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ON MIGRATION ASPIRATIONS IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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migration intentions;
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Abstract: Southeast Europe is considered a traditional emigration region in the past and present. Our study looks to the future, and it focuses on migration intentions there. The representative database of the OeNB Euro Survey offers the opportunity to analyse both large- and small-scale as well as group-specific differentiations beyond the question of the potential for future mobility in Southeast Europe. It became evident that migration intentions are still high. It can be seen that pure intentions are often accompanied by concrete plans. The age and level of education as well as a lack of trust in the government policy are important determining factors. The preference for Germany as a destination country in the post-Yugoslav region indicates the persistence of networks from the Gastarbeiter era. From a spatial perspective, it is also clear that it is mainly the deprived regions of Southeastern Europe where migration intentions are strong. However, the affected sub-regions are not necessarily those in which the plans are very concrete, i.e. there is often a considerable gap between aspirations and capabilities. The long-term and sustainable effects of the migration that is expected to continue, with the corresponding consequences for demographics, education, labour force and social infrastructures, remain problematic.

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Introduction

The Gallup World Poll reported for the period 2013 to 2016 that the “number of potential migrants world wide tops 700 million” (Esipova et al. 2017). According to this, nearly 9% of the world's population had migration intentions; in terms of adults alone, the figure was as high as 14%. In 2021, the total was already 900 million or 16% (Pugliese and Ray 2023). However, the potential for current and future mobility appears to be high, even if it should be borne in mind that the aspiration to migrate often does not go hand in hand with carrying out a migration immediately. Behind sub-Saharan Africa, the highest figures are found in the group of European non-EU countries (27%; Esipova et al. 2017). The increases compared to the period 2010 to 2012 are well above average in some cases.

As expected, Eastern and Southeastern European countries occupy the top places in the ranking in this group of countries. First and foremost are Albania (in third place world wide with 56% of respondents, on a par with Haiti), Bosnia and Herzegovina (36%) and Kosovo and North Macedonia (34% each). The fact that massive increases were recorded in most countries at the same time – in the case of Albania by 20 percentage points [!] – must give food for thought and it is also motivation to take a closer look at migration intentions in Southeastern Europe. This is all the truer as this group of countries has already experienced considerable population losses through emigration in the past: there were 4.6 million emigrants from the Western Balkans between 1990 and 2019, half of whom moved to Western EU countries, with Germany as their main destination (Ströhm 2023). It is not without reason that the same author recently referred to “emigration as tradition in the Western Balkans” and, like a number of other studies (Oruč 2022, Petrović and Adeljević 2024), he problematised it with reference to the potentially noticeable brain drain and the demographic consequences. Earlier studies emphasised, among others, how EU enlargement contributed to a substantial change of the European migration system that created not least a “new face of East-West migration” (Favell 2008) there. In their quantitative study, Pezović and Rošinić (2017) point to political, cultural and economic impacts of migration in Croatia (for a similar study on Bulgaria: Mintchev et al. 2016; and on Romania: Şoşea et al. 2018), while Bălăţescu (2007) focused on the qualitative aspect of life satisfaction of migrants from a receiving countries' perspective mainly. Finally, Şuiu (2015) analysed the coping strategies of Romanian stayers in Spain in the face of the 2008 crisis.

Our analysis then looks to the future. We follow the approach of de Haas (2021), which conceptualises migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities within given sets of perceived geographical opportunity structures, and then we ask these further questions: (1) how strong is the potential for future mobility in Southeastern Europe; (2) how concrete are the intentions expressed by individuals; (3) what group-specific differences stand out; and (4) what country-specific differentiations need to be

considered? Such topics, among others, are part of the Euro Survey of the Austrian National Bank (OeNB 2023) and the opportunity arose for the authors to conduct a secondary statistical analysis in 2023¹. From a geographical perspective, this task is fascinating, as the survey (a) enables a cross-country comparison inside SEE, which (b) can be continued at the small-scale level of the NUTS 3 regions, and (c) it offers the reference to two Eastern European countries.

Methodology

The OeNB Euro Survey (OeNB 2023) has been conducted annually in ten Central and South-East European countries since 2007; the data from the 2019 survey as used for our analysis as, since 2020, the pandemic has led to a significant decline in migration volumes and massive upheavals in the global migration regime. The selection criterion was the means of payment used in each country: the sample only included countries that have not introduced the Euro as official currency. With regard to the Western Balkans, this results in a gap, as Montenegro and Kosovo unilaterally use the Euro as their national currency.

The OeNB's Euro Survey (OeNB 2023) focuses on issues related to the use of foreign currency. In particular, it aims to determine the extent to which the Euro is used for payment and savings purposes in the surveyed countries. Determinants of the demand for foreign currency are also examined. These include, for example, questions on critical risks such as a financial crisis or the pandemic and on expectations of currency developments, but also on private income and remittances from other countries. A second part of the survey covers socio-demographic and socio-economic questions, such as age, number of household members or income. A third part covers additional topics of policy relevance and of current research interest. In the 2019 survey, on which this study was based, this additional topic was migration and migration intentions.

The sample elements in the Euro Survey are individuals. For the survey, approx. 1,000 adult citizens are selected in each of the ten countries, i.e. the entire sample (n) comprises 10,102 people, 8,086 of whom live in the sample's Southeast European countries. The selection is based on a multi-stage stratified random sample with random route selection. Bulgaria and Bosnia-herzegovina are exceptions as quota sampling is used there. The interviews are conducted face-to-face in the homes of the interviewees.

The underlying questionnaire is initially formulated in English, and it is translated into the respective national languages in order to avoid communication problems during

¹ The OeNB has had no capacity for a detailed analysis of the data set, and it contacted the working group on 'Geographic Migration and Transition Studies' at the University of Bamberg (Germany). There, a candidate was found (C. Tausch) and he took on the analysis in the form of a supervised thesis (by D. Göler).

the interviews (OeNB 2023). More detailed information on the survey, including the limitations of the data, can be found in Raggl (2017).

Results

The regions of emigration

The wish to migrate

In the survey, 15.4% of all respondents stated that, if they had the opportunity, they would move permanently to another country. Almost as many (14.8%) would emigrate temporarily. Just under a third therefore expressed a 'permanent' or 'temporary' desire to migrate. In terms of the next 12 months, however, only 6.6% stated that they were planning to do so. When asked about concrete steps, such as organising the emigration trip, only 2.9% confirmed. This means that around one tenth of people with migration intentions actually underpinned these with corresponding measures.

Migration potential and the 'EU paradox'

The desire to live permanently at another place is particularly high in the non-EU states of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia. This is also where concrete plans are the most advanced. The lowest values are found in the Czech Republic and Hungary, followed by the Southeast European EU countries (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Countries of origin for migration intentions and plans. Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; n=10,102

In contrast, the desire to migrate temporarily is more pronounced among the citizens from the EU countries in the sample; this is particularly clear in the case of Hungary and Croatia. The question of EU membership (or a more advanced EU perspective, as in the case of Serbia) therefore seems to play a decisive role in that way that free and thus possibly repeatable access to the EU labour market after return is more likely to stimulate circular movements instead of permanent ones, as it could be expected at a first glance. This kind of a paradox would be an excellent argument for an accelerated EU enlargement in the Balkans, as our findings suggest that such a step would primarily promote circularity and return rather than further accelerating the (already high) permanent emigration and brain drain. In any case, there is no empirical evidence from the previous rounds of enlargement to support the frequently expressed concerns about overburdening the EU labour market or the social systems there (Pries 2023).

Three facts stand out and should be emphasised. Firstly, there is the permanent and extreme tendency to emigrate for the population in Albania (Göler and Doka 2015), where the OeNB sample confirms quite precisely the allup findings mentioned above. Secondly, the situation is similar in North Macedonia, particularly because the permanent desire there is already massively accompanied by concrete plans. Third, in the case of Serbia, the tendency towards permanent and temporary emigration is at a similarly high level with a slight predominance of the temporary, which in our opinion would again reflect the argument of the comparatively advanced EU perspective.

In order to be able to assess how realistic the migration wishes are, the Euro Survey asked those who had expressed migration plans for the next 12 months (n'=669) to take concrete preparatory steps such as obtaining a visa, work permit or contract and arranging travel and accommodation. In the case of Albania, nearly 60% of the respondents had already taken such steps and in the case of Serbia more than 50% (Figure 2). The lower rates for Poland and Romania (34.1% and 28.6% respectively) indicate a certain routine in preparing for (then circular) migration.




Figure 2. Preparations for migration by country of origin. Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; n'=669

A small-scale analysis of regions of emigration

The small-scale analysis of permanent migration intentions on the basis of the NUTS 3 regions only provides clear findings insofar as no particular 'clusters' can be identified in the maps on Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (Tausch 2023). The migration intentions in particular tend to show a spatial uniformity of intentions (Figure 3). With regard to the potential for temporary or circular migration, the picture is somewhat more differentiated, although there is no need to go into this in detail here.




Figure 3. Migration plans. Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; only Southeast European countries; $n'=8,086$

In Serbia (eastern parts of the country) and Albania (especially in the north) in particular, there are clusters with stronger migration intentions, which, as in North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are evidently widespread. However, the regions with pronounced migration aspirations are not necessarily those with the most developed migration plans. In the case of the latter, the picture is quite fragmented, i.e. there is no single potential region of emigration. Rather, in the mentioned countries, and similarly in Bulgaria and Romania, there are almost erratically distributed individual NUTS 3 regions with strikingly high values for migration plans. This is the case in detail, for example, around Tuzla or in Una-Sana (B), in eastern Vojvodina (Srednjobanatska oblast) and around ruševac and Kraljevo (RS), in the district of ukës (AL), in eastern and eastern peripheral districts of North Macedonia, around Buzău or Iași (RO) and in Lovech and Veliko Tarnovo (BG).

The gap between expressed migration wishes on the one hand, and the plans to migrate on the other, which is particularly evident in the small-scale differentiation, is clearly linked to local migrant network structures. Family members, friends or acquaintances living abroad define important, local support structures for further migration. The survey shows that half of the respondents in Southeast European countries with migration plans and preparations have family member(s) living abroad. Among those with migration plans, the proportion is one third (Table 1).

Table 1. Share of respondents with family members living abroad

Family abroad	Permanent migration wish	Temporary migration wish	Migration plan	Migration preparation
Yes	33.4%	34.1%	47.5%	52.2%
No	66.2%	64.8%	52.1%	47.4%
Don't know	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%
No answer	0.3%	0.9%	0.2%	0.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; only Southeast European countries; n'=8,086

If such “facilitators” in the form of social networks (Kley 2017) are not present to a similar extent in a neighbouring region, then this would explain the spatially fragmented pattern, even if no further empirical evidence can be found in detail in the used data set.

Embedded in the migration theory, this gap reflects exactly the contrast between migration aspirations and capabilities (de Haas 2021), whereby a certain proximity or desire to migrate may be offset by individually limited resources. This can lead to a failure to migrate, and it leaves those affected with the feeling of forced immobility, i.e. ultimately being trapped, figuratively speaking. Nevertheless, if the desire to migrate exists, it can be reactivated at any time as a means of social resilience (Göler and Krišjāne 2024) if resources change.

Destination countries

In the survey, 45 countries were specified as the destinations for migration planning. Table A1 shows the 17 countries that were named most frequently. Overall, there is a clear dominance of Germany, which at 33.9% has also a large lead over all other migration destinations, followed by the United Kingdom and Switzerland with more than 7% each and Austria with 6%. After that, EU countries that were already members before the 2004 enlargement round, such as Greece, Italy, France and Belgium, are the main destinations. Non-European destinations are the USA, Canada and Australia.

However, if the respective country of origin is considered individually, a more differentiated picture emerges with regard to the main destination. In percentage terms,

the respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina (at 58% (!)), North Macedonia and Croatia mention Germany more often than the average, whereas Romanians mention the United Kingdom, and Hungarians opt for neighbouring Austria the most frequently.

The second place in this order shows an even wider spread: in the ten countries in the survey, seven different countries were mentioned in this regard. In addition to the nations already mentioned, such as Great Britain (by 16.9% of Bulgarians), Switzerland (by 18.3% of North Macedonians; by 15.9% of Serbs) and the USA, other destinations stand out: in Croatia, for example, Ireland (14.0%) and, in Albania, Greece (10.8%) were named in the second place. And in the case of Bulgaria, it is surprising that 12.3% are still undecided about their migration plans.

With regard to the destination countries for migration wishes, there are hardly any changes in the respective preferences. However, the frequency with which they are mentioned differs. For example, non-European countries are less prominent as migration destinations. The USA was named as a destination country by 6.6% of the respondents with migration wishes, but only by 4.5% of those with migration plans. The reasons for this are probably to be found in the geographical barriers (distance; costs) and the restrictive immigration policy there.

All in all, the countries of Southeastern Europe differ significantly in terms of the variety of planned destination countries. Migrants from Albania and Serbia are expected to continue to move in very diverse directions in the future. In contrast, North Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina show an almost monopolistic position of the destination country Germany. In both countries, the guest worker era plays a role as a historical component; after all, networks from that time, which are known to generally favour migration (Aug 2008), are still in place today. Other factors are Germany's robust labour market and the shortage of (skilled) workers, for example in the medical and nursing sector, which is covered by migrants from Western Balkan countries, among others, via the German "Beschäftigungsverordnung" (the so-called "Western Balkans regulation", Brücker et al. 2020).

King and Edeshi (2020) come to similar conclusions in their study on migration intentions in Albania. Here, too, Germany is the main destination country, followed by the USA, Italy and Greece. In addition to economic factors such as access to the labour market and wage levels, the study identifies factors such as social networks and education as reasons for the choice of a certain destination country. It also shows that social networks are the main reasons for the long-established destination countries Greece, Italy and the U.S.; however, the migration movement here has shifted towards the more prosperous countries in Europe over the last 10 years due to the temporarily poor economic situation in the neighbouring countries. Recently, there has indeed been an increase in the choice of Germany as a destination country for qualified specialists and academics. These migrants attach greater importance to issues of job opportunities

and income, a trend that intensifies the brain drain (King and Ködeshi 2020). Fassmann (2015) also cites issues of social security, solidarity, democracy and respect for human rights as factors that influence the choice of destination country, leading us to a more diversified analysis of the reasons.

In general, events such as the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU and the associated regulations on the free movement of labour force, as well as the current accession to the Schengen area, have pushed destination countries such as Italy, Spain and Germany to the forefront of migrants' considerations (Mintchev 2016, OECD 2019). In contrast, Brexit has had the opposite effect in that the UK has become less attractive to migrant workers from East and Southeast Europe (Pries 2023). For example, while around 55,000 people from Bulgaria and Romania migrated to England and Wales in 2020, the number fell to around 8,500 in 2021 (ONS 2023). For the United Kingdom as a whole, the net migration with these countries fell by 40% (Cuibus 2023).

Discussion

Explaining migration intentions: findings and evidence

Migrants generally want to achieve an improvement in their previous living situation and conditions by relocating. Corresponding opportunities and possibilities can be generated through their own initiative (Oltmer 2017), but they can also be predetermined by external factors. Based on Williams et al. (2018), migration motives will therefore be explained and classified in this section on a macro and micro level.

The macro level

Explanations for patterns of emigration from a macro perspective (i.e. on the societal level) quickly move into the realm of gravitational concepts. Socio-economic disparities are among the main drivers of migration worldwide; the greater the difference between national and regional GDP, the greater the openness to migration (Williams et al. 2018). This is also the case in Southeastern Europe. The small-scale 'clusters' of emigration mentioned above, such as northern Albania, southern Serbia and parts of North Macedonia, are among the most deprived regions on the Balkans; push-pull mechanisms may serve to explain the intensive emigration from exactly these areas. In the Bulgarian case, the above-average unemployment in individual regions – in Vidin, Montana and Silistra, for example, between 13.3% and 20.4% each, with 4.1% nationwide in 2019 (NS 2023) – finds its expression in strong international migration wishes and plans.

High unemployment rates and low GDP are also usually associated with poor career opportunities in the country of origin, which reinforces the intention to migrate (Fassmann and Interemann 1997, Vidovic and Mara 2015, Zulfiu Alili et al. 2024).

upiszski (2009) also points to shortcomings of infrastructure, such as recurring blackouts of electricity or critical water supplies, as further push factors at this scale.

The micro level

Approaches at the micro level address demographic, socio-economic and psychosocial characteristics of individuals. International labour migration is generally very strongly influenced by age. In our sample, too, the affinity for migration is less prevalent with increasing age. It is noticeable, however, that although there is only a moderate difference between the age groups under 50, young adults (18–29-year-olds) in particular have a disproportionate number of plans and preparations already in place, meaning that they are often already at a very concrete stage (Table 2). Young people are therefore more likely to be willing and able to realise their desire to migrate.

Table 2. Age-specific differentiation of migration intentions

Age	Permanent migration wish	Temporary migration wish	Migration plan	Migration preparation
18 to 24 years	19.5%	15.4%	20.8%	20.2%
25 to 29 years	12.8%	12.6%	20.6%	20.6%
30 to 34 years	12.0%	11.2%	11.1%	11.1%
35 to 39 years	13.9%	13.8%	13.2%	15.4%
40 to 44 years	11.2%	12.8%	11.1%	10.7%
45 to 49 years	10.1%	11.4%	8.4%	7.9%
50 to 54 years	7.5%	9.3%	7.0%	8.3%
55 to 59 years	6.5%	7.2%	4.5%	4.3%
60 to 64 years	3.8%	3.8%	1.7%	1.2%
65 to 69 years	1.5%	2.1%	1.2%	0.4%
70+ years	1.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; only Southeast European countries; n'=8,086

The level of education of potential migrants also plays a major role (Table 3). The propensity to migrate is by far the most significant among those with a medium level of education. By contrast, the reluctance of people with a high level of education seems surprising. This confirms the finding for Albania, for example, that emigration among academics was quite common very early on after the beginning of the transition period (Jonca 2002, Schmidt 2003); a similar effect is reported for Bosnia and Herzegovina and other ex-Yugoslavian countries for the 1990s (Uvalic 2005). This suggests the reverse conclusion, namely that those with higher qualifications who wanted to emigrate have long since done so or, if still in the country, have found an adequate position that makes staying more attractive. Otherwise, there is only a limited difference in intensity within

the respective categories; only among the highly educated is the desire to migrate already more strongly underpinned by concrete measures.

Table 3. Migration intentions and education level

Education level	Permanent migration wish	Temporary migration wish	Migration plan	Migration preparation
Lo education	12.5%	9.4%	11.1%	9.9%
Medium education	62.7%	67.2%	64.5%	59.3%
High education	24.8%	23.4%	24.4%	30.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; only SouthEast European countries; n'=8,086

The social-psychological aspect, which has long been underestimated and it has recently received increasing attention in migration studies (Vathi and King 2017), is only slightly reflected in the OeNB Euro Survey (OeNB 2023). Only the question about trust in political actors generally shows a massive mistrust in this regard, which is strongly correlated with the advanced concretisation of migration intentions (Table 4).

Table 4. Trust in politics and migration intentions

Level of trust	Permanent migration wish	Temporary migration wish	Migration plan	Migration preparation
I trust completely	5.3%	5.6%	5.7%	5.5%
I trust somewhat	19.4%	25.7%	20.1%	26.5%
I neither trust nor distrust	17.4%	23.5%	17.8%	17.0%
I distrust somewhat	13.7%	17.7%	13.4%	13.8%
I do not trust at all	42.7%	26.5%	41.7%	37.2%
Don't know	1.1%	0.8%	1.0%	0.0%
No answer	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; only Southeast European countries; n'=8,086

Taken together, these findings confirm the ongoing brain drain, especially among the young and well-educated people. In addition to structural deficits on labour markets, in education system etc., the skilled emigration from Southeast Europe has a lot to do with the government policies there and the resulting general lack of future prospects (Efendić 2016).

Conclusions

All in all, it can be said that the potential for future mobility all over Southeastern Europe remains high. Our findings from the Euro Survey show that this will remain

the case in the future, even if it must be taken into account that not every individual aspiration to migrate leads or can lead to the realisation of migration, especially if relevant and supportive capabilities are lacking. The findings also clearly show that social networks significantly increase the likelihood of migration and that it is particularly the young population with a medium level of education who will be able to realise their desire to migrate to Western EU countries. At the centre of this desire is Germany, which is by far the most frequently mentioned destination. However, the United Kingdom and Switzerland are also mentioned as destinations in many countries. In contrast, regions with strong migration intentions are spatially fragmented. In most of the analysed countries, there are individual NUTS3 regions with high values regarding the migration plans. However, no specific spatial pattern of emigration can be identified.

In a similar context to our study on migration intentions in Southeastern Europe, Pries (2023: 16) recently called for greater consideration of the “multidirectionality of migration impacts”, and he suggested broadening the mainly economic focus to include remittances. So, “societal transmittances” (Pries 2023), as a dimension of analysis, offer a viable perspective for evaluating the dynamics of migration with regard to Southeastern Europe. The mobilisation and dynamization of relevant capitals concern not only monetary values, brains and skills, but also social dimensions. We argue that discussions in this regard should not be one-sided and deficit-orientated from the outset, as the corresponding effects are bi-directionally constituted in the context of origin and destination. The economic, political, cultural and social impact of migration unfolds in both countries of origin and destination.

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Appendix

Table A1. Migration plans and destination countries

Country	Albania	Bosnia-Herzegovina	North Macedonia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Poland	Romania	Serbia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Mean
Germany	32.3%	58.0%	44.2%	24.6%	34.0%	26.3%	20.4%	30.5%	17.2%	20.9%	33.9%
UK	5.4%	1.2%	1.7%	16.9%	2.0%	7.0%	26.5%	1.2%	10.3%	18.6%	7.3%
Switzerland	0.0%	4.9%	18.3%	0.0%	6.0%	1.8%	4.1%	15.9%	6.9%	2.3%	7.2%
Austria	2.2%	9.9%	5.0%	1.5%	10.0%	1.8%	2.0%	3.7%	6.9%	25.6%	6.0%
USA	6.5%	1.2%	4.2%	1.5%	4.0%	8.8%	0.0%	6.1%	17.2%	0.0%	4.5%
Greece	10.8%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0%	1.2%	3.4%	2.3%	2.8%
Italy	4.3%	1.2%	2.5%	3.1%	4.0%	1.8%	10.2%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%
France	5.4%	1.2%	0.8%	6.2%	0.0%	1.8%	4.1%	1.2%	0.0%	2.3%	2.4%
Belgium	6.5%	1.2%	0.0%	3.1%	6.0%	0.0%	4.1%	1.2%	0.0%	2.3%	2.4%
Netherlands	4.3%	0.0%	0.8%	3.1%	4.0%	5.3%	2.0%	1.2%	6.9%	0.0%	2.4%
Spain	1.1%	0.0%	0.8%	9.2%	0.0%	3.5%	8.2%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%
Denmark	4.3%	0.0%	0.8%	1.5%	2.0%	1.8%	0.0%	4.9%	3.4%	2.3%	2.1%

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Canada	4.3%	0.0%	3.3%	1.5%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	2.4%	6.9%	0.0%	2.1%
Ireland	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	14.0%	3.5%	2.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	2.1%
Norway	1.1%	1.2%	4.2%	0.0%	2.0%	3.5%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%
Slovenia	0.0%	7.4%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.9%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%
Australia	1.1%	0.0%	2.5%	1.5%	4.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	6.9%	0.0%	1.6%
Sweden	4.3%	1.2%	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	2.3%	1.5%
Finland	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.1%	0.0%	3.4%	9.3%	1.3%
Other	6.5%	8.6%	4.2%	4.6%	8.0%	26.3%	6.1%	9.8%	10.3%	11.6%	8.8%
Don't know	0.0%	2.5%	0.8%	12.3%	0.0%	5.3%	4.1%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: OeNB Euro Survey 2019; n=10,102