becoming a legal citizen (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 156; Schmid 2020, 1–2; Vink and Bauböck 2013).

I understand all policies, including immigration and immigrant policies, as ‘policy outputs’, that is concrete laws, regulations, and decisions (Knill and Tosun 2011, 496–97), rather than as ‘policy outcomes’, which are the consequences that result from the outputs (Easton 1965, 351), such as immigration rates or the number of asylum applications in the case of immigration policies.

1.2.2 Social cohesion

Social cohesion is a condition of a nation-state in which its members are connected to each other and the political system (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290; Schaeffer 2016, 8–9; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). It has a cognitive component, manifested in feelings of trust, and a

behavioral component, manifested in participation (Schaeffer 2016, 8–9). It consists of a social connectedness and a political connectedness dimension because trust and participation can both refer to people and political institutions (Chan, To, and Chan 2006; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). I thus conceptualize social cohesion to consist of social trust and social participation as well as political trust and political participation (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 294; Green and Janmaat 2011, 19; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). However, since for practical reasons I include social and political participation together under the umbrella term civic engagement (Schaeffer 2016, 8–9), I distinguish three components of social cohesion, namely social trust, political trust, and civic engagement, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Three components of social cohesion

	Social connectedness	Political connectedness
Cognitive component	Social trust	Political trust
Behavioral component	Civic engagement	

Note. Table from Chan, To, and Chan (2006, 294), in adapted and abridged form.

The selection of these three constituting elements corresponds to a minimalist conceptualization of social cohesion, as it excludes cultural values as well as causes and consequences of cohesion (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 279–80; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 593). This allows cross-national and over-time comparisons in the empirical analyses and to examine immigration policy as an explanatory factor. However, in addition to these core elements of cohesion, at the end of this subchapter, I will list some other indicators that I consider to be indicative of and supportive of social cohesion, and which will also be used in this dissertation.

Social cohesion is conceptualized as a “state of affairs” and not as a process, making it closer to ordinary usage (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290). It is also the property of territorial nation-states rather than of individuals or small groups (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 291; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586). This conceptualization reflects the dominant political discourse on social cohesion in Western European immigration societies. Thus, a feeling of belonging to a nation-state and sharing a moral community are underlying the capacity to make and maintain connections to other people and political institutions (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 291; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586, 588). However, social cohesion is one among many other desirable societal values (Chan, To, and Chan 2006).

The fact that social cohesion is about the “[...] state of cohesiveness of society as a whole” does not mean that it cannot be measured with individual-level data (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290; see also Kesler and Demireva 2011), which this dissertation intends to do.⁴ However, social cohesion is different from social capital. While social cohesion refers to a society’s general condition, social capital refers to the individual gains that result from an individual’s possession of social capital, and therefore the latter does not necessarily lead to a high level of social cohesion in the country (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 292).

The next step is to outline the main constituent elements of social cohesion and how they together form the glue that binds members of society to each other and to the political system.

1.2.2.1 Social trust

Social trust is generalized trust, and it is distinct from strategic or group-based trust (Stolle 2002). Social trust is trust in people that are personally unknown, and it is therefore directed at “people in general” and as such “all-inclusive” (Stolle 2002, 403). Trust in strangers is a “leap of faith” because it transcends “[...] specific personal settings in which the partner to be cooperated with is already known” (Stolle 2002, 403–4). In complex anonymous societies, trust facilitates building ties and cooperation with strangers. A person bases his or her trust in a stranger on the belief that the stranger is committed to universal norms and values, including that of not harming others (Uslaner 2002). Trust is thus a “moral resource” that underlies solidarity (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586).

People who trust strangers believe that these strangers feel committed to the norm of reciprocity (Putnam 2000, 134). Social trust is important for societies because people who trust believe that strangers will contribute to the common good⁵, and therefore they themselves feel morally obligated to do so themselves (Schaeffer 2013, 11, 2016, 11). As such, mutual trust contributes to solving the collective action dilemma of public goods production (Paxton 2002; Schaeffer 2016) and to maintain the redistributive welfare state in a society (Crepaz 2006).

⁴ Thus, focusing at the effects of country-level immigration policies on a person’s levels of, for example, social trust and civic engagement – as this dissertation intends to do – shall provide insight into the effectiveness of certain theoretical mechanisms linking immigration policies and social cohesion (see e.g., van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

⁵ For example, a person who trusts would believe that strangers pay their taxes.

1.2.2.2 Political trust⁶

Political trust refers to people's support for political institutions such as the parliament, political parties, the legal system, and political authorities (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 4). It is based on the conviction that the institutions will do no harm even though their actions are uncertain and people are vulnerable to them (van der Meer 2017b, 1). People who trust political institutions feel connected to them, support them, and cooperate with them (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290; Dickes, Valentova, and Borsenberger 2010; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 586). There are several objects of public support for the political system (also termed 'political support') and these span from more specific to more abstract (Norris 1999, 2017). Trust in political institutions represents a "middle-range object of support" (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 4). It correlates with trust in individual politicians and with support of the regime principles, but it is different from them (Marien 2011, 2017; van der Meer 2017a, 5–6). By contrast, a specific object of support would be, for example, support for particular government policies (Easton 1975, 437; Ziller and Helbling 2021), and a very abstract object would be the support for the ideals of democracy or feelings of patriotism (Norris 2017, 23).

Political trust is "[...] essential for democratic and stable political life" (Newton 2001, 205). Trust in legislative and legal institutions is a prerequisite for the production of public goods⁷ (Easton 1957; Hetherington 1998), and for citizens to pay taxes (Scholz and Lubell 1998), comply with the law (Marien and Hooghe 2011), and to not develop cynicism and political alienation (van der Meer 2017b).

In regard to explanatory approaches, political trust can be viewed in a rationalist manner as a top-down 'evaluative orientation' or as a bottom-up 'cultural orientation'. According to the first perspective (e.g., Hetherington 1998), citizens evaluate political institutions in a given political domain as to whether they act in their interest (Mishler and Rose 2001, 32), and trust is thus relational and situational (Hardin 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000, 476), and rather volatile (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 4). Political trust is thus more vulnerable than social trust, as it can depend on citizens' evaluations of institutional performance (e.g., Kumlin 2014), institutional process (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 740), and substantive representation (Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). On the contrary, 'cultural theories' (e.g., Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 2011) stress the empirical relevance of interpersonal trust, and

⁶ Note that some parts of this subsection were taken from the second article of this dissertation.

⁷ As explained in detail by Easton (1957), political institutions need sufficient public support to be entrusted with the production of public goods.

long-lasting cultural changes such as increases in a country's educational levels and postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1999; Norris 2011, 7) for political trust.

1.2.2.3 Civic engagement

I capture social and political participation under the umbrella term of civic engagement (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 294; Putnam 1995; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 593). Yet, social and political participation have distinct meanings. For example, while social participation can be broadly said to include membership in cultural organizations or sports organizations, or volunteer work, political participation includes voting, participating in campaigns and protests, or signing petitions (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 588).

Overall, all forms of civic engagement are important to the health of a democracy (Putnam 1995, 65), although to varying degrees (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 588). Nevertheless, through any form of civic engagement, individuals overcome social and religious divides and it enables mobilization for collective action (Schaeffer 2016, 10). Through organizing work in social and political organizations and the democratic voicing of interests, individuals acquire democratic competencies and shared values (Schaeffer 2016, 10; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 588). This is crucial for members of a society to develop a sense of political efficacy, tolerance, belonging, and the ability to organize and communicate interests, which are essential for the functioning of political institutions and representative government (Putnam 1995, 66; Schaeffer 2016, 10; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 588).⁸

In addition to the mentioned three core elements of social cohesion (i.e., social trust, political trust, and civic engagement), there are a number of additional attitudes and behaviors that will also be examined as outcome variables in the first and third articles of this dissertation. Although these are not included in the aforementioned minimalist definition of social cohesion, I argue that they are supportive and indicative of social cohesion. These additional outcomes are employment status, socioeconomic occupational status, political interest, perceived ethnic discrimination, and support for (asylum and labor migration) policies. According to studies, being employed increases social participation and a feeling of belonging (Kearns and Whitley 2015), political interest increases political trust (de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013, 1346), not feeling discriminated against (e.g., when applying for work) increases the likelihood of

⁸ It should be noted, of course, that anti-democratic or xenophobic aims of a political party or organization can have negative rather than positive consequences for social cohesion (Schaeffer 2016, 10–11; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, 588).

social participation (Laurentsyeva and Venturini 2017, 287), and long-term support or disagreement with policies may affect political trust in the long run (Easton 1975, 449).

1.3 Literature review

The literature review in this subchapter identifies the research gaps on which the dissertation builds its main arguments. It examines empirical and conceptual shortcomings in the relevant literature. The aim is to determine whether existing studies have provided empirical evidence and theoretical explanations on the relationship between immigration policy and social cohesion, and have considered the following aspects: (a) immigration policy as policy output (for a definition see Section 1.2.1); (b) social cohesion outcomes in terms of social trust, political trust, and civic engagement (for a definition see Section 1.2.2); (c) the effects of immigration policy on the population as a whole and/or first-generation immigrants.⁹

In what follows, I divide the relevant literature into four branches, which I have identified on the basis of the different theoretical mechanisms on which they build their arguments: ‘net cultural effects’ (Section 1.3.1), ‘cultural effects’ (Section 1.3.2), ‘representation effects’ (Section 1.3.3), and ‘composition effects’ (Section 1.3.4). These branches differ also in whether they mainly focus on effects on the population as a whole or on first-generation immigrants, and which dimension of social cohesion they mostly consider (see Table 2 below for an overview of these branches). Note that I will mostly review studies that look at effects (e.g., of country-level policy outputs) on the individual level (e.g., a person’s level of political trust) rather than effects on the aggregate level (e.g., a country’s, neighborhoods, or community’s overall level of political trust).

Table 2: Four branches of relevant literature

Theoretical strand	Connectedness dimension of social cohesion	Population segment in focus
Net cultural effects	Social and political	Population as a whole
Cultural effects	Political	Population as a whole
Representation effects	Political	Population as a whole
Composition effects	Social and political	First-generation immigrants

⁹ Recall from Footnote 1 in Subchapter 1.1 ‘Introduction and research questions’ that for the purpose of this dissertation I take the ‘population as a whole’ to be legal citizens of the country in which they live, and ‘immigrants’ to be first-generation immigrants.

1.3.1 Net cultural effects

The first branch of the literature focuses on ‘net cultural effects’ on the social and political connectedness of societies. I refer to net cultural effects as the unconditional and homogeneous social cohesion responses of a mass public to, for example, immigration policies or immigration rates, that are independent of peoples’ “immigration-related predispositions” (cf. Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014, 6–7), such as individual attitudes toward immigrants.

Most notably, studies in this branch have examined the effects of immigration rates and ethnic diversity on mostly social trust and civic engagement in Western European countries (cf. Holtug 2021), frequently neglecting to look at political trust.¹⁰ Using a cultural explanatory approach, these studies broadly assume that mutual trust and civic engagement in nation-states are enabled by citizens’ belief that they share a moral community (or national identity; cf. Larsen 2013, 3; Miller and Ali 2014).¹¹ In that line, many scholars of social cohesion (and social capital) have argued that an increase in ethnic heterogeneity (i.e., ethnic diversity or immigration) in territorial nation-states would reduce among citizens the perception that they share a moral community (with underlying shared norms and values), disabling their cognitive capacity to trust strangers and engage with others. As a consequence, the redistributive welfare state (Collier 2013; Goodhart 2004, 2013; Koopmans 2013, 163; Miller 2016) and the civic engagement underlying democracy (Putnam 2007) could lose their social and moral foundation.¹²

In regard to social trust and civic engagement, the theoretical argument has been made that immigration would initiate at the national level symbolic threat (Gundelach and Manatschal 2017; Holtug 2021; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014, 463–65) and thus cause people to express less social trust and withdraw from civic engagement.¹³ In addition, Jeannet (2019, 5) makes

¹⁰ For a recent in-depth overview of this very vast literature see for instance Holtug (2021).

¹¹ Sharing a moral community includes sharing certain norms and values, such as reciprocity and solidarity (Holtug 2021).

¹² This debate is also known as the ‘progressives dilemma’. See Goodhart (2004) for a seminal contribution and Holtug (2021) for a summary. Goodhart (2004) argues that the reduction of social trust and solidarity through immigration and ethnic diversity will deprive the redistributive welfare state of its social and moral basis. At the core of this argument is the claim that solidarity and trust are based on a shared national identity. Trust and solidarity have mutual reciprocity as its core. People only support the redistributive welfare state when other community members can be trusted to pay their taxes and not freeride (Holtug 2010, 2021). Since migrants do not necessarily share the same national identity they could not be trusted to reciprocate, and people would therefore cease to support the welfare state, leading to its demise (Collier 2013). For a critique of the arguments underlying the progressives dilemma see for example Bauböck (2016) and Holtug (2010, 2021).

¹³ Putnam (2007) refers to this hypothesis as the ‘constrict theory’. Constrict theory and symbolic threat theory are both in line with the homophily principle (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), which proposes that people are more likely to interact with (and express trust towards) those that they perceive as similar to themselves (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014, 464). However, I mostly leave out Putnam’s arguments on anomie, constrict theory,

the argument that an increase in immigration at the national level could also depress political trust. She argues that citizens' feelings of disunity in the moral community caused by perceptions of immigration could "[...] provoke disunity not only between citizens themselves but also between citizens and the state" (Jeannet 2019, 5).

Empirically, most related evidence (in studies that focus on effects on the individual level) on the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity and immigration on social cohesion – including social trust, civic engagement, and political trust – is either mixed or weak (see e.g., Holtug 2021; Jeannet 2019; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).¹⁴ Nevertheless, a number of scholars have proposed the introduction of restrictive immigration policies as a means to mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity on social cohesion. They argue that reducing the number of immigrants and filtering out immigrants that are more educated and culturally more similar to the native-born would reduce the symbolic threat and perceived communal disunity caused by immigration, and thereby its negative effects on social cohesion (Collier 2013; Goodhart 2004, 2013; Miller 2016).¹⁵

Against this background, it is surprising that the impact of immigration policies on social cohesion has not been the subject of much research. The only study that examines the effects of (one area of) immigration policy is a study by Gundelach and Manatschal (2017, 424), which focuses on the regional level (cantons in Switzerland) rather than countries. It finds that, in line with the symbolic threat hypothesis, ethnic diversity reduces social trust more in cantons that have more liberal regulations on family reunification.

All other existing studies look at the effects of immigrant policies rather than immigration policies. In line with the homophily principle (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), these studies argue theoretically that integration and citizenship policies increase social cohesion by either forcing immigrants to assimilate into the mainstream culture, or by being more inclusive in terms of endowing them with equal rights (i.e., cultural, social, economic, and political rights) or legal citizenship. Empirically, these studies have provided a slightly mixed but overall positive picture of the direct or moderating effects of more inclusive immigrant policies (i.e., integration, multiculturalism, and citizenship policies), finding overall more evidence for a positive (or null effect) than a negative effect on social trust and civic

and 'hunkering down' (Putnam 2007), because they are mostly valid for the neighborhood level rather for individuals living in countries, which is the focus of this dissertation (see van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

¹⁴ Moreover, various contextual and individual-level factors moderate the negative relationship to the extent that it vanishes in many cases (Holtug 2021).

¹⁵ In addition, Collier (2013) argues that reducing immigration and limiting it to immigrants from Western countries would result in fewer immigrants with low levels of social trust and solidarity, which would be beneficial to the welfare state.

engagement (Bloemraad and Kesler 2010, 336; Hooghe, Reeskens, and Stolle 2008, 16; Lupo 2010; Reeskens 2010; Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012).

None of the studies in this branch of literature has looked at the effects of immigration policies or immigrant policies on political trust.

1.3.2 Cultural effects

The second branch of the literature investigates cultural effects on political connectedness through effects on the mass public, with a strong focus on political trust and other measures of political support (see Subsection 1.2.2.2 ‘Political trust’)¹⁶. Therefore, civic engagement and social trust are not the subject of the review in this section.

Like the previous branch (Section 1.3.1 ‘Net cultural effects’), this branch views political trust as a bottom-up cultural phenomenon resulting from social relations rather than evaluations of institutional performance or substantive representation (see Subsection 1.2.2.2 ‘Political trust’). However, the literature in this branch argues that citizens have a heterogeneous (rather than a homogeneous) political trust reaction to a policy which varies according to their individual national identity or attitude to immigration (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; McLaren 2011), constituting according to Jannet (2019, 4) a variant of Putnam’s (2007) theoretical arguments.

Drawing on Easton (1957, 391–94), McLaren (2011, 2012) makes the theoretical argument that a citizen’s degree of political trust varies depending on whether she or he normatively conceives of membership in the national community as ethnic or civic (see Wright 2011b, 2011a). Individuals who hold an ethnic conception of national membership generally have a negative view of political institutions because they perceive them as inadequate in protecting the national community from immigration and diversity (McLaren 2011, 2015). The assumption is that if these citizens perceive an increase in immigration rates or in the inclusiveness of immigrant policies, the negative relationship will be strengthened.

McLaren (2015, chap. 5) provides empirical evidence that a strong ethnic national identity or a related preference against immigration¹⁷ can reduce political trust (see also Berg and Hjerm 2010; McLaren 2012, 218–19, 2016, 13). She shows, moreover, that this negative relationship is stronger in countries that have a long-term history of post-World War II

¹⁶ For an overview of different measures of political support see Norris (2017).

¹⁷ Heath and Tilley (2005) demonstrate a strong correlation between holding an ethnic national identity and a preference against immigration.

immigration (McLaren 2012, 200, 2015, 5) and when citizens perceive their government to handle the issue of immigration ineffectively (McLaren 2011).

A few studies have looked at the role of policies in moderating the negative relationship between holding an ethnic national identity (or being concerned about immigration) and political trust. Again, however, as with the previous branch of literature, studies have examined the effects of immigrant policies instead of immigration policies. McLaren (2016) finds that more inclusive integration policies strengthen the negative association between holding an ethnic national identity and political trust. Citrin, Levy, and Wright (2014) find that opposition to immigration reduces political trust more in countries with more inclusive multiculturalism policies (see also Hooghe and de Vroome 2015). However, studies do not show that the same is true for people who are pro-immigration rather than anti-immigration.

None of the existing studies has investigated the role of immigration policies. This is surprising given the indications that integration policy is in line with public preferences, while immigration policy is not (Lutz 2021). This could imply that the effects of immigration policy on political trust are more negative than those of integration policy, making the former the more relevant case to study.

More generally, this research branch is limited from a theoretical perspective in that it conceptualizes political trust as a bottom-up cultural phenomenon rather than a top-down evaluative orientation (see section 1.2.2.2 ‘Political trust’), which only allows for examining the indirect moderating role of policy rather than its direct effect on political connectedness (Simon 2024, 16). The next branch of literature is different in that regard.

1.3.3 Representation effects

The third branch of literature examines how citizens’ perceptions of ‘political representation’ with respect to immigration affect their degree of political connectedness.

In contrast to the previous branches, this branch views political connectedness as a top-down evaluative orientation. In that perspective, individuals rationally evaluate the different elements of the political system in a given policy domain as to whether they act in their interest or not (Mishler and Rose 2001, 32; Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). The more citizens perceive the actions of the representatives to resemble their own interests, the more they feel politically connected (cf. Ferland 2021; Golder and Ferland 2017, 216). This branch can be divided into several theoretical approaches which, at the most general level, can be distinguished into two types of political representation, namely ‘substantive representation’ and

the ‘quality of representation’, as Table 3 and Table 4 below illustrate, respectively (see also Simon 2024, 148).

Substantive representation

The most promising political representation type for examining the effects of immigration policy outputs (i.e., policy on paper; see Section 1.2.1 ‘Immigration policy’) on political connectedness is the ‘substantive representation’ type. Substantive representation is given when the actions of the political representatives resemble the substantive (i.e., ideological) preferences of citizens (Golder and Ferland 2017). This type of substantive representation can be subdivided into a dynamic approach (i.e., ‘responsiveness’) and a static approach (i.e., ‘ideological congruence’), as Table 3 illustrates.

Table 3: Political representation: Substantive representation type

	Responsiveness	Ideological congruence
Sub-approaches (or stages) of representation		Party system congruence Legislative congruence Government congruence
	Policy responsiveness	Policy congruence
Time perspective	Dynamic	Static

Note. See also Simon (2024, 148). The overview of the sub-approaches of responsiveness is abbreviated here. For a more complete overview see Golder and Ferland (2017).

As a ‘dynamic’ approach to substantive representation, ‘policy responsiveness’ refers to whether political representatives change or amend policies in response to citizens’ substantive demands (Golder and Ferland 2017, 4–6). Focusing on citizens’ social connectedness rather than political connectedness, Vrânceanu and Lachat (2021, 13) examine how immigration policy outputs, which they measure with the Immigration Policy in Comparison Index (IMPIC), affect citizens’ attitudes to immigration (Bjerre et al. 2015; Helbling et al. 2017). They find that a liberal immigration policy change increases an individual’s positive attitude to immigration if she or he is more educated.¹⁸ The remaining relevant studies within the policy responsiveness approach investigate how responsive immigration policies are in European countries (e.g., Ford, Jennings, and Somerville 2015; van

¹⁸ Some scholars of social cohesion view attitudes to immigration as element of social cohesion, namely as part of its social connectedness dimension (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). Thus, Vrânceanu and Lachat’s findings can be viewed as evidence of immigration policy responsiveness effects on social cohesion.

Hauwaert 2023; Jennings 2009)¹⁹, but none of these have examined the effects of policy responsiveness on political connectedness.

As a ‘static’ approach to substantive representation, ‘ideological congruence’ refers to the representation of citizens’ interests in the political arena at a certain moment in time (Golder and Ferland 2017, 216). Ideological congruence consists of four stages that together make a political system congruent, each of which represents a specific element of the political system: party system congruence, legislative congruence, government congruence, and policy congruence (Golder and Ferland 2017, 7–18).²⁰

Because policy congruence, the fourth stage of ideological congruence (see Table 3 above), is most relevant to examining the impact of immigration policy outputs on political connectedness, I will discuss it here first. Policy congruence studies examine the extent to which the substantive content of policies and citizens’ related policy preferences match at a certain point in time (Golder and Ferland 2017, 229). Ziller and Helbling (2019) comparatively investigate the effects of anti-discrimination policy instead of immigration policy on individual political support.²¹ They show that subjective knowledge about the existence of anti-discrimination policies increases political support among citizens who have egalitarian values and who are immigrants. The remaining related studies that investigate policy congruence do so by either using measures of immigration policy positions instead of policy outputs (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Leruth and Taylor-Gooby 2019; Teney and Helbling 2014) or by focusing on integration policy outputs instead of immigration policy outputs (Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin 2015, 1505).²² None of these studies examine the effect of immigration policy congruence on political connectedness.

¹⁹ Using a qualitative approach, Ford, Jennings, and Somerville (2015; see also Jennings 2009) show that the British government (1980-2015) responds to changing public opinion on immigration by adopting immigration policies that accommodate these demands. Using a policy outcome indicator instead of an output indicator, van Hauwaert (2023) argues that, at the aggregate level, asylum policies in European countries are systematically more liberal than their citizens demand, providing some evidence of an immigration policy gap (as argued e.g., by Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013). van Hauwaert (2023) also tests his arguments in the appendix of his article with the IMPIC immigration policy output indicator, but does not discuss his null finding, which contradicts his main finding.

²⁰ In other words, citizens’ preferences can be represented by the party system, legislatures, governments, and by policies, respectively (see Golder and Ferland 2017). Golder and Ferland speak, therefore, of citizen-party system congruence, citizen-legislative congruence, citizen-government congruence, and citizen-policy congruence.

²¹ Although Ziller and Helbling (2019) speak in their article of policy responsiveness, I argue that what they actually measure in their models is policy congruence rather than responsiveness, because they measure policy at a certain point in time rather than policy change.

²² Among these studies, considering integration policy instead of immigration policy, Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin (2015, 1505) find some, but not consistent, evidence of a mismatch between policy content and public opinion (unlike suggested by Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013). Teney and Helbling (2014) find that the immigration policy positions of elites and citizens diverge, indicating an immigration policy gap. Leruth and Taylor-Gooby

The remaining stages of the ‘ideological congruence’ approach (i.e., citizen-party system congruence, citizen-legislative congruence, and citizen-government congruence) are not relevant to the topic of this dissertation. This is because the immigration policy positions of parties, legislators, and government can strongly deviate from the actual contents of immigration policies (i.e., the policy outputs), once adopted (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Nevertheless, studies using these approaches offer some interesting insights into the impact of ideological congruence regarding immigration issues on political connectedness, so I briefly mention them here. They show that a mismatch between citizens’ positions on immigration and those of political parties affects individual voting choices in favor of the radical right (Brady, Ferejohn, and Paparo 2020, 9).²³ Stecker and Tausendpfund (2016, 506) find that citizens are slightly less satisfied with the way democracy works when their governments’ policy position on immigration deviates from their own. However, these studies have focused on parties’ and governments’ policy positions rather than the actual policy content and therefore do not provide insights into how immigration policies as policy outputs affect political connectedness.

Quality of representation

‘Quality of representation’ is the second type of political representation discussed here (see Table 4 below).

Table 4: Political representation: Quality of representation type

	Institutional process	Institutional performance
Time perspective	Static	Static

The literature related to the quality of representation type argues that citizens’ positive evaluations of the quality of representation result in higher political connectedness (e.g., Jeannet 2019). In that perspective, political connectedness is explained by evaluations of ‘institutional process’ and ‘institutional performance’ (see Table 4 above), the former of which is not relevant to this dissertation and is therefore not further discussed here (see e.g., Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). Arguing that anti-immigration citizens associate (a growth in) the presence of migrants

(2019) find evidence of so-called top-down policy congruence (but see Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005), in which citizens adopt the restrictive policy positions of the far right even when these conflict with their own party affiliation.

²³ Focusing on European countries, Brady, Ferejohn, and Paparo (2020, 9) find that voters who are culturally conservative and economically struggling are more anti-immigration than the party they support (see also Mader and Schoen 2019). Mader and Schoen (2019) find that German voters viewed the ruling party CDU during the so-called ‘European refugee policy crisis’ around 2015 as more liberal on immigration than themselves.

with bad institutional performance, studies find that for this group a rise in migrant stock (Jeannet 2019, 5) and asylum applications (Harteveld et al. 2018) decrease political trust while higher deportation rates increase it (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015).²⁴ Yet, these studies do not give insight into how policies as policy outputs (Knill and Tosun 2011) impact political connectedness, as they focus on policy outcomes instead.

1.3.4 Composition effects

A fourth branch of studies examines the impact of immigration policies on social cohesion by focusing on first-generation immigrants rather than the population of a country as a whole.

These studies do so by examining the effects of immigration policies on immigrants' integration outcomes. Although the focus of the studies is on immigrant integration, I argue that they can tell us something about the effects of immigration policies on social cohesion. This is because, as I will argue in Section 1.4.1 'Composition' below, I assume that the outcomes of immigrant integration matter for social cohesion in a country (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010, 699; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2017; Leigh 2006, 276). Indeed, some integration outcomes can be considered "social cohesion outcomes" of integration (Kesler and Demireva 2011, 215). These, I argue drawing from Kesler and Demireva (2011), are those aspects of migrant integration outcomes (i.e. social trust, political trust, and civic engagement; see discussion in Section 1.2.2) that may contribute to the overall level of social cohesion in a country (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010, 699; Leigh 2006, 276).

Understanding immigrant integration as a process of participation in the social and political spheres of a society, in addition to participation in the economic sphere of a society (Alba and Foner 2015), some of the studies in this branch of the literature thus examine the social connectedness and the political connectedness dimensions of cohesion. What unites these studies is the assumption that pre-immigration selection of immigrant groups with greater potential to integrate into the host society through immigration policy will lead to better integration outcomes (Doomernik et al. 2009; Solano and Huddleston 2022).

This selection effect results from the capacity of immigration policy to regulate who is admitted and allowed to stay, or in other words, the composition of immigration flows (Bjerre et al. 2015; Massey 1998, 13; Waldinger 2005). Scholars emphasize the existence of (socio-)economic (i.e., education, language, and professional skills) and (socio-)cultural selection

²⁴ Studies focusing on institutional performance effects traditionally investigate the role of (evaluations of) macro-economic performance (e.g., van der Meer 2017) and the welfare state (e.g., Staffan Kumlin 2014) on political trust.

criteria (e.g., Bonjour 2014; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Goodman 2012, 2014) that could influence the socio-economic and socio-cultural composition of immigrants entering and residing in a country.

Current existing research has mainly examined the impact of immigration policies on the economic aspects of integration, such as employment status, thereby neglecting those aspects of integration that are directly relevant to social cohesion. Moreover, these studies mostly focus on the impact of (socio-)economic selection criteria, neglecting (socio-)cultural selection criteria. Söhn (2013, 320), for instance, finds that for so-called ‘Aussiedler’ living in Germany knowing the language and language classes had a positive effect on educational attainment. Chiswick and Miller (2004, 39) show that visa categories in the 1990s that gave points for language skills had an impact on the language skills of immigrants’ living in Australia. Tani (2020) shows that selection on the basis of professional and English language skills for migrant workers in Australia led to the rise in human capital of the respective group, but had no effect on the utilization of skills. Looking at the same change in policy, Cobb-Clark (2003, 676) shows that more restrictive criteria of selection increase the human capital of migrants as well as their chances of being employed. Other studies focus on the effects of entry channels (Cangiano 2014; Constant and Zimmermann 2005). They show that compared to family and humanitarian migrants, labor migrants receive higher salaries and are more likely to be employed.²⁵ In a recent study, Guzi, Kahanec, and Kureková (2023) found that more liberal rather than restrictive immigration policies improve the labor market outcomes of immigrants.

An exception to the overwhelming focus on economic integration outcomes is a qualitative study by Taylor and Foster (2015). It focuses on the restrictions placed on temporary migrant workers by Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program, which limits their access to settlement services, family reunification, and opportunities for further education. The authors find that the policy encourages among immigrants social exclusion and inequality, lowering their sense of social trust, and feeling of attachment, and increasing their feeling of being rejected by non-immigrant colleagues.

Nevertheless, a shortcoming shared by all of the existing studies is that they look at single policies or policy effects in few or single countries only (Rinne 2013, 12–13).

²⁵ There are a few more studies which have examined the impact of immigration policies on immigrant integration. They do, however, not measure immigration policy outputs because they look at variations in immigrant integration outcomes across different countries which they assort to different immigration policy *regimes* (e.g., Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo 2004). These studies also have further limitations similar to the other discussed studies. For comprehensive (but not up to date) overviews of the wider literature see Tani (2014) and Rinne (2013).

Only one study has empirically examined the impact of (socio-)cultural selection criteria on integration, whose presence in immigration regulations has been emphasized by a number of scholars (Bonjour 2014; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Goodman 2012, 2014). These scholars have argued that immigration policies determine the composition of immigrants based on their culture of origin, specifically by discouraging immigrants from majority-Muslim countries and providing exceptions for migrants from Western countries. In that regard, focusing on European countries, Goodman and Wright (2015) examine so-called mandatory integration programs that are tied to a migrant's residency permit requiring her to acquire the knowledge, language, and values of the country in order to be allowed to enter, settle, and acquire citizenship. They find that the existence of these programs does not improve the social and political integration outcomes of migrants, contrary to the program's intentions. A shortcoming that the study shares with the other existing studies is that it also looks only at individual policies and covers few integration outcomes that are relevant to social cohesion.

Furthermore, among the existing studies that do focus on integration outcomes that are directly relevant for social cohesion have primarily looked at the impact of immigrant policies (i.e., primarily integration²⁶ and multiculturalism policies) rather than immigration policies (Aleksynska 2011; Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Erisen 2017; Heath and Demireva 2014; Helbling et al. 2016; Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014; Solano and Huddleston 2022; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).²⁷

1.3.5 Concluding remarks

This literature review has been seeking to identify whether there is a need to empirically examine the effects of immigration policy outputs on social cohesion. I have looked at studies that have examined the effects of immigration, immigration policy, and immigrant policies on social cohesion through effects on the population of a country as a whole (sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3) or first-generation immigrants only (section 1.3.4), focusing on policy effects on the individual rather than the aggregate level.

²⁶ Some scholars also include anti-discrimination policies as part of integration policies (e.g., Huddleston et al. 2015). In this regard, it is noteworthy that studies have found that the presence of anti-discrimination policies reduces immigrants' levels of social trust (Ziller 2017) but increase their levels of political trust (Ziller and Helbling 2019).

²⁷ Moreover, other remaining studies look at the effects of citizenship policies, but they use indicators that measure the outcomes rather than the outputs of citizenship policy. They find that naturalization (i.e., the assignment of legal citizenship) in Switzerland increases immigrants' overall social and political integration. Naturalization decreases perceived discrimination, increases feelings of host country belonging, perceived political efficacy, political knowledge and voting, while, however, not increasing social trust and civic engagement (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017).

To conclude, the overwhelming emphasis of existing studies is on the effects of immigration policy outcomes or integration policies, and they often focus on outcomes that are not directly relevant to social cohesion. I identified, however, a few exceptions (Goodman and Wright 2015; Gundelach and Manatschal 2017; Taylor and Foster 2015; Vrânceanu and Lachat 2021). Moreover, there is, to my knowledge, no original empirical study that has looked at immigration policy effects on the population as a whole and immigrants *at the same time*. There is thus a need for original empirical research that examines how immigration policies influence social cohesion by impacting the population as a whole *and* immigrants.

1.4 Theoretical mechanisms

This subchapter²⁸ lays out the theoretical mechanisms through which, as this dissertation argues, immigration policy may impact social cohesion. These mechanisms are ‘composition effects’ (Section 1.4.1) and ‘policy congruence effects’ (Section 1.4.2). Whereas the former is argued to influence social cohesion by affecting first-generation immigrants, the latter is argued to influence social cohesion by affecting the overall population as a mass public.²⁹

1.4.1 Composition

This section outlines the theoretical mechanisms through which restrictive immigration policies may affect the social and political connectedness dimension of social cohesion by affecting first-generation immigrants. It argues that restrictive immigration policies increase social cohesion by selectively restricting admission and settlement to groups of immigrants with a greater potential for integration.

It should be noted that the following paragraphs outline the theoretical argument on the relationship between immigration policy restrictiveness and immigrant integration, based on the composition effect (or, in other words, the selection effect) developed in the first article of the dissertation, which I co-authored with Marc Helbling and Samuel D. Schmid. I will extensively draw from the first article throughout the next four paragraphs. Then, as an original contribution of this framework chapter, I will build on this theoretical approach and further

²⁸ Note that in some parts of the three sections of this subchapter portions of the first, second, and third articles are taken in a mostly abbreviated and adapted form.

²⁹ Recall from Footnote 1 in Subchapter 1.1 ‘Introduction and research questions’ that for the purpose of this dissertation I take the ‘population as a whole’ to be legal citizens of the country in which they live, and ‘immigrants’ to be first-generation immigrants.

outline how immigration policy affects social cohesion through its effect on immigrant integration.

As outlined in the first article, in recent decades, immigration policies have become increasingly selective rather than *either* restrictive or liberal (Beine et al. 2016; FitzGerald and Arar 2018). Policies were adopted at the end of the 1970s to encourage high-skilled migrants to immigrate and to discourage migrants that are low-skilled (Cerna 2008, 2014; Doomernik et al. 2009). Selecting migrants on the basis of skill serves, on the one hand, the purpose of filling the need for high-skilled workers (Constant et al. 2011; Constant and Zimmermann 2005). But on the other hand, highly skilled immigrants are more and more believed to have greater potential for social, political, and economic integration because they would have the requisite level of education and language skills (Doomernik et al. 2009).

In addition to skills, cultural attributes are another category of selection criteria. From around the year 2000 on, countries in Western Europe have implemented pre-migration integration tests. These tests focus on language proficiency, and knowledge and values of the host country and thereby aim at selecting immigrants with a greater potential for integration (Goodman 2012, 2014, chap. 6). These selection criteria have an ethnocentric foundation: not only are there exceptions for nationals from affluent and non-Muslim countries, but these tests also aim to discourage particularly Muslims from immigrating by asking about and emphasizing potentially unfamiliar social and cultural norms (FitzGerald et al. 2018, 11–12). The introduction of these tests has led to a reduction in the number of immigrants from Muslim countries (FitzGerald et al. 2018, 16; Goodman 2014, 217 et sqq.).

Overall, immigration regulations include at the moment, besides other conditions, many cultural and economic criteria (Bjerre et al. 2015). The purpose of making these criteria more restrictive is to selectively limit immigration to the immigrant group that has better qualifications and greater financial independence, and whose culture and values resemble those of the host society (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2605–6). These criteria function as a mechanism of selection (Bonjour 2014; Cangiano 2014, 423) which may result in better integration outcomes for immigrants because they may have better “starting positions” (Söhn 2013, 320) or “integration potential”, as we have termed it in the first article. It has been shown by a number of studies that a lack of immigrant integration is explained by the integration potential of immigrants regarding their social distance³⁰ from the society in the host country and their skills (Ebner and Helbling 2016; Heath and Martin 2013).

³⁰ Migrant groups with high social distance are immigrants from “[...] poorer countries whose citizens have, on average, a lower level of education” (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2605).

Based on this framework, we make the theoretical argument in the first article that selective immigration policies increase the integration potential of immigrants and thereby increase their integration into the host society. I argue here that the selection of immigrants with greater integration potential increases also integration outcomes that are indicative of social cohesion (Kesler and Demireva 2011, 211). Full immigrant integration³¹ consists of economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions, with some of their elements having a direct indication of higher social cohesion (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2017, 2; Kesler and Demireva 2011), such as feelings of social trust and political trust, and civic engagement. With Kesler and Demireva (2011, 210–13), I term the latter the “social cohesion outcomes” of immigrant integration.

As argued in the first article, the relationship between immigration policy, integration potential, and integration works for economic, social, and political integration – and thus, as I argue in this dissertation, for social and political connectedness – as higher levels of education and cultural similarity with the host country population can be viewed as “resources” which help immigrants enter the labor market, and be socially and politically more engaged and trusting (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2604).

For instance, in terms of the social connectedness dimension of social cohesion, studies have shown that immigrants who share cultural values (Beilmann and Lilleoja 2015; Cvetkovich et al. 2002) and national identity (Breidahl and Gustavsson 2022) of the destination country and who come from specific countries of origin (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006) express higher levels of social trust. Moreover, immigrants with similar cultural values to the host society feel more connected to it (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006), are less ethnically discriminated against in the labor market (Koopmans, Veit, and Yemane 2018, 33–34), and are socially more engaged (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Laurentsyeva and Venturini 2017, 285–86).

In terms of political connectedness, studies show that immigrants with higher levels of education, higher economic capital, and cultural values similar to the host society participate more in politics (Aleksynska 2011; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Maxwell 2010b, 2010a) and express higher levels of political trust (Jacobs and Tillie 2004).

As such, this theoretical framework addresses the research puzzles outlined in the introduction, which relate to (a) how effective immigration policies are in limiting the composition of immigration flows to groups of immigrants with a greater integration potential,

³¹ Immigrants are fully integrated when they participate in the labor market and the political system on an equal footing with the native-born and feel a sense of belonging to the country's community (Alba and Foner 2015).

and (b) the extent to which socio-structural constraints in the destination countries hinder the integration of immigrants (including immigrants with a greater integration potential), thereby diminishing the immigration policies' potential positive effects on social cohesion. These puzzles will be outlined in Section 1.5.1 'First article: Better migrant integration as a result of selective restrictions' of Subchapter 1.5 'Contributions of individual articles'.

However, the concept of immigrant integration as a part of the 'composition effect' theoretical framework has limitations. The term immigrant integration encompasses the social construction of society and its culture as 'bounded' (and culturally homogeneous). Such a conceptualization naturally leads to the problematization of immigrants who are culturally different from the host society, labeling them as in need of cultural adaptation (Schinkel 2013, 1145) as a precondition for integration. This ethnocentric view of society inherent in the integration concept is problematic (Schinkel 2018). Thus, while acknowledging the limitations of the concept of immigrant integration and its pitfalls for social research (Schinkel 2018), I use it as a way to test the widely held political assumption that immigration restrictions would promote immigrant integration and cohesion (through cultural and economic selection).

1.4.2 Policy congruence

This section outlines the theoretical mechanisms through which immigration policy affects political trust in institutions as an element of the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion (see section 1.2.2.2 'Political trust') by affecting the population as a whole or 'mass publics' (Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2014; Pierson 1993).

I view political trust in a rationalist manner as an 'evaluative orientation' (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 740; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001).³² I consider political trust to result from citizens' evaluations of how well the actions of political authorities are substantively representing their interests and preferences (Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). More specifically, building on the concept of policy congruence, I consider political trust to result from citizens' evaluations of how much the content of adopted policies at a certain point in time is in line with their related ideological preferences (Golder and Ferland 2017). This conceptualization is essential for capturing how the specific legislative content of immigration policy, namely policy output (Knill and Tosun 2011), affects political trust, and it takes into account that the effects can vary depending on an individual's ideological preferences regarding immigration (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren

³² See Subsection 1.2.2.2 'Political trust' for an overview on explanatory approaches to political trust.

2016). In that line, political trust increases (decreases) when immigration policy is in line (not in line) with citizens' preferences.

Regarding theoretical mechanisms, I argue that immigration policies impact political trust through 'policy feedback' as a type of 'interpretive feedback effects' (Campbell 2012; Pierson 1993). The policies provide citizens with information and meaning regarding their specific content and make citizens aware of their associated interests and ideological preferences. Citizens interpret the policies as to whether they and the political institutions that enacted them are protecting these (cf. Pierson 1993) and accordingly, adjust their support of the policies and political institutions.

This theoretical framework allows arguing that immigration policies affect political trust heterogeneously depending on whether their contents are (in)congruent with citizens' anti- or pro-immigration preferences. It allows, furthermore, to make three distinct arguments in that regard. First, it allows arguing that citizens adjust their level of political trust depending on whether their ideological preferences are (in)congruent with how restrictive the immigration policies are. In that regard, whereas immigration opponents prefer restrictive immigration policies, immigration proponents prefer liberal immigration policies, which is rooted in their perception of immigration as either a sociotropic threat or as an enrichment to their country's economy and culture, respectively (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Sides and Citrin 2007). Thus, according to this framework, restrictive and liberal immigration policies affect the political trust of immigration opponents and proponents heterogeneously.

Second, by putting emphasis on the specific content of an immigration policy and its congruence or incongruence with an individual's ideological preferences, the framework allows for the argument that specific immigration policies can have distinct effects on political trust. In that regard, specific asylum and labor migration policies signal to the public not only how restrictive or liberal the regulations are but also the motivation of the regulated migrant group to immigrate. The theory of deservingness (De Coninck, Swicegood, and Matthijs 2021; van Oorschot 2000, 2006) suggests that when citizens interpret the content of an asylum or labor migration policy, they consider the deservingness of the migrant group the policy regulates to receive public support, in addition to whether the policy is liberal or restrictive. The theory predicts that individuals will favor 'involuntary' over 'voluntary' migrants and those migrants whom they believe to have a greater need. Thus, it expects individuals to view asylum seekers/refugees as more deserving than labor migrants as the former came involuntarily to seek humanitarian protection and the latter supposedly came voluntarily for work and social well-being (De Coninck, Swicegood, and Matthijs 2021; Hager and Veit 2019, 413; Helbling

2020).³³ According to this argument, asylum and labor migration policies have a varying impact on the political trust of both opponents and supporters of immigration, because both groups are likely to view asylum seekers to be more legitimate and deserving than labor migrants (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016, 219; Newman et al. 2015, 603).

Third, the policy feedback mechanism described above allows for the argument that the effect of immigration policy congruence on political trust also varies by citizens' degree of policy knowledge or seeking of political information. According to policy feedback theory, 'public visibility' as well as the 'traceability' of the policies to the actions of politicians and institutions are preconditions for feedback effects of immigration policies on political trust (Pierson 1993, 622; Ziller and Helbling 2019, 5). Knowledge about policies, political interest, and the seeking of political information should make the contents of immigration policies more visible and traceable. They allow people to better compare their own policy positions to those of authorities, to identify (in-)congruencies, and to reward or punish them accordingly (Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016; Ziller and Helbling 2019). The theoretical framework of this section thus also allows for the argument that the policy congruence effect of immigration policies on political trust is stronger the higher an individual's degree of policy knowledge, political interest, or political information seeking.

Therefore, I conceptualize the effect of immigration policies on political trust as a policy congruence effect in which individuals compare the content of the perceived policies to their own ideological preferences and interests. Political trust should thus increase when the policy contents match their preferences and decrease when they mismatch their preferences. This framework does not exclude that also other phenomena may have an effect on the link between immigration policy and political trust, such as issue salience at the country level (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Kriesi 2012; Lahav 1997; Messina 2007, 5–9) or the individual level (Dennison 2020, 416; Paul and Fitzgerald 2021, 383), or discursive gaps (Czaika and de Haas 2013, 495).

As such, the framework addresses the research puzzles outlined in the introduction, which relate to (a) whether political trust is volatile enough to be affected by immigration

³³ Recent empirical evidence on public discourse and public attitudes about immigration supports the idea that individuals make these deservingness assumptions when evaluating asylum seekers/refugees and labor migrants (e.g., Crawley and Skleparis 2018; Fraser and Murakami 2022). Evidence on public discourse shows that it portrays refugees more positively than economic migrants (Crawley and Skleparis 2018; Van Hootegem, Meuleman, and Abts 2020), thereby influencing how the public assesses the deservingness of these different types of immigrants (De Coninck 2020). Recent research on public attitudes to immigration shows that people prefer the admission and settlement of asylum seekers/refugees over other migrant groups (Abdelaaty and Steele 2022; Coenders, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2017; De Coninck 2020), of asylum seekers/refugees over labor migrants (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Fraser and Murakami 2022; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, 538; Helbling 2020), and of asylum seekers with humanitarian motives over asylum seekers with economic motives (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Hager and Veit 2019; Verkuyten 2004).

policy, (b) whether the public is sufficiently informed about immigration policy for it to affect political trust, and (c) whether asylum and labor migration policies have different effects on political trust. The puzzles will be outlined in more detail in Section 1.5.2 ('Second article: Variation in political trust based on immigration policy congruence') and Section 1.5.3 ('Third article: Heterogeneous policy congruence effects of asylum and labor migration policies on political support') of Subchapter 1.5 'Contributions of individual articles'.

1.4.3 Concluding remarks

The overarching theoretical framework of this dissertation outlined in the previous two sections allows us to link the issue of the relationship between immigration policy and social cohesion to broader scholarly debates. As briefly outlined in Subchapter 1.1 'Introduction and research questions', these debates refer to the liberal paradox (Hollifield 1992), the immigration policy gap (Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013), responsibility and representation in immigration policymaking (Armingeon and Lutz 2019), and the immigration policy mix (Czaika, Bohnet, and Zardo 2021; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021).

To sum up, the theoretical framework addresses the impact of immigration policy on social cohesion through its effects on the population as a whole and immigrants. Thereby, the framework allows for a systematic and comprehensive empirical analysis of the consequences of immigration policies on the social connectedness and political connectedness dimensions of social cohesion.

1.5 Contributions of individual articles

In this subchapter³⁴, I place my study within the known literature and illustrate the contributions of the three distinct articles to it. The narrative is as follows: selective immigration policy restrictions increase some integration outcomes of first-generation immigrants that are indicative of social cohesion, but these effects are limited to a certain group of migrants (Section 1.5.1). Individual ideological congruence with a country's overall immigration policy has a small substantive effect on political trust if a person opposes immigration and also seeks political information (Section 1.5.2), while ideological congruence with specific labor and asylum policies has no effect on political trust (Section 1.5.3). As an overall result, immigration

³⁴ Note that in some parts of the three sections of this subchapter portions of the first, second, and third articles are taken in a mostly abbreviated and adapted form.

policies have a rather substantively small effect on social cohesion in European countries and governments therefore appear to have limited control over the level of social cohesion of their country through the regulation of immigration policy.

1.5.1 First article: Better migrant integration as a result of selective restrictions

The first article investigates the impact of restrictive immigration policies on the integration of immigrants. The article seeks to test the argument that restrictive immigration policies increase integration outcomes by restricting immigration to migrant groups with a greater potential to integrate (see Section 1.4.1 ‘Composition’). By focusing also on some “social cohesion outcomes” of migrant integration (Kesler and Demireva 2011), the article gives insight into whether restrictive immigration policies increase the contributions of immigrants to the level of social cohesion in a society.

In doing so, the article empirically tests the composition effects mechanism outlined in Section 1.4.1 ‘Composition’, focusing on the effects on economic, social, and political integration, the latter two of which I argue in this dissertation are indicative of social cohesion.

Societal context

Research shows that whereas immigration policies have become more liberal overall in recent decades (Helbling & Kalkum, 2017; Schultz et al., 2020), they have become more selective at the same time (Beine et al. 2016). Various researchers have argued that governments aim with these selective immigration policies not only to meet the demands of employers for skilled migrants (Constant et al. 2011; Rinne 2013) but also to increase the integration outcomes of new immigrants (Cerna 2014). Despite the political relevance, there is a lack of empirical studies researching how effective immigration policies are in that regard.

Research gap & puzzle

The literature review in Section 1.3.4 ‘Composition effects’ has shown that the few existing studies on the effects of immigration policies on migrant integration have limitations. They (a) mostly focus on single policies, single countries, and economic integration as the dependent variable. Furthermore, they (b) rarely test the effects of (socio-)cultural (in addition to (socio-)economic) criteria of migrant selection even though they are a crucial part of immigration regulations (FitzGerald et al. 2018). In light of the aim of this dissertation and given the importance of immigrant integration for social cohesion (as outlined in section 1.4.1

‘Composition’), there is a lack of empirical research that examines the impact of immigration policies on a broad range of integration outcomes (particularly those that are relevant for social cohesion) and that tests the effectiveness of the selection mechanisms inherent in immigration policies.

Besides seeking to fill these empirical gaps, the article addresses an underlying research puzzle related to research question 1 of this dissertation (‘How and to what extent do restrictive immigration policies select immigrants with greater integration potential, and does this selection foster migrant integration?’):

How effective are selective immigration policies in increasing (the social cohesion outcomes of) immigrant integration, given that there are contrary theoretical expectations that result from (a) the debated effectiveness of immigration policies in controlling immigration flows (Czaika and de Haas 2013; Helbling and Leblang 2018) and (b) systematic socio-structural barriers to successful immigrant integration that exist in host countries (e.g., ethnic discrimination), and which also apply to immigrants with high integration potential (Doomernik et al. 2009).

Together with co-authors Marc Helbling and Samuel D. Schmid³⁵, I address the empirical gaps and the research puzzle in the first article.

Theoretical arguments

In terms of the theoretical framework, the article develops the framework which I have also outlined in Section 1.4.1 ‘Composition’. While the article developed the framework of how immigration policy affects immigrant integration through selection or composition effects, this dissertation takes it further by elaborating on its implications for social cohesion (see Section 1.4.1 ‘Composition’).

The article speaks of full migrant integration when immigrants participate equally with natives in the social, economic, and political institutions of the host country, and feel as a member of the national society (Alba and Foner 2015; Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2604).³⁶ The article examines the impact of composition effects as a theoretical mechanism through which these policies affect immigrant integration, namely by increasing the composition of immigrants with a high ‘integration potential’ living in the host country, as outlined in Section 1.4.1 ‘Composition’. Although social cohesion is not the primary concern

³⁵ The contributions of the authors are described in the Subchapter ‘**Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**’.

³⁶ This definition of the constituting elements of integration overlaps with the elements of social cohesion as laid out in Section 1.2.2 ‘Social cohesion’. As was explained in the same section, even though economic integration is not an element of social cohesion, it can be viewed to be supportive and indicative of social cohesion outcomes.

of this article, it is indirectly addressed as successful social and political integration is indicative of social cohesion (Kesler and Demireva 2011).

The article argues more generally that a targeted selection of immigrant groups with a greater ‘integration potential’ (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020) leads to better integration outcomes. We propose in the article that immigrants have a greater integration potential when they are highly skilled, financially independent, and culturally close to the host society. First, we argue that immigration regulations that make admission and settlement contingent on meeting economic (Doomernik et al. 2009) and cultural (Bonjour 2014; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Goodman 2012, 2014) requirements function as mechanisms of selection that aim at selectively restricting admission and settlement to the group of migrants with a greater integration potential. Second, the article argues that immigrants from low-income countries have an integration potential that is on average lower than that of immigrants from high-income countries because of the lower share of potential immigrants with a tertiary degree in low-income countries (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2607).

Based on these arguments, the article tests two hypotheses. The *first hypothesis* expects that more restrictive immigration policies lead to better economic, social, and political integration outcomes as migrants are selected based on their integration potential. The *second hypothesis* expects that these selection effects are limited to groups that consist of migrants from low-income countries with an average integration potential that is relatively low.

Research questions & method

To what extent do selectively restrictive immigration policies increase the integration outcomes of immigrants? To what extent are these selection effects limited to groups of migrants from low-income countries with, on average, relatively low integration potential?

To answer these questions, in the article, we combine rounds 1-8 (2002-2016) from the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure migrant integration outcomes with data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset to measure immigration policy restrictiveness (Helbling et al. 2017) across 22 European countries and 31 years (1980-2010).

The IMPIC measures national and over-time variation in policy outputs at the country level, namely the concrete laws and legal regulations. We use a single comprehensive indicator that is the mean score of the restrictiveness measures (for eligibility criteria, entry conditions, status security, and rights associated with a status; see section 1.2.1 ‘Immigration policy’) for the three policy areas of labor migration, family reunification, and asylum and refugees. To measure immigrant integration outcomes on the individual level we pool eight waves (2002–

2016) of the ESS. For the purposes of our study, we include only first-generation immigrants who arrived as non-EU citizens or as EU citizens before the EU’s free movement regime, who have lived in the host country for 20 years or less, who arrived between 1980 and 2010, and who were at least 18 years old when they arrived in the host country. To measure integration, we operationalize employment status and socioeconomic occupational status (i.e., economic integration), political interest and political trust (i.e., political integration), and social trust and lack of perceived discrimination (i.e., social integration).

At the individual level, the sample consists of 6.500 first-generation immigrants. To test the second hypothesis, we differentiated between immigrants with high, medium, and low integration potential. We did this by distinguishing between three broader categories grasping the country of origin which can be differentiated based on their social distance to European destination countries and different degrees of education: European OECD migrants (high integration potential), non-European OECD migrants (medium integration potential), and non-OECD migrants (low integration potential; see Table 5 below).

Table 5: Types of immigrants (abbreviated)

Types of immigrants by origin region	Social distance	Integration potential
European OECD migrants	Low	High
Non-European OECD migrants	Medium	Medium
Non-OECD migrants	High	Low

Note: This table is an abbreviated version of Table 8 from the first article of the dissertation, as published in Helbling, Simon, and Schmid (2020, 2612).

Regarding the analytical strategy, we matched the year of entry of individuals with country-year observations of the IMPIC indicator. Hence, for the purpose of this study, the IMPIC variable was at the individual rather than at the country level, so the IMPIC variable varies across individual immigrants depending on their year of immigration rather than by country. We applied linear regressions for the dependent variables and controlled for time-invariant and various time-varying factors at the level of the host country.

Results and contributions to the relevant literature

First, we find that more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the share of more educated migrants living in the country but the share of migrants with high integration potential (i.e., European OECD migrants, see Table 5 above) compared to other types of migrants. As

we lay out in the article, the finding provides new insights for the literature that looks at how immigrants are selected based on cultural characteristics (FitzGerald et al. 2018).

Second, we find that immigration policies impact some types of social, political, and economic integration outcomes, but only among immigrants with low integration potential (i.e., non-OECD migrants), and these effects are substantively rather small. The effect on employment and socio-economic status is limited to migrants with low (i.e., non-OECD migrants) and medium integration potential (i.e., non-European OECD migrants). While political trust remains rather stable for migrants with a low integration potential, more restrictive immigration policies decrease the political trust of migrants with high and medium integration potential. While the social trust of immigrants with medium integration potential (i.e., non-European OECD migrants) increases with more selection, it only has a very small effect on migrants with low and high integration potential.

Based on this second finding, we conclude in the article that the demand part of immigration is crucial for comprehending effects of selection: if primarily immigrants that have a rather high potential for integration (i.e., European OECD migrants) want to immigrate, mechanisms of selection are rendered meaningless.

We draw the conclusion that immigration policies impact integration outcomes (*first hypothesis*) but that these impacts are confined to economic integration or non-OECD and non-EU OECD immigrants (*second hypothesis*).

Therefore, in the context of the wider relevant literature, we argue that immigration policies seem to be of little relevance to the integration of immigrants and that the results challenge the popular belief that restrictive immigration policies are generally positive for migrant integration.

Contributions to the dissertation's research questions

What are the contributions of the article to the *first sub-question of the dissertation*, namely 'How and to what extent do restrictive immigration policies select immigrants with greater integration potential, and does this selection foster migrant integration?'

First, the article showed that immigrants are selected on cultural rather than economic aspects, namely region of origin rather than education. Restrictive immigration policies do so by limiting the composition of immigration to groups of immigrants that are culturally more similar to the host society.

Second, the article suggests that these composition effects play a minor role in how immigration policies affect social cohesion through their effect on immigrant integration. This

is because the effect on immigrant integration outcomes is substantively rather small and limited to migrants from outside of Europe. I argue that the positive effect on employment and socioeconomic status of migrants with low and medium integration potential may have positive secondary effects on cohesion through their likely effects on social participation (Kearns and Whitley 2015).

Third, regarding the article's research puzzles, it must be concluded that despite the debated effectiveness of immigration policies in controlling immigration flows, the article has shown that restrictive immigration policies succeed in selecting the group of migrants that is culturally more similar to the host country. We must, however, conclude that they increase migrants' integration outcomes that are relevant to social cohesion only to a substantively limited extent, potentially due to structural barriers to integration in the host countries.

Regarding the *dissertation's overarching research question*, 'How and to what extent do immigration policies affect social cohesion in European democracies?', the results of the article lead to the following conclusions: immigration policies do so through cultural selection rather than skill selection of immigrants, but the effect of this selection on social cohesion is substantively rather small as it is limited to economic integration or migrants from outside Europe.

1.5.2 Second article: Variation in political trust based on immigration policy congruence

Having analyzed the impact of immigration policy on social cohesion through effects on immigrants, namely on the social cohesion outcomes of immigrant integration, the second and third articles focus on effects on the population as a whole or, in the words of Pierson (1993), the 'mass public'. In contrast to the first article, which examined 'composition effects' (see Section 1.4.1 'Composition') on immigrants, the remaining second and third articles investigate 'policy congruence' effects on mass publics (see Chapter 1.4.2 'Policy congruence').

In contrast to the first article, the second and third articles focus only on the effects of immigration policy on political trust as a key measure of the 'political connectedness' dimension of social cohesion (see Section 1.2.2 'Social cohesion'). However, the third article also examines the effects on the support for asylum and labor migration policies, which is compared to political trust, a more specific type of support for the political system (see Subsection 1.2.2.2 'Political trust'; Ziller and Helbling 2021, 998). The main theoretical argument explored by both articles is that political trust (and asylum and labor migration policy

support) is greater the more individuals interpret the content of the immigration policies as congruent with their related ideological preferences.

Based on a lacuna in the relevant literature and a striking research puzzle, the second article tests the theoretical argument by comparatively examining the effects of immigration policy on political trust in 23 European countries, conditional on individual ideological preferences on immigration and the individual level of political informedness.

Societal context

Citizens' political trust is essential to the viability and stability of representative democracies (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 1), and it results to a significant extent from the degree to which citizens feel that their ideological preferences are represented by government policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; McLaren 2016). Immigration policy is one of the most salient, polarizing (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav 1997), and emotionalized (Verkuyten 2004) political issues in European countries, and citizens vary widely in their views on how strictly immigration should be regulated (Heath and Richards 2019; McLaren 2015, chap. 3). Despite this, it is unclear whether the extent to which immigration policies substantively represent citizens' immigration preferences matters for political trust.

Moreover, the fact that the 'liberal paradox' (Hampshire 2013; Hollifield 1992) limits the capacity of liberal democratic governments to adopt restrictive immigration policies despite the median voter's call for tightening immigration (Ford, Jennings, and Somerville 2015; van Hauwaert 2023; Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin 2015) may reduce political trust especially among the anti-immigration public.

Research gap & puzzle

The literature review in Section 1.3.2 'Cultural effects' and Section 1.3.3 'Representation effects' has shown that empirical studies have mostly focused on investigating the effects of a) integration policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016) and b) the outcomes of immigration policy on political trust (e.g., Hartevelde et al. 2018; Jeannot 2019; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015). However, to make claims about whether (mis-)representation of citizen preferences by immigration *policies* matters for political trust, the impact of policy outputs (see Section 1.2.1 'Immigration policy') must be examined. Moreover, given the indications that immigration policy is less in line with public opinion than integration policy (Lutz 2021), which could imply that the effects of immigration policy on political trust are more negative, the former is the more relevant case to study.

Moreover, existing studies have c) neglected to examine the relevance of factors related to individual policy knowledge as moderators of the effects of immigration policy congruence on political trust (see Campbell 2012; Kumlin 2014; Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016; Ziller and Helbling 2019).

In addition to attempting to fill these empirical gaps, the article addresses an underlying research puzzle related to the second research question of this dissertation ('To what extent do immigration policies explain variations in individual political trust?'):

To what extent can immigration policy affect political trust, given the ambiguous theoretical expectations in the literature about its actual effects? While some perspectives see political trust as a middle-range (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017) or specific (Norris 1999, 2017) object of political support that tends to change in response to political events and can thus be affected by policies, other perspectives see it as a very abstract object of political support unaffected by policies in the short term (Easton 1975).

Its social (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav 1997) and political (Kriesi 2012; Kriesi et al. 2006) importance, its potential for polarization (Heath and Richards 2019) and its emotional charge (Verkuyten 2004) make the immigration issue a viable case for investigating this puzzle.

I address these empirical gaps and the research puzzle in the second article.

Theoretical arguments

In terms of the theoretical framework, the article applies the approach laid out in Section 1.4.2 'Policy congruence'.

Accordingly, the article defines political trust as citizens' support for political institutions (van der Meer 2017b, 1) and as an evaluative orientation (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001), which results to a substantial extent from policy congruence (Golder and Ferland 2017, 229; Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). Moreover, the article conceptualizes the effect of immigration policy congruence on political trust using the concepts of policy congruence effects and policy feedback effects (see Section 1.4.2 'Policy congruence'; Pierson 1993, 611; Ziller and Helbling 2019, 4).

In sum, the article argues that immigration policies impact political trust heterogeneously conditional on whether the contents are (in)congruent with the anti- or pro-immigration preferences of citizens.

The article has three hypotheses: *Hypothesis H1a* expects that restrictive immigration policies increase the political trust of people who oppose immigration, while liberal immigration policies will decrease it. *Hypothesis H1b* expects that restrictive immigration policies will decrease the political trust of people who support immigration, while liberal

immigration policies will increase it. As outlined in section 1.4.2 ‘Policy congruence’, being informed about the content of immigration policies is a condition for immigration policy feedback effects on political trust, as it increases the visibility and traceability of policies (Pierson 1993, 622; Ziller and Helbling 2019). Therefore, *Hypothesis H2* expects the effect of immigration policy congruence on political trust to be stronger the more people seek political information.

Research questions & method

To what extent is the impact of immigration policy on political trust conditional on an individual’s immigration preference? Is this relationship, furthermore, influenced by an individual’s degree of seeking political information? To deal with these questions, I undertook a comparative analysis of the effects of immigration policy on individual political trust.

To cover national and over-time variation in immigration policy, I use data from the IMPIC dataset (Helbling et al. 2017), which measures policy outputs for the years 1980 to 2010 for 33 countries of the OECD. As with the first article, I use a single comprehensive indicator that is the mean score of the restrictiveness measures (i.e., eligibility criteria, entry conditions, status security, and rights associated with a status) for the three policy areas of labor migration, family reunification, and asylum and refugees.

Individual level data is retrieved from waves 1-5 (2002-2010) of the ESS. Contrary to the first article, only respondents who possess the legal citizenship of the country they live in are included, as my argument is about the interpretive effects of immigration policy on people who are not the target group of immigration policy. After including legal citizens only, the overlap of the IMPIC with the ESS allows me to cover a sample of 182,276 individuals across 23 European countries and five years (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). The outcome variable is political trust, which is a composite of items measuring how much trust the respondents have in their country’s politicians and parliament. As moderating variables, immigration attitudes (as a measure of ideological preference related to immigration policy) on the one hand, and political interest and political news exposure (as measures of political information seeking) on the other, were operationalized.

Regarding the statistical approach, ESS survey-year data was matched with IMPIC data from one year prior to the survey year to prevent potential reverse causality. To deal with this time-series cross-sectional data, a multilevel modeling technique recommended by Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016, 25–26) was applied. All of the multilevel models incorporate a

full set of individual-level and contextual-level control variables and random effects in order to account for clustering in the data.

To test my main argument about the extent to which the degree of congruence of immigration policy outputs affects political trust (*Hypothesis H1a* and *Hypothesis H1b*), I interact the immigration policy indicator with immigration attitudes (i.e., 2-way interaction). To test the role of political information seeking as an additional moderator (*Hypothesis H2*), I interact the immigration policy indicator with immigration attitudes and – successively – with variables capturing individual political information seeking (i.e., 3-way interactions), namely political news exposure and political interest. All interaction models include random slopes for the individual-level moderating variables.

Results

The results show that, as expected by *hypotheses H1a* and *H1b*, immigration policies impact the political trust of immigration opponents and supporters heterogeneously, in the expected directions. However because the effects are substantively only extremely small, they insufficiently support the hypotheses.

However, the results further show that immigration policy impacts the political trust of citizens who are highly anti-immigration and at the same time very strongly exposed to political news, which I used as an indicator for political information seeking. Because the effect is limited to this rather small segment of society and is substantively rather small, the article concludes overall that the impact of immigration policy congruence on political trust is moderate at best.

Contributions to the relevant literature

The article tested for the first time systematically the effects of immigration policy congruence on political trust, using a measure for immigration policy outputs.

First, I contribute to the relevant literature by showing that immigration policy congruence plays a limited role when it comes to political trust when compared to the effects of immigration policy outcomes found in other studies (Harteveld et al. 2018; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015; but see Jeannet 2019). It appears that legal regulations are less visible and traceable to the public than their outcomes, therefore having a comparably smaller effect on political trust. The results also contradict the assumption that immigration policies impact

political trust more strongly than immigrant policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016).³⁷

Second, the finding that immigration policy congruence affects the political trust of immigration opponents but not of proponents (see also Harteveld et al. 2018, 173–74) backs the empirical literature supporting the assumptions of the liberal paradox (e.g., Hollifield 1992).

Third, the findings qualify the assumption that a lack of substantive representation on immigration is harmful to liberal representative democracy (Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013). The evidence presented here implies that ‘responsible’ (i.e., more liberal) immigration policies (Armingeon and Lutz 2019) that are not in line with the demands of citizens who favor restrictions, do not substantively reduce political trust in institutions – at least not at the individual level and in the short term.

Contributions to the dissertation’s research questions

What are the contributions of the article to the *second sub-question of the dissertation*, namely ‘To what extent do immigration policies explain variations in individual political trust?’.

First, the results of the article suggest that immigration policy congruence explains variations in political trust to a substantively small extent only. The level to which citizens are informed about policies plays, however, an important role in that process.

Second, concerning the articles’ research puzzle, I conclude that despite the emotional charge of immigration policy (Verkuyten 2004), its political salience, and assumed volatility to political events (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017), political trust is rather stable in the face of policy (in-)congruence (Easton 1975).

Regarding the *dissertation’s overarching research question*, ‘How and to what extent do immigration policies affect social cohesion in European democracies?’, the results of the article lead to the following conclusions: Individual ideological congruence to the restrictiveness of immigration policy as a whole is not a primary means of how immigration policy affects the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion, measured as political trust. However, the extent to which individuals are informed about political events and policies turns out to be crucial for the relationship between immigration policies and political connectedness.

³⁷ But this question cannot be conclusively resolved because the existing studies which find that immigrant policies affect political trust do only investigate the indirect moderating role of these policies.

1.5.3 Third article: Heterogeneous policy congruence effects of asylum and labor migration policies on political support

Having investigated how immigration policies impact the political trust of the mass public comparatively for European countries in the second article, the third article explores this relationship further. It addresses several unanswered questions from the second article.

First, the third article builds on the results of the second article, which suggest that immigration policy's overall level of liberalness or restrictiveness has minimal impact on political trust. The third article examines whether variations in political trust derive from perceptions of the liberalness or restrictiveness in specific policy areas (i.e., certain legal channels) of immigration policy, rather than from the restrictiveness or liberalness of immigration policy as a whole. In other words, the second article's discovery of minor effects with a highly aggregated measure does not necessarily indicate that specific regulations won't have more significant effects.

Second, due to the aggregate nature of the IMPIC immigration policy indicator used and the multilevel method applied, the second article cannot eliminate the possibility that the effects of immigration policy on political trust occurred through the perception of immigration policy or other factors, such as the discourse surrounding the policies (Czaika and de Haas 2013). This creates difficulty in determining whether effects are limited to the study situation or extend to the real world.

Third, the second article solely examined the impact of immigration policy congruence on a more abstract measure of political support, namely political trust in institutions (see Subsection 1.2.2.2 'Political trust'). The aim of the third article is to expand upon these findings by examining the effects of immigration policy also on a more specific type of political support, namely policy support (see Ziller and Helbling 2021). This will reveal whether immigration policy influences stronger less abstract forms of political support, with, however, potentially lesser (and less immediate) implications on the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion.

Systematically examining these unaddressed issues, the third article examines the impact of asylum and labor migration policies, which regulate the most prominent forms of immigration (Messina 2007; Schain 2008), on political trust and policy support within a single country, Germany. The study uses a unique controlled survey experiment that enables causal inference, utilizing immigration policy indicators with high external validity.

Societal context

In addition to public debates about the overall restrictiveness of immigration policies, there are discussions increasingly centering on the question of whether particular legal channels of immigration should be subject to greater restrictions than others (Czaika, Bohnet, and Zardo 2021; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021). Schultz, Lutz, and Simon (2021) show that under certain conditions countries adopt an immigration policy mix that tightens regulations in some policy areas while relaxing them in others.

We know from existing research that citizens have a preference for certain types of migrants rather than being generally for or against migration. Consistent with assumptions from the deservingness approach (e.g., van Oorschot 2000), citizens, in general, prefer refugees to migrant workers (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), and this appears to be true for both anti-immigration and pro-immigration citizens (Newman et al. 2015). We lack, however, systematic evidence on how citizens respond to concrete asylum and labor migration policies in terms of political support.

Addressing this issue is important from a societal point of view, as it is possible that liberal immigration regulations in certain policy areas may lead to variations in individual political trust as a crucial element of the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion.

Research gap & puzzle

Besides the research gaps resulting from the shortcomings of the second article, the third article addresses a research puzzle related to the third research question of this dissertation (‘To what extent do labor migration and asylum policies explain variations in policy support and political trust?’):

To what degree can labor migration and asylum policies have a differential impact on political support, given the contradictory viewpoints in the literature on whether individuals actually exhibit varying attitudes towards specific migrant groups (such as labor migrants and asylum seekers)?

Rather than holding a polarized view of migration and immigrants as a whole, studies show that citizens favor certain types of immigrants over others. They appear to prefer refugees over migrant workers (e.g., Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), and there are indications that this preference is true for supporters and opponents of immigration (Newman et al. 2015). At the same time, it has also been suggested that rather than being different (Jedinger and Eisentraut 2020; Meuleman et al. 2019), citizens’ attitudes toward different types of immigrants are related (Meeusen et al. 2018; Meuleman and Billiet 2003). This could imply that instead of supporting

or opposing particular immigrant groups, citizens either hold a preference for a “fortress” or do not (Coenders, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2017, 98; Ivarsflaten 2005, 27).

We do not have empirical evidence to determine which of these explanatory logics (which I will refer to further below as the ‘deservingness’ and the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ approach) applies to (a) how citizens support asylum and labor migration policies, and (b) how the level of policy support affects political support. As outlined in the literature review in Section 1.3.3 ‘Representation effects’, studies have so far only examined the effects of immigrant policies (e.g., Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014) or of the general restrictiveness of immigration policy, as in the second article of this dissertation.

I address these empirical gaps and the research puzzle in the second article.

Theoretical arguments

In terms of the theoretical framework, the article applies the ‘Policy congruence’ framework developed in Section 1.4.2 ‘Policy congruence’.

As objects of support for the political system, the article focuses on support for asylum and labor migration policies as well as trust in political institutions. The former represents a specific and the latter a more abstract type of political support (see Ziller and Helbling 2021, 998).

Drawing from section 1.4.2 ‘Policy congruence’, the article conceptualizes the effect of asylum and labor migration policy congruence on policy support and political trust as interpretive policy feedback effects (Pierson 1993, 611; Ziller and Helbling 2019, 4). I consider political support to result from citizens’ evaluations of how much the content of adopted policies is in line with their related ideological preferences (Golder and Ferland 2017). If the policy content is in line (or not in line) with citizens’ preferences, their political support increases (or decreases).

Asylum and labor migration policies indicate to the public how restrictive or liberal the regulations are as well as the motivation of the regulated migrant group to immigrate, namely to seek humanitarian protection or work, respectively (Bjerre et al. 2015).

The so-called deservingness theory posits that people favor asylum seekers over labor migrants because they perceive the former as more deserving to receive public support due to their involuntariness to immigrate and their perceived greater need (De Coninck, Swicegood, and Matthijs 2021; van Oorschot 2000, 2006). I argue in the article that opponents as well as supporters of immigration take this into account (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; cf. Newman et al. 2015) when evaluating restrictive or liberal asylum and labor migration

policies. On that basis, I formulate *deservingness hypotheses*, which posit that the political support of anti- and pro-immigration individuals varies conditional on whether they are confronted with a labor migration or asylum policy (*Hypotheses H1a and H1b, H2a and H2b*).

Building on findings by Meeusen et al. (2018; see also Meuleman and Billiet 2003), I formulate *restrictiveness-liberalness hypotheses*, which posit that individuals who interpret the content of an asylum or labor migration policy compare their own ideological preference only to the degree of restrictiveness/liberalness of that policy, without regard for whether it regulates asylum seekers/refugees or labor migrants. Therefore, the *restrictiveness-liberalness hypotheses* posit that asylum and labor migration policies have a homogeneous effect on the political support of anti- and pro-immigration citizens (*hypotheses H3a and H3b*).

Besides these arguments, I expect policy support to be more strongly affected by policy congruence than political trust because the former is more immediate to citizens than the latter (see Ziller and Helbling 2021, 998).

Overall, the article examines how citizens react to specific immigration policies conditional on whether they target asylum seekers or labor migrants and on whether they are restrictive or liberal. To do so, I conducted a unique survey experiment in Germany that randomly assigned respondents to descriptions of four different specific immigration policies. This procedure allows me to test their empirical relevance for policy support and political trust causally.

As a new feature, I designed each description to closely resemble the content of a specific existing German immigration law, with the aim to enhance the external validity of the policy treatments, and thus increase confidence that policy perceptions and political support attitudes are indeed related (Barabas & Jerit, 2010).

Research questions & method

To what extent do asylum and labor migration policies impact political support heterogeneously? To what extent do these policies have a larger impact on policy support rather than political trust, given that the former is less distant to citizens than the latter?

To answer these questions, I use the original data that I collected for this article (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.10396335). The data is based on a representative survey in which I embedded a priming experiment (e.g., Bloemraad, Silva, and Voss 2016; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Naumann and Stoetzer 2018; Ziller and Helbling 2021), a type of randomized controlled

experiment.³⁸ In priming experiments, respondents are randomly assigned to a treatment group or a control group. Exposure to treatment is thought to trigger cognitive processes influencing responses to post-treatment questions (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Lavrakas 2008). The difference in outcomes on the questions between treatment and control groups or between the different treatment groups are taken to be causal treatment effects (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007, 5).

The net sample is based on a random probability sample among participants of an online access panel, and it consists of $n = 1,110$ respondents who are representative of the German population. Consistent with the second article of the dissertation, only respondents possessing (German) legal citizenship at the time the survey was conducted were included.

Regarding the experimental setup, respondents were randomly assigned to one of five groups, of which four were treatment groups and one was a control group. To investigate the ‘deservingness’ hypotheses ($H1a-b$ and $H2a-b$) and the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ ($H3a-b$) hypotheses, each treatment group was assigned one of four treatment vignettes. Each assigned treatment vignette describes the content of a real existing German immigration law. The assigned treatment vignette either describes the content of a liberal labor migration law (vignette 1), restrictive labor migration law (vignette 2), liberal asylum law (vignette 3), or restrictive asylum law (vignette 4). Respondents in the treatment groups must then answer post-treatment questions querying how much they support or do not support that law, and how much they trust or do not trust various political institutions.

To examine whether the phenomena (i.e., immigration policies) impact citizen political support in the “real world” (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007, 5; Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 90), existing German immigration laws served as “real world referents” to make the treatment “resemble the relevant phenomenon” (Barabas and Jerit 2010, 226).

The article operationalizes political trust and policy support, and immigration preference corresponding to the definition of immigration as a ‘sociotropic threat’ (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Sides and Citrin 2007).

To deal with the cross-sectional structure of the data I estimate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Because of the representativeness of the dataset for the German population and because respondents were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups (Barabas and Jerit 2010), the models do not include any control variables (Ziller and Helbling 2021).

³⁸ The priming method is preferred over the conjoint method (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) as it is considered more suitable for testing effects of relatively few treatments on multiple outcome variables.

Results

Overall, the results show that the individual ideological (in-)congruence of specific labor migration and asylum policies affects specific political support (i.e., policy support) but not more abstract political support (i.e., political trust).

Second, I found that the ideological congruence effects on policy support varied according to whether the asylum and labor migration policies were either liberal or restrictive.

These findings show that, in line with the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ assumption, the liberal asylum and labor migration policies polarize pro-immigration and anti-immigration individuals, with both policies increasing policy support for the former and decreasing it for the latter. In contrast, however, restrictive asylum and labor migration policies are less polarizing and, instead, rather uniting as both pro-immigration and anti-immigration individuals support the restrictive labor migration policy more than the restrictive asylum policy. Thus, individuals seem to apply a ‘deservingness’ heuristic, but only to restrictive policies, which is why I find support for both the deservingness and the restrictiveness-liberalness hypotheses.

Contributions to the relevant literature

First, I contribute to the relevant literature by showing that ideological congruence with asylum and labor migration policies plays a limited role in political trust but a significant role in policy support (e.g., Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2021; Fraser and Murakami 2022; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), providing some support for the findings of the second article of this dissertation.

Second, the study illustrates that the deservingness concept explains public attitudes to immigration policy and that distinguishing between anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant individuals reveals overlaps in policy support (Newman et al., 2015), which are driven by a shared perception of asylum seekers as more deserving than labor migrants (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017). In that regard, it contributes to very recent literature finding that anti- and pro-immigration individuals have overlaps in the support of certain aspects of immigration policy (Helbling et al. 2023; Helbling, Maxwell, and Traunmüller 2024; Letki et al. 2024).

Third, the finding that citizens apply the deservingness heuristic to restrictive policies only may be driven by a status quo bias expressed in the desire to maintain a society that is neither fully open nor fully closed to migrants, namely selective rather than a ‘fortress’ (e.g., Beine et al. 2016; Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021), as is

also reflected in the dominant public discourse (De Coninck 2020; Crawley and Skleparis 2018).

Contribution to the dissertation's research questions

What are the contributions of the article to the *third sub-question of the dissertation*, namely 'To what extent do labor migration and asylum policies explain variations in policy support and political trust?'

Concerning the article's research puzzles, I conclude that despite different viewpoints in the literature on whether individuals' attitudes toward different migrant groups differ, asylum and labor migration policies have a heterogeneous effect on policy support.

Regarding the *dissertation's overarching research question*, 'How do immigration policies affect social cohesion in European democracies', the results of the article lead to the following conclusions: first, supporting the findings from the second article, ideological congruence with asylum and labor migration policies is not a primary means of how these policies impact the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion, when measured as political trust and at least not in short-term.

Second, using vignettes that resemble the content of real immigration policies, the article showed that there is no direct causal relationship between asylum and labor migration policies with the political connectedness dimension of social cohesion, at least not when measured as political trust and in the short-term.

Third, however, it could be argued that when incongruence with these policies leads to long-term policy dissatisfaction, this may have consequences for political connectedness in the long run (Easton 1975).

1.6 Concluding remarks

In the context of increasing immigration, immigration policy has come to be seen by policymakers as a political instrument to influence social cohesion. Restrictions on immigration are seen as necessary to maintain a shared set of cultural values and practices in a society, and thus as a precondition for social cohesion in terms of a society's social and political connectedness. First, it is often believed that bringing immigration policy more in line with public demands for restrictions would increase citizens' political connectedness. Second, it is often assumed that restrictions would limit immigration to groups of immigrants who are more skilled and culturally more similar to the host society and, therefore, more socially and

politically connected. This dissertation sought to challenge these prominent assumptions about immigration policy, by bringing them together as two modes through which policymakers seek to influence social cohesion through immigration policy-making. The aim of this dissertation was to outline and empirically test theoretical mechanisms ('composition effects' and 'policy congruence effects') through which immigration policies impact social cohesion (by affecting the population as a whole and immigrants), and to make statements about the magnitude and conditions of the effects.

The results of this dissertation show that the effects of immigration policies on social cohesion do not live up to the high expectations of politicians and the public (e.g., Czaika and de Haas 2013). First, regarding effects on the population as a whole, individual ideological congruence to the overall restrictiveness of a country's immigration policy has a small substantive effect on political connectedness (measured as political trust), but individual political informedness has been identified as a condition for the relationship. Second, individual ideological congruence with the content of asylum and labor migration policies is not causally related to political connectedness (measured as political trust), in Germany. In terms of policy support, however, the study found a consensus among anti-immigration and pro-immigration citizens in support of the status quo, in which humanitarian admissions are favored over economic admissions. Third, regarding effects on immigrants, restrictive immigration policies increase migrant integration outcomes with relevance for social cohesion through cultural selection, but the effect is limited mostly to immigrants from outside of Europe.

In conclusion, immigration policy impacts social cohesion through policy congruence and composition mechanisms, but the impact is substantively limited and conditional. Only by combining these two theoretical perspectives has it been possible to understand systematically and comprehensively how and to what extent immigration policies affect social cohesion, and to test widely held policy assumptions. Nevertheless, the prioritization of humanitarian over economic admissions (Czaika, Bohnet, and Zardo 2021; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021) pays off to some extent by having a positive effect on policy support of the population as a whole, and selective restrictions (Doomernik et al. 2009) pay off by having a moderate effect on the economic success and the social trust of certain immigrant groups. Still, the capacity of governments in liberal representative democracies to influence social cohesion through the creation of fortresses, selective restrictions, or policy mixes is rather limited. Thereby, the results of the dissertation challenge the prominent assumption of restrictive immigration policies as an effective means of maintaining and enhancing social cohesion.

As practical takeaways, the consensus among anti- and pro-immigrant citizens in supporting policies that favor humanitarian over economic intakes gives policymakers some room in designing responsible immigration policy in an environment in which it becomes increasingly more difficult to do so (Armingeon and Lutz 2019; Mair 2009). Second, although there are some indications that immigration policies are more liberal than demanded by the median voter (e.g., van Hauwaert 2023), this dissertation has shown that incongruence with liberal immigration policy has a very limited negative effect on political trust. This speaks for the resilience of political institutions in a context in which liberal democratic governments have to balance ‘representation’ and ‘responsibility’ (Mair 2009). Third, in order to increase the effect of selective immigration policies on the social and political connectedness of immigrants, it would be crucial to address the socio-structural barriers present in destination countries that prevent immigrants from making acquaintances and becoming politically engaged, such as ethnic discrimination (e.g., Auspurg, Hinz, and Schmid 2017; Zschirnt and Ruedin 2015), a lack of social capital (Lancee 2010), and difficult access to legal citizenship (Dronkers and Vink 2012), and to invest in integration policies, even if they are costly (Doomernik et al. 2009).

To come to these conclusions, the separate articles of this thesis used different theories and research methods which were guided by the dissertation’s general research question. I have tried to demonstrate that to comprehend immigration policy effects on social cohesion it is crucial to look both at policy congruence effects on the population as a whole and composition effects on immigrants. Through looking at these two mechanisms, the dissertation makes a contribution to the research of the impacts of immigration policy on social cohesion in European countries.

The shortcomings of this dissertation give instructions for future empirical inquiry. First, in the first article, I tested together with my co-authors the effects of restrictive immigration policies on immigrant integration outcomes. The fact that only small substantive effects were found with an aggregate-level policy index does not exclude that more substantive effects could be found by testing the effects of single policies. Moreover, it could be fruitful to empirically investigate whether structural barriers to integration in the host country (e.g., ethnic discrimination) moderate the effects of immigration policies on integration and cohesion. In the second article, I tested the effects of immigration policy congruence on political trust. Some limitations of this article, namely the use of an aggregate indicator composed of different immigration policy areas, have been taken up in the third article. The third article tested the effects of asylum and labor migration policy congruence on political trust using a survey experiment, but it is limited in that its focus on the external validity of the policy treatments

comes at the price of low internal validity. It can thus not be excluded that the use of treatments with stronger internal validity would also have led to effects on political trust. Besides dealing with this measurement problem, future studies could examine the effects of long-term (in-)congruence with immigration policy on political connectedness.

Although this dissertation has shown that immigration policy (via composition and policy congruence effects) has a limited impact on social cohesion, at least as measured by the indicators used in this dissertation, the immigration issue will continue to have an influence on the social and political dimension of social cohesion. The dissertation has pointed to starting points for the development of more responsible immigration regulations that have some consensus among anti- and pro-immigration citizens.

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Chapter 2. First article: Restricting immigration to foster migrant integration? A comparative study across 22 European countries

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Restricting Immigration to Foster Migrant Integration? A Comparative Study

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Abstract. Elaborating a popular assumption about the effects of immigration policies on the integration of migrants, we argue in this article that more restrictive immigration policies lead to the selection of immigrants with greater integration potential, and that this selection should foster migrant integration. To test this argument, we combine country-level data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database with individual-level data on economic, political and social integration from multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) across 22 European countries. We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted, but they do make it more likely for migrants from European OECD countries to be admitted, while making it less likely for migrants outside the OECD. Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries. We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes but that these effects are small and limited to specific integration outcomes and migrants from specific regions. Our study, therefore, relativises the underlying popular assumption that immigration restrictions foster migrant integration, bearing important implications for the currently salient debates on immigration policy-making.

Keywords: Immigration policies, integration outcomes, Europe

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1 Introduction

In the context of increasing migration inflows, debates over how to best integrate immigrants have become very important in Western societies over the last decades. These debates not only revolve around the effectiveness of *integration* policies but also around the role of *immigration* policies. It is often assumed that a more targeted selection of migrants according to criteria that are aimed at helping them integrate (which we shall call integration potential) foster migrant integration. This was for example an important issue in the 2017 German elections when both left and right liberal parties alluded to the idea: The Free Democratic Party (FDP) wanted to reform the Blue Card that allows high-skilled migrants to migrate to Germany in order to reach better social and economic integration outcomes (FDP 2017: 69). In addition, they proposed to introduce a point system that considers age, language capacities and skills, as in their view integration courses are not enough to build modern immigration societies. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) also promoted a point system to improve what they explicitly called the “migrants’ capacity to integrate” (SPD 2017: 77). However, despite the practical relevance of this idea, systematic research on this topic is rare, and we do not know whether restrictive immigration policies indeed lead to better integration outcomes.

Migrants are fully integrated if they participate on an equal basis with natives in major institutions of the host country such as the labor market or the political system and if they feel recognized as a part of the national community (Alba and Foner 2015: 5). Accordingly, we focus in this paper on migrants’ employment and socio-economic occupational status, their political trust and participation as well as their social trust and perceived discrimination. To study the degree of migrant integration in these different domains most studies so far have focused on the policy effects of integration and citizenship policies (e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Koopmans 2010; Helbling et al. 2016; Vernby 2013; Hainmueller et al. 2017). These policies are aimed at providing immigrants with rights and duties that constitute necessary resources or incentives to participate economically, politically and socially in the host society.

There are only very few studies that have looked at the effects of immigration policies, which regulate who is admitted and allowed to remain in a country. Waldinger (2003: 263) and Massey et al. (1998) pointed to this selection effect already two decades ago. More recently, several studies have focused on very specific aspects only, be it single policy changes and/or effects in a small number of countries (Rinne 2012: 12-13). Söhn (2013) is the only one who looks at the effects of both immigration and integration policies and shows that for Aussiedler

in Germany language skills and classes had positive impacts on structural integration. Chiswick and Miller (2004) found that the way visa categories were organized in the 1990s had an effect on immigrants' language skills in Australia. Tani (2019) showed that the introduction of more restrictive measures for labor migrants in Australia in the late 1990s influenced the human capital of the affected group. There was, however, no detectable impact on indicators measuring immigrants' skill utilization. The same policy change was exploited by Cobb-Clark (2003), who found that the more restrictive selection criteria lead to better labor market integration. Constant and Zimmerman (2005) as well as Cangiano (2014) investigate the role entry channels play in Germany and Denmark in the early 2003, respectively for several European countries in 2008. They show that, compared to labor migrants, humanitarian and family migrants have lower salaries and are less likely to be employed.

Against the background of the limitations of existing studies, we attempt for the first time to test in a systematic and comprehensive way the role immigration policies play in integrating migrants economically, politically and socially. We argue that if policies are more restrictive, more criteria need to be fulfilled to enter a country, which in turn increases the selectivity of the regulations. In other words, by increasing the integration potential of admitted migrants, restrictive immigration regulations should lead to better integration outcomes. We also argue that selection effects are more likely to emerge for migrant groups with a relatively low integration potential or relatively high social distance, by which we mean immigrants from poorer countries whose citizens have, on average, a lower level of education.

To test our arguments, we combine rounds 1 to 8 from the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure economic, political and social dimensions of integration outcomes with data from the newly built Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset to measure immigration policy restrictiveness (Helbling et al. 2017) across a large number of European countries. We mostly focus on how migrants are selected based on their education and regions of origin to measure their skills and social distance. We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted, but the likelihood of migrants from European OECD countries compared to migrants from other regions. Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries.

2 Immigration policies and integration potential

Migration selection processes can serve various purposes. In some cases, the very aim of these policies was to keep migrants in the country for only a short period of time and to prevent them from integrating as it was the case with many guest worker programs (Ellermann 2013). After the oil crisis of the 1970s more and more policies have been implemented whose aim it is to attract high-skilled migrants while deterring low-skilled migrants (Cerna 2014; Doornik et al. 2009: ix). Selection based on skill does not only constitute a means to meet the demand for high-skilled professionals (Constant and Zimmermann 2005). High-skilled immigrants are also increasingly viewed to be easier to integrate economically, socially and politically, as they purportedly possess the necessary language skills and level of education (Doornik et al. 2009: 10).

Cultural characteristics constitute another group of important selection criteria. Since the 2000s several Western European states have introduced pre-arrival integration tests (mostly focused on language capacities and country knowledge) whose aim it is to select migrants that are easier to integrate (Goodman 2012, 2014). Such strategies already existed in earlier times in the Americas and were mostly based on group-level racial categories (FitzGerald et al. 2017). Ethnocentric attitudes can still be found nowadays behind the individual based selection criteria as exceptions are made based on the immigrants' nationalities and as the introduction of these tests decreased the number of migrants mostly from Muslim countries (FitzGerald et al. 2017).

In a nutshell, among other criteria current immigration regulations include numerous conditions regarding economic and cultural requirements (Bjerre et al. 2016: 9). Increasing restrictiveness regarding these criteria aims at selectively restricting the group of migrants to those who are financially more independent, better qualified and culturally closer to the host society. As Cangiano (2014: 423) and Bonjour (2014) have already noted, the establishment of such conditions constitute selection mechanisms that might lead to better migrant integration as migrants have better "starting positions" as Söhn (2013: 320) puts it. We refer to this idea as *integration potential*. Various studies have shown that integration gaps can indeed be explained by the integration potential in terms of migrants' skill levels and social distance to the host society (Granato and Kalter 2001; Heath and Martin, 2013; Ebner and Helbling 2016).⁴⁴

We argue that this relationship holds for economic, social and political integration to the same extent as high education can be seen as a resource that helps immigrants access the

⁴⁴ By immigrants with low social distance we mean immigrants from poorer countries whose citizens are on average lower educated.

job market, social networks and become politically active. Such migrants are better qualified for (high-skilled) jobs (economic integration) and share similar values and thus have fewer difficulties to connect to the host society and to be accepted by them (social integration). We also know from existing research that higher education leads to more political participation (Aleksynska 2008; Maxwell 2010) and economic and social capital to increased political trust and political participation (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). It can thus be argued that *more restrictive immigration policies lead to better economic, political and social integration outcomes as migrants are selected based on their integration potential* (H1).

This selection process can occur right at the border when it is decided who can enter the country and who cannot. It can also happen through self-selection when potential migrants with a low integration potential are deterred by restrictive measures and decide, for example, against applying for a visa or prefer to move to a more liberal country (Docquier et al. 2014). Such decisions might be affected by initiatives through which states try to attract high-skilled migrants and thereby convey clear signals about the kind of migrants they want (Shachar 2006). Migrants might also improve their integration potential through step-wise migration (Paul 2011). They first move to countries that are easier to access to gain certain skills that allow them to migrate to more restrictive countries.

3 Diverging selection effects across country groups

It has been heavily debated for some time whether immigration policies have any effects on migration flows. If there are no policy effects on flows, there is no selection of migrants with preferred characteristics. Castles (2004) and Sassen (1996: 63-105) argue that state immigration policies have failed and sovereignty in this field eroded, among others because international human rights treaties and principles of freedom of circulation have prevented nation-states from closing national boundaries. Meanwhile, Messina (2007: 244) concludes that “the declining sovereignty thesis is largely exaggerated and unsubstantiated by the facts.” Nowadays, nation-states have better means to control their borders (Freeman 1994) and often externalize controls to non-state actors or control migration through venue shopping (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Zolberg 2003).

Several studies have already shown that there are indeed policy effects on immigration flows (Hatton 2004; Ortega and Peri 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Helbling and Leblang 2018). It can be assumed that these effects depend on the demand-side of migration that has not been considered by studies investigating the immigration policy effects. This has also consequences

for immigration policy effects on migrant integration outcomes. If it is people with a high integration potential from OECD countries that primarily want to move, policy effects disappear as migrants fulfill the eligibility criteria in both generous and restrictive immigration countries. Selection and consequently integration effects can thus only be observed if there is variation in the demand for migration among both groups of migrants with high and low integration potential. This variation depends to a large extent on the sending countries' characteristics. As Söhn (2013: 304) puts it: "While 'poorly' educated immigrants from more developed countries usually have at least basic literacy skills, immigrants coming from lower social strata of less developed states are less likely to be literate and will have a hard time finding qualified jobs."

As Migali and Scipioni (2018) show, the socio-economic status of persons who intend to migrate varies considerably across low- and high-income countries. The share of potential migrants in low-income countries that have a tertiary degree is much lower than in high-income countries. Given the fact that there is a high correlation between potential and actual migrants (Tjaden et al. 2019), it can be assumed that immigrants from such countries have on average a much lower integration potential than immigrants from high-income countries that consist mostly of immigrants with a high integration potential. It can therefore be argued that *the selection mechanisms only have an effect for groups that consists of migrants from low-income countries with an average integration potential that is relatively low* (H2).

4 Reverse causality arguments

The argument that immigration regulations affect integration outcomes is based on the assumptions that regulations affect migrant integration and not vice versa. It is plausible to assume that a country's immigration regulations become more restrictive because migrant integration is poor. However, even if this is the case it is not clear whether new regulations lead to better integration outcomes. It is still of interest whether policies are effective, irrespective of the reasons of their introduction. There would only be endogeneity if restrictive policies are introduced because integration outcomes are very good. But there is little reason to expect such a relationship.

More importantly, reverse causality could only become a problem if migrant integration outcomes were aggregated to the national level and regressed on immigration policies at that same level. In this paper, we hold instead that to assess the potential association between immigration policies and migrant integration outcomes, individual migrants must be matched

with the immigration policy they were exposed to. Hence, in our models immigration policies are temporally prior to migrant integration outcomes and, therefore, these outcomes cannot determine the specific immigration policies the individual migrants were exposed to.

Integration outcomes might also be affected by return migration if migrants with high and low integration potentials have different likelihoods to return. However, it is far from clear whether such a bias exists. It can be assumed that people with a low integration potential have a higher likelihood to return exactly because they did not integrate, did not find a job and/or did not feel at home (Dustmann 1996; Dustmann and Weiss 2007). However, these people also have a higher likelihood to come from less attractive countries, which makes a return less probable and naturalization more probable (Dronkers and Vink 2012). Those with a higher integration potential might also have a higher likelihood to return (or move to a third country) as they are generally more mobile regarding financial resources and social capital.

5 Data and methods

5.1 Immigration policies

To measure the restrictiveness of immigration policies we draw on the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database (Helbling et al. 2017). The IMPIC measures policy outputs (i.e. actual laws and regulations rather than their implementation or their related policy outcomes) for 33 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 1980 until 2010. It covers regulations regarding labor immigration, family reunification, refugee and asylum policies, and policies targeting co-ethnics.⁴⁵

For each of these fields the comprehensive IMPIC index captures the restrictiveness of entry conditions and eligibility criteria that define how difficult it is to establish legal residence in a country. Moreover, the rights and the security of status associated with a respective entry permit are included that stipulate for how long immigrants can stay on the territory and to what extent they are granted certain rights such as access to the labor market.⁴⁶ In addition, the IMPIC

⁴⁵ The last group concerns people who are entitled to easier access to immigration because of cultural or historical affiliations to the nation-state. This might be because these groups share the same language or religion as the country of destination; because their ancestors emigrated from this country, or because of former colonial ties.

⁴⁶ Although there is some overlap, these regulations are different from integration policies as measured, for example, by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Huddleston et al. 2015). Integration policies are not tied to specific entry permits but cover more general political, social and cultural rights of immigrant groups (Helbling et al. 2017: 84-85).

measures immigration control mechanisms that cross-cut these policy fields, indicating how strictly the regulations are enforced, and how undocumented migrants are treated. Using categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA), it has been shown that the regulations in the three policy fields of labor migration, family reunification and asylum can be reduced to a single and consistent empirical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016). The special and usually marginal category of co-ethnics as well as the variables capturing control mechanisms form separate dimensions.

Building on the latter result, in the following analyses we will thus use one comprehensive index that combines the regulations in the three policy fields of labor migration, family reunification and asylum (see also Helbling and Leblang 2018). These are the fields that nowadays constitute the main legal channels of migration into advanced industrialized societies (Messina 2007: 20-46; Schain 2008: ch.1). Regulations targeting co-ethnic immigrants are excluded, because they exist only in a few countries and, as already mentioned, concern a very special category of immigrants. Finally, control mechanisms do not concern selection and therefore are irrelevant for testing the argument.

In Table 12 in Appendix 1 we list all regulations that we used to build an additive index that measures the restrictiveness of immigration regulations and that varies between 0 (liberal) and 1 (restrictive) (for codebook and technical details see Bjerre et al. 2016). Figure 4 in Appendix 1 illustrates the distribution of the restrictiveness of immigration policies comprehensively for all three policy fields in our twenty-two host countries for the years 1980-2010. It shows that immigration policy restrictiveness in these fields varies over time within countries, providing within-variation for our statistical analyses, which include fixed-effects for the receiving countries. Furthermore, it reveals that immigration policies in most countries became more liberal over time (see also Schmid and Helbling 2016).

5.2 Migrant integration

To measure immigrant integration outcomes on the individual level for a sufficient number of immigrants, we pool eight waves (2002-2016) of the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is the only survey that allows us to investigate migrant integration across a large number of countries and years. For the purposes of our study we only include first-generation immigrants, which are defined as persons who have been born outside the country of destination, and if at least one

of their parents also fulfils this criterion.⁴⁷ From this group, we exclude all those who have entered as EU citizens under the EU free movement regime, as national immigration restrictions do not apply to this group. EU citizens that entered before the free movement regime was in place are included. Moreover, we only include persons who have been resident for 20 years or less in the host country as we assume that the selection effects become negligible after such a long time. As IMPIC covers the years 1980 to 2010, we only include persons that entered the host country in this period. Furthermore, we do not know whether persons below the age of eighteen came with their parents and therefore were not themselves selected by immigration policies. Therefore, we only included people that were at least 18 years of age when they entered the country.

Using the ESS for research on immigrant integration may have certain drawbacks. The data is produced in lengthy face-to-face interviews which are conducted only in (one of) the host country's language(s). This has two potential implications. First, questioning immigrants about their integration in such a personal setting may aggravate problems of social desirability, making the respondents likely to report more "positive" outcomes. Second, the fact that language proficiency of (one of) the host country's language(s) is required for participation in the ESS may create not only a general under-representation of immigrants in the sample but could also bias the sample towards immigrants who are more integrated. Nevertheless, while the first problem constitutes a generally unresolved issue in survey research, the second problem is partly mitigated by the inclusion of several individual-level control variables (in some of our models) that are also associated with varying aspects and degrees of integration.

Following Alba and Foner (2015: 5) we define integration as a process that allows migrants to participate in the important domains of their host societies and to feel accepted as part of that society. These domains include the educational and political system as well as the labor and housing markets. The questions included in the ESS do not allow us to measure all but some of the most important forms of integration, namely the integration into the labor market and the political system as well as feelings of acceptance. While there certainly exist further items to measure relevant forms of integration the questions included in the different ESS waves allow us to analyze some important aspects of economic, political and social

⁴⁷ Following Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010: 352) we exclude foreign-born persons whose parents are both native. It can be assumed that these persons are children of expats rather than ordinary immigrants who themselves consciously decide to immigrate.

integration (see Table 13 in Appendix 1 for question wordings).⁴⁸ For economic integration, our measures cover two aspects of immigrants' labor market outcomes: *employment* and *socio-economic occupational status*. The former is a dummy measuring whether in the last five years the respondent has not had a longer period of unemployment that is three months or more and has also been employed by Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) to study economic integration (see also Van Tubergen et al. 2004). For socio-economic occupational status we use the ISEI scale (International Socio-Economic Index; Ganzeboom et al. 1992). The ISEI is derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) combined with information on education and income and constitutes a measure of the status of specific occupations. In order to make sure to only include individuals that are economically active, we limited the economic outcome indicators to respondents that are not older than 65.

To capture immigrant political integration, we use four indicators that have been employed by Helbling et al. (2010) to measure political integration. We measure, first of all, *political interest* and *political trust*. While the former is a single four-point variable, the latter is a composite of trust in political parties, in the national parliament, and in politicians, which are all 11-point scale items. Secondly, we measure *conventional* and *unconventional political participation*. The first is a four-item additive scale of being member of a political party, working in a party or action group, contacting a politician or government official, or working in another organization or association.⁴⁹ The second is a four-item additive scale of having worn campaign badges and stickers, having signed a petition, having taken part in a lawful public demonstration, or having boycotted a product. We acknowledge that it might not be fully clear whether unconventional forms of participation, particularly demonstration activities, can be seen unambiguously as instances of political integration. Yet we are interested in this aspect of political participation, because especially if immigrants may feel unwelcome in the receiving country and politically inefficient, they may fall back on such unconventional forms of political participation.

Finally, to measure social integration we use two indicators: *social trust* and *not having perceived discrimination*. We define social trust as generalized trust, which denotes trust in people that are personally unknown (Stolle 2002). Our measure combines three 11-point variables available in the ESS and which have been shown to form a reliable scale in previous

⁴⁸ In other words, we do not claim that our operationalization covers all aspects of economic, political and social integration. However, we are convinced that the items provided by the European Social Survey include very relevant aspects of these three forms of integration that have been employed by other studies.

⁴⁹ As the variable party membership is not available in ESS rounds 6-8, we can only analyze conventional participation for the remaining rounds.

research (cf. Rosenberg 1956) and that have been used in the study by Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) to measure migrants' integration. Our measure for not having perceived discrimination is a dummy variable that measures whether respondents have not perceived discrimination in at least one of three domains: color or race, nationality and ethnic group membership. We consider this aspect of integration to be an indicator for social integration in contrast to, for instance, labor market integration, because the absence of discrimination perceptions as measured with this variable is not restricted to a specific social situation or organizational domain (such as the labor and housing markets or the education system).

To facilitate visualization and comparison, we standardize all dependent variables from 0 to 100, using empirical minima and maxima. Higher values indicate higher levels of integration. In addition, the key independent immigration policy variable is standardized with empirical minima and maxima from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most restrictive), so that the total effect size can be gauged directly (summary statistics are shown in Table 6).

5.3 Sample

Our sample covers a total of 22 European countries with a maximum of eight ESS rounds that were fielded from 2002 to 2016. About 6'500 first-generation immigrants that have resided in the country for no longer than 20 years are included (see Table 7).

Table 6: Summary statistics of dependent and key independent variables

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min / Max</i>	<i>N</i>
Political trust	47.08	22.74	0 / 100	6,291
Political interest	43.33	32.71	0 / 100	6,524
Conventional political participation	5.54	14.08	0 / 100	4,541
Unconventional political participation	9.81	19.64	0 / 100	6,479
Employment	70.68	45.53	0 / 100	6,292
Socio-economic occupational status	35.19	24.76	0 / 100	5,678
No perceived discrimination	82.69	37.83	0 / 100	6,553
Social trust	52.68	19.06	0 / 100	6,541
Education	13.14	4.52	0 / 38	6,449
Matched immigration policy values	0.33	0.25	0 / 1	6,553

Table 7: Overview of the sample used in the multivariate analyses

Country	ESS rounds								Freq. first generation immigrants
Austria	1	2	3				7	8	209
Belgium	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	387
Switzerland	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	628
Czech Republic	1	2		4	5	6	7	8	54
Germany	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	658
Denmark	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		195
Estonia		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	108
Spain	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		687
Finland	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	166
France	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	288
Great Britain	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	507
Greece	1	2		4	5				444
Hungary	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		71
Ireland	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	628
Italy	1	2				6			43
Luxembourg	1	2							225
Netherlands	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	297
Norway	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	238
Poland	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	10
Portugal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		284
Sweden	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	402
Slovakia		2	3	4	5	6			24
Total	22 countries / max. 8 rounds								6553

We differentiate between three broad country of origin categories that can be distinguished according to their social distance to European destination countries. This allows us to differentiate between migrant groups with generally high and low integration potential. We first use the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries of origin and thus migrant groups with different degrees of education (Migali and Scipioni 2018), and, accordingly, with a higher and a lower integration potential. Second, within the OECD, we distinguish between European and non-European countries. We therefore assume that there are three main types of migrants with varying integration potentials. Table 8 illustrates the distribution of migrants with high, medium and low integration potentials in European countries. It also shows the distribution of these three migrant types overall, as well as distinguished by a dichotomization of the immigration policy that was in place in the year of entering the country of each individual migrant (liberal for values above the average, restrictive for values below the average). Across both categories (all) it appears that most migrants in European countries have a low integration potential, followed by migrants with a high integration potential and lastly those with a medium integration potential. Moreover, we see that the distribution of these three migrant types differs by the type of immigration policy. Countries with restrictive policies have a higher share of migrants with a high integration potential and a lower share of migrants with a medium and a

low integration potential, which reflects our initial assumptions about the effects of relatively restrictive immigration policies on migrant composition. We observe the opposite if relatively liberal immigration policies were in place. This overall unequal but systematic distribution of the types of migrants is also reflected in Table 14 in Appendix 1, which shows the distribution of the three main migrant types across countries and ESS waves.

Table 8: Summary statistics of types of migrants

			<i>Matched immigration policy values</i>					
			<i>Liberal</i>		<i>Restrictive</i>		<i>All</i>	
<i>Types of migrants by origin region</i>	<i>Social Distance</i>	<i>Integration potential</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>
European OECD	Low	High	22	984	36	732	26	1,716
Non-European OECD	Medium	Medium	8	355	6	119	7	474
Non-OECD migrants	High	Low	70	3,180	58	1,183	67	4,363
Total			100	4,519	100	2,034	100	6,553

Note: The cutoff-point for liberal/restrictive immigration policy values is defined as the arithmetic mean (=0.33) of the matched immigration policy indicator (see Table 6; see chapter on the analytical strategy for details).

5.4 Analytical Strategy

To prepare the analysis we match the year of entry of individuals with country-year observations of the IMPIC indicator (see Table 15 in Appendix 1 for a description of the immigration policy indicator). Hence, in the context of this study, the IMPIC variable is located on the individual and not the country-level. In other words, it mainly varies across individual migrants according to their year of immigration rather than across countries. The ESS asks migrants how long ago they came first to live in the country (rounds 1-4) or what year they came first to live in the country (rounds 5-8). As the ESS data does not allow accounting for the exact entry category of immigrants, we cannot match individuals with the specific immigration policy field that applied to them. However, the fact that the regulations in different immigration policy fields can be reduced to the same empirical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016) increases the validity of our matching approach. As the resulting matched immigration policy variable is highly skewed, we transformed it⁵⁰ to better capture the relevant variation towards the lower end of the scale (see Appendix 1 Figure 5).

⁵⁰ We reversed the scaling of the variable, then squared it, and then reversed it again.

To fully ascertain whether and how immigration policies affect migrants' integration outcomes, our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we explore whether more restrictive immigration regulations increase the likelihood of a migrant to have a higher education and come from a country that is socially closer to the host society. This is a test of the assumption that more restrictive policies lead to better integration outcomes by affecting the composition of the migrant population. Second, we examine whether more restrictive immigration policies increase migrant integration outcomes and whether skills and social distance function as selection criteria in addition to age and gender. Third, we interact the restrictiveness of immigration policies with our country of origin categorization to test whether the policy effects are conditional on the social distance between host and destination countries.

To test our arguments, we need to proceed differently from the studies that investigate the effects of integration policies. These studies control for all relevant individual factors in order to investigate the effect of integration policies on comparable immigrants in different countries. In our case including many individual-level variables would distort our estimate of how integration is affected by the composition of the migrant population. One of the aims of immigration policies is to affect this composition of the migrant population regarding their integration potential, which in turn affects the likelihood of successful integration. Therefore, for each dependent variable we estimate four models in which we successively introduce individual controls that are potentially relevant for a successful integration in order to find out how they alter the immigration policy effect. This procedure allows us to see which immigrant characteristics are most affected by selection processes. For instance, if the introduction of the education variable into a model leads to a reduction or disappearance of the policy effect, this shows us that immigrants integrate better if they have been selected based on their level of education.

Models 1 have no controls. To test the most important selection effects, as discussed in the theory section, we proceed as follows: in Models 2 we include age and sex as basic individual controls, in Models 3 we include age, sex and education (to measure the effect of skills), and in Models 4 we include age, sex and country of origin categories (to measure the effect of social distance). However, note that in all models we include receiving country and survey rounds fixed-effects as well as further time-varying country-level factors to control for cross-national differences as well as differences over time in different survey rounds (see below).

We use linear regressions for all dependent variables. This is because, on the one hand, our ordinal variables sufficiently approximate linearity. On the other hand, we favor linear

probability models to analyze our binary outcomes, since they yield very similar marginal effects as logistic regression models and are more straightforward to interpret. The application of linear probability models for binary outcomes is increasingly viewed as a viable strategy in sociology and economics (Mood 2010; Angrist and Pischke 2008). Given our scaling, the coefficients of these regressions indicate the increase in the probability to observe a positive outcome for a change in the independent variable from most liberal to most restrictive.

To control for the time-invariant host country context in these individual-level models, we add country and survey rounds fixed-effects. We also control for various relevant time-varying factors at the host country level. First, we include measures for *mean xenophobic attitudes* and the *percentage of the foreign-born population* (see

Table 16 in Appendix 1 for sources).⁵¹ The former captures the degree of tolerance or hostility towards immigrants more broadly and thus reflects the reception context that might improve or worsen integration outcomes. The size of the immigrant population is important as a general context and might also tell us something about the restrictiveness of immigration policies. Second, we control for *GDP per capita*⁵² and the *unemployment rate*, which both reflect the availability of jobs on the labor market and thus may affect immigrants' economic integration outcomes and contentment with the political arena as well as the social environment. To control for general assimilation effects, we include the *native level of the respective dependent variable* (see

⁵¹ Missing data for some country-years for the percentage of the foreign-born population have been replaced with data from succeeding and previous years.

⁵² GDP per capita was divided by 1,000 to ease interpretation.

Table 17 to Table 20 in the Appendix 1 for summary statistics of all macro- and individual-level independent variables).⁵³

Lastly, we introduce *integration policies* as a further control variable. We use the MIPEX scores (Huddleston et al. 2015), as these constitute the most comprehensive cross-national indicators to measure integration policies. The MIPEX captures political, social and cultural rights of immigrant groups), which have been shown to affect immigrant political integration outcomes (Helbling et al. 2016). We use the longitudinal MIPEX dataset which was released in 2015 and which captures integration policies for each year from 2007 to 2014. MIPEX 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 were matched with the respective ESS rounds 4-7, and MIPEX 2007 and 2014 data were used as a proxy for ESS rounds 1-3 [2002-2006] and for ESS round 8 [2016], respectively.⁵⁴

6 Results

We do not find that more restrictive immigration policies increase the probability of migrants having higher skill-levels, as measured with their years of education. Although the sign of the coefficient is positive, Table 9 shows that the association between policy restrictiveness and education is neither statistically nor substantively significant.⁵⁵

Table 9: Effects of immigration regulations on years of education

	Education
Matched immigration policy values	0.353 (0.575)
Constant	12.69*** (0.330)
Observations	6,400
R-squared	0.089
Country FE	YES
Survey FE	YES
Individual controls	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

⁵³ For the analysis of unemployment we only use the unemployment rate and not the aggregate native level so as to capture the more objective reality that is not dependent on the survey.

⁵⁴ MIPEX is standardized with empirical minima and maxima from 0 (most exclusive) to 1 (most inclusive) to allow comparison of effect sizes with our immigration policy indicator.

⁵⁵ See Table 21 in Appendix 1 for full regression outputs.

Note: Linear regressions include country and survey fixed effects as well as cluster corrected standard errors at the country-level. Sex and age were included as individual-level controls. Dependent variable scaled from 0-38, and independent variable scaled from 0-1.

As appears in Table 10, however, the restrictiveness of immigration policies affects the composition of migrants by countries of origin.⁵⁶ The table shows the probability of a migrant in the host country to belong to one of the three migrant groups depending on the degree of immigration policy restrictiveness at the time of entering the country. Relative to very liberal policies, very restrictive policies increase the probability of a migrant being of European OECD origin by 25 percentage points. At the same time, greater immigration policy restrictiveness is associated with a decrease in the probability of a migrant being of non-OECD origin by 22 percentage points. Meanwhile, immigration policies do not have a discernable effect on the probability of a migrant being of non-European OECD origin. Thus, more restrictive policies privilege migrants from regions with a lower social distance, namely those of European OECD origin, and discriminate those from regions with a higher social distance, namely those of non-OECD origin.

Table 10: Predicted marginal effects of immigration policies on types of migrants

	European OECD	OECD	Non-OECD
Matched immigration policy values	0.247** (0.0761)	-0.0305 (0.0502)	-0.217** (0.0723)
Observations	6,490	6,490	6,490
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES
Individual controls	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Predicted marginal effects estimated using multinomial logistic regression. Models include country and survey fixed-effects as well as cluster corrected standard errors at the country level. Sex and age were included as individual-level controls; independent variable scaled from 0-1.

After having seen that restrictive immigration policies select migrants based on their countries of origin but not based on their level of education, we now turn to the question whether restrictive immigration policies affect migrants' integration outcomes. Table 11 shows the means of the dependent and key independent variables by migrants' origin region and

⁵⁶ See Table 22 in Appendix 1 for full regression outputs.

restrictiveness of host country immigration policies. We first see that across all countries of origin migrants economic and political integration outcomes differ by the type of immigration policy. Compared to countries with liberal immigration policies, political integration is a little lower in countries with restrictive immigration policies and economic integration is higher. The other integration outcomes are almost the same in both groups. Regarding countries of origin, positive effects of restrictive immigration policies on economic integration outcomes are most apparent for non-OECD migrants (i.e. low integration potential) and to a smaller extent also for non-EU OECD migrants (i.e. medium integration potential). For all migrant groups the means on some of the political integration outcome indicators are a little lower in countries with restrictive policies as opposed to countries with liberal policies. Moreover, for non-EU OECD migrants (i.e. medium integration potential), social integration outcomes are a little higher in countries with restrictive immigration policies.

These results provide some first evidence for our hypotheses. Restrictive immigration policies lead to better economic integration outcomes (H1), but this effect seems to be exclusive for migrants from non-EU OECD and non-OECD countries (H2). However, political integration outcomes for these two groups are lower in countries with restrictive immigration policies.

Table 11: Means of integration outcomes by origin region and host country immigration policy


Indicator	<i>Liberal matched immigration policy values</i>				<i>Restrictive matched immigration policy values</i>			
	All	EU- OECD	Non-EU OECD	Non- OECD	All	EU- OECD	Non-EU OECD	Non-OECD
Socio-econ. status	34	41	42	31	38	37	45	37
Employment	68	78	75	65	76	79	81	73
Political trust	49	49	49	49	43	41	42	45
Political interest	44	48	50	41	41	42	51	40
Conv. pol. part.	6	6	7	5	5	6	6	5
Uncon. pol. part.	10	13	14	9	9	12	12	7
No perc. discr.	82	91	82	79	84	91	87	80
Social trust	53	55	54	52	52	52	59	52

Note: The cutoff-point for restrictive/liberal immigration policies is again defined as the arithmetic mean (=0.33) of the matched immigration policy indicator.

Figure 1 shows the effects of immigration policies on various outcome variables, each of which is analyzed by four model specifications, as explained above (see Table 23 to Table 26 in Appendix 1 for full regression outputs). We observe only one statistically significant regression coefficient: A shift from very liberal to very restrictive immigration policies is

associated with a higher probability of not having been unemployed in the past five years. The effect size is between 10 and 13 percentage points, depending on the model specification. While accounting for skills does not change anything, controlling for region of origin reduces the estimated effect size to some extent. This suggests that social distance rather than the skill-level acts as a selection criterion mediating the effect of immigration policy restrictiveness on unemployment. Otherwise, we observe no statistically and substantively significant effects of more restrictive immigration policies on integration outcomes. We therefore reject our first hypothesis.

Figure 2: Effects of restrictive immigration policies on migrant integration outcomes



Note: Entries are coefficients from linear regression models; dependent variables standardized from 0-100; independent variables standardized from 0-1; solid bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals; models include country and survey fixed-effects and cluster-corrected standard errors at the country-level; DV = dependent variable.

In the last step of our analyses we like to know whether the policy effects vary across migrants from different regions. As explained in the theory section, we expect larger selection effects for migrants from non-OECD countries as compared to migrants from OECD countries, and especially compared to those from European OECD countries. In Figure 3 we display graphs with marginal effects for statistically significant interaction terms between the origin

region variable and the immigration policy predictor (see Table 27 in the Appendix 1 for full regression outputs).

First, non-OECD migrants are statistically different from European OECD migrants regarding the association between immigration policy restrictiveness and socio-economic occupational status. For migrants from outside the OECD, the socio-economic occupational status increases by almost 7 points when we they entered a country under a very restrictive instead of a very liberal immigration regime, though the net effect is still below 10 points on the 100 points scale.


Second, non-OECD migrants differ to a statistically significant extent from European OECD migrants regarding the association between restrictive immigration policies and employment. For migrants coming from outside the OECD, the chances of being employed versus having recently been unemployed increase by almost 14 percentage points when they entered a country under a very restrictive instead of a very liberal immigration regime. Non-European OECD migrants are not statistically different from non-OECD migrants but substantively, their employment chances increase with greater immigration policy restrictiveness, though in a slightly less pronounced way and starting from a higher absolute level of employment. Hence, the general immigration policy effect we observe for employment outcomes is mainly driven by specific selection effects for non-OECD migrants.

Third, we also observe diverging effects on immigration policies on political trust among non-OECD and OECD migrants. In this case, however, it appears that for migrants from the OECD area, greater selection reduces political trust while it remains stable across different immigration regimes for non-OECD migrants. The net effect is also below 5 points on the 100 points scale. We speculate that non-OECD migrants with a higher social distance may experience the political system more positively when they have been granted access under a restrictive immigration regime, perceiving the possibility for settlement as a reward. For OECD migrants with a lower social distance, highly restrictive immigration policies may symbolize a more hostile political reception context.

Fourth, we see diverging policy effects on social trust. While for non-OECD migrants the association is non-existent, for non-European OECD migrants it is positive and slightly below 10 points on a 100 points scale. It might be that selection is perceived as a higher reward and therefore leads to more social trust. As social trust can also be interpreted as a very general integration indicator, this result may point to the specific effectiveness of selection when it comes to migrants that are different yet proximate enough in social terms. Overall, we see that

our second hypothesis can be confirmed for all three forms of integration investigated in this paper (but not all measurements of these forms of integration).

Figure 3: How the immigration policy effect differs across types of migrants



7 Robustness Checks

We conducted several supplemental analyses to assess the robustness of our results. The main goal of these analyses is to ascertain whether the general effect of the restrictiveness of immigration policies on employment outcomes is robust across different dimensions of immigration policies. These disaggregated analyses show that this main finding remains the same when we examine the effects of individual policy fields as well as of so-called internal and external policy dimensions separately (see Table 28 to Table 47 in Appendix 1 for further details and regression outputs). The positive policy effect of our composite immigration policy indicator on employment status is the result of restrictive *internal* immigration policies (that is laws regulating status security and permit rights⁵⁷) rather than *external* immigration policies

⁵⁷ This is different from integration policies, which measure general rights.

(that is laws regulating eligibility and further conditions), though the latter policies are also substantively significant in terms of effect size. The disaggregated results also show that more restrictive *asylum* policies are positively associated with migrants' socio-economic status, their political interest, perceived discrimination, and social trust. Furthermore, we also find a small positive effect of restrictive *family reunification* policies on employment when either sex and age or sex, age and education is controlled for. These results therefore do not fully support our results for employment outcomes across different model specifications. Instead, they suggest that only by considering all relevant immigration policies we can speak of a robust association of restriction with better employment chances. These analyses also show that further research that can reliably match separate immigration policy areas with distinct types of migrants is needed.

Second, we run additional analyses for all dependent variables in which we exclude migrants with a short stay of five years or less. We do this for two reasons. The first reason relates to our employment indicator. Our employment integration indicator measures unemployment that happened within the last five years. To avoid that the results are affected by migrants who were still living in their home country in that five-year period and who have possibly been unemployed during that time, we conducted additional analyses in which we excluded migrants who stayed in the host country for less than five years. The results of our additional analyses show that the effect of the matched immigration policy values on employment status is stronger if we exclude these migrants from our analyses, thus corroborating our initial results. For all other dependent variables excluding this group of migrants makes no difference (see Table 48 to Table 51 in Appendix 1 for regression outputs).

Third, in our regression analyses we applied linear probability models for our binary outcome indicators. More detailed analyses have shown that the results do not change substantially if we run logistic regression models for the binary outcome variables employment and perception of discrimination (see Table 52 and Table 53 in Appendix 1 for regression outputs).

Fourth, as we are not able to differentiate between years of education accumulated in the origin and host country, we ran additional regressions using a years of education variable that we adjusted for the years of education that immigrants have supposedly accumulated in the host country. First, we use our estimation of the age upon entry to identify those that can be assumed to have accumulated years of education in the receiving country. Combining this information with the residence duration, we then estimated the years of education before and

after entry. The results do not deviate substantially from the results in Table 4 (they are available upon request).

8 Conclusion

In this study we have shown that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the number of more educated migrants but the number of migrants from European OECD countries compared to migrants from other countries. This finding adds important evidence to the literature that investigates how immigrants are selected on cultural characteristics (FitzGerald et al. 2017). Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but only for immigrants from mostly non-OECD countries. The effect on employment is limited to non-OECD and non-European OECD migrants. While for non-OECD migrants political trust remains stable, for OECD migrants it decreases when immigration policies are more restrictive. And while for non-European OECD migrants social trust increases with greater selection, for non-OECD migrants and European OECD migrants the restrictiveness of immigration policies only has a very small effect. It thus appears that the demand-side of immigration plays an important role in understanding selection effects. If mostly migrants with a relatively high integration potential intend to migrate, which is mainly the case for European OECD migrants, selection mechanisms become irrelevant.

We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes (Hypothesis 1) but that these effects are limited to economic integration or migrants that come from countries outside the OECD (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, when viewed from the angle of the broader literature, both integration and immigration policies appear to play a minor role when it comes to migrant integration. It can be noted however that our analyses confirm for a larger sample of countries earlier economic studies that focused on individual countries and showed that immigration policies affect migrants' economic integration (Cobb-Clark 2003; Constant and Zimmerman 2005; Cangiano 2014). This stands in contrast to the literature on integration policies that did not detect any policy effects on the economic integration of migrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010). These findings put in perspective the widespread assumption that greater immigration policy restrictiveness has a general and substantial positive effect on various migrant integration outcomes.

While this study helps us better understand how immigration regulations affect migrant integration it also faces certain limitations. It needs to be kept in mind that migrant participants in the ESS surveys are most likely relatively well integrated. Also, a common limitation of

studies that investigate policy effects concerns the fact that the role of relatively highly aggregated measures are studied. Finding overall null effects does therefore not mean that individual regulations do not have very concrete effects.

Besides tackling these measurement problems future research also needs to investigate why exactly policies are relatively ineffective when it comes to migrant integration. As recent research has shown, immigration regulations do affect migrant inflows (Hatton 2004; Ortega and Peri 2013; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Helbling and Leblang 2018). As we have shown in this study, however, this does not necessarily imply that the selected immigrants integrate better. This might be due to the fact that restrictive policies can lead to unintended effects when the number of irregular migration increases and return migration is discouraged (Brekke et al. 2016; Czaika and De Haas 2016; Czaika and Hobolth 2016). We also need to take a closer look at how difficult it is even for high-skilled migrants to integrate when it comes to the transfer of skills from one country to another, when they lack the required social and cultural capital, or when they encounter discrimination (see Steinmann 2019). This would also be a reason to investigate the relationship between immigration and integration policies as well as their interaction in producing integration outcomes. Hence, while we hope our analysis has broken important ground in the study of the potential effects of immigration policies on migrant integration, much remains to be done. What seems certain is that the currently salient and heated debates on immigration policy-making need more systematic scientific evidence.

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
Appendix 1

Table 12: Items of the IMPIC immigration policy data

		Policy areas		
		Family reunification	Labor migration	Asylum and refugees
External	Eligibility	Residence requirements Family members Age limits Quotas family reunification	Targeting Quotas labor Age limits Young age beneficial	Existence of subsidiary/ humanitarian protection Nationality Quotas asylum Safe third country Safe countries of origin Resettlement agreements
	Conditions	Financial requirements Accommodation requirements Language skills Application fees	Specific income per month Specific financial funds Language skills Application fee Job offer Equal work conditions List of occupations Labor market tests	Place of application
Internal	Security of status	Residence permit validity Autonomous residence permit	Work permit validity Renewal of permit Transition temporary permanent Loss of employment	Permit validity Permit renewal Permanent permit Right to appeal Status when crisis resolved
	Rights associated	(Self)employment	Flexibility of permit	Free movement (Self)employment Form of benefits

For more details and codebook see Bjerre et al. (2016).

Figure 4: Immigration policy restrictiveness by country (1980-2010)



Note: Figure shows the degree of immigration policy restrictiveness by country and year. The figure was created using a squared composite macro-level indicator comprising the three immigration policy fields relevant for our analyses (asylum, labor migration and family reunification).

Table 13: Question wordings of dependent variables (continued on next page)

Variable names	Question wordings	Answers
<i>Unemployment (we use the inverse of this variable)</i>	Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months? Have any of these periods been within the past 5 years?	Yes (1), no (2)
<i>Political trust</i>	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: ... [country]'s parliament? ... politicians? ... political parties?	No trust at all (0) to complete trust (10)
Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics – are you...	Very interested (1), quite interested (2), hardly interested (3), not at all interested (4)
<i>Conventional political participation</i>	Are you a member of any political party? There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you... ... contacted a politician, government or local government official? ... worked in a political party or action group? ... worked in another organisation or association?	Yes (1), no (2)
<i>Unconventional political participation</i>	There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you... ... worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? ... signed a petition? ... taken part in a lawful public demonstration? ... boycotted certain products?	Yes (1), no (2)
<i>Perceived discrimination (we use the inverse of this variable)</i>	On what grounds is your group discriminated against? ... colour or race ... Nationality ... Ethnic group	Not marked (0), marked (1)
<i>Social trust</i>	Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful ² in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage ³ of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful ⁴ or	You can't be too careful (0) – Most people can be trusted (10) Most people try to take advantage of me (0) – Most people try to be fair (10)

that they are mostly looking out for themselves? People mostly look out for themselves (0) – People mostly try to be helpful (10)

Table 14: Distribution of types of migrants across countries and ESS rounds (continued on next page)

ESS round 1 (2002)					ESS round 2 (2004)				
Country	Types of migrants			Total	Country	Types of migrants			Total
	European OECD	OECD	Non OECD			European OECD	OECD	Non OECD	
AT	29	5	27	61	AT	19	8	11	38
BE	10	4	18	32	BE	13	1	19	33
CH	48	7	23	78	CH	42	11	56	109
CZ	3	0	3	6	CZ	7	0	0	7
DE	18	6	56	80	DE	24	14	63	101
DK	4	5	21	30	DK	6	0	10	16
EE	EE	3	0	35	38
ES	7	0	34	41	ES	16	3	57	76
FI	13	2	14	29	FI	5	0	2	7
FR	3	1	23	27	FR	4	1	17	22
GB	8	9	36	53	GB	8	9	45	62
GR	10	4	110	124	GR	18	5	89	112
HU	6	0	2	8	HU	8	2	2	12
IE	17	2	8	27	IE	19	4	8	31
IT	1	0	4	5	IT	2	1	5	8
LU	58	1	48	107	LU	76	1	41	118
NL	10	1	21	32	NL	14	4	28	46
NO	14	4	33	51	NO	0	4	25	29
PL	PL	1	0	2	3
PT	2	0	17	19	PT	2	0	33	35
SE	15	5	43	63	SE	14	3	29	46
SK	SK	4	0	2	6
Total	276	56	541	873	Total	305	71	579	955

ESS round 3 (2006)					ESS round 4 (2008)				
Country	Types of migrants			Total	Country	Types of migrants			Total
	European OECD	OECD	Non OECD			European OECD	OECD	Non OECD	
AT	15	6	13	34	AT
BE	16	3	21	40	BE	17	4	16	37
CH	43	9	38	90	CH	46	17	51	114
CZ	CZ	1	0	1	2
DE	23	9	65	97	DE	17	7	64	88
DK	4	2	21	27	DK	9	3	21	33
EE	1	0	19	20	EE	2	0	9	11
ES	17	2	75	94	ES	29	0	128	157
FI	3	0	9	12	FI	7	2	13	22
FR	7	1	37	45	FR	6	1	28	35
GB	9	15	37	61	GB	12	8	58	78
GR	GR	11	0	46	57
HU	9	1	2	12	HU	9	0	1	10
IE	52	4	33	89	IE	39	5	58	102
IT	IT
LU	LU
NL	7	7	44	58	NL	8	7	28	43
NO	9	7	22	38	NO	14	1	27	42
PL	0	0	2	2	PL	1	0	0	1
PT	6	0	45	51	PT	4	0	50	54
SE	15	7	35	57	SE	16	3	32	51
SK	4	0	0	4	SK	5	0	3	8
Total	240	73	518	831	Total	253	58	634	945


ESS round 5 (2010)					ESS round 6 (2012)				
Country	Types of migrants			Total	Country	Types of migrants			Total
	European	OECD	Non OECD			European	OECD	Non OECD	
AT	AT
BE	7	3	39	49	BE	15	10	52	77
CH	13	7	33	53	CH	14	10	34	58
CZ	5	0	3	8	CZ	9	1	6	16
DE	12	13	69	94	DE	13	3	53	69
DK	4	4	21	29	DK	6	3	26	35
EE	1	0	7	8	EE	2	0	11	13
ES	26	2	77	105	ES	28	5	97	130
FI	4	2	22	28	FI	8	0	26	34
FR	1	1	32	34	FR	2	3	34	39
GB	14	15	65	94	GB	9	2	58	69
GR	21	0	130	151	GR
HU	11	0	4	15	HU	4	0	1	5
IE	33	13	80	126	IE	52	2	56	110
IT	IT	10	1	19	30
LU	LU
NL	5	9	14	28	NL	7	4	25	36
NO	7	3	34	44	NO	8	1	12	21
PL	1	0	2	3	PL
PT	3	1	53	57	PT	0	1	43	44
SE	14	4	40	58	SE	14	5	43	62
SK	2	0	1	3	SK	2	0	1	3
Total	184	77	726	987	Total	203	51	597	851

ESS round 7 (2014)					ESS round 8 (2016)				
Country	Types of migrants			Total	Country	Types of migrants			Total
	European	OECD	Non OECD			European	OECD	Non OECD	
AT	14	6	21	41	AT	10	9	16	35
BE	17	6	39	62	BE	12	6	39	57
CH	12	6	48	66	CH	10	10	40	60
CZ	5	0	2	7	CZ	4	0	4	8
DE	14	8	50	72	DE	11	9	37	57
DK	8	3	14	25	DK
EE	1	0	12	13	EE	0	0	5	5
ES	14	2	68	84	ES
FI	5	3	20	28	FI	1	0	5	6
FR	1	1	37	39	FR	6	2	39	47
GB	9	0	42	51	GB	14	1	24	39
GR	GR
HU	6	0	3	9	HU
IE	20	5	40	65	IE	42	0	36	78
IT	IT
LU	LU
NL	6	4	23	33	NL	1	1	19	21
NO	2	0	7	9	NO	2	0	2	4
PL	0	0	1	1	PL
PT	2	1	21	24	PT
SE	1	4	32	37	SE	5	1	22	28
SK	SK
Total	137	49	480	666	Total	118	39	288	445

Table 15: Description of key independent variable

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Years and countries</i>
Matched immigration policy values	<i>Average restrictiveness of IMPIC regulations for asylum, labor migration, family reunification; matched with entry year; scale was reversed, squared, and then again reversed (see below)</i>	<i>1980-2010, all countries</i>

Figure 5: Matched immigration policy values – untransformed and transformed (reversed, squared, and again reversed)



Note: Figure shows untransformed and transformed matched immigration policy values.

Table 16: Sources of macro-level variables

Variable name	Source(s)	Comments
Foreign born population	<p>OECD live data: https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm</p> <p>OECD International Migration Outlook 2016 (IMO 2016): https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2016_migr_outlook-2016-en</p> <p>OECD International Migration Outlook 2017 (IMO 2017): http://www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook-1999124x.htm</p> <p>Data on migrant stock from World Development Index (retrieved from Quality of Government OECD time-series dataset Jan 2017): https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/data-archive</p>	<p>Data for 2000-2013 was retrieved from OECD live; data for 2014 was retrieved from IMO 2016; data for 2015 was retrieved from IMO 2017.</p> <p>Remaining missing data was, if available, replaced with data from the World Development Index. Further remaining missing data was replaced with data from succeeding years and, if these were not available, from previous years.</p>
Gross Domestic Product per capita (current US\$)	<p>Retrieved from Quality of Government (QoG) OECD time-series dataset Jan 2019: https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogocddata</p>	-
Unemployment rate	<p>Retrieved from Quality of Government (QoG) basic time-series dataset Jan 2019: https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogbasicdata</p>	-
MIPEX	<p>Retrieved from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), http://www.mipex.eu/</p>	<p>MIPEX 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 were matched with the respective ESS rounds 4-7, and MIPEX 2007 and 2014 data were used as a proxy for ESS rounds 1-3 [2002- 2006] and for ESS round 8 [2016], respectively.</p>
IMPIC: External IMPIC: Internal IMPIC: Overall	<p>Retrieved from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset http://www.impic-project.eu/data/</p>	-
Means of dependent variables	<p>Retrieved from the European Social Survey (ESS), http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/</p>	<p>Socio-economic occupational status (ESS 1-8), political interest (ESS 1-8), political trust (ESS 1-8), unconventional political participation (ESS 1-8), conventional political participation (ESS 1-5), social trust (ESS 1-8), no perceived discrimination (ESS 1-8), concern about immigration (ESS 1-8)</p>

Table 17: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (dummies)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min / Max</i>	<i>N</i>
Sex (male)	0.46	0.50	0/1	6,543

Table 18: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (numerical)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min / Max</i>	<i>N</i>
Age	40.39	10.65	19/99	6,492
Years of education	13.14	4.52	0/38	6,449

Table 19: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (categorical)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
Region of origin		
European OECD	1,716	26.19
OECD	474	7.23
Non-OECD	4,363	66.58
<i>Total</i>	6,553	100.00
Residence Duration		
Within last year	118	1.80
1-5 years ago	1,496	22.83
6-10 years ago	1,930	29.45
11-20 years ago	3,009	45.92
<i>Total</i>	6,553	100.00

Table 20: Summary statistics of country-level independent variables (numerical) (continued on the next pages) ⁵⁸

2002/ ESS Round 1	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	20	46.63	8.338	29.07	59.77
Political trust (mean of natives)	20	44.33	7.318	30.91	58.38
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	20	14.41	6.538	3.827	23.68
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	20	10.90	3.617	5.022	17.47
Social trust (mean of natives)	20	51.75	9.288	34.07	68.46
Employment (mean of natives)	20	86.04	6.168	70.39	95.45
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	20	99.02	0.939	96.02	99.95
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	20	48.87	6.735	36.93	66.36
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	20	40.23	3.125	34.69	46.82
% Foreign born	20	10.02	7.185	2	33.10
Unemployment rate	20	6.817	4.095	2.550	19.89
GDP per capita	20	25.25	12.39	5.197	52.93

⁵⁸ Figures for socio-economic occupational status, political trust, political interest, employment, conventional political participation and unconventional political participation show the mean values for all non-first-generation respondents in the sample of the European Social Survey.

MIPEX	20	0.455	0.292	0	0.951
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2004/ ESS Round 2	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	22	45.09	7.636	32.26	58.46
Political trust (mean of natives)	22	39.60	9.463	20.98	58.50
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	22	13.30	7.140	3.054	25.81
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	22	9.871	4.457	3.170	18.85
Social trust (mean of natives)	22	51.38	9.280	35.81	67.16
Employment (mean of natives)	22	84.52	5.821	70.34	94.36
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	22	98.94	0.810	96.90	99.80
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	22	50.80	6.474	40.63	64.83
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	22	40.35	2.647	35.30	46.03
% Foreign born	22	10.54	7.428	2.163	35.01
Unemployment rate	22	8.131	4.175	4.260	19.07
GDP per capita	22	32.97	17.77	6.681	75.72
MIPEX	22	0.422	0.299	0	0.951

2006/ ESS Round 3	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	18	47.22	7.716	31.59	60.41
Political trust (mean of natives)	18	41.15	9.477	23.08	59.24
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	18	14.19	7.229	3.437	24.50
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	18	10.38	4.524	3.309	17.57
Social trust (mean of natives)	18	54.19	8.329	41.21	68.82
Employment (mean of natives)	18	84.86	5.196	74.15	92.12
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	18	98.55	1.721	94.14	99.88
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	18	48.40	6.307	39.32	60.17
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	18	40.53	3.777	33.00	46.44
% Foreign born	18	10.48	5.413	2.175	24.20
Unemployment rate	18	7.146	3.062	3.400	13.84
GDP per capita	18	36.72	18.02	9.039	74.11
MIPEX	18	0.459	0.302	0	0.951

2008/ ESS Round 4	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	19	46.90	9.578	29.55	63.31
Political trust (mean of natives)	19	39.29	10.76	22.08	59.38
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	19	13.66	7.388	3.483	27.22
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	19	9.485	4.221	3.329	16.74
Social trust (mean of natives)	19	52.88	9.231	36.25	68.21
Employment (mean of natives)	19	85.06	4.417	77.12	92.01

No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	19	98.64	1.253	95.46	99.82
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	19	49.05	7.498	38.24	67.33
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	19	40.97	3.454	34.16	47.10
% Foreign born	19	10.73	5.527	2.175	25.81
Unemployment rate	19	6.266	2.266	2.550	11.25
GDP per capita	19	43.63	22.12	14.00	97.01
MIPEX	19	0.439	0.305	2.48e-08	0.951

2010/ ESS Round 5	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	19	45.47	9.379	30.55	61.65
Political trust (mean of natives)	19	37.95	11.41	15.41	54.79
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	19	13.17	6.913	3.250	24.96
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	19	9.580	4.327	3.222	17.60
Social trust (mean of natives)	19	53.29	8.974	37.21	67.52
Employment (mean of natives)	19	83.51	6.086	73.47	94.83
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	19	98.68	1.059	96.13	99.83
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	19	50.19	8.225	34.99	71.18
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	19	40.76	3.356	33.93	46.89
% Foreign born	19	10.81	5.941	2.175	26.51
Unemployment rate	19	9.763	4.223	3.520	19.86
GDP per capita	19	38.97	20.83	12.60	87.77
MIPEX	19	0.531	0.280	0.0238	0.916

2012/ ESS Round 6	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	19	46.53	9.400	30.91	62.61
Political trust (mean of natives)	19	38.14	11.96	20.64	55.03
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	19	14.80	7.374	2.789	29.38
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	0
Social trust (mean of natives)	19	53.65	8.390	40.04	68.32
Employment (mean of natives)	19	81.98	6.788	71.31	92.52
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	19	98.60	1.341	95.34	99.95
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	19	47.89	6.552	37.20	58.48
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	19	41.32	4.943	29.68	50.90
% Foreign born	19	10.91	5.902	1.752	27.74
Unemployment rate	19	9.711	4.938	3.120	24.79
GDP per capita	19	41.19	23.58	12.89	101.7
MIPEX	19	0.495	0.260	0.0955	0.984

2014/ ESS Round 7	N	mean	sd	min	max
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Political interest (mean of natives)	18	48.45	9.619	27.81	61.97
Political trust (mean of natives)	18	40.02	10.90	22.86	57.62
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	18	16.61	7.700	3.129	30.67
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	0
Social trust (mean of natives)	18	54.70	8.160	40.91	67.51
Employment (mean of natives)	18	83.60	5.795	67.21	91.62
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	18	98.45	1.261	96.05	99.88
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	18	48.45	6.462	34.60	61.60
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	18	42.50	4.830	33.97	49.17
% Foreign born	18	12.28	6.070	1.752	28.78
Unemployment rate	18	8.567	4.678	3.480	24.44
GDP per capita	18	45.55	23.17	14.20	97.20
MIPEX	18	0.512	0.252	0.213	0.991

2016/ ESS Round 8	N	mean	sd	min	max
Political interest (mean of natives)	14	50.87	8.631	29.52	63.52
Political trust (mean of natives)	14	43.73	8.917	27.78	59.02
Unconventional political participation (mean of natives)	14	17.91	7.657	7.320	31.49
Conventional political participation (mean of natives)	0
Social trust (mean of natives)	14	57.60	7.065	42.72	70.27
Employment (mean of natives)	14	85.23	3.925	80.12	90.73
No perceived discrimination (mean of natives)	14	98.65	0.946	96.97	99.82
Xenophobia (mean of natives)	14	47.08	6.858	37.26	62.72
Socio-economic occupational status (mean of natives)	14	43.98	4.342	36.53	50.77
% Foreign born	14	13.66	6.512	1.752	29.12
Unemployment rate	14	6.358	1.823	3.950	10.06
GDP per capita	14	43.57	19.39	12.42	79.87
MIPEX	14	0.484	0.246	0.213	0.948

Table 21: Effects of immigration regulations on years of education

	Education
Matched immigration policy values	0.353 (0.575)
Sex (male)	-0.0814 (0.163)
Age	-0.0180* (0.00813)
Constant	12.69*** (0.330)
Observations	6,400
R-squared	0.089
Country FE	YES
Survey FE	YES
Individual controls	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 22: Predicted marginal effects of immigration policies on types of migrants

	European OECD	OECD	Non-OECD
Matched immigration policy values	0.247** (0.0761)	-0.0305 (0.0502)	-0.217** (0.0723)
Sex (male)	-0.0486*** (0.0115)	0.0139 (0.00713)	0.0347* (0.0147)
Age	0.00287* (0.00119)	-0.000876 (0.000700)	-0.00199 (0.00139)
Observations	6,490	6,490	6,490
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES
Individual controls	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 23: Immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls)

	M1: Socio- economic Status	M5: Employment	M9: Political Trust	M13: Political Interest	M17: Conventional Polit. Participation	M21: Unconv. Polit. Participation	M25: No Perceived Discrimination	M29: Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	4.004 (3.920)	13.34* (5.879)	-1.331 (3.036)	2.895 (5.824)	0.311 (1.565)	3.779 (2.712)	5.436 (7.069)	2.832 (2.371)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.164 (0.175)	-0.127 (0.262)	0.0760 (0.116)	-0.187 (0.300)	-0.0676 (0.170)	0.0672 (0.120)	-0.0756 (0.281)	-0.191 (0.114)
% Foreign-born	-0.750 (0.388)	-0.298 (0.789)	0.948* (0.393)	-0.648 (0.617)	-0.579* (0.235)	0.0973 (0.176)	-0.790 (0.756)	0.446 (0.314)
GDP per capita	-0.0259 (0.0924)	0.292 (0.169)	0.0435 (0.0907)	-0.0191 (0.118)	-0.151* (0.0583)	-0.202*** (0.0497)	0.0753 (0.133)	-0.0802 (0.0526)
Unemployment rate	0.108 (0.108)	-1.055*** (0.214)	-0.564** (0.175)	-0.273 (0.227)	0.0358 (0.173)	-0.159 (0.136)	0.308 (0.169)	-0.0472 (0.0913)
MIPEX	0.941 (9.666)	0.915 (12.69)	-24.95* (11.48)	20.52 (22.96)	-5.634 (5.093)	5.533 (6.305)	-3.727 (15.08)	-1.841 (6.490)
DV (mean natives)	0.216 (0.147)		0.542*** (0.126)	0.823*** (0.112)	0.641** (0.193)	0.938*** (0.172)	0.114 (1.168)	0.469 (0.230)
Constant	46.25*** (11.13)	75.16*** (10.72)	10.38 (7.295)	21.56 (16.68)	13.58 (9.727)	-2.325 (7.561)	70.10 (118.1)	31.06 (15.24)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.037	0.143	0.067	0.043	0.055	0.047	0.097
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 24: Immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age)

	M2: Socio- economic Status	M6: Employment	M10: Political Trust	M14: Political Interest	M18: Conventional Polit. Participation	M22: Unconv. Polit. Participation	M26: No Perceived Discrimination	M30: Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	3.796 (3.736)	11.77* (4.686)	-1.198 (2.954)	1.802 (4.101)	0.148 (1.508)	3.714 (2.675)	3.424 (5.964)	2.271 (2.870)
Sex (male)	0.518 (0.772)	-1.390 (1.471)	1.501* (0.560)	9.990*** (1.243)	1.388* (0.511)	0.908 (0.688)	-3.248*** (0.848)	0.314 (0.505)
Age	0.0429 (0.0702)	0.246** (0.0762)	0.00129 (0.0408)	0.245** (0.0644)	0.0377* (0.0177)	0.0185 (0.0401)	0.222*** (0.0447)	0.0738** (0.0225)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.156 (0.178)	-0.0809 (0.258)	0.0776 (0.114)	-0.138 (0.303)	-0.0714 (0.165)	0.0702 (0.120)	-0.0204 (0.286)	-0.171 (0.110)
% Foreign-born	-0.741 (0.393)	-0.250 (0.793)	0.941* (0.392)	-0.624 (0.642)	-0.567* (0.235)	0.0969 (0.171)	-0.746 (0.757)	0.460 (0.310)
GDP per capita	-0.0255 (0.0918)	0.295 (0.168)	0.0441 (0.0902)	-0.0121 (0.114)	-0.153* (0.0572)	-0.201*** (0.0494)	0.0801 (0.133)	-0.0787 (0.0517)
Unemployment rate	0.101 (0.103)	-1.126*** (0.217)	-0.555** (0.175)	-0.294 (0.214)	0.0385 (0.171)	-0.159 (0.130)	0.224 (0.176)	-0.0677 (0.0909)
MIPEX	1.004 (9.796)	0.367 (12.45)	-24.55* (11.52)	22.24 (24.28)	-4.978 (4.923)	5.731 (6.225)	-4.381 (14.82)	-1.890 (6.494)
DV (mean natives)	0.220 (0.151)		0.542*** (0.126)	0.793*** (0.128)	0.625** (0.190)	0.934*** (0.172)	0.224 (1.148)	0.481* (0.226)
Constant	43.68** (12.53)	63.91*** (10.77)	9.368 (7.285)	5.284 (20.60)	11.59 (9.939)	-3.649 (7.476)	49.42 (115.6)	26.35 (14.48)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.040	0.144	0.096	0.046	0.056	0.052	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 25: Immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	M3: Socio- economic Status	M7: Employment	M11: Political Trust	M15: Political Interest	M19: Conventional Polit. Participation	M23: Unconv. Polit. Participation	M27: No Perceived Discrimination	M31: Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	2.419 (2.380)	11.57* (4.549)	-1.202 (2.959)	1.054 (3.671)	-0.0999 (1.459)	3.324 (2.365)	3.259 (5.903)	2.080 (3.011)
Sex (male)	1.739* (0.752)	-1.313 (1.433)	1.502* (0.561)	10.14*** (1.093)	1.405** (0.474)	0.977 (0.623)	-3.215*** (0.816)	0.348 (0.536)
Age	0.0405 (0.0551)	0.245** (0.0749)	0.00149 (0.0407)	0.278*** (0.0601)	0.0437* (0.0162)	0.0351 (0.0388)	0.230*** (0.0476)	0.0818** (0.0235)
Education	2.727*** (0.221)	0.584*** (0.126)	0.00997 (0.0776)	1.835*** (0.122)	0.411*** (0.0544)	0.882*** (0.0924)	0.421* (0.159)	0.435*** (0.0628)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0808 (0.122)	-0.0603 (0.249)	0.0779 (0.114)	-0.138 (0.263)	-0.0809 (0.150)	0.100 (0.107)	-0.00168 (0.300)	-0.158 (0.103)
% Foreign-born	-0.720 (0.349)	-0.245 (0.795)	0.941* (0.392)	-0.577 (0.634)	-0.586* (0.225)	0.0901 (0.168)	-0.754 (0.773)	0.459 (0.316)
GDP per capita	0.0344 (0.0705)	0.312 (0.170)	0.0444 (0.0910)	0.0393 (0.105)	-0.140* (0.0531)	-0.174** (0.0466)	0.0939 (0.135)	-0.0657 (0.0516)
Unemployment rate	0.145 (0.122)	-1.122*** (0.228)	-0.555** (0.175)	-0.256 (0.213)	0.0439 (0.165)	-0.152 (0.129)	0.226 (0.183)	-0.0656 (0.0967)
MIPEX	-6.145 (6.965)	-1.223 (12.97)	-24.58* (11.46)	17.87 (21.97)	-4.709 (4.795)	3.376 (7.465)	-5.435 (14.78)	-3.010 (5.707)
DV (mean natives)	0.328 (0.170)		0.542*** (0.126)	0.683*** (0.128)	0.597** (0.175)	0.923*** (0.169)	0.287 (1.151)	0.467 (0.228)
Constant	1.021 (9.608)	55.53*** (11.32)	9.225 (6.803)	-13.78 (18.56)	7.204 (8.858)	-16.51* (7.252)	36.66 (116.4)	20.70 (14.62)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.290	0.043	0.144	0.155	0.062	0.093	0.054	0.109

Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 26: Immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	M4: Socio- economic Status	M8: Employment	M12: Political Trust	M16: Political Interest	M20: Conventional Polit. Participation	M24: Unconv. Polit. Participation	M28: No Perceived Discrimination	M32: Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	2.669 (3.755)	9.832* (4.413)	-0.257 (2.977)	1.040 (4.208)	0.0763 (1.546)	2.814 (2.881)	1.178 (5.680)	2.129 (2.909)
Sex (male)	0.755 (0.778)	-1.067 (1.475)	1.367* (0.575)	10.08*** (1.252)	1.394* (0.513)	1.034 (0.670)	-2.841** (0.840)	0.324 (0.489)
Age	0.0295 (0.0652)	0.222** (0.0750)	0.00794 (0.0373)	0.239*** (0.0613)	0.0375* (0.0177)	0.0109 (0.0356)	0.199*** (0.0493)	0.0731** (0.0228)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.568 (2.637)	-1.632 (2.661)	0.0763 (1.014)	1.454 (2.592)	0.473 (0.842)	-0.103 (1.197)	-7.236* (2.872)	0.772 (1.292)
Non-OECD	-5.682* (2.280)	-8.201*** (2.022)	4.070*** (1.051)	-3.430 (1.951)	-0.351 (0.587)	-3.896*** (0.864)	-8.964*** (1.098)	-0.698 (0.779)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0926 (0.171)	0.0242 (0.263)	0.0330 (0.114)	-0.0947 (0.308)	-0.0689 (0.166)	0.117 (0.120)	0.0994 (0.281)	-0.165 (0.111)
% Foreign-born	-0.639 (0.380)	-0.155 (0.750)	0.876* (0.381)	-0.579 (0.634)	-0.553* (0.236)	0.146 (0.169)	-0.643 (0.702)	0.470 (0.306)
GDP per capita	-0.0195 (0.0992)	0.302 (0.154)	0.0418 (0.0847)	-0.0121 (0.115)	-0.154* (0.0566)	-0.198** (0.0547)	0.0931 (0.125)	-0.0792 (0.0517)
Unemployment rate	0.0600 (0.0999)	-1.186*** (0.217)	-0.518** (0.174)	-0.321 (0.214)	0.0334 (0.174)	-0.184 (0.126)	0.174 (0.171)	-0.0746 (0.0906)
MIPEX	-1.146	-2.750	-22.71	20.50	-4.831	4.234	-7.208	-2.269

DV (mean natives)	(9.289) 0.190 (0.147)	(12.36)	(11.75) 0.553*** (0.125)	(24.37) 0.793*** (0.132)	(4.912) 0.621** (0.190)	(6.317) 0.928*** (0.172)	(15.12) 0.206 (1.085)	(6.360) 0.472* (0.225)
Constant	43.32** (12.53)	62.76*** (10.80)	9.533 (7.108)	4.450 (21.40)	11.49 (10.13)	-4.240 (7.320)	50.31 (109.3)	26.67 (14.38)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.091	0.046	0.151	0.099	0.046	0.064	0.061	0.100
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 27: Interaction effects of immigration policies with region of origin (continued on next page)

	M33: Socio- economic Status	M34: Employment	M35: Political Trust	M36: Political Interest	M37: Conventional Polit. Participation	M38: Unconv. Polit. Participation	M39: No Perceived Discrimination	M40: Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	-6.750 (6.406)	0.898 (6.340)	-6.153* (2.567)	-5.039 (4.804)	0.0442 (2.038)	3.742 (3.717)	0.842 (6.477)	-0.659 (3.094)
Sex (male)	0.750 (0.775)	-1.075 (1.485)	1.347* (0.576)	10.08*** (1.216)	1.406* (0.519)	1.028 (0.666)	-2.849** (0.839)	0.348 (0.503)
Age	0.0306 (0.0651)	0.222** (0.0737)	0.0107 (0.0360)	0.240*** (0.0609)	0.0368* (0.0173)	0.0111 (0.0354)	0.200*** (0.0493)	0.0723** (0.0234)
DV (mean natives)	0.219 (0.142)		0.550*** (0.121)	0.796*** (0.133)	0.624** (0.192)	0.929*** (0.172)	0.203 (1.083)	0.476* (0.223)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.130 (0.164)	-0.0191 (0.260)	0.00433 (0.115)	-0.125 (0.288)	-0.0695 (0.167)	0.122 (0.123)	0.0978 (0.282)	-0.179 (0.111)
% Foreign-born	-0.748 (0.380)	-0.237 (0.786)	0.811* (0.383)	-0.636 (0.630)	-0.551* (0.238)	0.154 (0.163)	-0.646 (0.715)	0.447 (0.312)

GDP per capita	-0.00508 (0.106)	0.317 (0.152)	0.0521 (0.0900)	-0.00129 (0.110)	-0.154* (0.0569)	-0.200** (0.0549)	0.0936 (0.128)	-0.0742 (0.0523)
Unemployment rate	0.0593 (0.0969)	-1.185*** (0.212)	-0.520** (0.175)	-0.324 (0.208)	0.0317 (0.176)	-0.184 (0.127)	0.175 (0.171)	-0.0765 (0.0913)
MIPEX	-2.489 (9.094)	-3.610 (12.65)	-23.58 (11.86)	20.03 (24.27)	-4.704 (4.886)	4.259 (6.256)	-7.295 (15.15)	-2.360 (6.261)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	-2.184 (2.612)	-5.166 (3.903)	-0.694 (1.603)	-1.986 (3.402)	-0.261 (1.282)	0.813 (2.028)	-6.817 (3.541)	-2.220 (1.382)
Non-OECD	-10.36*** (2.688)	-12.71*** (2.454)	1.061 (0.842)	-6.456* (2.708)	-0.338 (1.040)	-3.451* (1.542)	-9.157*** (1.828)	-2.023 (1.252)
Matched immigration policy values × Origin Region (ref. cat: EU-OECD)								
× Non-EU OECD	10.40 (7.634)	9.608 (8.747)	1.220 (3.336)	9.886 (12.56)	2.272 (2.263)	-2.796 (4.169)	-1.453 (7.884)	9.176*** (2.347)
× Non-OECD	13.38* (5.064)	12.73** (4.127)	8.589*** (1.504)	8.449 (4.440)	-0.0652 (1.521)	-1.225 (2.314)	0.569 (3.333)	3.627 (2.408)
Constant	49.23*** (10.73)	69.44*** (12.00)	14.25 (7.280)	8.856 (19.23)	11.45 (10.44)	-4.981 (7.567)	50.85 (109.6)	28.49 (14.45)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.095	0.047	0.152	0.100	0.046	0.064	0.061	0.101
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 28 to Table 47. Robustness checks: Effects of the external and internal immigration policy dimensions and the different immigration policy fields (labor migration, family reunification, asylum) and on integration outcome indicators

Besides distinguishing between different immigration policy fields, the Immigration Policy in Comparison Index allows also to differentiate between policies that either regulate immigration at the border or within the territory – that is laws with an external or an internal target, respectively (Bjerre et al. 2015). While the external regulations include conditions and entry criteria for being eligible to enter a country, internal regulations determine the duration that immigrants can stay in a country and which rights they can obtain based on their permit (cf. Table A1). Internal immigration regulations are different from integration policies as they do not regulate general rights independent of permits.

Table 28: Robustness checks: External immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched external immigration policy values	5.037 (4.981)	8.241 (6.272)	1.986 (3.176)	0.613 (6.279)	-0.320 (1.516)	2.115 (2.367)	2.208 (8.413)	4.133 (2.363)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.167 (0.172)	-0.105 (0.258)	0.0717 (0.115)	-0.178 (0.301)	-0.0656 (0.170)	0.0769 (0.117)	-0.0678 (0.288)	-0.194 (0.115)
% Foreign-born	-0.751 (0.386)	-0.325 (0.743)	0.939* (0.418)	-0.655 (0.633)	-0.592* (0.237)	0.0929 (0.177)	-0.787 (0.758)	0.447 (0.316)
GDP per capita	-0.0280 (0.0910)	0.293 (0.166)	0.0367 (0.0910)	-0.0174 (0.117)	-0.149* (0.0579)	-0.201*** (0.0496)	0.0752 (0.134)	-0.0829 (0.0526)
Unemployment rate	0.107 (0.107)	-1.048*** (0.214)	-0.548** (0.181)	-0.270 (0.224)	0.0385 (0.175)	-0.159 (0.132)	0.313 (0.170)	-0.0487 (0.0911)
MIPEX	1.101 (9.462)	-0.278 (12.78)	-23.62 (11.53)	20.03 (23.28)	-5.558 (5.095)	5.103 (6.163)	-4.537 (15.21)	-1.668 (6.473)
DV (mean natives)	0.211 (0.149)		0.565*** (0.128)	0.821*** (0.113)	0.636** (0.192)	0.943*** (0.168)	0.00567 (1.209)	0.471 (0.227)

Constant	45.79*** (11.41)	76.12*** (11.16)	7.925 (7.217)	22.27 (16.86)	14.00 (9.649)	-2.197 (7.353)	81.81 (122.8)	30.21 (15.17)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.037	0.143	0.067	0.043	0.055	0.046	0.098
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 29: Robustness checks: External immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched external immigration policy values	5.087 (4.720)	8.130 (5.137)	2.163 (3.135)	1.131 (4.775)	-0.283 (1.479)	2.167 (2.301)	1.399 (7.063)	3.997 (2.844)
Sex (male)	0.526 (0.770)	-1.409 (1.462)	1.520* (0.555)	9.987*** (1.248)	1.386* (0.511)	0.900 (0.688)	-3.258*** (0.852)	0.323 (0.504)
Age	0.0469 (0.0693)	0.258** (0.0784)	-0.000332 (0.0421)	0.246** (0.0653)	0.0379* (0.0177)	0.0219 (0.0399)	0.226*** (0.0427)	0.0752** (0.0226)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.161 (0.175)	-0.0620 (0.256)	0.0729 (0.113)	-0.135 (0.304)	-0.0700 (0.165)	0.0798 (0.117)	-0.0147 (0.289)	-0.176 (0.113)
% Foreign-born	-0.740 (0.394)	-0.268 (0.755)	0.932* (0.417)	-0.627 (0.646)	-0.575* (0.237)	0.0934 (0.171)	-0.744 (0.757)	0.463 (0.317)
GDP per capita	-0.0276 (0.0906)	0.295 (0.166)	0.0371 (0.0905)	-0.0119 (0.114)	-0.152* (0.0569)	-0.200*** (0.0494)	0.0801 (0.134)	-0.0817 (0.0522)
Unemployment rate	0.0986 (0.102)	-1.124*** (0.218)	-0.539** (0.180)	-0.293 (0.213)	0.0402 (0.172)	-0.160 (0.126)	0.226 (0.177)	-0.0702 (0.0910)
MIPEX	1.258 (9.543)	-0.533 (12.56)	-23.21 (11.51)	22.08 (24.44)	-4.927 (4.926)	5.331 (6.107)	-4.885 (14.94)	-1.622 (6.505)

DV (mean natives)	0.212 (0.153)		0.566*** (0.129)	0.793*** (0.129)	0.622** (0.189)	0.939*** (0.169)	0.158 (1.181)	0.482* (0.223)
Constant	43.07** (12.78)	63.80*** (11.25)	6.957 (7.273)	5.316 (20.90)	11.87 (9.850)	-3.716 (7.278)	56.37 (119.6)	25.37 (14.41)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.039	0.144	0.096	0.046	0.056	0.052	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 30: Robustness checks: External immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched external immigration policy values	2.684 (3.067)	7.747 (5.055)	2.158 (3.134)	0.0687 (3.990)	-0.594 (1.419)	1.622 (2.094)	1.166 (6.947)	3.732 (2.947)
Sex (male)	1.740* (0.751)	-1.334 (1.423)	1.521* (0.556)	10.13*** (1.096)	1.402** (0.473)	0.968 (0.622)	-3.226*** (0.820)	0.358 (0.535)
Age	0.0431 (0.0550)	0.257** (0.0771)	-0.000159 (0.0419)	0.279*** (0.0613)	0.0438* (0.0161)	0.0382 (0.0386)	0.233*** (0.0456)	0.0831** (0.0234)
Education	2.726*** (0.221)	0.584*** (0.126)	0.00890 (0.0773)	1.835*** (0.122)	0.412*** (0.0543)	0.882*** (0.0923)	0.421* (0.159)	0.435*** (0.0628)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0802 (0.120)	-0.0408 (0.248)	0.0731 (0.112)	-0.134 (0.264)	-0.0796 (0.150)	0.111 (0.106)	0.00409 (0.303)	-0.162 (0.106)
% Foreign-born	-0.722* (0.346)	-0.264 (0.757)	0.932* (0.417)	-0.579 (0.641)	-0.595* (0.228)	0.0865 (0.170)	-0.752 (0.772)	0.462 (0.322)

GDP per capita	0.0332 (0.0698)	0.313 (0.168)	0.0373 (0.0913)	0.0401 (0.105)	-0.139* (0.0530)	-0.174** (0.0472)	0.0941 (0.136)	-0.0685 (0.0521)
Unemployment rate	0.144 (0.122)	-1.120*** (0.229)	-0.539** (0.180)	-0.255 (0.212)	0.0456 (0.166)	-0.152 (0.125)	0.228 (0.183)	-0.0679 (0.0968)
MIPEX	-6.158 (6.882)	-2.151 (13.12)	-23.24 (11.45)	17.66 (22.18)	-4.657 (4.802)	2.951 (7.373)	-5.952 (14.89)	-2.749 (5.735)
DV (mean natives)	0.329 (0.174)		0.566*** (0.129)	0.682*** (0.129)	0.593** (0.175)	0.928*** (0.166)	0.220 (1.187)	0.468* (0.224)
Constant	0.578 (9.692)	55.52*** (12.00)	6.831 (6.824)	-13.52 (18.81)	7.563 (8.789)	-16.49* (7.120)	43.83 (120.7)	19.79 (14.54)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.290	0.042	0.144	0.155	0.062	0.093	0.054	0.109
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 31: Robustness checks: External immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched external immigration policy values	4.166 (4.718)	2.927 (3.028)	0.505 (4.839)	-0.350 (1.510)	1.437 (2.460)	-0.307 (6.854)	3.878 (2.869)	6.578 (5.078)
Sex (male)	0.765 (0.777)	1.383* (0.571)	10.08*** (1.256)	1.392* (0.512)	1.029 (0.670)	-2.847** (0.844)	0.334 (0.488)	-1.079 (1.468)
Age	0.0323	0.00721	0.240***	0.0376*	0.0134	0.200***	0.0744**	0.232**

	(0.0645)	(0.0387)	(0.0622)	(0.0178)	(0.0352)	(0.0479)	(0.0229)	(0.0777)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.561	0.102	1.439	0.468	-0.143	-7.262*	0.772	-1.751
	(2.633)	(1.005)	(2.574)	(0.842)	(1.179)	(2.886)	(1.287)	(2.657)
Non-OECD	-5.681*	4.113***	-3.446	-0.358	-3.936***	-8.993***	-0.690	-8.315***
	(2.279)	(1.045)	(1.939)	(0.582)	(0.857)	(1.081)	(0.781)	(2.048)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0993	0.0285	-0.0920	-0.0676	0.126	0.103	-0.170	0.0422
	(0.169)	(0.112)	(0.309)	(0.166)	(0.117)	(0.282)	(0.113)	(0.262)
% Foreign-born	-0.636	0.867*	-0.580	-0.561*	0.144	-0.641	0.473	-0.170
	(0.383)	(0.405)	(0.637)	(0.239)	(0.171)	(0.702)	(0.313)	(0.716)
GDP per capita	-0.0212	0.0348	-0.0118	-0.153*	-0.197**	0.0937	-0.0822	0.302
	(0.0984)	(0.0850)	(0.115)	(0.0564)	(0.0548)	(0.126)	(0.0523)	(0.152)
Unemployment rate	0.0575	-0.503*	-0.321	0.0350	-0.185	0.176	-0.0770	-1.185***
	(0.0993)	(0.178)	(0.212)	(0.175)	(0.123)	(0.172)	(0.0905)	(0.217)
MIPEX	-0.779	-21.45	20.38	-4.785	3.881	-7.559	-1.991	-3.562
	(9.023)	(11.71)	(24.53)	(4.917)	(6.208)	(15.24)	(6.380)	(12.48)
DV (mean natives)	0.178	0.575***	0.793***	0.618**	0.932***	0.159	0.473*	
	(0.149)	(0.127)	(0.133)	(0.190)	(0.169)	(1.111)	(0.222)	
Constant	42.96**	7.162	4.526	11.78	-4.239	55.43	25.70	62.73***
	(12.79)	(7.114)	(21.67)	(10.03)	(7.147)	(112.5)	(14.30)	(11.26)
Observations	5,623	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394	6,206
R-squared	0.091	0.151	0.099	0.046	0.063	0.061	0.100	0.045
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 32: Robustness checks: Internal immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched internal immigration policy values	2.601 (3.994)	23.67** (7.927)	-6.674 (3.722)	7.050 (6.180)	1.136 (2.241)	6.747 (3.731)	10.07 (6.342)	1.706 (2.620)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.150 (0.177)	-0.142 (0.270)	0.0814 (0.117)	-0.194 (0.300)	-0.0699 (0.170)	0.0616 (0.123)	-0.0788 (0.273)	-0.184 (0.110)
% Foreign-born	-0.764 (0.382)	-0.324 (0.856)	0.971* (0.364)	-0.656 (0.600)	-0.568* (0.229)	0.0880 (0.175)	-0.814 (0.760)	0.438 (0.307)
GDP per capita	-0.0249 (0.0912)	0.301 (0.172)	0.0462 (0.0886)	-0.0170 (0.120)	-0.152* (0.0588)	-0.199*** (0.0509)	0.0811 (0.132)	-0.0778 (0.0517)
Unemployment rate	0.110 (0.108)	-1.069*** (0.207)	-0.579** (0.166)	-0.278 (0.230)	0.0320 (0.172)	-0.162 (0.134)	0.301 (0.169)	-0.0456 (0.0906)
MIPEX	0.171 (9.839)	1.496 (12.76)	-26.37* (11.35)	20.89 (22.83)	-5.758 (5.140)	5.715 (6.251)	-3.344 (14.61)	-2.187 (6.524)
DV (mean natives)	0.242 (0.145)		0.515*** (0.122)	0.826*** (0.110)	0.643** (0.193)	0.937*** (0.173)	0.206 (1.112)	0.471 (0.233)
Constant	45.16*** (11.22)	68.85*** (10.70)	14.26 (7.206)	19.19 (16.98)	13.05 (9.829)	-4.031 (7.769)	58.09 (112.1)	31.04 (15.11)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.078	0.039	0.144	0.068	0.043	0.056	0.047	0.097
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 33: Robustness checks: Internal immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched internal immigration policy values	1.986 (4.195)	20.19** (6.973)	-6.734 (3.562)	3.563 (4.285)	0.669 (2.201)	6.615 (3.832)	6.124 (5.719)	0.417 (3.173)
Sex (male)	0.503 (0.775)	-1.382 (1.479)	1.483* (0.564)	9.992*** (1.239)	1.389* (0.511)	0.910 (0.687)	-3.247*** (0.844)	0.303 (0.505)
Age	0.0432 (0.0732)	0.219** (0.0749)	0.0108 (0.0395)	0.241** (0.0637)	0.0369 (0.0178)	0.0116 (0.0412)	0.216*** (0.0464)	0.0755** (0.0231)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.140 (0.180)	-0.0963 (0.264)	0.0851 (0.115)	-0.141 (0.303)	-0.0730 (0.165)	0.0636 (0.122)	-0.0236 (0.281)	-0.162 (0.105)
% Foreign-born	-0.755 (0.384)	-0.279 (0.848)	0.966* (0.363)	-0.630 (0.635)	-0.560* (0.229)	0.0864 (0.170)	-0.762 (0.760)	0.455 (0.298)
GDP per capita	-0.0249 (0.0901)	0.303 (0.170)	0.0471 (0.0881)	-0.0108 (0.115)	-0.154* (0.0573)	-0.198*** (0.0506)	0.0835 (0.133)	-0.0767 (0.0502)
Unemployment rate	0.103 (0.103)	-1.130*** (0.212)	-0.574** (0.167)	-0.295 (0.215)	0.0363 (0.170)	-0.160 (0.129)	0.222 (0.177)	-0.0659 (0.0905)
MIPEX	0.150 (10.03)	0.782 (12.47)	-26.03* (11.43)	22.36 (24.19)	-5.059 (4.963)	5.897 (6.163)	-4.186 (14.43)	-2.309 (6.499)
DV (mean natives)	0.249 (0.150)		0.515*** (0.121)	0.794*** (0.127)	0.626** (0.190)	0.934*** (0.173)	0.271 (1.107)	0.485* (0.228)
Constant	42.65** (12.46)	60.02*** (10.94)	12.86 (7.194)	4.417 (20.63)	11.31 (10.02)	-4.971 (7.618)	43.35 (111.3)	26.48 (14.36)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.041	0.145	0.096	0.046	0.057	0.052	0.099

Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 34: Robustness checks: Internal immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched internal immigration policy values	1.705 (2.556)	20.18** (6.909)	-6.738 (3.573)	2.929 (4.115)	0.411 (2.178)	6.299 (3.480)	5.987 (5.751)	0.253 (3.380)
Sex (male)	1.731* (0.754)	-1.304 (1.441)	1.485* (0.565)	10.14*** (1.090)	1.406** (0.474)	0.980 (0.622)	-3.213*** (0.811)	0.339 (0.535)
Age	0.0398 (0.0568)	0.218** (0.0737)	0.0110 (0.0395)	0.275*** (0.0589)	0.0430* (0.0165)	0.0283 (0.0399)	0.224*** (0.0495)	0.0836** (0.0241)
Education	2.728*** (0.221)	0.587*** (0.125)	0.0109 (0.0775)	1.835*** (0.123)	0.411*** (0.0544)	0.882*** (0.0929)	0.421* (0.159)	0.436*** (0.0625)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0728 (0.123)	-0.0763 (0.255)	0.0854 (0.115)	-0.143 (0.262)	-0.0826 (0.150)	0.0930 (0.107)	-0.00505 (0.295)	-0.149 (0.0990)
% Foreign-born	-0.728* (0.346)	-0.273 (0.850)	0.967* (0.363)	-0.581 (0.625)	-0.578* (0.219)	0.0804 (0.167)	-0.769 (0.776)	0.453 (0.306)
GDP per capita	0.0351 (0.0696)	0.320 (0.172)	0.0475 (0.0888)	0.0400 (0.105)	-0.142* (0.0531)	-0.172** (0.0471)	0.0972 (0.135)	-0.0638 (0.0504)
Unemployment rate	0.146 (0.123)	-1.126*** (0.222)	-0.574** (0.167)	-0.258 (0.214)	0.0418 (0.164)	-0.153 (0.128)	0.224 (0.183)	-0.0637 (0.0965)
MIPEX	-6.579 (7.062)	-0.777 (12.94)	-26.06* (11.37)	18.05 (21.83)	-4.784 (4.836)	3.582 (7.364)	-5.224 (14.39)	-3.414 (5.715)
DV (mean natives)	0.342 (0.165)		0.515*** (0.121)	0.684*** (0.127)	0.599** (0.175)	0.922*** (0.168)	0.337 (1.107)	0.471 (0.229)

Constant	0.384 (9.636)	51.56*** (11.20)	12.71 (6.693)	-14.61 (18.71)	6.927 (8.931)	-17.79* (7.414)	30.42 (111.8)	20.84 (14.48)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.290	0.044	0.145	0.155	0.062	0.094	0.055	0.109
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 35: Robustness checks: Internal immigration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched internal immigration policy values	0.257 (4.353)	17.28* (6.211)	-5.348 (3.757)	2.428 (4.532)	0.574 (2.253)	5.267 (4.129)	2.582 (5.285)	0.192 (3.245)
Sex (male)	0.742 (0.780)	-1.070 (1.480)	1.355* (0.581)	10.08*** (1.250)	1.394* (0.512)	1.034 (0.671)	-2.841** (0.835)	0.316 (0.489)
Age	0.0319 (0.0675)	0.200* (0.0740)	0.0158 (0.0359)	0.236*** (0.0606)	0.0367 (0.0178)	0.00549 (0.0371)	0.196*** (0.0507)	0.0749** (0.0235)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.521 (2.642)	-1.422 (2.653)	-0.0311 (1.027)	1.491 (2.613)	0.484 (0.840)	-0.0356 (1.223)	-7.198* (2.866)	0.734 (1.292)
Non-OECD	-5.726* (2.285)	-8.015*** (1.976)	3.958** (1.054)	-3.396 (1.962)	-0.339 (0.590)	-3.834*** (0.869)	-8.929*** (1.106)	-0.738 (0.781)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0748 (0.174)	0.00782 (0.267)	0.0416 (0.115)	-0.0982 (0.307)	-0.0706 (0.166)	0.110 (0.123)	0.0969 (0.276)	-0.155 (0.106)
% Foreign-born	-0.650	-0.181	0.899*	-0.583	-0.547*	0.137	-0.650	0.465

GDP per capita	(0.369)	(0.799)	(0.351)	(0.626)	(0.230)	(0.166)	(0.702)	(0.294)
	-0.0197	0.308	0.0456	-0.0114	-0.155*	-0.196**	0.0944	-0.0773
	(0.0974)	(0.156)	(0.0830)	(0.116)	(0.0566)	(0.0556)	(0.125)	(0.0502)
Unemployment rate	0.0620	-1.189***	-0.537**	-0.322	0.0315	-0.185	0.173	-0.0729
	(0.0999)	(0.213)	(0.166)	(0.215)	(0.173)	(0.126)	(0.172)	(0.0904)
MIPEX	-2.040	-2.313	-24.18	20.63	-4.902	4.409	-7.056	-2.701
	(9.562)	(12.35)	(11.68)	(24.25)	(4.949)	(6.260)	(14.73)	(6.365)
DV (mean natives)	0.221		0.526***	0.794***	0.623**	0.927***	0.234	0.476*
	(0.146)		(0.120)	(0.131)	(0.191)	(0.173)	(1.053)	(0.227)
Constant	42.53**	59.38***	12.72	3.814	11.22	-5.307	46.86	26.83
	(12.42)	(10.86)	(7.000)	(21.50)	(10.20)	(7.429)	(105.9)	(14.27)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.091	0.046	0.151	0.099	0.046	0.064	0.061	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 36: Robustness checks: Labor migration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched labor migration policy values	-1.607 (2.043)	5.292 (8.677)	-1.040 (1.199)	1.515 (4.044)	-1.003 (0.909)	-0.769 (1.551)	4.223 (4.796)	0.716 (1.719)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.128 (0.169)	-0.0982 (0.247)	0.0771 (0.113)	-0.183 (0.292)	-0.0670 (0.167)	0.0905 (0.112)	-0.0799 (0.278)	-0.182 (0.105)
% Foreign-born	-0.760* (0.359)	-0.377 (0.724)	0.956* (0.392)	-0.664 (0.626)	-0.595* (0.226)	0.0940 (0.183)	-0.813 (0.759)	0.435 (0.302)
GDP per capita	-0.0255 (0.0884)	0.298 (0.163)	0.0430 (0.0901)	-0.0184 (0.118)	-0.146* (0.0571)	-0.198*** (0.0498)	0.0733 (0.134)	-0.0786 (0.0508)
Unemployment rate	0.119 (0.106)	-1.058*** (0.227)	-0.558** (0.174)	-0.275 (0.224)	0.0416 (0.176)	-0.155 (0.124)	0.298 (0.172)	-0.0465 (0.0920)
MIPEX	-0.597 (9.773)	-1.713 (12.67)	-24.62* (11.44)	19.95 (23.25)	-5.306 (5.198)	4.648 (5.838)	-4.813 (13.89)	-2.415 (6.689)
DV (mean natives)	0.269 (0.151)		0.544*** (0.125)	0.822*** (0.111)	0.629** (0.196)	0.949*** (0.162)	0.0199 (1.117)	0.475 (0.231)
Constant	45.39*** (10.78)	78.11*** (10.37)	9.994 (7.692)	22.15 (16.82)	14.47 (9.814)	-1.468 (7.267)	80.40 (112.4)	31.41* (15.05)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.078	0.036	0.143	0.067	0.043	0.055	0.047	0.097
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 37: Robustness checks: Labor migration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched labor migration policy values	-1.900 (2.064)	3.429 (8.103)	-0.900 (1.361)	0.490 (3.825)	-1.124 (0.892)	-0.877 (1.709)	2.202 (4.307)	0.147 (1.944)
Sex (male)	0.484 (0.776)	-1.432 (1.471)	1.501* (0.558)	9.984*** (1.234)	1.381* (0.509)	0.882 (0.694)	-3.251*** (0.847)	0.303 (0.513)
Age	0.0502 (0.0713)	0.253** (0.0732)	0.00122 (0.0423)	0.246*** (0.0625)	0.0389* (0.0177)	0.0236 (0.0414)	0.223*** (0.0423)	0.0760** (0.0234)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.119 (0.172)	-0.0490 (0.243)	0.0784 (0.112)	-0.133 (0.293)	-0.0712 (0.162)	0.0945 (0.111)	-0.0212 (0.285)	-0.162 (0.101)
% Foreign-born	-0.747 (0.364)	-0.312 (0.722)	0.948* (0.389)	-0.631 (0.645)	-0.580* (0.228)	0.0954 (0.176)	-0.758 (0.756)	0.454 (0.299)
GDP per capita	-0.0249 (0.0878)	0.302 (0.163)	0.0436 (0.0896)	-0.0111 (0.114)	-0.148* (0.0559)	-0.197*** (0.0496)	0.0792 (0.134)	-0.0769 (0.0501)
Unemployment rate	0.111 (0.102)	-1.126*** (0.228)	-0.551** (0.174)	-0.294 (0.211)	0.0435 (0.175)	-0.156 (0.118)	0.220 (0.179)	-0.0661 (0.0912)
MIPEX	-0.485 (9.907)	-1.970 (12.49)	-24.25* (11.47)	21.87 (24.48)	-4.636 (5.064)	4.861 (5.780)	-5.085 (13.88)	-2.366 (6.718)
DV (mean natives)	0.272 (0.154)		0.545*** (0.124)	0.793*** (0.129)	0.613** (0.193)	0.944*** (0.163)	0.156 (1.117)	0.486* (0.227)
Constant	42.52** (12.00)	66.48*** (10.44)	9.009 (7.479)	5.696 (20.71)	12.39 (10.02)	-3.034 (7.072)	56.83 (112.4)	26.55 (14.38)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.039	0.144	0.096	0.046	0.055	0.052	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 38: Robustness checks: Labor migration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched labor migration policy values	-0.297 (1.443)	3.719 (7.927)	-0.895 (1.350)	1.407 (4.129)	-1.093 (0.844)	-0.412 (1.609)	2.434 (4.321)	0.377 (2.014)
Sex (male)	1.722* (0.752)	-1.353 (1.430)	1.502* (0.558)	10.14*** (1.078)	1.399** (0.471)	0.956 (0.628)	-3.215*** (0.813)	0.341 (0.544)
Age	0.0437 (0.0556)	0.251** (0.0720)	0.00139 (0.0422)	0.277*** (0.0584)	0.0447* (0.0161)	0.0392 (0.0400)	0.230*** (0.0453)	0.0836** (0.0245)
Education	2.728*** (0.221)	0.589*** (0.127)	0.00916 (0.0773)	1.836*** (0.123)	0.411*** (0.0544)	0.883*** (0.0924)	0.423* (0.159)	0.436*** (0.0623)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0621 (0.122)	-0.0302 (0.234)	0.0787 (0.112)	-0.141 (0.255)	-0.0817 (0.148)	0.120 (0.102)	-0.00376 (0.298)	-0.150 (0.0954)
% Foreign-born	-0.729* (0.333)	-0.308 (0.728)	0.948* (0.389)	-0.587 (0.631)	-0.594* (0.218)	0.0868 (0.172)	-0.767 (0.772)	0.452 (0.309)
GDP per capita	0.0342 (0.0690)	0.319 (0.165)	0.0438 (0.0904)	0.0386 (0.107)	-0.136* (0.0519)	-0.171** (0.0475)	0.0929 (0.136)	-0.0642 (0.0505)
Unemployment rate	0.148 (0.124)	-1.122*** (0.238)	-0.551** (0.174)	-0.261 (0.214)	0.0478 (0.167)	-0.150 (0.120)	0.220 (0.185)	-0.0650 (0.0973)
MIPEX	-7.033 (7.004)	-3.529 (13.03)	-24.27* (11.41)	17.68 (22.08)	-4.409 (4.906)	2.606 (7.038)	-6.096 (13.85)	-3.440 (5.969)
DV (mean natives)	0.359* (0.168)		0.545*** (0.124)	0.683*** (0.127)	0.587** (0.178)	0.932*** (0.162)	0.230 (1.121)	0.471 (0.228)
Constant	0.267 (9.562)	57.94*** (10.96)	8.873 (7.028)	-13.75 (18.62)	7.850 (8.901)	-16.01* (7.093)	42.96 (113.4)	20.87 (14.50)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.290	0.042	0.144	0.155	0.062	0.093	0.054	0.109

Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 39: Robustness checks: Labor migration policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched labor migration policy values	-2.738 (1.822)	1.806 (7.814)	-0.178 (1.300)	-0.0944 (4.067)	-1.174 (0.916)	-1.614 (1.984)	0.319 (4.115)	0.0361 (2.006)
Sex (male)	0.731 (0.781)	-1.102 (1.476)	1.367* (0.574)	10.08*** (1.245)	1.388* (0.510)	1.013 (0.675)	-2.844** (0.837)	0.316 (0.496)
Age	0.0364 (0.0664)	0.229** (0.0716)	0.00791 (0.0386)	0.240*** (0.0595)	0.0386* (0.0177)	0.0158 (0.0372)	0.200*** (0.0473)	0.0752** (0.0237)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.429 (2.589)	-1.777 (2.640)	0.0768 (1.015)	1.431 (2.641)	0.444 (0.840)	-0.201 (1.184)	-7.251* (2.860)	0.731 (1.306)
Non-OECD	-5.789* (2.252)	-8.362*** (1.956)	4.072*** (1.036)	-3.455 (1.963)	-0.377 (0.586)	-3.993*** (0.870)	-8.982*** (1.099)	-0.742 (0.775)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0574 (0.166)	0.0576 (0.250)	0.0331 (0.113)	-0.0898 (0.296)	-0.0689 (0.164)	0.142 (0.111)	0.101 (0.280)	-0.154 (0.101)
% Foreign-born	-0.634 (0.354)	-0.199 (0.679)	0.877* (0.374)	-0.581 (0.633)	-0.565* (0.231)	0.151 (0.178)	-0.643 (0.697)	0.465 (0.295)
GDP per capita	-0.0178 (0.0963)	0.309* (0.148)	0.0417 (0.0844)	-0.0110 (0.116)	-0.149* (0.0553)	-0.194** (0.0548)	0.0932 (0.125)	-0.0773 (0.0503)
Unemployment rate	0.0714 (0.0987)	-1.183*** (0.227)	-0.517** (0.172)	-0.320 (0.210)	0.0381 (0.177)	-0.179 (0.113)	0.174 (0.173)	-0.0729 (0.0913)
MIPEX	-2.295 (9.417)	-4.748 (12.42)	-22.64 (11.71)	20.28 (24.50)	-4.497 (5.055)	3.526 (5.925)	-7.475 (14.32)	-2.729 (6.602)

DV (mean natives)	0.229 (0.150)		0.553*** (0.123)	0.792*** (0.133)	0.609** (0.194)	0.936*** (0.163)	0.175 (1.049)	0.477* (0.227)
Constant	42.54** (11.99)	65.04*** (10.80)	9.450 (7.356)	4.749 (21.54)	12.29 (10.22)	-3.686 (6.921)	53.72 (105.7)	26.86 (14.32)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.091	0.045	0.151	0.099	0.046	0.063	0.061	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 40: Robustness checks: Family reunification policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched family reunification policy values	2.368 (4.480)	4.844 (3.567)	1.985 (2.710)	0.446 (6.572)	-0.476 (1.239)	3.149 (2.292)	-1.711 (6.368)	2.037 (2.369)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.154 (0.168)	-0.0963 (0.267)	0.0703 (0.113)	-0.178 (0.307)	-0.0634 (0.170)	0.0687 (0.118)	-0.0596 (0.296)	-0.187 (0.113)
% Foreign-born	-0.712 (0.378)	-0.242 (0.753)	0.981* (0.399)	-0.646 (0.683)	-0.600* (0.236)	0.154 (0.189)	-0.816 (0.839)	0.482 (0.318)
GDP per capita	-0.0272 (0.0899)	0.297 (0.163)	0.0366 (0.0901)	-0.0173 (0.117)	-0.149* (0.0573)	-0.203*** (0.0495)	0.0782 (0.135)	-0.0806 (0.0517)
Unemployment rate	0.116 (0.105)	-1.031*** (0.205)	-0.546** (0.180)	-0.268 (0.224)	0.0384 (0.175)	-0.150 (0.133)	0.316 (0.171)	-0.0415 (0.0919)
MIPEX	0.579 (10.09)	-0.426 (13.35)	-23.54 (11.58)	20.04 (23.45)	-5.554 (5.121)	5.650 (6.156)	-5.514 (14.88)	-1.873 (6.352)

DV (mean natives)	0.233 (0.143)		0.562*** (0.126)	0.821*** (0.111)	0.638** (0.194)	0.934*** (0.169)	-0.108 (1.158)	0.470 (0.237)
Constant	44.82*** (11.52)	75.51*** (10.37)	7.231 (6.802)	22.21 (16.86)	14.15 (9.812)	-3.576 (7.615)	95.54 (118.1)	30.24 (15.37)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.078	0.036	0.143	0.067	0.043	0.055	0.046	0.097
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 41: Robustness checks: Family reunification policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched family reunification policy values	2.476 (4.150)	5.248* (2.477)	2.078 (2.680)	0.956 (4.441)	-0.392 (1.154)	3.205 (2.164)	-1.900 (5.141)	2.040 (2.916)
Sex (male)	0.508 (0.773)	-1.433 (1.472)	1.515* (0.554)	9.984*** (1.247)	1.386* (0.511)	0.900 (0.690)	-3.272** (0.858)	0.309 (0.500)
Age	0.0478 (0.0695)	0.260** (0.0777)	0.000124 (0.0422)	0.247** (0.0657)	0.0379* (0.0178)	0.0224 (0.0402)	0.226*** (0.0421)	0.0761** (0.0226)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.148 (0.170)	-0.0552 (0.265)	0.0717 (0.112)	-0.135 (0.308)	-0.0683 (0.165)	0.0717 (0.117)	-0.00750 (0.295)	-0.170 (0.112)
% Foreign-born	-0.698 (0.384)	-0.176 (0.758)	0.976* (0.396)	-0.608 (0.684)	-0.581* (0.235)	0.155 (0.183)	-0.777 (0.818)	0.498 (0.319)
GDP per capita	-0.0268 (0.0895)	0.298 (0.163)	0.0372 (0.0897)	-0.0119 (0.113)	-0.152* (0.0564)	-0.202*** (0.0493)	0.0828 (0.135)	-0.0796 (0.0512)

Unemployment rate	0.107 (0.101)	-1.108*** (0.211)	-0.537** (0.179)	-0.291 (0.213)	0.0400 (0.172)	-0.151 (0.127)	0.227 (0.179)	-0.0635 (0.0914)
MIPEX	0.765 (10.14)	-0.554 (13.04)	-23.16 (11.56)	22.13 (24.67)	-4.927 (4.956)	5.885 (6.097)	-5.747 (14.63)	-1.803 (6.350)
DV (mean natives)	0.233 (0.145)		0.563*** (0.127)	0.791*** (0.129)	0.623** (0.191)	0.929*** (0.169)	0.0645 (1.145)	0.480 (0.231)
Constant	42.02** (12.78)	62.76*** (10.72)	6.270 (6.710)	5.094 (20.64)	11.99 (10.03)	-5.141 (7.407)	67.86 (116.1)	25.30 (14.63)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.079	0.039	0.144	0.096	0.046	0.056	0.052	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 42: Robustness checks: Family reunification policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched family reunification policy values	0.843 (2.866)	5.081* (2.342)	2.075 (2.674)	0.389 (3.685)	-0.558 (1.158)	2.846 (1.843)	-2.043 (4.971)	1.872 (3.118)
Sex (male)	1.728* (0.753)	-1.357 (1.433)	1.516* (0.555)	10.13*** (1.096)	1.402** (0.473)	0.970 (0.625)	-3.239*** (0.826)	0.345 (0.531)
Age	0.0435 (0.0554)	0.259** (0.0765)	0.000297 (0.0420)	0.279*** (0.0618)	0.0436* (0.0162)	0.0386 (0.0390)	0.234*** (0.0451)	0.0840** (0.0235)
Education	2.727*** (0.221)	0.586*** (0.126)	0.00897 (0.0772)	1.835*** (0.123)	0.412*** (0.0545)	0.882*** (0.0923)	0.422* (0.159)	0.435*** (0.0628)

Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0699 (0.121)	-0.0346 (0.258)	0.0719 (0.112)	-0.136 (0.269)	-0.0777 (0.150)	0.102 (0.107)	0.0112 (0.309)	-0.156 (0.105)
% Foreign-born	-0.711 (0.355)	-0.174 (0.760)	0.976* (0.396)	-0.571 (0.672)	-0.601* (0.225)	0.142 (0.184)	-0.788 (0.831)	0.494 (0.322)
GDP per capita	0.0338 (0.0690)	0.315 (0.165)	0.0375 (0.0904)	0.0397 (0.104)	-0.140* (0.0524)	-0.176** (0.0468)	0.0968 (0.137)	-0.0665 (0.0512)
Unemployment rate	0.148 (0.122)	-1.104*** (0.222)	-0.538** (0.179)	-0.255 (0.214)	0.0447 (0.166)	-0.144 (0.126)	0.229 (0.186)	-0.0617 (0.0975)
MIPEX	-6.631 (7.152)	-2.154 (13.55)	-23.19 (11.49)	17.76 (22.29)	-4.678 (4.808)	3.506 (7.361)	-6.808 (14.55)	-2.929 (5.565)
DV (mean natives)	0.346 (0.174)		0.563*** (0.127)	0.682*** (0.128)	0.596** (0.177)	0.919*** (0.167)	0.130 (1.151)	0.466 (0.232)
Constant	0.102 (9.706)	54.44*** (11.54)	6.144 (6.401)	-13.77 (18.53)	7.592 (8.971)	-17.83* (7.336)	54.97 (117.2)	19.74 (14.75)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.290	0.042	0.144	0.155	0.062	0.093	0.054	0.109
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 43: Robustness checks: Family reunification policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched family reunification policy values	2.057 (4.221)	4.485 (2.394)	2.446 (2.653)	0.694 (4.514)	-0.418 (1.155)	2.868 (2.143)	-2.841 (5.147)	1.997 (2.925)

Sex (male)	0.752 (0.779)	-1.095 (1.477)	1.376* (0.571)	10.08*** (1.256)	1.392* (0.512)	1.032 (0.673)	-2.854** (0.848)	0.322 (0.485)
Age	0.0329 (0.0648)	0.234** (0.0772)	0.00779 (0.0387)	0.240*** (0.0626)	0.0375* (0.0179)	0.0138 (0.0354)	0.200*** (0.0476)	0.0752** (0.0229)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.532 (2.628)	-1.768 (2.633)	0.104 (1.007)	1.442 (2.564)	0.465 (0.843)	-0.124 (1.175)	-7.293* (2.895)	0.754 (1.270)
Non-OECD	-5.716* (2.276)	-8.361*** (2.047)	4.098*** (1.041)	-3.446 (1.933)	-0.358 (0.579)	-3.929*** (0.856)	-9.015*** (1.063)	-0.724 (0.777)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0883 (0.166)	0.0472 (0.270)	0.0277 (0.112)	-0.0935 (0.314)	-0.0659 (0.166)	0.116 (0.118)	0.110 (0.286)	-0.163 (0.113)
% Foreign-born	-0.601 (0.375)	-0.0887 (0.722)	0.920* (0.376)	-0.566 (0.674)	-0.567* (0.237)	0.199 (0.177)	-0.693 (0.766)	0.508 (0.315)
GDP per capita	-0.0204 (0.0980)	0.304 (0.149)	0.0359 (0.0840)	-0.0122 (0.115)	-0.153* (0.0559)	-0.200** (0.0547)	0.0962 (0.127)	-0.0802 (0.0514)
Unemployment rate	0.0647 (0.0978)	-1.172*** (0.210)	-0.503** (0.176)	-0.319 (0.214)	0.0347 (0.175)	-0.177 (0.125)	0.173 (0.174)	-0.0707 (0.0911)
MIPEX	-1.175 (9.594)	-3.528 (12.88)	-21.55 (11.77)	20.48 (24.69)	-4.791 (4.941)	4.479 (6.214)	-8.333 (14.90)	-2.171 (6.240)
DV (mean natives)	0.195 (0.140)		0.568*** (0.126)	0.792*** (0.132)	0.620** (0.192)	0.922*** (0.171)	0.0938 (1.077)	0.471 (0.230)
Constant	42.10** (12.85)	61.69*** (10.69)	6.640 (6.510)	4.234 (21.47)	11.87 (10.23)	-5.652 (7.275)	64.21 (109.1)	25.64 (14.55)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.091	0.045	0.151	0.099	0.046	0.064	0.061	0.100
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 44: Robustness checks: Asylum policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched asylum policy values	11.77* (4.730)	11.03 (8.118)	-7.727 (5.572)	11.65* (4.588)	5.419 (3.393)	9.194 (4.705)	12.36* (4.988)	4.794* (1.837)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0809 (0.170)	-0.0107 (0.252)	0.0258 (0.112)	-0.116 (0.315)	-0.0303 (0.172)	0.142 (0.117)	0.0187 (0.297)	-0.152 (0.104)
% Foreign-born	-0.861* (0.398)	-0.439 (0.688)	1.020* (0.373)	-0.750 (0.558)	-0.570* (0.237)	0.00548 (0.184)	-0.908 (0.771)	0.393 (0.299)
GDP per capita	-0.00599 (0.0926)	0.318 (0.164)	0.0305 (0.0907)	-0.00160 (0.117)	-0.146* (0.0601)	-0.186*** (0.0457)	0.0951 (0.134)	-0.0714 (0.0534)
Unemployment rate	0.121 (0.106)	-1.029*** (0.213)	-0.570** (0.170)	-0.251 (0.228)	0.0351 (0.171)	-0.147 (0.128)	0.328 (0.183)	-0.0396 (0.0949)
MIPEX	0.218 (7.998)	-1.466 (13.27)	-24.77* (11.80)	20.25 (21.70)	-5.688 (4.956)	4.866 (6.584)	-4.678 (13.21)	-2.261 (6.551)
DV (mean natives)	0.191 (0.148)		0.546*** (0.123)	0.801*** (0.112)	0.628** (0.198)	0.944*** (0.174)	0.0443 (1.045)	0.453 (0.223)
Constant	43.61*** (11.09)	74.63*** (11.08)	12.97 (7.182)	19.08 (17.71)	10.79 (10.52)	-5.368 (7.005)	73.45 (106.0)	30.86* (14.80)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.080	0.037	0.144	0.068	0.044	0.057	0.047	0.098
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 45: Robustness checks: Asylum policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched asylum policy values	11.45* (5.295)	8.100 (7.807)	-7.745 (5.443)	9.077* (4.206)	4.860 (3.308)	9.075 (4.473)	9.539* (4.382)	3.896 (2.156)
Sex (male)	0.528 (0.772)	-1.432 (1.470)	1.490* (0.565)	9.997*** (1.246)	1.374* (0.502)	0.904 (0.696)	-3.251*** (0.835)	0.308 (0.501)
Age	0.0314 (0.0700)	0.248** (0.0779)	0.00830 (0.0373)	0.237*** (0.0610)	0.0321 (0.0172)	0.0127 (0.0341)	0.216*** (0.0462)	0.0720** (0.0227)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0781 (0.172)	0.0126 (0.253)	0.0288 (0.112)	-0.0867 (0.310)	-0.0393 (0.166)	0.143 (0.116)	0.0491 (0.298)	-0.141 (0.102)
% Foreign-born	-0.852* (0.408)	-0.361 (0.697)	1.015* (0.374)	-0.704 (0.602)	-0.560* (0.238)	0.00518 (0.179)	-0.839 (0.775)	0.417 (0.300)
GDP per capita	-0.00621 (0.0921)	0.316 (0.164)	0.0313 (0.0904)	0.00104 (0.114)	-0.149* (0.0587)	-0.186*** (0.0453)	0.0951 (0.135)	-0.0716 (0.0529)
Unemployment rate	0.116 (0.102)	-1.105*** (0.219)	-0.564** (0.170)	-0.275 (0.215)	0.0388 (0.169)	-0.146 (0.122)	0.240 (0.188)	-0.0611 (0.0940)
MIPEX	0.336 (8.164)	-1.785 (12.93)	-24.42 (11.85)	22.12 (23.20)	-5.068 (4.816)	5.066 (6.476)	-4.944 (13.31)	-2.226 (6.652)
DV (mean natives)	0.193 (0.150)		0.547*** (0.124)	0.776*** (0.130)	0.615** (0.196)	0.940*** (0.174)	0.190 (1.064)	0.467* (0.219)
Constant	41.75** (12.22)	64.07*** (11.43)	11.67 (7.486)	3.630 (21.04)	9.332 (10.58)	-6.359 (7.291)	50.08 (107.8)	26.29 (14.20)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.080	0.039	0.145	0.097	0.047	0.057	0.053	0.099
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 46: Robustness checks: Asylum policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched asylum policy values	9.190* (3.592)	7.589 (7.885)	-7.756 (5.441)	7.201 (3.950)	4.317 (3.350)	8.173 (4.666)	9.087 (4.440)	3.429 (2.012)
Sex (male)	1.750* (0.750)	-1.356 (1.429)	1.491* (0.566)	10.14*** (1.094)	1.393** (0.463)	0.973 (0.627)	-3.218*** (0.803)	0.343 (0.532)
Age	0.0306 (0.0542)	0.247** (0.0767)	0.00856 (0.0371)	0.272*** (0.0571)	0.0385* (0.0160)	0.0298 (0.0329)	0.224*** (0.0490)	0.0804** (0.0235)
Education	2.724*** (0.220)	0.584*** (0.128)	0.0130 (0.0785)	1.832*** (0.123)	0.409*** (0.0541)	0.879*** (0.0916)	0.417* (0.158)	0.434*** (0.0624)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0223 (0.119)	0.0296 (0.246)	0.0291 (0.112)	-0.0989 (0.272)	-0.0532 (0.151)	0.166 (0.103)	0.0644 (0.311)	-0.130 (0.0960)
% Foreign-born	-0.806* (0.351)	-0.351 (0.701)	1.015* (0.374)	-0.639 (0.601)	-0.575* (0.224)	0.00750 (0.176)	-0.842 (0.791)	0.420 (0.306)
GDP per capita	0.0500 (0.0696)	0.332 (0.166)	0.0317 (0.0911)	0.0493 (0.104)	-0.138* (0.0542)	-0.161** (0.0426)	0.108 (0.137)	-0.0594 (0.0525)
Unemployment rate	0.157 (0.124)	-1.101*** (0.230)	-0.564** (0.170)	-0.242 (0.213)	0.0432 (0.162)	-0.140 (0.123)	0.241 (0.194)	-0.0596 (0.0996)
MIPEX	-6.449 (5.502)	-3.348 (13.52)	-24.45 (11.78)	17.86 (21.07)	-4.821 (4.636)	2.789 (7.734)	-5.961 (13.38)	-3.320 (5.914)
DV (mean natives)	0.298 (0.152)		0.547*** (0.124)	0.670*** (0.127)	0.589** (0.180)	0.929*** (0.172)	0.255 (1.073)	0.455 (0.221)
Constant	-0.292 (9.367)	55.83*** (11.86)	11.48 (7.083)	-15.16 (18.94)	5.099 (9.374)	-18.91* (6.921)	37.39 (109.4)	20.68 (14.37)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.291	0.042	0.145	0.155	0.063	0.094	0.055	0.109

Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 47: Robustness checks: Asylum policy effects on migrant integration – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched asylum policy values	9.357 (5.230)	5.089 (8.431)	-6.230 (5.096)	7.686 (4.073)	4.708 (3.381)	7.615 (4.198)	6.502 (4.323)	3.590 (2.226)
Sex (male)	0.761 (0.780)	-1.101 (1.476)	1.358* (0.580)	10.08*** (1.257)	1.377* (0.503)	1.031 (0.679)	-2.840** (0.828)	0.319 (0.486)
Age	0.0200 (0.0660)	0.225** (0.0760)	0.0141 (0.0350)	0.232*** (0.0588)	0.0322 (0.0174)	0.00591 (0.0306)	0.194*** (0.0502)	0.0715** (0.0228)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	1.571 (2.654)	-1.794 (2.636)	0.0588 (1.017)	1.474 (2.584)	0.476 (0.870)	-0.122 (1.186)	-7.227* (2.943)	0.748 (1.272)
Non-OECD	-5.570* (2.313)	-8.313*** (2.043)	3.961*** (0.975)	-3.306 (1.969)	-0.262 (0.586)	-3.813*** (0.833)	-8.866*** (1.055)	-0.675 (0.784)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0327 (0.169)	0.0942 (0.255)	-0.00385 (0.112)	-0.0547 (0.312)	-0.0388 (0.167)	0.175 (0.117)	0.143 (0.289)	-0.136 (0.102)
% Foreign-born	-0.729 (0.403)	-0.233 (0.658)	0.939* (0.363)	-0.647 (0.595)	-0.548* (0.239)	0.0684 (0.178)	-0.709 (0.721)	0.430 (0.296)
GDP per capita	-0.00382 (0.0997)	0.317* (0.149)	0.0329 (0.0847)	-0.00143 (0.115)	-0.150* (0.0580)	-0.185** (0.0507)	0.103 (0.126)	-0.0727 (0.0527)
Unemployment rate	0.0725 (0.101)	-1.171*** (0.217)	-0.529** (0.169)	-0.305 (0.215)	0.0346 (0.171)	-0.172 (0.120)	0.185 (0.180)	-0.0682 (0.0937)
MIPEX	-1.508	-4.608	-22.93	20.55	-4.917	3.775	-7.284	-2.576

DV (mean natives)	(7.955) 0.164 (0.149)	(12.77)	(12.05) 0.551*** (0.123)	(23.41) 0.779*** (0.133)	(4.836) 0.613** (0.196)	(6.500) 0.933*** (0.174)	(13.86) 0.220 (1.015)	(6.556) 0.460* (0.219)
Constant	41.87** (12.35)	63.49*** (11.53)	11.82 (7.372)	2.949 (21.63)	9.267 (10.71)	-6.540 (7.243)	46.83 (103.0)	26.61 (14.14)
Observations	5,623	6,206	6,163	6,373	4,426	6,333	6,400	6,394
R-squared	0.092	0.045	0.151	0.100	0.047	0.065	0.062	0.100
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 48: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on employment chances, recent migrants (five years or less) excluded – Linear regression models (Without individual level controls) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	6.102 (3.294)	17.14** (4.809)	-0.292 (3.442)	3.723 (4.133)	-0.679 (1.866)	3.218 (2.928)	3.921 (6.101)	2.274 (3.088)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0960 (0.208)	-0.130 (0.272)	0.135 (0.160)	-0.322 (0.281)	-0.125 (0.182)	-0.0138 (0.166)	-0.228 (0.295)	-0.295 (0.155)
% Foreign-born	-1.052* (0.413)	-0.576 (0.679)	0.604 (0.515)	-0.580 (0.769)	-0.654 (0.424)	0.0791 (0.181)	-0.980 (0.677)	0.436 (0.337)
GDP per capita	-0.0301 (0.0893)	0.342 (0.179)	0.0586 (0.0786)	-0.126 (0.142)	-0.187* (0.0839)	-0.202* (0.0822)	0.00984 (0.137)	-0.0624 (0.0537)
Unemployment rate	-0.117 (0.145)	-1.137*** (0.213)	-0.487* (0.231)	-0.321 (0.248)	-0.146 (0.215)	-0.345 (0.168)	0.147 (0.221)	-0.157 (0.120)
MIPEX	-2.851 (13.05)	1.283 (12.14)	-26.22* (11.91)	17.70 (22.17)	-3.686 (8.603)	4.974 (7.790)	-16.36 (13.49)	0.351 (6.232)
DV (mean natives)	0.312*		0.607**	0.933***	0.647*	1.070***	-0.530	0.181

	(0.144)		(0.160)	(0.153)	(0.252)	(0.279)	(1.412)	(0.294)
Constant	44.88*** (11.25)	77.11*** (13.36)	9.103 (10.18)	27.90 (16.48)	21.13 (12.10)	3.470 (11.83)	155.3 (141.5)	52.75** (18.58)
Observations	4,310	4,661	4,695	4,810	3,105	4,782	4,829	4,823
R-squared	0.069	0.047	0.154	0.060	0.047	0.062	0.047	0.092
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 49: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on employment chances, recent migrants (five years or less) excluded – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex and age) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	5.964 (3.201)	15.53** (4.433)	-0.501 (3.330)	2.402 (3.329)	-0.719 (1.824)	3.282 (2.801)	2.044 (5.889)	1.725 (3.423)
Sex (male)	0.904 (0.862)	0.330 (1.504)	1.501* (0.666)	10.74*** (1.186)	1.694* (0.612)	0.595 (0.885)	-3.811** (1.240)	0.126 (0.572)
Age	0.0309 (0.0814)	0.284** (0.0960)	0.0372 (0.0538)	0.249** (0.0736)	0.0113 (0.0202)	-0.00330 (0.0472)	0.219** (0.0604)	0.0709* (0.0329)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.0896 (0.214)	-0.0772 (0.265)	0.146 (0.155)	-0.224 (0.294)	-0.128 (0.180)	-0.0138 (0.162)	-0.183 (0.298)	-0.275 (0.154)
% Foreign-born	-1.042* (0.417)	-0.514 (0.674)	0.623 (0.518)	-0.481 (0.808)	-0.632 (0.420)	0.0796 (0.178)	-0.942 (0.684)	0.457 (0.344)
GDP per capita	-0.0316 (0.0882)	0.336 (0.186)	0.0584 (0.0781)	-0.135 (0.137)	-0.192* (0.0829)	-0.202* (0.0820)	0.00771 (0.140)	-0.0639 (0.0550)
Unemployment rate	-0.118	-1.188***	-0.494*	-0.331	-0.141	-0.341*	0.0805	-0.172

MIPEX	(0.139)	(0.219)	(0.233)	(0.243)	(0.210)	(0.162)	(0.230)	(0.122)
	-2.658	0.871	-26.01*	19.69	-2.908	5.151	-17.76	0.157
	(13.34)	(11.99)	(12.01)	(24.00)	(8.614)	(7.714)	(13.45)	(6.235)
DV (mean natives)	0.315*		0.602***	0.939***	0.624*	1.068***	-0.432	0.192
	(0.145)		(0.157)	(0.176)	(0.251)	(0.279)	(1.381)	(0.297)
Constant	42.65**	62.77***	6.297	6.007	20.11	3.285	136.5	48.14*
	(13.18)	(12.81)	(10.12)	(21.11)	(11.95)	(11.48)	(136.9)	(18.36)
Observations	4,310	4,661	4,695	4,810	3,105	4,782	4,829	4,823
R-squared	0.070	0.049	0.155	0.093	0.051	0.062	0.053	0.093
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 50: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on employment chances, recent migrants (five years or less) excluded – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and education) (continued on next page)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	3.351	15.19**	-0.448	0.903	-1.077	2.477	1.777	1.347
	(2.190)	(4.476)	(3.333)	(3.216)	(1.838)	(2.652)	(5.955)	(3.602)
Sex (male)	2.011*	0.391	1.494*	10.88***	1.715**	0.682	-3.780**	0.163
	(0.750)	(1.480)	(0.666)	(1.059)	(0.572)	(0.817)	(1.204)	(0.587)
Age	0.0180	0.281**	0.0361	0.277***	0.0156	0.0123	0.225**	0.0784*
	(0.0568)	(0.0949)	(0.0531)	(0.0646)	(0.0190)	(0.0441)	(0.0632)	(0.0345)
Education	2.821***	0.426**	-0.0622	1.804***	0.444***	0.991***	0.382	0.465***
	(0.218)	(0.139)	(0.0854)	(0.132)	(0.0747)	(0.0938)	(0.188)	(0.0767)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	0.104	-0.0392	0.142	-0.142	-0.127	0.0698	-0.146	-0.241

% Foreign-born	(0.154)	(0.265)	(0.154)	(0.269)	(0.178)	(0.155)	(0.314)	(0.148)
	-1.036**	-0.517	0.623	-0.463	-0.728	0.0585	-0.958	0.445
GDP per capita	(0.348)	(0.670)	(0.520)	(0.789)	(0.427)	(0.193)	(0.694)	(0.338)
	0.0387	0.351	0.0559	-0.0703	-0.169	-0.163	0.0235	-0.0463
Unemployment rate	(0.0697)	(0.188)	(0.0792)	(0.134)	(0.0837)	(0.0794)	(0.140)	(0.0555)
	-0.0496	-1.178***	-0.494*	-0.249	-0.0955	-0.312	0.0913	-0.160
MIPEX	(0.135)	(0.227)	(0.233)	(0.251)	(0.208)	(0.156)	(0.239)	(0.133)
	-12.21	-0.701	-25.78*	13.97	-3.953	1.625	-18.99	-1.323
DV (mean natives)	(7.998)	(12.41)	(12.06)	(21.38)	(8.815)	(9.333)	(13.58)	(5.230)
	0.390*		0.603**	0.816***	0.587*	1.062***	-0.347	0.150
	(0.179)		(0.158)	(0.188)	(0.245)	(0.270)	(1.378)	(0.294)
Constant	-5.037	55.69***	7.285	-15.86	15.63	-13.71	121.4	42.70*
	(11.05)	(13.51)	(9.524)	(20.38)	(11.53)	(11.24)	(136.8)	(18.38)
Observations	4,310	4,661	4,695	4,810	3,105	4,782	4,829	4,823
R-squared	0.289	0.051	0.155	0.148	0.067	0.105	0.055	0.104
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 51: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on employment chances, recent migrants (five years or less) excluded – Linear regression models (Including controls for sex, age and region of origin)

	Socio-economic Status	Employment	Political Trust	Political Interest	Conventional Polit. Participation	Unconv. Polit. Participation	No Perceived Discrimination	Social Trust
Matched immigration policy values	4.422	13.50**	0.725	1.784	-0.782	2.215	-0.105	1.529
	(3.323)	(4.545)	(3.366)	(3.451)	(1.855)	(2.901)	(5.798)	(3.396)
Sex (male)	1.297	0.696	1.305	10.87***	1.707*	0.799	-3.356*	0.157

	(0.831)	(1.502)	(0.687)	(1.244)	(0.616)	(0.858)	(1.226)	(0.558)
Age	0.0127	0.264*	0.0438	0.244**	0.0107	-0.0107	0.202**	0.0698*
	(0.0709)	(0.0963)	(0.0480)	(0.0704)	(0.0203)	(0.0421)	(0.0642)	(0.0334)
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)								
Non-EU OECD	-0.152	0.316	0.402	-2.057	-0.141	-1.607	-6.650	-0.00670
	(3.106)	(3.106)	(1.249)	(2.615)	(1.058)	(0.998)	(3.274)	(1.230)
Non-OECD	-6.999**	-8.355***	4.664***	-2.454	-0.244	-4.330***	-8.392***	-0.791
	(2.196)	(1.983)	(1.049)	(2.187)	(0.588)	(0.814)	(1.309)	(0.793)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	0.0276	0.0709	0.0682	-0.180	-0.125	0.0529	-0.0350	-0.263
	(0.213)	(0.260)	(0.149)	(0.309)	(0.182)	(0.159)	(0.290)	(0.158)
% Foreign-born	-0.921*	-0.419	0.554	-0.448	-0.626	0.126	-0.821	0.466
	(0.400)	(0.637)	(0.503)	(0.798)	(0.422)	(0.157)	(0.622)	(0.340)
GDP per capita	-0.0250	0.341	0.0529	-0.129	-0.192*	-0.195*	0.0245	-0.0633
	(0.0985)	(0.171)	(0.0731)	(0.145)	(0.0834)	(0.0903)	(0.126)	(0.0556)
Unemployment rate	-0.190	-1.286***	-0.438	-0.350	-0.144	-0.371*	0.0135	-0.180
	(0.126)	(0.218)	(0.230)	(0.242)	(0.213)	(0.162)	(0.232)	(0.122)
MIPEX	-5.728	-3.886	-22.92	18.59	-2.995	3.231	-21.68	-0.284
	(12.84)	(12.26)	(12.02)	(24.43)	(8.656)	(7.641)	(14.01)	(6.220)
DV (mean natives)	0.271		0.617***	0.936***	0.620*	1.042**	-0.529	0.184
	(0.133)		(0.156)	(0.179)	(0.252)	(0.280)	(1.317)	(0.296)
Constant	41.00**	59.30***	7.518	5.198	20.12	2.313	143.0	48.31*
	(13.22)	(12.00)	(9.659)	(21.67)	(12.22)	(11.30)	(130.4)	(18.24)
Observations	4,310	4,661	4,695	4,810	3,105	4,782	4,829	4,823
R-squared	0.085	0.056	0.163	0.094	0.051	0.070	0.062	0.094
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 52: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on employment chances – Logistic regression models

	Without controls	With sex and age	Plus education	Plus origin region
Matched immigration policy values	0.124* (0.0558)	0.109* (0.0434)	0.107* (0.0420)	0.0887* (0.0404)
Sex (male)		-0.0138 (0.0144)	-0.0128 (0.0140)	-0.0104 (0.0144)
Age		0.00246** (0.000781)	0.00246** (0.000763)	0.00225** (0.000771)
Education			0.00586*** (0.00117)	
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)				
Non-EU OECD				-0.0165 (0.0275)
Non-OECD				-0.0838*** (0.0205)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.00196 (0.00271)	-0.00143 (0.00269)	-0.00116 (0.00262)	-0.000357 (0.00274)
% Foreign-born	-0.00390 (0.00820)	-0.00346 (0.00822)	-0.00348 (0.00827)	-0.00251 (0.00772)
GDP per capita	0.00325 (0.00204)	0.00330 (0.00202)	0.00351 (0.00203)	0.00336 (0.00187)
MIPEX	0.0422 (0.125)	0.0356 (0.123)	0.0225 (0.128)	0.00305 (0.124)
Unemployment rate	-0.00879*** (0.00191)	-0.00951*** (0.00194)	-0.00945*** (0.00203)	-0.0101*** (0.00192)
Observations	6,206	6,206	6,206	6,206
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Coefficients show predicted marginal effects using logistic regression.

Table 53: Robustness checks: Immigration policy effects on no perceived discrimination – Logistic regression models (continued on next page)

	Without controls	With sex and age	Plus education	Plus origin region
Matched immigration policy values	0.0427 (0.0653)	0.0286 (0.0501)	0.0276 (0.0493)	0.00731 (0.0463)
Sex (male)		-0.0324*** (0.00754)	-0.0315*** (0.00712)	-0.0269*** (0.00753)
Age		0.00238*** (0.000481)	0.00243*** (0.000488)	0.00212*** (0.000511)
Education			0.00421** (0.00150)	
Origin region: EU-OECD (ref. cat.)				
Non-EU OECD				-0.0764* (0.0298)
Non-OECD				-0.0943*** (0.00952)
Xenophobia (mean natives)	-0.00107 (0.00275)	-0.000399 (0.00274)	-0.000134 (0.00288)	0.000786 (0.00265)
% Foreign-born	-0.00731 (0.00901)	-0.00699 (0.00888)	-0.00718 (0.00904)	-0.00580 (0.00818)
GDP per capita	0.00112 (0.00170)	0.00119 (0.00168)	0.00133 (0.00171)	0.00137 (0.00158)
Unemployment rate	0.00271 (0.00193)	0.00180 (0.00197)	0.00181 (0.00201)	0.00133 (0.00192)
MIPEX	-0.0466 (0.131)	-0.0576 (0.127)	-0.0638 (0.128)	-0.0862 (0.128)
DV (mean natives)	0.00379 (0.0120)	0.00497 (0.0117)	0.00564 (0.0116)	0.00497 (0.0109)

Observations	6,369	6,369	6,369	6,369
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Coefficients show predicted marginal effects using logistic regression.

Chapter 3. Second article: Immigration policy congruence and political trust: a cross-national analysis among 23 European countries

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Immigration policy congruence and political trust: A cross-national analysis among 23 European countries

Abstract. This study examines how immigration policy impacts citizens' trust in politicians and political institutions. The article argues that immigration policy affects political trust through policy congruence. More specifically, it claims that the level of restrictiveness of immigration policy impacts political trust heterogeneously, conditional on whether citizens are anti- or pro-immigration and additionally on how strongly citizens are seeking information about political issues, the latter making it potentially easier for them to identify policy (in-)congruencies. Combining country-level data on immigration policy outputs in European countries with individual-level data to complex multilevel models, the findings reveal that the level of congruence of immigration policy to citizens' immigration preferences alone does not impact political trust. But they show that immigration policy impacts the political trust of citizens who are highly anti-immigration and at the same time very strongly seeking political information. Overall, however, I conclude that the impact of immigration policy congruence on political trust is moderate at best.

Keywords: Immigration policy, political trust, policy congruence, attitudes to immigration, political information seeking

1 Introduction

Citizens' trust in political institutions and authorities is essential for the stability and viability of representative democracies (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 1). A lack of political trust reduces citizens' degree of compliance with law (Marien and Hooghe 2011), the capacity of political leaders to effectively govern and adopt redistributive policy (Hetherington 2004) and it can increase political cynicism (van der Meer 2017b). Variations in citizens' political trust result to a considerable extent from the degree to which citizens feel substantively represented by government policies (e.g., Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; McLaren 2016).

Among the most salient and polarizing policy issues in European countries in recent decades is immigration policy (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav 1997), which is part of the new integration-demarcation cleavage (e.g., Grande and Kriesi 2012). European citizens' views diverge strongly on how strictly immigration to their country should be regulated (e.g., Heath and Richards 2019; McLaren 2015, chap. 3). Moreover, public debates over immigration policy are heated and polarized. However, we do not yet know whether the extent to which immigration policy substantively represents citizens' immigration preferences matters for political trust.

Addressing this issue is of great importance from both a practical and scholarly perspective. The so-called 'liberal paradox', which assumes that liberal democracies must balance competing demands arising from representation, constitutionalism, and capitalism (Hampshire 2013), limits the ability of liberal democratic governments to enact restrictive immigration policies even though the median voter calls for tightening immigration (Ford, Jennings, and Somerville 2015; Morales, Pilet, and Ruedin 2015). In other words, the fact that in the design of immigration policy liberal democratic governments must reconcile 'representation' with 'responsibility' (e.g., Armingeon and Lutz 2019) provides particularly great potential for reduced political trust among the anti-immigration public.

To study effects on political trust, studies have so far focused on policy effects of integration and multiculturalism policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016). These policies are directed at the obligations and rights concerning the participation of immigrants (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2604). There are indications that integration policy is in line with public preferences whereas immigration policy is not (Lutz 2021). This could imply that the effects of immigration policy on political

trust are more negative than those of integration policy, making the former the more relevant case to study.

There is, however, no study that has examined the impact of immigration policies on political trust. Immigration policies regulate who can be admitted and permitted to stay (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2604), and they are referred to here as ‘policy outputs’, that is concrete laws, regulations, and decisions (Knill and Tosun 2011, 496–97). Instead, existing studies have looked at effects of immigration ‘policy outcomes’ on political trust, thus focusing on the consequences resulting from the outputs (Easton 1965, 351). These refer to effects of immigration rates (Jeannet 2019; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015), asylum applications (Harteveld et al. 2018), or perceived government performance (McLaren 2011). But to make claims about the consequences of public representation of citizen preferences by immigration policies for political trust, the impact of concrete immigration policy outputs must be investigated. I refer to this effect on political trust as an effect of policy congruence, namely the extent to which policy content and citizen preferences and interests match (Golder and Ferland 2017, 229).

What is more, it has been pointed out that there are strong differences among citizens in how much they know about their country’s public policies (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016). In that regard, studies have suggested that effects of ideological congruence on citizens’ support of the political system are conditional on how strongly citizens are seeking information about political issues (e.g., Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), making it easier for them to identify policy (in-)congruencies (Campbell 2012). To make convincing claims about the effects of immigration policy on political trust it is therefore imperative to take into account heterogeneity in the extent to which citizens are seeking political information.

Against the background of the limitations of existing studies, I attempt for the first time to test in a systematic way the consequences of the degree of government immigration policy congruence for peoples’ trust in national political institutions in European countries. I argue that if the immigration policy output of a country is congruent or incongruent to citizens’ ideological preferences, citizens’ levels of political trust increase or decrease, respectively. I also argue that policy effects are greater for citizens with a higher compared to lower level of seeking political information.

I test my arguments with complex multilevel models by combining country-level data from the Immigration Policy in Comparison index (Helbling et al. 2017) for 23 European countries for the period 2002-2010 with corresponding individual-level data from the European

Social Survey. The policy index measures the restrictiveness of concrete immigration laws, and it combines many specific regulations regarding immigration conditions, eligibility criteria, security of status and rights. First, the empirical results demonstrate that the impact of immigration policy congruence on political trust is substantively negligible. Second, however, the results show that immigration policy congruence affects the political trust of people who very strongly oppose immigration, once very high levels of political information seeking are accounted for.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 The concept of political trust

Political trust can be defined as "citizens' support for political institutions [...] in the face of uncertainty about or vulnerability to the actions of these institutions" (van der Meer 2017b, 1). Objects of support for the political system span from more specific to more abstract (Norris 1999, 2017). Trust in institutions such as parliament, political parties, the legal system and political authorities represent a "middle-range object of support" (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 4). It correlates with trust in individual politicians and with support of the regime principles, but is different from them (Marien 2011, 2017; van der Meer 2017b, 5–6). As it is considered central yardstick for whether a democracy is in good condition (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 740), I concentrate on political trust in institutions.

Drawing from theories and existing empirical research, I view political trust in a rationalist manner as an 'evaluative orientation' (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 740; Hetherington 1998; Mishler and Rose 2001). In that perspective, citizens evaluate political institutions in a given political domain as to whether they act in their interest (Mishler and Rose 2001, 32), and trust is thus relational and situational (Hardin 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000, 476), and rather volatile (van der Meer and Zmerli 2017, 4). To the contrary, 'cultural theories' (e.g., Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris 2011) stress the empirical relevance of interpersonal trust (e.g., Liu and Stolle 2017), and long-lasting cultural changes such as increases in educational levels and postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1999; Norris 2011, 7) for political trust.

Drawing from the evaluative perspective, I argue that political trust results from citizens' evaluations of the extent of 'substantive representation' (Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). Substantive representation is given when the actions of representatives

resemble the substantive or ideological preferences of citizens (Golder and Ferland 2017). As a static type of substantive representation, ‘ideological congruence’ demands that “the actions of the representative are in line with the interests of the represented at a fixed point in time” (Golder and Ferland 2017, 216).⁵⁹ An essential condition for ideological congruence is policy congruence, namely the resemblance of policy content with citizen preferences (Golder and Ferland 2017, 229). Studies show that political trust is greater when government policies are in line with citizens' preferences, as citizens feel more strongly that institutions are acting in their interests. For instance, using objective policy measures, studies find that political trust is greater when integration and multiculturalism policies are more in line with citizens’ ideological preferences related to migration (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016). Other studies find that ideological congruence and how it affects support of the political system also depends on its institutional characteristics (Golder and Stramski 2010; Reher 2015).

Another strand of studies linked to the evaluative perspective argues that political trust results from citizens’ evaluations of the ‘quality of representation’ (Noordzij, De Koster, and Van Der Waal 2021). In that perspective, political trust is explained by evaluations of ‘institutional process’ (e.g., Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012) and ‘institutional performance’. Studies focusing on institutional performance effects traditionally investigate the role of (evaluations of) macro-economic performance (e.g., van der Meer 2017b) and the welfare state (e.g., Kumlin 2014) on political trust, and more recently immigration. Arguing that anti-immigration citizens associate (a growth in) the presence of migrants with bad institutional performance, they find that for this group a rise in migrant stock (Jeannet 2019, 5) and asylum applications (Harteveld et al. 2018) decrease political trust while higher deportation rates increase it (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015).

Yet, this latter approach does not speak to how policies as policy outputs or legal regulations (Knill and Tosun 2011) impact political trust, as it focuses on policy outcomes instead. Therefore, I concentrate instead on policy congruence, as it enables conceptualizing the effects of citizens’ substantive representation by concrete immigration policy outputs on political trust. In that line, political trust increases (decreases) when immigration policy is in line (not in line) with citizens’ preferences.

⁵⁹ The concept of ideological congruence differs from responsiveness. Whereas the former conceptualizes substantive representation as static, the latter conceptualizes it as dynamic (Golder and Ferland 2017, 216).

2.2 Immigration policy congruence and political trust

In terms of underpinning mechanisms, I conceptualize the effect of immigration policy congruence on political trust as an ‘interpretive effect’ (Pierson 1993, 611; see also Ziller and Helbling 2019, 4). The concept is part of policy feedback theory, which asserts that the content of public policy influences mass public opinion and behavior (Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2014). The interpretive effects perspective assumes that policies influence public opinion by providing information and meaning regarding the policies (Pierson 1993). Policies feature as interpretive signals, which influence the public’s “perceptions about what their own interests are and whether their representatives are protecting those” (Pierson 1993, 621).

Building from the above, I argue that immigration policies impact political trust heterogeneously conditional on whether the contents are (in-)congruent with the anti- or pro-immigration preferences of citizens. During the period of this study, the first decade of the 2000s, European countries hosted and received significant numbers of workers, asylum seekers and family members (McLaren 2015, chap. 3; Messina 2007, 3–4; van Mol and de Valk 2016). Immigration issues were salient politically (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Kriesi 2012; Lahav 1997; Messina 2007, 5–6; 9) and publicly (Dennison 2020, 416; Paul and Fitzgerald 2021, 383), thus being of significance for the formation of citizens’ political attitudes.⁶⁰

European citizens also strongly varied in their opinion of whether they were in favor or against more immigration (McLaren 2015, chap. 3). But given that immigration policy across European countries has systematically become more liberal in past decades (Helbling and Kalkum 2017) despite public demands for restrictions, there is most potential for decreased political trust among the opponents of immigration. A central reason for the liberalization trend is that, as presumed by the ‘liberal paradox’, liberal democracies must reconcile demands of the public for restrictions with external demands for liberalizations resulting from well-organized capitalist interests and constitutionalism when designing immigration policy (Hampshire 2013, chap. 3). It ties in with the idea that democratic governments must balance ‘representation’ and ‘responsibility’ in order to govern legitimately (Mair 2009, 10–12). From this follows that whereas responsible (i.e., more liberal) immigration policy is likely to be evaluated by anti-immigration citizens as unrepresentative of their interests and preferences, it

⁶⁰ During the first decade of the 2000s, cultural issues such as immigration challenged the political salience of economic issues (Kriesi 2012; Kriesi et al. 2006). Public and media attention was focused on the perceived failure of integration policies to integrate former migrant workers and their families, leading to salient discussions about the introduction of selective immigration policies (Doomernik et al. 2009) and stricter controls for undocumented migrants (van Mol and de Valk 2016).

is likely to be evaluated by pro-immigration citizens as representative, thereby impacting the political trust of these groups heterogeneously.

Citizens who are anti-immigration view national membership to be based on shared ethnicity and culture (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Heath and Tilley 2005, 128). Therefore, anti-immigration citizens view immigration as a threat to the cultural identity of their country (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) and their own exclusive status in its political community (McLaren 2011). Thus, they will interpret liberal and thus ‘responsible’ immigration policies as ‘unrepresentative’ of their immigration policy preferences. Their political trust is expected to decrease if they feel that the immigration policy adopted by politicians and institutions mismatches their interest in the preservation of the country’s cultural identity (cf., McLaren 2015, chap. 4). To the contrary, restrictive policies that are viewed to alleviate the perceived threat from immigration signal to anti-immigration citizens that institutions and politicians are acting on their behalf. Thus, immigration policy interpreted as restrictive and therefore less ‘responsible’ is expected to increase political trust. Consequently, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H1a: Restrictive immigration policies will increase the political trust of people who oppose immigration, while liberal immigration policies will decrease it.

In contrast, people who are pro-immigration define national membership as based on shared political principles rather than shared ethnicity or culture (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014, 5; Wright 2011, 838). Membership in the national community is thus viewed to be achieved by attaining citizenship, learning the country’s language, and respecting the law (Heath and Tilley 2005, 122). People supporting immigration therefore likely interpret a liberal or ‘responsible’ immigration policy to be in line with their ideological profile, and to thus be ‘representative’ of their views. These policies may include, for instance, measures to facilitate admission of unskilled labor migrants and to grant asylum seekers the right to work. In contrast, restrictive immigration policies may be rejected as making it too difficult for foreigners to achieve membership. Thus, citizens who support immigration may interpret from liberal immigration policies that political authorities and institutions are substantively representing their ideological preferences, and from the enactment of restrictive policies that they are not, thus increasing and decreasing their political trust, respectively. I therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis H1b: Restrictive immigration policies will decrease the political trust of people who support immigration, while liberal immigration policies will increase it.

2.3 Political information seeking

Empirical studies investigating policy effects on citizens' attitudes presume that people have some knowledge about the policies (Ziller and Helbling 2019, 5). This assumption is questionable because knowledge of which policies have been passed or amended in the country varies strongly across citizens (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016). A condition for immigration policy effects to occur on political trust is therefore that people have some information about them (see Campbell 2012; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 176).

Studies suggest that active *seeking of political information* is associated with knowledge of public policy (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 176). In this vein, self-exposure to political information via the media has been identified to trigger knowledge about policies (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Vettehen, Hagemann, and Van Snippenburg 2004). News media such as newspapers, radio and television do so by informing about public policies and by making them more intelligible (Campbell 2012, 345–46). Besides news exposure, political interest is associated with seeking of political information (e.g., Fraile and Iyengar 2014, 281; Luskin 1990). It motivates people to learn about a wide range of political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 175; Galston 2001, 222), and it makes them more attentive to the policy positions of political authorities (Otjes 2018, 648; De Vries and Giger 2014).

In this vein, I assume that seeking of political information conditions the immigration policy feedback process on political trust, as it should make the contents of the policies more visible to the public and more traceable to the actions of politicians and institutions (see Ziller and Helbling 2019, 5). It allows people to better compare their own policy positions to those of authorities, to identify (in-)congruencies and to reward or punish them accordingly (see Pierson 1993, 622). In support of these arguments, a study finds that a more visible welfare state enables voters to better compare their own positions with those of political parties (Gingrich 2014, 566). Other studies show that political interest moderates the effect of policy distance on democratic satisfaction (Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), and that knowledge about antidiscrimination policy (Ziller and Helbling 2019) and institutional performance (Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010) affects political trust. Based on these considerations, I expect the following:

Hypothesis H2: The moderation effect of immigration attitudes on the association between immigration policy and political trust is stronger the higher the degree of political information seeking.

3 Data, measures and method

3.1 Measure of immigration policy

To cover national and over-time variation in immigration policy, I use data from the Immigration policy in Comparison dataset (IMPIC; Helbling et al. 2017). The IMPIC measures policy outputs (i.e., the concrete laws and legal regulations instead of their implementation or resulting outcomes) for the years 1980 to 2010 for 33 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It captures regulations pertaining to the policy areas of labor migration, refugee and asylum policy, family reunification, and co-ethnics (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2607–8).

For each policy area, the index measures the restrictiveness of eligibility criteria and entry conditions, which determine how hard it is for an immigrant to become a legal resident in a country. Furthermore, the index captures the security of status and the rights that come with a specific entry permit, determining for instance length of stay and employment access. The index also captures the extent of enforcement of these regulations through the control of irregular immigration (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2607–8).

To create the IMPIC dataset, legal experts provided information on concrete legal regulations by answering a questionnaire. On that basis, the IMPIC team coded the restrictiveness of these regulations. All resulting items on regulations map the level of restrictiveness of concrete legal regulations (Helbling et al. 2017, 86–90). They can vary between 0 (liberal) and 1 (restrictive). The fact that the index measures restrictiveness as opposed to policy changes guarantees comparability over time and between countries (Helbling et al. 2017, 88).

All these individual items were aggregated to retrieve comprehensive measures for the restrictiveness of the different policy areas (Helbling et al. 2017, 90–92). To ensure the comparability between the different policy areas, the mere existence of a specific law is fixed at the value of 0.5 (Helbling et al. 2017, 89). Schmid and Helbling (2016) find that the policy areas of labor migration, family reunification, and refugees and asylum form a unique and

coherent dimension, while the policy areas co-ethnicity and control of irregular immigration constitute a separate dimension each (Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2608).

Based on these findings, I use a single comprehensive indicator that is the mean score of the above described restrictiveness measures for the three policy areas of labor migration, family reunification, and asylum and refugees. These areas are the main legal channels of immigration (e.g., Messina 2007). Regulations targeting co-ethnic migrants are excluded because it concerns a special category of immigrants existing in only few countries (for a similar approach see Helbling, Simon, and Schmid 2020, 2608). Moreover, because immigration control does not concern immigration regulations but their enforcement, it is not relevant for testing my argument. In Table 56 in Appendix 2 I list all regulations that constitute the comprehensive index that I use.

The index ranges from 0.19 to 0.80, with a mean value of 0.33, indicating that immigration policy among the country sample and the selected time period (i.e., 23 countries, period 2002-2010) is liberal on average (see Table 54 for an overview of the variable). Because the index is skewed (see Figure 8 in Appendix 2), I divided the variable into quartiles to better capture the relevant information towards the lower end of the scale (the 1st quartile being the quartile with the most liberal immigration policy values, and the 4th quartile being the quartile with the most restrictive immigration policy values).

3.2 Individual level data

Individual level data is retrieved from waves 1-5 (2002-2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS data are collected biannually in lengthy face-to-face interviews in the language of the respective country.

I only include respondents who possess the legal citizenship of the country at the time of the interview in my sample. I do so because my argument is about interpretive effects of immigration policy on people who are not the target group of immigration policy, namely legal citizens. After including legal citizens only, the overlap of the IMPIC with the ESS allows me to cover a sample of 182,276 individuals across 23 European countries and five years (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Table 55 provides an overview of the sample.

The outcome variable is political trust, which I measure with items on how much trust the respondents have in their country's politicians and parliament. The items range from 0 ('no trust at all') to 10 ('complete trust'), and I calculated the mean score on both items (scale

reliability: Cronbach’s alpha = 0,84). The resulting political trust index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more political trust.

To capture immigration attitudes as moderator, I estimate the respondents’ mean score on six items. Three relate to what extent respondents agree that immigrants with the same race/ethnicity, a different race/ethnicity, or immigrants from poorer countries should be allowed to live in the country (4-point scale each, ranging from 1 ‘allow many’ to 4 ‘allow none’). Three other items refer to what extent respondents think that immigration is bad/good for the country’s economy, undermines/enriches the country’s cultural life, and whether it makes the country a better/worse place to live (11-point scale each, ranging from 0 to 10). To ease interpretation, the resulting immigration attitude index was transformed to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating a stronger anti-immigration attitude.

To measure political information seeking as additional moderator I include two separate indicators. The first is the respondents’ level of political interest (4-point scale, ranging from 1 ‘very interested’ to 4 ‘not at all interested’). Political interest is taken to account for seeking political information as it indicates the extent to which a person is self-motivated to learn about general issues of political relevance (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 175; Fraile and Iyengar 2014, 282; Galston 2001, 222). The second indicator is political news exposure, i.e., the amount of time a person spends seeking information about news/politics and current affairs, which is gauged by measuring the respondents’ mean scores on three items. These items are the amount of time a person spends an average weekday on watching the tv, listening to the radio, and reading the newspaper to receive information about news/politics/current affairs (8-point scale each, ranging from 0 ‘no time at all’ to 7 ‘more than 3 hours’). Exposure to political news has been found to predict political knowledge (Vettehen, Hagemann, and Van Snippenburg 2004).

Summary statistics on the outcome variable and the moderator variables are presented in Table 54 and Appendix 2 Table 58 to Table 60, and question wordings are shown in Appendix 2 Table 57.

Table 54: Summary statistics of policy indicator, outcome variable and moderators

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min / Max</i>	<i>N</i>
Immigration policy (country-level indicator)	0.33	0.12	0.19 / 0.80	99 (country-years)
Political trust	4.12	2.23	0 / 10	176,372
Immigration attitudes	0.49	0.21	0 / 1	162,415
Political interest	2.38	0.90	1 / 4	181,864
Political news exposure	1.65	0.87	0 / 7	108,160

Table 55: Overview of the sample used in the multivariate analyses

Country	ESS rounds					Freq. of respondents
Austria	1	2	3			6,665
Belgium	1	2	3	4	5	8,452
Switzerland	1	2	3	4	5	8,078
Czech Republic	1	2		4	5	8,720
Germany	1	2	3	4	5	13,902
Denmark	1	2	3	4	5	7,465
Estonia		2	3	4	5	5,782
Spain	1	2	3	4	5	9,145
Finland	1	2	3	4	5	9,861
France	1	2	3	4	5	8,784
Great Britain	1	2	3	4	5	10,699
Greece	1	2		4	5	9,229
Hungary	1	2	3	4	5	7,780
Ireland	1	2	3	4	5	9,723
Iceland		2				570
Italy	1	2				2,728
Luxembourg	1	2				2,212
Netherlands	1	2	3	4	5	9,494
Norway	1	2	3	4	5	8,266
Poland	1	2	3	4	5	8,903
Portugal	1	2	3	4	5	10,012
Sweden	1	2	3	4	5	8,896
Slovakia		2	3	4	5	6,910
Total	23 countries / max. 5 waves					182,276

3.3 Statistical models

Five years of the ESS [2002-2010] were merged with the IMPIC data [2001-2009]. More precisely, ESS data from the respective survey-year was matched with IMPIC data from one year prior to the survey-year. For instance, ESS data from 2002 was matched with IMPIC data from 2001 and ESS data from 2004 was matched with IMPIC data from 2003, and so on. By matching ESS survey-year data with IMPIC data from one year prior to the survey-year, I intend to prevent potential reverse causality, namely that political trust may impact the degree of immigration policy restrictiveness.

The structure of the data is time-series cross-sectional. To deal with this data structure I estimate multilevel regression models, as recommended by Gelman and Hill (2009, 246). In order to account for clustering in the data and for correct estimation of the standard errors, I follow Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother's (2016) advice to include random effects at all contextual levels. I adopt their recommendation to apply a statistical modelling technique, in

which country-years are cross-classified within countries and years, and individuals are nested in country-years. According to the authors, this technique results in a full model that principally accounts for all potential statistical dependencies and contains a level for every type of variable (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016, 25–26).

In a range of multilevel models, my arguments on the relationship between immigration policy congruence and political trust and on the moderating role of political information seeking are tested. All of my multilevel models incorporate a full set of control factors at individual and contextual level. Individual level controls consist of a standard series of factors, which have been identified in other studies to influence political trust. These are the respondents' years of age, gender, years of education, area of living, employment status, migration status, political ideology, and feeling about the household's income (e.g., de Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Ziller and Helbling 2019).⁶¹ See Table 58 to Table 60 in Appendix 2 for summary statistics on all individual-level control variables. At contextual level, all models incorporate time-varying factors on the respective country's gross domestic product per capita (in current US\$), unemployment rate (in percent of total labor force) and foreign-born population (as a percentage of the population), which all may exert a direct impact on the respondents' political trust levels. With exception of the variable for the foreign-born population, all of these contextual control variables are matched with ESS data at the year of the survey. In order to avoid potential reverse causality of political trust on the share of the foreign-born population, this variable was lagged by one year. See Appendix 2 Table 61 for summary statistics on all country-level control variables and Appendix 2 Table 62 for sources.

In summary, all of the multilevel models incorporate a full set of individual level and contextual level control variables and random effects in order to account for clustering in the data. Also, for the reason mentioned above, only legal citizens of the respective country are included in the sample of the models.

In a first multilevel model, the average effect of the immigration policy indicator on political trust is tested. In addition to individual-level and country-level controls, it incorporates the immigration policy indicator, the variable for the respondents' immigration attitudes, but

⁶¹ Details on the coding of the individual-level control variables: years of age (i.e., the respondents' age in years), gender (male=0; female=1), years of education (i.e., years of full-time education completed), area of living (small/middle town=0; Rural area or village=1; Large town=2), employment status (employed=0; unemployed=1), migration status (0= native born with native background; 1=second-generation immigrants; 2=first-generation immigrants), political ideology (11-point scale, ranging from 0 'left' to 10 'right'), and feeling about one's household's income (4-point scale, ranging from 1 'living comfortably on present income' to 4 'very difficult on present income').

no interaction terms. The size of the variance inflation factor does not indicate multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Furthermore, a random slope for the respondents' immigration attitudes is included. It allows the effect of the respondents' immigration attitudes to vary across country-years. In so doing, this model accounts, for example, for the possibility that there is a strong negative relationship between immigration attitudes and political trust in countries with a rapid increase of the share of immigrants or the unemployment rate. A likelihood-ratio test confirms that the model is improved by the inclusion of the random slope.

Second, I interact the immigration policy indicator with immigration attitudes (i.e., 2-way interaction) to test my main argument about the extent to which the degree of congruence of immigration policy outputs affects political trust. Again, a full set of individual and contextual level controls, and a random slope for immigration attitudes are included.

Third, I interact the immigration policy indicator with immigration attitudes and with variables capturing individual political information seeking (i.e., 3-way interactions). This way, I can test whether immigration policy congruence effects on political trust are particularly pronounced among individuals with pro-/anti-immigration attitudes who also exhibit high levels of political information seeking. In other words, this allows me to investigate to what extent the seeking of political information influences the degree to which immigration attitudes moderate the effect of immigration policy on political trust. To do so, I estimate two specific 3-way interactions, which each include (in addition to the immigration policy and immigration attitude measures) either political interest or political news exposure, which serve as indicators for political information seeking (see discussion in Section 3.2). To prevent multicollinearity, only one interaction term is included at a time. In addition to the full set of individual and contextual level controls and a random slope for immigration attitudes, I also include random slopes for political interest and political news exposure, respectively, in the corresponding regressions. It allows the effect of the respondents' political interest and political news exposure to vary across country-years. In so doing, the models account, for example, for the possibility that there is a strong negative relationship between political interest or media exposure, respectively, with political trust in countries with a rapid increase of the share of immigrants. A likelihood-ratio test confirms that the models are improved by their inclusion.

Because I have little interest in the control variables, I only discuss the coefficient estimate of the policy indicator, and the interaction terms graphically. Full model details are available in the appendix. Furthermore, to ease interpretation of the regression models, all dummy variables are set to zero, and all interval-scaled individual-level independent variables

are centered at the total grand mean. Thus, the individual manifestations of the interval-scaled individual-level independent variables indicate the deviations from the total mean value.

4 Results

What is the impact of the congruence of government immigration policy with peoples' immigration preferences on their level of trust in political institutions? As a first step to answering the question, regression Model 1 incorporates the immigration policy measure, the immigration attitude measure and all control factors, but no interaction terms (see Appendix 2 Table 63 for full regression outputs). The model predicts that the average level of political trust of a regular citizen is 3.8 on a 0-10 scale.⁶² Moreover, the model shows that the level of restrictiveness of government immigration policy outputs alone does not affect the level of political trust of an average citizen to a statistically and substantively significant extent.

How does the degree of congruence of immigration policy with citizens' immigration preferences impact their political trust (i.e., hypotheses H1a and H1b)? To answer this question, Model 2 incorporates, in addition to the control factors, a term for the 2-way cross-level interaction between immigration policy and immigration attitudes (see Table 63 for full regression outputs). The interaction term is statistically significant. Figure 6 presents the substantive meaning of the interaction, using the estimates from Model 2. It illustrates the degree to which a person's attitude to immigration moderates the association between government immigration policy outputs and her political trust. In the figure, pro-immigration attitudes are fixed at 2 standard deviations below the mean value and anti-immigration attitudes at 2 standard deviations above the mean value. Recall that the immigration policy indicator is divided into quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values.

⁶² Recall that due to centering the continuous individual-level variables at the total grand-mean and setting the individual-level dummy variables to zero, the constant in all regression models represents the average level of political trust for a citizen that is 47 years of age, male, has 12 years of education, lives in a small/middle town, is employed, is native born with native background, has an on average political ideology (5.1 on a scale ranging from 0 'left' to 10 'right'), on average immigration attitudes (0.5 on a scale ranging from 0 to 1), and an on average feeling about her household's income (1.99 on a scale ranging from 1 'living comfortably on present income' to 4 'very difficult on present income').




Figure 6: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration attitudes on political trust (2-way interaction)

Note. Shows the predicted effect of immigration policy on political trust at pro-immigration attitudes (=black line) and anti-immigration attitudes (=gray line), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model 2 in Appendix 2 Table 63. Immigration policy restrictiveness on x-axis divided into four quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values. Pro- and anti-immigration attitudes fixed at 2SDs below and above the mean, respectively.

Looking at Figure 6, whereas the line for anti-immigration attitudes (=gray line) is upward sloping, the line for pro-immigration attitudes is downward sloping (=black line). The figure reveals that for immigration opponents restrictive immigration policies are associated with higher political trust and liberal immigration policies with lower political trust, while the opposite applies to immigration supporters. Whereas the former finding is in line with what related studies found (Jeannet 2019; McLaren 2011; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015), the latter is more novel. Both effects correspond to what I assumed in hypotheses H1a and H1b, respectively. Nevertheless, both slopes are not steep: For people who oppose (support) immigration, a change from the most liberal to the most restrictive immigration policy increases (decreases) political trust by only 0.29 points (0.27 points) on an 11-point scale. Therefore, the effects are substantively negligible and support the hypotheses insufficiently. Thus, the congruence of government immigration policy with the interests of citizens with pro- or anti-immigration attitudes does not substantively impact the level of political trust of these groups.

Turning to hypothesis H2, to what extent does the impact of the interaction between immigration policy and immigration attitudes on political trust vary by the degree of individual political information seeking? For that purpose, Models 3-4 incorporate each a coefficient for the 3-way cross-level interaction between immigration policy, immigration attitudes and one of the two indicators for political information seeking (i.e., political interest and political news exposure, respectively; see Appendix 2 Table 64 for full regression outputs). Graphical interpretations of these 3-way interactions show that the interaction including political news exposure is substantively meaningful whereas the interaction incorporating political interest is not. For that reason, only the graph for the former is presented in the following (see Figure 7 below), while a graph for the latter can be viewed in Appendix 2 (i.e., Appendix 2 Figure 9).

Figure 7 presents the substantive meaning of the interaction, using the estimates from Model 4. It illustrates how political news exposure conditions the moderation effect of immigration attitudes on the association between immigration policy and political trust. For Figure 7, a low level of political news exposure is fixed to 0 ('No time at all') and a high level to 7 ('More than 3 hours') of the 0-7 scale.




Figure 7: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration attitudes & political news exposure on political trust (3-way interaction)

Note. Shows the predicted effect of immigration policy on political trust at pro-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political news exposure, and at anti-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political news exposure, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model 4 in Appendix 2 Table 64. Immigration policy restrictiveness on x-axis divided into four quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values. Pro- and anti-immigration attitudes fixed at 2SDs below and above the mean, respectively. Low level of political news exposure to 0 and high level of political news consumption to 7 of the 0-7 scale.

The lines for the combination of pro-immigration attitudes with either low (=circle symbol) or high levels (=square symbol) of political news exposure are both only weakly downward sloping, and the line for the combination between anti-immigration attitudes and low levels of political information seeking (=diamonds symbol) is leveled. However, the line for the combination of anti-immigration attitudes with high levels of political news exposure (=triangle symbol) is upward sloping to a substantive extent. This means that for people with strong anti-immigration attitudes and a high degree of exposure to political news, a change from liberal to restrictive immigration policy increases political trust by a meaningful 1.3 points. Thus, while political information seeking moderates the conditional effect of anti-immigration attitudes on political trust, this is not the case for pro-immigration attitudes. This corroborates hypothesis H2, but only for respondents with anti-immigration attitudes.

On a more cautionary note, however, this substantively large effect only prevails when the policy knowledge proxy is set to its extremes, and the immigration attitude variable as well (i.e., +/- 2 SDs). The substantial effect becomes much smaller when a high level of news exposure is set to 3 ('More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours') instead of 7 ('More than 3 hours'), the former still being a considerable amount of political news consumption for an average weekday. Then the increase in political trust for people with anti-immigrant attitudes is only 0.55 points, which is not substantively different from the effect shown in Figure 6, where the respondents' political information seeking behavior is unaccounted for (Figure 10 in Appendix 2).

In summary, the results reveal that immigration policy (in-)congruence (decreases) increases political trust, but only for people with very strong anti-immigration views and a very high degree of political news exposure, representing only a small segment of society.

5 Robustness

I test the stability of the results presented in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Appendix 2 Figure 9 with a series of robustness tests and additional controls (see Table 65 to Table 71 in Appendix 2 for the model output; graphical interpretations not shown).

The first goal of these analyses is to ascertain whether the effects are robust across different dimensions of immigration policies (i.e., external and internal)⁶³ and immigration policy areas (i.e., family reunification policies, labor migration policies and asylum policies). Then, the second goal is to find out whether the results of the study remain the same when also legal citizens with immigration background are included. Finally, in order to test the sensitivity of the results, I run models without country-level controls and then successively add them (i.e., first the foreign born population, then gross-domestic product per capita, and then the unemployment rate). Lastly, but exclusively for the 3-way interactions in which the composite indicator for political news exposure is used, I test whether the results remain robust when radio listening is excluded from the indicator. This is because the latter may reflect the individual's

⁶³ For an explanation of the meaning of these indicators see Section 3.1 and Table 56. Moreover, all alternative indicators were lagged by one year and, because they are also right-skewed, were divided into quartiles.

age (with older respondents tending to have higher levels of radio consumption) rather than political information seeking.

The results from Figure 6 (i.e., 2-way interaction) remain robust in these alternative models: When graphically examined the substantively minor interaction effect between immigration policies and immigration attitudes on political trust remains, with small variations, the same. This is the case when alternative immigration policy indicators are used (see Appendix 2 Table 65), when all legal citizens are included in the models (see Appendix 2 Table 66), and when country-level controls are included in the models consecutively (see Appendix 2 Table 67).

The findings for the 3-way interactions with the political information seeking indicators from Appendix 2 Figure 9 (i.e., political interest) and Figure 7 (i.e., political news exposure) also remain robust in these alternative models. To start with, the 3-way interaction effect including political interest remains substantively insignificant in all alternative specifications (Table 69 to Table 71 in Appendix 2). The 3-way interaction effect including political news exposure is mostly confirmed in the alternative analyses. First, disaggregated analyses show that the interaction effect remains substantively large with most but not all of the alternative immigration policy indicators: They indicate that policy effects are more attributable to internal immigration policy, labor migration policy and asylum policy, but less to external immigration policy, and family reunification policy (see Appendix 2 Table 69). Second, the effects remain robust with minor variations when all citizens are included (Appendix 2 Table 70), and also third, when country-level controls are included in the models consecutively (see Appendix 2 Table 71). Fourth, when radio listening is excluded from the political information seeking composite indicator, the effect size becomes substantively a little smaller but remains robust (see Table 68 and Figure 11 in Appendix 2).

6 Discussion and conclusion

That citizens' substantive interests and preferences are in line with the policies enacted by government is a key element of democratic representation (Pitkin 1967). Yet, the contexts in which governments govern are changing, forcing governments to sometimes prioritize 'responsibility' over 'representation' (Mair 2009). This pertains particularly to the issue of immigration policy, where external pressures arising from constitutionalism and international

interdependencies urge governments to liberalize immigration policies, thus systematically neglecting public demands for restrictions (e.g., Hampshire 2013).

Starting from the assumptions that political trust in institutions is a crucial yardstick for the political well-being of a democracy and that it is influenced by citizens' evaluations of substantive representation, this contribution sought answering the question to what extent political trust is impacted by the extent to which immigration policies in a country are in line with citizens' preferences. Answering this question is highly instructive for our understanding of how immigration policies impact citizens' political trust in a political context in which it becomes more difficult for governments to represent (Armingeon and Lutz 2019; Mair 2009).

I have argued that immigration policy impacts political trust through citizens' perceptions of (in-)congruence and that citizens' efforts to seek political information strengthen this effect.

In this study, I have shown that, first, immigration policy has no substantive effect on political trust, neither for opponents nor for supporters of immigration. But I find, secondly, that immigration policies impact the political trust of people who are highly anti-immigration and at the same time very strongly seeking political information. For them, liberal (restrictive) immigration policy reduces (increases) political trust substantively. This finding adds important evidence to the literature that investigates how migrant policies and immigration impact political trust (e.g., Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Jeannet 2019).

I conclude that immigration policy congruence does impact political trust but that it is limited in scope to a small segment of society who is very strongly anti-immigration and also very well politically informed (i.e., rejection of Hypotheses H1a and H1b; partial support for Hypothesis H2). As this amounts to a small part of the population, I suggest that the effect of the congruence between government immigration policy outputs and citizens' preferences on political trust is moderate at best.

Overall, when viewed from the angle of the broader literature, immigration policy congruence plays a rather limited role when it comes to political trust.

This finding on policy effects stands in contrast to studies that find effects of immigration policy outcomes, that is asylum applications and deportation rates, on political trust (Harteveld et al. 2018; Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle 2015). But it is also more in line with Jeannet (2019), who finds a moderate effect of countries' migrant stock on political trust. All in all, it appears that legal regulations are less visible and traceable to the public than their outcomes, thus having a comparably smaller effect on political trust. The results of my study

are also at odds with my assumption (see Introduction) that immigration policies impact political trust more strongly than migrant policies (i.e., integration and multiculturalism policies). But this question cannot be conclusively resolved because the existing studies which find that migrant policies affect political trust do only investigate the indirect moderating role of these policies (Citrin, Levy, and Wright 2014; Hooghe and de Vroome 2015; McLaren 2016).

Second, the findings show that immigration policy congruence affects the political trust of immigration opponents but not of proponents. These findings are in line with Hartevelde et al. (2018, 173–74), who have similar results for the effects of the number of asylum applications on political trust. My finding is also in line with the ‘liberal paradox’ (e.g., Hampshire 2013), based on which I expected a stronger impact on the political trust of immigration opponents compared to proponents (see Section 2.2).

Third, the findings put in perspective the assumption that a lack of substantive representation on immigration is detrimental for liberal representative democracy (e.g., Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013). The evidence presented here implies that ‘responsible’ immigration policies (Armingeon and Lutz 2019) that are not in line with the demands of citizens favoring restrictions, do not substantively reduce institutional trust – at least not at individual level and in short term.

Fourth, the results of this contribution do not generally question the relevance of objective indicators of policy outputs or government performance vis-à-vis subjective indicators as determinants of political trust (see for discussions Kumlin 2014; van der Meer 2017b). This study included political information seeking indicators, that have been found in previous studies to correlate with policy knowledge (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and/or to moderate congruence effects on political support (Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016), as moderating variables. Thus, the moderate policy effect found in my study may indicate the actual limited relevance of *immigration policy* outputs for citizen political trust – rather than questioning the role of objective measures per se.

While this study helps to understand more how immigration policy (outputs) impact(s) political trust in institutions, it also has some limitations. First, a frequent limitation of research examining policy effects is that it studies the effects of strongly aggregated indicators. Finding moderate effects with an objective indicator does not exclude that subjective indicators cannot have more substantive effects (e.g., van der Meer 2017a). Second, the study is limited due to the fact that the timespan of the immigration policy data that is used is limited until 2010, where immigration was less salient compared to 2015, the start of the so-called ‘European refugee

policy crisis', and after. Third, the study implicitly assumes that the respondents consider the issue of immigration important, which is a condition for immigration policy (in-)congruence to influence their political trust. In that regard, it is a limitation of the study that it cannot explicitly measure subjective issue salience and that the relative influence of immigration policy in comparison to other public policies cannot be gauged. Thus, salience is an untested assumption and the results are therefore also context-specific and cannot be readily applied to other time periods. Lastly, the political information seeking indicator that is used does not contain information about certain news outlets or social media use, which may play a more specific role in interpretive policy effects on political trust.

Besides dealing with these problems of measurement, prospective studies could investigate under which conditions immigration policies may impact political trust more substantively. These could be for instance the increased salience of certain policy areas or specific policies. Moreover, it is also possible that the impact on trust is larger if policies do not reach promised goals (Czaika and de Haas 2013) or when politicians are perceived to talk tough on immigration but act weakly on it (Lutz 2021). We also need to explore whether immigration policy effects on political trust are more negative if there is already a low repertoire of political trust at country level.

It becomes clear that the salient discussions on the relationship between immigration (policy) and democracy require more rigorous empirical research.

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
Appendix 2

Table 56: Items of the IMPIC immigration policy data

		Policy areas		
		Family reunification	Labor migration	Asylum and refugees
External	Eligibility	Residence requirements Family members Age limits Quotas family reunification	Targeting Quotas labor Age limits Young age beneficial	Existence of subsidiary/ humanitarian protection Nationality Quotas asylum Safe third country Safe countries of origin Resettlement agreements
	Conditions	Financial requirements Accommodation requirements Language skills Application fees	Specific income per month Specific financial funds Language skills Application fee Job offer Equal work conditions List of occupations Labor market tests	Place of application
Internal	Security of status	Residence permit validity Autonomous residence permit	Work permit validity Renewal of permit Transition temporary permanent Loss of employment	Permit validity Permit renewal Permanent permit Right to appeal Status when crisis resolved
	Rights associated	(Self)employment	Flexibility of permit	Free movement (Self)employment Form of benefits

Note. In addition to differentiating between different areas of immigration policy, the Immigration Policy in Comparison Index also allows to distinguish between policies that regulate immigration either at the border or within the country (i.e., external and internal regulations, respectively). Whereas external regulations cover the conditions and entry criteria, internal regulations determine the length of time immigrants are allowed to stay and the rights they are granted on the basis of their permit. For more details and codebook see *Bjerre, Liv, Marc Helbling, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel. 2016. "The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset: Technical Report." WZB Discussion Paper: 1–196.*

Figure 8: Distribution of immigration policy variable⁶⁴



Note: Figure shows the distribution of the immigration policy indicator at country-level, lower numbers indicating more liberal policies, and higher numbers more restrictive policies.

Table 57: Question wordings of main dependent and independent variables (continues on next page)

Variable names	Question wordings	Answers
<i>Political trust</i>	Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: ... [country]'s parliament? ... politicians?	No trust at all (0) to complete trust (10)
<i>Immigration attitudes</i>	Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here?	Allow many to come and live here (1) Allow some (2) Allow a few (3) Allow none (4)
	How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? Still use this card.	Allow many to come and live here (1) Allow some (2) Allow a few (3) Allow none (4)
	How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Use the same card.	Allow many to come and live here (1) Allow some (2) Allow a few (3) Allow none (4)
	Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come	Bad for the economy (0) to good for the economy (10)

⁶⁴ Figure was created using Stata plugin "plotplain" by Bischof (2017).

to live here from other countries? Please use this card.

Cultural life undermined (0) to cultural life enriched (10)

And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

Worse place to live (0) to better place to live (10)

Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Please use this card.

Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics – are you...	Very interested (1), quite interested (2), hardly interested (3), not at all interested (4)
TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday	And on an average weekday how much of your time watching television is generally spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs?	No time at all (0), Less than 0,5 hour (1), 0,5 hour to 1 hour (2), More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours (3), More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours (4), More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours (5), More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours (6), More than 3 hours (7)
Radio listening, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday	And again on an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio is generally spent listening to news or programmes about politics and current affairs?	No time at all (0), Less than 0,5 hour (1), 0,5 hour to 1 hour (2), More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours (3), More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours (4), More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours (5), More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours (6), More than 3 hours (7)
Newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday	And how much of this time is spent reading about politics and current affairs?	No time at all (0), Less than 0,5 hour (1), 0,5 hour to 1 hour (2), More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours (3), More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours (4), More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours (5), More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours (6), More than 3 hours (7)

Table 58: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (dummies)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
Gender			
0 Male	84,919	46.64	46.64
1 Female	97,163	53.36	100.00
<i>Total</i>	182,082	100.00	
Living area			
0 Small/middle town	79,846	43.93	43.93
1 Rural area or village	68,820	37.86	81.79
2 Large town	33,109	18.21	100.00
<i>Total</i>	181,775	100.00	
Unemployed			
0 Employed	171,978	94.35	94.35
1 Unemployed	10,298	5.65	100.00
<i>Total</i>	182,276	100.00	
Migration status			
0 Native born with native background	161,269	88.94	88.94
1 Second-generation immigrants	11,653	6.43	95.36
2 First-generation immigrants	8,406	4.64	100.00
<i>Total</i>	181,328	100.00	

Table 59: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (numerical)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Immigration attitudes	162,415	0.4875936	0.209717	0	1
Age	181,405	47.77948	18.53984	14	123
Years of education	180,241	12.07683	4.112003	0	56
Political ideology	160,985	5.101742	2.11678	0	10
Political interest	181,864	2.385981	0.8974997	1	4
Political news exposure	108,160	1.653122	0.8727531	0	7

Table 60: Summary statistics of individual-level independent variables (categorical) (continued on next page)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Cum.</i>
TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday			
0 No time at all	11,463	6.50	6.50
1 Less than 0,5 hour	56,296	31.92	38.42
2 0,5 hour to 1 hour	67,925	38.52	76.94
3 More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours	22,806	12.93	89.87
4 More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours	9,782	5.55	95.42
5 More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours	3,811	2.16	97.58
6 More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours	2,025	1.15	98.73
7 More than 3 hours	2,246	1.27	100.00
<i>Total</i>	176,354	100.00	
Radio listening, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday			
0 No time at all	24,763	17.16	17.16
1 Less than 0,5 hour	62,622	43.39	60.55
2 0,5 hour to 1 hour	32,641	22.62	83.16
3 More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours	10,549	7.31	90.47
4 More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours	5,400	3.74	94.21
5 More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours	2,576	1.78	96.00
6 More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours	1,782	1.23	97.23
7 More than 3 hours	3,992	2.77	100.00
<i>Total</i>	144,325	100.00	
Newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average weekday			
0 No time at all	17,754	13.33	13.33
1 Less than 0,5 hour	81,327	61.07	74.41
2 0,5 hour to 1 hour	26,244	19.71	94.11
3 More than 1 hour, up to 1,5 hours	4,980	3.74	97.85
4 More than 1,5 hours, up to 2 hours	1,626	1.22	99.07
5 More than 2 hours, up to 2,5 hours	570	0.43	99.50
6 More than 2,5 hours, up to 3 hours	298	0.22	99.73
7 More than 3 hours	365	0.27	100.00
<i>Total</i>	133,164	100.00	
Feeling household income			
1 Living comfortably on present income	54,407	30.73	30.73
2 Coping on present income	81,950	46.28	77.01
3 Difficult on present income	30,544	17.25	94.26
4 Very difficult on present income	10,170	5.74	100.00
<i>Total</i>	177,071	100.00	
Political interest			
1 Very interested	18,896	10.39	10.39
2 Quite interested	65,203	35.85	46.24

3 Hardly interested	64,966	35.72	81.97
4 Not at all interested	32,799	18.03	100.00
<i>Total</i>	181,864	100.00	

Table 61: Summary statistics of country-level independent variables (numerical)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
GDP per capita	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	35307.74	18985.15	5196.933	96880.51
Percentage unemployment	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	7.66	3.8	2.5	19.9
Percentage foreignborn	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	10.48	6.26	2	35.013
Immigration policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.33	0.12	0.19	0.80
External immigration policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.31	0.12	0.14	0.79
Internal immigration policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.35	0.13	0.15	0.82
Family reunification policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.28	0.24	0.02	1
Labor migration policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.41	0.13	0.21	1
Asylum policy	99 (<i>country-years</i>)	0.3	0.08	0.14	0.48

Table 62: Sources of country-level variables

Variable name	Source(s)	Comments
Percentage foreignborn	OECD live data: https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm	Missing data was replaced with data from succeeding years and, if these were not available, from previous years.
GDP per capita	Retrieved from Quality of Government (QoG) OECD time-series dataset Jan 2018: https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogoecddata	-
Percentage unemployment	Retrieved from Quality of Government (QoG) OECD time-series dataset Jan 2018: https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogoecddata	-
Immigration policy, external immigration policy, internal immigration policy, family reunification policy, labor migration policy, asylum policy, control policy	Retrieved from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset http://www.impic-project.eu/data/	-

Table 63: Main regression models: Immigration policy indicator only, and 2-way interaction (continued on next page)

	DV: Political trust	
	M1	M2
<i>Respondent level</i>		
Constant	3.813*** (0.355)	3.848*** (0.356)
Immigration attitudes	-2.286*** (0.104)	-2.844*** (0.249)
Age	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)
Education	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)
Political ideology	0.0872*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)
Gender	-0.0377*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)		
Rural area or village	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0244* (0.0115)
Large town	0.0394** (0.0146)	0.0395** (0.0146)
Unemployed	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)
Feeling household income	-0.288*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)		
2nd generation immigrants	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)
1st generation immigrants	0.0899*** (0.0249)	0.0900*** (0.0249)
<i>Country-year level</i>		
Immigr. policy t-1	0.0112 (0.0710)	-0.00321 (0.0713)
GDP per capita	0.0000179** (0.00000553)	0.0000180** (0.00000553)
% unemployment	-0.0444** (0.0164)	-0.0445** (0.0164)
% foreign born t-1	0.00966 (0.0155)	0.00961 (0.0155)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes		0.223* (0.0911)
Variance components		
var(Year)	0.0957** (0.0400)	0.0960** (0.0401)
var(Country)	0.209*** (0.0377)	0.210*** (0.0377)
var(Country-year)	0.121*** (0.0119)	0.120*** (0.0117)
var(Individual)	3.551***	3.551***

	(0.00674)	(0.00674)
N (country)	23	23
N (country-year)	97	97
N (respondents)	139070	139070

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 64: Main regression models: 3-way interactions of immigration policy indicator with immigration attitudes and political information seeking indicators (continued on next page)


	DV: Political trust	
	M3: Political interest	M4: Political news exposure
<i>Respondent level</i>		
Constant	2.772*** (0.348)	3.872*** (0.352)
Immigration attitudes	-2.741*** (0.304)	-2.717*** (0.313)
Age	0.000910** (0.000304)	0.00273*** (0.000399)
Education	-0.00576*** (0.00148)	0.0132*** (0.00185)
Political ideology	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0821*** (0.00312)
Gender	0.0369*** (0.0101)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)		
Rural area or village	0.0377*** (0.0114)	0.00534 (0.0141)
Large town	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0372* (0.0182)
Unemployed	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.156*** (0.0307)
Feeling household income	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.282*** (0.00929)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)		
2nd generation immigrants	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.163*** (0.0264)
1st generation immigrants	0.0942*** (0.0246)	0.0687* (0.0315)
Political interest	0.429*** (0.0321)	
Political news exposure		0.00396 (0.0254)
Political news exposure (w/o radio)		
<i>Country-year level</i>		
Immigr. policy t-1	0.0543 (0.0729)	-0.0549 (0.0712)

GDP per capita	0.0000176*** (0.00000535)	0.0000186*** (0.00000537)
% unemployment	-0.0417* (0.0162)	-0.0387* (0.0157)
% foreign born t-1	0.00873 (0.0149)	0.00866 (0.0152)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	0.148 (0.110)	0.155 (0.113)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Political interest	-0.0252* (0.0117)	
Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.104 (0.0719)	
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.0146 (0.0255)	
Immigr. policy t-1 X Political news exposure		0.0324*** (0.00910)
Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure		-0.0635 (0.0929)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure		0.0465 (0.0319)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Political news exposure (w/o radio)		
Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure (w/o radio)		
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure (w/o radio)		
Variance components		
var(Year)	0.0800** (0.0341)	0.106** (0.0428)
var(Country)	0.186*** (0.0341)	0.209*** (0.0374)
var(Country-year)	0.155*** (0.0167)	0.128*** (0.0141)
var(Individual)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.352*** (0.00804)
N (country)	23	23
N (country-year)	97	97
N (respondents)	138938	87179

Standard errors in parentheses


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 9: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration attitudes & degree of political interest on political trust (3-way interaction)



Note. Shows the predicted effect of immigration policy on political trust at pro-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political information seeking, and at anti-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political interest, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model 3 in Table 64. Immigration policy restrictiveness on x-axis divided into four quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values. Pro- and anti-immigration attitudes fixed at 2SDs below and above the mean, respectively. Low level of political interest to 1 and high level of political interest to 4 of the 1-4 scale.

Figure 10: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration attitudes & degree of political news exposure on political trust (3-way interaction) – level of political news exposure set to 0 and 3



Note. Shows the predicted effect of immigration policy on political trust at pro-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political news exposure, and at anti-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political news exposure, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model 4 in Table 64. Immigration policy restrictiveness on x-axis divided into four quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values. Pro- and anti-immigration attitudes fixed at 2SDs below and above the mean, respectively. Low level of political news exposure to 0 and high level of political information seeking to 3 of the 0-7 scale.

Robustness tests – 2-way interactions

Table 65: Using alternative immigration policy indicators (external immigration policy, internal immigration policy, family reunification policy, labor migration policy, asylum policy)– 2-way interactions (continued on next page)

	DV: Political trust				
	M5: External immigration policy	M6: Internal immigration policy	M7: Family reunification policy	M8: Labor migration policy	M9: Asylum policy
<i>Respondent level</i>					
Constant	3.829*** (0.334)	3.817*** (0.344)	3.772*** (0.329)	3.785*** (0.368)	3.738*** (0.336)
Immigration attitudes	-2.374*** (0.253)	-3.103*** (0.241)	-2.695*** (0.248)	-2.680*** (0.254)	-2.591*** (0.251)
Age	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00421*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)
Education	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)
Political ideology	0.0872*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)
Gender	-0.0377*** (0.0102)	-0.0377*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)					
Rural area or village	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)
Large town	0.0395** (0.0146)	0.0396** (0.0146)	0.0395** (0.0146)	0.0395** (0.0146)	0.0395** (0.0146)
Unemployed	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)
Feeling household income	-0.288*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)					
2nd generation immigrants	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)
1st generation immigrants	0.0899*** (0.0249)	0.0898*** (0.0249)	0.0900*** (0.0249)	0.0899*** (0.0249)	0.0899*** (0.0249)
<i>Country-year level</i>					
External immigration policy t-1	0.00635 (0.0657)				
Internal immigration policy t-1		0.0162 (0.0684)			
Family reunification policy t-1			0.0389 (0.0622)		
Labor migration policy t-1				0.0136 (0.0599)	
Asylum policy t-1					0.0488 (0.0637)
GDP per capita	0.0000177** (0.00000563)	0.0000177** (0.00000548)	0.0000170** (0.00000559)	0.0000183*** (0.00000555)	0.0000174** (0.00000555)
% unemployment	-0.0443** (0.0164)	-0.0459** (0.0165)	-0.0450** (0.0162)	-0.0430** (0.0165)	-0.0469** (0.0164)
% foreign born t-1	0.0100 (0.0158)	0.00987 (0.0155)	0.0106 (0.0157)	0.00953 (0.0153)	0.0114 (0.0158)
External immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	0.0354 (0.0929)				

Internal immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes		0.325*** (0.0879)			
Family reunification policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes			0.166 (0.0914)		
Labor migration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes				0.157 (0.0924)	
Asylum policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes					0.122 (0.0916)
Variance components					
var(Year)	0.0960** (0.0401)	0.0900** (0.0383)	0.0922** (0.0388)	0.0951** (0.0397)	0.0928** (0.0390)
var(Country)	0.210*** (0.0383)	0.207*** (0.0373)	0.218*** (0.0398)	0.200*** (0.0368)	0.224*** (0.0414)
var(Country-year)	0.121*** (0.0119)	0.121*** (0.0120)	0.119*** (0.0119)	0.122*** (0.0119)	0.118*** (0.0118)
var(Individual)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)
N (country)	23	23	23	23	23
N (country-years)	97	97	97	97	97
N (respondents)	139070	139070	139070	139070	139070

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 66: All legal citizens included – 2-way interactions (continued on next page)

	DV: Political trust M10: All citizens
<i>Respondent level</i>	
Constant	3.849*** (0.355)
Immigration attitudes	-2.840*** (0.249)
Age	0.00433*** (0.000300)
Education	0.0114*** (0.00146)
Political ideology	0.0875*** (0.00250)
Gender	-0.0361*** (0.0102)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)	
Rural area or village	0.0264* (0.0115)
Large town	0.0405** (0.0146)
Unemployed	-0.174*** (0.0231)
Feeling household income	-0.289*** (0.00716)
<i>Country-year level</i>	
Immigration policy t-1	-0.00490 (0.0711)
GDP per capita	0.0000180** (0.00000552)
% unemployment	-0.0444** (0.0164)
% foreign born t-1	0.00897

Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	(0.0155) 0.221* (0.0908)
<hr/>	
Variance components	
var(Year)	0.0956** (0.0399)
var(Country)	0.208*** (0.0376)
var(Country-year)	0.120*** (0.0116)
var(Individual)	3.556*** (0.00673)
<hr/>	
Observations	139628

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 67: Sensitivity analyses – 2-way interactions (continued on next page)

	DV: Political trust			
	M11	M12	M13	M14
<i>Respondent level</i>				
Constant	4.474*** (0.258)	4.104*** (0.315)	3.424*** (0.340)	3.848*** (0.356)
Immigration attitudes	-2.844*** (0.250)	-2.844*** (0.250)	-2.843*** (0.249)	-2.844*** (0.249)
Age	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)	0.00420*** (0.000301)
Education	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)	0.0112*** (0.00147)
Political ideology	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)	0.0873*** (0.00250)
Gender	-0.0378*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)	-0.0378*** (0.0102)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)				
Rural area or village	0.0244* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0243* (0.0115)	0.0244* (0.0115)
Large town	0.0394** (0.0146)	0.0394** (0.0146)	0.0396** (0.0146)	0.0395** (0.0146)
Unemployed	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)	-0.175*** (0.0231)
Feeling household income	-0.289*** (0.00718)	-0.289*** (0.00718)	-0.289*** (0.00718)	-0.288*** (0.00718)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)				
2nd generation immigrants	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)	-0.150*** (0.0210)
1st generation immigrants	0.0903*** (0.0249)	0.0901*** (0.0249)	0.0900*** (0.0249)	0.0900*** (0.0249)
<i>Country-year level</i>				
Immigr. policy t-1	-0.0827 (0.0832)	-0.0733 (0.0810)	-0.0260 (0.0719)	-0.00321 (0.0713)
% foreign born t-1		0.0325* (0.0164)	0.00628 (0.0157)	0.00961 (0.0155)
GDP per capita			0.0000230*** (0.00000544)	0.0000180** (0.00000553)
% unemployment				-0.0445** (0.0164)
Immigr. policy t-1 X Immigration	0.222* (0.0908)	0.222* (0.0908)	0.222* (0.0908)	0.223* (0.0908)

attitudes	(0.0911)	(0.0911)	(0.0911)	(0.0911)
Variance components				
var(Year)	0.0199*** (0.0102)	0.0298*** (0.0139)	0.128** (0.0511)	0.0960** (0.0401)
var(Country)	0.369** (0.0640)	0.325** (0.0582)	0.211*** (0.0381)	0.210*** (0.0377)
var(Country-year)	0.164*** (0.0189)	0.157*** (0.0179)	0.127*** (0.0119)	0.120*** (0.0117)
var(Individual)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)	3.551*** (0.00674)
N (country)	23	23	23	23
N (country-years)	97	97	97	97
N (respondents)	139070	139070	139070	139070

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Robustness tests – 3-way interactions


Table 68: Political news exposure (w/o radio news exposure)

	DV: Political trust M15
<i>Respondent level</i>	
Constant	3.631*** (0.355)
Immigration attitudes	-2.840*** (0.297)
Age	0.00179*** (0.000369)
Education	0.0133*** (0.00170)
Political ideology	0.0841*** (0.00287)
Gender	-0.0437*** (0.0116)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)	
Rural area or village	0.0207 (0.0132)
Large town	0.0238 (0.0168)
Unemployed	-0.166*** (0.0278)
Feeling household income	-0.285*** (0.00851)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)	
2nd generation immigrants	-0.175*** (0.0243)
1st generation immigrants	0.0712* (0.0286)
Political news exposure (w/o radio)	0.0729** (0.0260)
<i>Country-year level</i>	
Immigration policy t-1	-0.0143 (0.0708)
GDP per capita	0.0000203*** (0.00000544)
% unemployment	-0.0388*

% foreign born t-1	(0.0158)
	0.00870
	(0.0154)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	0.202
	(0.107)
Immigration policy t-1 X political news exposure (w/o radio)	0.0157
	(0.00930)
Immigration attitudes X political news exposure (w/o radio)	0.0141
	(0.0878)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X political news exposure (w/o radio)	0.0201
	(0.0300)
Variance components	
var(Year)	0.113**
	(0.0452)
var(Country)	0.216***
	(0.0388)
var(Country-year)	0.113***
	(0.0120)
var(Individual)	3.427***
	(0.00755)
N (country)	23
N (country-year)	97
N (respondents)	103320

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 11: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration attitudes & degree of political information seeking (w/o radio listening) on political trust (3-way interaction)



Note. Shows the predicted effect of immigration policy on political trust at pro-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political information seeking, and at anti-immigration attitudes & low/high levels of political information seeking (w/o radio listening), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model 15 in Table 68. Immigration policy restrictiveness on x-axis divided into four quartiles, with quartile 1 representing the most liberal immigration policy values and quartile 4 the most restrictive immigration policy values. Pro- and anti-immigration attitudes fixed at 2SDs below and above the mean, respectively. Low level of political information seeking (w/o radio listening) to 0 and high level of political information seeking (w/o radio listening) to 7 of the 0-7 scale.

Table 69: Using alternative immigration policy indicators (external immigration policy, internal immigration policy) – 3-way interactions (continued on next pages)

	DV: Political trust									
	Political interest					Political news exposure				
	M16: External immigration policy	M17: Internal immigration policy	M18: Family reunification policy	M19: Labor migration policy	M20: Asylum policy	M21: External immigration policy	M22: Internal immigration policy	M23: Family reunification policy	M24: Labor migration policy	M25: Asylum policy
<i>Respondent level</i>										
Constant	2.844*** (0.327)	2.786*** (0.337)	2.852*** (0.323)	2.885*** (0.362)	2.644*** (0.328)	3.832*** (0.331)	3.828*** (0.343)	3.711*** (0.327)	3.776*** (0.363)	3.767*** (0.334)
Immigration attitudes	-2.311*** (0.303)	-3.055*** (0.298)	-2.682*** (0.301)	-2.674*** (0.303)	-2.587*** (0.305)	-2.575*** (0.317)	-3.046*** (0.304)	-2.950*** (0.313)	-2.615*** (0.312)	-2.393*** (0.312)
Age	0.000910** (0.000304)	0.000908** (0.000304)	0.000908** (0.000304)	0.000905** (0.000304)	0.000914** (0.000304)	0.00274*** (0.000399)	0.00273*** (0.000399)	0.00274*** (0.000399)	0.00273*** (0.000399)	0.00273*** (0.000399)
Education	-0.00574*** (0.00148)	-0.00576*** (0.00148)	-0.00573*** (0.00148)	-0.00574*** (0.00148)	-0.00576*** (0.00148)	0.0133*** (0.00185)	0.0133*** (0.00185)	0.0133*** (0.00185)	0.0132*** (0.00185)	0.0132*** (0.00185)
Political ideology	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0851*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0822*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)
Gender	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0370*** (0.0101)	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0368*** (0.0101)	-0.0463*** (0.0125)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)	-0.0464*** (0.0125)	-0.0463*** (0.0125)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)										
Rural area or village	0.0376*** (0.0114)	0.0376*** (0.0114)	0.0376*** (0.0114)	0.0375** (0.0114)	0.0377*** (0.0114)	0.00551 (0.0141)	0.00562 (0.0141)	0.00577 (0.0141)	0.00568 (0.0141)	0.00554 (0.0141)
Large town	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0260 (0.0144)	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0364* (0.0182)	0.0369* (0.0182)	0.0363* (0.0182)	0.0367* (0.0182)	0.0373* (0.0182)
Unemployed	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.156*** (0.0307)	-0.156*** (0.0307)	-0.155*** (0.0307)	-0.156*** (0.0307)	-0.156*** (0.0307)
Feeling household income	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.281*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)	-0.281*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)										
2nd generation immigrants	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.162*** (0.0264)	-0.162*** (0.0264)	-0.162*** (0.0264)	-0.162*** (0.0264)	-0.163*** (0.0264)
1st generation immigrants	0.0942*** (0.0246)	0.0942*** (0.0246)	0.0944*** (0.0246)	0.0942*** (0.0246)	0.0943*** (0.0246)	0.0683* (0.0315)	0.0685* (0.0315)	0.0681* (0.0315)	0.0681* (0.0315)	0.0687* (0.0315)
Political interest	0.401*** (0.0320)	0.412*** (0.0326)	0.363*** (0.0323)	0.368*** (0.0329)	0.450*** (0.0310)					
Political information seeking						0.0410 (0.0263)	0.0319 (0.0261)	0.0694* (0.0275)	0.0426 (0.0265)	0.00614 (0.0259)
<i>Country-year level</i>										
External immigration policy t-1	0.0269 (0.0680)					-0.0393 (0.0659)				
Internal immigration policy t-1		0.0560 (0.0701)					-0.0394 (0.0688)			
Family reunification policy t-1			0.0344 (0.0647)					0.0126 (0.0630)		
Labor migration policy t-1				0.00449 (0.0631)					-0.0219 (0.0607)	
Asylum policy t-1					0.113 (0.0659)					-0.00514 (0.0641)
GDP per capita	0.0000174** (0.00000543)	0.0000172** (0.00000528)	0.0000166** (0.00000538)	0.0000177** (0.00000538)	0.0000170** (0.00000536)	0.0000184*** (0.00000547)	0.0000186*** (0.00000534)	0.0000179*** (0.00000543)	0.0000187*** (0.00000538)	0.0000178*** (0.00000538)

% unemployment	-0.0410*	-0.0431**	-0.0420**	-0.0404*	-0.0438**	-0.0383*	-0.0384*	-0.0386*	-0.0376*	-0.0407**
	(0.0162)	(0.0163)	(0.0160)	(0.0163)	(0.0162)	(0.0156)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)	(0.0157)	(0.0156)
% foreign born t-1	0.00866	0.00900	0.00949	0.00860	0.0104	0.00883	0.00857	0.00948	0.00869	0.0107
	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0155)	(0.0152)	(0.0153)	(0.0150)	(0.0155)
External immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	-0.0214 (0.110)					0.0863 (0.115)				
External immigration policy t-1 X Political interest	-0.0141 (0.0117)									
Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.108 (0.0712)	0.115 (0.0718)	0.101 (0.0714)	0.122 (0.0696)	0.145* (0.0715)					
External immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.0117 (0.0251)									
Internal immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes		0.273* (0.108)					0.279* (0.110)			
Internal immigration policy t-1 X Political interest		-0.0182 (0.0119)								
Internal immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest		0.0102 (0.0262)								
Family reunification policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes			0.131 (0.109)					0.234* (0.114)		
Family reunification policy t-1 X Political interest			0.00145 (0.0119)							
Family reunification policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest			0.0140 (0.0249)							
Labor migration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes				0.123 (0.112)					0.105 (0.114)	
Labor migration policy t-1 X Political interest				-0.000677 (0.0120)						
Labor migration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest				0.00598 (0.0262)						
Asylum policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes					0.0862 (0.110)					0.0272 (0.113)
Asylum policy t-1 X Political interest					-0.0334** (0.0113)					
Asylum policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest					-0.00179 (0.0253)					
External immigration policy t-1 X Political information seeking						0.0183 (0.00938)				
Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking						0.144 (0.0957)	-0.00881 (0.0909)	0.217* (0.0955)	-0.0540 (0.0887)	-0.151 (0.0950)
External immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking						-0.0282 (0.0325)				
Internal immigration policy t-1 X Political information seeking							0.0218* (0.00943)			
Internal immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking							0.0284 (0.0320)			
Family reunification policy t-1 X Political information seeking								0.00794 (0.00988)		

Family reunification policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking								-0.0559 (0.0327)		
Labor migration policy t-1 X Political information seeking									0.0176 (0.00956)	
Labor migration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking									0.0475 (0.0320)	
Asylum policy t-1 X Political information seeking										0.0316*** (0.00928)
Asylum policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political information seeking										0.0811* (0.0330)
Variance components										
var(Year)	0.0797** (0.0340)	0.0731** (0.0320)	0.0768** (0.0330)	0.0794** (0.0338)	0.0766** (0.0329)	0.105** (0.0423)	0.106** (0.0430)	0.103** (0.0417)	0.105** (0.0422)	0.104** (0.0418)
var(Country)	0.184*** (0.0345)	0.180*** (0.0333)	0.192*** (0.0357)	0.179*** (0.0334)	0.197*** (0.0369)	0.207*** (0.0377)	0.207*** (0.0371)	0.214*** (0.0393)	0.201*** (0.0368)	0.222*** (0.0407)
var(Country-year)	0.157*** (0.0168)	0.157*** (0.0169)	0.157*** (0.0167)	0.159*** (0.0169)	0.149*** (0.0160)	0.132*** (0.0150)	0.133*** (0.0148)	0.135*** (0.0154)	0.136*** (0.0154)	0.130*** (0.0145)
Var(Individual)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)
N (country)	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
N (country-year)	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97
N (respondents)	138938	138938	138938	138938	138938	87179	87179	87179	87179	87179

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 70: All legal citizens included – 3-way interactions (continued on next page)

	DV: Political trust	
	M26: Political interest	M27: Political news exposure
<i>Respondent level</i>		
Constant	2.773*** (0.347)	3.870*** (0.351)
Immigration attitudes	-2.711*** (0.303)	-2.709*** (0.312)
Age	0.00104*** (0.000303)	0.00285*** (0.000398)
Education	-0.00552*** (0.00148)	0.0132*** (0.00185)
Political ideology	0.0852*** (0.00248)	0.0822*** (0.00312)
Gender	0.0385*** (0.0101)	-0.0447*** (0.0125)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)		
Rural area or village	0.0397*** (0.0114)	0.00752 (0.0141)
Large town	0.0268 (0.0144)	0.0376* (0.0182)
Unemployed	-0.164*** (0.0228)	-0.153*** (0.0306)
Feeling household income	-0.265*** (0.00709)	-0.282*** (0.00926)
Political interest	0.428*** (0.0324)	
Political news exposure		0.00585 (0.0254)
<i>Country-year level</i>		
Immigration policy t-1	0.0516 (0.0726)	-0.0555 (0.0710)
GDP per capita	0.0000177*** (0.00000533)	0.0000186*** (0.00000535)
% unemployment	-0.0415* (0.0162)	-0.0385* (0.0156)
% foreign born t-1	0.00813 (0.0149)	0.00797 (0.0152)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	0.136 (0.109)	0.152 (0.112)
Immigration policy t-1 X Political interest	-0.0249* (0.0118)	
Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.0929 (0.0717)	
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.0189 (0.0254)	
Immigration policy t-1 X Political news exposure		0.0317*** (0.00906)
Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure		-0.0671 (0.0928)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure		0.0472 (0.0319)
<i>Variance components</i>		
var(Year)	0.0796** (0.0333)	0.105** (0.0423)
var(Country)	0.184*** (0.0337)	0.208*** (0.0373)
Var(Country-year)	0.154*** (0.0144)	0.128*** (0.0141)

Var(Individual)	3.465*** (0.00657)	3.358*** (0.00804)
N (country)	23	23
N (country-year)	97	97
N (respondents)	139496	87494

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 71: Sensitivity analyses – 3-way interactions

	DV: Political trust							
	Political interest			Political news exposure				
	M26	M27	m30	m31	m32	m33	m34	m35
<i>Respondent level</i>								
Constant	3.375*** (0.258)	3.025*** (0.308)	2.362*** (0.327)	2.772*** (0.348)	4.522*** (0.260)	4.158*** (0.318)	3.531*** (0.338)	3.872*** (0.352)
Immigration attitudes	-2.742*** (0.304)	-2.741*** (0.304)	-2.740*** (0.304)	-2.741*** (0.304)	-2.716*** (0.313)	-2.717*** (0.313)	-2.718*** (0.313)	-2.717*** (0.313)
Age	0.000907** (0.000304)	0.000908** (0.000304)	0.000911** (0.000304)	0.000910** (0.000304)	0.00273*** (0.000399)	0.00273*** (0.000399)	0.00274*** (0.000399)	0.00273*** (0.000399)
Education	- (0.00148)	- (0.00148)	-0.00576*** (0.00148)	-0.00576*** (0.00148)	0.0132*** (0.00185)	0.0132*** (0.00185)	0.0132*** (0.00185)	0.0132*** (0.00185)
Political ideology	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0850*** (0.00248)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)	0.0821*** (0.00312)
Gender	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0369*** (0.0101)	0.0369*** (0.0101)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)	-0.0462*** (0.0125)
Living area (ref. Small/middle town)								
Rural area or village	0.0377*** (0.0114)	0.0376*** (0.0114)	0.0377*** (0.0114)	0.0377*** (0.0114)	0.00544 (0.0141)	0.00535 (0.0141)	0.00540 (0.0141)	0.00534 (0.0141)
Large town	0.0257 (0.0144)	0.0257 (0.0144)	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0259 (0.0144)	0.0369* (0.0182)	0.0369* (0.0182)	0.0373* (0.0182)	0.0372* (0.0182)
Unemployed	-0.166*** (0.0228)	-0.166*** (0.0228)	-0.166*** (0.0228)	-0.165*** (0.0228)	-0.157*** (0.0307)	-0.157*** (0.0307)	-0.157*** (0.0307)	-0.156*** (0.0307)
Feeling household income	-0.265*** (0.00711)	-0.265*** (0.00711)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.265*** (0.00712)	-0.282*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)	-0.282*** (0.00929)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)								
2nd generation immigrants	-0.155*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.156*** (0.0208)	-0.162*** (0.0264)	-0.163*** (0.0264)	-0.163*** (0.0264)	-0.163*** (0.0264)
1st generation immigrants	0.0946*** (0.0246)	0.0944*** (0.0246)	0.0943*** (0.0246)	0.0942*** (0.0246)	0.0692* (0.0315)	0.0689* (0.0315)	0.0688* (0.0315)	0.0687* (0.0315)
Political interest	0.430*** (0.0321)	0.430*** (0.0321)	0.429*** (0.0321)	0.429*** (0.0321)				
Political news exposure					0.00388 (0.0255)	0.00403 (0.0255)	0.00416 (0.0255)	0.00396 (0.0254)
<i>Country-year level</i>								
Immigration policy t-1	-0.0175 (0.0847)	-0.00998 (0.0821)	0.0341 (0.0728)	0.0543 (0.0729)	-0.122 (0.0824)	-0.114 (0.0807)	-0.0787 (0.0720)	-0.0549 (0.0712)
% foreign born t-1		0.0312* (0.0156)	0.00602 (0.0149)	0.00873 (0.0149)		0.0323* (0.0164)	0.00584 (0.0154)	0.00866 (0.0152)
GDP per capita			0.0000225*** (0.00000520)	0.0000176*** (0.00000535)			0.0000225*** (0.00000528)	0.0000186*** (0.00000537)
% unemployment				-0.0417* (0.0162)				-0.0387* (0.0157)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes	0.147 (0.110)	0.146 (0.110)	0.147 (0.110)	0.148 (0.110)	0.155 (0.113)	0.156 (0.113)	0.155 (0.113)	0.155 (0.113)
Immigration policy t-1 X Political interest	-0.0253* (0.0117)	-0.0253* (0.0117)	-0.0252* (0.0117)	-0.0252* (0.0117)				
Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.104 (0.0719)	0.104 (0.0719)	0.103 (0.0719)	0.104 (0.0719)				
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political interest	0.0148 (0.0255)	0.0149 (0.0255)	0.0148 (0.0255)	0.0146 (0.0255)				
Immigration policy t-1 X Political news exposure					0.0324*** (0.00912)	0.0324*** (0.00911)	0.0323*** (0.00910)	0.0324*** (0.00910)
Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure					-0.0632 (0.0929)	-0.0628 (0.0929)	-0.0625 (0.0929)	-0.0635 (0.0929)
Immigration policy t-1 X Immigration attitudes X Political news exposure					0.0457 (0.0319)	0.0455 (0.0319)	0.0460 (0.0319)	0.0465 (0.0319)
<i>Variance components</i>								
var(Year)	0.0153*** (0.00848)	0.0239*** (0.0116)	0.109** (0.0438)	0.0800** (0.0341)	0.0252*** (0.0116)	0.0345*** (0.0150)	0.130** (0.0510)	0.106** (0.0428)
var(Country)	0.330** (0.0581)	0.285*** (0.0506)	0.181*** (0.0336)	0.186*** (0.0341)	0.381** (0.0659)	0.342** (0.0608)	0.213*** (0.0382)	0.209*** (0.0374)
var(Country-year)	0.209*** (0.0239)	0.196*** (0.0178)	0.157*** (0.0167)	0.155*** (0.0167)	0.168*** (0.0187)	0.163*** (0.0182)	0.136*** (0.0147)	0.128*** (0.0141)
var(Individual)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.460*** (0.00657)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)	3.352*** (0.00804)
N (country)	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
N (country-year)	97	97	97	97	97	97	97	97
N (respondents)	138938	138938	138938	138938	87179	87179	87179	87179

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Chapter 4. Third article: How Specific Asylum and Labor Migration Policies affect Political Support. Results from a Survey Experiment in Germany

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How Specific Asylum and Labor Migration Policies affect Political Support. Results from a Survey Experiment in Germany

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Abstract. The study examines how citizens respond to specific immigration policies in terms of policy support and political trust. It claims that citizens respond heterogeneously, conditional on whether policies regulate asylum or labor migration, are liberal or restrictive, and whether citizens are anti- or pro-immigration. Using treatments resembling the content of real asylum and labor migration laws in a randomized controlled experiment embedded in a German representative survey, the findings show that the policies affect policy support but not political trust. Moreover, anti- and pro-immigration citizens' responses converge in that they support restrictive labor migration policies more than restrictive asylum policies.

Keywords: asylum policy; labor migration policy; policy congruence; deservingness; policy support; political trust

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1 Introduction

In recent decades, Western liberal democracies have often debated how to regulate immigration as the number of migrants has increased. The openness of asylum and labor migration policies, which are among the most prominent legal channels of migration, has often been at the center of these discussions (e.g., Messina, 2007). Germany, for instance, has in recent years adopted policies that privilege the admission of highly skilled migrants (Doomernik et al., 2009) and, in the context of the ‘refugee policy crisis’ beginning in 2015, facilitate the settlement of asylum seekers (Laubenthal, 2019).

For these and other channels of migration, immigration policies regulate who is allowed to be admitted and to remain, and determine the residence rights that come with a permit (Helbling et al., 2020, p. 2; Schmid, 2020, p. 4). These measures are intended to determine the volume and composition of migrants residing in a country (Czaika & de Haas, 2013, pp. 489–490). Citizens can feel more or less represented by the contents of immigration policies, which can strengthen or undermine their support for these policies and, more fundamentally, their trust in the political institutions that adopt them.

We know from existing research that citizens have a preference for certain types of migrants rather than being generally for or against migration. Consistent with assumptions from the ‘deservingness’ approach (e.g., van Oorschot, 2000), citizens in general prefer refugees to migrant workers (e.g., Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015), and this appears to be true for both anti-immigration and pro-immigration citizens (Newman et al., 2015). We lack, however, systematic evidence on how citizens respond to concrete asylum and labor migration policies in terms of concrete policy support and political trust in institutions, which I take to represent key measures of more specific and more abstract support for the political system, respectively (cf. Ziller & Helbling, 2021, p. 998). In other words, studies have not yet examined the impact of asylum and labor migration policy *outputs*, or ‘policies on paper’ (Bjerre et al., 2015), on political support.

Empirical evidence suggests that citizens are more supportive of policies (Ziller & Helbling, 2021) and political institutions (Citrin et al., 2014; but see Simon, 2023) when the content of the policies adopted aligns with their ideological preferences, also referred to as ideological congruence (Golder & Ferland, 2017). Citizens in European countries, including Germany, are rather divided between proponents and opponents of immigration (Heath & Richards, 2019). Yet, we have limited understanding of whether the congruence of labor

migration and asylum policies with citizens' preferences on immigration affects only policy support or also, more general, trust in political institutions. Existing studies have so far examined effects of immigration policies as a whole rather than of specific policies (e.g., Simon, 2023), and of integration policies (e.g., Citrin et al., 2014; McLaren, 2016), and solely focused on effects on either policy support or political trust. This contribution aims to systematically improve upon these studies.

In this study, I argue that an individual citizen's level of policy support and political trust depends on whether the policies regulate asylum seekers or labor migrants as well as on her general immigration preference. Secondly, following the general reasoning of Ziller and Helbling (2021), it is argued that asylum and labor migration policies have a greater impact on policy support than political trust in institutions because the former is more immediate to citizens than the latter. Overall, I examine how citizens react to specific immigration policies conditional on whether they regulate asylum seekers or labor migrants and on whether they are restrictive or liberal. To do so, I conduct a unique survey experiment in Germany that randomly allocates respondents to descriptions of four different specific immigration policies. This procedure allows to test their relevance for policy support and political trust causally. As a novel feature, each description is designed to closely resemble the content of a specific existing German immigration law, aiming to enhance the external validity of the policy treatments, and thus bolster confidence that policy perceptions and political support attitudes are, in fact, associated (Barabas & Jerit, 2010).

The findings demonstrate that the specific policies affect policy support but not political trust. Furthermore, the impact of liberal and restrictive policies on policy support differs. First, the liberal asylum and liberal labor migration policies both uniformly increase policy support among immigration proponents and decrease policy support among immigration opponents. Secondly, however, the pattern differs when it comes to the restrictive policies, as immigration proponents and opponents are less polarized in their policy support. Rather, they converge in that they both support restrictive labor migration policies more than restrictive asylum policies.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Concept of Political Support

As objects of support for the political system, the emphasis is on support for asylum and labor migration policies as well as trust in political institutions, the former representing a specific and the latter a more abstract type of political support (see Ziller & Helbling, 2021, p. 998). I consider political support to result from citizens' evaluations of how well the actions of political authorities are substantively representing their interests and preferences (Noordzij et al., 2021). More specifically, building on the concept of policy congruence, I consider political support to result from citizens' evaluations of how much the content of adopted policies is in line with their related ideological preferences (Golder & Ferland, 2017). Studies show that political support is greater when government policies resemble citizens' preferences (e.g., Citrin et al., 2014; McLaren, 2016). Although both orientations are rather volatile (e.g., van der Meer & Zmerli, 2017, p. 4), I expect support for asylum and labor migration policies to be more strongly affected, in terms of the size of the effect, by policy congruence than political trust in institutions, as the former is more immediate to citizens than the latter (cf. Ziller & Helbling, 2021, p. 998).

2.2 Asylum and Labor Migration Policy Congruence and Political Support

Regarding mechanisms, asylum and labor migration policies impact political support through interpretive feedback effects (Campbell, 2012; Pierson, 1993). The policies provide citizens with information and meaning regarding their specific content and make citizens aware of their associated interests and ideological preferences. Citizens interpret the policies as to whether they and the political institutions that enacted them are protecting these (cf. Pierson, 1993) and accordingly adjust their support of the policies and political institutions. If the policy content is in line (or not in line) with citizens' preferences, their political support increases (or decreases).

Asylum and labor migration policies indicate to the public how restrictive or liberal the regulations are as well as the motivation of the regulated migrant group to immigrate, namely to seek humanitarian protection or work, respectively (Bjerre et al., 2015). We lack, however, systematic evidence on how important these two policy cues, restrictiveness/liberalness and motivation, are for the effect of the specific immigration policies on political support. Do the specific policies impact political support solely based on whether they are restrictive or liberal, and thus independent of whether they regulate asylum or labor migration? Or does the effect

also vary depending on whether the policies regulate either asylum or labor migration? To explore these two questions, I propose a ‘deservingness’ and a ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ framework drawing on existing literature. The frameworks apply to political support in general, so when I speak of political support in the following, I am referring to both policy support and political trust.

The ‘deservingness’ framework suggests that when citizens interpret the content of a specific asylum or labor migration policy, they not only compare the policy’s degree of restrictiveness/liberalness to their ideological preferences but also consider the ‘deservingness’ of the migrant group that it regulates. This assumption is based on literature indicating that individuals’ attitudes toward different migrant groups differ (Jedinger & Eisentraut, 2020; Meuleman et al., 2019) rather than being connected (Meeusen et al., 2018; Meuleman & Billiet, 2003). Thus, a specific immigration policy provides citizens with information allowing them to assess the deservingness of the migrant group it regulates. It does so by informing about the targeted migrant group’s motivation for immigration, such as humanitarian protection in the case of an asylum policy or employment in the case of a labor migration policy (Bjerre et al., 2015). According to the theory of deservingness (e.g., van Oorschot, 2006), people favor those groups of migrants they view as more deserving to receive public support. It predicts that individuals favor ‘involuntary’ over ‘voluntary’ migrants and those migrants whom they believe to have a greater need. Thus, individuals are expected to view asylum seekers/refugees as more deserving than labor migrants as the former came involuntarily to seek humanitarian protection and the latter supposedly came voluntarily for work and social wellbeing (De Coninck et al., 2021, p. 268; Hager & Veit, 2019, p. 413; Helbling, 2020). Recent empirical evidence on public discourse⁶⁶ and public attitudes⁶⁷ about immigration supports the idea that individuals make these deservingness assumptions when evaluating asylum seekers/refugees and labor migrants (e.g., Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Fraser & Murakami, 2022). Studies have also found that the public views asylum seekers and refugees as similarly deserving (Bjånesøy, 2019, p. 227; Lawlor & Paquet, 2022, p. 10; Newman et al., 2015, p. 600), despite of their

⁶⁶ For instance, public discourse portrays refugees more positively than economic migrants (Crawley and Skleparis 2018; Van Hootegeem, Meuleman, and Abts 2020), thereby influencing how the public assesses the deservingness of these different types of immigrants (De Coninck 2020).

⁶⁷ Recent research shows that people prefer the admission and settlement of asylum seekers/refugees over other migrant groups (Abdelaaty and Steele 2022; Coenders, Gijssberts, and Scheepers 2017; De Coninck 2020), of asylum seekers/refugees over labor migrants (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017; Fraser and Murakami 2022; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, 538; Helbling 2020), and of asylum seekers with humanitarian motives over asylum seekers with economic motives (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Hager and Veit 2019; Verkuyten 2004).

different legal status. Therefore, individuals are likely to perceive both asylum seekers and refugees as more deserving than labor migrants.

To begin with, I make two general arguments based on the aforesaid. First, I argue that individuals apply the deservingness heuristic not only when evaluating asylum seekers/refugees and labor migrants but also when interpreting policies that regulate the admission and settlement of these distinct groups, namely asylum policies and labor migration policies. Second, I propose that not only the general population or the ‘average’ citizen applies the deservingness heuristic when evaluating specific asylum and labor migration policies (e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015), but also anti-immigration and pro-immigration individuals more specifically (e.g., Newman et al., 2015, p. 603). Thus, drawing on the deservingness approach, I assume that labor migration and asylum policies are likely to generate heterogeneous levels of political support among both opponents and proponents of immigration.

Immigration opponents, more specifically, have a general preference for restrictive rather than liberal immigration policies. This preference is rooted in their perception of immigration as a sociotropic threat to their country’s economy and culture (e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Despite their general preference for restrictive policies over liberal ones, I argue that opponents of immigration should differentiate between asylum and labor migration policies. Specifically, in line with ‘deservingness’ theory, they should oppose liberal labor migration policies more strongly than liberal asylum policies as they are likely to view asylum seekers/refugees to be more legitimate and deserving than labor migrants due to their involuntary emigration and genuine needs (Van Hootegeem et al., 2020). Recent research supports this argument as it finds that individuals on the right side of the political spectrum are more likely to support the admission of humanitarian rather than economic migrants (Bansak et al., 2016, p. 219) and that politically conservative citizens are less likely to support restrictive immigration policies when they are aware of migrants’ humanitarian needs (Newman et al., 2015, p. 603).

Thus, regarding policy congruence effects of liberal asylum and liberal labor migration policies on political support I expect the following for immigration opponents: whereas liberal immigration policies are generally incongruent with the preferences of immigration opponents and should thus decrease political support, this negative effect should be stronger when these policies are labor migration policies rather than asylum policies. Consequently, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H1a: For immigration opponents, the liberal labor migration policy leads to a stronger decrease in political support than the liberal asylum policy.

The converse is to be expected for restrictive labor migration and asylum policies. Again, this is because despite of their overall opposition to immigration, immigration opponents may express more empathy towards asylum seekers/refugees than towards labor migrants. Thus, it is likely that a specific restrictive immigration policy generally increases the political support of an anti-immigration citizen but that, at the same time, this positive effect is stronger for labor migration policies than for asylum policies. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H1b: For immigration opponents, the restrictive labor migration policy leads to a stronger increase in political support than the restrictive asylum policy.

Immigration proponents, on the other hand, can be expected to generally prefer liberal over restrictive immigration policies because they do not view immigration as a cultural threat. Given that their attachment to the country's cultural identity is less pronounced, they feel less threatened by immigration (Heath & Tilley, 2005, p. 128; Sides & Citrin, 2007). Regardless of this general ideological preference for openness, I also expect immigration proponents to assess asylum and labor migration policies differently. Specifically, they should support liberal asylum policies more strongly than liberal labor migration policies as they are also likely to view asylum seekers/refugees as more deserving of public support than labor migrants. This expectation is supported by empirical findings showing that citizens with a left-leaning political orientation are more likely to accept migrants whose motivation to immigrate is humanitarian rather than economic (Bansak et al., 2016).

Therefore, regarding policy congruence effects of liberal asylum and labor migration policies on political support I expect the following for immigration proponents: whereas liberal immigration policies are generally congruent with their ideological preferences and should therefore increase political support, this positive effect should be stronger for asylum compared to labor migration policies. Consequently, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis H2a: For immigration proponents, the liberal asylum policy leads to a stronger increase in political support than the liberal labor migration policy.

The opposite can be expected for restrictive labor migration and asylum policies. Again, this is because immigration proponents may, despite of their general support of immigration, empathize more with asylum seekers/refugees than with labor migrants and perceive them as more legitimate. Thus, it is likely that a specific restrictive immigration policy generally reduces the political support of pro-immigration individuals but that, at the same time, this negative effect is stronger when it is an asylum rather than a labor migration policy. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H2b: For immigration proponents, the restrictive asylum policy leads to a stronger decrease in political support than the restrictive labor migration policy.

The ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ framework, on the other hand, posits that individuals who interpret the content of a given asylum or labor migration policy compare their own ideological preference only to the degree of restrictiveness/liberalness of that policy, without regard for whether it regulates asylum seekers/refugees or labor migrants. This approach builds on research showing that citizens’ attitudes toward different immigrant groups are related (Meeusen et al., 2018; Meuleman & Billiet, 2003). Thus, citizens tend to either support or oppose all migrants equally, rather than favoring or opposing a particular type of migrant based on assessments of their deservingness. Therefore, citizens prefer a “fortress” or not (Coenders et al., 2017, p. 98). Ivarsflaten (2005, p. 27) for example finds that citizen support for restrictive asylum policies and restrictive immigration policies does not diverge. According to the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ perspective individuals have a fundamental preference for either restrictive or liberal immigration policies.

In that vein, immigration opponents should oppose any liberal and support any restrictive immigration policy, irrespective of whether it regulates the immigration of labor migrants or asylum seekers/refugees. Therefore, all restrictive policies will be in line with the demands of immigration opponents and all liberal policies not, so the former increase and the latter reduce political support. Consequently, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H3a: Restrictive immigration policies increase the political support of people who oppose immigration, while liberal immigration policies decrease it.

The opposite can be expected for immigration proponents. On the basis of the aforesaid, individuals who generally support immigration should view labor migrants and asylum seekers as equally unthreatening. Thus, they should support any liberal and oppose any restrictive immigration policies, independent of whether they regulate asylum or labor migration. Therefore, all liberal immigration policies are assumed to be in line with the demands of immigration supporters and restrictive policies not, so the former increase and the latter reduce political support. In consequence, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis H3b: Liberal immigration policies increase the political support of people who support immigration, while restrictive immigration policies decrease it.

In summary, I conceptualize political support as resulting from the degree of congruence between the substantive content of specific asylum and labor migration policies and citizens' general immigration preferences.

3 Method

3.1 Priming Experiment

To test the theoretical claims, I conducted a representative survey in Germany in which I embedded a priming experiment.

In priming experiments, respondents are randomly assigned to a treatment group or a control group. Respondents in the treatment groups are exposed to a treatment vignette highlighting a particular topic, and then their responses to post-treatment questions are measured. The control group answers these questions without prior exposure to treatment. Exposure to treatment is thought to trigger cognitive processes influencing responses to post-treatment questions (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Lavrakas, 2008). The difference in outcomes on the questions between treatment and control groups or between the different treatment groups are taken to be causal treatment effects (Gaines et al., 2007).

The random assignment of empirical observations into treatment and control groups enables causal inference (Druckman et al., 2006, p. 627) and the experimental separation of cause and effect precludes unobservable variable bias and two-way causation (Druckman et al., 2006, p. 633), which plague analyses of observational data. I prefer the priming method to the

conjoint method (e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015) as it is better suited for testing the effects of relatively few treatments on multiple outcome variables (Lavrakas, 2008).

Priming has been used by previous studies to investigate treatment effects of political events (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990), framings of immigration (Bloemraad et al., 2016; Naumann & Stoetzer, 2018), and surveillance policies (Ziller & Helbling, 2021) on public opinion.

3.2 Sample and Experimental Setup

A university-based research institute was commissioned to program an online-questionnaire and to collect the data in Germany using an online access-panel from the provider ‘respondi’. The language of the questionnaire was German, and the data collection took place in March 2019. The resulting dataset is based on a random probability sample among participants of the access panel that were between eighteen and sixty-nine years of age and were German citizens⁶⁸ at the time the survey was conducted. The net sample consists of $n = 1,110$ respondents who are representative of the German population regarding gender (female, male), five age-groups (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69), three groups of education (lower, medium and higher level of education⁶⁹), and residency in the sixteen German states.

After collecting demographic information on gender and formal education, survey respondents were randomly assigned to one of five groups, four of which were treatment groups and one of which was a control group. All respondents in the treatment groups received the same introductory paragraph explaining that in the following they must indicate how much they support or oppose a specific immigration law that has been adopted in Germany in recent years:

“In recent years, various laws have been enacted which newly regulate the entry and residence of immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany. In the following we will describe one of these laws and would like to know what your personal opinion is about it. Please tell us now to what extent you support or do not support the following legislative amendment.”

To investigate the ‘deservingness’ hypotheses (H1a-b and H2a-b) and the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ (H3a-b) hypotheses, each treatment group was assigned one of four

⁶⁸ To ensure that the sample only consists of individuals that are not the target group of immigration policies, only those with German citizenship at the time of the survey were included.

⁶⁹ These levels of education represent the different types of education that can be acquired in the German education system: lower education (‘no school leaving certificate’, ‘elementary or lower secondary school’), medium education (‘secondary school’), and higher education (‘high-school diploma’, ‘vocational college diploma’, ‘university diploma’).

treatment vignettes. Each assigned treatment vignette describes the content of a real existing German immigration law. The assigned treatment vignette either describes the content of a liberal labor migration law (vignette 1), restrictive labor migration law (vignette 2), liberal asylum law (vignette 3), or restrictive asylum law (vignette 4). An assigned treatment vignette contains only the description of one single specific law (as shown in the second column of Table 72), no other information is shown to the respondents.

Table 72: Contents and original sources of treatment vignettes

Vignette No.	Content of treatment vignette	Type of policy	Original source in German legislation
1	“A change in federal law facilitates in comparison to previous years the issue of a residence permit for foreign nationals of non-EU-states for the purpose of employment in Germany. Foreign nationals with a university degree get, even if they do not have an employment contract, a six-month residence permit, in order to search during that time an employment that fits their university degree.”	Liberal labor migration policy	§ 18c (1) Residence Act; amended 1.6.2012
2	“A change in federal law exacerbates in comparison to previous years the issue of a residence permit for foreigners from non-EU-states for the purpose of employment in Germany. Foreigners with a vocational qualification acquired abroad only receive a temporary work permit if they can prove the equivalence of their vocational training to German standards before entering the country”.	Restrictive labor migration policy	§ 6 (2) no. 2 Employment Regulation; amended 1.7.2013
3	“A change in federal law facilitates in comparison to previous years the labor market access of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers can be given approval to work already after three months of residence in Germany.”	Liberal asylum policy	§ 32 (1) Employment Regulation; amended in 2015
4	“A change in federal law exacerbates in comparison to previous years the labor market access of asylum seekers from so called safe countries of origin. Asylum seekers whose country of origin is classified as secure and who are therefore supposedly not persecuted cannot enter an employment during the asylum procedure.”	Restrictive asylum policy	§ 61 (2) Asylum Act; amended 20.10.2015

Respondents in the treatment groups must then answer post-treatment questions querying how much they support or do not support that law, and how much they trust or do not trust various political institutions (see Section 3.3 for details). The order of the political trust

questions is randomized so that each institution will be equally affected by the treatments. In contrast, respondents in the control group do not receive any vignette and logically only have to indicate how much they trust or do not trust the political institutions. After the political trust questions, respondents in each group are also asked several other questions related to political attitudes, social cohesion, attitudes toward migrants, and personal demographics.

Each treatment vignette (see second column of Table 72 for the contents) emphasizes which migrant group the respective law targets (“asylum seekers” or “foreign nationals of non-EU-states for the purpose of employment”) and whether it is more restrictive (“exacerbates”) or more liberal (“facilitates”) “in comparison to previous years”. This shall make easier for the respondents to cognitively process the contents of the laws, and to ensure post-treatment questions are indeed causally affected by variations of treatment and control groups (McDermott, 2011, p. 27).

A central focus of this contribution is to examine whether the phenomena in question (i.e., the specific immigration policies) impact citizen political support in the “real world” (Gaines et al., 2007, p. 5; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018, p. 90). For that reason, emphasis was laid on the external validity of the treatments. Following advice from Barabas and Jerit (2010, p. 226), German immigration laws served as “real world referents” to make the treatment “resemble the relevant phenomenon”. Reference laws were selected based on whether they were recently passed, regulate non-EU migration, and were present in public discourse (see the fourth column in Table 72 for the sources of the laws and Table 73 in Appendix 3 for the original wording of the laws that were used as references). The laws used in vignettes 1 and 2 are representative of the reorientation of German immigration policy toward high-skilled migration and are integral part of German public discourse on skilled migration (Doomernik et al., 2009; Martin, 2014; SVR, 2019b, 2019a). The laws used in vignettes 3 and 4 were enacted during the so-called ‘refugee policy crisis’ beginning in 2015 and are inherent part of German public debates about the rights of asylum seekers during asylum procedure (SVR, 2019a).

That the selected labor migration laws regulate entry and the asylum laws regulate stay should not bias outcomes, since both aspects are central elements of immigration regulations (Bjerre et al., 2015) and have been found to affect the composition of migrants living in a country (Helbling et al., 2020).

Table 74 in Appendix 3 gives an overview of the sample I use in the analyses. It shows that there are, with smaller deviations, about twenty percent of all respondents in each treatment group.

3.3 Measurement of Dependent and Independent Variables

The outcome variables are policy support and political trust. See Table 75 in Appendix 3 for question wordings of all key outcome and independent variables.

Regarding the outcome variables, I measure policy support with four items on how much respondents support the specific policy described to them in their assigned treatment group (5-point rating scale each, ranging from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘completely’) and I computed a single additive scale over all items. Political trust is measured with items on how much trust the respondents have in the parliament, politicians, and parties in Germany (11-point rating scale each, ranging from 1 ‘not at all’ to 11 ‘completely’), and I computed a mean index over all items (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.95). I transformed the policy support scale and the political trust index to both range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more political trust and policy support, respectively, to make both outcome variables comparable to each other.

To measure the respondents’ immigration preference, I combine three 11-point variables (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.92) on immigration attitudes that refer to the extent to which respondents think that immigration is bad/good for the country’s economy, undermines/enriches the country’s cultural life, and whether it makes the country a worse/better place to live (11-point scale each, ranging from 1 to 11). The resulting immigration preference index was reversed and transformed to range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a stronger anti-immigration preference. The key independent variable is a dummy variable indicating the specific policy treatment group or control group to which the respondent was assigned (0 = control group, 1 = liberal asylum policy, 2 = liberal labor migration policy, 3 = restrictive asylum policy, 4 = restrictive labor migration policy).

Please see Appendix 3 for summary statistics for the outcome and independent variables (Table 76 and Table 77).

3.4 Analytical Strategy

To deal with the cross-sectional structure of the data I estimate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. In two regression models, my arguments on the relationship between ideological congruence with the content of specific immigration policies and political support are tested. Because of the representativeness of the dataset for the German population and the random assignment of respondents to treatment and control groups (see sections 3.1 and 3.2), the models do not include any control variables (see Ziller & Helbling, 2021).

Models M1 and M2 test my hypotheses on the effects of ideological congruence with the specific immigration policies on political support. To do so, the models regress policy support (model M1) and political trust (model M2) on the policy treatment dummy, immigration preference, and an interaction term for the 2-way interaction between the policy treatment dummy and immigration preference.

In the results section (Section 4), the regression results for the models are discussed graphically by plotting predicted values (marginal effects). While the political trust plot shows the predicted effect of all values of the policy treatment dummy on political trust (including that of the control group as a baseline condition), the plot for policy support does not show an effect for the control group. This is because there are no observations for the control group on the outcome variable of policy support, as the control group (who received no treatment vignette) was not asked about policy support in the questionnaire as a result of the study design (see Section 3.2).

4 Empirical Results

What is the impact of the congruence of specific asylum and labor migration policies with an individual's immigration preference on her level of political support?

A first look at the descriptive results shows that there is variation in the support of the policies among the respondents (i.e., responses above the middle category of the 11-point scales). The share of policy support is highest for the restrictive labor migration policy (49 percent) and lowest for the restrictive asylum policy (34 percent). Support for the liberal asylum policy and the liberal labor migration policy are 46 percent and 43 percent, respectively. Political trust is only at 24 percent.

In the following I will examine the main research question and related hypotheses (H1a-H3b) following the analytical strategy outlined in Section 3.4. First, Model M1 regresses the policy support outcome on the policy treatment dummy, immigration preference, and the term for the interaction between the policy treatment and immigration preference (see Table 78 in Appendix 3 for full regression outputs). Figure 12 illustrates the substantive meaning of the interaction, using the estimates from Model M1. Recall that because this model has policy support as the outcome variable, there is no baseline condition (i.e., the control group) to plot (see Section 3.4). The figure shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy at anti-immigration preferences (=gray circle) and pro-immigration preferences (=black diamond) on

policy support. Note that in the figure anti-immigration preferences are fixed at responses above the middle category of 5 (of the 0-10 scale) of the immigration preference variable and anti-immigration preferences at responses below 5. We can see that exposure to the two specific liberal immigration policies (i.e., the liberal asylum policy and the liberal labor migration policy) polarizes immigration opponents and proponents: both policies increase policy support among immigration opponents (=gray circles) and decrease policy support among immigration proponents (=black diamonds), respectively. The effects do not differ by whether these policies regulate asylum or labor migration. The findings in Figure 12 thus support the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ hypotheses H3a and H3b, which state that the effect of a particular policy on political support is a function of how liberal (or restrictive) the policy is rather than of the perceived social deservingness of the migrant group that the policy regulates (see discussion in Section 2.2).




Figure 12: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration preferences on policy support (2-way interaction)

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on policy support at anti-immigration attitudes (=gray circle) and pro-immigration attitudes (=black diamond), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M1 in Table 78 in Appendix 3. Anti- and pro-immigration attitudes are fixed at responses above and below the middle category of 5 of the immigration preference variable, respectively.

However, looking at the two specific restrictive policies (i.e., the restrictive asylum policy and the restrictive labor migration policy) shows that the respondents do consider the

deservingness of the migrant group regulated by the policy when expressing support for the policy, providing evidence for the ‘deservingness’ argument. I observe a consistent pattern in that both immigration opponents and proponents are comparably more supportive of policy restrictions for labor migrants than for asylum seekers. Thus, this finding supports the theoretical assumption that for immigration opponents (immigration proponents) exposure to the restrictive labor migration policy increases (decreases) policy support more (less) strongly than the restrictive asylum policy, corroborating Hypothesis H1b (Hypothesis H2b).

Second, in order to determine how ideological congruence influences political trust, Model M2 regresses the political trust outcome on the policy treatment dummy, immigration preference, and the term for the interaction between the policy treatment and immigration preference (see Table 79 in Appendix 3 for full regression outputs). Figure 13 illustrates the substantive meaning of the effect, using the estimates from Model M2. Recall that because this model has political trust as the outcome variable, I plotted the baseline condition (i.e., the control group) in the figure (see Section 3.4). We can see a consistent pattern across all laws: for both opponents and proponents of immigration exposure to none of the specific policies leads to levels of political trust that are significantly different from the baseline condition or from the other specific policies. Therefore, none of the hypotheses from the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ or the ‘deservingness’ frameworks are supported for political trust.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ I also calculated Models M3 and M4, which estimate the average effect of the policy treatment dummy on policy support and political trust, respectively, independent of a person’s immigration preference. The results from these models (see Figure 14 and Figure 15 in Appendix 3 for graphical representations and Table 80 and Table 81 in Appendix 3 for full regression outputs) are very similar to those from Models M1 and M2 as well as Figure 12 and Figure 13, supporting their findings.




Figure 13: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration preferences on policy political trust (2-way interaction)

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on political trust at anti-immigration attitudes (=gray circle) and pro-immigration attitudes (=black diamond), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M2 in Table 79 in Appendix 3. Anti- and pro-immigration attitudes are fixed at responses above and below the middle category of 5 of the immigration preference variable, respectively.

5 Robustness

As a robustness check I test whether the results presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13 remain stable after adding control variables to the models. To do so, I include (standard demographic) control variables that may affect political support, namely the respondents' year of age, gender, level of education, area of living, residency in West or East Germany, employment status, migration status, political ideology, and satisfaction with the personal economic situation. The results do not differ from those presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13 (see Table 80 and Table 81 in Appendix 3 for full regression outputs and information on the scaling of the control variables, and Figure 16 and Figure 17 in Appendix 3 for graphical illustrations of the effects).

6 Conclusion

Using a randomized controlled experiment with a representative sample in Germany, I have shown that the individual ideological (in-)congruence of specific labor migration and asylum

policies affects specific political support (i.e., policy support) but not more abstract political support (i.e., political trust). Second, I found that the congruence effects on policy support varied according to whether these asylum and labor migration policies were either liberal or restrictive. These findings show that, in line with the ‘restrictiveness-liberalness’ assumption, the liberal asylum and labor migration policies polarize pro-immigration and anti-immigration individuals, with both policies increasing policy support for the former and decreasing it for the latter. In contrast, restrictive asylum and labor migration policies are less polarizing and, instead, rather uniting as both pro-immigration and anti-immigration individuals support the restrictive labor migration policy more than the restrictive asylum policy. Thus, individuals seem to apply a ‘deservingness’ heuristic, but only to restrictive policies. This may be driven by a status quo bias expressed in the desire to maintain a society that is neither fully open nor fully closed to migrants (e.g., Beine et al., 2015; Helbling et al., 2020; Schultz et al., 2021), as is also reflected in the dominant public discourse (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; De Coninck, 2020).

These findings add important evidence to the literature investigating the effects of immigration policies on policy support (e.g., Clayton et al., 2021; Fraser & Murakami, 2022; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015) and political trust (Simon, 2023).

I conclude that the effects of individual ideological (in-)congruence with specific labor migration and asylum policies are limited to specific political support, not affecting more abstract political support. Second, I conclude that deservingness explains people’s support for specific asylum and labor migration policies (i.e., support for H2a-b, refutation of H3a), but only partially (i.e., support for H3b, refutation of H1a-b).

From the perspective of the broader literature, ideological (in-)congruence with specific asylum and labor migration policies is not relevant for short-term changes in political trust (in Germany), even though immigration is a divisive and emotionally charged political issue (e.g., Heath & Richards, 2019; Verkuyten, 2004; Verkuyten et al., 2017). Second, using unique policy treatments resembling the content of specific existing German policies, this study’s results corroborate Simon (2023), who finds substantively very small effects of immigration policy ‘outputs’ (Bjerre et al., 2015) on political trust in European countries using an aggregate country-level policy indicator. Third, the study illustrates that the deservingness concept explains public attitudes to immigration policy and that distinguishing between anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant individuals reveals overlaps in policy support (Newman et al., 2015), which

are driven by a shared perception of asylum seekers as more deserving than labor migrants (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017).

In terms of societal relevance, the lack of effects on political trust, a key measure of democratic well-being (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012, p. 740), qualifies the assumption that a lack of substantive representation in immigration policy is detrimental to liberal representative democracy (e.g., Freeman et al., 2013). Incongruence does not translate into political distrust, at least not in Germany in short-term. Second, the findings put into perspective Germany's and other Western European governments' efforts to create borders that are simultaneously open and closed (e.g., Schultz et al., 2021) in order to balance conflicting demands for representation and responsibility (Armingeon & Lutz, 2019; Hampshire, 2013). Regarding political trust, it appears that selective restrictions and differential treatment of different legal categories of migrants (Helbling et al., 2020; Schultz, 2020) does not succeed in narrowing the political trust gap between pro-immigration and anti-immigration individuals (e.g., McLaren, 2015). However, given that the results show some consensus among them in preferring restrictions on labor migrants over restrictions on asylum seekers (see also Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015), there may be some room for policymakers to maintain responsible asylum policies against public demands for restrictions (e.g., Van Hauwaert, 2023), at least when the status quo of selective restrictions is at stake. Finally, my study improves on studies using aggregate policy indicators or indicators with strong internal but weak external validity by highlighting the importance of using (descriptions of) real policies. These may lead to more realistic responses by putting respondents in the position of evaluating real policies that have real consequences for migrants.

While this study helps to understand how the content of certain immigration policies affects political support, it also has limitations. First, the strong focus on external validity comes at the price of low internal validity. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the use of treatments with stronger internal validity would also have led to effects on political trust. Second, because the study was conducted in Germany and the treatments designed to resemble German laws, the generalizability to other countries is limited.

Besides dealing with these problems of measurement, future studies could examine the effects of long-term (in-)congruence with immigration policy on abstract political support.

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Appendix 3

Table 73: Original wording of the laws used in the treatment vignettes – German original and translated into the English (continued on next page)

German original		English translation	
Source of the laws in German legislation	Content of the laws	Source of the laws in German legislation	Content of the laws
<p>§ 18c Abs. 1 Aufenthaltsgesetz; amended 1.6.2012 <i>Used for liberal labor migration policy treatment</i></p>	<p>„(1) Einem Ausländer, der über einen deutschen oder anerkannten Hochschulabschluss oder einem deutschen Hochschulabschluss vergleichbaren ausländischen Hochschulabschluss verfügt und dessen Lebensunterhalt gesichert ist, kann ein Aufenthaltstitel zur Suche nach einem der Qualifikation angemessenen Arbeitsplatz für bis zu sechs Monate erteilt werden. Der Aufenthaltstitel berechtigt nicht zur Erwerbstätigkeit.“</p>	<p>§ 18c (1) Residence Act; amended 1.6.2012 <i>Used for liberal labor migration policy treatment</i></p>	<p>“(1) A foreigner who holds a German or recognized foreign university degree or a foreign university degree comparable to a German university degree and whose livelihood is secured may be granted a residence permit for up to six months to look for a job appropriate to their qualifications. The residence permit does not entitle the holder to gainful employment.”</p>
<p>§ 6 Abs. 2 Nr. 2 Beschäftigungsverordnung; amended 1.7.2013 <i>Used for restrictive labor migration policy treatment</i></p>	<p>„(2) Für Ausländerinnen und Ausländer, die ihre Berufsqualifikation im Ausland erworben haben, kann die Zustimmung zur Ausübung einer der beruflichen Qualifikation entsprechenden Beschäftigung in einem staatlich anerkannten oder vergleichbar geregelten Ausbildungsberuf erteilt werden, wenn die nach den Regelungen des Bundes oder der Länder für die berufliche Anerkennung zuständige Stelle die Gleichwertigkeit der Berufsqualifikation mit einer inländischen qualifizierten Berufsausbildung festgestellt hat und [...]“</p>	<p>§ 6 (2) no. 2 Employment Regulation; amended 1.7.2013 <i>Used for restrictive labor migration policy treatment</i></p>	<p>“(2) Foreign nationals who have acquired their professional qualification abroad may be granted permission to pursue an occupation corresponding to their professional qualification in a state-recognized or comparably regulated training occupation if the body responsible for professional recognition in accordance with federal or state regulations has determined that the professional qualification is equivalent to qualified professional training in Germany and [...]”</p>
<p>§ 32 Abs. 1 Beschäftigungsverordnung; amended in 2015 <i>Used for liberal asylum policy treatment</i></p>	<p>„(1) Ausländerinnen und Ausländern, die eine Duldung besitzen, kann eine Zustimmung zur Ausübung einer Beschäftigung erteilt werden, wenn sie sich seit drei Monaten erlaubt, geduldet oder mit einer Aufenthaltsgestattung im Bundesgebiet aufhalten“.</p>	<p>§ 32 (1) Employment Regulation; amended in 2015 <i>Used for liberal asylum policy treatment</i></p>	<p>“(1) Foreign nationals who have a tolerated stay permit may be granted permission to take up employment if they have been permitted, tolerated or have a residence permit in the federal territory for three months”.</p>

<p>§ 61 Abs. 2 Asylgesetz; amended 20.10.2015 <i>Used for restrictive asylum policy treatment</i></p>	<p>„(2) Im Übrigen kann einem Asylbewerber, der sich seit drei Monaten gestattet im Bundesgebiet aufhält, abweichend von § 4 Abs. 3 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes die Ausübung einer Beschäftigung erlaubt werden, wenn die Bundesagentur für Arbeit zugestimmt hat oder durch Rechtsverordnung bestimmt ist, dass die Ausübung der Beschäftigung ohne Zustimmung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit zulässig ist. Ein geduldeter oder rechtmäßiger Voraufenthalt wird auf die Wartezeit nach Satz 1 angerechnet. Die §§ 39, 40 Absatz 1 Nummer 1 und Absatz 2 und die §§ 41 und 42 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes gelten entsprechend. Einem Ausländer aus einem sicheren Herkunftsstaat gemäß § 29a, der nach dem 31. August 2015 einen Asylantrag gestellt hat, darf während des Asylverfahrens die Ausübung einer Beschäftigung nicht erlaubt werden. Absatz 1 Satz 2 bleibt unberührt.“</p>	<p>§ 61 (2) Asylum Act; amended 20.10.2015 <i>Used for restrictive asylum policy treatment</i></p> <p>“(2) In addition, an asylum seeker who has been permitted to stay in the federal territory for three months may be permitted to take up employment, notwithstanding Section 4 (3) of the Residence Act, if the Federal Employment Agency has given its consent or if it has been determined by statutory order that employment is permitted without the consent of the Federal Employment Agency. A tolerated or lawful previous stay shall be counted towards the waiting period according to sentence 1. Sections 39, 40 (1) no. 1 and (2) and Sections 41 and 42 of the Residence Act shall apply accordingly. A foreigner from a safe country of origin pursuant to Section 29a who has submitted an application for asylum after August 31, 2015 may not be permitted to work during the asylum procedure. Paragraph 1 sentence 2 remains unaffected.”</p>
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Note: The text in the grey areas was used to construct the treatment vignettes. Translated from German to the English with www.DeepL.com/Translator.

Table 74: Overview of the sample

Treatment groups and control group	N	%
Control Group	200	18.02
Liberal asylum policy group	206	18.56
Liberal labor migration policy group	221	19.91
Restrictive asylum policy group	226	20.36
Restrictive labor migration policy group	257	23.15
Total	1,110	100.00

Table 75: Question wordings of outcome and independent variables (author’s translations from German to the English) (continued on next page)

Variable names	Question wordings	Answers
<i>Political trust</i>	How much do you personally trust the following public institutions and groups of people? ... Political parties ... Bundestag ... Politicians	Not at all (1) to completely (11)
<i>Immigration attitude</i>	Would you say it is generally bad or good for Germany’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? And, using this card, would you say that Germany’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Is Germany’s made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	Bad for the economy (1) to good for the economy (11) Cultural life undermined (1) to cultural life enriched (11) Worse place to live (1) to better place to live (11)
<i>Support for the...</i>	In recent years, various laws have been enacted which newly regulate the entry and residence of immigrants and asylum seekers in Germany. In the following we will describe one of these laws and would like to know what your personal opinion is about it. Please tell us now to what extent you support or do not support the following legislative amendment.	
<i>... liberal asylum policy</i>	“A change in federal law facilitates in comparison to previous years the labor market access of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers can be given approval to work already after three months of residence in Germany.”	Not at all (1) to completely (5)
<i>... liberal labor migration policy</i>	“A change in federal law facilitates in comparison to previous years the issue of a residence permit for foreign nationals of non-EU-states for the purpose of employment in Germany. Foreign nationals with a university degree get, even if they do not have an employment contract, a six-month residence permit, in order to search during that time an employment that fits their university degree.”	Not at all (1) to completely (5)
<i>... restrictive asylum policy</i>	“A change in federal law exacerbates in comparison to previous years the labor market access of asylum seekers from	Not at all (1) to completely (5)

so called safe countries of origin. Asylum seekers whose country of origin is classified as secure and who are therefore supposedly not persecuted cannot enter an employment during the asylum procedure.”

... restrictive labor migration policy

“A change in federal law exacerbates in comparison to previous years the issue of a residence permit for foreigners from non-EU-states for the purpose of employment in Germany. Foreigners with a vocational qualification acquired abroad only receive a temporary work permit if they can prove the equivalence of their vocational training to German standards before entering the country”.

Not at all (1) to completely (5)

Table 76: Summary statistics for key outcome and key independent variables (continuous)

Indicator	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Policy support	5.57	3.38	0	10	909
Political trust	3.34	2.61	0	10	1,095
Immigration attitudes	5.66	2.7	0	10	1,107

Table 77: Summary statistics for key independent variable (dummy)

Indicator	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Policy treatment			
0 Control group	200	18.02	18.02
1 Liberal asylum policy	206	18.56	36.58
2 Liberal labor migration policy	221	19.91	56.49
3 Restrictive asylum policy	226	20.36	76.85
4 Restrictive labor migration policy	257	23.15	100.00

Table 78: Main regression models for policy support

	Model M1 (policy support)	Model M3 (policy support)
Treatment (ref. Liberal asylum policy)		
Liberal labor migration policy	0.154 (0.633)	-0.254 (0.323)
Restrictive asylum policy	-6.821*** (0.637)	-0.782* (0.321)
Restrictive labor migration policy	-5.320*** (0.645)	0.882** (0.312)
Immigration attitudes	-0.808*** (0.0756)	
Treatment X Immigration attitudes (ref. Liberal asylum policy X Immigration attitudes)		
Liberal labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	-0.0578 (0.102)	
Restrictive asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	1.089*** (0.102)	
Restrictive labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	1.107*** (0.104)	
Constant	10.07*** (0.465)	5.583*** (0.232)
Observations	907	909

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 14: Illustration of the effect of the policy treatment on policy support

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on policy support, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M3 in Table 78 in Appendix 3.

Table 79: Main regression models for political trust

	Model M2 (political trust)	Model M4 (political trust)
Treatment (ref. Control group)		
Liberal asylum policy	0.200 (0.539)	-0.0909 (0.262)
Liberal labor migration policy	-0.197 (0.519)	0.105 (0.257)
Restrictive asylum policy	-0.714 (0.523)	-0.201 (0.256)
Restrictive labor migration policy	0.306 (0.530)	-0.156 (0.249)
Immigration attitudes	-0.452*** (0.0616)	
Treatment X immigration attitudes (ref. Control group X Immigration attitudes)		
Liberal asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	-0.0630 (0.0865)	
Liberal labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	0.0501 (0.0824)	
Restrictive asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	0.0898 (0.0830)	
Restrictive labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	-0.0770 (0.0844)	
Constant	5.983*** (0.388)	3.415*** (0.188)
Observations	1093	1095

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Figure 15: Illustration of the effect of the policy treatment on political trust

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on political trust, with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M4 in Table 79 in Appendix 3.

Table 80: Robustness test. Policy support model with control variables (continued on next page)

	M5 (policy support)
Treatment (ref. Liberal asylum policy)	
Liberal labor migration policy	0.176 (0.631)
Restrictive asylum policy	-6.902*** (0.637)
Restrictive labor migration policy	-5.188*** (0.640)
Immigration attitudes	-0.754*** (0.0795)
Treatment X immigration attitudes (ref. Liberal asylum policy X Immigration attitudes)	
Liberal labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	-0.0666 (0.101)
Restrictive asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	1.133*** (0.103)
Restrictive labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	1.080*** (0.103)
Gender (ref. Male)	
female	-0.130 (0.191)
Age	0.0191** (0.00696)

Education (ref. Medium)	
Low	0.195 (0.240)
High	0.510* (0.243)
Living in West/East Germany (ref. West)	
East	0.245 (0.256)
Political ideology	0.0737 (0.0498)
Satisfaction with personal econ. situation	0.154*** (0.0372)
Employment status (ref. Employed)	
Unemployed	-0.0330 (0.461)
Living area (ref. City or small city)	
Large city	0.0852 (0.245)
Suburb or outskirts of a large city	0.210 (0.306)
Village	0.523* (0.264)
Farm house or house in the country	-0.0506 (0.724)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)	
2nd generation immigrants	-0.202 (0.351)
1st generation immigrants	-0.209 (0.547)
Constant	9.419*** (0.541)
Observations	889

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note. Model M5 includes a full set of control variables. After centering the continuous control variables to the total grand mean and setting the dummy control variables to zero, the constant in all regressions in Model M5 represents the average level of policy support for a citizen that is 45 years of age, male, has a medium education, lives in a city or small city in West Germany, is employed, is native born with native background (i.e., respondent and respondent's parents were born in Germany), has an on average political ideology (5.7 on a scale ranging from 1 'left' to 11 'right'), and an on average satisfaction with his personal economic situation (6 on a scale ranging from 1 'very dissatisfied' to 11 'very satisfied').




Figure 16: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration preferences on policy support (2-way interaction); with control variables

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on policy support at anti-immigration attitudes (=gray circle) and pro-immigration attitudes (=black diamond), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M5 in Table 80 in Appendix 3. Anti- and pro-immigration attitudes are fixed at responses above and below the middle category of 5 of the immigration preference variable, respectively.

Table 81: Robustness test. Political trust model with control variables (continued on next page)

	M6 (political trust)
Treatment (ref. Control group)	
Liberal asylum policy	-0.297 (0.525)
Liberal labor migration policy	-0.446 (0.502)
Restrictive asylum policy	-0.874 (0.508)
Restrictive labor migration policy	0.0367 (0.511)
Immigration attitudes	-0.413*** (0.0608)
Treatment X immigration attitudes (ref. Control group X Immigration attitudes)	
Liberal asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	0.0175 (0.0842)
Liberal labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	0.0911 (0.0796)
Restrictive asylum policy X Immigration attitudes	0.116 (0.0811)

Restrictive labor migration policy X Immigration attitudes	-0.0549 (0.0815)
Gender (ref. Male)	
female	-0.129 (0.137)
Age	-0.0192*** (0.00498)
Education (ref. Medium)	
Low	0.0697 (0.170)
High	-0.160 (0.173)
Living in West/East Germany (Ref. West)	
East	0.0527 (0.182)
Political ideology	0.0202 (0.0354)
Satisfaction with personal econ. situation	0.246*** (0.0263)
Employment status (ref. Employed)	
Unemployed	-0.0147 (0.325)
Living area (ref. City or small city)	
Large city	0.237 (0.173)
Suburb or outskirts of large city	0.182 (0.217)
Village	0.341 (0.190)
Farm house or house in the country	0.0301 (0.534)
Migration status (ref. Nat. born with nat. backgr.)	
2nd generation immigrants	-0.0381 (0.255)
1st generation immigrants	0.236 (0.388)
Constant	5.729*** (0.410)
<hr/>	
Observations	1071

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note. Model M6 includes a full set of control variables. After centering the continuous control variables to the total grand mean and setting the dummy control variables to zero, the constant in all regressions in Model M6 represents the average level of policy support for a citizen that is 45 years of age, male, has a medium education, lives in a city or small city in West Germany, is employed, is native born with native background (i.e., respondent and respondent's parents were born in Germany), has an on average political ideology (5.7 on a scale ranging from 1 'left' to 11 'right'), and an on average satisfaction with his personal economic situation (6 on a scale ranging from 1 'very dissatisfied' to 11 'very satisfied').




Figure 17: Illustration of the conditional effect of immigration preferences on political trust (2-way interaction); with control variables

Note. Shows the predicted effect of the policy treatment dummy on political trust at anti-immigration attitudes (=gray circle) and pro-immigration attitudes (=black diamond), with 95% confidence intervals. Predictions are based on Model M6 in Table 81 in Appendix 3. Anti- and pro-immigration attitudes are fixed at responses above and below the middle category of 5 of the immigration preference variable, respectively.