

Secondary Publication



Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula

The salience of the socio-economic cleavage in old and new democracies

Date of secondary publication: 02.05.2023

Version of Record (Published Version), Bookpart

Persistent identifier: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-592462

Primary publication

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula: The salience of the socio-economic cleavage in old and new democracies. In: Democracy under scrutiny : elites, citizens, cultures. van Beek, Ursula J. (Hg). Opladen u.a. : Budrich, 2010. S. 173 - 200.

Legal Notice

This work is protected by copyright and/or the indication of a licence. You are free to use this work in any way permitted by the copyright and/or the licence that applies to your usage. For other uses, you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).

This document is made available under a Creative Commons license.



The license information is available online:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode>

The salience of the socio-economic cleavage in old and new democracies

Ursula Hoffmann-Lange

Introduction

The socio-economic cleavage over the (re)distribution of economic resources is frequently seen as the most pervasive political conflict in modern democracies. In his analysis of 36 consolidated democracies, Arend Lijphart (1999) concluded that the cleavage was salient in all 36 cases and was largely independent of the other characteristics of a country such as the level of socio-economic development, the size of the population or cultural background. It does therefore not come as a surprise that in virtually all democracies political parties differ in their basic ideas of the social and economic policies they advocate. Even in countries with a high degree of consensus on the fundamentals of the economic order, major political parties are characterised by persistent differences over these policies. Economic policy issues tend to dominate party competition and electoral campaigns. Usually, the positions taken by conservative and neo-liberal parties are markedly different from those of the social-democratic or socialist parties.

The concept of a cleavage was first formulated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) who analysed the formation of Western European party systems in the 19th and early 20th century. They concluded that most political parties created during that period represented the interests of certain social groups, and that political mobilisation by these parties was primarily aimed at members of these groups. While the term cleavage has been increasingly used to denote any controversial conflict matter in party systems, in the present context the term will be used only for large and persistent differences on social and economic policy matters that are rooted in the social structure. Bartolini emphasised that a cleavage in this narrower meaning required the existence of an identifiable group, a shared collective identity and an organisation expressing the interest of that group (Bartolini and Mair 1980; Bartolini 2000). Such a structural basis for political conflict provides long-term stability for a party system, as opposed to conflicts over political issues that are of short duration and liable to change from one election to the next. Lane and Ersson (1999: 80) introduced the term *structural parties* for those political parties that can be traced back to the formative period of the Western European party systems.

However, in step with the increasing pluralisation of modern societies traditional cleavages have eroded over the last decades even though scholars continue to disagree considerably to what extent this is the case (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Brettschneider *et al* 2002; Dalton 2006; Knutsen 2005; Lane and Ersson 1999). While there is agreement that traditional cleavages have lost some of their mobilising power since World War II and that modern catch-all parties mobilise their voters primarily on the basis of issues rather than group identity, voting patterns show that the old cleavages continue to play an important role. This is especially true for the class cleavage and for ethnic cleavages in countries with ethnic minorities (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Caramani 2004; Esping-Andersen 1999).

Using the cleavage concept in its original sense makes it possible to study the usefulness of this concept for new democracies especially in non-European contexts. While it can be safely assumed that the conflict over economic and social policies is pervasive and can be found in any society, it will not necessarily provide the basis for the formation of a persistent cleavage in the party system. Especially in traditional societies, characterised by clientelism, the economic cleavage is much less salient and encourages the formation of party systems in which social class is not important for the vote. The same is true for post-industrial societies in which the class cleavage has lost much of its former power to structure electoral behaviour.

Lijphart, who was primarily interested in studying and classifying democracies according to their style of political decision-making, i.e. majoritarian vs. consensual, included in his analysis only those countries that had an uninterrupted record of democratic government of at least 20 years and became democratic not later than in the mid-1970s. The TRI project instead is focused mainly on the study of social and political values and their relevance for the functioning of democracy. By including five younger and two older democracies, the project makes it possible to examine differences between these two groups of countries.

In the context of the TRI project, the salience of the socio-economic cleavage is especially relevant in countries where it is associated with different concepts of democracy or where it overlaps with ethnic or religious cleavage lines. Many social scientists have argued that overlapping cleavages or cleavages associated with deep-seated value conflicts over the political order may exacerbate political conflicts, while cross-cutting cleavages have a moderating effect (Lipset 1960). More recently, based on evidence from Latin American countries, Samuel Huntington (1991) claimed that successful democratisations have only been possible in these countries once political parties agreed to consider conflicts over economic policies as political rather than constitutional matters. Such agreement implied that even groups advocating far-reaching changes in the economic order accepted the institutional framework of liberal democracy and that a consensus on a purely procedural conception of democracy replaced the former ideological confrontation. In those countries, as Huntington (1991: 70) noted:

“The other side of the democratic bargain was moderation in tactics and policies by the included leaders and groups. This often involved their agreeing to abandon violence and any commitment to revolution, to accept existing basic social, economic, and political institutions ..., and to work through elections and parliamentary procedures in order to achieve power and put through their policies”.

Another question to be addressed in this chapter is the detrimental effect economic crises may have on the consolidation of democracy. New democracies have to negotiate new political institutions and handle the inevitable conflicts over vague or inconsistent rules. They lack the precedents consolidated democracies can rely on for settling such conflicts. If political elites have to deal with two major tasks at the same time, however, that is, where the task of consolidating the democratic political institutions coincides with the pressing need to cope with an economic crisis, disagreements over purely institutional matters may easily develop into substantial conflicts because the contenders will suspect that a certain interpretation of the institutional rules may result in a lasting disadvantage for their party and/or their electorate. Seymour Martin Lipset and many other social scientists have therefore argued that the development of democracy is much smoother where countries have to deal with only one major problem at a time.

Lipset (1960) was also the first to systematically analyse the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy pointing out that effectiveness may in the long run engender legitimacy. While effectiveness does of course not only mean economic success, a flourishing economy will certainly speed up the consolidation of democracy since citizens tend to associate democracy with improved living conditions. At the same time, as Lipset (1960), Easton (1965, 1975) and others have argued, it is essential for a democratic political culture that citizens learn to value democratic institutions for their own sake rather than accept them because their standard of living has improved. While democracies are on average more successful economically than authoritarian regimes, the current economic recession should alert us to the fact that they are not immune to deep economic crises. In consolidated democracies such crises may result in the electoral defeat of the current government but the great majority of the elites and citizens will remain confident that the crisis can be overcome within the established democratic framework and will not advocate non-democratic solutions.

Several aspects of political culture can be assumed to increase the chances of a democratic polity to survive an economic crisis unscathed:

- If the bulk of the elites and citizens believe that democracy is the best type of political system;
- If conflicts over social and economic policies are not based on ideologically incompatible preferences regarding the economic order;
- If the conflict over social and economic policies is not associated with identifiable groups in a society, i.e. if it remains a purely political conflict rather than a socio-political cleavage;

- If satisfaction with the economic performance of the government is not too strongly associated with the satisfaction with democracy;
- If differential satisfaction with democracy, i.e. the difference in satisfaction ratings of the supporters of government and opposition parties, is not too large.

The data of the TRI project will be analysed to study support for democracy, economic policy preferences and satisfaction with the political and economic performance of the current government in order to determine the degree of polarisation over economic policies and to establish if such a polarisation is related to satisfaction with democracy. In this way, the data is expected to provide insights into the current state of democratic consolidation in the seven democracies included in the study.

The data base

As in the other chapters of the empirical section of this volume here too the TRI elite survey data for parliamentarians and media elites was compared with the data of the World Values Survey (WVS). Throughout the analysis weight factors were used to correct for sampling bias. The parliamentary elite samples were weighted to achieve a correct representation of the party composition of the national parliaments in the seven countries. No weight could be applied for the media elites as it was not possible to determine if the media elite sample was representative for the prevailing political outlooks of the media in the seven countries. Since there was no objective sampling procedure for identifying the 'media elite', the sampling frame for this elite group differed from country to country. While the samples may not have been fully representative of the size of the national audiences these media elites were able to reach, they nevertheless provide additional insights into the existence of systematic differences between the media elites and the other two groups. For the WVS data, the weight variable included in the original data-set was used.

The German data required special consideration because Germany is the only country in the study which is partly an established democracy (the old Federal Republic) and partly a new democracy (the former German Democratic Republic). For the general population, it can be assumed that the political outlooks of the respondents more or less reflected the prevailing political mood in the two respective regions. Even close to 20 years after reunification, German public opinion surveys regularly show the continuing existence of a considerable gap in value orientations, in assessments of the performance of German democracy, and especially in views on distributive justice (Abold and Wenzel 2005). East Germans are more sceptical about the proper functioning of the free market, are more in favour of socio-economic equality and assign more respon-

sibility to the government for providing welfare services. At the same time, they are much more dissatisfied with the performance of the political system than are people living in the western part of Germany (Gabriel 2005).

This comes as no surprise given that living standards are still lower in the eastern German states and that the unemployment rate is about twice as high. While the past 20 years have seen a considerable mobility between the two German regions, for the most part this has been a one-directional migration from east to west.¹ However, migrants moving from the eastern to the western part of Germany have been personally exposed to the dramatic differences in infrastructure, unemployment rate etc. and it can therefore be assumed that they have largely adapted the political outlooks of the original inhabitants.

But the same is not true for the elites. Although the regional basis is more important for parliamentarians than for other elites, and even though most of them were born and lived for most of their lives in the state they represent in the Bundestag, their party affiliation is much more important for their political outlooks than is attachment to their native region. For other elites, the job market is more or less unified because persons at higher managerial levels are more regionally mobile and take positions wherever there are promising job openings (Holtmann 2009). Thus, while the data for the population in the western and eastern regions of Germany will be treated separately in the following analyses the data from the elite survey will be broken down by sector rather than region.


Support for a democratic system of government

Prior to reviewing different conceptions of democracy and their relationship to the socio-economic cleavage, it makes sense to first determine the overall degree of support for a democratic system of government. Two relevant questions were included in both the elite and the general public (WVS) questionnaires. The first question asked how important it was for the respondents to live in a democratically governed country; the second question requested them to assess a variety of regime types for governing a country, namely:

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
- Having experts not government make decision according to what they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule
- Having a democratic political system

1 1989 and 1990 saw the largest east-west migration with some 388.4 thousand East Germans moving to the West. Since then, the numbers have been steadily declining. In 2006, total East-West migration amounted to 173.6 thousand and West-East migration to 122.9 thousand (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008: 16).

Figure 1: Mean personal importance of living in a democracy



* Mean range: 1 = not at all important, 10 = absolutely important

Figure 1 shows very high means for the first question among parliamentarians, journalists and citizens alike, even though the means for the citizens were slightly lower. The question asking for a positive vs. negative evaluation of democracy produced similar distributions for the two elite groups, with next to no negative ratings.

However, the results presented in Table 1 also show pockets of support for non-democratic ways of governing in all seven countries. Support for these three non-democratic systems of government was very low among both parliamentarians and journalists in Sweden, Germany and Chile. The idea that non-political experts were better equipped to rule the country enjoyed some support in Turkey, Chile and South Africa, reached two fifths among Polish parliamentarians and journalists, and was supported by 65.3% of the parliamentarians and 78.4% of the journalists in South Korea. Moreover, between 10% and 20% of the parliamentarians in Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea were at least somewhat supportive of autocratic leadership. Turkish parliamentarians stood out in this respect with more than two fifths answering affirmatively (31.7% somewhat positive and 9.7% very positive). Evaluations by journalists closely resembled those of the parliamentarians of their country on all five items. Support for an authoritarian system of government was somewhat lower in this group (mean percentage difference: 7.0%).

Sympathy for non-democratic styles of political decision-making was much higher among the citizens in all seven countries. With the exception of

the two consolidated democracies, more than a fifth of citizens in East Germany and in the other five younger democracies favoured authoritarian leadership. A clear majority preferred a government by experts instead of party politicians, indicating a lack of understanding that there is no such thing as politically neutral experts. Finally, support for a military dictatorship showed high cross-country variation. This sentiment ran relatively high (more than 15% support) in Chile, Poland and Turkey, three countries that have experienced military rule, but also in South Africa, while it was much lower in the other three countries including eastern Germany.

Table 1: Support for non-democratic leadership styles

Countries	Autocratic rule			Expert rule			Military rule		
	MPs	Media	Public	MPs	Media	Public	MPs	Media	Public
Chile	15.1	12.5	33.3	19.2	4.2	50.7	4.1	0.0	18.9
Germany	2.0	0.0		4.1	8.2		0.0	0.0	
East Germany			20.8			68.4			3.4
West Germany			12.5			48.3			3.1
Poland	17.9	6.0	30.5	41.2	50.0	84.5	1.0	2.0	21.4
South Africa	9.9	3.0	43.6	19.6	21.6	59.8	2.1	0.0	32.4
South Korea	15.1	11.7	47.6	65.3	78.4	52.3	1.0	3.9	7.9
Sweden	0.0	0.0	17.9	0.0	4.7	35.9	0.0	1.6	4.7
Turkey	41.4	18.5	58.9	14.3	21.2	69.7	0.0	3.2	33.8

* Percent good and very good, 1= very good, 4 = very bad

The above results confirm earlier findings. Herbert McClosky and his collaborators were the first to systematically compare support for democracy and libertarian values among elites and voters in the United States. Although they found that the great majority of both elites and citizens were generally supportive of democracy, they also established that citizens were less willing to grant basic democratic rights, such as free speech or the right of due process, to members of socially or politically deviating minorities (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983). The authors concluded that elites had a better understanding of the theoretical and practical implications of democracy and could therefore be considered the main '*carriers of the democratic creed*'. Later surveys in the U.S. and in other developed democracies have confirmed their results (Hoffmann-Lange 2008).

The current findings add to this knowledge by pointing to the existence of considerable cultural differences between the seven countries. The lower support for political competition among parliamentarians² and the widespread support for a rule by experts in Poland – and even more so in South Korea – point to a good deal of scepticism regarding the beneficial effects of political conflict as well as a preference for a more cooperative political style. In Tur-

2 Only 82.8% of the parliamentarians in Poland and 73.5% in South Korea appreciated the existence of strong opposition parties, while this percentage was above 90% in the other countries.

key, with its long-standing authoritarian tradition, authoritarian rule still enjoys considerable support among both parliamentarians and citizens, but much less so among the media elite.

According to Larry Diamond (1999: 69) democratic consolidation requires that no relevant elite group and no more than 15% of the general population support authoritarian forms of government. This yardstick may be too demanding, however, as this would imply that only Sweden and Germany could be considered as consolidated democracies among the seven countries in our study. It seems more important that generalised support for a democratic polity is overwhelmingly high in all seven countries. Still, the fact that strong minorities among the mass publics and even among the elites in the five new democracies do not explicitly reject authoritarian regime types indicates the existence of latent support for non-democratic solutions that may be mobilised in times of political and economic crisis.

Different conceptions of democracy and support for free market economy

Both surveys included a question asking respondents to assess various characteristics of democracy. The lists included aspects of a liberal democratic order as well as items dealing with the responsibility of governments for the economic well-being of the citizens. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each item on a 10-point scale (1-10). The results for the parliamentarians showed that the essentials of a liberal democratic polity, i.e. equality of the vote, free elections, equal rights for women, human and civil rights, minority protection and freedom to criticise the government received the highest average ratings, ranging between 8.9 and 9.6. The items dealing with the responsibility of governments for the economic well-being of the citizens (unemployment benefits, a prospering economy, providing jobs, shelter, food and water for everyone) received considerably lower ratings, ranging on average between 6.3 and 8.1. These items have also much higher standard deviations and produced considerable variation across countries. The Polish parliamentarians stood out in assigning rather low values to welfare-oriented policies such as subsidies for the poor and measures for achieving full employment.

For the sake of data reduction, a principal components analysis of the 16 items included in the elite questionnaire was performed for the sample of parliamentarians. It revealed that three of the items showed low average correlations with the others and had either high loadings on a separate factor or on several factors:

- People can change the laws in referendums
- Elected officials try to do what people want
- Political parties in parliament engage in political compromises

These aspects were obviously not unanimously considered to be democratic essentials and received only average to low ratings.³ Rerunning the principal components analysis without these three items produced a much more clear-cut structure with only two factors. The two factors explain 58.3% of the total variance. The matrix of factor loadings revealed high loadings on the first factor for the items tapping essentials of a liberal democratic polity and on the second factor for the items pertaining to government responsibility for welfare policies.⁴ The six items with high loadings on the second factor were then combined to an additive index *Active Economic Role of Government*.⁵ High values on this index indicate that the respondents supported an economically pro-active government taking responsibility for providing a sufficient infrastructure, unemployment benefits and incentives for economic growth, financed by a progressive tax system. The other seven items were combined into an index *Essentials of Liberal Democracy*.⁶

The factor structure for the journalists is rather similar, although the order of the two factors was reversed in this group. Moreover, the percentage of explained variance and the factor loadings were somewhat lower than for the parliamentarians. The item 'human dignity' showed nearly equal loadings on both factors. These differences in the dimensional structure of the items indicate that ideas about democracy are somewhat less structured in this elite group. Nevertheless it seemed justified to create the same two indices also for this group of respondents.

The list of items in the WVS was less comprehensive and included only six characteristics. A principal components analysis for these six items re-

-
- 3 Support for referendums ranked second lowest among the 16 characteristics with a mean value of 6.9; responsiveness to the electorate received a 9th rank (mean 8.5) and readiness for political compromises ranked 11th with a mean of 7.6.
 - 4 However, equality of educational opportunities which had received rather high ratings and primarily loaded on the second factor (.62), also had a fairly high loading of .44 on the first factor, thus confirming that even respondents who were in favour of limited government tended to consider equality of opportunities as an essential characteristic of democracy.
 - 5 Cronbach's Alpha for the six items is .86 and confirms that it is warranted to combine these items to one index. The items included in the index are progressive taxes, unemployment benefits, a prospering economy, providing jobs, providing shelter, food and water for everyone, equal opportunity in education. The scores of the items were added and divided by the number of items (6), so that the index has the same range (1 - 10) as the original variables. The factor analysis for the journalists produced a slightly different factor structure. Moreover, separate analyses by country also confirmed the existence of country-specific dimensional structures, thus indicating cultural differences in the way the connections between these items are perceived. It would lead too far to discuss those differences in the present context, especially since the overall structure is theoretically meaningful and provides empirical support for the index construction. Such cultural differences do not preclude, however, the existence of an overarching structure which can only be uncovered by a combined analysis.
 - 6 The following items were included in this additive index: individual human right to dignity, free elections, civil rights, equal rights for women, freedom to criticise the government, equality of the vote, minority rights.

vealed, however, a similar structure with two factors explaining 60.3% of the total variance.⁷ This warranted the construction of two similar indices, made up of three items each, which makes it possible to compare the levels of support for an economically active government among elites and citizens.


Even though they tap different aspects of democracy, the two indices are not statistically independent. The correlation coefficient between the two varies considerably across countries and subgroups, though. For the parliamentarians, the coefficients are lower in the two older democracies (Germany: $r=.13$; Sweden: $r=.34$), while they ranged between $r=.45$ in Poland and $r=.70$ in South Korea. Among citizens, the correlations were mostly above $r=.45$, with the exception of Sweden ($r=.04$). This indicates that citizens as well as elites in young democracies tend to view both democratic political rights and public welfare as democratic essentials.

Figure 2 indicates the existence of a rather high level of support for an economically active government in five of the seven countries. The two exceptions are Poland and Sweden. In both of these countries support is not only lower among the elites, but there is also a larger discrepancy between elites and citizens. The level of citizens' expectations is nearly as high here as in the other countries. Since Sweden provides a very high level of government benefits to its citizens, Swedish elites place obviously less emphasis on welfare policies than on other aspects of democracy. The result for Poland is consistent with other elite surveys in post-communist countries, which have frequently shown that after more than 40 years of controlled economy elites in these countries tend to prefer market solutions over government intervention into the market (Miller *et al.* 1997; Wasilewski 1998).

Support for the essentials of liberal democracy such as respect for human dignity, free elections, women's rights etc. was much more unanimous with no apparent differences across the seven nations, thereby confirming the results of the previous section. On the other hand, correlations between the perception of democratic essentials and generalised support for democracy were not very strong. This should not come as a surprise, however, since the conceptual question of what constitutes a democracy is analytically distinct from a personal preference for a democratic political system.

7 A first analysis had only produced one substantial factor that explained 45% of the total variance. Since the second factor had barely missed the Kaiser cut-off criterion, the analysis was rerun, this time enforcing the extraction of two factors. As for the elite survey, two additive indices were constructed. The first index *Active Economic Role of Government* includes three items (progressive taxes, unemployment benefits, prospering economy), the second index *Essentials of Liberal Democracy* another three items (free elections, civil rights, and equal rights for women).

Figure 2: Mean support for active economic role of government



* Mean range: 1 = no essential characteristic of democracy, 10 = essential characteristic of democracy

The two indices can also be used for determining if respondents gave priority to the political or the economic aspects of democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001: 473) have recently taken up Almond and Verba's (1989) distinction between intrinsic and instrumental support for democracy, arguing that democracies where support is primarily based on instrumental considerations (*performance-driven*) remain at risk. While these authors analysed satisfaction with different aspects of democracy, i.e. political (elections, civil rights) and economic (jobs, education, health care), this distinction has been applied here to the respondents' conceptions of democracy. A third index was therefore constructed, based on whether respondents placed more emphasis on liberal democratic rights or on the delivery of public welfare. This index was based on the difference between the first two indices, i.e. support for *Essentials of Liberal Democracy* and for an *Active Economic Role of Government*. These values were recoded into three categories, 'intrinsic', 'balanced' and 'instrumental'.⁸

Table 2 provides the results for this index. In all seven countries, the percentage of respondents rating basic liberal-democratic rights as more important than government responsibility for the well-being of its citizens is con-

⁸ The maximum difference was either -9 or +9. Respondents with a difference of one or less between the two indices were coded as 'balanced', larger negative differences as 'instrumental' and larger positive differences as 'intrinsic'.

siderable higher among the elites. Sweden has by far the highest percentage of citizens rating political aspects as more important than economic ones, while the percentage of citizens with a purely instrumental conception of democracy was largest in South Korea, South Africa and Turkey.

Table 2: Instrumental vs. intrinsic conception of democracy¹ among elites and citizens (percentages)

Countries		Elite		Citizens
		Parliamentarians	Media	
Chile	Instrumental	1.1	0.0	7.4
	Balanced	44.1	37.5	51.1
	Intrinsic	54.8	62.5	41.5
Germany	Instrumental	0.0	0.0	4.7
	Balanced	29.9	8.6	43.3
	Intrinsic	70.1	91.4	51.9
Poland	Instrumental	3.2	0.0	5.5
	Balanced	12.9	4.1	40.0
	Intrinsic	83.9	95.9	54.5
South Africa	Instrumental	3.0	0.0	18.9
	Balanced	40.4	39.2	52.1
	Intrinsic	56.6	60.8	29.1
South Korea	Instrumental	1.0	3.9	19.0
	Balanced	61.6	45.1	53.4
	Intrinsic	37.4	51.0	27.5
Sweden	Instrumental	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Balanced	9.0	3.2	15.4
	Intrinsic	91.0	96.8	84.6
Turkey	Instrumental	1.5	1.8	12.5
	Balanced	50.7	27.1	59.8
	Intrinsic	47.8	71.0	27.7

1 Score for Essentials of Liberal Democracy minus score for Active Economic Role for Government; Instrumental: (-9 to -1), Balanced: (-1 to +1), Intrinsic: (+1 to +9)

Both questionnaires also included the following four items dealing directly with the benefits of a competitive free market:

- ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ vs. ‘We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort’
- ‘Private ownership of business and industry should be increased’ vs. ‘Government ownership of business and industry should be increased’
- ‘The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ vs. ‘People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’
- ‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas’ vs. ‘Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people’

These items contrasted individual responsibility and a reliance on market forces with support for government intervention into the market and a policy of socio-economic equality.

A principal components analysis for the parliamentarians confirmed that these items form a single dimension which explains close to 55% of the total variance.⁹ They were combined to an additive index *Support for Government Intervention into the Market*.¹⁰ As expected, the country means for this index were lower than those for an economically active government. The index had much higher standard deviations within each of the countries, indicating these matters were more controversial. As a result, the overall means were not helpful and needed to be broken down by party affiliation.

The same item battery was also included in the World Values Survey. However, correlations between the four variables were rather low for the citizens. It seems that citizens do not perceive any logical connection between the four items. It was therefore not warranted to combine these items into a single index, but rather to look at them separately.¹¹

Polarisation of social and economic policy attitudes

While the overall results provided a first insight into the main trends of support for basic democratic tenets and into preferences for economic policies, only a differentiation between different party groups could show the degree of polarisation within the respective party systems of the seven countries. Unfortunately, the number of respondents in the elite survey was too low to allow for a breakdown of the results by individual parties, which is why parties were grouped into two large camps, either centre-left or centre-right.¹² The data for party affiliation of the media elite were incomplete, so this analysis could not be performed for that group.¹³

The data indicate the existence of only small differences with respect to an active role of government in securing a basic standard of living for its citizens. While the parliamentarians of centre-left parties are somewhat more in favour of an active economic role of government, the average difference is

9 Although Cronbach's Alpha is somewhat lower than for the previous set of items (.73), the scale quality is sufficiently high to warrant the construction of an index. The results for the media elite were again rather similar.

10 Since two of the items were coded in the different direction, they were reversed so that a higher value indicates a preference for government intervention into the market to increase socio-economic equality as opposed to a free-market economy.

11 None of them was higher than $r = .28$, while those for the parliamentarians range between .27 and .45.

12 The allocation of the political parties to these two groups were made in close collaboration with the country specialists on the team. Some parties cannot be classified within the left-right scheme and were therefore allocated to a third category 'other'. The classification was validated by checking the mean self-positioning of the parliamentarians on the left-right scale which confirmed the correctness of the classification.

13 In South Korea and Sweden, the journalists were not asked for their vote intention. In Chile and Turkey where this question had been included, the number of refusals was so high (28.0% and 87.2%) that the variable could not be used for analysis.

only 0.7, i.e. less than 10% of the maximum possible difference and in none of the countries exceeds a value of 1.2. The same is true for the citizens. This indicates the existence of a broad consensus regarding these matters.


There is much more disagreement on the degree of government intervention into the market, as can be seen in Figure 3. The difference of the means between parliamentarians of centre-right and centre-left parties ranges between 0.9 (Poland) and 3.6 (Sweden). Interestingly enough, the differences for the two consolidated democracies, Sweden and Germany, are higher than those for some of the new democracies. Among the latter, only Chile shows similarly high differences, which may be due to the fact this country has a long-established party system. This finding supports the tentative conclusion that the conflict between support for a free market economy vs. support for government intervention into the market in favour of redistributive measures tends to be more deeply rooted in older party systems. Whether this is because other cleavages are more pervasive in the other countries or because the established party systems tend to preserve traditional cleavage lines that have long lost their relevance under the conditions of globalised markets, remains to be seen.

Since the attitudes of citizens towards a free market economy were less structured and could therefore not be combined into an index, the differences of the mean values for each of the four items were analysed instead. Although they went into the expected direction, the differences were much lower in the population and mostly did not exceed values of 1.0. The only exception was Sweden where voters of centre-left parties were much more in favour of income equality, with a mean of 4.0 compared to 7.2 for the voters of centre-right parties, thus producing a difference that is nearly as high as the difference for the Swedish parliamentarians. The supporters of centre-left parties were also more in favour of government ownership of business and industry, with a mean of 5.9 compared to 3.7 for supporters of centre-right parties.

Overall, it can be concluded that conflicts over social and economic policies are much less pronounced in today's democracies than they were in the first half of the 20th century, especially among citizens. In the present analyses, this is of course partly attributable to the fact that the spectrum of political parties could only be broken down into the two broad centre-left and centre-right categories. However, the distribution of the scores for parliamentarians, journalists and the general population confirms this conclusion.

Figures 4 and 5 show the distributions for the attitude towards income equality for Turkey and Sweden. Sweden was selected as the country in which the difference of means for the two party groups (7.3 for the centre-right and 3.2 for the centre-left parties) as well as the reduction in the standard deviation are larger than in the other countries. Turkey was selected because it does not have a colonial history and because the difference of means for the two party groups (2.6) is also relatively large among parliamentarians. The 10-point scale was collapsed to 5 points which provides a more clear-cut pattern.

Figure 3: Mean support for government intervention into the market, amongst members of parliament



* Mean range: 1 = in favour of free market, 10 = in favour of government intervention into the economy.

Figure 4: Attitudes towards income distribution by party groups, Sweden





Figure 5: Attitudes towards income distribution by party groups, Turkey



Among Swedish parliamentarians the curve lines for the two party groups diverge. At the same time, the distribution for the voters of centre-right parties closely mirrors that of the parliamentarians of these parties, while the curve line for the voters of centre-left parties resembles a normal distribution. Turkey also shows rather different distributions for the two groups of parliamentarians. The two curve lines for the voters, however, are rather similar. Overall, the results for Sweden indicate that a stable democracy does not preclude the existence of deep disagreements over social and economic policies among both elites and voters. But even here, polarisation is much lower among the citizens than among parliamentarians.

Economic policy attitudes and satisfaction with democracy

It was argued before that the distinction between the institutions of liberal democracy and the economic order is an important precondition for democratic consolidation since it allows the inevitable disagreements over economic policies to be treated as political matters to be decided by elections. This will now be investigated in more detail. The data analysis will differ for elites and voters, however. For the elites, it is possible to analyse their evaluations of government policies and to determine if their degree of satisfaction with economic policy outputs is associated with their conception of what constitutes a democratic political order and their perception of how well democracy works in their country. For the voters, for whom we lack such evaluations, the degree to which the legitimacy of the democratic political system is associated with so-

cio-demographic factors will be analysed instead. These factors are primarily social class, religion and ethnicity which traditionally have been the basis for the development of socio-political cleavages. First, however, the degree of satisfaction with democracy as a dependent variable had to be determined.

The ability to distinguish between the regime support and satisfaction with the current government is one of the basic features of democracy as well as the most important precondition for its resilience – as opposed to non-democratic systems where the two are intricately connected. This feature of democracy reduces the vulnerability of the democratic order since unpopular or unsuccessful policy decisions may be blamed on the current government without endangering regime support. Yet, public opinion research has repeatedly shown that citizens tend to pool these two aspects of political support and that satisfaction with democracy is usually higher among the supporters of parties controlling the government.

Rather than asking directly for satisfaction with democracy, respondents were asked to assess the degree to which their country was governed democratically which was used as indicator of satisfaction with the current democratic political system.¹⁴ The relationship of this indicator with political support for the parties in government is rather weak among the citizens, with coefficients ranging from $r = -.12$ in Sweden to $r = .29$ in South Africa. It is considerably higher for the parliamentarians, however, ranging from $r = .30$ in Sweden to a high of $r = .72$ in Poland. The results, therefore, do not support the assumption that elites are better equipped to distinguish between their evaluation of the democratic regime and their support of the current government, on the contrary.

The perceived democraticness of one's own country shows a great deal of variation across the cases and respondent categories (Table 3). In all countries except Germany, parliamentarians are more satisfied with the democraticness of their country than are journalists. The latter in turn are more satisfied than the voters in five of the seven countries. The parliamentarians of the two older democracies of Sweden and Germany rated the democraticness of their countries rather high, followed by those in South Africa, Chile, South Korea, Poland and Turkey. However, the relatively high satisfaction with the democraticness of their country among South African parliamentarians and voters contrasts with considerably lower satisfaction among South African journalists, indicating that members of this group are more sceptical about the development of South African democracy. Turkey, the other country with a dominant party, shows a similar pattern and at the same time has the lowest levels of elite satisfaction of all the seven countries.

14 This question differs from the straightforward question for satisfaction with democracy that is customarily asked in public opinion surveys. Since both questions were included in the elite questionnaire, it was possible to determine if they are functionally equivalent. The correlation coefficients between the two items are not sufficiently high to warrant this conclusion. Lacking additional empirical evidence, however, it cannot be determined which of these two questions is the more valid indicator of satisfaction with democracy.

Table 3: Perceived democractiness¹ of own country

<i>Countries</i>	Elite		Citizens
	<i>Parliamentarians</i>	<i>Media</i>	
Chile	63.3	54.2	44.2
Germany	80.0	88.9	45.8
Poland	48.0	46.0	19.9
South Africa	77.0	45.1	56.1
South Korea	55.0	41.2	28.3
Sweden	96.0	94.0	61.6
Turkey	34.9	10.7	30.3

1 Question: "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" Percentage of respondents with scores of 8 - 10 on a scale from 1 = not at all democratic to 10 = completely democratic

In the elite survey, the question on essential characteristics of democracy was followed by a question asking respondents to evaluate how well they thought the current government was achieving these policy goals, using a four-point scale ranging from very badly (1) to very well (4). This made it possible to measure political satisfaction in more detail by distinguishing between satisfaction with political and economic aspects of government performance.¹⁵ Table 4 shows that satisfaction with the realisation of basic democratic rights was fairly high among parliamentarians and journalists in Germany and Sweden, reaching values of more than 3 out of a maximum of 4. In the five new democracies, the values were somewhat lower for parliamentarians, but all means were still above 2.5. By contrast, satisfaction with the economic policies of the respective governments was lower in all seven countries, and the means for Chile and South Korea were even slightly negative.

Table 4: Mean satisfaction with democratic and economic performance of the current government among the elite

<i>Countries</i>	Democratic performance		Economic performance	
	<i>Parliamentarians</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Parliamentarians</i>	<i>Media</i>
Chile	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.5
Germany	3.4	3.4	2.7	2.6
Poland	2.9	2.3	2.7	2.5
South Africa	3.3	3.0	3.1	2.5
South Korea	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.1
Sweden	3.3	3.4	2.8	3.0
Turkey	2.8	2.1	2.6	2.0


* Mean range: 1 = government is handling very badly to 4 = government is handling very well.

¹⁵ These ratings were again used to construct two additive indices, one for the democratic performance of the government with respect to the protection of basic democratic rights, and the second one for the economic performance of the government in securing economic growth and a basic standard of living for everyone.

Table 4 shows that the evaluations of the journalists were generally more negative than those of the parliamentarians. Moreover, the differences between the evaluations of parliamentarians and journalists were again considerably larger for South Africa and Turkey than for the remaining five countries. It seems that in South Africa and Turkey journalists evaluate the development of democracy more critically than elsewhere and thereby make up for the absence of strong parliamentary opposition.

The degree of polarisation – or differential satisfaction as Lijphart (1999: 286) termed it – between the parliamentarians of centre-left and centre-right parties is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Differential satisfaction among parliamentarians: mean differences¹ between members of government and opposition parties



¹ Percent of maximum difference; scale values 1 = government is handling very badly, 4 = government is handling very well.

As is evident from the graph differential satisfaction is largest in Turkey and, significantly, it is higher for the government's handling of fundamental democratic rights than for its economic policies. This points to a conflict over

the essentials of liberal democracy, which is potentially more dangerous for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey than the conflict over economic policies. Sweden shows the opposite pattern. Differential satisfaction is high with respect to the current government's economic policies, but much lower regarding the democratic performance of the government. This result is not surprising since, as Figure 3 had already revealed, polarisation over economic policies is rather high in Sweden. Despite a similarly high polarisation over economic policies in Germany, the level of differential satisfaction is much lower there because the grand coalition in power since 2005 requires Social Democrats and Christian Democrats to work out broad compromises that are acceptable even to opposition parties. In Poland, the structure is similar to that of Turkey, although the level of conflict is lower.

For the following Table 5, the two indices were dichotomised at their arithmetic mean (2.5). A cross-tabulation of the two dichotomised variables yielded four types of elite respondents: Those satisfied with government performance regarding both democratic essentials and economic policies, those dissatisfied with one but not the other aspect, and those dissatisfied with both aspects. Since most national party systems are characterised by conflicts over social and economic policies, dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the current government can be taken as normal as long as people are satisfied with the workings of the democratic order. In young democracies, however, widespread dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of the current government indicates the existence of a conflict over constitutional matters. If respondents are at the same time also dissatisfied with the economic performance of the current government, dissatisfaction goes even deeper and may contribute to political alienation. This conclusion can be drawn based on McAllister's (1999) empirical analysis which indicated that the impact of economic dissatisfaction is limited even in new democracies and that political factors are more relevant for democratic consolidation.

Table 5: Satisfaction types¹ by country and elite sector (percentage)

<i>Countries</i>	Satisfied with both		Dissatisfied with economic performance		Dissatisfied with democratic performance		Dissatisfied with both	
	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>MPs</i>	<i>Media</i>
Chile	37.5	40.9	46.6	40.9	0.0	0.0	15.9	18.2
Germany	71.0	59.8	23.7	39.2	0.0	0.0	5.4	1.0
Poland	57.5	26.2	16.3	28.6	3.8	16.7	22.5	29.6
South Africa	80.4	35.3	16.5	52.9	1.0	2.0	2.1	9.8
South Korea	37.4	9.8	40.4	52.9	0.0	3.9	22.2	33.3
Sweden	60.9	80.4	38.0	17.9	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.8
Turkey	63.7	10.1	4.8	23.1	0.0	3.0	31.5	63.8

¹ Satisfaction type based on a cross-tabulation of satisfaction with political and economic performance of the country. Scale values were dichotomized at the arithmetic mean of the scale (2.5) of the four-point scale

Table 5 illustrates that the combination of satisfaction with the democratic performance and dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the government is relatively widespread in Chile, Germany, Sweden and South Africa. In the other three countries, the percentage of elites dissatisfied with both aspects is relatively high. This is particularly true for the Turkish, but to a lesser extent also for the South Korean media elite. If the parliamentarians are additionally subdivided according to their party affiliation, dissatisfaction with both the economic and the democratic performance of the current government is especially high among members of the opposition parties in Turkey (97.8%), Poland (55.3%) and South Korea (45.8%). These results indicate that the consolidation of democracy in these three countries is more fragile than in the other countries included in our study. It has to be noted, though, that satisfaction with democracy is considerably higher even among the parliamentarians of opposition parties in these countries. This confirms that the elites distinguish between their overall assessment of the democratic nature of the country and their evaluation of the performance of the current government. Still, since new democracies have yet to consolidate their democratic institutions, dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of the government indicates the existence of potentially divisive constitutional conflict.¹⁶

As was mentioned earlier, the World Values Survey included only a question on the perceived democraticness of the respective country, which makes it impossible to distinguish between different aspects of political satisfaction. Tables 6a and 6b show that the differences between supporters of government and opposition parties are much lower among citizens than among parliamentarians, indicating that (dis-)satisfaction with democracy among voters is not very strongly related to their party preference. Those differences are highest in South Africa where the ethnic cleavage is closely associated with the voting decision. It is also relatively high in eastern Germany where the Left Party (Die Linke) has its stronghold. The mean score of the German voters of the Left Party in the east is only 5.4 compared to 5.9 among all east German respondents and 7.2 among Germans in the western part of the country.

16 Poland has meanwhile experienced a rather smooth transfer of governmental power to the former political opposition, however, indicating that the two competing political camps have successfully managed to keep political conflict at bay. This is all the more remarkable since Poland's semi-presidential system which gives the president veto power over legislation, is especially prone to the emergence of intense political conflict in times of divided government. However, Poland's membership in the EU strongly encourages such accommodative behaviour. Countries that are not part of such transnational political structures are probably more at risk.

Table 6a: Perception of democraticness of own country¹ among parliamentarians

<i>Countries</i>	Government parties	Opposition parties	Difference	% of Maximum difference
Chile	8.66	6.95	1.71	19.0
Germany	8.76	7.74	1.02	11.3
Poland	9.04	5.71	3.33	37.0
South Africa	9.21	6.58	2.63	29.2
South Korea	7.94	6.92	1.01	12.2
Sweden	9.32	8.73	0.59	6.6
Turkey	7.28	5.48	1.80	20.0

1 Means for the question "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" (1 = not at all democratic, 10 = completely democratic, maximum difference = 9)

The World Values Survey data also show that respondents who classify themselves as working class or who live in households with lower income levels evaluate the state of democracy in their country more pessimistically than those with higher social status/income in six out of the seven countries. However, the existence of a socio-economic cleavage would require that social status is at the same time associated with vote intention and yet, out of the seven countries, this is only the case in South Africa and Sweden.

In South Africa, a vote intention for the ANC is strongly associated with subjective class. Only 55.4% of respondents who considered themselves as upper or upper middle class intended to vote for the ANC against 84.1% of those who considered themselves to belong to the working or lower class, a percentage difference of 18.7%. In Sweden, similarly high percentage differences exist between vote intention for the Moderata Samlingspartiet, which has a clear stronghold among members of the upper and upper middle class (47.1% to 13.1%), and the Social Democrats who are the preferred party for working and lower class voters. (53.3% to 18.2%).

Table 6b: Perception of democraticness of own country¹ among citizens

<i>Countries</i>	Supporters of Government Party/Parties	Supporters of Opposition Parties	Difference	% of Maximum Difference
Chile	7.41	6.73	0.68	7.6
East Germany	7.36	7.08	0.28	3.1
West Germany	6.48	5.49	1.00	11.1
Poland	6.00	5.61	0.39	4.3
South Africa	7.89	6.49	1.40	15.6
Sweden	7.32	7.74	-0.42	-4.7
Turkey	6.51	5.72	0.79	8.8

1 Means for the question "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" (1 = not at all democratic, 10 = completely democratic, maximum difference = 9)

2 South Korea not included because no party labels are provided in the data-set

In South Africa the association of social class, vote intention and political satisfaction, however, is spurious and it largely disappears once ethnic background is controlled for. This can be seen in Table 7. Especially black and coloured respondents give more positive evaluations of the quality of South African democracy than do whites and voters with Asian background. The vote intention of the members of different ethnic groups confirms the salience of ethnicity for the South African voters. While 89.3% of the black voters expressed a vote intention for the ANC, 72.1% of the white voters preferred the Democratic Alliance. The coloured group was almost equally split between the ANC (34.5%) and the Democratic Alliance (31.0%), while a sizeable minority of 12.9% showed a preference for the Independent Democrats. Voters with Asian background also split their political allegiance between the ANC (27.8%), the Democratic Alliance (36.8%) and the Minority Front (21.1%).

Table 7: Ethnic background, vote intention, subjective class and perceived democraticness in South Africa¹ (column percentages)

	Ethnic background			
	Black	Coloured	Asian	White
Vote intention				
ANC, SACP	89.5	43.5	26.2	7.7
DA	1.4	26.1	40.5	74.2
Other	9.1	30.4	33.3	18.1
Subjective social class				
Upper and upper middle class	10.3	22.7	27.6	65.3
Lower middle class	19.5	21.7	27.6	16.7
Working and lower class	70.2	55.7	44.8	18.0
Perceived democraticness of South Africa				
Low	6.4	13.8	39.0	30.3
Medium	31.4	43.4	35.6	44.5
High	62.3	42.9	25.4	25.2

¹ Percent of each group with values 1-3 (low), 4-6 (medium) and 8-10 (high) on a 10-point scale for the question: "And how democratically is this country being governed today?"

Turkey is a third country in the sample with a cleavage that is rooted in social structure. Despite frequent attempts by the Turkish military to suppress political Islamism, the Islamic AKP has successfully managed to mobilise voters on the basis of religion which has become the most salient cleavage in Turkish politics (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006; Hazama 2003). The WVS confirms that religiosity is strongly related to the vote intention in Turkey, as can be seen in Table 8.¹⁷ But, unlike the situation in South Africa, religiosity in Turkey is not associated with social status or with a preference for government intervention into the market. Thus, this cleavage is primarily a religious-cultural one. At the

¹⁷ However, since more than two fifths of the respondents in the Turkish sample did not indicate their vote intention, this result has to be interpreted with caution.

same time, religiosity strongly affects satisfaction with the democratic quality of the country, which in Turkey is lower than in any of the other countries of this study, and even lower among respondents with a secular orientation than among those with a religious orientation. While more than two fifths (41.1%) of highly religious Turks are satisfied with quality of democracy in Turkey, this figure stands at only 24.5% for those who never attend religious ceremonies. At the same time, Turkish secularists form a strong minority, making up about one third of the population. This group is thus nearly as strong as the group of highly religious respondents who attend the mosque at least once a week.¹⁸

Table 8: Religiosity, vote intention¹, subjective social class and perceived democraticness in Turkey² (column percentages)

	Attendance of Religious Services			
	More than once a week	Once a week	At least once a year	Never
Vote intention				
AKP	74.1	56.8	57.7	39.9
Secular center-left	11.5	16.4	23.0	51.0
Secular center-right	14.4	26.8	19.2	9.1
Subjective social class				
Upper and upper middle class	26.0	34.1	38.4	24.6
Lower middle class	46.3	33.0	32.7	44.1
Working and lower class	27.7	33.0	28.9	31.2
Perceived democraticness of South Africa				
Low	14.9	21.8	25.6	34.3
Medium	44.0	42.5	45.5	41.2
High	41.1	35.7	28.9	24.5

- 1 Secular centre-left parties: CHP, DSP, DTP; secular centre-right parties: ANAP, DYP, Felicity party; vote intention for other parties and missing values (would not vote, don't know, no answer) excluded.
- 2 Percent of each group with values 8 to 10 on a 10-point scale for the question: "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" (1 = not at all democratic, 10 = completely democratic)

¹⁸ The relevance of the ethnic cleavage involving the Kurdish minority cannot be assessed with the data of the World Values Survey since the ethnicity question was not asked in Turkey. However, although the Kurdish question is certainly extremely divisive, it involves only a relative small minority of about 12 of the population, while the religious cleavage is much more pervasive. The spatial analysis of Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) also confirms the predominance of the religious cleavage. At the same time, while the religious cleavage is not associated with socio-economic status, the Kurdish minority is on average poorer and less well-educated, thus increasing the divisive nature of this cleavage.

Conclusion: Some tentative answers on the salience of the socio-economic cleavage and its implications for the consolidation of new democracies

Analyses of the two previous waves of democratisation suggested that socio-economic disparities had a detrimental effect on the consolidation of democracy because they were frequently associated with fundamental ideological conflict over economic policies. Starting from that assumption, the aim of the above analyses was to determine the structure and depth of conflict over socio-economic policies and its association with support for democracy among elites and citizens in the seven societies studied.

First and foremost the findings revealed that a great majority of parliamentarians and media elites in the seven countries emphasise that living in a democracy is important to them. Support for authoritarian or military rule is rather low among the elites in all countries with the exception of parliamentarians in Turkey. Support for a democratic political order is also very high among the citizens, but at the same time citizens show considerably higher support for authoritarian rule. Such differences between elites and citizens can be found even in Germany and Sweden, although they are much smaller in those two countries.

In all seven countries, consensus on the economic responsibility of governments to provide a decent standard of living for its citizens is nearly universal. This consensus is shared even by conservative and neo-liberal parties. Conflict over (re-)distributive issues and the reliance on market forces is more pronounced, but still not as much as it was in the first half of the 20th century (Esping-Andersen 1999: 310). It is even less salient in four of the five new democracies (with the exception of Chile) than in the two established ones where the economic cleavage played a central role in the formative period of their party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Economic policy preferences of the elites are only weakly related to their satisfaction with democracy in their respective countries. However, in some of the countries dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of the current government, on the one hand, and with the economic performance, on the other, are related, although the relationship is only moderately strong. While dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the current government is quite normal given different economic policy preferences of the opposition parties and is therefore unproblematic for democratic consolidation as long as overall satisfaction with democracy is high, dissatisfaction with both the economic performance *and* with the democratic performance indicates a much more deep-seated conflict in the political system. In this vein, between one third and one fourth of parliamentarians in Turkey, South Korea and Poland can be considered as politically alienated. Such political alienation is much more dangerous for the consolidation of democracy than eco-

conomic dissatisfaction alone, and the two types of dissatisfaction may even reinforce each other during a sustained economic crisis.

The traditional class cleavage continues to be highly salient in Sweden. In South Africa, the ANC and the Democratic Alliance differ considerably with respect to the ethnic profile of their voters and, at the same time, ethnicity is associated with economic disparities. Yet despite this cleavage overall satisfaction with the development of South African democracy is rather high, even among the parliamentarians and voters of the opposition parties. However, given the rather high economic expectations of its voters, the ANC government is under considerable pressure to improve the economic situation of its followers. If it does not achieve this within the next couple of years, support for democracy may erode because it is not firmly rooted in a democratic political culture. This may be difficult to achieve, though, considering the low economic performance of South Africa which remains the poorest among the seven countries in the study. While Turkey, Chile and Poland have experienced a substantial increase in GNP per capita since the year 2000, recent statistics show that the South African economy has not grown comparably. In his analysis of the South African economic system, Mohr (2005) argued that this is at least partly due to affirmative action and black economic empowerment. Thus, while the rates of economic growth have been relatively low in South Africa compared to Poland, Chile and Turkey, political reforms have decreased racial economic inequality. This in turn makes it easier for black voters to accept the slow improvement of their economically dismal situation (Mohr 2005: 176), especially since South African citizens give their government relatively high marks for addressing educational needs, improving basic health services, managing the economy and combating HIV (Kotzé and Steenekamp 2009: 89). Moreover, South Africa is comparatively well-off among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa which are probably more relevant as reference countries than the other new democracies included in our study.

In East Germany, social class and income are also related to political satisfaction but the existing economic disparities are not strongly associated with voting patterns. While the Left party is much stronger in the east, it receives only about a quarter of the votes from the eastern German voters and despite its attempts to mobilise the economically discontented, it has not succeeded in establishing a new socio-economic cleavage based on region and class. In the other five countries, the influence of social class and income on the vote intention is relatively weak.

The analyses of the Turkish data show that the religious cleavage is highly salient and separates secular voters from those who are religious. But while religion is a matter of considerable conflict between the AKP and the secular parties, the opposition is split because the secular left and the secular right disagree on economic policies. The cross-cutting nature of the two cleavage lines contributes to lowering the intensity of the conflict over the role of religion in Turkish society.

Summing up, the data confirm that although differences over economic policies play a role in all seven countries, the economic cleavage seems to have lost a good deal of its formerly divisive character. It is no longer closely associated with different ideological conceptions of democracy, but rather involves disagreements about more or less government intervention into the market.

References

- Abold, R. and Wenzel, E. (2005). Die Größe des Kuchens und seine Verteilung. In Gabriel, O.W., Falter, J.W. and Rattinger, H. (eds.). *Wächst zusammen, was zusammengehört?* Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1989). *The Civic Culture*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Bartolini, S. (2000). *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980. The Class Cleavage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990). *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, M. and Mattes, R. (2001). Support for democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3): 447-474.
- Brettschneider, F., van Deth, J. and Roller, E. (eds.) (2002). *Das Ende der politisierten Sozialstruktur?* Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Caramani, D. (2004). *The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Çarkoğlu, A. and Hinich, M. (2006). A spatial analysis of Turkish party preferences. *Electoral Studies*, 25(2): 369-392.
- Dalton, R. J. (2006). *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 4th edition. Washington (D.C.): CQ Press.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4): 435-457.
- Esping-Andersen, G. 1999. Politics without class? Postindustrial cleavages in Europe and America. In Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G. and Stephens, J.D. (eds.). *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gabriel, O.W. (2005). Wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört? In Gabriel, O.W., Falter, J.W. and Rattinger, H. (eds.). *Wächst zusammen, was zusammengehört?* Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Hazama, Y. (2003). Social cleavages and electoral support in Turkey: toward convergence? *The Developing Economies*, 41(3): 362-387.
- Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2008). Studying elite vs mass opinion. In Donsbach, W. and Traugott, M.W. (eds.). *The Sage Handbook of Public Opinion Research*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
- Holtmann, E. (2009). Signaturen des Übergangs. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 28/2009: 3-8.
- Huntington, S.P. (1991). *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Knutsen, O. (2005). *Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Aldershot: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kotzé, H.J. and Steenekamp, C.L. (2009). *Values and Democracy in South Africa: Comparing Elite and Public Values*. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

- Lane, J. and Ersson, S. (1999). *Politics and Society in Western Europe*. 4th edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, S.M. (1960). Social conflict, legitimacy and democracy. In Lipset, S.M. *Political Man*. Garden City: Doubleday.
- Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. In Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press.
- McAllister, I. (1999). The economic performance of government. In Norris, P. (ed.). *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McClosky, H. (1964). Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 58(2): 361-382.
- McClosky, H. and Brill, A. (1983). *Dimensions of Tolerance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Miller, A. H., Hesli, V.L. and Reisinger, W.M. (1997). Conceptions of democracy among mass and elite in post-Soviet societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 27(2): 157-90.
- Mohr, P. (2005). Economic performance and the consolidation of democracy. In van Beek, U.J. (ed.). *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. London: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Statistisches Bundesamt. (eds.) (2008). *Datenreport 2006*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- van Beek, U.J. (2005). *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. London: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Wasilewski, J. (1998). Elite circulation and consolidation of democracy in Poland. In Higley, J., Pakulski, J. and Wesolowski, W. (eds.). *Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press.