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TURKMEN PRINCES AND RELIGIOUS DIGNITARIES: A SKETCH IN GROUP PROFILES

In the last decades of the fourteenth and throughout the fifteenth century in the regions of western Iran, Azarbaijan, eastern Anatolia, and parts of upper Mesopotamia the semi-nomadic Qaraqoyunlu and Aqqoyunlu tribal confederations fought for political dominance not only over the two confederations but also within their respective leading clans, the Baharlu/Barani and the Bayandur. Although they succeeded, one after the other, in founding something like an empire — or at least in controlling a considerable amount of territory — from the very beginning their successes were threatened by their approach to political power governed by long established Turco-Mongolian patterns.¹

In 1501 contingents of the Qizilbash, the militant followers of the Safavid Sufi order, first defeated the Aqqoyunlu prince Alvand, then conquered Tabriz, and finally proclaimed their fifteen-year-old idol Isma'il Safavi, a grandson of Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu, as shah of Iran. This represented more than just one Turkmen prince gaining a victory over another — as had so often been the case for the previous hundred and fifty years² — because what distinguished Isma'il from his predecessors in the eyes of his devoted followers, and made him so irresistibly attractive, was the way he combined spiritual guidance with his claims to temporal rulership. In doing this, he not only created a new type of ruler, which replaced the model represented in western Iran by the Turkmen princes, but he also upset the well-established interplay between the temporal ruler and the elite of the religious class.³

What had been the deficiencies of this outmoded “Turkmen” type of sovereign and what kind of relationship had the ruler had with religious institutions and their representatives?

Contemporary narrative sources⁴ give endless accounts of armed conflicts between the rival confederations as well as of internecine strife. They describe the relative abilities of the various pretenders; that is to say, they reveal both the winners and the losers in this power play. Occasionally they insert statements as to the character, conduct, and piety of individual princes. What is

striking is the sharp contrast drawn between good and evil in the portraits most contemporary chroniclers provide of Jahan Shah Qaraqoyunlu and Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu: while Uzun Hasan is unanimously praised as a just and lawful ruler, Jahan Shah is generally blamed for his cruelty and his dissipated and impious life.⁵ A closer look at the authors of these statements suggests that prejudice triggered by self-interest was not the only factor to affect their judgments of these rulers. Their bias could also well be interpreted as a tribute to the Aqqoyunlu, the winners.⁶

As to the often assumed Shi'i-Sunni opposition between the Qaraqoyunlu and Aqqoyunlu, the evidence is and will remain far from clear.⁷ We must even beware of trying to apply rigid categories of Sunni or Shi'i to the Turkmen princes. Such labels do not explain their ambiguous and sometimes changeable religious stance.⁸

Faced with such more or less doubtful, unreliable assessments of individual princes, one would do well to check these judgments against the background of the whole group. If one examines the male members of the leading clans of the two confederations (the Bayandur and the Baharlu/Barani⁹) as a sample, one can clearly identify — beyond differences of personal character — a remarkable conformity in terms of motivation, purpose, and methods of action, strategies of behavior, legitimizing activity, and self-presentation. These congruent features of approximately one hundred and fifty individuals are to be explained readily by social pressures within the tribal environment shared by them all.

As is well known, affiliation with the supreme clan was at the same time a source of legitimacy and of internal strife. In the absence of a generally approved order of succession every prince claiming supreme leadership — and every candidate he designated as his successor — had to stand up against a band of kinsmen (sons, brothers, cousins, uncles, or nephews), who did not hesitate to shed his blood.¹⁰ His means of achieving success were limited: he could either eliminate his rivals or he could win them over by allotting territories to them as appanages.¹¹ Territorial expansion was a natural

precondition for this appanage system, and it also strengthened the prince's authority. Sometimes marriage alliances proved to be useful for settling quarrels. Whoever succeeded tried to secure the succession to power for his own progeny and to exclude the offspring of his brothers, cousins, and so on.

Anyone not generally accepted as supreme leader of the clan and sovereign of the dominant principality or empire, and who at the same time refused to give up his ambitions and submit to one of his rivals was likely in due course to be exterminated. Many Turkmen pretenders could not accept being losers and preferred exile to submission. When they went into exile, they then often tried to garner support for their cause from the hosts — the Ottomans, Mamluks, Timurids, or even *the leaders of the opposing confederation* — who had given them shelter. The regularity with which this scenario recurred in ever new variations, and in the process decimated the clans, suggests that for the persons involved there was no alternative.

It is well known that in pre-modern times membership in the social group into which an individual was born largely determined his range of profession or career and marriage possibilities. This was true for all four classes of society, which contemporary thinkers subdivided into “men of the sword” (the Turkmen military class), “men of the pen” (the administrative and fiscal functionaries, the clergy, poets, doctors of medicine, etc.), the men of business (artisans and merchants) and husbandmen.¹² Special knowledge, skills, and techniques were not available to everyone to the same extent. The transmission of knowledge and skills, as well as of the value judgments pertaining to them, was organized within one's respective group or even within one's family. This at least partly explains the strong tendency toward hereditary function or office in this type of society.¹³

The Turkmen princes were no exception. Embedded as they were in a tribal background their descent and training forced them to behave the way they did as men of the sword. A son of a qadi had a good chance of becoming a qadi too; but, depending on circumstances or personal inclination, he could opt for some other occupation. A Turkmen prince, however, hardly had an analogous choice.

So far we have dealt with the expectations which the tribal milieu encouraged in Turkmen princes and which clearly forced the candidate to prove his charisma as a leader and abilities as a warrior. If he gained control of the empire, or even of a major province,

however, the prince was confronted with a Muslim and sedentary majority whose taxes and services he needed as badly as their administrative and fiscal know-how. Consequently in dealing with his sedentary subjects an additional set of expectations and obligations affected the self-image which he had promoted. Also relevant in this connection was the already somewhat threadbare but still prevalent ideal of social order, which had been elaborated in learned treatises and edifying writings and culminated in the concept of the temporal ruler as the shadow of God on earth. It called for an absolute and powerful monarch, who protected his subjects from violence and arbitrariness, dispensed justice, and kept everyone in his proper place. In return he could claim obedience, service, dues, and taxes.¹⁴ This all too well known model of society with its final aim of a harmonious stasis reveals the tremendous desire of the sedentary population for continuity and security. Yet these ideals were all too often abandoned by the very monarchs who should have put them into effect.

Although in the long run the Turkmen princes were dependent on the prosperity of their sedentary subjects — and therefore should have fostered the same ideal of peaceful harmony — they were unable to reconcile their Turkmen way of domination with the requirements of a monarch reigning over city and village dwellers. This shortcoming was compensated for, at least on a symbolic level, by using a set of prerequisites which were conventionally attached to the role of a ruler. Employing these accessories was a sign that a given Turkmen prince was a proper ruler and placed him within an ancient, if largely fictional, tradition of rulership. Besides, certain expressions of sovereignty associated with legitimacy were essential for anyone who wanted to be recognized as a monarch. Briefly these were to have coins struck and the khutba read in the ruler's name, to have a capital, and to adorn this capital with buildings, although the numerous campaigns and the necessity of moving from summer to winter pastures commonly required long-term absences from the imperial residence. The Mongol Ilkhans, who had revived Iran as political entity,¹⁵ had made Tabriz their most impressive capital.¹⁶ That the Qaraqoyunlu, Aqqoyunlu, and the Safavids proclaimed themselves rulers of Iran as soon as they had conquered Tabriz, even if the rest of Iran was not under their dominion, cannot be explained by rational motives alone. It shows rather that the possession of this city was of great symbolic importance. It conferred the notion of sovereignty upon the claimant to the throne.¹⁷

To erect a mausoleum for oneself and one's family was not the prerogative of kings, but it was an effective means of imperial display. The tomb complexes of Jahan Shah and Uzun Hasan in Tabriz — the Muzaffariyya and Nasriyya — probably imitated the prestigious enterprises of the Ilkhans, especially Ghazan's mausoleum in the Shanb-i Ghazan of Tabriz.¹⁸ To refer to established models to create fictional traditions are basic techniques that recur in many facets of pre-modern Iranian cultural life. If one examines, for instance, the often tedious strings of ornamental epithets which usually accompany the mention of any ruler's name, an impressive share of them compares him to famous predecessors, including the mythical kings of the *Shahnama* or the Mongol khaqans.¹⁹ Patronizing artisans and poets, making charitable endowments for public welfare, and having a chronicler at one's disposal to record one's "world-conquering campaigns" were all further elements in the ritual of imperial display.²⁰

One of the indispensable obligations of a king was respect and veneration for the religious class. The proper expression of this high esteem was generosity. The motives for veneration of the religious classes mentioned in princely *soyūrghāls* and endowment deeds were many. Most important were descent from the family of the Prophet, eminent learning, exemplary piety, and long-established family tradition in holding a special office or privilege.

The first to be mentioned are the presumably innumerable sayyids, who held a privileged status merely by virtue of their descent from the Prophet. They were by no means confined to the religious estate but were found in all classes of the sedentary population and therefore did not necessarily hold religious offices or dignities. Many of them were wealthy landowners and played a major role in the social and political life of the town or village where they lived. Hagiographical sources often depict them as advocates of the poor and deprived and as intermediaries between members of the military class or tax collectors and the victims of their oppression.²¹ Documents which proclaim exemptions or endowments for sayyids usually cite in their introductory parts verses from the Qur'an and hadith emphasizing that it is the ruler's duty to support the family of the Prophet. But there can be no doubt that in view of their large numbers only a limited group could have received the benefit of immediate royal favor. Within the sayyid group the *naqībs*, who were in charge of checking the correctness of genealogies and the assignment of pensions, held a

rather exalted position. It is therefore not surprising to find them frequently cited among the beneficiaries in the preserved documentary material.²²

The religious class — sayyid or not — properly defined was made up of those who had received a formal religious education at the madrasa and held any kind of religious office as mulla, preacher, mudarris, shaykh al-Islam, or qadi. Again we are anything but well informed about the mass of village mullas and low-ranking ulama in the towns. Evidence throws light predominantly on the elite among the ulama, who not seldom were members of real clerical dynasties that could look back on a centuries-old family tradition.²³ Locally they were of considerable influence for the same reasons that applied in the case of the more wealthy sayyids: in their function as landowners, beneficiaries, and benefactors. But their authority was not, or not exclusively, bound to their noble birth. As experts on the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, and the divine law, who often additionally excelled in the various branches of Islamic learning and philosophy, they formed the intellectually sophisticated branch of the "men of the pen." They were masters of written and oral communication. Their correspondence with their colleagues, or even with royal houses in far away metropolises, bestowed at least upon the most brilliant of them a cosmopolitan flair. As Friday preachers, imams, and holders of the office of shaykh al-Islam, their professional eloquence gave them wide possibilities for influencing public opinion. This was true also in questions of political life. As qadis they were endowed with executive power and were, above all, representatives of divine law and authority, which at least theoretically was superior to any temporal power.²⁴ Rootedness in a village or town and the resulting familiarity with the local situation furnished them with a degree of local support which governors and rulers could not easily neglect. There were thus plenty of good reasons for honoring at least the most prominent of these men of influence.

An impressive example is the Dashtaki family who had lived in Shiraz since at least the eleventh century. The *naqībs* of Shiraz and several reputed religious scholars were members of this family. In the Turkmen period Sadr al-Din Muhammad Dashtaki (1425–98), who achieved prominence through his scholarly disputes with Jalaladdin Davvani and as founder of the Mansuriyya madrasa in Shiraz, managed to gain support from successive Turkmen rulers. But finally his local influence became a menace to Aqqoyunlu aspirations, and he was murdered by the adherents of Qasim Beg Pur-

nak who saw in him a leader of local opposition. Notwithstanding this unfortunate fate, his son Ghiyath al-Din Mansur (d. 1541) held the office of *ṣadr* for a short period under Shah Tahmasp, but resigned proudly from this office when frustrated by a dispute with the Arab Shi'ite newcomer Shaykh 'Ali al-Karaki. In the Safavid period they even married into the royal family. Several members of the Dashtaki family lived in Mecca, while another branch served — and even intermarried with — the Qutbshahs of Haydarabad. Descendants of the family still lived in Shiraz in the nineteenth century, the most prominent of whom was Hasan-i Fasa'i, the author of the *Fārsnāma-yi Nāsirī*.²⁵ In cultural identity, custom, and value system, the distinction between the clerical elite and the Turkmen military leaders was even more sharply drawn than that between the military and the rest of the sedentary population, a fact reflected in the almost total absence of intermarriage. It is, however, by no means clear which side thought such intermarriage to be a misalliance. There are no examples of Turkmen princes choosing a career in the clerical estate.²⁶ Some prominent representatives of the religious class could occasionally be found in a Turkmen prince's entourage, even accompanying his campaigns, but of course in their function as religious dignitary and not primarily as warriors.

Suggesting an analogy to previous conditions, the members of the religious class could be labeled as "elements of continuity," while those of the military class, the Turkmens, are seen as "elements of change."²⁷ The amazing ability of the first-mentioned group to keep certain offices and dignities (*qadī*, *naqīb*, *mutavallī*) as well as real estate, within a family for centuries is not only attributable to their less competitive family life. Ironically they owed their lasting existence to their flexibility vis-à-vis changing rulers. To see that the Dashtaki family was not exceptional, one has only to look at the series of documents that confirm members of one of the same family — for instance, as administrators of sanctuaries — bearing the names of several temporal rulers belonging to competing dynasties. The documents concerning the family that for at least one hundred and fifty years provided the *naqīb* of Qum and *mutavallī* of the endowments of the Fatima-yi Ma'suma report the approval of Timur, Shahrukh, Jahan Shah Qaraqoyunlu, Uzun Hasan, and Alvand Aqqoyunlu and several Safavid shahs.²⁸

As for the side of "the elements of change," the Turkmen princes, it was their lack of ability to cope with changing conditions, their rigid persistence in tra-

ditional patterns of domination, that made them not only the subject but also the object of change. With the Safavid rise to power they were swept away within a few years.

The unexpected challenge which was responsible for their sudden disappearance from the stage of history was a result of new trends affecting the religious climate. Locally based Sufi shaykhs drew large crowds, and Sufi orders were emerging everywhere in Iran. They were looked upon by the religious class with some jealousy and suspicion. In contrast to the sayyids and the ulama, they derived their authority mainly from their expertise in spiritual affairs and from their charisma. They won the hearts of the common people, who we must suppose were largely illiterate, more easily than did the intellectual urban ulama.²⁹ The fifteenth century also witnessed a whole series of millenarian Mahdi movements — the Hurufiyya, Nurbakhshiyya, Musha'asha' — which were very popular with city and village dwellers.³⁰ But the spiritual approach to the divine proved to be attractive for the Turkmen element of society as well. Various Turkmen rulers sought the company of Sufi shaykhs and were even eager to establish family ties with them: Jahan Shah Qaraqoyunlu married his favorite daughter to a descendant of Shah Ni'matullah Vali and both Shaykh Haydar and Isma'il Safavi had Aqqoyunlu mothers.³¹ Unfortunately for the Turkmen princes, they did not realize that the kind of attachment their tribal common folk and above all the Turkmen Qizilbash contingents of Anatolia fostered for the shaykhs of the Safavid order was threatening their own status as leaders. They had been living in a kind of mutual consent with the urban ulama as to what spheres of influence each maintained and what role each was to play. They could coexist because of their dissimilarity. It was a relationship of mutual respect and clear-cut, separate competence.

In the case of Sufi shaykhs, things were different. Although primarily not interested in temporal rule, they became, by virtue of their warlike adherents, men of considerable influence. It was only a little extra step to merge spiritual with temporal aspirations. In the eyes of their devotees this made it worthwhile to change loyalties. The resulting reunification of the temporal and spiritual by Isma'il Safavi was also to threaten the Iranian ulama, many of whom went into exile. Those who stayed behind had to stand up not only against a shah who combined the charisma of the warrior with the charisma of the divine, but also against newly imported competitors: the Shi'ite clergy from Arab coun-

tries, who would try to oust them from their inherited positions.³²

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NOTES

- For detailed presentations and analyses of these patterns, see John E. Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire. A Study in 9th/15th Century Turko-Iranian Politics* (Minneapolis-Chicago, 1976), esp. pp. 7–16; John Masson Smith, “Turanian Nomadism and Iranian Politics,” *Iranian Studies* 11 (1978): 57–81; Joseph Fletcher, “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46 (1986): 11–50; Bert G. Fragner, “Historische Wurzeln neuzeitlicher iranischer Identität: zur Geschichte des politischen Begriffs «Iran» im späten Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit,” *Studia semitica necnon iranica. Rudolpho Macuch septuagenario ab amicis et discipulis dedicata*, edd. Maria Macuch, Christa Müller-Kessler, Bert G. Fragner (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 79–100, esp. pp. 782–88.
- Narratives of the eventful Turkmen period in Iranian history, Mukrimin Halil Yananç, “Akkoyunlular,” *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 251–70; Faruk Sümer, “Kara-Koyunlular,” *ibid.*, vol. 6 (Istanbul, 1955), pp. 292–305; idem, *Kara Koyunlular*, vol. 1 (Ankara, 1967); Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*; Hans Robert Roemer, “The Türkmen Dynasties,” *Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6 (1986), pp. 147–88; idem, *Persien auf dem Weg in die Neuzeit: Iranische Geschichte von 1350–1750* (Beirut, 1989) (Beiruter Texte und Studien 40), pp. 173–218 (with extensive bibliography).
- See, for instance, the network of mutual interests between Uzun Hasan and high-ranking ulama as depicted by Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, pp. 118 sq.
- These sources are listed and discussed in detail in the bibliographical sections of the works cited in n. 2.
- A typical example of the way most sources inveigh against Jahan Shah is to be found in the *Tārīkh al-Ghiyāthī*, where he is reproached for his excessive drinking (and consequently for being a late riser) and for his neglect of prayer. See Marianne Schmidt-Dumont, *Turkmenische Herrscher des 15. Jahrhunderts in Persien und Mesopotamien nach dem Tārīkh al-Ghiyāthī* (Freiburg i. Br., 1970) (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 6), pp. 59 sq., pp. 145 sq.
- Abū Bakr-i Tihriānī, the author of the *Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya* (edd. N. Lugal and F. Sümer, 2 vols. [Ankara, 1962–64]), was the official chronicler of the Aqqoyunlu and an intimate of Uzun Hasan (*Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya*, vol. 1, pp. xii, xvi; Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, p. 21); Faḍlallāh b. Rūzbihān Khunjī (d. 1521), who wrote the *Tārīkh-i ‘ālamārā-yi Aminī* for Sultan Ya‘qūb ‘Aqqoyunlu, spent four years at the court of this prince (see Vladimir Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478–1490* [London, 1957], pp. 1–8; Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, pp. 21 f.); the pro-Aqqoyunlu attitude of the Egyptians Ibn Taghrībīrdī (d. 1469; see his *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fi mulūk Miṣr wa’l-Qāhira*, vol. 17, p. 119; Schmidt-Dumont *Turkmenische Herrscher des 15. Jahrhunderts*), and al-Sakhāwī (d. 1497, *al-Ḍau al-lāmī‘*, 12 pts. in 6 vols. [Beirut n.d.], vols. 3–4, p. 80), could well reflect the circumstance that Uzun Hasan had at least twice, (in 1452 and 1469) — although only symbolically — recognized Mamluk suzerainty. Al-Ghiyath also shows sympathy for the Aqqoyunlu (see Schmidt-Dumont, *Turkmenische Herrscher des 15. Jahrhunderts*, p. 9 and pp. 59–60). Moreover, all of them witnessed Uzun Hasan’s final success and with it the downfall of the Qaraqoyunlu. As for Jahan Shah, it is worth noting that ‘Abd al-Razzāq Beg Samarqandī (d. 1482), who met the Qaraqoyunlu chief in Herat, is not, as is generally assumed, the only one who draws a favorable picture and praises him for justice and efficiency (see *Matla‘ al-sa‘dain*, ed. Muḥammad Shaḥī‘, 2 vols. (Lahore, 1941–49), 2: 1148–84; 1271–74. We also have the contemporary statements of Aḥmad b. Husain b. ‘Ali al-Kātib, who even sees Jahan Shah as the one to bring peace and order (*Tārīkh-i ja‘id-i Yazd*, ed. Iraj Afshar [Tehran, 1975], see pp. 11, 159). Jahan Shah’s benevolence toward the inhabitants of Yazd was still remembered by Muḥammad Mufid Mustauḥ Bāfqi in the seventeenth century (*Jāmi‘-i Mufidī*, ed. Iraj Afshar, vol. 1 [Tehran, 1963], pp. 208–9).
- For the sometimes controversial judgments on the religious scene in the Turkmen period, see B. S. Amoretti, “Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods,” *Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6 (1986), pp. 610–55; Roemer, *Persien auf dem Weg in die Neuzeit*, pp. 198–200; 221–25; 233–48.
- Only Aspad Qaraqoyunlu is clearly identified as Shi‘ite by Nūrallāh Shūshārī in his *Majālis al-mu‘minīn* (ed. Ḥājī Sayyid Aḥmad Kitābchī mudīr, 2 vols. in 1, 2: 395). Veneration for ‘Ali and the Twelve Imams — often taken as an indication of Shi‘ite inclinations — is a widespread phenomenon of this period and says almost nothing about religious affiliation. See Hamid Algar, “Some Observations on Religion in Safavid Persia,” *Iranian Studies* 7 (1974): 287–93.
- The genealogical tables in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. “Akkoyunlular and Kara-Koyunlular” (1: 264–65; 6: 299), mention about 150 individuals. Unfortunately exact data concerning birth, career, age, cause of death, etc., are only available for the more prominent of them, and even that information is scattered in the sources. Therefore the profile of the group remains a rather rough one.
- This phenomenon has generally been described by Western authors as predominantly destructive and as revealing deficiency in establishing a clear mode of succession such as primogeniture. Fletcher, who tries to explain it in the case of the Mongols, refers to an anthropological concept of Jack Goody (*Succession to High Office* [Cambridge, 1966]), and uses the term “tanistry”, which he describes as a clever procedure for ensuring the most competent member of the leading clan as leader (see “The Mongols,” pp. 17, 24–48).
- Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, pp. 12–13.
- Ann K. S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic, and Social History, 11th–14th Century* (Albany, N.Y., 1988) (Columbia Lectures on Iranian Studies 2), p. 223.
- Ibid.*, p. 297; Jean Aubin, “Shah Ismail et les notables de l’Iraq persan,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 2 (1959): 39.
- Cf. Ann K. S. Lambton, “Quis custodiet custodes,” *Studia Islamica* 5 (1956): 125–48; 6 (1956): 125–46; idem, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (London, 1980).
- See Fragner, “Historische Wurzeln.”
- Cf. Karl Jahn, “Tābris — ein mittelalterliches Kulturzentrum zwischen Ost und West,” *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaft-*

- ten, *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1968, pp. 201–12.
17. Fragner, "Historische Wurzeln," pp. 89 f.
 18. Ghazan himself was inspired by the shrines of Mashad, Najaf, and Baghdad, and by the mausoleum of Sultan Sanjar at Marv which he clearly tried to surpass; Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlallāh Hamadānī, *Jāmi' al-tawārīkh*, ed. Bahman Karīmī, vol. 2 (3d ed., Tehran, 1988), p. 997. The mausolea of Ghazan Khan, Jahan Shah, and Uzun Hasan at Tabriz each formed the nucleus of large-scale endowment complexes, the imperial character of which did not fail to impress visitors even when the buildings fell into decay. Cf. Muḥammad Javād Mashkūr, *Tārīkh-i Tabrīz tā pāyān-i qam-i nuhum-i hijrī* (Tehran, 1973), pp. 472–92; 651–89; 740–46.
 19. We can find passages with such epithets not only in the well-known narrative sources cited above, but also in the published documentary material of the time. See, for instance, the relevant section of Bert Fragner's *Repertorium persischer Herrscherurkunden. Publiizierte Originalurkunden* (Freiburg i. Br., 1980), pp. 31–51.
 20. See, for instance, the efforts of Sultan Ya'qub Aqqoyunlu to develop royal splendor at Tabriz; see Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, pp. 150 sq.
 21. Cf. the classical study of Jean Aubin, *Deux sayyids de Bam au XVe siècle: Contribution à l'histoire de l'Iran timouride*.
 22. See Fragner, *Repertorium persischer Herrscherurkunden*, nos. 36, 43, 72, 73, 81, 85, 87.
 23. See Aubin, "Shāh Ismā'īl et les notables," pp. 37–81; Rosemarie Quiring-Zoche, *Isfahan im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur persischen Stadtgeschichte* (Freiburg i. Br., 1980 [Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 54]), pp. 169–79; 210–53.
 24. Erika Glassen, "Schah Ismā'īl und die Theologen seiner Zeit," *Der Islam* 48 (1972): 254–68; Aubin, "Shāh Ismā'īl et les notables," Said Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam* (Chicago, 1984), pp. 122–59.
 25. For the family history, see Hājji Mīr Ḥasan Fasā'ī, *Tārīkh-i Fārsnāma-yi Nāṣirī*, ed. Manṣūr Rastagār Fasā'ī, 2 vols. (Tehran, 1988), for instance, pp. 21 sqq.; 351–60, pp. 1039 sqq.; 1057 sqq.; 1147 sqq; Shūshtarī, *Majālis al-mu'minīn*, 2: 229 ff.; Raḥmatallāh Mīhrāz, *Buzurgān-i Shīrāz* (Tehran, 1969), pp. 281–86, 309–12; Heribert Busse, *A History of Persia under Qajar Rule* (New York, 1972), pp. xiii–xxi; Glassen, "Shah Ismā'īl und die Theologen," pp. 256 sq. An endowment deed in favor of Sadr al-Din Muhammad Dashtaki by Qara Yusuf b. Jahanshah Qaraqoyunlu was published by Ḥusain Mudarrisī-Ṭabātabā'ī in *Farhang-i Iran Zamin* 20 (1974): 245–65 (cf. Birgitt Hoffmann, "Eine Stiftungsurkunde des Turkmenen Yūsuf Mīrzā b. Ḡahānshāh Qara Qoyunlu aus dem Jahre 1464. Übersetzung und Kommentar," M. A. thesis, Freiburg i. Br. 1979. Other documents which grant exemptions to the family are inserted in the *Fārsnāma-yi Nāṣirī*: one of these is discussed by Minorsky in "A Soyūrgḥāl of Qāsim b. Jahāngīr Aqqoyunlu," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 9 (1937–39): 952 sqq.
 26. See, for instance Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, p. 9.
 27. See Ann Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic, and Social History, 11th–14th Century* (Albany, N.Y., 1988), chaps. 7, 9.
 28. Ḥusain Mudarrisī-Ṭabātabā'ī, *Farmānhā-yi Turkmanān-i Qara Qoyunlu wa Aq Qoyunlu* (Qum, 1352/1973), no. 7, pp. 38–43 (= Fragner, *Repertorium*, no. 36, p. 33); no. 11, pp. 62–67 (= Fragner, *Repertorium*, no. 43, p. 36); no. 19 (= Fragner, no. 72, p. 45). For a detailed commentary, see Heribert Busse, *Untersuchungen zum islamischen Kanzleiwesen an Hand turkmenischer und safawidischer Urkunden* (Cairo, 1959), pp. 125–29.
 29. Heinz Halm, *Die Schia* (Darmstadt, 1988), pp. 90–98. For the development of the Safaviyya, the Sufi order that most significantly influenced the religious scene in Iran; see Michel Mazzaoui, *The Origins of the Safavids* (Wiesbaden, 1972).
 30. See *ibid.*, pp. 98–107.
 31. For Uzun Hasan's Sufi contacts, see Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, pp. 94–96; 119; as to the Aqqoyunlu intermarriage with the Safavid Sufi order, see Mazzaoui, *The Origins of the Safavids*, pp. 74, 78; for Jahan Shah's marrying his daughter to a descendant of Shah Ni'matallah Wali, see Aubin, *Shāh Ismā'īl*, p. 39.
 32. These struggles are dealt with in great detail by Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, n. 22.