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# Re-electing MEPs: The factors determining re-election probabilities

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## Abstract

By placing candidates on electoral lists for European elections, national parties hold a very powerful position in the (re) election of Members of European Parliament (MEPs). This article analyses the factors or individual characteristics of MEPs that affect list placement decisions. I identify three possible national party goals in European elections – legislative leverage, loyalty and attractiveness to voters – and examine evidence for each. Based on a unique data set of German MEPs from 1999-2009, the analysis shows that national parties, in particular small parties, value MEPs from more powerful committees. National parties furthermore reward MEPs with national party positions during the EP term. Surprisingly, I find little evidence that German parties reward very loyal parliamentarians.

**Keywords:** Candidate selection, European elections, European Parliament, Germany, party behavior.

*‘There’s firstly the track record of someone, that means what did he previously do? How does he present himself? And thirdly, what does he want to do in future?’*

— Party Member on List Placement Criteria

## Introduction

National parties are powerful principals of MEPs (see Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007). As the agent, the MEP is ‘torn’ between two principals: the party group inside the European Parliament (EP) and the national party (Hix, 2002). To be successful MEPs should cater to the interests of influential groups inside the EP, like their EP party group; however, the national party selects MEPs for re-election. National parties decide upon the position of every candidate on their electoral list. Especially in closed list proportional representation election systems where voters are unable to influence the list ordering, party placements effectively determine the re-election probability of their MEPs. While a robust literature on European elections has emerged, virtually all of it neglects the earlier role of list placements (for exceptions see Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Meserve et al., 2011).

This article sheds light on the national parties’ (NP) candidate selection for European elections. It seeks to find out which factors affect the re-election probability of MEPs. The characteristics national parties value in their parliamentarians depend in large part upon their goals. This article identifies three party goals in European elections, each of which identifies a different set of factors that influence the re-election probabilities of MEPs. First, parties want MEPs who possess legislative leverage (i.e. the potential and opportunity to influence decision making and policy inside the EP). Second, national parties also desire loyal MEPs. Finally, parties are interested in MEPs who attract voters.

What I call ‘factors’ in this article are essentially the individual characteristics of MEPs related to behavior, past experience or qualities on the national level (for example national political experience (Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Hobolt and Høyland, 2011; Meserve et al., 2011) or previous positions and activities in the EP (Lyder Hermansen, 2014; Sigalas, 2011)). I complement factors identified in previous research with a number of factors that contribute to the re-election of MEPs: the type of legislative committee an MEP was a part of in the previous term (committee power) as well as variables related to the electoral institutions, national party offices

(NP office) and competition.<sup>1</sup>

I investigate factors influencing the re-election probabilities of MEPs based on an innovative data set linking behavioral data, biographical information and party list positions of German MEPs between 1999 and 2009. In EP elections Germany maintains proportional representation in the form of a closed list system with a 5 percent electoral threshold until 2009. Candidate selection of German parties for European elections is partially informal and often dominated by the local and district/regional party level. German parties select their MEP candidates either on a national level or on a German state level. German parties thus have either one (SPD, Greens, FDP, and Linke) or 16 (CDU/CSU) electoral lists. Another feature of German candidate selection for the EP is the importance of the constituency, region or federal state. Geographical parity is an important principle within German parties (Mittag, 2013: 202), and also respected in European elections. Aiming for an even distribution of MEPs and thus for a fair representation of voters, German parties with one federal electoral list have formal or informal rules for aggregating MEP candidate proposals from different German regions or states onto one list.

The German case is particularly useful for studying the re-election probabilities of MEPs. Germany is the EU member state with the highest number of MEPs. About 13 percent of all MEPs are German, and more than half of German MEPs are re-elected. Understanding what drives German parties' candidate selection decisions might inform our understanding of the behavior of one of the most influential EU member state's MEPs. Furthermore, focusing on Germany enables me to hold national level variables such as broad legal framework and electoral system constant while taking party level differences in candidate selection and individual biographical information into account.

High candidate leverage is valued by national parties in the list placement process. The results show that being a member of a more powerful legislative committee inside the EP significantly increases the re-election probability of German MEPs. Also, the number of reports an MEP wrote and attendance in plenary have a small, but not very convincing, effect. Surprisingly, I find little evidence that loyalty in roll call voting to the national party is valued by the parties. MEPs with national party offices also have an advantage in re-election, especially in small German parties.

This study contributes to the field in two ways. First the study helps broaden our knowledge of an under-researched aspect of the European elections: the selection stage where national parties select candidates and place them on the electoral list. This article makes a number of improvements on previous studies on EP candidate selection. By concentrating on the re-selection of MEPs instead of looking at all candidates (see Meserve et al., 2011; Sigalas, 2011), the article recognizes

that the electoral logic applicable to MEPs will differ from that of new candidates. The famous incumbency advantage (e.g. Lee, 2001; Zaller, 1998) does also exist in European elections. Complementing other (working) papers by Meserve et al. (2011), Lyder Hermansen (2014) and van Thomme et al. (2015), I demonstrate that a combination of general, EU-related characteristics and specific national factors determines MEP re-election probability. This article uses individual candidate list positions - a data source that is still relatively new to studies of EP elections (see also Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Lyder Hermansen, 2014; Meserve et al., 2011). My data set allows for a specialized measure of individual re-election probability as set by the national party. The second contribution is more general. The article examines party decision making and party goals in European elections, which interests scholars of national parties and elections alike. My results are also of interest for EP scholars because the influential factors for re-election might in turn influence MEP behavior in parliament (e.g. Hix, 2004).

## **Party goals and what they mean for re-election probabilities: Theoretical framework**

The factors influencing re-election probabilities of MEPs depend on the goals national parties pursue. I identify three specific goals national parties use when selecting (potential) future MEPs: leverage, loyalty and attractiveness to voters. National parties desire MEPs with the potential and opportunity to influence policy making within the EP. Furthermore, national parties want loyal MEPs. Finally, national parties desire MEPs who attract voters because without votes the party cannot send MEPs to Brussels. The two goals of leverage and loyalty relate to behavior and political processes at the EU level, while attractiveness to voters relates to the domestic arena.

Questions surrounding the goals of party behavior are not new. More than half a century ago scholars started describing political parties as policy oriented (see De Swaan, 1973), office-seeking (Riker, 1962) or vote-seeking (Downs, 1957). Strøm (1990: 565) discusses the relationship between these originally distinct theories of party behavior and develops a unified theory of political party behavior in parliamentary democracies. Previous theories on party goals help us understand party behavior in the EU context but must be adapted (see also Aldrich, 2014).

Existing theories about party behavior were developed to explain national politics (Strøm, 1990), where an executive, possibly even a coalition government exists and where the national party leadership is usually part of the legislature, and maybe

even the government. None of this is true for the European Union (EU). Studies on party behavior in the national arena (see Müller and Strøm, 1999) usually identify the party elite as the decision making unit within the party. During candidate selection for the EP the party selectorate (formally) takes the decision. As is the case in Germany, the party selectorate might be from lower levels of party hierarchy. In contrast to national politics, neither national party leaders nor the party selectorate has a position in the EP. Hence, the European setting makes it difficult for the national party to influence the form a policy takes on the EU level. The only way national parties can influence EP legislation is through loyal MEPs with legislative leverage.

According to Strøm (1990) and Müller and Strøm (1999) political office is an end in itself because ‘parties maximize their control over political office benefits’ (Müller and Strøm, 1999: 5). However the EU does not form an executive and the decentral national party selectorate may not win a seat in the EP. Hence, there are no office benefits to be expected and no office-seeking behavior as defined by Müller and Strøm (1999: 5). Instead, national parties value EP offices as instrumental in (potentially) influencing EP legislation (Budge and Laver, 1986: 492).

The party goals of legislative leverage, loyalty and attractiveness to voters are manifestations of the classic party objectives (Müller and Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990) adapted to the European setting. While leverage and loyalty relate to the policy orientation of parties (see De Swaan, 1973), attractiveness to voters equals the vote-seeking behavior that also exists in the national political sphere (Downs, 1957). All three goals are connected with expectations for the future. When selecting MEPs for the party list the national party wants candidates to attract votes and future MEPs who have legislative leverage and will be loyal. In the case of leverage and loyalty I argue that the national party uses past MEP behavior as an indicator for future leverage or loyalty. Just as Strøm (1990) describes party behavior, the three EU specific party goals can be described as forming a three dimensional space. Figure 1 displays the three party goals in candidate selection for European elections. When selecting candidates for the EP, parties pursue multiple goals (see Strøm, 1990: 571) but also potentially face trade-offs. These theoretically existing trade-offs are painted as solid lines in Figure 1. The horizontal line illustrates the divide between EU related and national goals.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The factors influencing re-election probability tested in this study are each motivated by one of the party goals. In an ideal world, a party would aim to select an MEP who is 100 percent loyal, has significant legislative leverage inside the EP, and

also attracts many voters. In reality, however, this MEP is not likely to exist. The legislative leverage of an MEP depends partially on the goodwill of the EP party group who has a considerable say in the distribution of offices and assignment to committees (see Yordanova, 2013: 40). In the event that both principals, the national party and the EP party group, hold different positions, the MEP would need to do what the EP party group wants to secure influence within the EP. This implies, however, that the MEP acts disloyally toward the national party which determines the re-election probability.<sup>2</sup>

Another theoretical trade-off exists between attractiveness to voters, which requires that the MEP spends time in the home constituency, and legislative leverage in the EP, which requires time spent in Brussels or Strasbourg. This trade-off between time spent in the constituency versus in the EP is not as pronounced in regard to loyalty (voting) or attendance of parliamentary sessions because sessions last one week per month and are scheduled well in advance. However, key offices in the EP or membership in a busy committee requires an MEP to spend more time in Brussels and Strasbourg; time, which cannot otherwise be spent in the home constituency. As long as time spent in the constituency or contact with voters cannot be measured, this trade-off remains theoretical.

*Legislative Leverage:* The Oxford dictionary defines leverage as ‘the power to influence a person or a situation’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2015). If national parties want to influence policy making inside the EP they require MEPs with legislative leverage, i.e. the potential and/or opportunity to influence decision making and policy within the EP. Unlike the notions of legislative effectiveness or legislative influence, this concept is less about the actual amount of legislation an individual influences but rather about the potential to do so (Volden et al., 2013; Volden and Wieseman, 2014). Given this information, which individual MEP characteristics show that has a great deal of legislative leverage? An important aspect of leverage is legislative activity because only active MEPs have the opportunity to affect policies. Few studies, mostly working papers, analyze the effect of MEPs’ activities in the EP on re-election (see van Thomme et al., 2015). Lyder Hermansen (2014) finds that drafting reports increases the probability that the MEP will end up on a high (i.e. safe) list position for re-election. The more reports an MEP drafts, the more opportunities she has to change opinions or influence the legislative outcome. The same is true for attendance in plenary (see Lyder Hermansen, 2014; Sigalas, 2011): the more plenary sessions an MEP attends, the more legislative decisions she can make. The EP’s policy positions are *de facto* decided in legislative committees (Ringe, 2010; Yordanova, 2013:1). MEPs involved in an EP committee with

more output and power (e.g. Budgets (BUDG) or Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)) therefore have greater legislative leverage because they can influence more (and potentially more important) legislation than MEPs from committees with less output (e.g. Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) or Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)). Therefore MEPs from more powerful committees should be valuable to national parties. A second aspect of legislative leverage relates to the question of how well the MEP understands internal political processes and people. Experienced MEPs with an important EP office could potentially have more legislative leverage than someone who produces a large amount of reports. They have more legislative leverage because senior, experienced MEPs have greater knowledge of specific processes within the EP, have a larger personal network and are therefore better able to influence policy making. The same is true for EP offices, which grant formal involvement in decision making. Similarly age has been used as a measure of experience (Sigalas, 2011). The age argument states that older politicians are more senior and therefore might get better list positions. But the effect of age on re-election probability likely non-linear (see Sigalas, 2011): being older only has a positive effect for younger MEPs and is likely negative from a certain age onward.

I identify legislative leverage as an important goal for national parties in European elections. The first hypothesis is therefore:

*H1:* The more legislative leverage an MEP has, the higher her re-election probability.

Legislative leverage, as defined above, is measured by the number of reports an MEP writes, the percentage of plenary sessions she attends, the power of the committee in which she is a member, the EP seniority and age of the MEP and the number of EP offices an MEP holds. For example, an MEP possesses more leverage if she writes more reports or is member of a powerful committee.

When analyzing the effect of the mentioned leverage factors one must consider that these factors might not be independent of each other. Evidently age and seniority are related. It is also true that committee chairs and more senior MEPs write more reports (see Daniel, 2015). Not all of the interdependencies can be accounted for in the analysis, the online appendix does, however, provide correlations. It is even more important to note that some analyzed factors may not be influenced by the MEPs themselves. The value of factors like reports or committee power can be influenced by the European Party Group (EPG), the national party, the MEP herself or by a combination of these actors.

*Loyalty:* Compared with other parliamentarians, MEPs are in a special situation because they serve two distinct principals. Previous studies, however, demonstrate that the national party is the stronger principal: in cases where the preferences of the EP party group and the national party conflict, the MEP more frequently decides to vote with the national party (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007). The common explanation is that by controlling candidate selection for the EP elections, national parties can decide who is (re-)elected (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002). If this explanation is true, the reverse conclusion is that national parties sanction disloyal behavior. We would therefore expect that MEP loyalty (in voting) towards the national party determines the MEP's candidate list placement if running for re-election.

*H2:* The more loyal (in voting) an MEP is towards his or her national party, the higher her re-election probability.

*Attractiveness to voters:* The third party goal in European elections – attractiveness to voters – relates to the national sphere. National parties or their MEPs are elected by national voters, hence national votes are maximized for European elections. An increased vote share yields more MEPs within the EP and therefore more policy influence. It follows that national level behavior, experience or candidate reputation is important.

A common factor found to matter for voters (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011) as well as for the list ordering of candidates by national parties (Gherghina and Chiru, 2010; Meserve et al., 2011) in European elections is the political experience of candidates at the national level. Past political experience at the national level could be seen as a proxy for reputation or popularity among voters. To be attractive to voters, a party and its MEPs also need to maintain contact with voters. The measurement, however, of the frequency or intensity of MEP contact with the voters poses a problem. As a result, while national political experience is not the only factor capturing attractiveness to voters, it is the only measurable one.

If attractiveness to voters is an important goal when national parties determine the list placement of MEPs then the analysis should yield a positive relationship between attractiveness to voters (measured as national political experience) and the MEPs re-election probability.

*H3:* The more attractive an MEP is to voters (i.e. nationally politically experienced), the higher her re-election probability.

## Data and measurement

In this section I propose a measure for national parties' candidate list placement. I discuss candidate list placements and issues with the sample. Then I describe how a list position is transformed into the re-election probability of the MEP. Next I explain how each factor is measured. Table A1 in the online appendix summarizes the data sources, operationalization and descriptive statistics of each variable, main factors as well as control variables.

### *List placement and sample*

Over half (125) of the 208 German MEPs between 1999 and 2009 were re-elected. However, I am interested in the candidate selection decision of the national party, and hence in list placement. About one-third (63) of the 208 German MEPs were not repositioned on the electoral list of any German party after their legislative term. The fact that only 20 (about 14 percent) of the 145 MEPs on a party list for re-election were not elected demonstrates that sitting MEPs tend to gain promising list positions. The German MEPs in the dataset are relisted on positions one through 30, from which list position 23 was the last successful list position (for the distribution of the list positions of German MEPs that lead to re-election see the online appendix).

To be (re-) elected three interlinked steps are necessary. First, a person has to be put on the party list. Second, given that the candidate is (re) listed, she has to obtain a high ranking list position. Third, the party has to receive a sufficient number of votes. These steps imply a set of design decisions for this study. First, I include the 63 MEPs who did not secure a place on their parties' list and set their re-election probabilities to zero (see footnote 9 in Stoffel, 2014: 60). Not placing a candidate on the party list can also be a candidate selection decision – maybe the most severe form of punishment by the party. However, not being placed on the party list is not necessarily a deliberate decision of the national party. To ensure I only capture the placement of the national party – a conscious decision by the national principal — and not voluntary drop out from the electoral list, I conducted a qualitative background analysis (of CVs, media reports and interviews) on all 63 non-relisted German MEPs. The analysis indicates that 28 of the 63 non-relisted MEPs chose not to seek office again (because of age, health reasons, another job or death). I exclude these MEPs from the analysis and keep 10 of the 63 MEPs who desired to be relisted but could not achieve (promising or secure) list positions. For the remaining 25 non-relisted MEPs the qualitative analysis did not provide any evidence for why they were not relisted after their term in office. MEPs who were not granted any or an unpromising list position have an incentive to disguise the

true reason for not standing as a candidate again. Assuming that some of the MEPs with unclear motivation retired I exclude five MEPs who are above 67-years-old at the time of reelection from the further analysis and I include the remaining 20 MEPs in the sample. Another question is how to account for three MEPs who reran with a different national party. I also exclude these three MEPs because many of the independent variables connected to behavior or achievement during the term (e.g. NP loyalty) do not make sense if the national principal changed. To make sure that this exclusion of MEPs does not affect the result, I ran the main model including these three MEPs (for details see the online appendix). After excluding the mentioned MEPs 173 German MEPs remain in the dataset.

### ***The measurement of re-election probabilities***

The dependent variable of this study, ‘re-election probability’, captures the probability that an MEP is re-elected given her position on the electoral list. National leaders or party delegates decide on the list placement of MEP candidates. The quality of a list position is determined by the probability that a candidate placed at a specified list position is elected.

As we cannot observe this probability directly, I predict it in a two step procedure using a measurement technique developed by Stoffel (2014). For this purpose I use unique data on electoral list positions of German candidates (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009). I follow Stoffel’s reasoning to gather data from three elections (Stoffel, 2014). Because this article is about party decision making in candidate selection, I base estimates of re-election probability not only on two previous electoral lists and results, but also on the upcoming election. Party delegates consider current opinion polls and previous European election(s) when they make a judgement on the quality of the list places before positioning the candidates (see Höhne, 2013)<sup>3</sup>. Hence, the re-election probability of any MEP standing for re-election in 2004 is based on the electoral lists and election outcomes during 1994, 1999 and 2004. The re-election probability of the same MEPs in 2009 (if re-elected) is based upon list data from 1999 to 2009. Table 1 shows the structure of the list data.

[Table 1 about here.]

As a first step, the following probit regression was conducted explaining electoral success using list position. Let  $i$  index each candidate and  $j$  be the number of election/party list combinations under consideration in this study. For each candidate in election/list  $j$ , we observe the binary re-election outcome  $Y_{ij}$  and the list position

$X_{ij}$ . Then separately for each list/election combination, I estimate probit models of the form  $\Pr(Y_{ij} = 1) = \Phi(\hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 X_i)$ , where  $\Phi$  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution (see Stoffel, 2014: 60).<sup>4</sup> This model assumes that list position is a strong predictor of electoral success – an assumption that is generally true in closed list electoral systems such as Germany where voters cannot alter the list ordering of the party. I acknowledge that electoral success also depends on the vote share the party gets, which is affected by many factors. A probit model is chosen here because the dependent variable in this regression, being elected or not, is binary and the error term is assumed to be normally distributed. As expected, (see the online appendix) these probit regressions reveal a negative relationship between list position and electoral success: the better the list position (equals a smaller position number), the higher the probability on average that the candidate on the list position is elected. As a second step the parameters for  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  estimated in the first step are used to calculate the predicted probability for each list position using the equation above. These predicted probabilities are then assigned to each (based on the list position she ran on for re-election) MEP as their probability of re-election.

The following example illustrates the point: Thomas Ulmer, CDU MEP from Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), was first elected in 2004 and reran in 2009 on list position six. List position six on the CDU-BW list has consistently been elected since 1994. The somewhat safe list position six is, however, not as safe as position one or two because in 1994 it was the lowest list position elected. The probit model in estimation step one shows us that, for the CDU-BW, list position is a significant predictor of success and higher list positions (lower numbers) are on average more likely to be elected. This probit model furthermore gives us a  $\beta_0$  of 8.43 and a  $\beta_1$  of -1.17 (see online appendix). In the second step I calculate the re-election probability of CDU-BW position six (in 2009) by taking the cumulative density function of the normal distribution of the mentioned results. The result is a re-election probability of 91.99: rather safe.

Estimating re-election probabilities with the data and model described poses a number of problems inherent to estimation and the data. The first problem lies in the nature of the data used. List positions above a certain threshold are associated with only one value of the dependent variable ('elected'), while the list positions below the threshold are associated with the other value (complete separation). In significant models, coefficients and standard errors are not excessively large. The second problem arises from estimating separate models for each party list because they are not comparable. Short party lists (few data) lead to insignificant results and large confidence intervals (see the online appendix). This affects only the (shorter) state-

level CDU party lists. Statistically speaking, all re-election probabilities derived from insignificant models (where the effect of independent variable and constant are insignificant or zero) should be coded zero. Yet, realistically we know that not all of the CDU list positions in these models have a re-election probability of zero. The first list position of the CDU Saarland (always successful since 1994) had a high chance of being elected. Because my goal is to create a sensible dependent variable I choose to leave the estimates based on insignificant models in the analysis. In a robustness check I code re-election probabilities from insignificant models zero to show that the substantive results do not change. Results are reported in the online appendix.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the predicted re-election probabilities of German MEPs who wanted re-election. The re-election probabilities of MEPs on party lists have a u-shaped distribution (see also Stoffel, 2014: 62), which can be explained by the incumbent advantage of MEPs and the fact that MEPs tend to refuse clearly unpromising list positions. The differences in distributions between parties can be seen in the online appendix.

[Figure 2 about here.]

## ***Factors***

*Committee power:* For this factor I use a categorization by Yordanova (2009), who classifies EP committees as more or less powerful (Yordanova, 2009: 256). The online appendix gives an overview of the classification of EP committees. MEPs are coded as ‘more powerful’ (1) if he or she was an official member of at least one of the more powerful committees (at least in one half of the legislative term) and ‘less powerful’ (0) otherwise.

*Reports:* Reports captures the total number of reports drafted by the MEP within a given term. It has been noted that committee chairs write more reports, though on less salient topics (e.g. Hausemer, 2006). I include an interaction between reports and status as committee chair to control for this effect.

*Committee Chair:* Binary variable capturing whether the MEP was chair of an EP committee during the term.

*Attendance:* Gives the percentage of all EP plenary sessions (Brussels+Strasbourg) officially attended by the MEP within the EP term.

*EP Seniority:* This variable represents specific experience in the EP, measured by the total number of years the person served as MEP from the very first entry into EP until the end of the EP term in question (see also Sigalas, 2011).<sup>5</sup>

*Age:* Variable gives the age of the MEP at the time of re-election (end of the term)

in whole years.

*EP Position:* This variable shows if the MEP had any of following positions in the EP within the given legislative term (before the election) (1) or not (0): committee chair, committee vice chair, president of the EP, EP vice president, EPG chairpersons, EPG vice chair. Data were provided by Hobolt and Høyland (2011).

*NP loyalty:* Loyalty towards the national party is measured as the percentage of substantially interesting roll call votes (votes where EPG and NP held different positions) where an MEP voted with his or her national party. I assume the political position of the national party to be measured by the (voting) position of the plurality of the MEP from the same national party. Hence, if 40 members vote 'yes', 20 members vote 'no', then voting 'no' would be voting against the national principal. In categorizing each vote as loyal to the NP or not, I dismiss cases where there is no clear plurality (tie). I drop MEPs with less than 100 roll-call votes due to insufficient information (see Hix et al., 2007: 136ff). A minimum number of MEPs per NP is reasonable (Hix et al., 2007: 136) but not necessary for the German sample.<sup>6</sup>

*National Political experience:* To create a measure of political experience that includes the sub-national level, I analyzed the resumes of every German MEP and coded whether she had any of the following positions prior to her entry into the EP: district council member, Major, member of state parliament, Minister or President at state level, member of Bundestag or Volkskammer and Minister of the Federal Government. For the analysis, a dummy variable captures whether an MEP held any of these positions before entering the EP(1) or not (0). Because the effect of seniority could be dependent on age, I include an interaction effect between age(at re-election) and seniority into the analysis.

*NP Position:* This binary variable captures MEP membership in a party executive committee on the local, county/sub-district, district/regional, state or federal level of party hierarchy in Germany during the legislative term.<sup>7</sup>

*Home constituency:* The 'home' constituency of a German MEP is the German constituency where he or she officially lived at election into the EP term (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999, 2004). The variable captures the relative strength of the MEP's party in the home constituency (measured by the relationship between the total result of the party at the federal level in percent and the result of the party in the constituency in percent).<sup>8</sup>

*Competition Intensity:* This variable captures whether the competition in the official delegates meeting selecting the candidates for the list positions is high ( $\geq 0.5$ ) (1) or not (0). The degree of competition is measured with an index developed by Höhne (2013: 217). He divides the sum of competitive list positions, i.e. the positions more than one person officially ran for in the final decision round, by the sum of list

positions that are considered safe or promising by the party (Höhne, 2013: 217).<sup>9</sup>

*Entry Probability:* The variable captures the election probability associated with the list position held by an MEP when entering the EP term. For a description of the exact calculation of entry probability, please see the description of the dependent variable.

A detailed description of the control variables that have not been listed here (Federal List (dummy variable), Gender Quota (in percent), Female and Regional Selectorate (binary variable shows the degree of selectorate centralization)), the data sources and other relevant information can be found in the online appendix.

## Results

The dependent variable analyzed in this article, re-election probability, measures the probability that German MEPs standing for re-election in 2004 and 2009 are re-elected given their list position. I use two different methods to analyze this variable. First, I report results (Table 2) based on multivariate linear regression models with ordinary least squares (OLS). I also use a technique for estimating heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrices. The dependent variable is continuous, but bounded between zero and one. Using an OLS regression model could therefore potentially lead to out of boundary predictions (predictions that fall outside of the zero to one range of possible values) and thereby to non normal errors and heteroscedasticity. To demonstrate the robustness of my results I also use a quasi-likelihood estimation method that was developed for dealing with fractional response variables (including the values of zero and one) in regression models (fractional logit model) (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). The results of the fractional logit models (see the online appendix) confirm the OLS findings. In the following discussion I will refer to the OLS results for several reasons. First, and most importantly, because these estimates are easier to interpret. Second, even though the OLS regression model is simple, it is still the best linear estimator. It has been shown that linear regression models may be preferred over non-linear ones (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Also, I am mainly interested in the marginal effects, not in the predicted values themselves. Given that the models don't have particularly many out of boundary predictions (between 4 and 16 percent), I am confident that the results are substantially unaffected by the usage of an OLS regression model.

[Table 2 about here.]

My analysis shows that legislative leverage is valued by German parties. The lever-

age factor with the highest impact on MEP list placement is committee power. An MEP from a more powerful committee has (according to my results in Table 2, M1), keeping all other factors constant, a 17 percent higher re-election probability than an MEP from a less powerful committee. Committee power is especially important in small parties.

Other legislative leverage factors that yield a positive, albeit small effect are attendance in plenary and the number of reports. This effect ceases to be significant when I control for candidate selection aspects or parties. Being a committee chair does not affect re-election probability, an unsurprising finding given that there are only nine committee chairs in the dataset. Age, it seems, does not matter to German parties. The results of model M2 and M3 demonstrate, contrary to the effect hypothesized in *H1*, that the age of MEPs has a negative effect on re-election. Even though the effect is very small and insignificant, its negative sign asks for analysis. An in-depth check of the relationship between age and list positioning reveals an inverted u shape: up to an age of about 40 years MEPs have indeed higher re-election probabilities the older they are. Past the age of approximately 60 years the re-election probabilities decline (see Figure A3 in the online appendix). Holding office in the EP (EPG chairman, vice-president etc.) as well as seniority in the EP do not have an effect on re-election probability.

Consistent with the theory, that loyalty yields a positive effect on re-election probability, though the effect is small and not statistically significant. A robustness check (see the online appendix) shows that this result is not substantially influenced by five loyalty outliers. The result that NP loyalty does not impact MEPs' re-election probabilities confirms the findings of previous studies (Lyder Hermansen, 2014; van Thomme et al., 2015) and can be explained by the importance of policy experts in the EP and the missing policy influence of party leaders (van Thomme et al., 2015: 342). Hypothesis 3 states that MEPs who are attractive to voters (nationally politically experienced) have a higher re-election probability because of a reputation with the voters at home. I find no evidence that national political experience influences the German MEPs' re-election probability.

A small party with few MEPs might weigh party goals differently and will therefore favor different factors in relation to the individual MEP than larger parties with many MEPs.<sup>10</sup> The models analyzing the data by party size show that committee power, and EP positions matter more in small parties. Note the small sample size, especially when analyzing only small German parties.

Analyzing the factors important for national parties in candidate selection for the EP, it is crucial to take the vast differences in candidate selection rules into account. The analysis shows that MEPs with positions in the German party organization

(NP Position) are rewarded by a 14 percent increase in re-election probability (M2). Again, having a position within the national party is more important in small than in large parties. MEPs from constituencies where the national party was unusually strong in the last EP elections may also have a re-election advantage. MEPs from a party with high competition intensity in the final round of candidate selection are likely to end up on a significantly lower list position for re-election than MEPs from a party with little competition. When analyzing the effect of candidate selection variables on re-election probabilities one must consider that some of these variables (e.g. competition intensity or gender quota) have different values for each party but do not vary individually. The estimated effect is therefore hard to distinguish from party effects. A detailed analysis of the influence of candidate selection variables on re-election probabilities will be presented in a future study. Entry probability is an important control variable. My results show that the MEP's list position when she entered the EP term is a strong predictor of list placement at re-election. The large positive effect might be a sign for an incumbency advantage during the candidate selection stage within the national party. Including entry probability into the models I am able to control for important factors that cannot be measured – charisma or dedication for example.

## Conclusion

This study investigates the factors influencing the re-selection of MEPs in German political parties. Because the important factors for re-election depend on the goals of the national party re-selecting the MEPs, I develop hypotheses pertaining to a number of potentially influential factors from three party goals in European elections. First, national parties want MEPs with a lot of legislative leverage. Here, factors such as the committee membership of the MEP, the amount of reports written, seniority or the number of EP offices the MEP held are expected to determine re-election probabilities. Second, national parties want loyal MEPs. The third goal of parties is vote maximization or attractiveness to voters. This third goal implies that national political experience (popularity) is important for the national party when determining the re-election probabilities of their MEPs. On the basis of a dataset of all German MEPs between 1999 and 2009, I examine which factors determine the re-election probabilities of German MEPs.

The question of how national parties decide on candidate selection for the EP or which factors determine the list placement of MEPs is of great interest to politicians and scientists. My results demonstrate that German parties value powerful MEPs. For MEPs, in particular those from smaller parties, committee power is positively

related to list positioning. The results further show that loyalty does not usually pay off. Competition intensity in the final round of candidate selection has a negative impact on re-election probability. The most important control variable, entry probability, shows that MEP list position at entry is a good predictor for list placement at re-election.

Two issues should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study. First, there are a number of factors (personality of an MEP, personal network, but also reputation or voter contact) that play a role for the party in candidate selection but cannot be measured here. Therefore, my non-finding with regard to national political experience does not mean that attractiveness to voters is unimportant in (re-) selecting MEPs. Second, this article aims to determine which factors influence candidate selection decisions by national parties. It is beyond the framework of this article to assess whether and in how far factors influencing national parties' candidate selection are influenceable by the MEP personally.

This article contributes to our understanding of parties' decision making in candidate selection for the European elections. Knowing more about individual factors that influence the re-election probability of German MEPs allows us to draw conclusions related to these parties' goals in European elections. These theoretical party goals and the trade-offs between them are applicable to all parties in European elections. With its closed list electoral system in European elections, Germany can be viewed as representative of a number of European member states. The results of this study therefore allow us to draw conclusions on factors potentially influencing re-election probabilities of MEPs in other closed list systems with a similar federal structure. The findings of this article are thus of interest to scholars of party politics and elections. Because knowledge of individual characteristics determining the re-election probability might eventually impact MEP behavior, my research is also of interest to scholars investigating MEP behavior.

There are a number of directions in which these findings can be extended. First future research is needed to gain more detailed knowledge of formal and informal selection rules in other EU countries' parties for European elections. Second, it is important to further analyze the connection between legislative behavior and the re-election of MEPs to discern whether parties dismiss MEP loyalty given the high cohesiveness of the EP or whether we are in need of a different measurement of loyalty. A further extension of this analysis would be to examine how the factors determining re-election probabilities of MEPs vary between EU member states, especially between states with open and closed list electoral systems. Fourth, there are a number of MEP characteristics that are not currently measurable but are important for list placement and electoral success, for example, charisma, professional

skills or voter contact. A reliable measure for these factors would be important for future research.

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## Notes

1. This article has an online appendix that contains additional information on variables and data sources as well as additional models. The interviews cited in this article are semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in 2013 and 2014. More information on the interviews is available from the author upon request.

2. The trade-off does not apply to all leverage factors because national party determines seniority and might also influence committee assignment or office allocation. The existence of this trade-off in practice is therefore questionable. A future study will have to analyze the trade-offs between party goals in detail.

3. This is supported by interviews that were conducted by the author. Using the upcoming election results instead of opinion polls rests on the assumption that the national party can make a realistic assessment of its expected vote shares in an upcoming election. I decided against using opinion polls because the time interval between them and party delegates’ meeting on the creation of the electoral list for European elections varies. Also, opinion polls on European elections exist only on the federal level in Germany.

4. Table A4 in the online appendix gives a comprehensive overview of each model that was run in this first step of the estimation, which data (years) it comprised, the coefficients, significance, the percent correctly predicted and confidence intervals.

5. The calculation of EP experience refers only to the years. The exact number of months is disregarded by calculating the value as follows: (re-election year - first year entering EP) - years of 'break' (times of no mandate between two mandates).

6. Hix et al. (2007: 137), whose measurement of loyalty I follow, discuss the treatment of abstentions and note that, due to the small number of abstentions, their treatment does not make a difference for the overall result. To calculate the loyalty scores I disregarded the abstentions. I coded the MEPs who never voted with the national party when the vote was substantially interesting as having a NP loyalty score of zero.

7. Party positions are usually given in CVs or other biographical data sources. Because CVs usually only list years, I require an overlap of the office period with the EP term of at least one year

8. I calculated the values of this variable by dividing the constituency party result (in percent) by the national party result (in percent). Federal vote percentages for CDU and CSU are taken together. This is done to ensure the comparability of the constituency party performance values of CSU MEPs with the values of MEPs from other parties.

9. The used values are from Höhne (2013: 219) and valid for 2009. I use the index also (as a proxy) for 2004. For the CDU I use the overall value of 0.22 for all states.

10. Parties with less than 16 MEPs, i.e. Greens, PDS/Linke, FDP and CSU, are considered small parties. Parties with more (or equal to) 16 MEPs (CDU and SPD) are considered large.


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
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**Figure 1.** The Behavioral Space of Parties in EP Elections.



**Figure 2.** Distribution of the Re-election Probabilities of German MEPs (N=172).

**Table 1.** Example of Input Data for the Estimation of Re-election Probabilities.

Election	Party List	Position	Elected
2009	CSU	1	1
2009	CSU	2	1
2009	CSU	3	1
2009	CSU	4	1
2009	CSU	5	1
2009	CSU	6	1
2009	CSU	7	1
2009	CSU	8	1
2009	CSU	9	0
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
2009	FDP	1	1
2009	FDP	2	1
2009	FDP	3	1
2009	FDP	4	1
2009	FDP	5	1
2009	FDP	6	1
2009	FDP	7	1
2009	FDP	8	1
2009	FDP	9	1
2009	FDP	10	1
2009	FDP	11	1
2009	FDP	12	1
2009	FDP	13	0
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
2009	Greens	1	1
2009	Greens	2	1
2009	Greens	3	1
2009	Greens	4	1
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.
.	.	.	.

Own representation, see Table 2 in Stoffel (2014: 61)

**Table 2.** Main Results Table

Motivating Goal (Level)	Factor	M1	M2	M3	Party Size	
		Three Goals	Full	With Parties	Large	Small
Leverage (EU related)	Committee Power	0.17*	0.13 <sup>†</sup>	0.11	0.05	0.43**
	Reports	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)
	Reports*Chair	0.02*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	Committee Chair	-0.01	-0.00	-0.0		
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
	Attendance	-0.09	-0.10	-0.09		
		(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.49)		
	EP Seniority	0.01 <sup>†</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	
	Age	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.09
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)
	Seniority*Age	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	EP Position	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
		0.08	0.12	0.11	-0.03	0.51
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.32)
Loyalty (EU related)	NP Loyalty	0.00	0.00 <sup>†</sup>	0.00	0.01	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	0.00
Attractiveness to Voters (National)	National Pol. Experience	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.08
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Controls	NP Position		0.14*	0.15*	0.16*	0.22 <sup>†</sup>
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
	Home Constituency		0.10	0.14*	0.11	0.02
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)
	Federal List		0.14			
			(0.15)			
	Gender Quota		-0.09			
			(0.37)			
	Quota*Female		-0.14			
			(0.39)			
Female		0.02				
		(0.13)				
Regional Selectorate		-0.19				
		(0.15)				
Competition Intensity		-0.47**				
		(0.16)				
Entry Probability		0.52***	0.46**	0.53*	0.57**	
		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.21)	
	SPD			0.11		
				(0.10)		
	CDU			0.16		
				(0.10)		
	Greens			-0.11		
				(0.17)		
	Left			-0.40**		
				(0.13)		
	FDP			0.10		
				(0.14)		
	Constant	-0.16	-0.15	-0.23	0.02	-1.09
		(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.80)	(0.80)
	N	169	167	167	121	46
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.6
	adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.5
	Resid. sd	0.38	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.29

Dependent variable: re-election probability

Results of an Ordinary Least Squares Model (OLS) are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup> significant at  $p < 0.10$ ; \* at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* at  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* at  $p < .001$

# Re-electing MEPs: The factors determining re-election probabilities

Online Appendix

Elena Frech

December 22, 2015

**Table A1.** Variables and Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Party Motivation	Description and Coding	Exp.Effect	N	Min	Mean	Max	SD	Data Source
Committee Power	Leverage	IV: Captures whether MEP was member of at least one powerful committee during the term (1) or not (0)	+	173	0	0.61	1	0.49	(Yordanova, 2009) (Hoyland et al, 2009)
Reports	Leverage	IV: Notes the total number of legislative reports an MEP wrote within the leg. term.	+	173	0	4.26	32	4.94	(European Parliament, 2014)
Attendance	Leverage	IV: Shows how many % of all EP plenary sessions an MEP officially attended.	+	172	59.4	87.56	99.05	8.11	EP6: (European Parliament, 2014) EP5: own calculation (European Parliament, 2012)
Seniority	Leverage	IV: Provides the number of years a MEP has been in office until reelection (year, months disregarded).	+	173	1	10.85	30	6.14	(European Parliament, 2012) (Hobolt and Hoyland, 2011)
EP Position	Leverage	IV: Binary variable that shows whether an MEP had any of the following positions (1) during the EP term nor not (0): vice/committee chair, vice/president,EPG vice/chair.	+	169	0	0.16	1	0.37	(Hobolt and Hoyland, 2011)
Committee Chair	Leverage	IV: Shows whether an MEP served as committee chair during the EP term (1) or not (0)	+	173	0	0.05	1	0.22	(Hoyland et al, 2009)
Age	Leverage	Captures the age of the MEP in the end of the respective EP term (in whole years)	+	173	28	53.93	76	9.17	(European Parliament, 2014)
NP Loyalty	Loyalty	IV: Gives the percentage of substantially interesting votes an MEP voted with the plurality of his nat. party (without abstentions)	+	172	0	4.22	96.23	12.78	(Hix et al., 2007)
National Pol. Experience	Attractiveness	Variable is 1 if MEP held a local, state or federal political position previous to his/her first EP term and 0 otherwise	+	173	0	0.52	1	0.5	own coding

**Table A1.** Variables and Descriptive Statistics (continued).

Variable	Party Motivation	Description and Coding	Exp.Effect	N	Min	Mean	Max	SD	Data Source
NP-Office	-	IV: Captures whether an MEP was member of the party executive committee on the local, sub-district, district, state or federal level during the EP term(1) or not (0)	+	173	0	0.48	1	0.5	own coding
Home constituency	-	IV: Index gives the ratio of party vote share in the previous EP Elections on federal level and party vote share of the home constituency	+	172	0.19	1.22	4.56	0.65	(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2004) (Bundeswahlleiter, 2014)
Federal List	-	Control: Shows whether an MEP's party has one federal electoral list(1) or more (0)		173	0	0.47	1	0.5	own analysis
Gender Quota	-	Control: Captures the official gender quota (as prescribed by the party statutes) in percent		173	0	0.33	0.5	0.14	own analysis
Female	-	Control: Binary variable which shows whether an MEP is female (1) or not (0)		173	0	0.38	1	0.49	(European Parliament, 2014)
Entry Probability	-	Control: The probability that an MEP is elected into EP at beginning of term		172	0	0.83	1	0.30	own analysis (see paper)
Competition	-	Control: Captures the intensity of competition in the official delegates meeting. High competition ( $\geq 0.5$ )(1), low competition (0)		173	0	0.15	1	0.36	(Hoehe, 2013: p. 219)
Regional Selectorate	-	Control: dummy variable showing whether MEP's party EP election selectorate comes from a district or state (1) or local party level (0)		173	0	0.43	1	0.5	own analysis
Re-election Probability	-	DV: The probability that an MEP is re-elected at the end of the term (in %)		173	0	72.7	100	40.44	own analysis (see paper)

**Table A2.** Correlation Matrix of Variables.

	Comm.Power	Reports	Comm.Chair	Attendance	EP Seniority	Age	EP Position	NP Loyalty	Nat. Pol. Experience	NP Office
Committee Power	1.00									
Reports	0.03	1.00								
Committee Chair	-0.13	0.60	1.00							
Attendance	-0.05	0.00	-0.03	1.00						
Seniority	-0.05	0.25	0.28	0.15	1.00					
Age	-0.23	0.11	0.19	0.10	0.46	1.00				
EP Position	-0.11	0.25	0.47	0.04	0.46	0.22	1.00			
NP Loyalty	-0.04	0.16	0.14	-0.07	0.04	-0.03	0.06	1.00		
Political Experience	-0.01	0.07	0.02	0.11	-0.15	0.12	-0.01	0.02	1.00	
NP Position	0.13	0.02	-0.07	0.05	-0.04	-0.24	-0.07	-0.13	0.04	1.00
Home Constituency	-0.12	0.01	0.07	-0.10	-0.24	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.0
Federal List	0.01	-0.16	-0.01	-0.14	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.13	-0.24
Gender Quota	-0.17	0.02	0.09	0.13	0.10	0.25	0.01	0.10	0.18	-0.26
Female	0.04	-0.05	-0.07	-0.12	-0.03	-0.02	-0.17	0.09	-0.12	-0.20
Entry Probability	0.01	0.24	0.11	0.21	0.51	0.37	0.14	0.06	0.10	0.09
Competition	-0.16	-0.06	0.05	-0.10	-0.16	-0.03	-0.01	0.34	0.08	-0.27
Regional Selectorate	0.17	-0.15	-0.10	-0.12	0.07	-0.12	-0.01	-0.20	-0.27	0.01
SPD	0.05	-0.09	-0.04	0.04	0.19	0.11	0.00	-0.21	-0.11	-0.11
CDU	-0.04	0.19	0.07	0.18	0.05	0.13	0.02	-0.04	0.20	0.20
Greens	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.07	0.04	0.46	0.12	-0.28
Left	-0.20	-0.08	0.04	-0.13	-0.21	-0.11	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01	-0.08
FDP	0.15	-0.05	-0.04	-0.25	-0.18	-0.20	-0.08	-0.06	-0.20	0.13
CSU	0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08	-0.22	0.03	0.03	-0.13	0.09

**Table A2.** Correlation Matrix of Variables (continued).


	Home Constituency	Federal List	Gender Quota	Female	Entry Prob.	Competition	Regional Selectorate	SPD	CDU	Greens	Left	FDP	CSU
Committee Power													
Reports													
Committee Chair													
Attendance													
Seniority													
Age													
EP Position													
NP Loyalty													
Political Experience													
NP Office													
Constituency Contact													
Home Constituency	1.00												
Federal List	0.26	1.00											
Gender Quota	0.14	0.48	1.00										
Female	0.04	0.22	0.19	1.00									
Entry Probability	-0.20	-0.11	0.14	-0.02	1.00								
Competition	0.50	0.44	0.49	0.21	-0.25	1.00							
Regional Selectorate	-0.06	0.49	-0.36	0.03	0.02	-0.36	1.00						
SPD	-0.12	0.66	0.31	0.10	0.22	-0.27	0.72	1.00					
CDU	-0.29	-0.80	0.00	-0.17	0.16	-0.36	-0.73	-0.55	1.00				
Greens	0.08	0.31	0.35	0.21	-0.02	0.71	-0.26	-0.19	-0.25	1.00			
Left	0.62	0.29	0.32	0.07	-0.33	0.65	-0.24	-0.18	-0.23	-0.08	1.00		
FDP	0.03	0.20	-0.43	-0.08	-0.34	-0.08	0.22	-0.12	-0.16	-0.06	-0.05	1.00	
CSU	0.05	-0.32	-0.78	-0.07	-0.09	-0.14	0.39	-0.22	-0.29	-0.10	-0.09	-0.06	1.00

**Table A3.** Committee Power: Classification of EP Committees.


More Powerful Committees	Less Powerful Committees
Budgets (BUDG)	Foreign Affairs (AFET)
Transport and Tourism (TRAN)	Development (DEVE)
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)	International Trade (INTA)
Legal Affairs (JURI)	Budgetary Control (CONT)
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)	Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)	Petitions (PETI)
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)	Agriculture (AGRI)
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)	Fisheries (PECH)
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)	Regional Development (REGI)
Culture and Education (CULT)	Womens Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)
	(Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism (RETT))

Classification from: (Yordanova, 2009, p. 256)

Committee names in parentheses existed only in EP5 and were classified by the author.



**Figure A1.** Histogram of Electoral List Positions that led to Re-election (of all German MEPs between 1999 and 2009).



**Figure A2.** Distribution of the Re-election Probabilities by Parties.

**Table A4. Estimation of Re-election Probabilities: Significance, Confidence Intervals and other Statistics.**

Party	List Length (2004/2009)	Years included (EP)	Coefficient/Significance (IV: list position)	Coefficient/Significance (Intercept)	Percent Correctly Predicted	Confidence Interval Lower Bound (2.5%)	Confidence Interval Upper Bound (97.5%)	Classification Threshold
CDU-BE	7	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-12.74	19.15	100	-5359.15	1296.78	50%
CDU-BW	20	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-1.38*	10.34*	96.67	-3.17	-0.56	50%
CDU-HE	22	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-11.71	41.00	100	-1070.09	185.70	50%
CDU-HH	6	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-13.06	19.62	100	-8786.96	2135.97	50%
CDU-MV	10	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-12.43	18.68	100	-3334.46	801.25	50%
CDU-NI	21	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.30	31.95	97.87	-	79.72	50%
CDU-NW	21	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.29	68.81	98.31	-436.95	43.28	50%
CDU-RP	20	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.28	24.70	97.87	-	-346.85	50%
CDU-SH	11	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.33	12.24	96.55	-	154.76	50%
CDU-SL	8	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-12.29	18.47	100	-2691.94	644.05	50%
CDU-SN	9	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.29	19.31	96.15	-	98.57	50%
CDU-ST	5	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-6.28	12.14	95.45	-	133.08	50%
CDU-TH	10	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-12.61	31.55	100	-4132.18	833.51	50%
CSU	39	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-1.38*	13.09*	98.04	-3.17	-0.56	50%
Greens	25	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-0.40***	4.43***	90.14	-0.64	-0.24	50%
PDS/Left	14	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-0.30***	1.38*	80.43	-0.50	-0.16	50%
SPD	97	1994, 99, 2004 (5)	-0.15***	4.83***	93.55	-0.20	-0.11	50%
CDU-BB	3	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-13.25	19.92	100	-	1452.45	50%
CDU-BE	6	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-12.80	19.23	100	-5845.87	1415.92	50%
CDU-BW	20	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-1.17*	8.43*	95	-2.58	-0.50	50%
CDU-HE	20	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.32	19.40	98.33	-	108.80	50%
CDU-NI	21	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.23	31.58	98.18	-	63.50	50%
CDU-NW	26	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-1.38*	14.47*	97.01	-3.17	-0.56	50%
CDU-RP	20	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.38	25.08	98.21	-	116.02	50%
CDU-SH	9	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.38	12.32	96.30	-	-351.81	50%
CDU-SL	10	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-12.44	18.70	100	-3373.30	810.75	50%
CDU-ST	3	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.32	12.20	93.33	-	146.91	50%
CDU-TH	7	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-6.26	12.96	95.83	-	112.77	50%
CSU	41	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-1.38*	13.09*	98.23	-3.17	-0.56	50%
Greens	25	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-0.34***	3.97***	87.84	-0.52	-0.21	50%
PDS/Left	30	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-1.38*	10.34*	96.55	-3.17	-0.56	50%
FDP	124	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-0.18***	1.17**	96.91	-0.28	-0.11	50%
SPD	98	1999, 2004, 09 (6)	-0.22***	5.97***	95.49	-0.32	-0.15	50%

\* significant at  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table A5.** The Factors determining Reelection Probability: Robustness Checks.

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
	With	Without	Without Not Re-listed	Insignificant	Without
	Party Changers	Loyalty Outliers	MEPs with unclear Reason	Re-el. Pr. = 0	Seniority*Age
Committee Power	0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)	0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.17)	0.09 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)	0.15* (0.17)	0.14* (0.07)
Reports	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Reports*Chair	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Committee Chair	-0.12 (0.48)	-0.28 (0.48)	0.16 (0.31)	0.50 (0.54)	-0.13 (0.49)
Attendance	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
EP Seniority	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)
Seniority*Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	
EP Position	0.11 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.02 (0.10)	0.11 (0.13)	0.10 (0.12)
NP Loyalty	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00* (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00 <sup>†</sup> (0.00)
National Pol. Experience	-0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.7)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)
NP Position	0.13* (0.07)	0.13* (0.17)	0.02 (0.05)	0.20** (0.07)	0.13 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)
Home Constituency	0.08 (0.07)	0.10 (0.06)	0.16** (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.10 (0.06)
Federal List	0.16 (0.15)	0.23 (0.21)	0.09 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.17)	0.13 (0.15)
Gender Quota	-0.11 (0.37)	-0.18 (0.39)	0.09 (0.33)	0.42 (0.39)	-0.01 (0.04)
Quota*Female	-0.25 (0.38)	-0.03 (0.38)	-0.03 (0.35)	-0.05 (0.43)	-0.08 (0.38)
Female	0.04 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.12)
Regional Selectorate	-0.20 (0.15)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.14)	0.52** (0.19)	-0.17 (0.15)
Competition Intensity	-0.42** (0.16)	-0.54** (0.17)	-0.55*** (0.15)	0.07 (0.18)	-0.46** (0.16)
Entry Probability	0.55*** (0.14)	0.53** (0.17)	0.49** (0.16)		0.55*** (0.15)
Entry Probability (see M4)				0.10 (0.11)	
Constant	-0.15 (0.50)	-0.25 (0.52)	0.03 (0.41)	-1.07 <sup>†</sup> (0.58)	0.31 (0.37)
N	169	163	148	167	167
$R^2$	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
adj. $R^2$	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Resid. sd	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3

Note: Dependent variable: re-election probability

Results of a linear regression model (Ordinary least squares) reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.


<sup>†</sup> significant at  $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table A6.** Results of Fractional Logit Models.

Motivating Goal (Level)	Factor	M1 Three Goals		M2 Full		M3 With Parties	
		C	ME	C	ME	C	ME
Leverage (EU related)	Committee Power	0.93** (0.35)	0.17** (0.06)	0.94* (0.38)	0.14** (0.05)	0.77* (0.38)	0.12* (0.06)
	Reports	0.13* (0.06)	0.02* (0.01)	0.06 (0.08)	0.01 (0.01)	0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.01)
	Reports*Chair	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.02)
	Committee Chair	-0.86 (1.97)	-0.15 (0.36)	-0.97 (2.26)	-0.15 (0.33)	-0.65 (2.20)	-0.10 (0.34)
	Attendance	0.04* (0.02)	0.01* (0.00)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)
	EP Seniority	0.37 (0.33)	0.07 (0.06)	0.39 (0.35)	0.06 (0.05)	0.36 (0.34)	0.05 (0.05)
	Age	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)
	Seniority*Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
	EP Position	0.43 (0.70)	0.08 (0.13)	0.94 (0.98)	0.14 (0.14)	0.80 (0.86)	0.12 (0.13)
	Loyalty (EU related)	NP Loyalty	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.02)
Attractiveness to Voters (National)	National Pol. Experience	0.25 (0.34)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.43)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.43)	-0.02 (0.07)
Controls	NP Position			1.06* (0.42)	0.15* (0.07)	1.26** (0.45)	0.19** (0.07)
	Home Constituency			0.54* (0.26)	0.08* (0.04)	1.10* (0.46)	0.17* (0.08)
	Federal List			0.49 (0.91)	0.07 (0.14)		
	Gender Quota			0.16 (2.19)	0.02 (0.33)		
	QuotaXFemale			-2.57 (2.933)	-0.38 (0.42)		
	Female			0.69 (1.13)	0.10 (0.16)		
	DistrictStateSelectorate			-0.92 (0.96)	-0.14 (0.14)		
	Competition Intensity			-2.14* (0.95)	-0.32* (0.14)		
	Entry Probability			3.52*** (0.97)	0.53*** (0.14)	3.06** (0.94)	0.47** (0.14)
	SPD					0.67 (0.67)	0.10 (0.10)
	CDU					1.01 (0.66)	0.15 (0.10)
	Greens					-0.51 (0.90)	-0.08 (0.12)
	Left					-2.88* (1.20)	-0.44* (0.20)
	FDP					0.20 (0.90)	0.03 (0.14)
	Constant		-4.31 (2.98)		-5.07 (3.56)		-5.54 (3.97)
<i>AIC</i>		187.37		168.12		164.49	
<i>BIC</i>		224.93		233.60		226.85	
Observations		169		167		167	

Note: Dependent variable: re-election probability. Results of a Fractional Logit Model. Logit coefficients (C) and marginal effects (at means, dy/dx) (ME) are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

$AIC = (-2)\ln L + 2k$  (Akaike, 1974) and  $BIC = (-2)\ln L + k\ln(N)$  (Schwarz, 1978). Where  $\ln L$  denotes the overall (log) likelihood of the model,  $k$  the number of parameters and  $N$  the total number of observations. † significant at  $p < 0.10$ ; \* at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* at  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* at  $p < .001$



**Figure A3.** The Relationship between Age and Re-election Probability.

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