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# **Party soldiers**

## **The selection of electoral leaders in parliamentary democracies**

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# Abstract

The selection of candidates for public office is one of the pivotal functions political parties perform in liberal democracies. Many works have studied the nomination of candidates for the legislative branch, and a fewer number of studies have looked into the nomination of candidates for the executive branch in presidential democracies. However, very few works have looked at the nomination of candidates for the executive branch in parliamentary democracies, who have been called as electoral leaders or top candidates. This dissertation contributes to filling this gap by exploring three main research questions. First, what criteria do political parties use when nominating a top candidate? Second, to what extent do political parties nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations? Third, under which conditions is electoral competition more likely to shape party decision-making?

I consider that political parties hold two criteria when nominating a top candidate. First, based on the electoral and campaigning function of top candidates, parties seek to nominate *electable* top candidates likely to achieve more votes. Second, considering that top candidates may become prime ministers after the election and that they perform a series of post-electoral functions, parties will seek to nominate more *reliable* candidates who stay close to their party's preferences. Building on the literature on party organization change, this dissertation proposes a new theoretical framework for understanding how different incentives can drive parties to nominate top candidates closer to one or the other criterion. In particular, this dissertation studies four factors: the party's screening and recruitment capacity, the internal demand, the external demand, and the type of selectorate.

To test for the influence of these four factors, this dissertation presents a novel dataset of more than 2500 sub-national top candidates in Canada, Germany and Spain. There have been collected information about the personal, partisan and political background of top candidates, which been complemented with information about the type of selectorate, the party's internal structure and the state of the electorate. The main results are summarized as follows. First, parties are heavily dependent on their access to public institutions to recruit and train new members, and hence to produce top candidates with high degrees of reliability. Second, the results show that political parties are more reactive to changes in the composition of their internal coalitions than to changes in the overall electorate. Finally, and in regard to the type of selectorate, the results show that party primaries tend to differ from party conferences and party elites when the party has experienced some environmental change. This dissertation contributes

to the understanding of the role of top candidates in parliamentary democracies as well as to academic knowledge about party organizational change and adaptation.

*To my parents and my grandmother.*



# Acknowledgments

Writing a doctoral dissertation, especially a monography, is a long and often lonely task. During this process, I regularly remembered one of Antonio Machado's most famous poems, which I think could be used to summarize the experience of writing a doctoral dissertation. The poem says: *Caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar. Al andar se hace el camino, y al volver la vista atrás se ve la senda que nunca se ha de volver a pisar*.<sup>1</sup> After many years of "regular" education, fresh graduate students soon discover that there is no more a path to follow and that you need to start building your own road. Writing a doctoral dissertation is a constant learning process. On the one hand, you get in-depth knowledge on the topic you are researching on. On the other hand, you also get to know a lot about the issues your friends and colleagues are studying. Furthermore, you will also learn about writing, logic, rhetoric, mental resilience, and how to deal with colleagues. A dissertation is a marathon, and often you find that your main competitor is a younger and more inexperienced version of yourself. You end up playing against a younger and more inexperienced version of yourself, who made whatever decision you now have to cope with. Finally, as Machado's lines say, writing a doctoral dissertation is a road you should only cross once.

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<sup>1</sup> *Traveller, the road is only your footprint, and no more; traveller, there's no road, the road is your travelling. Going becomes the road and if you look back you will see a path none can tread again* (Antonio Machado, *Poesías completas*, 1917).

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## Party names and abbreviations

### Canada

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<b>ADQ / CAQ</b>	Action démocratique du Québec / Coalition Avenir Québec	Democratic Action of Quebec / Coalition for Quebec's Future
<b>CCF / NDP</b>	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation / New Democratic Party	
<b>Green</b>	Green Party	
<b>Liberal</b>	Liberal Party	
<b>P. Conservative</b>	Progressive Conservative Party	
<b>PQ</b>	Parti Québécois	Quebecer Party
<b>QS</b>	Québec solidaire	Quebec Solidarity
<b>Saskatchewan Party</b>	Saskatchewan Party	
<b>Social Credit</b>	Social Credit	
<b>UN</b>	Union Nationale	National Union

### Germany

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<b>AfD</b>	Alternative für Deutschland	Alternative for Germany
<b>CDU</b>	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
<b>CSU</b>	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
<b>FDP</b>	Freie Demokratische Partei	Free Democratic Party
<b>Grüne</b>	Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen	Alliance 90 / The Greens
<b>PDS / Die Linke</b>	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus / Die Linke	Party of Democratic Socialism / The Left
<b>SPD</b>	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Social Democratic Party of Germany

### Spain

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<b>AP / PP</b>	Alianza Popular / Partido Popular	People's Alliance / People's Party
<b>BNG</b>	Galician Nationalist Bloc	Bloque Nacionalista Galego
<b>C's</b>	Ciudadanos	Citizens
<b>CC</b>	Coalición Canaria	Canarian Coalition
<b>CDN</b>	Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra	Convergence of Democrats of Navarre
<b>Cha</b>	Chunta Aragonesista	Aragonese Union
<b>CiU / CDC / JxCat</b>	Convergència i Unió / Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya / Junts per Catalunya	Convergence and Union / Democratic Convergence of Catalonia / Together for Catalonia
<b>EA</b>	Eusko Alkartasuna - Solidaridad Vasca	Basque Solidarity
<b>EE</b>	Euskadiko Ezkerra - La izquierda de Euskadi	Basque Country Left
<b>ERC</b>	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Republican Left of Catalonia

<b>FAC</b>	Foro Asturias	Asturias Forum
<b>ICV</b>	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds	Initiative for Catalonia Greens
<b>Nafarroa Bai /</b>	Nafarroa Bai / Geroa Bai	Navarre Yes / Yes to the Future
<b>Geroa Bai</b>		
<b>PA</b>	Partido Andalucista	Andalusian Party
<b>PAR</b>	Partido Aragonés	Aragonese Party
<b>PCE / IU</b>	Partido Comunista de España /	Communist Party of Spain / United
	Izquierda Unida	Left
<b>PNV</b>	Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea - Partido	Basque Nationalist Party
	Nacionalista Vasco	
<b>Podemos</b>	Podemos	We can
<b>PR</b>	Partido Riojano	Riojan Party
<b>PRC</b>	Partido Regionalista de Cantabria	Regionalist Party of Cantabria
<b>PSM / MES</b>	Partit Socialista de Mallorca / Més per	Socialist Party of Majorca / More for
	Mallorca	Majorca
<b>PSOE</b>	Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
<b>UM</b>	Unió Mallorquina	Majorcan Union
<b>UPN</b>	Unión del Pueblo Navarro	Navarrese People's Union
<b>UPV / Bloc /</b>	Unitat del Poble Valencià / Bloc	Valencian People's Union / Valencian
<b>Compromís</b>	Nacionalista Valencià / Compromís	Nationalist Bloc / Commitment
<b>UV</b>	Unió Valenciana	Valencian Union
<b>Vox</b>	Vox	Voice ( <i>in Latin</i> )

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

One of the essential functions of political parties in democratic societies is to recruit, train and nominate candidates for public office. Parties routinely select candidates for the legislative and the executive branches, as well as for their internal positions such as the party leader. However, the criteria that parties use in each of these decisions remain unknown, and it is sensible to think that these criteria would change across time and the political circumstances. For example, in 1994 the sudden death of the UK Labour party leader, John Smith, left the organization divided between his two natural successors, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. Although both belonged to the modernizer wing of the party, the former represented a kind of traditional policy-focussed politician who had already occupied important roles in parliament. Blair, in contrast, represented a new type of popular and media-savvy politician, but also someone who had had a less successful parliamentary career. In the end, Brown did not contest the election and Blair comfortably won against two other candidates with 57% of the weighted votes of MPs, party members and affiliated trade union members. Brown's reasons to not contest the election remain unknown, however, Blair's election seemed to represent a new approach for Labour. During the same period, the German SPD faced a similar dilemma. On May 3, 1993, the social democrat party leader and presumptive chancellor candidate, Björn Engholm, resigned from all his positions after being implicated in a scandal. The main contenders for the succession were Rudolf Scharping, Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schröder<sup>1</sup>, and these three would play musical chairs in the following years. Lafontaine represented the left-wing of the party, but also a new, provocative and polarizing way of practising politics, while Schröder represented the moderate wing of the party and enjoyed high popularity among the overall electorate. Finally, Scharping was a consensual figure within the party, but he was considered uncharismatic. Schröder and Scharping competed in a primary election for the party leadership. Scharping won, and also later secured the candidacy for chancellor in the 1994 election. After a disappointing performance, Lafontaine successfully challenged Scharping for the party leadership during the 1995 party conference<sup>2</sup>. However, given his lack of popularity among swing voters, Lafontaine had to concede the top candidacy to Schröder<sup>3</sup> for the 1998 federal election, which Schröder won and became chancellor. A year later, and after several policy disagreements, Schröder forced Lafontaine to give up the party leadership and had himself elected<sup>4</sup>. At the end, the most popular aspirant won control over the candidacy, the party and the government.

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<sup>1</sup> Vor 25 Jahren: Scharping besiegt Schröder in der SPD-Urwahl. Vorwärts 12/06/2018

<sup>2</sup> Oskars zweiter Anlauf. Der Spiegel 20/11/1995

<sup>3</sup> SPD-Kandidatenkür 1998: Spaltpilz an der Spitze. Der Spiegel 29/02/2008.

<sup>4</sup> Vor 20 Jahren: Warum Oskar Lafontaine vom SPD-Vorsitz zurücktrat. Vorwärts 01/03/2019.

Peter Mair (2013, pp. 67-68) referred to these two examples to discuss how media-savviness and electoral popularity are increasingly shaping political parties' criteria when electing either party leaders or electoral leaders. As Mair writes: "the choice of leader is now less often determined by the strength of a candidate's support within the party and more often by the candidate's capacity to appeal to the media and thence to the wider electorate". However, if we look at the latest developments of the very same parties, the trend towards more "electable" or "popular" candidates seems to have gone into reverse, at least partially.

In 2010, the last time the traditional selection method was used, the Labour party elected Ed Miliband as leader against his more moderate opponent – and brother – David Miliband<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, in 2015 the party organized a primary election for the first time, and the primary voters elected Jeremy Corbyn, who according to The Guardian newspaper is "one of the most left-wing, anti-establishment leaders in [the Labour Party] history"<sup>6</sup> – somebody who was widely considered "unelectable" as Prime Minister. These are two examples of how party elites or grassroots members will not always prioritize the most electable candidates and that other factors will play a role in the nomination process.

The German social democrats have also recently experienced turbulent times in regard to their leadership. In early 2017, the party leader and federal vice-chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, resigned from the leadership arguing that he was not the most electable candidate ahead of the next election. He asked the party to nominate Martin Schulz, the former president of the European Parliament, as new party leader and chancellor candidate for the upcoming election since public opinion polling revealed Schultz to have the most support among the electorate<sup>7</sup>. Schulz obtained both positions but did not succeed in the election, and resigned as party leader amid heated discussion on whether the SPD should renew their coalition with the conservative CDU. Andrea Nahles succeeded him. She was a young but very experienced party insider who had been leader of the party's youth organization, general secretary, deputy party leader and federal minister, and had the task of revitalizing the party from its electoral decline. However, after a year of the party still losing electoral support in the polls, and a disappointing result in the 2019 European election, she also resigned. Then the party decided to take a new approach: the new leadership would be chosen through a primary election – the last time they had used such method was 1993 – and they allowed the leadership to be formed by a female-male tandem instead of a single person. Six tandems competed in the primaries, the favourite being the federal deputy prime minister and minister of finance Olaf Scholz, who chose Klara Geywitz, an unknown politician to the general public, as running mate<sup>8</sup>. However, the winners of the primary were Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans, a backbencher member of parliament and a former regional minister of finance in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. They did not have any of the expected characteristics of national party leaders such as extensive experience in the frontline of politics – both in public institutions and within the party organization – or popularity and recognition among the electorate. However, they

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<sup>5</sup> Ed Miliband is elected leader of the Labour Party. BBC 25/09/2010.

<sup>6</sup> Labour leadership: Jeremy Corbyn elected with huge mandate. The Guardian 12/09/2015.

<sup>7</sup> Spiegel Interview with Martin Schulz: 'The Trump Approach Will Never Be Our Approach'. 08/02/2017

<sup>8</sup> Olaf Scholz tritt mit Klara Geywitz an. Der Spiegel 08/08/2019

succeeded against Scholz, and the party elite they supported them mainly thanks to their popularity with party's left wing and the youth organization, and their clear-cut position against governing with the conservatives<sup>9</sup>.

The examples of the SPD and the UK Labour in the 1990s and recently show how parties can change their selection criteria over time. In the 1990s, electoral popularity seemed to be the leading criterion for obtaining the party leadership and/or the candidacy for prime minister. Lately, other factors seem to play a role, such as roots within the party organization, some degree of ideological radicalism, or even a sense of rebellion against the establishment. In addition, political parties have been strained by multiple factors. Internally, parties have changed their selection methods over time, and more and more parties nominate their electoral leaders and party leaders through party primaries, potentially explaining why parties nowadays seem to nominate a different type of leader. Externally, political parties face more fragmented, volatile and polarized electoral environments. Voter loyalty has decreased over the recent decades, and parties may need to rely on popular candidates to maintain their levels of electoral support.

## **1.1 The puzzle of nominating electoral leaders.**

The purpose of this dissertation is to assess which selection criteria political parties use when selecting a candidate for the executive office, which will shed light on how political parties change and adapt to the different – internal and external – circumstances they face. I will focus on this specific type of candidate, which I call the top candidate. This is the party's nominee for executive office, and the person expected to act as main campaigner. I will pursue three main research questions. First, what criteria do political parties use when nominating a top candidate? Second, to what extent do political parties nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations? Third, under which – internal and external – conditions is electoral competition more likely to shape party decision-making? The main expectation tested in this dissertation is that political parties will react to a change in the electoral market by changing the type of candidate they nominate. In competitive environments with high electoral volatility, parties would have incentives to nominate vote-seeking candidates able to break partisan constraints, even if these candidates are more likely to disagree with the party's policy positions or lack the necessary skills and experience to become prime minister. Under some circumstances parties may prefer to nominate "party soldiers" and people who possess great experience, reliability and appeal to the party insider. However, under different circumstances, parties may prefer to nominate "vote-maximizer", "vote-seeking" or "popular" candidates, although they may be policy-inconsistent. In this dissertation, I explore the determinants that may motivate party organizations to nominate candidates from one or the other end of this continuum.

From a normative point of view, the recruitment and selection of candidates for public office is one of the key functions political parties perform in liberal democracies. The act of putting together a list of candidates behind a common brand constitutes the first link in the chain of democratic delegation. Parties ensure the representation of political preferences and will be held accountable for their behaviour in office (Müller, 2000). However, over the

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<sup>9</sup> SPD-Mitglieder stimmen für Esken und Walter-Borjans. Süddeutsche Zeitung. 30/11/2019

last few decades, the concept of party government has been put into question in developed democracies. On the one hand, party government can cease to be the "only game left in town" (Linz and Stepan, 1998), as new populist and technocratic alternatives grow (Caramani, 2017). On the other hand, some authors claim that traditional political parties are becoming less responsive to citizens' demands (Mair, 2013).

Some of the latter criticism tends to agree that parties have come under strain in recent decades due to fundamental change in their societies. The unprecedented economic growth after WWII produced deep changes in their social structures (Inglehart, 1971; Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, 2002), and thus altered how voters interact with political parties. Traditional social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) are progressively eroding, and thus losing their capacity to explain the structure of political conflict (Kriesi, 1998; Kriesi et al., 2012). Besides this, new cleavages and conflicts are appearing. New political parties are joining the electoral arena, some for short periods of time, while others manage to endure, while traditional parties are either disappearing or experiencing a steady decrease in their electoral support (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2015). In addition, campaigns have become more critical than in the past, and more and more voters at the later stages of campaigns on them to make up their minds (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2015)<sup>10</sup>. The development of mass media, first television and later the internet, has been crucial for changing the way political parties interact with voters. In addition, the new media has contributed to levelling of the political playing field, as new actors can now compete almost in the same conditions as traditional actors (Jungherr, Schroeder and Stier, 2019) .

A burgeoning literature has inquired into how these changes in electoral circumstances have changed party behaviour in different dimensions. Most reflect on how political parties change their ideological positions in reaction to a prior shift in public opinion (Adams et al., 2004), and recent studies have shown how parties become more reactive when the political competition increases (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski, 2016; Dassonneville, 2018). Although, different types of political parties will respond in different ways (Adams et al., 2006; Klüver and Spoon, 2014; Bischof and Wagner, 2017), and some parties will be more reactive to certain elements of society than others (Adams and Ezrow, 2009). In addition, some of these factors will have internal consequences as, for example, parties can react internally to electoral setbacks by removing their party leader (Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Horiuchi, Laing and 't Hart, 2013; Ennsner-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015; Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015). Mair, Müller and Plasser (2004) propose that parties have different possible responses when facing a change in the electoral market, depending on which element they tackle: the party's internal organization structure, the candidates they nominate, the voters they aim to address, their competition/cooperation relationships with other parties, their policy program or the state's institutions. However, parties can also consciously choose not to react to the new challenge and to preserve the status-quo. Similarly, Harmel and Janda (1994) also propose that a change in electoral competition – what they call external stimuli or environmental change – is one of the main drivers of party change, in any shape or form. However, they also point to how internal stimuli, like changes in the party leadership, or more broadly, in the party's dominant coalition<sup>11</sup>, can open a window of opportunity for party change. Throughout this book, I will combine this literature on party change and adaptation with works that analyse party behaviour

<sup>10</sup> For a critique see Kalla and Broockman (2018).

<sup>11</sup> See Panebianco (1988).

from a principal-agent perspective to derive theoretical expectations on how would political parties behave under different conditions. In particular, I will consider that the criteria political parties use when nominating a top candidate depends on four different elements: the internal demand, the external demand, the type of selectorate and parties' screening and recruitment capacity.

Before start discussing who are and which function top candidates performs, let me advance some of the main arguments that I will develop in the following chapters. I will show that intra-party fights play a much determinant role in explaining parties the nomination criteria of top candidates than changes in the electorate. In general terms, the selection of screening and recruitment capacity is critical to understand the structurally constrains that parties face when nominating candidates. Empirically, I will use two sources of variation; top candidates' re-selection in the next election and top candidates' personal characteristics. For this purpose, I collected information on the personal, political and partisan characteristic of more than 1400 sub-national<sup>12</sup> top candidates running more than 2300 times and belonging from 44 different political parties – and 265 party-region dyads—in Canada, Germany and Spain since 1900, 1945 and 1980 respectively. In addition to information about the internal and external circumstances they parties faced at each different point in time.

## 1.2 Who are the top candidates?

Let me start with three examples showing the different characteristics, career paths and degrees of partisanship a candidate for the executive office may have. The first example is Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the former leader of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and previous prime minister of the state of Saarland. She joined her party at age 19 and became highly involved within the party's youth organisation. Over the following years, she was elected local councillor, national member of parliament, president of the party's regional women's association, member of the regional parliament of Saarland and regional minister. Later, after 12 years holding different ministerial responsibilities, and when her predecessor retired from politics, she was elected party leader of the CDU in Saarland, and soon afterwards regional prime minister. She then went on successfully winning two regional elections while enhancing her profile in the rest of the country. In 2017, she was elected as the CDU's general secretary, one of the most important positions in the party central organization after the party leader. A year later she successfully competed for the party leadership after Angela Merkel's resignation. Kramp-Karrenbauer shows a long, linear and traditional career within a mainstream political party. Since she joined the party she climbed up the party ladder both in terms of internal positions and public office. Notwithstanding, she was also an active member of the party's ancillary organisations, in particular the youth branch and the women's organization.

The second example is Ángel Gabilondo, candidate the Spanish PSOE for president of the region of Madrid. He was a university professor of philosophy and president of one of Madrid's main universities till he entered politics in 2009, at the age of 60, when he was appointed national minister for education in PSOE's social-democratic

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<sup>12</sup> By sub-national, I refer to the state, province or regional political arena that lies in between the local and the national political arenas. See chapter 3 for further detail.

government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. He stayed in office for two years, and then went back to his previous academic life until 2015 when the party asked him to run as the party's leading candidate in the upcoming Madrid regional election. He accepted and lost the election by a small margin, but he remained as leader of the opposition for four years, and ran again in 2019 when he gained a plurality of votes but a conservative-led coalition obtained more seats. To this day, he has not joined PSOE as an official member, and remains an independent.

The last example is Jean Charest, who started in politics as a young conservative parliamentarian from Quebec in the Canadian House of Commons. From there he occupied several cabinet positions during the governments of Brian Mulroney. He tried to succeed him as party leader and prime minister in 1992, but lost to Kim Campbell, who appointed him Canada's deputy prime minister until the conservatives lost the 1993 election. Afterwards, he was elected party leader and he led the party for almost five years. In 1997, despite significant electoral improvements, he decided to step down from the leadership and retire from politics. He would come back to politics almost a year later at the provincial level to run for the Quebec premiership. However, he did not run as a conservative but as a liberal, his old party's traditional adversary at the federal level. In the context of extreme polarisation around the secession of Quebec, Charest was considered to be the most popular candidate to rally the opponents of secession in the upcoming provincial election. And as the press from that time reports, he faced considerable public pressure from parties and business circles (McDonald, 1999; Meisel, 1999). Switching party labels may be more acceptable in Canada, where parties across the different political arenas are loosely connected in comparison with other federal systems, however, it is remarkable that Quebec's Liberals were willing to select as party leader and top candidate somebody with an outstanding career in another party. In fact, they elected him unopposed. Charest did not succeed in 1998 but he remained as leader of the opposition, and in 2003 he won the provincial election. Later he managed to remain for two terms as prime minister of Quebec.

These three examples represent different degrees of risk a party organisation may be willing to accept when nominating a candidate for the executive office. On the one hand, parties – or party selectors more precisely – may prefer to rely on veteran party members and experienced public officers like Kramp-Karrenbauer. On other occasions, parties will have a limited pools of aspirants and party selectors will be forced to choose sub-optimal options, like party members with a less impressive intra-party trajectory or less experience in party office. However, sometimes parties seem willing to take more risky choices in exchange for short-term benefits, namely votes or access to governmental office. In addition, parties simply do not have the organizational capacities to train candidates for the future that could grow to be considered as highly reliable. Hence parties can be structurally constrained. On the one hand, the examples of Gabilondo and Charest show different degrees of risk parties may be willing to accept. They may temporarily boost the party's electoral chances, but if proved to be bad campaigners, or incompetent governors, the party's long term electoral credibility may be permanently damaged.

In presidential and semi-presidential systems, the notion of a presidential candidate is clear and intuitive: a political party nominates a person to run in an electoral contest whose winner will be the next head of state and responsible for exercising the executive power (or part of it in a semi-presidential system). In parliamentary systems, the concept of a candidate for the chief executive office, a candidate for prime minister or a top candidate is much

less clear cut. When referring to the parliamentary equivalent of presidential candidates, I will mostly use the term “top candidate”. It refers to the person that a party seeks to install at the top of the executive power after the election, regardless of if that person is directly voted by the citizens or appointed by the legislature. In the literature, other authors have referred to this very same concept as top candidates, front-runners, electoral leaders, leading candidates, prime minister candidate, chief executive candidate, *Spitzenkandidaten*, or even *Kanzlerkandidaten* (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000; Aja, 2003; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Blais, 2013; Detterbeck, 2013, 2014; Astudillo, 2015; Verge and Astudillo, 2018). Top candidates are the person that a party chooses to be their lead campaigner. They will participate in electoral debate and personify the party message during the electoral campaign. Hence, we can distinguish between the pre-electoral (campaigning) and post-electoral (governing) functions of top candidates.

Despite its importance, and in contrast with the process regarding candidates for the legislative office, few studies have inquired into how parties select and nominate top candidates. In the legislative branch, many studies have looked into the characteristics of legislators (Best and Cotta, 2000; Cotta and Best, 2007), and have investigated if differences in personal features explain differences in parliamentary behaviour (O’Grady, 2018). Other studies have looked at the characteristics of aspirants for the legislative office (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994; Zittel, 2015; Verge and Claveria, 2018). In the executive branch<sup>13</sup>, most studies remain descriptive in both presidential and parliamentary systems (Blondel, 1980; Peter M Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). Although some studies seek to explain how chief executive characteristics are partly a function of the institutions of political systems (Samuels and Shugart, 2010), or how the personal backgrounds of chief executives can influence their behaviour in office and the policy decisions they take (Hayo and Neumeier, 2012, 2014). However, very few studies explore the selection of candidates for the executive office, and those that do are mostly restricted to concrete dimensions, like gender or selection method (Astudillo, 2015; Grimaldi and Vercesi, 2017; Verge and Astudillo, 2018; Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó, 2019). One of the reasons behind this lack of research is the conceptual confusion between top candidates and party leaders in parliamentary democracies.

There are several reasons for the conceptual confusion around the notion of top candidate in parliamentary democracies and why there is not a comprehensive and widely-accepted definition of them. First, unlike in presidential countries, there is no formal position of candidate for prime minister despite its importance in the media. Identifying who the candidate is heavily depends on the country’s electoral system. In countries like in Israel or the Netherlands that use a single nation-wide electoral district, the candidates for prime minister are easily identifiable as they occupy the first position on the electoral list<sup>14</sup>. In countries with a majoritarian, first-past-the-post electoral systems such as the UK or Canada, top candidates and party leaders run in single-member districts, without set traditions about where leaders should run. In contrast, in countries with more than one single multi-member electoral district, like Spain or Belgium, there are social conventions about where top candidates run. As a gen-

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<sup>13</sup> In regard to the executive branch, here I focus in the chief executive officer – president or prime minister – although there are many studies about the characteristics of the ministerial elite (Blondel and Thiebault, 1991; Rodríguez-Teruel, 2006; Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017; Smith and Martin, 2017; Alexidou and Gunaydin, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Dutch-speaking countries use the term *Lijsttrekker*, or “list puller”, for denoting the top candidate (Fiers and Krouwel, 2005).

eral rule, in Spain they run in the capital's district, while in Belgium they run in their home district. Lastly, in a mixed-member proportional electoral system, like Germany, top candidates can choose where to run. For instance, Angela Merkel contests elections in a single-member district in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while her predecessor Gerhard Schröder ran in the first position on the multi-member list of his home state of Lower Saxony. The nomination of the top candidate represents a symbolic relationship between the party and the candidate on the one hand, and the voters on the other. There is no formal requirement that after the election a party has to honor its promise of appointing that person as prime minister. Unlike in a presidential system, there is no formal link between the candidates' running position in the election and their later institutional role.

The electoral systems can give hints to identify the top candidates, but their place on the list is mostly the consequence of being nominated for such roles. In general term, top candidates are placed first on the electoral list because they are both the face of the party during the election, as well as the designated person to hold the role of chief executive after the election. What characterizes the top candidate is the symbolic commitment that a party establishes with the voters when nominating a person. That person will be at the frontline of the electoral campaign and from that moment on voters will be able to identify the person with the party, and the party with the person. Until the election ends, both will be intrinsically united in the voters' minds. The immediate future of the party depends on the candidate and her electoral performance.

The second reason for conceptual confusion is that top candidates tend to be considered as functional equivalents of the party leader (Kenig, Rahat and Hazan, 2015), despite both having different roles (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 35–36). Party leaders are in charge of managing the party bureaucracy, enforcing loyalty within the organisation, preventing free-riding and developing new policy positions. In sum, party leaders ensure that parties achieve their objectives and protect the party label (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 35–36). On the other hand, the top candidate's role is to win elections and govern (if successful). Some parties traditionally nominate their leaders as top candidates, but others do not. In Westminster systems, for example, parties automatically nominate their party leader as the top candidate because both roles are considered as highly complementary. Within that context, the same person is expected to develop both functions. On the one hand, managing the party's internal organization and keeping internal cohesion, and on the one hand, campaigning and ruling country. In these cases the selection of a party leader is also the selection of a top candidate. Moreover, party selectors have to consider both criteria in order to choose a suitable candidate.

This is not the case in other parliamentary systems, where it is more common that different people to perform each of the two functions. And thus for different criteria to arise for nominating each of them. In Germany, both Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have not nominated their party leaders to run as federal chancellor 6 out of 16 times since 1990. Other party leaders like Gerhard Schröder acted first as top candidates, and only later, they managed to get elected as party leaders. Similarly, Martin Schulz was first nominated by the party executive as top candidate for the 2017 federal election<sup>15</sup> and two months after a party conference elected him as party leader<sup>16</sup>. In

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<sup>15</sup> SPD-Kanzlerkandidat Schulz: "Wir werden die Wahlen in diesem Jahr richtig spannend machen". Süddeutsche Zeitung 29/01/2017

<sup>16</sup> Schulz mit 100 Prozent zum SPD-Parteichef gewählt. Der Spiegel 19/03/2017

some parties like the Basque Nationalist Party and most of the Belgian parties the same person is even officially prohibited by their internal regulations from holding both positions at the same time (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas, 2009; Pilet and Wauters, 2014).


The very nature of the role of the top candidate resides in the official commitment political parties express to voters regarding that person. This commitment, expressed nowadays mainly through the media, consists of making that person the party's leading campaigner, and later voting for them in parliament as a future prime minister. It is important to remark that this definition also applies to top candidates of minor political parties – those that due to their lower number of votes are not able to aspire to the prime-ministership – as they will be able to promote their top candidates to senior cabinet positions if they enter into a coalition. In some cases, their top candidates even stand a chance of becoming deputy prime minister. In sum, I define *top candidates* as those individuals that a political party nominates to become the chief executive officer of any country (president, prime minister or chancellor). Besides this, during elections, top candidates represent their party's brand and carry the main campaign message (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000, p. 135). They participate in rallies with citizens and party members, address the media and participate in TV debates with their opponents from other parties. During elections, nominees lead their party's electoral campaign, and after elections, if their party has enough support in the assembly, top candidates may find themselves invested as Prime Minister, or if their party enters into a coalition, they may be awarded a senior cabinet role. Thus, we can distinguish again between the electoral and the post-electoral roles of top candidates.

Several scholars have already suggested the changing role of top candidates, as a matter of example I will mention three works in chronological order. First, Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000, p.153) point out that party researchers face increasing difficulties as some parties explicitly differentiate more and more between the leadership in the central organization and in the electoral arena. Second, Poguntke (2005, p.65), remarked how strong leaders have always been an asset, but that they have become somewhat of a necessity lately. And third, Mair (2013, p.67), as already mentioned, highlighted that a change in the recruitment and nomination criteria may constitute a signal of how parties have changed in recent decades. In sum, all they suggest that parties seem to increasingly rely on nominating popular candidates, like Blair or Schröder, instead of party insiders. However, some recent examples like the selection of Jeremy Corbyn, Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans suggest that parties may not consider electability as their main selection criterion. Parties may follow cyclical trends, where a period when parties prioritize electability is followed by another when parties weight more reliability, and some conditions can explain the change of cycle.

Figure 1.1 provides some empirical evidence concerning the increasing importance of top candidates. The graph plots how many articles mentioned the German word stem *Spitzenkandidat* – direct translation of the term top candidate – each year in the influential German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The right axis shows the overall number of newspaper articles that mention the term, while the left axis shows these mentions as a percentage of the total number of articles published by the newspaper that same year (to account for the differing size of the newspaper throughout its history). A change in its use can provide a good proxy for how the role and

importance of candidates may have changed over time. We can observe a dramatic increase in the term since the late 1940s. The use of the term consistently grew over time, and especially since 2000. For example, in 1980 the word appeared in 200 articles, while in 2017 it appeared in 714 articles. Additionally, the use of the term seems to have become more dependent on the electoral cycle, with significantly higher use of the term *Spitzenkandidat* during federal election years.

Fig. 1.1: Use of the term *Spitzenkandidat* in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (1949-2019).



Source: Author own elaboration using FAZ digital archive (<https://fazarchiv.faz.net>)

### 1.3 Research questions

Once the object of study has been defined, several questions that merit further investigation arise. Despite the prolific literature on candidate selection, the question of *what criteria political parties use when nominating a top candidate* has hitherto remained unanswered. Some recent studies have surveyed party selectors to infer their selection criteria (Martocchia Diodati and Marino, 2016; Vandeleene, Dodeigne and De Winter, 2016), but most of the past studies focus on how different institutional arrangements within a party may produce different types of candidates regarding their background and behaviour (Shomer, 2009; Indridason and Kristinsson, 2015).

To reiterate the purpose of this dissertation, here, I propose three research questions, the first being; *what criteria do political parties use when nominating a top candidate?* I propose that specific characteristics of top candidates can be linked with the electoral and post-electoral roles they perform, and thus that differences in their backgrounds would point towards particular selection criteria in different moments in time and across parties' history.

Second, *to what extent do political parties nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations?* If external circumstances such as electoral competitiveness and changes in the electorate exert a larger degree of influence on top candidates' nomination, we should observe candidates with different characteristics when parties face more competition. Selecting a different type of candidate could be a rational response to a shift in the electoral market enabling parties to emphasize candidate features as valence issues during electoral campaigns. Third, *under which conditions is electoral competition more likely to shape party decision-making?* In addition to general changes in the electorate, other factors can shape party decision-making. I will pay special attention to internal circumstances linked to intra-party dynamics such as organisational reform, leadership change, or a switch in a party's dominant coalition (Harmel and Janda, 1994). These types of changes – on their own, or in conjunction with developments in the electoral environment – can create opportunity windows for changing the criteria party selectors use, if not even the selectors themselves.

Throughout this dissertation, I will examine variations in top candidates' personal, political and partisan backgrounds to infer which criteria political parties considered when nominating them. I will combine this information with information about the political environments political parties faced in each case, their organisational characteristics, and other contextual factors, to determine how these different variables may have had an impact on parties' choices regarding their candidates for the executive office.

## 1.4 The electoral and post-electoral roles of top candidates

Top candidates serve two purposes, each one at different stages. First, when a candidate is nominated they are expected to participate in the electoral campaign. An action that I term the *electoral function of top candidates*. This function only lasts until the election takes place with the electoral results determining the future role of the top candidate. If the party is not able to form or participate in the government after the election, the role of the top candidate ends there. However, if the party enters into government, they will access the executive power, and the *post-electoral function of the top candidate* begins. As chief executive or at least as a cabinet member if in a coalition, the top candidate will be in charge of translating their party's electoral platform into actual policies for the duration of the legislative term.

Figure 1.2 represents the lifespan of a top candidate nominated approximately six months before an election in a country where the electoral terms last 4 years. The solid line represents the period when the candidate develops their electoral function, which lasts from the nomination until the electoral night. The dashed line represents the possible post-electoral function they may perform, which may last as long as the legislative period. In addition, somewhere close to the next election, the party will again (re)nominate a candidate. Note that the post electoral function lasts for a much longer period than the electoral period. Hence when nominating a top candidate, we can expect parties to value qualities that fit both roles and weight them accordingly. I will explain now each function in further detail.

Fig. 1.2: The life span of a top candidate



### ***1.4.1 The electoral function***

The electoral function of top candidates is crucial. They act as hinge between voters and the party organization. Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt (2013) argue that candidates provide a psychological shortcut allowing voters to distinguish between different political parties, while others argue that candidates are an electoral asset, independent of their parties (Kinder et al., 1980; Johnston, 2002; Bittner, 2011; Blais et al., 2012). Over the last few years, a growing literature has studied the effects of electoral leaders on vote choice, and several empirical studies argue that voter assessment of candidates has an increasing importance on vote choice (Clarke et al., 1991; Johnston, 2002; Bittner, 2011; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2013; Costa Lobo and Curtice, 2014; Rico, 2014; Lobo and Ferreira da Silva, 2017). However, other authors remain skeptical (Blais et al., 2002; Kriesi, 2012). This phenomenon is amplified by the general erosion of traditional cleavages (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 2009) and growing levels electoral volatility (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2018; Emanuele, Chiaramonte and Soare, 2018). Furthermore, the mass media tend to report on electoral contests by focusing more on individual candidates than policies, and also by focusing on their personal rather than political qualities. Several studies have shown how this phenomenon has increased over time, but not at the same time and pace in every country (Foley, 1993; Mughan, 2000; Milazzo and Hammond, 2018).

Poguntke and Webb (2005) argue that this change is more profound, and that personalization is propelling change in the internal distribution of power within established democracies. For a while now, leaders in parties and governments have become more prominent within their organizations to the detriment of the middle-level elites (Poguntke and Webb, 2005, 2018; Webb and Poguntke, 2013). Poguntke and Webb (2005) call this phenomenon “presidentialization.” Regarding the selection of a candidate for the executive office, it follows that parties will seek candidates with high electability. As Poguntke writes, “party leaders (or leading candidates) are no longer selected because they unite a broad or dominant coalition within their party. Instead, their ability to appeal successfully to voters has become the prime selection criterion” (Poguntke, 2005, p. 65). However, drawing again on the UK Labour and the SPD examples, this trend may be changing again and the criteria parties use as a function of their internal and external circumstances.

### ***1.4.2 The post-electoral function***

After the election, top candidates may have a post-electoral function to fill if they join the executive branch as minister of prime minister. On the one hand, Prime Ministers lead the country’s government. They head the cabinet, represent the country abroad and often set policy priorities. Presidents and Prime Ministers do not merely channel their party preferences into the government, but they may decisively influence them. The role leaves them enough

advantage to leave their personal input on public policy, and thus express their policy preferences. The personal background of politicians could be an enormous driving factor behind their behaviour in office (Carnes, 2012; Carnes and Lupu, 2014; Alexiadou, 2015). Recruitment processes and the posterior party life shape individuals' sets of preferences and beliefs, and these can be reflected in their actions in government, independent of their parties' policy platforms. Hayo and Neumeier (2012, 2014) show that governments led by Prime Ministers of more humble origin tend to spend more on social policies. However, this type of study is very rare, and relatively little is known about the recruitment and nomination process of chief executives, especially outside the US.

Besides, they will be responsible for reacting to unexpected political events during the government's tenure. A party that nominates a neophyte runs the risk of jeopardising political capacity for the following legislative period for several reasons. First, political newcomers may lack the necessary skills for campaigning, especially if they confront much more experienced politicians, and in the end, a poor campaign performance may translate into a bad result for the party. Newcomers hence decrease the political capacity of a party for the next period. However, sometimes voters may prefer newcomers for a variety of reasons. They may bring new topics onto the political agenda or be better campaigners. However, even if a candidate is especially popular and obtains excellent results that allow the party to form a government, newcomers still need to prove that they know how to govern a country.

Second, excellent campaigners can be awful prime ministers, and this would inevitably affect a party's reputation and electoral perspectives. Outsider candidates are more likely to deviate from the party line, as they may hold their own personal political agenda. In contrast, insider candidates will have been socialized within their organization, and will have incorporated its norms and values. As such, they will be more likely to stay within the party line. In sum, parties need to select carefully who will represent them during electoral campaigns, and maybe in government afterward.

## **1.5 Parties' selection criteria: electability and reliability**

Although some of the very first scholars of politics and political parties such as Moisei Ostrogorsky and Robert Michels raised questions about the selection and recruitment of candidates, and the reproduction of intra-party structures, the empirical study of candidate selection is much more recent. March and Gallagher (1988) developed the first empirical cross-country study of candidate selection, and many scholars became interested in the topic thereafter<sup>17</sup> (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994; Norris, 1997; Peter M. Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Shomer, 2012). Later, two theoretical refinements provided the basic analytical framework for understanding candidate selection from a comparative perspective. On the one hand, Norris and Lovenduski (1994) and Norris (1997) provided the supply and demand model of candidate selection. Their model states that the selection of a candidate is given by the constant interaction between the supply-side and the demand-side, namely, the conditions that determine who is willing to run as a candidate, and those that define which criteria selectors

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<sup>17</sup> It is worth mentioning that at the same time, candidate selection also started to receive more attention in the US context (Schlesinger, 1966, 1994; Canon, 1990).

use during the election process. On the other hand, Hazan and Rahat's (2010) disaggregation of all the different dimensions of candidate selection provided the map for understanding the internal process of candidate selection and its consequences for the overall political system.

However, the vast majority of previous studies have been devoted to the selection of candidates for the legislative branch, while this research will tackle the nomination of candidates for the executive. The seminal study that has theorized about how political parties nominate chief executive candidates, and the selection criteria behind it, is Samuels and Shugart's (2010) work comparing presidential and parliamentary countries (see chapter 2 for a discussion in detail). In brief, they argue that the separate origin and survival of the executive and the legislative power in presidential democracies – unlike in parliamentary ones – shapes different dimensions of partisan organization, most notably their recruitment processes for executive office. On the one hand, parties in a presidential system have incentives to nominate a vote-maximizing candidate due to the higher competition parties face there. In those systems, parties are just able to achieve the national executive office through obtaining a plurality of votes in a single round, or the majority in two rounds. In parliamentary systems, if parties do not obtain an absolute majority they will need the support of other parties, which gives office access to minor political parties. For parties, the most important is to keep disciplined and cohesive parliamentary group that does not vote against the party leadership proposals, as this is necessary to maintain the governmental majority in parliament. These differences imply that in each system, parties will value different sets of abilities when nominating a candidate for the executive office. Chief executive nominees in parliamentary systems will be more likely to be party animals or apparatchiks able to "embody the party's vision and to coordinate the party's bureaucracy and legislative contingent" (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 63). In contrast, in presidential systems, the extremely majoritarian mechanisms for accessing the executive power forces parties to take vote-seeking strategies.

Samuels and Shugart's work outlines two possible criteria parties use, or more specifically party selectors, when nominating a chief executive candidate. These are electability and reliability, which we can link with the electoral and post-electoral functions of top candidates. According to Samuels and Shugart's argument, party selectors will weight both when deciding who to nominate, and all-else-equal, electability will trump reliability in a presidential system, whereas reliability will carry more weight in parliamentary systems. However, we can also interpret this as a reaction of selectors to higher electoral competition. An increase in political competition<sup>18</sup> pushes party selectors to accord the electoral aspect of the candidate more weight in their decision, even to the detriment of post-electoral considerations. Following a common argument in the literature about parties' policy responsiveness (Adams et al., 2006; Abou-Chadi and Orłowski, 2016), we can contemplate that an increase in electoral competition incentivizes party selectors to opt for more electable candidates, even at the expense of more reliable candidates. We have anecdotal evidence about parties nominating "unusual" candidates over the last years, at least according to their previous standards (i.e. Silvio Berlusconi, Donald Trump or Emmanuel Macron among others). However, Carreras

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<sup>18</sup> This dissertation is agnostic in regard to what may have generated the increase of political competition: institutional change from parliamentarism to presidentialism, increased electoral personalization, bankrupted representation or the erosion of traditional cleavages.

(2016) only finds 73 political outsiders<sup>19</sup> as heads of government following national elections around the world from a sample of 870 elections in the period 1945–2015.

Samuels and Shugart (2010) only test their propositions among those who achieved executive office (and not the whole pool of aspirants), thus potentially limiting their results to a subset of political parties, particularly to those able to gain executive office. Similarly, they do not take into account other country-specific variations, like the electoral system or the selector type, that may also shape parties' nomination processes (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994). This dissertation advances knowledge about the selection of candidates for the executive office by looking into party-level determinants that may guide that process. In concrete, the following chapter will look into four different factors explaining the dynamics behind top candidates' nomination: the internal demand, the external demand, the type of selectorate and parties' screening and recruitment capacity.

## **1.6 Discussion and structure of the dissertation**

This chapter has explained the concept of top candidates and introduced the strategical dilemma political parties face when nominating them. The candidates for executive office, or top candidates, are becoming much more prominent figures with the media increasingly paying more attention to them. Top candidates are the public faces of their political movements, and their personal charisma or skills have a significant and growing impact on citizens' vote choice. Some would even consider top candidates as the embodiment of their political organizations. The role of top candidates is indicative of how political parties perform their traditional functions in post-industrial democracies. Studying the underlying criteria that parties use to nominate top candidates will help us to understand what the current role is of political parties. On the one hand, the empirical analyses may show that parties have increasingly become "empty vessels" who only heed public opinion when making their more important decisions, like the nomination of the top candidate. In this case, parties would only nominate popular people who are able to attract votes due to their charisma, but who possess no close links to the party organisation, and they would be nominated regardless of their anticipated behaviour in public office. On the other hand, parties may retain some of their societal roots and ideological commitments. Then parties would nominate people with broad partisan and political experience – people who have proved to be faithful party soldiers.

In the second part of the chapter, I introduced the two functions that top candidates perform: electoral and post-electoral functions. Each directly translates into a specific selection criterion for the top candidate. First, top candidates have an electoral function based on their campaign and vote-drawing abilities. Parties may seek candidates able to attract more votes, and this is translated into the electability criterion. Second, concerning the reliability criterion, a top candidate may become the country's prime minister, or a senior cabinet member, and thus have a post-electoral function – although this is conditional on their success. Victorious top candidates will lead the executive and become their country's agenda-setters. For this role, parties seek skilled candidates with previous experience in public office and ideological positions that are close to those of the party. Such candidates are reli-

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<sup>19</sup> Defined as a maximum of three years of public office experience.

able agents for developing the proposals of party manifestos into real policies. Parties circulate between the two poles of this single continuum, and the influence of multiple internal and external factors will force them to trade off one criterion against the other. This dissertation investigates these two poles, and empirically seeks to identify which factors lead parties towards positioning themselves on one end of the continuum or the other. The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows.

Chapter 2 constitutes the theoretical base of this work and combines different sources of literature, mainly works based in delegation theory with the ones on party organization change. First, it starts by considering the nomination process as a delegation process between a party-principal and a top candidate-agent, for which it both reviews the main works on delegation theory as applied to political parties and the literature on party change and adaptation. Then it investigates the electability and reliability criteria introduced above more deeply. Second, the chapter discusses the main approach to studying parties' organizational changes, and after adopting a discrete change approach, the chapter introduces the four key elements of its nomination model: screening and selection mechanisms, internal demand, external demand and selectorate type. Finally, these are linked to a series of observable implications that later are tested empirically in Chapters 5 to 7.

Chapter 3 explains the empirical strategy for observing the different selection criteria parties use across time and in different scenarios. The chapter starts by discussing the methodological challenges of studying candidate selection processes and goes on to explain the case selection criteria in term of countries and political parties. The last part of the chapter is devoted to describing the dataset and the data collection process.

Chapter 4 explains the empirical strategy and deals with the two sources of empirical variation that can be used to infer parties' selection criteria: candidate features and re-selection. First, the chapter discusses the operationalisation of the electability-reliability continuum, and discusses the statistical model that will be used in the following empirical chapters. Second, it explores the determinants of top candidate reselection, and establishes that re-nomination and nomination follow different rationales that should be taken into account. Third, the chapter addresses how to operationalize reliability. It reviews the different variables that have been used in the past as signals of reliability, and explores how to combine them using principal component analysis. The use of this statistical technique for data reduction allows a single and parsimonious indicator to be built that measures how entrenched within the party organization top candidates are. This is followed by quantitative and qualitative robustness tests.

Chapter 5 inquires about the differences of opportunities. Due to their varied screening and recruitment capacities, parties differ in their capacity to produce quality candidates. The chapter is divided into two parts. First, the chapter examines whether access to the organisational resources associated with votes, parliamentary office, and executive office, is related to the type of candidate that parties produce. In the second part, the chapter tests to what extent different types of party organisation, those defined by either more labour, or capital-intensive activities, are associated with candidate characteristics. The results show that access to public institutions shape the type of candidates a party can nominate, and that the type of party organisational model has a far more limited effect.

Chapter 6 explores the first part of the differences in preferences. The chapter is structured around the internal events a party may experience which can cause a change of the party's dominant coalition. First, the chapter explores extraordinary circumstances such as splits, mergers and name changes. Second, I test for the effect of much more frequent events like leadership changes, differentiating between contested and peaceful leadership changes. Third, I explore whether new party leaders try to get onto the ballot as top candidates. The empirical results show that these events are important for explaining candidate turnover, but not so much for determining candidate characteristics.

Chapter 7 studies the differences in preferences associated with changes in the electoral market. First, the chapter explores the role of electoral defeat as trigger of candidate renewal. Second, I discuss on the different alternatives for measuring a change in the electoral market parties are subject to. Third, I test whether these changes in the electoral market are associated with parties nominating different types of candidates in general, or as a function of a third factor in play: type of electorate, electoral system, time period and party size. The empirical results show, on the one hand, that electoral defeat is more strongly associated with candidate turnover rates rather than their personal characteristics. On the other hand, it seems that parties resist electoral pressure and changes in their candidates' characteristics, as I only find evidence of parties changing their criteria when primaries are used as a selection method. I end the chapter by discussing the possible mechanism behind that finding.

Chapter 8 presents the concluding remarks. It contains a summary of the main results, outlines the scientific contributions, discusses the studies limitations and future venues or research and introduces a novel theory on party organizational change inspired by the empirical results of this dissertation.



## Chapter 2

# Understanding the nomination of electoral leaders office in parliamentary democracies

In early 2017, German political life was shaken by an unexpected event: the deputy prime minister, minister of economic affairs and leader of the social democratic party (SPD) announced that he would not be running as candidate for chancellor in the upcoming federal election. Instead, he proposed that Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, should become the party's nominee and replace him as party leader. The rationale behind his decision was that Gabriel performed very poorly at the pre-electoral polls, while Schulz seemed to have better electoral prospects. Soon afterwards, Schulz received almost unanimous support as top candidate and party leader. As Schulz explained<sup>1</sup>: “in the history of German political parties, it is the first time that an incumbent party chief and vice chancellor has subordinated his own ambition on the rationale that someone else stood a better chance of being elected”. The internal struggles and battles that may have preceded that decision remain out of the public eye. However, the fact that Schulz appeared as a more attractive electoral candidate caused the party to rally around him.

This chapter acts as the theoretical basis of the dissertation. However, I will not follow the structure of a traditional literature review. Here I will bring together three types of literature, parts of which will be further developed at the beginning of the subsequent empirical chapters. First, it draws on the empirical literature about the selection of parliamentary candidates and party leaders. Second, I will employ the theoretical literature that applies agency theory, or the principal-agent approach, to the functioning of representative institutions. This approach, despite being one of the most standard approximations to explain government formation, parliamentary behaviour or policy implementation (Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2003; Proksch and Slapin 2014; Huber and McCarty 2004), is not as common when it comes to explaining the internal dynamics of political parties and their decision-making<sup>2</sup>. Using this approach will allow me to explain the differences in opportunities parties have for nominating different types of top candidates. Third, I will make use of the literature on party change (Harmel and Janda 1994; Mair, Müller and Plasser 2004) to parties' differences in preferences when nominating a candidate. Combining these three different strands of literature will allow me to theoretically highlight which part of parties behaviour can be better explained regarding their differences in opportunities or in their preferences. So far, the literature on candidate selection as well as the one on party organization have focused on the second explanations linked to differences in preferences.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with German Chancellor Candidate Martin Schulz (Der Spiegel, February 8th, 2017)

<sup>2</sup> For an exception see Müller (2000).

This chapter examines how the current explanations, which focus on macro-level variables like the separation and fusion of power or the erosion of societal cleavages, could be complemented by variables at the party and party system level. In the subsequent section, these complementary explanations are shaped into empirical propositions to be tested in the following chapters. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of my approach.

## 2.1 2. Candidate selection as a delegation process

In the introduction to this work, the electoral and post-electoral functions of top candidates were presented. Samuels and Shugart (2010) studied these functions in their investigate into how the separation or fusion of powers affects the origin and survival of government, and therefore the overall nature of political systems and the parties that operate within them. One of the consequences of the separation or fusion of powers is how these influence the selection criteria of top candidates in parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential democracies.

Building on a principal-agent approach, Samuels and Shugart (2010) model the nomination of a candidate as a delegation process between the party and the candidate, where the party acts as the principal and the candidate as the agent. Lupia (2003, p.33) defines delegation “as an act where one person or group, called a *principal*, relies on another person or group, called an *agent*, to act on the principal’s behalf.” Here top candidates act as agents of the party for campaigning and / or governing, depending on their electoral and post-electoral functions. In all delegation processes, parties are at risk of experiencing agency loss, and hence seek to minimize such risk. On the one hand, parties can always refuse to delegate. In the context of nomination to top candidates, this would mean competing in elections and nominating a series of candidates, but refusing to name one as their top candidate, and therefore their future representative in the executive. It would also entail refusing to personalise the campaign message around a nominee. Parties can still decide to run on an exclusively policy-based platform, although this may be at odds with modern campaigning. To put this into context, the example of the German green party is illustrative. Due to its origin as a protest and grass-roots party (Poguntke 1987; van Haute 2016), the party refused on ideological grounds to personalize their campaign message. Their electoral posters did not represent people but issues, and different representatives would attend electoral debates. Nonetheless, the party has gradually personalized its message as it has gained electoral support, and most notably when it has participated in government at both the federal and regional level. On occasions when the Greens have been minor coalition partners, their ministers have played a crucial electoral role in the following electoral campaigns (Schmitt-Beck and Faas 2006), and this way the party has progressively normalized its campaigning behaviour. The German greens have transitioned from not nominating top candidates or only offering group candidacies, to nowadays nominating two top candidates, or a single candidate.

On the other hand, delegating the campaign effort to a candidate provides several benefits for parties, even when this is not imposed by the political system, as is the case in presidential regimes. First, delegating the main electoral message to a top candidate allows the party to concentrate all its attention on a single spot. This way, the party can centralize all its campaign efforts, manage campaign messages more effectively , thus avoiding conflicting

messages. Second, parties can establish a direct link between the voters and the candidate. Candidates' charisma can be an alternative tool to convince voters rather than policy proposals, as voters can develop an emotional attachment to particular candidates beyond party platforms. For example, Bittner (2011) shows that top candidates' perceptions have a consistent influence on vote choice, even among sophisticated voters.

Third, parties can experience a reduction in their media coverage if they refuse to personalize their campaign. In a context where the media is ever more inclined to portray elections as a horserace (Bittner 2018; Fowler and Lawless 2009; Tonge and Geddes 2015), parties who refuse to enter the race in a personalized way will not be attractive for the media because they lack a clear and identifiable top candidate. As a result they may suffer at the polls. It is reasonable to think that the pressure to delegate will be higher in bigger parties than in smaller ones, as parties with higher chances to enter government will necessarily have to delegate to a prime minister after an election. Fourth, voters may demand to know who a party will propose to head the cabinet after an election, if they are successful. In sum, the option of not delegating – not nominating a top candidate – may be available, but is not very attractive.

In general, not nominating a top candidate does not seem an attractive option for a party, especially in highly mediatized environments. However, once the nomination – delegation – has been established, the agent will hold considerable powers both during and after the election. During the election period, the party temporarily transfers the power to make decisions in the name of the party organization to the top candidate. The candidate will frame the campaign message and decide how to appeal to voters, becoming the public face of the organization. After the election, they may become prime minister, or an important cabinet member, and thus one of the main agenda-setters in the country. From the moment of the nomination, parties can experience agency loss at any point, specifically when their agent deviates from the party's desired behaviour. Experiencing agency loss does not imply that the delegation process has failed, as the party – acting as principal – can still benefit more from a bad agent than from not delegating to an agent at all. All difference between the principal's ideal action and the agent's actual behaviour constitutes agency loss – loss that arises due to informational asymmetry between both actors. We can distinguish different types of agency loss depending at which stage of the delegation process it happens. Here I will focus on *adverse selection* and *moral hazard*.

Parties may suffer agency loss in the form of *adverse selection* when they nominate somebody who is unsuitable for the task. Before nominating candidates, parties may not have a full understanding of the abilities, ideals and loyalties of particular aspirants, and aspirants may be tempted to exaggerate their qualities in order to obtain the nomination. This initial informational asymmetry can move parties to nominate somebody who is not prepared for the task they are assigned to. Concerning the nomination of top candidates, adverse selection will occur when the party nominates somebody who is not prepared to perform either their electoral function or their post-electoral function. During the electoral phase, an example would be a candidate who is a poor communicator or who transmits contradictory messages. A poor candidate could also be somebody who is hit by scandal mid-campaign, and thus damages their party's electoral prospects. A party with better information would have anticipated such an event. This was the case of the French conservative politician François Fillon during the presidential election

of 2017, whose popularity started to drop in the polls when he was involved in a corruption scandal. Adverse selection problems can also appear in the post-electoral phase when the top candidate has become chief executive officer or an important cabinet member. Considering that contemporary governments are composed of complex bureaucracies whose governance requires high managerial and inter-personal skills, not all politicians may be prepared for such roles. New prime ministers who lack previous governmental experience may well struggle to turn their electoral pledges into public policy.

Alternatively, parties may suffer agency loss in the form of *moral hazard*. Here the informational asymmetry problem arises after the delegation process has taken place – after the party has nominated a top candidate – and this starts to act against the principal's interest. Principals are not able to supervise all actions that the agent carries out on its behalf, so this asymmetrical information may encourage the agent to deviate from the principal's expected behaviour and follow their true preferences, if these differ. Regarding top candidates, this problem can arise during either the electoral or the post-electoral period. During the electoral campaign, for example, this would entail a candidate whose behaviour deviates from their party's position in a way that can harm the party's electoral prospects, such as alienating the party's core supporters.

Furthermore, parties can suffer moral hazard during the post-electoral phase. The very nature of the position of Prime Minister prevents parties from specifying a contract between them and the top candidate where the behaviour of the latter as prime minister would be specified. Parties need to rely on the overall capacities, goodwill and experience of their agent. Furthermore, in extreme cases parties may suffer a capture of the principal by the agent. This occurs when an agent uses the information they have acquired as an agent to reformulate the conditions of the contract with the principal. Within the specific context of top candidate nomination, this can be exemplified by popular prime minister that uses their good electoral standing to renegotiate their relationship with their party. Renegotiation of the contract may involve increasing the prime minister's autonomy vis-a-vis the party, or placing the candidate's supporters in the party executive committee. A party may accept the new conditions given the prime minister's electoral support. Prime ministers can shape their parties thanks to their perceived electoral appeal, even if they do not belong to the core of the party's leadership. In an extreme case, the popular prime minister can accumulate so much power that the party organization becomes a vehicle for the political action of the PM, rather than the other way around. Here the examples of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder in the British Labour Party and the German SPD are again insightful. Both were popular leaders able to expand their parties' appeal outside their traditional working-class milieu, and in particular to the growing middle class (Evans and Tilley 2017; Schäfer 2007). This allowed them to win elections and progressively increase their power within the party. They kept their centrist approach, even to the point that they passed policies that alienated their traditional working-class bases, such as the 1990s welfare reforms in the UK, or the Hartz IV in Germany (Heath 2016).

Although parties can experience agency loss in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard, parties also have tools at their disposal to prevent such loss. These tools can be distinguished according to whether they are used before or after delegation has taken place. Before nominating a top candidate, or *ex-ante*, parties can try to restrict top candidates' behaviour or to require them to seek the consent of the principal before acting. This mechanism for

preventing agency loss is called *contract design*. Samuels and Shugart (2010) studied how contract design could be applied to the nomination of top candidates. They note that this has proved to be ineffective in practice as it delays daily decision-making during the campaign season and fosters conflict between the candidate and the party leadership<sup>3</sup>. In addition, some agents may resign, or refuse to accept the nomination in the first place if the central party organization imposes too many burdens on them. Thus both situations would take away some of the benefits of delegating the main campaign effort to a top candidate in the first place.

Alternatively, parties can provide incentives to their agent to not deviate from the principal's preference – a mechanism called *incentive compatibility*. This entails all the efforts made by the principal to induce the agent to take the principal's own most preferred action. However, incentive compatibility proves difficult to implement in the specific context of top candidate nomination, as their reward is to hold the prime ministership. One of the most attractive offices in any political system (Borchert 2011, p.119) and whose powers have been settled beforehand. It is worth mentioning, of course, that a candidate's reward is conditional on their success. Samuels (1998) models the decision of an individual about whether to run for office as a cost-benefit utility function<sup>4</sup>, where the reward of holding a concrete political office is conditional on the probability of being elected minus the cost of running. Hence, the benefit of running depends on the chances of being elected. In the context of top candidates, parties cannot alter the value of the office they receive. Although some political offices could become more attractive over time, depending on the evolution of the political system (Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó 2019), generally these positions already represent one of the most attractive political offices a politician can aspire to. The attractiveness of the prime ministership has important implications on the supply-side of candidate selection. It is reasonable to assume that the high degree of attractiveness of the prime ministership office secures a steady flow of individuals willing to run, and it is the party's function to sort through them.

Although neither incentive compatibility, nor contract design appear to be the most efficient ways for parties to control their top candidates, parties have recourse to another resource: before delegation takes place, parties can rely on *screening and selection*. This arrangement represents the efforts developed by the principal to sort out good agents from bad ones (Strøm 1993). In this context, principals aim to predict the true intentions and future behaviour of the agent beforehand. However, aspirants know much more about their own aspirations, desires, intentions and future behaviour than parties, who have no direct way to obtain this information and need to rely on suboptimal solutions. Samuels and Shugart (2010) propose that parties tend to rely on aspirants' track record as the best tool to predict their future behaviour. According to this logic, past behaviour should act as the clearest indication of aspirants' future behaviour, if chosen as top candidates. Chapter 4 will develop which elements party selectorates may use as signals of reliability and electability.

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<sup>3</sup> They mention the example of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, who blames his first electoral defeats on the fact that he did not enjoy enough political autonomy from the central party office (Samuels and Shugart 2010, pp.196–97).

<sup>4</sup>  $u_{io} = B_{io}P_{io} - C_{io}$ ; where  $i$  stands for individual and  $o$  for political office,  $B$  for benefit,  $C$  for cost and  $P$  for the probability of being elected

The three previous mechanisms – contract design, incentive compatibility and screening and selection – concern how parties can prevent agency loss before nomination has taken place. However, parties can prevent agency loss after delegation to candidates by maintaining control over the agent’s behaviour. Principals can rely on *monitoring and reporting* mechanisms, whereby agents regularly have to report their activities to the party. In the context of nominating top candidates, this could entail establishing a liaison committee between the party’s central office and the campaign team, or the candidates themselves. This resembles McCubbins and Schwartz’s (1984) notion of *police-patrol* oversight, where the party regularly checks on the candidate’s activity. In addition, prime ministers may have to report to the central party organization. However, the most radical measure a principal can use to force compliance on an agent is the threat of dismissal, either during the electoral- or the post-electoral phase.

However, dismissing a candidate involves changing the candidate in the middle of the race, which will undoubtedly involve high costs for the party (Greene and Haber 2015; So 2020), and agents are well aware of this. A party will consider changing its front-runner only under extreme circumstances. It can also decide to dismiss its agent during the post-electoral phase. However, here the capacity of a party to dismiss its agent – the chief executive officer – is a function of the country’s institutional settings. In presidential systems, overturning a popular Presidential vote requires oversized majorities that are usually unattainable in practice for a single party. Conversely, obtaining a simple majority against the current government or in favour of a new one is far more attainable in parliamentary systems<sup>5</sup>. As Samuels and Shugart (2010, p.109) report, presidential impeachments are relatively rare, and far less common than changes of prime minister in parliamentary regimes. However, seeking to reduce the associated reputational cost, parties will informally try to force the exit of chief executives through their resignation before formally expelling them.. For instance, Cross and Blais (2012) find that in Westminster democracies most leaders resign in response to pressure from their party peers, rather than waiting to be formally removed.

In this study, the principal-agent model should be understood as a flexible heuristic tool and not as a complete theory with predetermined outcomes (Thatcher and Sweet 2002). I use it to develop a conceptual framework that helps to understand the different power relationships that emerge within an organization when nominating a top candidate, and more specifically should help to derive logical propositions on how political parties behave during the process. Some authors, like Katz (2014), show how the model presents some empirical problems when combined with different ideal conceptualizations of political parties<sup>6</sup>. I will follow a “liberal” application of the principal-agent model (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017; Maher, Billiet and Hodson 2009), implying that parts of the model will be treated as changing variables rather than as assumptions. However, the model requires at least two conditions to be fulfilled (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017). First, an act of delegation must be identified. In this sense, as discussed earlier, the nomination of a candidate by a party clearly constitutes an act of delegation. The

<sup>5</sup> If the party is the minor coalition partner in a government, dismissing the agent just requires the consent of the major coalition partner, who constitutionally holds the power to dismiss ministers.

<sup>6</sup> Katz (2014) shows that the principal-agent model presents some inconsistencies if we do not consider parties as unitary actors, but divide them according to their three traditional faces: parties on the ground, parties in public office, and parties in central office. Under a mass party model, where parties compete to mobilize their *class gardée*, the model holds, but when considering a Downsian model of political competition the model would predict parties in public office being forced to serve two principals – the party on the ground and in the central office – with competing objectives and contradictory demands.

party delegates to the candidate the main campaigning effort and entrust them with the responsibility to lead the government afterwards if successful. In exchange, the agent enjoys the benefits of political office. Second, it is necessary that the actors involved are considered rational. This entails that actors participating in this delegation process are considered utility-maximizers of their welfare, and thus seek to follow the strategy that will provide them with the highest utility. This is a common assumption, and previous research has pointed out how parties and their elements – members, parliamentarians, party organizers or grassroots members – behave rationally in expectation of certain outcomes. Therefore, the process of nominating a top candidate fulfils the two most basic criteria for applying the principal-agent model.

In addition, for the delegation approach to be useful within the specific context of top candidate selection, some assumptions need to be laid out. First, I will follow E. E. Schattschneider's (1942) notion that "he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party." I consider that party selectors are the backbone of the organization and its main stakeholders. They have a vested interest in the survival and success of the organization (Panebianco 1988), and therefore will strategically consider who should be the party's nominee in each election. Second, selectors are rational actors who seek to maximize their party's number of votes at election time. This is not incompatible with the party seeking other objectives in the medium- or long-term, such as policy and office (Strøm 1990), yet the fact that the nomination takes place shortly before an election will make "votes" the first and foremost objective of party selectors. Votes ensure the short-term success of parties, their medium-term capabilities to obtain office and policy, and their long-term organizational survival.

Parties are widely considered as risk-averse organizations (Harmel and Janda 1994; Müller 1997), and the nomination of a top candidate is a critical decision for them. On the one hand, parties aim to avoid the nomination of unsuitable candidates, which could lead to agency loss during or after election. In the worst-case scenario, parties would be forced to replace their agent prematurely, harming their reputation and electoral prospects. In this context, *screening and selection* arise as the most useful mechanisms for parties to select adequate and reliable agents in comparison with the other tools previously discussed. In the following section, I propose a conceptualization of how parties implement screening and selection.

### **2.2 3. Parties' selection criteria**

Samuels and Shugart (2010) propose that parties' criteria depend on whether they are nominating candidates for the legislative or the executive office. In the legislature, parties need cohesive parliamentary groups that vote together in the chamber. Therefore, parties will seek trustworthy agents to act as legislators. The nominees will be people who are ideologically close to the party position, reliable, and loyal to the party's ideals. However, in executive-presidential elections, the rationale is different. In these systems a plurality of votes, or the majority in two rounds will elect the new president. The electoral imperative shapes parties' criteria when nominating their candidate. Political parties in presidential systems need to build broader coalitions – encompassing more than their voters in legislative elections – if they aim to win the executive office. The authors term this the *electoral*

*separation of purpose*<sup>7</sup>, and show how some presidential candidates are able to obtain more votes than their parties in the legislative election, even when both are concurrent. In other words, parties in presidential systems have more incentives to nominate vote-maximizers, or popular figures<sup>8</sup> as candidates. In parliamentary democracies, where parties only face legislative elections, there is no possible electoral separation of purpose, and citizens vote for the legislative and the executive at the same time. In these systems, parties only need parliamentarians that form cohesive parliamentary groups and act within the state institutions according to the will of their parties. However, this differentiation between presidential and parliamentary democracies relies on the strong assumption that trustworthy agents are bad electoral candidates and vice versa (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.63)<sup>9</sup>.

These two elements constitute the core of Samuels and Shugart's (2010) argument, and constitute two independent dimensions on which we can model the nomination of a top candidate. Figure 2.1 represents a two-dimensional space where party selectors can independently assess the expected electability and reliability of each candidate. Note that electability is a concept close to what I call *electoral utility*, and reliability is similar to *post-electoral utility*. I propose that the transitive preferences of party selectors will be as follows. First, party selectors will prefer candidates with high values on both dimensions. Conversely, their last preference will be to nominate candidates with low values in both dimensions. If party selectors nominate a candidate that falls within the last category, it will be as a result of a lack of alternatives. The real dilemma for political parties appears when they find themselves with a pool of aspirants, which is orthogonally divided. This occurs when parties can only decide to nominate either top candidates with high electoral appeal but dubious party loyalty, or extremely loyal party apparatchik who lacks electoral appeal. In these situations, parties need to decide between aspirants located either at the top left or the bottom right of figure 2.1, because no aspirant is located at the top right of the two-dimensional space.

These two dimensions can be simplified by presenting them in a table with four possible outcomes, as shown in table 2.1. Above all other options party selectors will prefer those placed in the second cell as they provide high utility in both dimensions, if such candidates actually exist in reality. Similarly, the least preferred outcome for party selectors is an aspirant situated in cell III, as they perform poorly on both dimensions. The trade-off appears when party selectors are limited to deciding between aspirants located in cells I and IV<sup>10</sup>. This situation is the most interesting from an empirical point of view, as it allows to contrast the different incentives – and thus criteria – that party selectors use. The assumption that there is a trade-off between electability and reliability is common in the


<sup>7</sup> More specifically, they conceive of the electoral separation of purpose as a measure of the “degree to which the electoral process generates misalignment between the political incentives of a party’s executive candidate and its median legislative candidate” (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.123).

<sup>8</sup> In this dissertation, the terms *popular* and *vote-maximizer* will be used interchangeably (So 2012). Both refer to candidates’ personal features that can enhance or damage their party’s electoral performance, given a specific context, and including personal attributes like gender, ethnic, geographical or social background.

<sup>9</sup> “The skills needed to win the prime minister’s office in a parliamentary system are strongly correlated with the skills that make one a good party servant: an ability to embody the party’s vision and to coordinate the party’s bureaucracy and legislative contingent. In contrast, the skills most useful for winning a presidential election include proven vote-drawing ability and an appealing, supra-partisan public image. These skills may only weakly correlate with the skills that make one a faithful executor of the party’s will” (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.63).

<sup>10</sup> Party  $\in$  (II > I ~ IV > III)

Fig. 2.1: Electability and reliability as a bi-dimensional space



literature. I will thus also adopt this supposition. Candidates with higher levels of reliability and party experience will be assumed to be worse electoral assets than those with lower levels of experience – even resembling political outsiders. Also, it is important to remark that I treat electability and reliability as a continuum, and thus as a continuous variable, and that I am not interested in predicting the nomination of a specific type of candidate such as political outsiders, or newcomers (Carreras 2016). The approach here is more general.


Table 2.1: Simplified party choices

		Reliability	
		High	Low
Electability	High	I	II
	Low	III	IV

Previous empirical works commonly reduced the two selection criteria dimensions into a single one. Many past works assume this single continuum as standard (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino 2015; Samuels and Shugart 2010). Thus, in the nomination process, selectors evaluate aspirants according to a single *electability-reliability* dimension. As Samuels and Shugart's (2010) write: "the problem that all parties face is that the qualities that make a potential candidate useful for the party's collective goals may conflict with the qualities that suggest a candidate will reliably pursue those goals" (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.63). This confronts party selectors with a dilemma. The characteristics that make a good candidate in the short term are negatively correlated with those of a good candidate in the long term. A popular candidate without strong party links, and a lack of institutional experience, could nevertheless boost a party's electoral fortune in an upcoming election. However, if the party gains access to government, the new prime minister's lack of institutional experience and connections within the party organization can paralyze the government, preventing the party from accomplishing their electoral program, and damaging the party's electoral prospects in the next election. From now on, I assume that electability and reliability constitute a single dimension and a trade-off. This constitutes one of the critical assumptions of my understanding of how political parties nominate top candidates, in addition to assuming that party selectors are rational actors and that these seek to maximize the number of votes parties obtain in elections.

It should be possible to identify which criteria selectors used to agree on nominations according to the different personal features that top candidates show. I consider that selectors interpret some of the aspirants' personal features, such as experience in political office, as signals of future behaviour if nominated. Thus, it should be possible to disentangle the different criteria a party uses by observing changes from one election to the next, and the overall evolution of candidate trends. In this way, I can summarize selectors' criteria on a single dimension, as represented in Figure 2.2. On the one hand, one extreme of the axis represents candidates' campaigning and vote-drawing abilities, representing top candidates short-term electoral utility. On the opposite end of the spectrum, post-electoral utility represents candidate capacity to translate party platforms from proposals into policies once in office. This capacity consists of both the technical, political knowledge of the candidate, as well as how closely their ideological preferences align with the (median) party's selectorate. Again, this diagram represents how parties have to trade-off popular but unreliable candidates, and unpopular but reliable ones. We can consider that a candidate's position on the electability-reliability axis is a function of their entrenchment within the party organization, or *partyness*, the term I will use from here on. A higher degree of partyness signals higher reliability but lower electability and vice-versa. However, parties will differ in their capacity to screen and recruit candidates, as I will develop later. In brief, the structural conditions of a party will generate a "reliability ceiling", to which a party can aspire at a given moment. As far as parties grow, they will develop a higher ceiling.

Fig. 2.2: Electability and reliability as a unidimensional space



The position selectors will decide to take within this continuum will depend on several demand factors<sup>11</sup>, which can be structural or contingent. For Samuels and Shugart (2010), the main source of variation explaining the different profiles of contenders for the executive office is the separation of powers<sup>12</sup>. In presidential systems, parties seek to nominate popular candidates in order to win executive office, while in parliamentary regimes candidates for prime minister will have similar skills to those of normal MP candidates. In that context, parties need faithful candidates that follow the party's mandate before, and once, in office, as the skills needed to win the PM office are highly correlated with those that make a good party servant: "an ability to embody the party's vision and to coordinate the party's bureaucracy and legislative contingent." (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.63). Oppositely, candidates for president should show vote-drawing abilities, and parties are expected to nominate them according to these abilities, hence reinforcing the negative correlation between good candidates and bad governors.

On the one hand, trustworthy agents require long and intense processes of involvement in the party organization to build trust between the person and the organization (Samuels and Shugart 2010). On the other hand, this deep

<sup>11</sup> In the case of this dissertation, I focus on the demand-side factors as I consider that the high attractiveness of the top candidacy (and being the PM afterwards) will translate into a steady supply of possible candidates for all political parties, and thus the supply remains constant.

<sup>12</sup> For Samuels and Shugart (2010) parties in parliamentary systems are very unlikely to select political outsiders as candidates for prime minister, although they do not completely rule out the eventuality (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p.69).

embeddedness with the party organization may prevent them from appealing to other parties' voters (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Therefore, political parties in parliamentary systems will rate candidate trustworthiness higher than campaigning performance (or vote-drawing abilities). In contrast, parties in presidential systems will rate the candidate ability to win an election higher than her prospective reliance once in office.

However, Samuels and Shugart's (2010) rationale can be extended far beyond the presidential and parliamentary dichotomy. The electoral separation of purpose is not the only reason why party selectors can trade electability against reliability when nominating a candidate for the executive office. Parties operating under the electoral separation of purpose will have higher incentives to seek popular candidates, but these incentives are not exclusive to non-parliamentary regimes. Indeed, the electoral separation of purpose can be understood as an institutional indicator incentivising parties to take decisions according to electoral considerations. Nevertheless, other factors pointing in the same direction can be higher levels of electoral volatility and increasing levels of party competition<sup>13</sup>. In the following section, I lay out four dimensions that shape selectors' preferences for one type of candidate or the other: the party's screening and recruitment capacity, the internal demand, the external demand, and the type of selector.

### **2.3 Explaining parties' behaviour: a discrete change approach**

In the previous section, I have discussed the two criteria political parties may use under different conditions when nominating a top candidate. In this section, I will discuss which conditions can move parties towards weighting one criteria against the other in the electability-reliability spectrum. The literature features three main principal theoretical approaches on party change, Harmel (2002) identifies these as the life-cycle, the system-level trends approach, and the discrete change approach. In addition, some authors also consider the punctuated equilibrium approach, borrowed from public policy studies (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), for studying party organization (Scarrow 2014).

The life-cycle approach (Michels 1915) considers that parties change as they grow and age. At some point, the starting power equilibrium becomes unsustainable, and the different elements within the party have to re-settle their roles and relationships, which manifests itself through organizational reform. In Michels' view, this process is intrinsically linked to the progressive concentration of power into a few hands within the party organization. Alternatively, the system-level trends approach (Duverger 1964; Kirchheimer 1966; Katz and Mair 1995) considers that certain developments in the environment – like the enfranchisement process, technological changes or the expansion of public funding for political parties – will gradually and inevitably push parties to switch from one organizational stage to another. The discrete change (Harmel and Janda 1994) approach proposes that organizational change within parties is much more arbitrary and often the result of a conjunction of internal and external factors. On the one hand, external factors affecting the electoral competition may pave the way for a change in party be-


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<sup>13</sup> However, it is worth noting that Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Najera (2017) and Lago and Torcal (2019) only found a very feeble association between the political regime and the level of volatility a country experiences.

haviour, but this needs to be triggered by a ruling party elite (Wilson 1994). On the other hand, party reformers may take control of the party, but need an opportunity window created by an external factor to trigger reform without internal opposition. Finally, the punctuated equilibrium approach (Scarow 2014) suggests that parties consistently follow a particular behaviour or set of rules for a relatively long period of time, which suddenly change but the new ones will then tend to remain stable over a considerable period of time. In this approach, change does not occur as often as the discrete change approach would suggest, neither is this necessarily caused by macro-level variables that are out of parties' control, as is the case in life-cycle and system-level trends approaches.

Each of the above approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. However, for the study of top candidate selection, the discrete change approach presents two clear benefits. First, it applies better to the type of outcome studied here. I consider the nomination of a candidate as a spatial model where party selectors decide which type of candidate on the electability-reliability continuum they will nominate. This does not follow any concrete and pre-established pattern or evolution. I anticipate a circumstantial and actor-specific change that will not necessarily be followed by other political parties that do not face the same circumstances. Secondly, approaching change as a combination of internal and external stimuli allows for a parsimonious integration of my theoretical approach in the established theories of candidate selection, particularly with Norris and Lovenduski's (1994) supply and demand model (see section 2.3) and Harmel and Janda's work (1994). I will consider changes in the internal and the external stimuli to constitute changes in the selector's demand side.

Fig. 2.3: A model of top candidate nomination.



My theoretical model, described in figure 2.3, contains the following elements. First, selectors will change their criteria from one election to the next as a function of the internal and external stimuli their party is experiencing at the time. However, different party selectors may interpret the same stimuli differently, and therefore it is necessary to account for the composition of the selectorate. Given that the top candidacy represents the path towards the most important political office in a country, I will assume that the supply remains constant as, in principle, all aspirants are ambitious individuals who seek to advance their careers and ultimately become chief executive officers. This assumption may not be entirely realistic, as some politicians are not uniquely office driven, and the value of the chief executive office may vary across time, especially as a function of how likely it is that a party will win the ability to place a member in the position after the election (Samuels 1998). Nevertheless, for the sake of parsimony, I will retain this assumption. What varies is the quality of the aspirants a party may choose from, and this quality

can be considered as a function of parties' organizational capacities and structure. This is the main theoretical advantage of my model, and one of the main theoretical contributions of this dissertation. Previous models only took into account the different conditions in the supply and demand of candidates. Taking into consideration parties' screening and recruitment capacities introduce the differences in opportunities in addition to the differences in preferences studied in the past. Parties with high screening and recruitment capacities will be able to produce larger pools of candidates with a higher quality of candidates on average. Oppositely, parties with low screening and recruitment capacities will not be able to create such pools, and thus, they will be far more constrained in their decisions. It will be more likely that these parties employ sub-optimal solutions as they cannot straightforwardly apply their preferences when nominating a top candidate. My model expands the current theoretical knowledge on candidate selection by considering both parties differences in opportunities in addition to the differences in their internal and external preferences. I will now proceed to explain the rest of the different factors involved in the nomination process, namely: parties screening and recruitment capacities, external demand, internal demand, and selector types.

### ***2.3.1 The party's screening and recruitment capacity***

Before addressing how parties may have differences in preferences according to the internal and external stimuli they experience, it is necessary to tackle the differences in their opportunities. Different political parties can behave differently as principals, depending on their characteristics. Political parties are a family composed of multiple species, and since the foundational studies of party organization (Duverger 1964; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988; Kirchheimer 1966) there has been a tendency to classify political parties according to different variables such as their origin, organizational procedures or social composition. We should not expect all parties to behave in the same way. In principal agent theory, it is common to distinguish between principals according to their capacity to implement different tools for preventing agency loss. More specifically, several studies pay special attention to the principal's *ex-post* capacity to monitor their agent (Saalfeld 1995; Strøm and Bergman 2011). Monitoring capacity refers to how well a principal can evaluate the behaviour of an agent after the delegation has been established. This has important consequences, as principals with higher monitoring capacities are able to reduce the informational asymmetries between the principals and their agents.

However, as discussed in section 2.1, within the field of top candidate selection, parties do not have many *ex post* tools besides firing their agent. Most of the party tools to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard are *ex ante*, or before delegation takes place. In this context, we should also study how well different parties are able to apply selection and screening mechanisms. Given that parties differ in the amount of organizational resources – money and personnel – they have, we can expect that some of them will be between able to scrutinize aspirants and prevent future agency loss. In addition, parties with more resources will be able to implement clear internal pathways of success or *cursus honorum* (Stolz 2001; Carreras 2016). This structure will serve as a continuous screening process for all aspirants to the top candidacy, even years before they may begin to aspire to the position. Parties with clear

career paths are continuously sorting their personnel, as to access higher position it is necessary to pass through lower ones. I term this feature as *screening and recruitment capacity*<sup>14</sup>.

In regard to candidate selection, screening and recruitment capacity is strongly related to what Panebianco (1988) calls “internal opportunity structure” within parties. In Panebianco’s (1988, p.60) view, parties need to develop a series of collective and selective incentives towards their members, voters, supporters and members of affiliated organizations. An effective incentive structure will reward membership and help to build a collective identity, which will provide loyalty links between the core of the party organization and its peripheral elements. Selective incentives refer to the competition within the party elite for power, status, material incentives and control over the organization (Panebianco 1988, p.35). Parties that can build an effective structure of selective incentives can develop a foreseeable career path for their party members and thus organize the recruitment, selection and reproduction of party elites more efficiently and predictably. As Panebianco (1988, pp. 60–61) puts it:

there is thus only one way to make one’s career in the party: to allow oneself to be co-opted by the centre. The opportunity structure is such that the “ambitious members” (careerists) must, to rise to the party’s upper rungs, comply with central directives. The result is a sort of funnel-shaped structure, for personal mobility and success require a vertical convergence at the centre; one must be supported by a restricted national elite and zealously conform to its will.

Therefore, political parties with more organizational resources will become more powerful principals. These types of principals will be able to reduce the informational asymmetry gap between them and their (prospective) agents, and therefore they will be able to reduce agency loss. A clear career structure within a party means that any member aiming to climb the party ladder will be subject to routine screening and selection processes throughout their career. In addition, this implies that screening capacity is independent of the internal and external factors that may also shape a party’s decision-making. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this study is:

- Hypothesis 1: Parties with higher screening and recruitment capacities should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyiness

This raises the question of how to empirically conceptualize the internal opportunity structure of a political party. A selective incentive structure should entail the creation of a career-path structure (or a party ladder as it is sometimes described in the literature on political careers) that remains relatively stable over time. In addition, parties should have access to (stable) financial resources, which should be independent of other organizations not controlled by the party (i.e. trade unions, churches, business groups etc.). This financial inflow will allow the party to build an effective bureaucracy around its central office able to enforce discipline and prevent free-riding. From a delegation

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<sup>14</sup> This may resemble two different concepts also present in the literature: party institutionalization (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, p.206; Randall and Svåsand 2002) and party capacity (Samuels and Shugart 2014). The former refers to how “rooted” political parties are within a society, and how that affects their behaviour both internally and externally. For a discussion about the different dimensions of party institutionalization see Casal Bértoa (2011). The latter refers to how well a party keeps its consistency as collective actors of representation in democratic political systems, regarding not just the selection of candidates but also other aspects such as proposing policy proposals and governing.

point of view, we can assume that big and effective bureaucracies will be more likely to reduce the informational asymmetry gap between the principal and the prospective agents.

Some studies investigate the number of employees or financial revenues as a direct indicator for measuring the strength of a central party organization (Bolleyer, van Spanje and Wilson 2012). However, this information is hard to obtain systematically and longitudinally as parties are not willing to disclose their internal practices, and very often we need to rely on approximate estimates. I adopt an alternative way of measuring parties' organizational capacities. Considering that current party systems are characterized by an increasing imbrication between political parties and the state (Katz and Mair 1995), favoured through the generalized public funding of political parties (van Biezen 2004; Van Biezen 2008), we can consider that access to state institutions ensures organizational viability. We can then expect parties' structures of selective incentives – as Panebianco (1988) would call it—to be a function of parties' access to public institutions and the financial resources these provide to parties. This idea is also discussed by Strøm (1990, pp. 576–77) when he argues that parties that are not frequently in public office face more difficulty mobilizing their grassroots for campaigning, due to the lack of a credible promise of compensation after the election.

However, parties differ in the way they use their resources and in the type of organization they build. All parties pursue strategies that tend to be more labour or capital intensive. Some parties invest their resources in attracting new members, offering them training and establishing links with peripheral organizations, such as trade unions, that will provide more career opportunities for party members and supporters. Other parties will prefer to invest their resources in marketing agencies and media advertisement, which will result in a more flexible party organization. As Duverger (1964, pp.120–121) puts it:

the members [of mass parties] are the very matter of the party, the substance of its action. Without adherents, the party will look like a teacher without students. [...] Cadre parties responds to a different notion. It involves bringing together notables to prepare elections, conduct them and keep in touch with the candidates. [...] Here quality matters above all: the magnitude of prestige, the skill of technology, the importance of wealth.

Despite parties' overall move towards more capital-intensive strategies over the last few decades (Krouwel 2012), and regardless of contagions from the left or from the right (Duverger 1964; Epstein 1967), parties still differ in the size and shape of their internal organization. We should expect this to have an impact on their capacity to *sort out* candidates. I will focus on two differences. First, how dense is the peripheral organizational structure built around a party? Second, what is the impact of size difference when it comes to party membership? These lead to the following set of hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 2: Parties with higher organizational complexity should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyiness.
- Hypothesis 3: Parties with more members should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyiness.

From a delegation point of view, we can consider that ancillary organizations reduce the informational asymmetry gap. More labour-intensive party organizations reduce the capacity of prospective agents to hide information from their principal. As Samuels and Shugart (2010, p.47) point out: “In any institutional context, individuals who seek leadership positions have incentives to overstate their experience and qualifications or misrepresent their true preferences, particularly if their true preferences clash with those of the organization”. On the one hand, parties with predictable career paths scrutinize their members more regularly and thoughtfully than parties without clear career paths. On the other hand, when party life includes experiences like youth organizations or trade unions, individuals are still more likely to reveal more about themselves than in the absence of these associations. In addition, these organizations would likely shape the preferences of those aspirants participating in them

### ***2.3.2 The external demand***

In this section, I discuss parties’ differences in preferences, and which conditions may push parties to nominate more or less party-entrenched candidates. More specifically, I discuss the formation of preferences as a reaction to a change in parties’ electoral environments. Mair, Müller and Plasser (2004) as well as Harmel and Janda (1994), have conceptualized how parties adapt to their environments. Among other means, parties can respond to a new challenge in their electoral market by changing one of the former dimensions, or even by not responding at all. Here I focus on how a change in the electoral market can shape party selectors’ criteria. This change should push parties to reconsider their selection criteria, as when parties face increasing competition, they may prioritize short-term vote seeking behaviour instead of long-term policy pursuits. Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that the separation of powers, which pushes parties towards more electable candidates, is intrinsically linked with the degree of electoral competition. Due to the different electoral rules associated with each political system, competition tends to be higher in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones. Thus, the causal mechanism may not only be the separation of power, but also the electoral rules associated with each political system, as presidential races need be conducted in a more majoritarian way than legislative elections.

As Harmel and Janda (1994) argue, the effect of external stimuli will be conditional on a party’s primary goal. In the context of top candidate nomination, the short-term goal of the party will be votes, even if a party may hold a different long-term goal such as office or policy. I consider that parties need to maximize votes in the short term to achieve their long-term goals, whatever these may be. Thus, when nominating top candidates, parties will be especially sensitive to changes in the electoral market. Several studies have pointed out how an electoral defeat can be one of the most successful catalyst events for party change. Bad electoral results can push parties to change their policy positions (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski 2016), party leaders (Andrews and Jackman 2008; Enns-Jedenastik and Schumacher 2015) or even undertake further organizational reforms like introducing party primaries (Cross and Blais 2012; Barnea and Rahat 2007) or changing the party communication and campaigning strategy (Müller 1997) in order to regain electoral competitiveness.

In post-industrial democracies, elections are becoming more and more unpredictable (Franklin, Mackie and Valen 2009; Kriesi 1998). Several countries have recently experienced significant realignments of their party systems (Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2012) with the emergence of new parties on both the left and the right. In addition, decreasing levels of party identification have pushed parties to compete over new issues in the political agenda, and overall, parties are finding it more and more challenging to maintain the levels of electoral support they enjoyed in previous decades, and to resist the emergence of new parties. Parties in parliamentary systems are increasingly experiencing an electoral environment resembling that which parties in presidential systems face, where their voters tend to be more promiscuous and electoral realignments are more common. Studies like Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2017) or Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Najera (2017) show how electoral volatility has increased over recent decades, as voters are increasingly detached from their traditional loyalties. Overall, we should find that in parliamentary systems when nominating a top candidate, parties who face a higher level of electoral competition should have more incentives to trade electability against reliability.

- Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of electoral competition should result in a party nominating less partisan candidates.

This provides the basis of the main hypotheses of this dissertation: trading one criterion against the other is not exclusively a function of the political regime, but of the overall competition that a party expects to face in the following election. However, this hypothesis should be understood as an average effect over all parties. However, there are three factors that will help us to understand how parties react to a change in the electoral environment when selecting a top candidate. First, parties' incentives to react to a change on the electoral market will be partly conditional on the electoral system. The incentives for becoming more vote-seeking in the short term, even if this can harm the party's reputation in the long-term, will be higher in more disproportional electoral systems. In highly disproportional electoral systems, the marginal value in terms of seats of one additional vote is higher. Thus, the relatively small number of votes that a popular candidate could bring will be more critical in majoritarian electoral systems than in proportional ones. Second, as previously mentioned, parties differ greatly in their objectives and organizational structures. For instance, some political parties are empty vessels able to quickly change their trajectory and adapt to new circumstances. Other parties are ocean liners. These move slower, carry with them a long history of previous decisions, and have previously set trajectories that are more difficult to alter. In this regard, bigger parties will have stronger incentives to seek "popular" candidates in reaction to an electoral setback. Bigger parties are those that normally obtain the prime ministership, and it is more likely that their primary goals will be obtaining votes. Third, the campaigning environment has changed over the decades. Over time, parties have embraced new technological advancements (radio, television, social media, etc.) to improve their campaigns, make them more efficient, and reach broader segments of the population, to the extent of sometimes even neglecting traditional methods like door-to-door canvassing (Farrell and Webb 2002; Bolin and Falasca 2019). These new media have increased the salience of individual candidates by prompting, for instance, direct live confrontations between opposing candidates, and allowing candidates to directly appeal to voters (Rahat and Kenig 2018). We can expect that parties will face further pressures to personalize their campaign – and thus nominate a more electable rather than reliable top candidate – when the importance of personalized media is higher. Unfortunately, the only

indicator I possess to measure the importance of new media is the time when the nomination took place. Therefore, these three factors lead to the following hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 5: The effect of electoral competition should be higher in less proportional electoral systems.
- Hypothesis 6: The effect of electoral competition should be higher in political parties with higher electoral support.
- Hypothesis 7: The effect of electoral competition should be higher in political parties running in recent decades.

### ***2.3.3 The internal demand***

The study of political parties consists of both investigating the dynamics that drive the interaction between parties, as well as within parties. As Sartori (1976, p.67) considers that “most parties are - at the subunit level - amalgams, combinations of differing proportions of factions, tendencies, independents, and/or atomised groupings”, each subunit will compete with each other for power and influence within the organization, and the leading, or dominant, group will be composed of a coalition between different subunits. Harmel and Janda (1994) consider that changes in the party’s dominant coalition<sup>15</sup> constitute one of the most significant triggers of party change.

A change in top level personnel can affect the nomination process in several ways. First, a change in the dominant coalition can open an internal opportunity window. If previous demand for change already existed, this can find its way through when there is a change in the party elite, and the new group can channel these demands. Second, a new dominant coalition will aim to benefit their supporters through intra-party patronage. A new dominant coalition will try to occupy the main positions in the party’s electoral list, including the top candidacy. Occupying the electoral candidacies will help the new dominant coalition to consolidate their power within the party. Third, despite being part of the main political organization, different factions may hold very different ideological and political positions. Consider for example the ideological divides within the German Greens between pragmatist and fundamentalists (Poguntke 1987), or the atomization of factions within the Italian Christian Democracy (Ceron 2019), based on personal rather than programmatic links. When a new faction comes to power, they will seek to translate their ideological standing to the other spheres of party activity, such as the manifesto and the selection of candidates. Fifth, as Sandri, Seddone and Venturino (2015) argue, a change in the leadership represents party renewal. A change of leader involves the formulation of a new public image for the party, regardless of the leader’s ideological position and that of their predecessor. New party leaders will seek to position themselves as a “fresh start” for the party, and presumably that will also affect the nomination criteria for candidates. Therefore, we can hypothesise that:

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<sup>15</sup> Harmel and Janda distinguish between “leadership change” and “change in the dominant faction(s)”, despite considering both non-exclusive and cumulative. Here I use the general term “change in the dominant coalition” (Panebianco, 1988) to denote both.

- Hypothesis 8: A change in the party's dominant coalition should result in a party nominating less partisan candidates.

However, operationalizing a change in the dominant coalition is a difficult task. This is especially so if we lack information about the factional composition of the party, which is extremely difficult to obtain, and can only be inferred through deep qualitative work, and in those parties who allow researchers to access such information. For that reason, I will assume that certain events will lead to a change in the party's dominant coalition. More specifically, I consider that a change in the dominant coalition happens when there is a change in the party leadership (contested or not) or when a party experiences an event like a split, a merge or a name change.

### 2.3.4 *The type of selector*

Until now I have assumed that all selectors behave in the same way under similar circumstances. However, we need to acknowledge how diverse the types of selectors present in a political party may be. Hazan and Rahat's (2010) leading work established a classification of the different candidate selection methods: *candidacy* (passive suffrage), *selectorate* (active suffrage), *decentralization* (at which territorial level the selection takes place) and *appointment vs. voting* (which refers to the voting rules deciding the process). Of these, the selectorate is that which has received the most scholarly attention (Hazan and Rahat 2010) with several studies having theorized how the size and composition of the selectorate can shape their decision criteria (May 1973; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The enlargement of the selectorate from a small party elite, or a party conference to the whole party membership is one of the most profound changes that political parties are experiencing all around the world (Cross and Blais 2012c; Chiru et al. 2015). Parties may engage in this practise for promoting participation, intra-party democracy or avoiding intra-party conflict. However, their consequences are still unclear, and several studies have claimed that party primaries reinforce the standing party elite (Shomer 2012) and damage the selection chances of socio-demographic minorities (Sobolewska 2013; Indridason and Kristinsson 2015).

Unlike positions for the legislature, selecting a party leader or a top candidate involves selecting a single person, which entails two main changes with respect to the traditional framework for analysing candidates for the legislature. First, the party needs to develop its selection process at its highest level of territorial aggregation. Second, the party needs to use more majoritarian rules, as there is just one post to be decided (Kenig, Rahat and Hazan 2015)<sup>16</sup>. However, although some of the rules will be different when nominating a top candidate, different selectorates can also interpret changes in the political circumstances differently. How selectors interpret changes in the party's environment will be independent of their party screening capacity, the former being associated with preference differences, and the latter being linked to differences in opportunities. There are two different reasons

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<sup>16</sup> Regarding the candidacy, there is not much empirical information. Regarding the leadership, it seems that the formal requirements tend to be higher than for a legislative candidate, such as for instance, being MP in some parties (Kenig, Rahat and Hazan 2015). However, it is not clear that this would apply to the position of top candidate given their different roles. Also, sometimes parties do not need to formally increase their candidacy requirements given the existence of informal veto-players (Aylott and Bolin 2017).

why we may expect that selectorates of different sizes may behave differently than others. First, different selectors may inherently hold different preferences and thus systematically prioritize one criterion against the other. Second, changes in the selectorate can involve changes in the informational transaction cost and produce coordination problems within the selectorate.

The first approach to how different selectors may present different behaviours is based in John May's "law of curvilinear disparity" (1973), which states that an actor's position within a political party's hierarchy will shape their preferences when facing contradictory party goals (office, votes, and policy). In particular, elements situated either at the bottom or the top of the party's hierarchy should be more pragmatic, while the middle-elements should be the most ideologically minded<sup>17</sup>. Thus, we can speculate that middle level elites such as those present in a party conference, in opposition to members participating in a primary or the small party elite that composes the party executive committee, will value higher reliability than electability when analysing the pool of available candidates. For instance, Sánchez-Cuenca (2004) shows that once we include some ideological rigidity into the party's utility function, it is a rational outcome for a party to not converge towards the median voter, as would be predicted by a Downsian argument. Thus, if we assume that middle-level elites that compose a party conference are more ideologically-minded than the other elements of the party, we can propose a curvilinear, or quadratic, relationship between the selectorate size and the electability-reliability ratios candidates show through their personal features. Very inclusive or exclusive selectorates<sup>18</sup> tend to be the most pragmatic, and thus they are more likely to trade electability against reliability, especially when parties face high levels of electoral competition. Additionally, this also implies that when parties face an incentive towards electability against reliability, the effect will be stronger in party elites or primary voters than in middle-range selectorates. This argument leads us to the first of two competing hypotheses.

- Hypothesis 9A: Party conferences should nominate top candidates with higher reliability than party elites and primaries (U-shaped relationship).

The second set of arguments refers to the size of the selectorate, regardless of the preferences that we may assume on each party strata. In particular, it refers to the size of the winning coalition that a candidate needs to assemble in order to succeed. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 2002) proposes that the selectorate is made up of a small group of people, such as a party executive committee, aspirants could use specific incentives to gain the support of the selectors. Such incentives can include patronage, "pork-barrelling" or the distribution of private goods to candidates' supporters. However, this strategy becomes increasingly unfeasible as the selectorate grows. When aspirants need to gain the support of a considerable number of selectors, they need to campaign on public goods

<sup>17</sup> Several empirical studies argue both in favor (Baras et al. 2015; Kitschelt 1989; Belchior and Freire 2011) and against (Norris 1995; Van Holsteyn, Ridder and Koole 2015) this interpretation. Unfortunately, most studies are single country-based and a cross-country and over time study is still needed.

<sup>18</sup> Hazan and Rahat (2010) classify the different types of selectorate according to their size. These include, party primaries, where all party members can vote, a very inclusive form of selectorate, while those composed of a small number of people, such as a party's executive committee, are considered very exclusive.

such as policy proposals. Aspirants will need to rely on collective incentives and policy platforms that appeal to as many selectors as possible. In addition, the cost of (strategic) coordination between selectors needed to support an aspirant becomes higher when the selectorate grows. A small selectorate made up of professional politicians, such as a party's executive committee, can obtain information about all aspirants at a lower cost, and coordinate its efforts around a certain candidate. In a highly inclusive selectorate, such as a party primary, party members need to inform themselves of the aspirants' degree of reliability and electability, and strategic coordination around a given candidate is much costlier<sup>19</sup>. This approach points to a linear relationship between the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate and a candidate's position within the electability-reliability axis. Additionally, following the same logic, when a party experiences an internal or external stimuli pushing it to one end or the other of the electability-reliability continuum, it will be more likely that smaller the selectorate is able to react to this stimuli in comparison to bigger selectorates. Smaller selectorates enjoy lower transaction costs, which will make them more likely to coordinate a party response in reaction to a given internal or external stimuli.

- Hypothesis 9B: Smaller selectorates, such as those made up of party elites, should nominate top candidates with higher reliability than top candidates elected by bigger selectorates such as primary elections (linear relationship).

## 2.4 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter is to advance the understanding of how political parties nominate their electoral candidates, specifically those who are to enter executive office. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into three parts. First, I started by considering the nomination process as a delegation act between a party-principal and a candidate-agent. Second, I discussed electability and reliability as the two criteria that political parties use when nominating a top candidate. And third, I discuss which internal and external factors can change party selectors' preferences when nominating a top candidate.

Overall, there are some forces pushing parties to nominate more and more party-entrenched candidates over time. One is the institutional setting of parliamentary democracies, where parties primarily need to build cohesive parliamentary groups. In addition, provided parties possess organizational capacity, they will be able to better scrutinize all aspirants and nominate more candidates that are reliable. Over time, parties will tend to nominate more and more party-entrenched candidates, i.e. those with a higher level of partyiness. This trend can be altered by a change in the internal or the external demand, as well as by a change in the selector type. I consider that internal demand is dependent on the composition of a party's dominant coalition, and a change in that coalition should be reflected in whom the party nominates. External demand is associated with changes in the electoral market, and parties should accommodate market changes in their candidate selection decisions. Additionally, who selects plays a crucial role

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<sup>19</sup> Studies of the US case show that in early stages of primary elections, name recognition is one of the best predictors of a candidate's level of support (Kam and Zechmeister 2013). In addition, formal models have shown how the higher levels of uncertainty that primaries produce can induce voters to coordinate around their sub-optimal preferences (Deltas, Herrera and Polborn 2016).

in candidate nominations, even though that role can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, provided that each type of selectorate is mostly composed of a party strata, different selectorate types should show different preferences. Party activists that form party conferences are expected to be more radical and nominate more party-entrenched candidates than party elites or rank-and-file members – the other two types of selectorate. These differences would constitute a U-shape relationship between the selectorate size and the degree of partyyness in the candidates they nominate. On the other hand, the size of the selectorate may hinder coordination and increase both transaction and scrutiny costs, which would linearly benefit less partisan candidates when selectorates are bigger.

To summarize, this chapter has discussed how parties establish a delegation relationship with top candidates. How well parties are able to predict the behaviour of agents in order to prevent adverse selection, as well as how well can they monitor the behaviour of the agent afterwards to prevent moral hazard constitutes the differences in opportunities – one of the factors shaping parties' decisions. In addition, parties will differ in their preferences at each election, pushing them to nominate one or the other type of candidate. However, this also comes with some limitations, like the assumptions that help to build this theoretical framework. Most notably, it is assumed that party selectors are rational actors seeking to maximize the number of votes their party will receive in an election, that they are the main decision makers in the party organization, and that electability and reliability form a one-dimensional continuum where higher electability implies lower reliability, and vice versa.

## Chapter 3

### Research design

In their seminal work, Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (1988) describe the process of candidate selection as the “secret garden of politics” as it commonly takes place behind closed doors, hidden from public scrutiny. Voters and party members, but also researchers, are presented only with the outcome of the process, which hinders the capacity to understand the different mechanisms and dynamics behind it. This clear methodological challenge is discussed in this chapter in the context of this project’s research design. The chapter is comprised of three sections. First, I discuss the methodological challenges of studying candidate selection from a comparative perspective. Second, I explain my case selection. Specifically, I propose a study Canada, Germany and Spain at the regional level, and I justify the choice of parties studied within each country. Third, I explain the structure and the construction process of the dataset that is used in the empirical chapters.

#### **3.1 Looking inside parties’ black box: methodological challenges to the study of candidate selection**

The main aim of this dissertation is to disentangle which selection criteria political parties apply, through their selectorates when nominating a top candidate. However, I will not study each of the selection processes individually, in a qualitative fashion. Instead, I will draw inferences about the selectors’ preferences from the differences in each process outcome. In particular, I will use the variation generated by the re-nomination of top candidates as well as their personal characteristics. The first studies that addressed how political parties nominate their candidates to any political office focussed on the rules and institutions guiding the process (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Norris and Lovenduski (1994) developed a supply and demand model of candidate selection, which conceptualized the selection of candidates as an interactive process carried out between the state regulation, the party rules, the availability of aspirants and the demands of gatekeepers. Since then, the most influential studies have revolved around the different institutional setting that parties can use (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), and how these affect other dimensions such as intra- and inter-party competition, participation, responsiveness and representation. However, most studies have focused on a single aspect when assessing the impact of different rules – factors such as gender (Caul, 1999; Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016; Kerevel, 2019), race or migrant origin (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst, 2011). Fewer studies have directly investigated the specific criteria that drive party selectors towards one direction, de-

spite some having tried to survey them directly (Martocchia Diodati and Marino, 2016). Regarding candidates to the executive, published research is even scarcer (Peter M Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Astudillo, 2015; Verge and Astudillo, 2018).


The primary problem researchers confront when studying candidate selection processes is the lack of counterfactuals. In most cases, candidates who were not selected remain unknown. Only on particular occasions can researchers know who the other aspirants were, such is the case with party primaries or contested party conferences. However, even on these occasions, the “official” aspirants may only represent a subset of the whole party pool, with many others not making it into the public eye (Aylott and Bolin, 2017). In addition, the traditional pools of recruitment are increasingly blurred. Traditionally, party recruitment followed a pyramidal, ladder (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994), or bulls-eye (Duverger, 1964, pp. 90–1) structure, which any aspirant to higher political office had to work through before through the party peripheral positions in order to be *internally* eligible to the most important positions (see figure 3.1). More recently, authors like Scarrow (2014) have suggested that members’ involvement in party organizations has been transformed. Nowadays, party affiliation is more fluid and diverse than in the past: individuals may decide to only support a party in certain spheres (i.e. online), but not others, or to provide their support without formally being a party member. A similar argument can be applied to the selection of candidates. While in the past, short-cuts to the party’s highest positions, such as that of top candidate, were scarce and mostly resulted from extraordinary circumstances, there is reason to believe that these are becoming more common. For example, Pierre Karl Péladeau in the Parti Québécois, or Christian Kern and Pamela Rendi-Wagner in the Austrian SPÖ achieved party leadership after short and peripheral careers within their organizations. Figure 1.b represents how the top candidate position may no longer be the preserve of the top echelons of the political party. Nowadays, the position may be filled by peripheral members of the organization, and even by people who do not formally belong to the party.

The high level of informality of the process implies that researchers can only study the variance, in terms of data generated by those candidates that have been nominated. Except in rare cases, researchers have no means to systematically obtain data on the aspirants that were not selected. Gallagher (1988, pp.7–8) discusses how empirical strategies tend to fall into two categories. First, some studies compare the “backgrounds of selected candidates, or even deputies, with those of party voters, and [...] assume that differences between the two reveal what the selectors were looking for.” Other studies compare the selected candidates with the rest of the aspirants to infer the criteria party selectors used, despite rarely having information regarding the complete pool of available candidates. Thereby, many studies have focused on the personal features of candidates in terms of age, gender, occupational and class background, or political seniority (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994). However, translating these characteristics into testable selector criteria is not straightforward. Concerning top candidates, Samuels and Shugart’s (2010) concepts of electability and reliability emerge as the most significant contribution in the current literature<sup>1</sup> More recently, some studies have considered candidates’ features in relation to different outcomes, like


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<sup>1</sup> The high level of informality of the process implies that researchers can only study the variance, in terms of data generated by those candidates that have been nominated. Except in rare cases, researchers have no means to systematically obtain data on the aspirants that were not selected. Gallagher (1988, pp.7–8) discusses how empirical strategies tend to fall into two categories. First,

Fig. 3.1: Recruitment and selection pools of top candidates



(a) Traditional conceptualization



(b) Alternative conceptualization

re-selection, and others have taken advantage of the exogenous variance created by external circumstances, like some studies compare the “backgrounds of selected candidates, or even deputies, with those of party voters, and [...] assume that differences between the two reveal what the selectors were looking for.” Other studies compare the selected candidates with the rest of the aspirants to infer the criteria party selectors used, despite rarely having information regarding the complete pool of available candidates. Thereby, many studies have focused on the personal features of candidates in terms of age, gender, occupational and class background, or political seniority (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994). However, translating these characteristics into testable selector criteria is not straightforward. Concerning top candidates, Samuels and Shugart’s (2010) concepts of electability and reliability emerge as the most significant contribution in the current literature

changes in the electoral system or media coverage (Arceneaux et al., 2019) to determine if these background differences matter. Unfortunately, it is impossible for researcher to create “treated” and “control” aspirants for any of the features mentioned to study the behaviour of party selectors under different circumstances, and determine which type has more chances of being nominated.

Given these constraints, I will use two types of variance to tackle the problem of only being able to observe the outcome of the selection process. First, I will exploit the variation created by the different backgrounds of selected candidates. Each candidate has a different career track in terms of partisan and political experience. Some candidates will be political neophytes, while others will run after long and well-established political careers, having held multiple political offices. However, most of the candidates will be situated somewhere in between both ends of the scale. This variance appears for factors such as the length of time a candidate has belonged to their party, which previous experience in the legislature and the executive a person has held in the past, and for how long. Assuming that the electability and reliability criteria form a single continuum, where being situated higher on one implies a lower position on the other, we can use the variance created by the candidates’ personal features to infer which criteria party selectors may have prioritized at a given time.

The reason for using all of the candidates previous activities to infer the selection criteria used by parties, relies on the fact that the principal, the party’s selectorate, will use them to assess the reliability of an aspirant (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). Candidates with longer careers and experienced have already passed through more screening and selection processes, and thus have shown their organizational loyalty in the past. Candidates with shorter political careers remain an enigma, and parties sometimes will have to gamble on a candidate’s future behaviour. However, using each of the possible signals a prospective agent can send to its principal as dependent variables would be highly inefficient. In addition, different sub-sets of aspirants’ previous activities will have different weights for different types of selectors, and for selectors belonging to different political parties. For this reason, I created a composite variable of all signals using Principal Component Analysis, which is a statistical technique for data reduction (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). This new variable aims to capture all factors signalling an agent’s reliability or partyness. Chapter 4 explains in detail the construction of this dependent variable, listing all of the possible signals and explaining the process of calculating the principal components.

The second source of variation is the re-selection of a candidate at the next election. Once a candidate has competed, party selectors have more information about the actual degree of electability and reliability a candidate has, which they will use to decide on the candidates’ re-nomination. If the party decides not to renew a candidate, then it will seek a different person, thus pointing to a two-step process. If a party is on an ascendant trajectory, we may expect that it keeps nominating the same person. When a party decides to nominate a new candidate, this is decided following certain criterion – factors which should be included in the rationale of party selectors.

At this point, it is necessary to say some words about the problem of causal identification when it comes to studying candidate selection. Empirically, each sub-discipline gradually evolves from case studies covering single countries or parties at a given point in time to comparative cohort studies, and then to longitudinal ones. From that point,

randomised trials and experiments gradually replace previous studies based on observational data. In this way, researchers can make stronger causal claims about the phenomena they observe. However, some disciplines change faster than others, and each scientific contribution should be judged regarding the existing state of the art (Clarke et al., 2014). The study of political parties, and in particular of party organisation and candidate selection, is evolving much more slowly than neighbouring fields within political science, such as legislative studies (Druckman, Leeper and Mullinix, 2014). From an empirical point of view, research on candidate selection and internal party organisation has been switching from case studies to extensive cohort studies (Peter M Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017; Collier, Cordero and Jaime-Castillo, 2018). Besides this, the study of leadership selection is empirically changing, while previous works tend to be single-case studies or limited cross-country comparisons, newer publications have begun to venture into comparative longitudinal studies (Cross and Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Pilet, 2015) and experimental approaches remain absent. With each sub-discipline following its own path, generally, the causal claims researchers can make within the field of candidate selection will be weaker than in neighbouring fields – partly due to the lack of appropriate data. This study should be interpreted within the field of candidate selection, as part of the shift from cross-sectional towards longitudinal studies comprising several countries. This study also advances the knowledge on candidate selection by providing a new empirical dataset. However, future research will be able to tackle the problem of causality within party research more thoroughly.

### **3.2 Case selection: Countries, parties and time period**

One of the main aims of Samuels and Shugart's (2010) work was to demonstrate that "intraparty politics differs substantially under separation of powers". In my case, I want to show how environmental and intra-party variables also play an essential role in the candidate selection process. Moreover, one of my aims is to test how parties react to increasing levels of electoral competition. Therefore, while Samuels and Shugart aimed at maximising the variance regarding the separation or fusion of powers, I aim to maximise the party and party system differences while keeping the institutional settings as similar as possible. Therefore, I only study parliamentary democracies, as it is their institutional systems that incentivizes parties to prioritize reliability over electability (Samuels and Shugart, 2010).

One of the main arguments in chapter 2 refers to how electorates have become more volatile in recent decades, and a growing number of studies point towards the personalization of political battles (Bittner, 2010). Some elections are more competitive than others, but the overall partisan de-alignment of European electorates is rooted in historical processes dating back more than 70 years in western Europe (Inglehart, 1971; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1998; Mair, 1998). Therefore, studying how the increasing electoral uncertainty shapes candidate selection processes requires a longitudinal approach as the benchmark for comparison should be a historical time when parties did not face an electoral incentive for nominating vote-seeking or popular top candidates. The extraordinary economic growth after WWII contributed to a change in citizens' values, and a consequent restructuring of the lines of political conflict in advanced post-industrial societies. Citizens gradually have started to pay more attention to non-economic issues

such civil rights, immigration or environmentalism as well as to valence issues like candidates' personality. We should therefore expect the candidate electability to be more decisive nowadays than in the past, but we should compare parties' current criteria with those used when political cleavages started to unfreeze.

To summarize, here I have presented two conflicting forces that shape the selection criteria parties use. On the one hand, the parliamentary setting of a country – as an institutional variable that hardly changes over time – provides parties the incentive to nominate reliable candidates. On the other hand, changes in the electorate over the past decades may encourage parties to nominate more electable candidates. While Samuels and Shugart studied all countries with a minimum degree of democratic consolidation, I will only focus on a small set of parliamentary democracies. Because I wish to take a cross-time approach that looks as far back in time as data accessibility allows, this prevents me from including a large sample of political parties. Longitudinal research in party candidate selection is extremely demanding, more so when there is also the need to collect other contextual variables linked to the party organization. Collecting all different variables requires extensive analysis and coding of primary and secondary sources, retrieved online or through archival work. Thus, my limited resources force me to focus on a small set of selected countries. In addition, in contrast to Samuels and Shugart, who only studied the elected chief executive of a country, I will study the top candidates of all relevant political parties, which implies that instead of one data point at each election, I will use more than 3 data points on average. Studying only the elected chief executives introduces several biases. At the party level, I expect that chief executive officers will be more likely to belong to moderate political parties, which are closer to the median voter and have efficient party organizations. Nevertheless, at the individual candidate level, we can expect them to be more personally popular than the rest of the candidates.

Therefore, it is necessary to expand the set of observations from those elected to all relevant political party aspirants in a given election. Below, I elaborate on the criteria for determining which parties are "relevant". Using the same 40 post-WWII parliamentary democracies sample as Samuels and Shugart is unfeasible due to time restrictions and data availability. This would require a massive data collection effort in very different countries like Japan, Jamaica, Sri Lanka or the French Fourth Republic. Studying these 40 countries over 70 years, and with an average of five political parties per country would provide around 3500 observations. Furthermore, to test my hypotheses, I not only need to collect data about the candidates' features, but also about their parties' internal dynamics. I would need information about the size of the party membership, the existence of affiliated organisations, their electoral results government status or the dynamics of leadership selection. It becomes evident that undertaking such a project would be unfeasible in terms of time and resources, despite some recent efforts to provide comprehensive information comparing different aspects of political parties (Cross and Pilet, 2015; Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017).

A similar number of observations can be achieved by studying a smaller sample during the same period, which enhances the comparability of the cases as they share a set of more similar institutional and economic developments.

Following King, Keohane and Verba's (1994) advice<sup>2</sup>, I propose to study the sub-national level<sup>3</sup>. This is a suboptimal but viable research strategy. At the sub-national level, especially the state level within a federation, political parties also need to appoint regularly top candidates. There, parties should be subject to the same institutional and electoral constraints as their national level equivalents. Thus following King, Keohane and Verba's (1994, p.219) concept of using the same measures in new geographical units, "the nation-state might be tested in geographical subunits of that nation: states, counties, cities, regions etc. This, of course, extends the range of variation of the explanatory variables as well as the dependent variables". This strategy allows the same phenomenon to be tested under relatively similar conditions, obtaining a similar number of observations and keeping many other institutional and contextual variables stable. Besides this, from a data collection point of view, there are two advantages. First, the principal sources for obtaining the data are concentrated. Political parties tend to have archives where they store all the information belonging to their territorial branches. In addition, national and parliamentary libraries provide similar services. Therefore, data access will be more efficient when studying the sub-national level than other levels. Second, comparing how the same political organisation behaves in several regions will allow me to detect contextual factors more efficiently.

However, there are three main disadvantages of focusing on the sub-national arena. First, from a theoretical point of view, regional elections are second-order elections in most cases (Reif and Schmitt, 1997), which implies that voters, but also parties, behave differently to how they would in a national election. Voters are more likely to punish the incumbent or to cast a protest vote (Heath et al., 1999; Schakel, 2013). Parties can also be less risk-avoiding in the regional than at the national arena. In this context, parties can use the regional arena to test "new types" of candidates – a factor that has to be taken into account when discussing the generalization of the results. Second, national dynamics can affect the regional-level processes as regional party structures cluster within the overarching party organisation. I will discuss this point further below. Third, using evidence obtained at the regional level implies adding a new layer of aggregation, which on the same level as the party organization, above that of the individual candidate, and below the country level. This requires the use of more advanced statistical techniques.

The next step is to select a small set of parliamentary countries with meaningful sub-national arenas, either federations or regionalised countries<sup>4</sup>, that have the most similar institutional settings but which differ in their party and party-system attributes. I have chosen Canada, Germany and Spain<sup>5</sup>. In addition, these three complement each other on several variables that allow me to maximise the party level variance while keeping the institutional variables as similar as possible. The first set of differences concerns the institutional setting of each country. All three

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<sup>2</sup> For a critique see Beach and Pedersen (2019).

<sup>3</sup> From here on, I will use the terms regional, state, non-state-wide, and provincial as synonyms of sub-national, while federal, statewide and national will be used interchangeably.

<sup>4</sup> Drawing on Samuels and Shugart's (2010) original set of parliamentary democracies, the available countries with a meaningful sub-national arena are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the UK, India, Malaysia and South Africa.

<sup>5</sup> I do not include the Canadian territories of Northwest Territories and Nunavut as these have a non-partisan form of government (Smith, 2010). Also, I do not include the Spanish autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, whose very small size means that the nature of political competition differs there, probably reassembling more the local rather than the regional level.

countries feature parliamentary systems at the federal and regional levels and have not experienced a system change during their current democratic period. There is a clear fusion of powers, and the executive needs the support of the legislature to survive. The main difference in this regard resides in the fact that Canadian Provinces operate within a Westminster system and the others as consensual/continental models (Lijphart, 1999), implying that PMs possess slightly different powers in each system. However, all three countries score similarly on the sub-national authority index introduced by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010). The three countries also score similarly if we disaggregate the index according to their degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the central government (self-government) or the amount of influence they can exert on the latter<sup>6</sup> (shared-government).


Regarding the selection and replacement of the PM, all countries follow similar rules. In Canada, the principles of responsible government (Thomas, 2010) dictate that a Prime Minister needs to have the confidence of the house, which implies that PMs require at least a relative majority of votes for their appointment. In addition, an absolute majority would in general be required for their removal. In Spain and Germany, almost all regions require a relative majority for investiture, and removal from office is possible through a constructive vote-of-no-confidence that demands an absolute majority. In addition, all three are western societies and advanced post-industrial democracies for which we should expect similar patterns of interaction between parties and voters. They are all subject to cleavage re-alignment, an increase in electoral volatility over time, and similar patterns regarding how candidates' personalities may influence voters.

The main institutional difference between the three resides in their different electoral systems, and how this shape government formation. However, in terms of number of districts and average district magnitude all three complement each other as one country is majoritarian and the other two are proportional but with different district magnitudes. Canadian provinces run a first-past-the-post electoral system that produces single-party governments with a majority in the legislature, following the same principles as the Canadian federal elections. Parties are thus more likely to receive electoral shocks, as a small variation in electoral results can entail being ousted from government, or even parliament. These different electoral disproportionalities point towards the different values of vote marginality. In Canada, one additional vote has a higher impact than in a purely proportional system. On the other hand, the German *Länder* have highly proportional electoral systems where the value of an additional vote is highly elastic. This results in very stable coalition governments (Martínez-Cantó and Bergmann, 2019) whose alliances tend to last more than a single electoral period. Thus, parties can still access the benefit of political office even if they experience smaller changes in their electoral support. Finally, the Spanish situation sits mid-way on the spectrum, as some *Comunidades Autonomas* have much more proportional systems than others do. They differ in their number of districts and their average district magnitude. Some regions, like Castile-Leon and the Canary Islands, have many electoral districts with low seat magnitude, while others, like Madrid, have few districts with high seat magnitudes. Therefore, while still proportional, the Spanish system shows some majoritarian biases in some regions (Lago, 2004). Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of the Gallagher index of disproportionality in the re-

<sup>6</sup> In the last release of the data, in the aggregated RAI index German *Länder* scored 37, Canadian Provinces 26 and Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* 33.6. See Astudillo and Martínez-Cantó (2019) for a discussion on how different levels of power can affect party behavior when nominating top candidates.

gional elections of each country. Overall, the majoritarian electoral systems used in Canadian provinces are highly disproportional, while the German and Spanish much more proportional, despite some outliers<sup>7</sup>.

Fig. 3.2: Electoral systems' disproportion.



Note: The black thick line indicates the median and the grey thin line indicates the mean.

I now proceed to discuss the party and party system differences between the three countries. As already mentioned, the level of proportionality of an electoral system can partly explain why some regions tend to have single-party majority governments or coalitions comprising two or three different parties. At different historical times, regional party systems can vary from stable bipartisan systems to extremely fragmented ones. For instance, in New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, or in Castilla-La Mancha, third parties hardly ever win a seat in the house. In contrast, Navarre or the Canary Islands show high levels of political fractionalization. Most Canadian provinces have experienced at least three different party systems, alternating periods when the political system is composed by two-party system or periods in which there is a moderate multi-party system. However, there is no clear pattern of simultaneous change across provinces, with very few exceptions, like the formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation party in the 1930s. Nevertheless, in Quebec, like in the Spanish regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country, political fragmentation is higher due to the territorial cleavages experienced in these regions as a result of independence movements. The importance of the territorial cleavage also varies greatly. In some regions, there are no regionalist parties (also called non-state-wide parties), and in others, they are in the majority. However, when forming governments, the general pattern is to conform to the existing governing composition at the national level (Reniu, 2013; Simón, 2013a). In Germany, the regional party systems tend to mirror that of the federal level, with different levels of intensity, and parties tend to replicate the federal government alliances

<sup>7</sup> In the German case, the outliers correspond to the founding elections of some *Länder* after WWII.

in the states. In general terms, the initial moderate fragmentation following WWII reduced until a two-and-a-half party system emerged, which had remained stable until the recent birth of new parties. The first ones that emerged were the Greens in the 1980s, then PDS/Die Linke in the 1990s and 2000s, and finally AfD in 2013. Parties do not act within static party systems, but they evolve with their environments across time. This implies that most parties have experienced periods of higher and lower competition, which should be reflected in their decision-making.

Finally, the different parties within each country also show very interesting variance regarding their selection methods. Canadian parties have used party conference, primaries and the parliamentary group as selectors. In 1968, primaries were introduced and have since been gaining support. Nowadays they are the most common selection methods used. In Germany, primaries are still a relatively recent development and are restricted to specific occasions (Detterbeck, 2013; Astudillo and Detterbeck, 2018) so that the party conference remains the most common selection method. In contrast, in Spain parties could traditionally be divided into those using the party conference or a smaller intra-party body to select candidates, but since the mid-1990s primaries have been steadily gaining popularity with the traditional parties, and the newer parties use them by default (Astudillo and Detterbeck, 2018; Pruyssers and Stewart, 2019). Section 6.2 provides descriptive statistics about the selectorate parties used over time.

To summarize the case selection, all cases are parliamentary democracies, which should lead parties to prioritize reliability over electability when nominating their top candidates. However, the parties that operate within those systems work with different degrees of screening capacity, face distinct levels of competition across time, and employ several types of selectorate. Using this sample of countries at the sub-national level offers a remarkable degree of variance among the main independent variables of the study, as it will allow me to track changes in parties' dominant coalitions, their electoral markets, different degrees of access to public funding and variations in the composition of their selectorate.

In a second step, it is necessary to define which political parties to study within each country. For this selection, I have combined four different criteria. First, the sample of political parties needs to be representative of the country's current party system, and possibly of previous systems. To maintain the cross-time feature of the project, I aim to include political parties that no longer exist, but that were relevant in the past. In addition, when a party enters the sample, it enters for the studied period, or the entire party's life if this is shorter. The studied period corresponds to the current democratic period of each of country: Spain since 1980, Germany since 1945, and Canada since 1900<sup>8</sup>.

Second, the parties need to have a minimal degree of endurance over time. Some parties have an accelerated life, and may be born and achieve some success such as entering parliament or government soon afterwards, but later die as quickly as they rose (Bolleyer, Correa and Katz, 2019; Zur, 2019). Due to their short history, we can gain little analytical leverage from studying them, and their behaviour can be highly correlated with other contextual factors that enable their appearance and fast trajectory. On the other hand, looking into very established political parties can bias results towards the strategies of "successful" political parties, or at least to those with continuous

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<sup>8</sup> Despite the Canadian confederation dates back to 1867, the lack of reliable data and the fact that several provinces operated on a non-partisan form of governments settled 1900 as cutting point.

access to office, and therefore to state resources. A balance between both types is needed. It is necessary to understand not just how traditional and bureaucratic parties behave, but also how smaller and possibly more erratic organisations face environmental challenges. Thus, we should avoid survivorship bias as much as possible. Finally, data availability arises as a significant concern when developing historical research. It is hard to find primary sources about deceased political parties, and we must trust what newspapers reported about them. Even conducting historical research into active political parties can be problematic as some do not keep historical archives, and if they do so, these are not always accessible to researchers.

Table 3.1: Overview of the number of political parties, top candidates and candidacies

Country	Party	Territorial span	Regionalist	Party Family	Candidacies	Top candidates	Time period
Canada	Liberal	Canada	No	Liberals	308	172	1900 – 2019
	P. Conservative <sup>1</sup>	Canada	No	Conservatives	263	137	1900 – 2019
	CCF/NDP	Canada	No	Social Democrats	187	88	1933 – 2019
	Green	Canada	No	Green	53	38	1983 – 2019
	Social Credit	Alberta, B. Columbia	No	Radical Right	28	12	1935 – 1997
	Union Nationale	Québec	Yes	Conservatives	14	8	1936 – 1985
	Parti Québécois	Québec	Yes	Social Democrats	14	8	1970 – 2019
	ADQ/CAQ	Québec	Yes	Conservatives	8	2	1994 – 2019
	Québec Solidaire	Québec	Yes	Left Socialist	7	4	2008 – 2019
	Saskatchewan Party	Saskatchewan	Yes	Conservatives	5	2	1997 – 2019
					<b>887</b>	<b>471</b>	
Germany	FDP	Germany	No	Liberals	227	144	1946 – 2019
	SPD	Germany	No	Social Democrats	221	112	1946 – 2019
	CDU	Germany (but Bavaria)	No	Conservatives	211	113	1946 – 2019
	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Germany	No	Green	134	78	1993 – 2019 <sup>2</sup>
	PDS/Die Linke	Germany <sup>3</sup>	No	Left Socialist	74	50	1990 – 2019
	CSU	Bavaria	Yes	Conservatives	18	9	1946 – 2019
	AfD	Germany	No	Radical Right	17	16	2013 – 2019
					<b>902</b>	<b>522</b>	
Spain	PCE/IU	Spain	No	Left Socialist	208	128	1980 – 2019
	PSOE	Spain	No	Social Democrats	175	95	1980 – 2019
	AP/PP	Spain <sup>4</sup>	No	Conservatives	171	97	1980 – 2019
	C's	Spain <sup>5</sup>	No	Liberals	35	30	2006 – 2019
	Podemos	Spain	No	Left Socialist	32	27	2015 – 2019
	Vox	Spain	No	Radical Right	25	21	2015 – 2019
	CiU/CDC <sup>6</sup>	Catalonia	Yes	Liberals	12	3	1980 – 2019
	ERC	Catalonia	Yes	Left Socialist	11	6	1980 – 2019
	PNV	Basque Country	Yes	Conservatives	11	4	1983 – 2019
	PAR	Aragón	Yes	Conservatives	10	5	1983 – 2019
	PRC	Cantabria	Yes	Social Democrats	10	1	1983 – 2019
	BNG	Galicia	Yes	Left Socialist	10	5	1981 – 2019
	PSM/MES	Balearic I.	Yes	Left Socialist	10	5	1983 – 2019
	P. Rioja	La Rioja	Yes	Social Democrats	10	4	1983 – 2019
	UPN	Navarre	Yes	Conservatives	10	5	1983 – 2019
	P. Andalucista	Andalusia	Yes	Social Democrats	10	7	1982 – 2015
	Cha	Aragón	Yes	Left Socialist	9	4	1987 – 2019
	UPV/Bloc/Compromís	Valencia	Yes	Social Democrats	8	5	1983 – 2019
	CC	Canary I.	Yes	Liberals	7	5	1995 – 2018
	ICV	Catalonia	Yes	Green	6	4	1999 – 2018
	UV	Valencia	Yes	Conservatives	6	5	1983 – 2007
	UM	Balearic I.	Yes	Liberals	6	2	1983 – 2007
	CDN	Navarre	Yes	Conservatives	5	2	1995 – 2011
	EA	Basque Country	Yes	Social Democrats	5	2	1986 – 2009
	FAC	Asturias	Yes	Conservatives	4	3	2011 – 2015
	EE	Basque Country	Yes	Left Socialist	4	4	1980 – 1990
	Nafarroa Bai/Geroa Bai	Navarre	Yes	Social Democrats	2	1	2007 – 2019
				<b>818</b>	<b>480</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>265 Party-Region dyads</b>				<b>2607</b>	<b>1473</b>	

Countries sorted according to their number of candidacies

(1) Including the parties that directly evolved from the former Progressive Conservative provincial branches: United Conservative Party of Alberta and Yukon Party.

(2) The Greens were originally founded in 1980, but due to a lack of data on their early days, they only feature here after their merger with Bündis 90 in 1993.

(3) Only in the former GDR before 2007.

(4) PP did not run in Navarre between 1991 and 2008.

(5) Between 2006 and 2011, the party only ran in Catalonia.

(6) UDC is not included because the party only nominated its own candidate once. PDeCat and JxCat are considered successor parties.

Combining these criteria, the following sample of political parties from each country emerges. Table 3.1 presents the selected parties in each country, the time period in which they are studied, as well as the number of candida-

cies<sup>9</sup> and top candidates present for each. First, I take all regional branches of established national political parties. I understand that regional branches as all sub-national party organisations that are either integrated or affiliated with the federal branch<sup>10</sup>. Studying the territorial variance of national parties adds significant analytical leverage to the sample of political parties, as parties tend to have geographically asymmetrical success (Simón, 2013b). Furthermore, studying the sub-national level entails including parties that only run in a given region. Regionally based political parties are frequent in states with multiple national identities like Canada and Spain, and these have become more important in recent decades (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Mazzoleni, 2009). However, including all these parties would be infeasible in terms of data collection and availability. It is necessary to assemble a representative sample of parties consisting of both electorally successful and unsuccessful ones, as well as parties who survive over long periods and others with shorter trajectories. For this reason, I decided to include all regionally based parties that meet one of these three criteria. This means that an included party is either the regional branch of one of the main national political parties, or the party has held the prime ministership of its region, or it has obtained parliamentary representation more than three times, although not necessarily consecutively. Research at the national level shows that most new parties that break into parliament tend to exit it before the end of their fourth parliamentary term (Zur, 2019). However, I exclude all parties that aim to represent a smaller area than the region, such as island-based political parties in the Canary Islands<sup>11</sup>. Additionally, some parties had to be excluded due to a systematic lack of data availability or accessibility, however there may also be some missing data points for those parties which were finally included<sup>12</sup>.

### 3.3 Description and construction of the datasets

In total, the dataset comprises 2607 candidacies covering 1473 top candidates over 265 party-region dyads. Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of the observations by country in five-year periods. We can observe how the sample size

<sup>9</sup> Candidacy refers to each time an individual runs as top candidate.


<sup>10</sup> In Spain and Germany, political parties tend to organizationally integrate national and regional branches into a single structure, where they share membership and resources (Thorlakson, 2009). In Canada, some parties like the NDP follow this model, while the Conservatives do not maintain any formal link between the provincial and the national parties. Within the Greens, provincial branches are formally affiliated to the national organisation, but remain organizationally independent. Moreover, with the Liberals, some branches, especially in Atlantic Canada, some retain formal links with the federal party, while others have become independent over time such as the British Columbia and Quebec Liberal Parties.

<sup>11</sup> In Spain, I also excluded all political parties formally linked to the ETA terrorist group and their successor organizations: Herri Batasuna, Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok, Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas and EH Bildu. Some of these parties were banned by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Casal Bértoa and Bourne, 2016), which caused organizational discontinuities between the different organizations.

<sup>12</sup> In Canada, I had to exclude the following political parties due to lack of data, despite them meeting the aforementioned criteria: Social Credit branches outside Alberta and British Columbia and the Communist Party in Manitoba and Ontario. In addition, I was not able to include the United Farmers movement and Labour parties that predated the foundation of the CCF in 1932. In Germany, the DP and the GB/BHE have not been included due to a lack of data accessibility. In addition, due to a lack of data availability, the German Greens are only studied after their merger with Bündnis 90 in 1992. The PDS is excluded in the former West Germany until its merger with WAGS to form Die Linke. Moreover, in Spain, I have not been able to include the two former centrist parties that achieved at least a seat in the national parliament: CDS in the late 1980s and UPyD in the 2008-2015 period due to data accessibility.

increases over time as new countries and political parties join the sample. This is especially remarkable in Germany during the 1990s when Die Grüne and the PDS appear and in Spain since 2015 with the emergence of Podemos, Ciudadanos and Vox. In addition, the five-year periods present small variations due to the unequal distribution of the elections across time. Some regions hold elections every 4 years, and others every 5, and sporadic snap elections occur. This distribution reinforces this dataset's appropriateness for testing historically encompassing phenomenon such as the change of party selectors' criteria due to the increasing personalization of political contests. The dataset provides great variance in terms of internal party and party system features while keeping institutional factors relatively stable.

Fig. 3.3: Distribution of observations across time and country.




Before explaining the construction of the dataset, I need to stress its multi-layered structure. Deciding to develop this study at the regional level had important implications for the structure of the data. It adds a new layer of aggregation above the level of person, below the country level, and parallel to the party. As figure 3.4 shows, the smallest unit of observation is a candidate running at a regional election at a given time (or TC at  $t$ ), which I call “the candidacy”. Each candidacy groups candidates together who run one or more times for a given party in a given region<sup>13</sup>. Candidates may run an infinite number of times, but empirically, my data shows that candidates run on average 1.7 times, with the maximum lying at 10. Thus, the individual candidate is the first level of aggregation. All candidacies performed by a single candidate will have some personal attributes in common such as gender,

<sup>13</sup> In some exceptional cases, people have run for different political parties in the same region due to party splits and mergers, such as Oskar Lafontaine who ran in Saarland first as an SPD candidate and later for Die Linke, or Francisco Álvarez Cascos who first ran for AP/PP and later for Foro Asturias. More interesting is the case of candidates who run for the same party in different regions at different times. For instance, this is the case of Kurt Biedenkopf who ran first in the state of North-Rhine-Westphalia and later in Saxony; or Klaus von Dohnanyi who ran in Rhineland-Palatinate in 1979 and Hamburg in 1982. However, these are extraordinary cases.

professional background, or membership of any ancillary party organization. In contrast, other personal qualities of candidates change over time for each individual, such as age or time as a party member.

Fig. 3.4: Schematic representation of the data structure.



Above the candidate level, the data clusters into two parallel and non-hierarchical levels of aggregation: the political party and the region. On the one hand, candidates represent a political party, which generally remains the same over the whole career of the candidate. We can assume that the candidates within a party will be somehow more similar than those running for other political parties. For instance, selectors within the same party but in different regions may look more alike than those of the other parties in the same region, as for instance, they may have gone through similar processes of intra-party socialization. On the other hand, parties run in regions and react to the voters of that specific region. Therefore, we can also expect that candidates running in the same region may share some specific features. It is worth noting, as represented by TC<sub>5</sub> in figure 3, that some parties only run in a single region. I expect both levels to influence the candidate selection process. Finally, both regions and political parties cluster in one of the three countries.

One of the reasons for focussing on the regional level in this study is the opportunity it offers to obtain a high level of fine-grained contextual data. This will provide the independent variables for understanding how party organizations behave in changing environments. In total, I constructed nine inter-related datasets that link with the top candidates' personal features. Each of the additional datasets refers to one of the different faces of party organizations (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2002) and links it with the top candidate running at that time: party on the ground, party in the public office, party in the central office and party in the electoral arena. Figure 5 summarizes the structure of the different datasets and how they relate with each other.

First, the top candidates' dataset provides the benchmark for all following work. This dataset contains information about who a party nominated as top candidate at a given regional election (the candidacy), and composes the smallest unit of analysis of this final dataset. The dataset is divided into four parts. First, it contains information about in which election the candidate runs, how many times that person has run as a top candidate, and even if the candidacy is composed of more than one person<sup>14</sup>. Identifying the top candidate was not a trivial issue, especially concerning elections carried out decades ago when the number of sources were limited and the media did not cover regional contests very extensively. In Canada, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the role of party leader is equal to the position of top candidate. Therefore, I coded as top candidate the standing party leader at given election times. In Spain and Germany, the party leader is not necessarily the top candidate. My data shows that 49% of top candidates in Germany, and 62% in Spain were not party leaders at the time of the election. For regions with a single region-wide electoral district, I coded as top candidate the person at the head of the party list. This information was crosschecked using information from newspaper coverage of elections when possible. For regions with multiple electoral districts, I relied on newspaper coverage, surveys, questionnaires and even campaign material (i.e. leaflets and posters)<sup>15</sup>.

Second, the dataset contains information about the selection process of each candidate. These are variables like the type of electorate, the territorial level at which the decision was taken, if the process was internally contested, or if there was a formal vote on the nomination. In addition, I coded whether the top candidate won the subsequent election, or whether they were running in an electoral coalition with another party. The third part covers personal information on top candidates such as age, gender or professional background. The fourth part contains information about each candidate's partisan and political career. Here I coded differently past experiences that party selectors can utilise as signals of reliability. Here there is information about when the candidate joined the party or for how long they have held different types of public office. This information is critical, as it will allow each candidate's degree of partyiness to be constructed in the next chapter. I will use this degree of partyiness as a proxy for the reliability a electorate may expect of a given candidate. This dataset was collected through a very diverse range of primary and secondary sources. The Canadian data relies heavily on the yearly Canadian Parliamentary Guides<sup>16</sup>, as well as online sources. In Germany, I used national and regional parliamentary handbooks<sup>17</sup>, as well as online accessible biographical pages and newspaper archives. Mainly, the newspapers used were *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the archive of local newspapers available at WISO<sup>18</sup>. In Spain, I used mostly

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<sup>14</sup> In Germany, the Grüne and Die Linke tend to nominate double candidacies in many elections, where they tend to combine people of different gender, age, internal factions or ethnicity – a mechanism we can interpret as a way of balancing different internal demands. In these cases, I coded both people belonging to the candidacy. In contrast, the Greens sometimes nominated “teams” of candidates, especially during their first years. These were excluded from the analysis as they prevent the personalization of the campaigning.

<sup>15</sup> This is the case of several FDP, SPD and Green top candidates in the early stages of each party. I was able to identify several top candidates thanks to the campaign material kept at each party's archive supported by each political party's foundation – the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Heinrich Böll Foundation respectively. In cases where there were further doubts, I identified the top candidate as the person who was the subject of public voter surveys such as CIS or GESIS.

<sup>16</sup> Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Grey House Canada


<sup>17</sup> *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages*

<sup>18</sup> *Die Online-Datenbank für Studium und Wissenschaft*

used regional parliaments' websites and newspaper archives, both available online and in the system of the Spanish National Library. These included: *El País*, *El Mundo*, *La Vanguardia*, *ABC* and a myriad of regional newspapers.

In a second step, I link each candidacy in the previous dataset to a variety of data that contains different party characteristics at the time of the election. These additional datasets were not collected at the time of the election, but longitudinally, in monthly intervals, and were later merged with the candidate data at the time of the election. This allows party characteristics to be modelled in detail. Figure 5 summarizes the relationship between the top candidate dataset and the rest.

Fig. 3.5: The structure of the datasets.



I start with the datasets containing information about each party's central office. The second dataset used in this dissertation recalls the age of each different political party. Party age is one of the most common variables used as a proxy of party institutionalization, and therefore one of the components of the party screening capacity. To code this, I opted for the date of the party-branch foundation at the regional level. This controls for differences in the age of geopolitical regions, as well as for the fact that some parties were founded before the current democratic period of the countries studies, such as the SPD, PSOE or the PCE. The third dataset captures the different organizational changes that a party has experienced. More specifically, I coded when a party has experienced (a) name changes, (b) splits, and (c) mergers. However, splits and mergers can be very subjective. For that reason, I only coded what I consider to be "significant" cases. These consist of a merger with a party that has experienced parliamentary representation at some point in the past, for instance, the merger between Action démocratique du Québec and Coalition Avenir Québec, or Euskadiko Ezkerra with PSOE's Basque branch<sup>19</sup>. Similarly, for split-off parties to be considered as parties in their own right, they need to have obtained parliamentary representation at some point. Most notably, the Parti Québécois emerged from a split in Quebec's Liberals, and Eusko Alkartasuna resulted from a split in the PNV. These events mark important moments within political parties, point towards moments of ideological re-alignment and changes in the composition of the party membership and elites. This is also relevant to name changes, for instance, both Alianza Popular (which became Partido Popular) and Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (which became the New Democratic Party) changed their names when the parties moderated their political positions. All these events can act as proxies for changes within a party's dominant coalition (Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Janda, 1994).

The fourth dataset gathers information about parties' extra-parliamentary leaders. It contains information on 2429 party leaderships lasting an average of 4.27 years each (or 124,442 one-month periods in total), including caretakers. Each leadership includes the name of the leader (or leaders in the case of shared or group leaderships), the date leaders ascended to their leadership positions, when they exited, and the reason for leaving office, if available. In addition, I include information about the leadership selection process, mainly who selected the leadership, and what the exact result of the election vote was. For example, I collected data on the percentage of votes an aspirant to the leadership obtained, and even the precise number of votes, if available. Capturing the selection process of all party leaders allows me to model the internal life of parties at the time of nominating their top candidates. This data allows intra-party divisions to be traced, or the overall stability of the party to be measured, for instance, by looking at the rate of leadership turnover, or whether a change in party leadership precludes a change of candidate.

However, in this study I only collected data on the selection of new leaders and not re-selection processes. There are two reasons for this. From a theoretical point of view, both phenomena are different. When a party selector elects a new leader, it is because the previous one resigned or was ousted, and thus was deemed to be unsuitable. In a re-selection process, a majority of the selectorate can be expected to back the leader, although he or she may

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<sup>19</sup> Two special cases need to be commented upon: first, the merger between Bündnis 90 and Die Grünen, and second, that between the PDS and WAGS to form Die Linke. Both cases mainly involved the East-German part of the party organization, and therefore the mergers only affected the party branches in the former German Democratic Republic. The West-German greens are coded as a name change, while the West-German branches of Die Linke were born after that event.

have lost some support. Second, from a technical point of view, collecting this data would have been unfeasible. Obtaining the data on change of leadership already proved challenging. Unless it was reported in the press, this information is uncovered by consulting parties' internal documentation. In Spain and Germany, I have used primary and secondary sources to obtain this information. The secondary data mostly consists of the newspapers listed above. In other cases, thanks to assistance from some political parties or their political foundations, I have been able to access several primary sources such as party magazines (i.e. *Der Union*, *El Socialista*) and internal party documents (i.e. party conference minutes). For Canada, I mostly relied on online sources and the informational appendixes of several academic books (Carty, Erickson and Blake, 1992; Stewart and Archer, 2000; Dunn, 2016).

I now go on to explain the datasets that are related to the party on the ground. The fifth dataset captures party membership size. On the one hand, the decreasing levels of party membership all over Europe is a well-documented phenomenon (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Kölln, 2016). On the other hand, we should expect decreasing levels of party membership to be related to the varying screening and recruitment capacities of the parties studied. However, there is very little information available about these trends at the sub-national level. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain reliable data on sub-national party membership in Canada and Spain, but that obtained for Germany is very detailed. I rely on the data collected by Niedermayer (2013 and 2018) for the post-1990 period, and that provided in the *Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente* (Handschell, 2002; Boyer and Kössler, 2005; Franz and Gnad, 2005) for the period 1945-1990. Both studies provide the number of party members each regional party branch had at the end of the year. For some missing points, I interpolated the data. In total, there are 8085 yearly data points.

The next dataset captures the organizational density of a party— specifically, how some political organizations invest a portion of their resources into building effective structures for the active recruitment, training and political socialization of party members. Here, I checked for the existence of organizations linking parties with one or more societal groups. To code the organizational density of parties, I followed the categories established by the PPDB project (Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017). I thus coded the existence of any of the following nine types of ancillary organizations within the party: women, youth, seniors, SMEs, farmers, ethnic or linguistic minorities, religious groups as well as formal affiliations with trade unions or business associations. Following Allern and Verge's (2017) approach, I also searched for the date of foundation<sup>20</sup> of each sub-organization and built a composite index of how many organizations the party was linked to at the time of any given election. In this way, the organizational complexity of the parties studied can be traced back in time.

I now turn to an explanation of the datasets that capture parties' roles in public office, namely in government and parliament. The seventh dataset contains information about regional governments in all three countries. Specifically, there is information about each government's party composition, entrance into and exit from government, as well as its majority status, among other variables. I obtained this data through different sources. The Spanish data is built on information provided by the *Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición en España*<sup>21</sup> (Reniu and

<sup>20</sup> In cases when I did not find the foundation date in the specific region studied, I took the respective national foundation date.

<sup>21</sup> *Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición en España: Universitat de Barcelona*

Matas-Dalmases, 2016), and was complemented by official sources and newspapers. The German data was compiled using several publications on regional politics, mainly the works of Jun, Haas and Niedermayer (2008), Kost, Rellecke and Weber (2010) and Mielke and Reutter (2012). For the Canadian data, I mostly relied on Dunn (2016) and online sources for the most recent years. This data will allow us to calculate variables such as the cumulative time parties have spent in government, which serves a good proxy for parties' access to organizational resources (Bolleyer, van Spanje and Wilson, 2012), and thus for their screening capacity.

The eighth dataset, brings together the characteristics of parties when they are in public office and in the electoral arena. The dataset contains information about the number and percentage of votes and seats each political party obtained in regional elections. With this information, I was able to calculate other variables such as the electoral volatility and the electoral competitiveness of any given party at a given time (Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018), which I explain in detail in chapter 6. The electoral data was web-scraped from the ARGOS<sup>22</sup> website for Spain, and from the Canadian Elections Database<sup>23</sup>. The German data was obtained from Schakel (2013) and updated using *wahlrecht.de*. As the raw data only provided the string name of the party, all entries needed to be manually recoded to match name changes or mergers over time. In total, there are 3404 records for 749 elections.

The final dataset aims to capture how different individuals can have different electoral implications for political parties. To investigate this, I turned to publicly available survey data that assesses the electoral role of candidates. I rely on post-electoral surveys carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)<sup>24</sup> in Spain and by GESIS in Germany<sup>25</sup>. Unfortunately, publicly available post-electoral surveys could not be found for provincial elections in Canada. To measure the impact of candidates on voters, past studies have used candidates' ratings (Bittner, 2011), assessments of specific personality traits (Ohr and Oscarsson, 2013), and even the exponentiated coefficient of variables regressing some of these variables on vote choice (Curtice and Hunjan, 2013). Here I rely on the two variables that are most easily compared across time and different party settings. The first variable considers the numbers of surveyed people that recognize the candidate when asked. This number of people represent the percentage of the population able to rate the candidates, and thus to recognize them. This allows me to test for name recognition, and it thus becomes a proxy for candidates' popularity and public standing. Second, I will use the rating that the candidate received in the survey as direct measure of their popularity. I transformed the different scales into a 0 to 10 scale. In total, I use 225 surveys presenting 712 aggregated rating of candidates.

### 3.4 Discussion

This chapter has reviewed the methodological challenges that party researchers face when studying candidate selection processes and addressed how to address them in order to investigate the selection of top candidates. This

<sup>22</sup> *Archivo Histórico de Resultados Electorales – ARGOS: portal de Información de la Dirección de Análisis y Políticas Públicas de la Presidencia de la Generalitat Valenciana*

<sup>23</sup> Canadian Elections Database

<sup>24</sup> *Barómetros electorales elecciones autonómicas.*

<sup>25</sup> *Studien zu Landtagswahlen*

project takes advantage of two types of variation. First, as with many classical studies, I take advantage of the variance generated by the different types of career paths that candidates pursue. Second, I exploit the re-selection rates of the candidates. The next chapter argues how to combine both variances into a single parsimonious model. In addition, this chapter also discussed and justified this study's case selection regarding countries and political parties within each country. Canada, Germany and Spain will be studied at the subnational level, including their main national and non-state-wide political parties. This design maximizes party- and party-system differences while keeping country (and region) level features as similar as possible. Finally, the chapter has introduced the dataset that will be used in the following empirical chapters, covering both top candidates' personal features and their parties' characteristics over a series of different points in time.

## Chapter 4

### Operationalization of the dependent variable

Parties do not have any means to force candidates to reveal their true preferences. They need to rely on sub-optimal solutions, such as studying aspirants' previous actions, aiming to infer their future behaviour as candidates, and even as prime ministers. In this context, screening and selection is the most efficient tool political parties can use for evaluating aspirants to the nomination as top candidate. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss my empirical strategy and, in particular, to assess how the previous candidate experience can be used to situate a candidate along the reliability-electability continuum. Traditional studies have used the nomination of women or minorities to signal a change in the selectorate criteria (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994), and other studies have used a change in candidates or party leaders' personal features to infer party renewal (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015). Building on the previous chapter, here I propose to build on previous studies, and use candidates' previous experiences to ascertain their degree of entrenchment within their party organization, and thus their anticipated reliability.

I treat electability and reliability as a trade-off situation, where if one of the two characteristics is high, the other is inherently low. In other words, heavily party-entrenched candidates are assumed to be less electable candidates than outsiders. Outsiders can move more freely within the electoral arena, determine their own campaign messages and thus appeal to broader segments of society. Therefore, candidates with a lower degree of partyiness will be assumed to be more electable. However, this comes with two caveats. First, all selection processes are not independent of each other. Firstly, a party must decide whether to re-nominate the previous candidate and, as I explain below, the rationale behind each process is different. Then, if the party nominates a new candidate, the party will decide what the characteristics of the new candidate should be in terms of electability-reliability. Second, the degree of partyiness will also be a function of each party's structure of opportunities. In other words, it will also depend on to what extent, and how well will a party is able to recruit and train candidates with high levels of partyiness. I will study this factor in depth in chapter 5.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I present my two sources of empirical variation to explain when parties nominate more electable or more party-entrenched candidates. Besides top candidates' degree of partyiness, the reselection of candidates offers a critical source of variation for understanding political parties' nomination criteria. Using both sources of variation together provides a more fine-grained evaluation of parties' behavior. Second, I

discuss the determinants for re-nominating a top candidate, and I test them empirically. This is followed, in the following chapters, by an evaluation of Heckman sample selection regressions as a strategy for statistical modeling. Thereafter, I discuss the different signals that a political party acting as a principal could use to sort through candidates. Then, I tackle the problem of the multidimensional nature of such signals, and how to reduce this in order to perform multivariate analyses. More specifically, I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to obtain a new measure of partyiness or party entrenchment. I complement this analysis with a quantitative and a qualitative robustness test. The final section concludes.

## 4.1 Empirical strategy


Between shortly after WWII and until 2001, the First Mayor of Hamburg – as the regional premier is called there – had always been a member of the social democrats, as the party always managed to govern alone or in coalition. However, the traditional dominance of the social democrats was first challenged back in the 1997 election, when the SPD obtained its worst results in 50 years, and its main competitor, the conservative CDU, increased its vote share by five percentage points. Part of this increase was attributed to the personal charisma of the CDU top candidate, Ole von Beust, who was more popular among the general electorate than his predecessor<sup>1</sup>. Despite remaining in government thanks to a coalition with the Greens, so strong was the electoral shock that the SPD top candidate, who was prime minister at the time, resigned from his position. In 2001, after four years as leader of the opposition, von Beust repeated as top candidate and successfully acceded to the position of First Mayor of Hamburg.

The example of Ole von Beust points here to two important factors for understanding parties' nomination criteria. On the one hand, at the time of reselection, party selectors dispose of much more information about top candidates' levels of electability and reliability, as they have already competed before. When re-nominating von Beust in 2001, CDU selectors most likely took into account his extraordinary result in 1997. On the other hand, candidates that run for a second or more time will always show a higher degree of partyiness, as between elections, they will have remained party members and will have hoed some kind of political office, such as regional parliament membership. We can conceptualize the nomination of a candidate as a two-step process (figure 4.1). First, the party will decide whether to re-nominate the previous candidate or not. In other words, the party will decide whether to prolong the delegation relationship that the party and the candidate established in  $t - 1$ . The re-nomination of a top candidate will be conditional on the different conditions that the party faces at time  $t$ , as highlighted in chapter 2, but it will also depend on the previous candidate's performance in  $t - 1$ . If the party does not re-nominate the same candidate, it will seek out a new candidate who will reflect the party's preferences at that moment. This conceptualization implies that the empirical analysis will need to explore two different sources of variation – candidates' degree of partyiness, and who is re-elected or not – and that both processes will not respond to the same variables. To show how both processes differ, in the next section I explore the determinants of candidate re-nomination.

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<sup>1</sup> Die Hamburger Wahl war ein Fiasko fuer die SPD, aber kein Test fuer Bonn, Der Tagesspiegel 23.09.1997

Fig. 4.1: Empirical strategy




#### 4.1.1 The re-selection of top candidates

In the dataset, 1220 observations (55.78%) were candidates running for the first time, and around 48% of them had the opportunity to compete for at least a second time. Figure 4.2 shows how many times each person ran as top candidate. While more than 700 people were nominated only one time, more than 150 people were nominated three times. The average number of times candidates ran was 1.71 and the median is equal to 1. In this context, it is necessary to explore the determinants of top candidate re-nomination. On the one hand, we would expect that some of the factors that shape the type of candidate nominated when the party does not decide to re-nominate the previous candidate – screening capacity, internal demand and external demand – will play a role in the decision of whether to re-nominate the previous candidate in the first place. On the other hand, the variables related to candidates’ past performance will only play a role in the first part of the model, when the party decides whether to re-nominate the previous candidate. Below, I will explore the variables related to candidates’ past performance, whereas the screening capacity, the internal demand, the external demand and the type of selectorate will be treated in the following empirical chapters.

The question that arises is how parties are able to assess the previous performance of a candidate. Parties will rely on candidates’ prior electoral results and their behaviour during the previous campaign. Those who won elections will most likely be re-selected by their party as the top candidate. First, selectors will assess whether the candidate was successful in the previous election, for instance, party selectors can rely on the size of the vote share a candidate obtained in comparison to their predecessor. However, winning an election does not necessarily equate to obtaining more votes or a majority of the vote share, but instead implies successfully acceding to government. Astudillo (2015) distinguishes two types of winners. On the one hand, those top candidates who achieve the prime ministership can certainly be considered as winners, regardless of whether their party won the most votes or not. On the other hand, their selectors may perceive other candidates as “winners” after achieving any other sort of success for the party organization, especially in smaller political parties. Candidates who manage to bring their parties into government as minor coalition partners can also be considered as “winners”. The same logic would apply to those candidates whose party achieves parliamentary representation after being absent from the legislature. Their parties may consider this as a success. We can term these qualitative achievements as organizational “milestones” for the party. In addition, some of the personal features of the candidate can foster or hinder their re-selection, namely age and gender. Female candidates or party leaders have a greater likelihood of stepping down after adverse electoral

Fig. 4.2: How many times have top candidates run .




experience (O’Neill and Stewart, 2009; O’Brien, 2015; Verge and Astudillo, 2018). In addition, parties tend to use the nomination of younger candidates as a signal of renewal (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015), which will hinder the re-selection chances of older candidates. Finally, a factor not related to candidate performance in the last election, but which can have a considerable impact, is whether the party runs in a pre-electoral coalition.

Figure 4.3 presents a series of probit models exploring the determinants of candidate re-nomination. Each of the four previous elements are tested separately, and the final model pools the variables together. In addition, all models include the year when a candidate ran and the party age as control variables, as well as country, region and party fixed effects. Finally, to account for the potential non-independence of observations, the standard errors are clustered for party-region dyads<sup>2</sup>. The results show that there is a clear relationship between these variables and whether a new candidate is nominated. Interestingly, the number of votes a candidate obtains is not statistically related with their reselection chances, even though the coefficient does go in the expected direction. However, whether candidates achieve milestones for their parties proves to be intimately related with their reselection rates. In comparison with a “loser”, i.e. a candidate who has not improved their party’s political leverage after an election, a candidate that obtains the prime ministership has a 75% lower chance of being replaced by a different candidate. In cases where candidates successfully enter government as a minor coalition partner, or obtain parliamentary representation when their party is not in parliament, their chances of being replaced are around 43% lower than those of a “loser”. These results suggest that parties do not only rationalize candidates’ performance in term of votes, but that office emerges as a clear and desirable objective for parties. Furthermore, we can speculate that when parties achieve any of the above-mentioned milestones, the candidates that have contributed to that success

<sup>2</sup> The full regression tables are included in appendix B.

gain leverage vis-à-vis their party-principal. In other words, candidates who achieve government become assets that are more valuable for the party.

Fig. 4.3: Determinants of a party nominating a new candidate.



In contrast to the findings of other studies (Verge and Astudillo, 2018), women do not show a higher probability than men of being replaced by a new candidate. This does not exclude the fact that some of the factors investigated in the analysis may behave in a gendered manner. However, there is support for the idea that older candidates have a higher risk of being replaced. Finally, if a party enters into a pre-electoral coalition, it is very unlikely that the party will again nominate their previous candidate. This may be a response to different rationales. For example, when two or more parties agree to run together in a coalition, they need to agree on a specific candidate whose selection criteria may not only rely on their electability and reliability but also on other conditions like affiliation to any of the parties that form the coalition. Nevertheless, the effect is very strong, greater than that for achieving a position in government, although its direction is inversed. These results provide a baseline for understanding under which circumstances parties nominate a new candidate. However, these variables are not the only ones that will shape the decision regarding the reselection of a candidate. Some variables will be both a predictor of re-selection and of the degree of partyiness of a new candidate. Examples of these are the selection method or the degree of electoral competition, which will be studied in the following chapters.

#### 4.1.2 Statistical modelling strategy

The previous section has shown that the re-nomination of top candidates is clearly affected by their previous electoral performance, as well as by other factors such as the party agreeing to a pre-electoral coalition. These

results invite us to conceptualize the process of nominating a top candidate as a two-step process. First, parties decide whether to re-nominate the previous top candidate according to their performance in  $t - 1$ , as well as the party's current circumstances. Second, and only in the case that the party decides to nominate a new candidate, the party will decide which characteristics the new candidate should display according to the political circumstances. Therefore, I consider that the action of a party nominating a new candidate is partly dependent on the performance of the previous candidate in  $t - 1$ . Thus, inclusion in the sample is not random, it will depend on the previous candidate's performance as well as the party's current circumstances.

The two-step conceptualization highlights how we could gain theoretical insights by dividing both processes, as it is more than plausible that different rationales will guide each part of the process. However, there are also several caveats. First, modelling a party's decision making in statistical terms constitutes a simplification of reality. An alternative way of modelling this decision would be to consider that selectors simultaneously weight the alternative of re-nominating previous top candidates against alternative aspirants. However, this would necessitate knowing who the aspiring candidates were – data which is currently unavailable. It would also require including an uncertainty weight in the case of alternative candidates, as party selectors have less information about them than about the previous top candidate. Furthermore, this conceptualization does not explain the nomination of the top candidate for the first election in which a party competes. When parties compete for the first time, they find a very uncertain environment, and they ignore the consequences that some of their behaviour – such as the type of top candidate they nominate – would have on the overall electorate. For the same reason, the outcome of the first election a party competes in will be more idiosyncratic, and thus less interesting from a comparative point of view. Finally, the two-step conceptualization does not take into account the personal preferences of the previous top candidates, such as whether they are willing to run again. I assume, as I did when tackling the supply-side of top candidates that all members within the party are willing to compete for highly prestigious political office.

I propose to use a two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) to model the two steps of the nomination process of top candidates. This model allows both steps to be disentangled, and most importantly, it accounts for the non-random process of a party re-nominating a previous candidate versus nominating a new one. The fact that the party chooses the previous or the new candidate introduces selection bias in the sample which should be accounted for. Top candidates who repeat after a first bid should not be studied for two reasons. First, their re-nomination is partly dependent on their past performance, and this factor could confound the results. Second, top candidates who repeat after a first performance will systematically show a higher degree of partyiness, which is generated by the passing of time. In between elections, top candidates will remain party members and most probably will hold a prominent position, even if their first bid for the prime-ministership was not successful.

Studying only the candidates that run for the first time means that inclusion into the sample is not random. Inclusion will depend on political circumstances, but also on the performance of the previous candidate in  $t - 1$ . In the previous section, I have shown that past performance clearly impacts on the re-nomination chances of the top candidate. Heckman selection models (Heckman, 1979) are helpful when analysing non-randomly selected samples such as the one here. The model functions as follows. First, it fits a probit regression using all observations that acts

as the exclusion model. It calculates the probability that an observation falls within the range of those observed or not – in this specific case identifying whether a party nominates a new top candidate. Several of the variables included in the Heckman model will generate nontrivial variation in the selection variable, as already mentioned in the previous section, determining the inclusion of variable or not in the final sample. This will not influence the final outcome directly (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009), which here is a measurement of the degree of partyiness. The decision to nominate a new candidate will be based on the past performance of their predecessor –complete model in figure 4.3 – in addition to the main independent variable that is studied in each of the empirical sections.

In a second step, also called the outcome equation, the model estimates a heteroskedasticity-corrected OLS regression on the non-censored observations, which here are the top candidates running for the first time. In order to control for the potential bias emerging from the first step, the outcome equation includes as a variable in the model the inverse Mills ratio, calculated from the probit model. In other words, the model accounts for the dependent variable of interest being a function of some type of event that occurs before we can observe that variable, and that at least partially it is not associated with the main outcome. A great advantage of this approach is that using Heckman models will allow to me observe how the main variables of interest, which are included in both the exclusion and the outcome equation, behave in each step of the process.

Heckman selection models are a common tool used in political science, and have been previously applied to explain some truncated outcomes produced by political parties, such as law enactment, policy positions or the number of factions within parties (Bräuninger and Debus, 2011; Ceron, 2019; Ibenskas, 2019). However, using Heckman models comes with the significant impediment that it neither allows a multilevel structure to be modelled, nor for clustered standard errors to be included. This is problematic, as the nested structure of the dataset suggests that many observations will potentially violate the independence assumption. To account for this, all models include party, region and country fixed effects, and I will apply a Jackknife resampling procedure at the level of party-region dyad. This resampling procedure entails that every model is calculated as many times as there are different combinations of parties and regions in the sample, minus one. Each calculation excludes one party-region dyad (i.e. CDU in Berlin, PSOE in Catalonia, Liberals in Ontario etc.) and the observations associated with it. The final parameter of the model consists of the mean of that same estimator in all the different models, and should provide a bias-corrected estimator. I use the party-region dyad as it constitutes the smallest unit of aggregation I can use, and the level at which I would expect the different observations to display the highest degrees of correlation. In the following chapters, and unless otherwise specified, I will use Heckman selection models to capture the process that party selectors undertake when nominated a top candidate.

## **4.2 Measuring the reliability–electability trade–off**

In 2003, the regional election of the sparsely populated Spanish region of Castile-La Mancha attracted national attention. The reason was that the conservative party had decided to nominate Adolfo Suárez Illana, the son of the first democratic Spanish prime minister after Franco’s dictatorship, as their top candidate facing the long-standing

social democrat prime minister José Bono. Despite his family connections, Suárez Illana was a political neophyte who had never held public office, and had just joined the conservatives the year before. In contrast, José Bono had been a party member for more than 30 years, and regional prime minister for 20 years. The striking differences, in terms of previous experience, between the contenders of this particular election serves to introduce the topic of this section, that of which elements of top candidates' biography parties interpret as signals of an aspirant's reliability. Samuels and Shugart (2010), identify specific indicators that can reveal to what extent a candidate is embedded within the party organization, and hence how reliable they can be considered. Specifically, they propose the following indicators:

What career path sends signals of agent reliability, and what suggests agent unreliability? The strongest indicator of "insider-ness" is the nature and extent of a prospective agent's links to a central party organization - the organization that ultimately is responsible for nominating or "hiring" future national executives. Thus, an ideal-type insider will not only be a member of a political party but will also have served as formal leader of the party, and for a relatively longer period of time than an outsider. Similarly, insiders are more likely to have served formally on the party's national executive committee, even if they did not rise to the position of party leader. Third, insider status is associated with service in the national legislature - and the longer one serves, the stronger the links between principal and potential agent. Fourth, principal-agent links will be stronger to the extent that a politician has served in the cabinet (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 67).

Here we can distinguish both a partisan and a public office component. The first relates to parties' internal life: membership, forming part of the governing bodies or the leadership. On the other hand, there are indicators related to service in public office such as at the legislature or the executive. Climbing the party ladder involves undertaking positions in both dimensions. Helms (2005) describes the archetypal intra-party path as follows. First, prospective politicians become members and local party activists at a young age. Then they generally become members of a city council or a regional assembly. Later they can aspire to become a national MP or even a minister, while simultaneously climbing the internal party position ladder (i.e. by ascending to local leadership and membership of regional or national executive committees). Finally, as the ultimate goal of a successful political career, might seek to become prime minister, the most prestigious and inaccessible political office in the country (Borchert, 2011; Borchert and Stolz, 2011). Rising to the top requires the support of a party organization, and involvement within the organization secures nomination for public office.

We can analyse this traditional career path from a principal-agent perspective, but also from a sociological point of view. A candidate's accessing and remaining in prominent partisan and public office positions serves as the best indicator of reliability. An aspirant that has successfully gone through previous processes of screening and selection in order to climb the hierarchical ladder, signals that the principal that appointed them was satisfied with their performance. From a political sociology perspective, the formative period (prospective) politicians receive within their parties is crucial as this period will shape their political socialisation and therefore, their future behaviour (Best and Vogel, 2014) – a process that has been termed *party service* (McAllister, 1997) or *Ochsentour* (Wessels, 1997). This term expresses all the voluntary work a person undertakes within the organisation, to gain the party's trust and be eligible for promotion (Wessels, 1997)<sup>3</sup>. Through this process, the aspirant acquires a notion of the

<sup>3</sup> Or co-optation in Panebianco's (1988) terms.

party values and structure. Thus, a party only promotes aspirants who have internalised the norms and customs of the organisation, hence ensuring unity.

Both the partisan and the public office faces of the party organization are highly intertwined, and thus the occupation of previous public offices signals that a person has successfully been through other processes of screening in the past. There are too many possible partisan and public offices to be studied separately and selecting a small set of them would imply excluding an essential part of the variance. For instance, studying only the time that a candidate has spent in the legislature, as some studies do (Samuels and Shugart, 2014; Carreras, 2016), leaves disregards all the internal party dynamics. Instead, a composite index of “entrenchment” within the party organisation is needed. To achieve this, I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the variables mentioned by Samuels and Shugart (2010) to produce a parsimonious indicator of “insiderness” within the party, which I will name as “partyiness”.

PCA is a technique for data reduction that produces linear combinations of a large number of variables to represent the different possible underlying dimensions within the data. Based on Samuels and Shugart’s indicators, I have gathered data on the variables capturing the links between the party and the candidate (name of the variable in brackets). As the top candidates run on the sub-national level, I adapted the variables accordingly to capture the multilevel structure of the political system.

- Number of years as party member<sup>4</sup> (*Party\_y*)
- Number of years holding any kind of public office (*Off\_y*)
- Number of years as local councillor (*Local*)
- Number of years as mayor (*Mayor*)
- Number of years as regional MP (*rMP*)
- Number of years as national MP<sup>5</sup> (*nMP*)
- Number of years as regional minister (*rMin*)
- Number of years as national minister (*nMin*)
- Number of years as regional prime minister (*rPM*)

<sup>4</sup> In order distinguish those who do not belong to the party, from those who joined the party the same year they were nominated as top candidates, the former are coded as 0 while the latter receive a 0.5.

<sup>5</sup> For Spain and Canada, here is included both serving at either the lower or the upper house, indistinctly.

Including both the total amount of time in any political office and the disaggregate measure according to a specific position may seem redundant. However, there are two reasons for doing so<sup>6</sup>. First, it is important to use all the variables, since it is possible for a candidate to occupy several positions at the same time, and this circumstance is not captured by the overall measures counting time spent in public office. For example, a minister tends to also hold a seat in the legislature. In addition, some MPs may combine their legislative role with a position at the local level, like mayor or city councillor. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that people holding several public offices at the same time will be more entrenched within the organization than those who only hold one position at a time, and hence it is necessary to take these cases into account. Second, the variable measuring the overall time spent in political office accounts for types of political office that have not been broken down individually, like vice-ministers or secretaries of state, and country-specific offices such as “Delegado del gobierno” in Spain or “school district representative” in Canada. Thus, it is necessary to include both types of variables to obtain a more fine-grained picture of the candidates’ embedment within their party organization.

However, raw data on the number of years in office could sometimes be misleading. It should be understood in the context of an individual’s political career. Specifically, it should be considered as the maximum possible amount of time that a person has devoted to building further links with the party organization. For instance, let me consider two people who are nominated as top candidates after being party members for five years. The first case person joins the party aged 30, and the second when she is 50. The former has therefore spent (or invested) 29% of their adult life<sup>7</sup> as a party member before being nominated as top candidate. The latter has only spent 13% of their adulthood on this career. Despite the two having spent the same number of years in the party, the relative measures differ. Who shows the most commitment to the organization? For this reason, this factor should be controlled for when extracting the partyiness of candidates. In addition to the variables shown above, I will include the relative proportion of the two core variables: the proportion of a candidate’s adulthood spent as a party member (*Party\_p*), and the proportion of their adulthood spent in public office (*Off\_p*). I calculate these according to the following formula<sup>8</sup>:

$$\text{Party\_p}_{it} = \frac{\text{Party\_y}_{it}}{\text{age}_{it} - 18}$$

$$\text{Off\_p}_{it} = \frac{\text{Off\_y}_{it}}{\text{age}_{it} - 18}$$

Finally, there are two indicators discussed by Samuels and Shugart (2010), which I do not take into account for several reasons. First, I do not include information on whether the candidate belongs, or has belonged to the party’s executive committee. The reason for this exclusion is due to data inaccessibility. It was not possible to

<sup>6</sup> Table 4.6 provides a robustness test of the new indicator under different specifications.

<sup>7</sup> Although the suffrage age was reduced in Germany (1975) and Canada (1970), I consistently consider adulthood to start at 18.

<sup>8</sup> If a person joins a party in any way before age 18, such as if they join a party youth organization, the proportion takes the value of 1.

systematically obtain information on the composition of the executive committee over time for the more than 250 party organizations studied here. The press tends to report on the selection of a new party leader but seldom on the executive committee attached to that leader. Not using intra-party offices to capture further nuances could be criticised as a weakness of the measure, as such offices would provide a more fine-grained picture of the candidates' standing within the party. However, their inclusion was been possible due to data accessibility.

Second, I do not take into account the position of party leader. For Samuels and Shugart (2010), being party leader is one additional signal of reliability from the agent to the principal. This achievement shows that a prospective agent has already passed through critical scrutinizing processes within the party. However, what party leadership actually constitutes can vary. In some parties, being chosen as party leader is tantamount to being top candidate, such is the case in parties operating within a Westminster-style system. There, an individual may be chosen as party leader because of their perceived electoral appeal and not their ability to manage the party. As Thomas Poguntke puts it:

Finally, while strong leaders have always been an electoral asset for political parties since the early days of mass democracy, they have become a necessity now. In other words, party leaders (or leading candidates) are no longer selected because they unite a broad or dominant coalition within their party. Instead, their ability to appeal successfully to voters has become the prime selection criterion. (Poguntke, 2005, p. 65)

In this sense, previous experience within the party's executive committee, rather than the formal position of party leader may be more revealing of the internal standing of a candidate.

Let me illustrate the first point with an example. From 2007 until 2014 Pauline Marois was the leader of the pro-Quebec-independence and social-democratic Parti Québécois. She had a long and prolific political career within her party, which gives her a very high degree of partyness, as shown in table 2. Her successor was Pierre Karl Péladeau, a media tycoon that had only entered politics a year before ascending to the position of party leader, and did not have any previous political involvement. He lasted a year in office and did not compete at any election. However, his selection as party leader seem to follow a much more electoral, rather than partisan, logic. When PQ members voted for their leader, they probably had in mind Péladeau's popularity among the broader electorate, rather than his previous service to the party. This is not an outcome exclusive to systems where party leader and top candidate are embodied in one person. When Martin Schulz ran as the SPD's federal top candidate in 2017, he was first chosen as the top candidate and soon afterwards as party leader<sup>9</sup>. In both cases, being party leader seemed more a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for being the top candidate. Therefore, whether the top candidate is the party leader or not may tell us more about the party's customs, rather than about the nominee's profile.

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<sup>9</sup> Schulz was elected top candidate on January 29th 2017 (Der Spiegel: Die große Schulz-Show) and party leader on March 19th 2017 (Der Spiegel: Schulz mit 100 Prozent zum SPD-Parteichef gewählt).

In addition, the party leader is part of the electorate, and the smaller the electorate is, the more influence the party leader will have over the decision-making. The process of nominating a top candidate can also be considered partly as a function of the party leader's willingness to run as top candidate, given the cost of running and the expected probability of success (Samuels, 1998). Astudillo (2015) shows that top candidates who are also party leaders are more likely to be reselected as top candidates in the next election. They are a stakeholder in the process, and therefore, it is more appropriate to include this as an independent variable rather than as a part of the index that constitutes the first dependent variable.

#### ***4.2.1 A Principal Component Analysis of political careers***

To reduce the complexity of the data, I opted to apply a data reduction technique that reveals underlying dimensions in the data through the orthogonal transformation of the variables, which here represent the different features of top candidates trajectory (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). Principal Component Analysis (PCA) allows researchers "to summarize patterns of correlations among observed variables, to reduce a large number of observed variables to a smaller number of factors, to provide an operational definition (a regression equation) for an underlying process" (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014, p. 660). Here I aim to take all individual features that could signal reliability towards the principal, and summarize them in a single indicator. This new variable will indicate the overall level of candidates' entrenchment within their party organizations.

I go on to explain the different steps involved in applying PCA to the data on top candidates' personal and political characteristics. In a first step, I standardize all variables, converting them to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Figure 4.4 shows the correlations of the different partisan and political features of top candidates in all three countries combined. In the case that a candidate has never held public office, the specific variable takes the value of zero. On the one hand, some variables are highly correlated, especially the number of years candidates spend as party members or in public office with their respective transformations as a proportion of adult life. Other variables show medium levels of correlation such as the total number of years spent in public office and the number of years spent as member of the regional legislature. Given that we are studying the sub-national level, this result is not surprising. On the other hand, some variables are almost orthogonally independent of each other, such as the number of years spent as a local councillor or as a national legislator. This points to the fact that these three countries differ regarding the typical multi-level political career styles seen in each system (Borchert and Stolz, 2011; Dodeigne, 2014). Additionally, some within-country correlations can cancel each other out<sup>10</sup>. However, the reported Cronbach's alpha is equal to 0.7, which is considered a relatively good score (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014).

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<sup>10</sup> The next section includes the results of an alternative operationalization of the PCA analysis. To account for different political career paths that could affect the correlations, I calculated each country independently. The correlation between the predicted values of both analyses is 0.997.

Fig. 4.4: Correlations between the different characteristics of top candidates' personal and political trajectories

Years as party member (Party_y)												
0.858	Proportion of adulthood as party member (Party_p)											
0.681	0.484	Years holding public office (Off_y)										
0.589	0.579	0.902	Proportion of adulthood holding public office (Off_p)									
0.254	0.256	0.351	0.383	Years as local councillor (Local)								
0.149	0.114	0.235	0.228	0.107	Years as mayor (Mayor)							
0.491	0.327	0.662	0.576	0.021	0.008	Years as regional MP (rMP)						
0.191	0.139	0.295	0.266	-0.004	-0.024	-0.157	Years as national MP (nMP)					
0.047	0.005	0.121	0.079	0.030	0.116	-0.028	0.103	Years as MEP (eMP)				
0.287	0.148	0.368	0.279	-0.001	-0.008	0.461	-0.104	0.010	Years as regional minister (rMin)			
0.284	0.122	0.426	0.304	-0.026	0.012	0.474	0.048	0.003	0.175	Years as regional PM (rPM)		
0.096	0.027	0.223	0.156	-0.024	-0.012	-0.088	0.547	0.108	-0.073	0.062	Years as national minister (nMin)	

Second, I perform the PCA analysis. Table 1 reports the component loadings of the four different components identified (Eigenvalues  $\geq 1$ ) using the data on 2182 candidacies<sup>11</sup>. The factor loadings indicate how strongly each of the candidates' attributes correlates with the respective principal component. The first component is mainly loaded with the variables that indicate a general partisan and political involvement. These are: the total time spent as a party member measured in years or as a proportion of adulthood; the total time that a candidate has held a public office (measured in years and as a proportion of adulthood); and the years spent as regional MP. These variables indicate more general political involvement, in contrast to holding specific political offices such as MP or minister. Together account for 33.15% of the overall variance. The traditional literature on political careers (McAllister, 1997) predicts that future candidates join the party at a relatively young age, and after some years of probation, are nominated for a minor position. From there on, successful party animals advance their career, obtaining more prominent positions like MP. Studying three multi-level countries may distort the shape of the traditional career path explained above, as each country may have its typical career path specifics. However, the first principal component of the analysis captures the fact that public office comes together with being active in a party's internal life. Shortcuts to high political office are scarce, and parties only promote to public office those individuals who have expressed a deep and sincere commitment to the party organization. The literature on party careers has referred to this phenomenon variously as; *Ochsentour* (Wessels, 1997), *Cursus Honorum* (Stolz, 2001), or climbing the party-ladder (Borchert, 2003). The first principal component captures this phenomenon by

<sup>11</sup> Observations for which there was missing data on any of the key variables have been excluded.

correlating together summary variables of political involvement. Therefore, the new variable appropriately captures the intra-party involvement of a candidate.

Table 4.1: Principal Component Analysis of top candidates' partisan and political features

Variable	Component 1 Partyness	Component 2 National level experience	Component 3 Ministerial experience	Component 4 Uncommon offices	Unexplained
Party_y	<b>0.418</b>	0.015	-0.137	-0.221	0.218
Party_p	<b>0.355</b>	0.033	-0.292	<b>-0.34</b>	0.254
Off_y	<b>0.464</b>	0.058	0.058	0.12	0.106
Off_p	<b>0.442</b>	0.066	-0.07	0.046	0.197
Local	0.177	0.069	<b>-0.527</b>	-0.068	0.495
Mayor	0.109	0.057	<b>-0.371</b>	<b>0.567</b>	0.421
rMP	<b>0.351</b>	<b>-0.357</b>	0.264	0.046	0.188
nMP	0.122	<b>0.608</b>	0.217	-0.122	0.217
eMP	0.05	0.214	-0.031	<b>0.666</b>	0.434
rPM	0.212	<b>-0.32</b>	0.248	0.116	0.545
rMin	0.231	-0.139	<b>0.438</b>	0.133	0.479
nMin	0.085	<b>0.565</b>	<b>0.318</b>	-0.034	0.281
<b>Eigenvalue</b>	4.034	1.744	1.316	1.07	
<b>Variance (%)</b>	33.62	14.54	10.97	8.92	<b>n = 2438</b>

Note: Loadings above 0.3 displayed in bold.

The variables that load the second principal component are those indicating political experience at the national level, while those that correlate more negatively are connected with the regional arena. The results suggest that the second principal component captures a territorial dimension by ordering the candidates according to their national level experience on the one hand, and all other types of experience, especially regional experience, on the other. The third principal component represents candidates with ministerial expertise either at the national or at the regional level, as these two variables have the highest positive loading, indicating that the PCA captures the top candidates' previous experience within different branches of government. On one end of the spectrum, we find those with the most extensive experience in the executive, either national or regional, and on the other those whose experience is mainly confined to local institutions (councillors and mayors), while the candidates whose experience is more grounded within the legislative lie in the middle. Finally, the fourth principal component seems to capture the most infrequent political offices in the dataset, which are mayoral positions and membership of the European Parliament<sup>12</sup>.


Each of the identified components seem to reflect different phenomena. Here I am interested in identifying a single indicator that can summarize a candidates' involvement within their party organization, and thus signal organizational loyalty to the party selector acting as principal. From the four principal components identified in the data, the first component is the one that captures this phenomenon better. From now on, I will term this new variable as *partyness*. Moreover, another reason for honing in on the first component is that it explains the largest

<sup>12</sup> All Canadian observations are coded as 0 for this variable.

proportion of the variance: while partyness explains 33.62% of the variance, none other components explain more than 14%.

In the final step for obtaining my first dependent variable, to facilitate interpretation I compute the scores of the first principal component for each observation and I re-scale them to fit on a 0 to 100 scale. Thus, a candidate with a partyness of zero is a candidate with very limited partisan and political experience. On the one hand, a score of zero can represent individuals who are not party members, as is the case for independent candidates, but in most cases, it is either a candidate who has not held public office before and who has been a party member for a very short time. The following graph plots the distribution of the new variable partyness for each country subsample and for the whole sample. The vertical line indicates the mean. In general terms, we can observe how the distribution of the variable follows a normal distribution, lightly skewed to the right. This is especially visible in the Spanish and Canadian sub-samples, while the German subsample is closer to a normal Gaussian bell curve. The more normal distribution of the German sub-sample is also reflected in the fact that German candidates have a mean partyness close to 40, while the means in the other two countries lie at around 30. The skewness in the distribution of the Canadian and Spanish sub-sample is mainly produced by candidates situated in the left-part of the distribution, closer to zero. In Spain, this mostly reflects candidates that belong to the new parties appearing after 2014 like Podemos, C's and Vox, while in Canada it represents the Greens. If we counted these two groups, the overall mean would be around 35 in both countries.

Fig. 4.5: Distribution of partyness across countries



This variable will act as the main dependent variable. It allows us to treat electability and reliability as a single dimension and conceptualize these factors as a trade-off. I will test under which conditions parties nominate can-

didates with higher or lower degrees of partyiness. Now I present two robustness checks of this operationalisation. First, I will obtain the same principal component using slightly different operationalisations of the PCA. Namely, I will use different combinations of top candidates' features. This allows me to test whether the new index is very sensitive to a given combination of variables for extracting the principal component. Second, I will provide a qualitative assessment of the variable by studying the candidates located at each tail of the distribution in each country.

One of the concerns about using principal component analysis is that the method does not offer a set of readily available criteria to apply either after extracting the principal component from the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014), or to use when pre-processing the data. To address these concerns, I performed eight alternative operationalisations for the extraction of partyiness. I calculated the principal component scores for these eight alternative operationalisations and correlated them with the original analysis. Figure 4.6 presents the results of these correlations. First, there are several types of available rotations that require some qualitative assessment on the part of the researcher to provide interpretation and meaning to the results (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014). Here I apply both Varimax and Promax rotations, using two of the most common orthogonal rotation techniques, on the principal components after the first extraction. The results reveal correlations between the original and the alternative scores of partyiness of around 0.9. Second, I use factor analysis (FA) instead of principal component analysis. Both methods are extremely similar. The main technical difference is that PCA analyses all the variances in the observed variables, while FA, only decomposes the shared variance. Theoretically, this implies that

the difference between FA and PCA lies in the reason that variables are associated with a factor or component. Factors are thought to "cause" variables – the underlying construct (the factor) is what produces scores on the variables. Thus, exploratory FA is associated with theory development and confirmatory FA is associated with theory testing. The question in exploratory FA is: What are the underlying processes that could have produced correlations among these variables? The question in confirmatory FA is: Are the correlations among variables consistent with a hypothesized factor structure? Components are simply aggregates of correlated variables. In that sense, the variables "cause" – or produce – the component. There is no underlying theory about which variables should be associated with which factors; they are simply empirically associated. It is understood that any labels applied to derived components are merely convenient descriptions of the combination of variables associated with them, and do not necessarily reflect some underlying process (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014, pp. 662–663).

Thus, exploratory FA is associated with theory development and PCA with data reduction. For this reason, I initially chose to use PCA instead of FA. Nevertheless, the predicted scores of partyiness highly correlate with each other.

Third, I consider the possibility that the structure of political opportunities within each country (Borchert and Stolz, 2011) has such a strong impact on shaping conventional career-paths that some correlations could cancel each other out. For instance, in Canada, most city councils are non-partisan, and when political parties compete, these tend to be locally based and not affiliated with provincial or federal parties (Sancton, 2010). For this reason, those Canadian candidates who passed from the local to the regional arena commonly have more public than partisan experience. In contrast, in Spain and Germany, the local level serves as a training ground for future political positions, and candidates tend to occupy local positions at the beginning of their political careers (Capo et al., 1988; Borchert

Fig. 4.6: Correlations between the different operationalisations of partyiness

PCA								
0.968	PCA (w/o proportion vars)							
0.898	0.784	PCA (varimax rotation)						
0.909	0.799	1.000	PCA (promax rotation)					
0.978	0.927	0.900	0.909	Factor Analysis				
0.998	0.966	0.902	0.912	0.978	PCA (country-specific)			
0.980	0.977	0.827	0.840	0.935	0.981	PCA (w/ all vars as proportions)		
0.968	0.883	0.951	0.957	0.980	0.968	0.911	PCA (no break down vars.)	
0.872	0.941	0.662	0.677	0.814	0.886	0.928	0.766	PCA (w/o total time in public office)

Note: w/ is an abbreviation for *with*, and w/o is an abbreviation for *without*.

and L. Zeiss, 2003; Botella et al., 2011). Also, how integrated or hierarchized political arenas are in each country can play a role (Stolz, 2003, 2010; Dodeigne, 2018). Thus, I conducted the PCA procedure independently for each country. The results do now show significant differences, with their scores being almost the same.

Finally, I test for the exact combination of variables. On the one hand, even though I consider these two categories as measuring two slightly different phenomena, measuring the time candidates spent as party members in both years and as a proportion of adult life could prove to be problematic due to repetition. The overall ‘number of years’ serves as a general indicator of political and partisan involvement, while ‘proportion of adult life’ acts as a proxy for political socialisation. On the other hand, it can be argued that including the total number of public office positions held by individual candidates in addition to the variables that disaggregate the total could bias the result in favour of candidates with lengthy political careers. Both matters have been addressed by including alternative operationalisations where variables measuring candidates’ time spent as party members or in public office as a proportion of their adult life were not used. The same treatment is applied to the variables covering the total candidate time spent in public office. All correlations take a range of between 0.84 and 0.97, thus indicating that changes in the exact composition of the results do not significantly alter the outcome.

In a second step, I propose a qualitative assessment of the results. Table 4.2 shows the ten candidacies with the lowest and highest degree of partyiness and reports the name of the candidate, candidate party affiliations, regions

in which candidates competed and election years. The fact that I report candidacies instead of candidates implies that some people may appear several times.

In Canada, Douglas Lloyd Campbell is the top candidate with the highest predicted partyiness. He was PM of Manitoba for ten years, and he was a member of Manitoba's parliament 47 years, longer than anyone in the province's history (Bumsted, 1999). In Germany, Johannes Rau's 1995 candidacy displays the highest degree of partyiness. At that time, he had already been prime minister of the state of North-Rhine Westphalia for 17 years. Before that, he had been regional minister, MRP, mayor and local council member, as well as the federal top candidate for his party in 1987 and interim national leader of the SPD. Moreover, some years later he was elected Germany's president. In Spain Manuel Fraga also represents an excellent example of a candidate highly entrenched in their party. He was the founder of his party, AP/PP and its national leader for nine years. Furthermore, when he ran in 2005, he had already been PM of Galicia for 15 years, national minister for seven years, regional MP for eleven years, and a national MP for ten. He had one of the most extensive careers in recent Spanish history.

In general, we find that long-standing premiers are those identified with the highest partyiness. If we look at the highest decile of partyiness, these candidacies show on average, more than 30 years of party membership (which roughly equals 80% of their adulthood), more 25 years in political office, 15 years spent as members of regional parliaments, and more than five years as PM. In contrast, if we look at the lowest decile, these candidates are characterised by around 2.5 years of party membership experience and less than year of experience for any of the other variables measured. Unlike the top 10 candidates, they are far less known. They mostly are linked to parties at their birth like ADQ in Canada or Podemos, C's and Vox in Spain, and the expansion of (West-) German political parties to the east. However, there are some unusual cases of professionals that joined politics and were almost immediately nominated as top candidates, such as Wade MacLauchlan, Ulrich Nölle and Gerardo Fernández Albor. They were, respectively, a university president, a local banker and a prominent physician that did not show notable political involvement before their nominations. This hints that that the type of nominee is not only a function of structural factors such as the party age or its organisational capacity. This will be explored in the following chapter. Nevertheless, sometimes parties will deliberately decide to nominate candidates with low partyiness in search of, most possibly, electoral success.

The objective of defining this first dependent variable was to obtain a measure of reliability, which would allow me to treat reliability and electability as a trade-off. This variable can summarise what party selectors perceive when assessing different aspirants for the candidacy. Therefore, we can use it to test under which circumstances parties nominate more or less reliable candidates. Overall, PCA is an appropriate technique for unveiling an underlying dimension capturing the overall involvement of the candidate within the party organisation. The analysis provides an indicator robust to several operationalisations and which is meaningful after a qualitative assessment.

Table 4.2: Candidates with the lowest and highest partyiness

	Canada	Germany	Spain
<b>Top 10</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Douglas Lloyd Campbell (Liberal–MB–1959)</li> <li>2. Douglas Lloyd Campbell (Liberal–MB–1958)</li> <li>3. Louis-Alexandre Taschereau (Liberal–QC–1935)</li> <li>4. George Henry Murray (Liberal–NS–1920)</li> <li>5. George William Ross (Liberal–ON–1905)</li> <li>6. Louis-Alexandre Taschereau (Liberal–QC–1931)</li> <li>7. Hugh John Flemming (P. Conservative–NB–1960)</li> <li>8. Douglas Lloyd Campbell (Liberal–MB–1953)</li> <li>9. Ernest Manning (Social Credit–AB–1967)</li> <li>10. Pauline Marois (PQ–QC–2014)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Johannes Rau (SPD–NW–1995)</li> <li>2. Kurt Beck (SPD–RP–2011)</li> <li>3. Volker Bouffier (CDU–HE–2018)</li> <li>4. Wilhelm Kaisen (SPD–HB–1963)</li> <li>5. Henning Scherf (SPD–HB–2003)</li> <li>6. Johannes Rau (SPD–NW–1990)</li> <li>7. Erwin Teufel (CDU–BW–2001)</li> <li>8. Bernhard Vogel (CDU–TH–1999)</li> <li>9. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (CDU–SL–2017)</li> <li>10. Roland Koch (CDU–HE–2009)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Manuel Fraga Iribarne (AP/PP–GA–2005)</li> <li>2. Manuel Chaves (PSOE–AN–2008)</li> <li>3. Ximo Puig (PSOE–VC–2019)</li> <li>4. Miguel Ángel Revilla (PRC–CB–2019)</li> <li>5. Manuel Fraga Iribarne (AP/PP–GA–2001)</li> <li>6. Emiliano García-Page (PSOE–CM–2019)</li> <li>7. Miguel Ángel Revilla (PRC–CB–2015)</li> <li>8. Javier Lambán (PSOE–AR–2019)</li> <li>9. Juan José Ibarretxe (PNV–PV–2009)</li> <li>10. Manuel Chaves (PSOE–AN–2004)</li> </ol>
<b>Bottom 10</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mario Dumont (ADQ/CAQ–QC–1994)</li> <li>2. John LaBossiere (CCF/NDP–NB–1978)</li> <li>3. Nick Wright (Green–NS–2006)</li> <li>4. Adriane Carr (Green–BC–1983)</li> <li>5. Ed Finn, Jr. (CCF/NDP–NL–1959)</li> <li>6. Kristina Calhoun (Green–YK–2011)</li> <li>7. Robert Connell (CCF/NDP–BC–1933)</li> <li>8. Wade MacLauchlan (Liberal–PE–2015)</li> <li>9. William Aberhart (Social Credit–AB–1935)</li> <li>10. Markus Buchart (Green–MB–1999)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Lencke Steiner (FDP–HB–2015)</li> <li>2. Gisela Wild (FDP–HH–1993)</li> <li>3. Klaus Gaber (Die Grüne–SN–1990)</li> <li>4. Willi van Ooyen (PDS/Die Linke–HE–2008)</li> <li>5. Manfred Stolpe (SPD–BB–1990)</li> <li>6. Hartmut Sieckmann (FDP–TH–1990)</li> <li>7. Christiane Gleissner (AfD–HE–2013)</li> <li>8. Ulrich Nölle (CDU–HB–1991)</li> <li>9. Klaus Gollert (FDP–MV–1990)</li> <li>10. Hans-Herbert Haase-Lettin (FDP–ST–1990)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Josep Lluís Franco Rabell (Podemos–CT–2015)</li> <li>2. Daniel Pérez Calvo (C’s–AR–2019)</li> <li>3. Gerardo Fernández Albor (AP/PP–GA–1981)</li> <li>4. Beatriz Cano González (Vox–CM–2015)</li> <li>5. José Ángel Herrera Martínez (PCE/IU–CB–2011)</li> <li>6. Miguel Urquía Braña (AP/PP–NC–1987)</li> <li>7. Albert Rivera Díaz (C’s–CT–2006)</li> <li>8. Cristina Losada Fernández (C’s–GA–2016)</li> <li>9. Luis Guillermo Perinat y Elío (AP/PP–MD–1983)</li> <li>10. Cristóbal Palacio Ruiz (Vox–CB–2019)</li> </ol>

### 4.3 Discussion

This chapter has reviewed how to explore the variance generated by different candidate selection processes. The difficulty of finding appropriate counterfactuals pushes researchers to use sub-optimal solutions in order to infer which selection criteria political parties have used when nominating a top candidate. In the following chapters, I employ the two sources of variance explained here: re-selection and the top candidate's personal and political background. Previous activities within the party organization or in public office should reflect the candidates' level of integration within the party organization and thus act as a signal of reliability for the party organization. However, the personal and political characteristics of candidates can also present a high degree of dimensionality when we disaggregate the different types of previous political and partisan experiences a candidate may have. In this regard, one of the main contributions of this chapter concerns measurement. Previous studies had to rely on a single indicator of partyiness, such as years as a legislator, or as party member, despite the disadvantage that each indicator emphasised just one of the multiple dimensions of party organizations. Here I have shown that the use of principal component analysis allows all the different types of indicators to be summarized into a single and parsimonious operationalization of partyiness, i.e. a measurement of reliability towards a party organization. The new operationalization is accompanied by two robustness checks confirming the appropriateness of the new indicator. This is a remarkable contribution to the measurement of latent political traits, as previous studies were forced to repeat their analysis on several alternative dependent variables or to construct indices that involved many arbitrary decisions about the composition of the index and the weighting of each of their components. Principal Component Analysis, as long as it is accompanied by a careful qualitative assessment of the results, is a promising technique for summarizing rich and multifaceted data on political parties and their members.

Furthermore, this chapter has discussed how to disentangle the processes behind candidates' different re-selection rates and distinct levels of partyiness. The combination of both sources of variation will allow party selection criteria to be disentangled. I have discussed how the reselection of candidates can bias the overall sample, and proposed using a Heckman's selection model (1979) to control for this factor. More specifically, the performance of the previous candidate and the party in  $t - 1$  will be used to determine their inclusion in the sample of the final model, and to correct for the bias this may engender. My solution to the problem of finding counterfactuals to the nomination of certain candidates is still suboptimal. However, I advance in the current empirical state of the art by using PCA to summarize different candidate characteristics, and by including in the re-selection of a candidate in the same statistical model as another source of variation to explain selectors' criteria. The next chapter analyses the differences in opportunities parties have for generating members with higher levels of partyiness, in other words, which factors allow a party to behave as principals that are more efficient.

## Chapter 5

### The role of party capacity on top candidate selection

This dissertation studies whether a change in the the nature of party competition, as well as a change in the internal life of parties pushes political parties to switch their selection criteria towards more electable top candidates, even if this is to the detriment of traditional party animals or reliable candidates. Transformations within a party's dominant coalition can act as an incentive for parties to change their selection criteria at a given moment. However, before assessing how changes in parties' preferences may change selection criteria, it is necessary to explore how differences in opportunities may shape the nomination process. Parties differ in their capacity to attract new members and train them more thoughtfully. I refer to this variation in the opportunity structure as party screening and recruitment capacity. Furthermore, changes in parties' incentives to nominate one type of candidate or another will function within a given opportunity structure that constrains who the party can nominate. For example, a newly born party will not be able to nominate candidates with high levels of partyiness. In most cases, new parties cannot train their members by having them gain experience by occupying minor political office positions before nominating them for leading party positions. The only exception is when a party can attract people who had been members of other political organizations, or the party itself results from a split from an existing party. Following figure 2.1, the party's screening and recruitment capacity determines if parties can nominate candidates with high reliability or not. Hence, before looking into how differences in preferences may generate the outcome of interest, it is necessary to study to what extent the different degrees of reliability expressed by candidates are determined by differences in opportunities. Thus, the main argument of this chapter is that the level of parties' screening and recruitment capacity is crucial for understanding the type of top candidates that political parties nominate, and a necessary step to explore before assessing parties' selection criteria.

When political organizations are born, they grow and may achieve specific milestones that will affect their organizational capacity. These milestones can be; entering parliament for the first time, joining the government, or even heading it. We should expect these processes to be reflected in the partisan and political background of candidates, or partyiness. First, as parties gain organizational capacity, they will be able to train more and better aspirants (Samuels and Shugart, 2014). Second, a given level of party capacity will provide a "ceiling" for how entrenched within their parties we can expect top candidates to be for a given party organization at a specific time. Being able to discern the "floors" and "ceilings" of partyiness within a party at a given time will allow us to later identify more precisely the effect of other factors, like preferential change due to internal or external stimuli. Third, we can ex-

pect that losing party capacity will negatively affect top candidates' degree of partyness. A party in organizational decline will not be able to keep training their members at the same pace and to the same extent as previously. For instance, the party will not be able to provide members with public office positions from which to gain experience. Parties may face setbacks, like exiting government after a long period of being in power, or not making it into parliament for a legislative period. For parties, the implication of these situations is that they suddenly receive fewer organizational resources that to which they had become accustomed. If this situation continues over time, the party will go into organizational decline, and this will affect the kind of candidates they can train and nominate. This is crucial, as a decrease in party capacity would have similar observable implications as those hypothesized for an increase in electoral competition or a change in a party's dominant coalition. In other words, a decrease in candidates' degree of partyness generated by a decrease in party capacity could be wrongly understood as caused by a change in the party's preferences.

Furthermore, not all parties organize in the same way or allocate their resources to the same priorities. Some parties adapt more a labor-intensive organization that, for instance, builds strong intra-party bureaucracies and develops a series of ancillary organizations, which bring stable linkages with civil society. These parallel party structures act both as recruiters to enlarge the party base, as well as an instrument for socializing members to adhere to party values. Also, they can act as organizational reserves in periods of negative electoral results and organizational decline in the main organization. This chapter addresses three factors that can affect a party's screening and selection capacity: their access to organizational resources through public office, their organizational density, and the size of their party membership. The chapter is structured in the following manner. First, I focus on the first election in East Germany after the reunification as an example of how parties with low screening and recruitment capacity can behave erratically. Then, I present the evolution overtime of top candidates' levels of partyness across all the political parties studied here. Third, I discuss the relationship between party capacity and party institutionalization, and how each of these factors affect the candidate selection process. Fourth, I explore the relationship between candidates' degree of partyness and their parties' screening and recruitment capacities.

## **5.1 The importance of parties' screening and recruitment capacity**

In 1990, one of the consequences of the German Reunification was the addition of five new states to the federal republic and the expansion of the city-state of Berlin. Within this context, elections were here in the new states to choose their first regional governments. In these competed the East German PDS, the heir of the SED<sup>1</sup>, the one-party state that ruled East Germany, and the West German parties that expanded to the east, sometimes in association with some of the SED's satellite parties (Hough, Koß and Olsen, 2007), like the FDP and the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD). However, the western parties -- CDU, SPD, FDP and the Greens -- lacked any organizational structures in the East and suddenly had to build their policy platforms, develop their party organizations, and select local candidates for the upcoming election.

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<sup>1</sup> *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany).

Faced with such difficult conditions, one of the most interesting results was that parties decided to “import” West German politicians to compete in the East. Of the 20 *Spitzenkandidaten* that the CDU, SPD, FDP and the Greens nominated for the 1990 elections in the new five states, a quarter were West-German politicians<sup>2</sup>. To some extent, parties recognized their incapacity to recruit local candidates in some of the new federal states and opted for experienced party members despite their lack of connection with the local area. This disconnect with the state in which candidates were running clearly points to lower level of electability. In other words, we can speculate that local aspirants' *reliability* was so low that it could not be offset by their higher levels of *electability*. Hence, parties decided to “import” some candidates with higher reliability and lower electability.

More interestingly, parties' decision to trust some East German politicians later proved to be problematic. Of the five regional prime ministers elected in October 1990, three did not finish their term. In Thuringia, the first president had to resign due to alleged Stasi<sup>3</sup> contacts and was succeeded by a former West-German politician. In Saxony-Anhalt, there were three presidents in four years. The first had to resign after also being accused of having collaborated with the Stasi, and the second due to corruption allegations. These scandals are an example of how parties were not able to implement efficient tools for screening reliable aspirants, and thus prompting adverse selection. Finally, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, the first prime minister of the state, Alfred Gomolka, resigned after severe policy disagreements with his party about the privatization process of the former East German state-owned shipyards. It is reasonable to assume that with more time and resources to gather information, parties would have been able to prevent these events.

There are two underlying factors in here. The first is the asymmetrical screening capacities parties have when collecting information. Parties with developed bureaucracies and powerful central party organization will be able to gather more and more accurate information about any aspirant when making a nomination. These parties will have higher chances of preventing adverse selection and moral hazard than their counterparts who have less developed central machinery. In addition, once the nomination has taken place, parties with stronger structures will be also able to monitor their agents more extensively both during election campaigns and when in government (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Strøm, 2003). For instance, the party's executive committee or any branch of the party central office can act to police the agent.

The second underlying factor is that parties differ in their recruitment capacity. By recruitment, I do not simply mean how many members parties can attract, but also how can parties politically socialize and train those members to fit into internal party life. Party members with high degrees of socialization within organizations will hold political views closer to those of the median selector, and thus be more likely to tow the party line. Some organizational models prioritize building large organizations that invest greatly in recruitment and training of new members. These can be considered as labor-intensive. Instead others tend to be more capital-intensive by relying on advertising agencies or PR professionals (Strøm, 1990). For instance, some parties actively develop a series of ancillary

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<sup>2</sup> Three belonged to the SPD, one to the CDU and the other to the FDP. It is worth mentioning that while the CDU and the FDP were able to merge with some of the SED's satellite parties, the SPD did not have any such satellites parties.

<sup>3</sup> The former political police of East Germany.

organizations around the party where party members or like-minded people can meet, discuss and perform leisure activities. This sort of organization allows parties to attract more members and socialize them. However, parties also need to provide members with a foreseeable career track – or *cursus honorum* –, where succeeding in attaining a minor position will open the door to climbing the party ladder (Stolz, 2003). In summary, parties' screening and recruitment capacities will shape the range of choices selectors have at their disposal. As I will discuss later, this screening and recruitment capacity is closely linked with the parties' organizational modes and their access to organizational resources.

## 5.2 The evolution of top candidates' partyiness over time


Let me further illustrate the previous point by looking into the aggregated partyiness expressed by all top candidates from the same party over time. The literature on political careers has regularly used the metaphor of “climbing the party ladder” to explain the continuous scrutinization process that ambitious party members undergo on their journey from the grassroots to the top echelon of the party organization (Norris, 1997; Turner-Zwinkels and Mills, 2019). However, some parties will be more demanding with their members than others. We can expect that a certain degree of commitment and experience within an organization will be enough for some parties to consider a person for a specific position, but not enough in other party organizations. (Norris, 1997; Borchert and Zeiss, 2003; Fiers and Secker, 2007). Figure 5.1 plots the 5-year moving mean of top candidates' partyiness over time, since each party was founded or entered into the study sample. I use a 5-year moving average due to the uneven distribution of regional elections over time. Using a 5 year time span entails that each observation will be used at least once for the calculation of the yearly moving mean. We should be aware that in certain periods, some parties present a low sample size, and thus their evolution should be interpreted more cautiously. These are the Ciudadanos before 2015, the Canadian Social Credit, and the Canadian regionalist parties<sup>4</sup> before 1970 when this category was just composed of Quebec's Union Nationale. In addition, the NSWPs label (non-state-wide parties) pools together all regionalist parties within the same country.

First, we can distinguish parties according to their starting point. In their early stages, some parties nominate candidates with limited political and partisan experience, while others already nominate candidates with a more extensive background. There are several explanations for this. First, parties could have already existed in previous regimes (democratic or not). This was the case of the SPD as it was founded in 1863, and was already active during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. The same happens when considering the PDS as the direct successor of the SED party in East Germany (Hough, Koß and Olsen, 2007). Similarly, in Spain, the PSOE, PCE and ERC had already been active since 1879, 1921 and 1931, respectively. However, the PSOE and PCE's nominees are barely more experienced than those of the newly founded Spanish conservatives<sup>5</sup>. In contrast, during the first

<sup>4</sup> I use it as synonymous of common label non-state-wide-parties (NSWPs)

<sup>5</sup> First, we can distinguish parties according to their starting point. In their early stages, some parties nominate candidates with limited political and partisan experience, while others already nominate candidates with a more extensive background. There are several explanations for this. First, parties could have already existed in previous regimes (democratic or not). This was the case of the SPD as it was founded in 1863, and was already active during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. The same happens when

Fig. 5.1: Evolution of top candidates' partyyness over time, by party.



democratic elections in Germany during the late 1940s and 1950s, there is a clear gap in candidate partyyness levels between the SPD and the recently created CDU/CSU and FDP<sup>6</sup>. Second, parties may be created due to a merger considering the PDS as the direct successor of the SED party in East Germany (Hough, Koß and Olsen, 2007). Similarly, in Spain, the PSOE, PCE and ERC had already been active since 1879, 1921 and 1931, respectively. However, the PSOE and PCE's nominees are barely more experienced than those of the newly founded Spanish conservatives

<sup>6</sup> It is worth noting that some of CDU and FDP candidates had been members of political parties during the Weimar Republic, mainly the German Democratic Party and the Zentrum party. Nevertheless, there are no strong correlations of participating in a given party

with other political organization or splits with previous ones<sup>7</sup>. This implies that a proportion of their members will have gained experience in the previous organization. This is the case for the Canadian CCF, born through the merger of several small labor and farmer's parties (Jansen and Young, 2009), or Die Linke in the former West Germany, as the party attracted several SPD dissidents.

We can observe how parties tend to achieve certain natural ceilings when their evolution starts to resemble a flat line. The PSOE during the 1990s, and the CDU/CSU and FDP in the 1980s experienced this. Other parties will reach a ceiling, but later experience new periods of growth (the FDP in the late 1990s) or decline (the Spanish communists since 2010). However, we can also find some country-level convergence on a certain degree of party-ness, especially among the biggest political parties within each system. While Canadian parties tend to converge around a level of 40 party-ness, the main German and Spanish parties converge at close to 60. This may already point towards the decisive factor of accessing governmental office for increasing party capacity. In general, these results show how steep the party ladder may be at each point in time. What remains unclear is which factors drive the change in the curve. In the following section, I discuss how the different degrees of party institutionalization are closely related to parties' screening and recruitment capacity, which in turn can explain the evolution of candidate party-ness over time.

### 5.3 The construction of an internal opportunity structure

The guiding hypotheses of this chapter are that political parties with higher degrees of screening and recruitment capacity, organizational complexity and more membership levels should nominate candidates with higher levels of party-ness. Here I will discuss these relationships. Samuels and Shugart (2014, p. 138) consider "party capacity" as the ability of political parties to maintain their consistency as collective actors of representation in democratic systems. This is a concept developed from Mainwaring and Torcal's (2006) notion of party institutionalization, which itself derives from previous works (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 1988). Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) put particular emphasis on how socially well-rooted political parties are, and how parties born in the wake of historical patterns of modernization enjoy a higher degree of ideological voting, which has translated into such parties enjoying a more stable electorate over time. On the other hand, Samuels and Shugart (2014) propose an institutional argument. They argue that parties gain capacity as democracies age, thanks to their interaction with the given institutional setting, especially in parliamentary systems. However, party capacity should also be a function of access to several types of resources, and how a party decides to invest them. Additionally, we should consider their concept of party capacity as part of the broader concept of party institutionalization, as it includes not

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before and after WWII. However, I do not consider this as additional experience within the party organization that nominated them due to the lack of organizational continuity between their former and posterior affiliations. Besides, almost 40% of the candidates nominated between 1945 and 1960 had no previous political affiliation.

<sup>7</sup> Additionally, it can be due to late entrance in the sample. This possibility only applies to the German Greens, which I study just since 1993, after its merge with the East German party Bündnis 90 due to lack of reliable data before that date. In addition, the number of regionalist parties in Spain and Canada tend to increase across time.

only structural factors but also attitudinal and behavioral ones linked with the process of “routinization” (Randall and Svåsand, 2002).

At the candidate level, we can translate the notion of party capacity as the capacity of a party to build an effective “opportunity structure” for ambitious aspirants within the party organization. In other words, ambitious politicians should have opportunities to develop their careers and advance within the organization. Panebianco (1988, pp. 60–61) describes it as the opportunity to:

“to allow oneself to be coopted by the center’. The opportunity structure is such that the ‘ambitious members’ (careerists) must, in order to rise to the party’s upper rungs, comply with central directives. The result is a sort of funnel-shaped structure, for personal mobility and success require a ‘vertical convergence at the center’; one must be supported by a restricted national elite and zealously conform to its will”.

However, aspiring politicians are more likely to allow themselves to be coopted if they obtain some personal benefit in return in the form of election to public or party office. Thus, as I argue in the next section, stable access to financial and organizational resources is critical for parties that aim to build effective internal opportunity structures.

Second, it can be argued that some parties, due to better management of their resources, will enhance their party capacity. Thus, we can expect that these parties will be more resilient when confronted with sudden shocks in their access to financial and organizational resources, and will be able to socialize and better train their members. In the longer term, higher party capacity should be reflected in a party’s top candidates expressing a higher degree of partyness. Political parties that engage in these practices are the type of organization that “aim to control their environment” in Panebianco’s words (1988). They tend to be more labor-intensive and actively seek to recruit new members. In addition, these parties develop more complex internal bureaucracies and build a series of ancillary organizations to anchor themselves to some societal groups (Allern and Verge, 2017; Scarrow and Webb, 2017)<sup>8</sup>. Initially a characteristic of traditional social democratic mass parties, other parties soon copied this model and applied it to other sociodemographic groups like the young, women, or some religious confessions. Authors like Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the role of ancillary organizations should diminish as the cartelization process advances, and empirical studies find that the number of these organizations is far lower than expected (Allern and Verge, 2017). In a longitudinal study like this one, it is necessary to check the role of these organizations. In addition, I will study if the overall size of their membership has an impact on parties’ decision-making when nominating a candidate. We can expect an increase in party capacity, due to the development of ancillary organizations and a growing party membership, to be positively associated with a higher level of top candidate partyness. The

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<sup>8</sup> There is also organizational ecology, a different strand of literature that has generally studied how organizations behave and survive (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Here, for instance, organizational survival is considered as a function of trust among members, and knowledge about the environment. Although several recent studies on party survival and party fusion have relied on this literature to build their empirical expectations (Lowery et al., 2010, 2013; Van De Wardt and Van Witteloostuijn, 2019; Zur, 2019), here I mostly rely on the traditional literature on party organization despite some of these studies, most notably Panebianco (1988) clearly drawing on organizational studies.

following sections empirically study how the construction of an effective internal opportunity structure, including the establishment of societal links, increases parties screening and recruitment capacity.

#### 5.4 Parties' screening capacity: access to votes, seats and office

I conceptualize parties' screening capacity as a function of their ability to build powerful central organizations. Powerful central offices are able to gather more and more reliable information about their prospective agents, as well as to police candidates more efficiently after their nomination, which should translate into candidates with a higher degree of partyness. Hypotheses 1 stated that we should expect a positive relationship between parties' screening and recruitment capacities and their top candidates' degrees of partyness. To measure the size of a party's central organization, I rely on several indicators of parties' level of electoral support and access to public office, which acts as a proxy for access to public funding and other organizational resources.


Thereby, the Heckman selection model includes the following variables both in the selection<sup>9</sup>, and in the outcome equation. First, I use the party's vote share at  $t - 1$ , as a signal of party access to public funding due to their electoral size, even if they do not gain parliamentary representation. This variable also captures the party's ability to obtain support in the local and federal arenas, which should also influence overall party capacity. Second, I use parties' access to parliament as another indicator for accessing public resources. I measure this using the uninterrupted cumulative number of years a party has been in or outside parliament, and well as their share of seats in regional parliaments at  $t - 1$ . Given that party funding schemes are also based on parliamentary representation, and not just on electoral support, it is necessary to include both. Finally, I measure parties access to government using the cumulative number of consecutive years they have been in, or out, of government. Using the cumulative measure has the advantage of enabling these dynamics to be modelled over all periods, as well as changes to be taken into account that happened between elections.

As control variables all models include the (logged) age of the party and the year. Age has been widely used as the default indicator for both party capacity (Samuels and Shugart, 2014) and party institutionalization (Lane and Ersson, 1991; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Chiru et al., 2015), and may point to processes linked to other dimensions of party institutionalization. As discussed earlier, and due to the nested structure of my data, all models include country, region and party fixed effects. In addition, to avoid outliers, all models have been calculated using a jackknife procedure at the level of party-region dyads.

Figure 5.2 presents the results of a Heckman model regressing top candidates' partyness on the main indicators of screening capacity (the full model is available in appendix B and details about the model are available in section 4.1.2). The first three models show the individual effect of votes, seats and government on candidates' partyness and the final model pools all them together. The results of the first equation shows the effect of these variables on the likelihood of the party nominating a new candidate (logit model), and the second on the degree of partyness

<sup>9</sup> The selection model always includes the performance variables studied in chapter 4.

Fig. 5.2: The role of institutional resources on top candidates' partyyness.



Note: All models include party, region and country FEs. Jackknife-robust models by party-region dyad. Control variables omitted from the plot. CI at 95%


this new candidate presents (linear model). Inherently, the longer a party has been out of parliament, the greater the chance of that party changing candidate, which can be interpreted as the party becoming a much more divided and behaviorally erratic organization. However, the most surprising result is that the percentage of seats and votes in the previous election present opposite signs and a very similar size, indicating that electorally successful candidates may not have their re-nomination secured if they do not achieve tangible results, i.e. seats and office. It is worth mentioning that now the difference in the percentage of votes won between  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$  becomes statistically significant, indicating that top candidates that outperformed their predecessors are more likely to repeat their role as top candidate. The rest of the control variables omitted from the graph, behave similarly to those shown in the complete model in table ?? as older candidates have fewer chances of re-selection, and winning office fosters re-selection chances.

Concerning the second equation, there is a positive association between parties gaining access to public office, and its associated organizational resources, and party nominees' overall degree of partyyness. Moreover, the results of votes, size of the legislative group and time in government remain significant in the full model (Model 4). Interestingly, the variables expressing exit from government or parliament behave negatively as expected, but only exit from parliament achieves standard levels of statistical significance. Despite this finding pointing towards decreasing levels of party capacity due to lower imbrication with the states' structures, the size of the effect is smaller than its opposite (number of years in parliament or office), indicating that a change in the party status is not automatically reflected in top candidates degrees of partyyness. Hence, parties can gain resilience over time. Regarding the size of the coefficients, it is notable that access to government is the one that most clearly quickly fosters party capacity.

Building on the previous results, let us calculate the predicted partyiness (95% CI) of candidates nominated by four hypothetically newly created parties, each one varying in their degree of access to public office and state resources. Figure 5.3 plots the top candidates' predicted partyiness at ten consecutive elections under different specifications, according to the full model in figure 5.2. In all cases, I assume all parties were born two years before the first election they compete in ( $t_1$ ), and thus their nominees show the same predicted level of partyiness at this point in all predictions. All parties always achieve 5% of votes in each election. Party A is assumed to never enter into parliament, and we observe how the candidates they nominate express very little more experience in subsequent elections. I consider that the gap between one election and the next consistently consists of four years. For Party B, I assume this enters parliament at the  $t_1$  election and is able to obtain parliamentary representation in all subsequent elections with the same level of support. This is reflected in a considerable increase in party B candidates' levels of partyiness during the first elections, and stagnation in the growth of levels of partyiness afterwards. It is notable how the confidence interval decreases in comparison with party A. Party C, like B, also achieves parliamentary representation at  $t_1$ . In addition, it gains governmental office at  $t_2$  and maintains this for all following elections. This is reflected in a constant growth of their top candidates' partyiness levels over time. In comparison with Party B, at the end of the period, the difference in top candidates' partyiness levels between the party that attained parliamentary representation, and the party that attained both parliamentary representation and governmental office is around 15 points. Finally, Party D follows the same patterns as Party C until  $t_6$ . At this point, I assume this party suffers an electoral shock and exits both government and parliament at the same time, and remains in this situation thereafter. The effect of exiting institutions is reflected in the predicted partyiness of their candidate at  $t_7$ , which stands at a similar level of partyiness as the party's candidate at  $t_4$ . This demonstrates how a sudden event that decreases a party's access to public resources can affect its internal life. However, as already pointed out, the effect is not fatal, as parties express some resilience. Losing institutional access sets the party back for several legislative periods, but does not automatically force parties to nominate candidates without any experience whatsoever. Parties use the resources they obtain from the state to build a stronger organization, and thus can resist organizational shocks like exiting parliament or periods of poor electoral results. I will address this point in the following section where I test for the effect of several organizational forms. Overall, this simulation exercise helps us to understand how access to organizational resources structurally shapes the type of candidate parties will be able to nominate, especially in the longer term.

To finish this section, I will address a possible critique of the previous analysis and present a robustness test. It could be argued that there is an endogeneity problem in the models shown in figure 5.3, as the indicator of partyiness is constructed using top candidates' previous experience in government and parliament, among other variables. In addition, the models include parties' experience in government and in parliament as independent variables. It could be argued that parties with higher institutional experience will include many more candidates with more experience, and therefore these parties will display higher levels of partyiness. However, parties with extensive institutional experience may still decide to nominate political outsiders as an electoral strategy in response to their popularity. To address this concern, I perform a robustness test that reproduces the same statistical models using years as party members as the dependent variable (appendix B). From all the different variables used to compose partyiness, top candidates' years as party members should be the variable the least associated with parties' access

Fig. 5.3: Predicted partyiness of a candidate under different party settings.



to government and parliament. The analysis shows that the variables indicating seats in parliament (in  $t - 1$ ) and cumulative time spent in government remain positive and statistically significant. In contrast, time in opposition and the percentage of votes behave in the same direction as before, negative and positive respectively. Nevertheless, they do not achieve the standard levels of statistical significance. The results show that the previous results are not driven by how the dependent variable is constructed. On the one hand, parties with a higher parliamentary and governmental presence can implement cursus honorum systems - or effective systems of internal opportunity

structures - which lead to better political training of party members, which should increase the mean reliability of the party's whole pool of aspirants. On the other hand, these successful parties will attract more members as they become more attractive vehicles for ambitious people wishing to start a political career. However, it has to be kept in mind that time spent as a party member is only one of a variety of dimension parties can use to measure the reliability of candidates, in addition to all their service and experience holding public office (see section 4.2).

To conclude, this section has shown evidence in support of hypothesis 1, as parties with higher screening and recruitment capacities nominate candidates with higher partyness. In addition, I have shown that part of the screening and recruitment capacity is linked to their access – and size – in parliament and in government, implying that holding public office provides parties with several organizational resources, most crucially public funding and patronage opportunities. Access to public institutions turns parties into better principals. More resources enable parties to build more effective and efficient internal opportunity structures, which leads to higher capacity as an organization. Principals with higher capacity will be more likely to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard. In the next section, I discuss which organizational elements may help parties to build more effective internal opportunity structures independently of their access to public funding.

## **5.5 Modes of party organizational strategy**

In this section, I explore how different organization modes within parties can shape the nomination of top candidates. Due to their different social origins and timing, some parties develop labor-intensive organizations, where members are critical for developing many of the party tasks, like campaigning. Other parties rely on capital-intensive strategies, where some of these tasks are outsourced to professional advisors or consulting companies. These differences should affect the nomination of the top candidate. Parties with labor-intensive structures recruit more members and socialize them more intensively to adhere to party values. This should result in bigger pools of candidates with an overall higher level of partyness than is the case for parties with capital intensive strategies. I test for two factors that denote labor-intensive strategies: the number of existing ancillary organizations, and the number of party members.

### ***5.5.1 Ancillary organizations***

In this section, I proceed analyze the role of ancillary organizations within party life, and in particular the degree of top candidates' partyness. Ancillary organizations are all those organizations formally linked to a political party that defend any type of special interest within the party. Typically, parties have affiliated sub-organizations that bring together party members sharing any specific attribute such as youth or gender. Sub-organization will represent and promote specific groups within parties (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014). Alternatively, other ancillary organizations may hold greater autonomy from the party, and in some cases, a party may even be the product of an ancillary organization. This is the case for social-democratic parties that were founded or sponsored by trade

unions. In order to select which ancillary organizations to analyze, I followed the PPDB project coding (Poguntke et al., 2016), and thus checked for the existence of any organizations representing the interests of any of the following groups: women, youth, seniors, farmers, ethnic or linguistic minorities, specific religious groups, and workers and business community members (including SMEs). For the latter two, I also checked for parties' formal affiliations with trade unions<sup>10</sup> or business association. I searched for the founding date<sup>11</sup> of each sub-organization and built a composite index of how many organizations existed within the party in any given year following Allern and Verge's (2017) approach. I term this index 'organizational complexity'. The mean number of sub-organizations a party has in the time period covered here is 1.95 (with a standard deviation of 1.58), with youth and women's organizations being the most common. However, the number and types of organizations greatly differ by country and party family. As observed in figure 5.3, Spanish parties have on average one single organization (youth organizations), while German parties have an average of 3.01, and Canadian organizations 1.5. Among them, the most common type in all three countries is the youth organization, while women's organizations represent the second most common type in Germany and Canada. Concerning party family, social democrats have on average higher levels of organizational complexity, mostly due to their links with trade unions, despite having severed these ties in recent decades (Astudillo, 2004; Allern and Bale, 2017). In terms of evolution over time, the number of party sub-organizations significantly increased in the 1960s and 1970s, but has remained relatively stable since.

Additionally, I look more closely at the specific role of the party youth organization. This sub-organization is special as it not only acts as a way for young people to bring their interests to the party agenda, but also acts as a training camp for future party elites. For instance, in figure 5.4, we observe how, despite a few fluctuations, the percentage of top candidates that have belonged to parties' youth organizations has generally increased over time. We can assume that parties' youth organizations have played a critical role in the political socialization of their top candidates. These candidates succeeded in climbing the party ladder from the bottom to one of the most important positions. In addition, these people will have passed through more screening processes than their predecessors, and will probably express higher levels of reliability. As a result, we should observe a positive association between the existence of youth party organizations and degree of partyiness of top candidates. The variable is operationalized as the cumulative number of years that youth organizations have existed within a given party.

Figure 5.5 reports the results of the regression analysis. The two models add a new variable to the full model in figure 5.2, which acts as baseline. Contrary to expectations, organizational complexity and the existence over time of a youth organization within the party do not seem to be associated with higher levels of partyiness among top candidates. The coefficient of organizational complexity is positive, as expected, but fails to reach any of the standard levels of statistical significance. In addition, the effect of youth organizations is zero. Therefore,

<sup>10</sup> In order to determine if a trade union is affiliated with a political party, I considered if any of the following conditions are met: the trade union has a) reserved posts in the party executive committee, b) weighted votes in the leadership selection, c) a sub-party organization bringing together members of the union and the party, and d) the official trade union is listed in the party constitution. Data for Canada was obtained from Jansen and Young (2009), for Germany from Schroeder (2007) and Spier (2017), and for Spain from Astudillo (2004).

<sup>11</sup> If the founding date in each different region is not available, I assume the organization to have grown equally throughout the territory since its foundation at the federal level.

Fig. 5.4: Differences in organizational complexity.





Fig. 5.5: The role of organizational complexity on top candidates' partyness.



Note: All models include party, region and country FEs. Jackknife-robust models by party-region dyad. Control variables omitted from the plot. CI at 95%

after controlling for access to organizational resources, I do not find any support in the data indicating that youth organizations increase the degree of partyiness of top candidates, which leads me to reject hypothesis 2. We had expected that the existence of youth party organizations would help parties to establish foreseeable career paths, or internal opportunity structures, for new and ambitious members willing to climb the party ladder. As a result, we expected parties to have lower chances of experiencing adverse selection or moral hazard when nominating a candidate, and to generally be able to nominate candidates with higher partyiness on average. However, the results show that this is not the case. In the next subsection, I explore a similar argument concerning the number of party members.


### ***5.5.2 The size of party membership***

Another factor that helps us to identify labor-intensive models of party organization is the number of party members. The decreasing levels of party membership across all European political parties is a well-documented phenomenon (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Kölln, 2016). In addition several works have studied how the decreasing number of members has impacted the internal life of parties and transformed party organizations (Kölln, 2014; Scarrow, 2014; van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014). Members represent critical resources for parties. Through their fees, they have long been parties' main financial funding source, and even if nowadays public funding represents parties' most important source of funding (van Biezen, 2008), members still play a vital role. For example, they remain parties' most important canvassers during campaigns. In addition, members contribute to vital party organs such as political academies or the party newspaper. We should therefore expect a positive association between parties' membership levels and top candidates' degrees of partyiness as members constitute a vital organizational asset

Unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain reliable data on party membership at the sub-national level for Canada and Spain. Thus I perform the analysis using only the German subsample. For the German case, I rely on the *Handbuch zur Statistik der Parlamente* (Handscheil, 2002; Boyer and Kössler, 2005; Franz and Gnad, 2005) for the period 1945-1990, and on the data collected by Niedermayer (2013, 2018) for the post 1990 period. I will measure party membership both in terms of the total number of party members, as well as variations in numbers between elections. Due to the extreme positive skewness of the variable, I will use a logarithmic transformation of the variable.

Figure 5.6 displays the results of the analysis. Because this analysis is only carried out on the German sub-sample, appendix B includes a reproduction of the baseline model with the German subsample. Although none of the coefficients reach statistical significance, it is nevertheless worth mentioning the results of the first equation. On the one hand, larger party membership seems to favor candidacy renewal, while an increase in membership size between elections seems to benefit the incumbent. This could be interpreted as larger memberships being more critical of candidate performance. However it could also be indicative of as party expansion and the active recruitment of new members being used as a means for a candidate to increase their support base within an organization.

Fig. 5.6: The role of party membership size on top candidates' partyness.



Concerning the second equation, neither the total size of party membership nor changes in membership numbers between elections reach the conventional thresholds of statistical significance. Interestingly, changes in party membership numbers from one election to the next, despite not being statistically significant, operates in the opposite direction to that which was expected. Instead of pushing older party members towards the party elite, it may be related to some degree of renewal within organizations, and younger members being nominated as candidates. The result follows the same pattern as those for parties' organizational complexity, and contrasts with the strong statistical effect found in some of the variables pointing to the importance of access to public office, such as seats won in parliament and time spent in government. This leads me to reject hypothesis 3, as I do not find a significant association between the size of the party membership and the characteristics of top candidates. I would have expected that bigger memberships within a party to translate, on the one hand, into larger pools of aspirants for parties to choose from, but also that larger memberships be associated with more labor-intensive organizations with higher organizational capacity. Both situations would have entailed parties nominating top candidates with a higher degree of partyness, but this is not supported by the empirical analysis. The overall result of both analyses points towards a high degree of party cartelization (Katz and Mair, 1995). Parties seem very dependent on stable electoral results that give them access to public funding and other organizational resources associated with public office.

## 5.6 Discussion

This chapter has tackled the differences in opportunities regarding the recruitment and training of top candidates with high levels of partyiness, as not all political parties can build effective internal opportunity structures. Some parties can create foreseeable career paths for their members, where compliance with the party's dominant coalition will result in promotion through the party ranks, and ultimately appointment as a candidate for political office. Despite the literature on career paths having paid much attention to the existence of *cursus honorum* or foreseeable career paths within parties (Stolz, 2003; Ohmura et al., 2018), there is virtually no research about the conditions that enable parties to successfully build these structures. This chapter has contributed to exposing that gap in the literature. In addition, I have combined this perspective with a principal agent approach on the divergent capacities of principals have to implement screening and selection processes. To summarize, political parties that can successfully build a structure of internal opportunity will be able to systematically nominate more deeply entrenched top candidates. Therefore, studying the structural conditions – or differences in opportunities – that allow parties to nominate highly entrenched candidates or prevent them from doing so becomes a pre-requisite before looking into parties' preferences.

In conclusion, the different empirical analyses have shown support for the first hypothesis of this study, but not for the second and third. Political parties are consistently able to scrutinize nomination aspirants more deeply and thus to select top candidates with a higher degree of partyiness. First, the descriptive analysis shows that party capacity tends to grow over time, and reaches a certain natural ceiling, which acts as an equilibrium. However, that equilibrium depends on party characteristics, and these can vary over time. Second, access to votes, parliamentary seats and government office allows parties to increase their screening and recruitment capacities. In other words, parties become principals that are more efficient, and are able to train more entrenched party members. Access to public funding and patronage capacities is critical in allowing parties to generate internal structures of opportunities. Third, other traditional party resources such as party members and affiliated organizations able to mobilize the electorate do not play a significant role in shaping parties' internal structures of opportunity. It is interesting to remark that the results are in line with Samuels and Shugart's (2010) expectation that parliamentary democracies rarely nominating outsiders or political newcomers as top candidates. They argued that the institutional system provided parties incentives to nominate reliable, more experienced candidates. However, I find that party nomination of highly experienced individuals is clearly linked with parties' capacities to train them. In addition, Samuels and Shugart only studied the parties that chaired the executive branch, so the capacity of these parties would have presumably been higher. To disentangle further the specific role of both institutional systems and party capacities, it would be necessary to study the role of party capacity in presidential systems and observe whether it is on average lower in presidential democracies. If true, it would be considered as another consequence of the divergent incentives that the form of government provide for parties to behave differently. If false, it would be reasonable to believe that their results could have been driven by the selection of the sample, specifically by the decision of only including the parties that hold the chief executive office.

The results indicate that the studied parties behave as cartelized organizations (Katz and Mair, 1995), whose survival, strategic capacities and development, in this case concerning the nomination of top candidates, is heavily dependent on their access to public office and the benefits that this entails. Katz and Mair (1995) conceived of the cartel party as the organizational stage where parties become part of the state. Among many other factors, cartel parties are characterized by their reliance on public financing and patronage opportunities arising from their participation in public office to develop their activities. Their members tend to be professional politicians without the traditional networks and class background of mass party members. The results show that parties are highly dependent on access to public institutions for training and recruiting members. Another of the characteristics advocated by Katz and Mair is that cartel parties aim to shape party competition and increase the salience of valence issues such as efficiency, or parties' managerial skills (Katz and Mair, 1995), but also of candidate personality or honesty (Katz, 2014). If true, we would expect that parties increasingly prefer electable candidates vis-à-vis reliable ones. In the next two chapters, I explore how differences in preferences shape top candidates' nomination processes; specifically I look into how parties react to internal and external inputs.

## Chapter 6

### Internal demand

In the previous chapter, I have tackled the differences in opportunity parties have for nominating party members with high reliability as top candidates. The differences in opportunity – or *party screening and recruitment capacity* as I term them – arise from the party’s access to public office and other organizational resources that allow them to build effective internal structures of opportunity. However, I do not find evidence pointing to specific organizational forms being more or less successful in generating top candidates with higher levels of partyiness. In this chapter, I will tackle the differences in preferences. In concrete, I will explore the changes in preferences associated with changes in the internal life of parties. Norris and Lovenduski’s (1994, p. 14) traditional supply and demand model assumes that “selectors choose candidates depending upon their perceptions of the applicants’ abilities, qualifications, and experience”. However, selectors’ criteria are unlikely to remain stable over time, and certain candidate features that might be considered harmful for the party at one time, may be beneficial at another. Between one election and the next, many internal and external factors could shape the decision-making of party selectors.

Parties are commonly considered as unitary actors with cohesive preferences (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009), despite previous research having shown that individual members or groups have different incentives to deviate from the party line, and even switch party alliances (Heller and Mershon, 2009; Ceron, 2019; Sieberer and Ohmura, 2019). In this chapter, I relax the unitary actor assumption by exploring how changes in the internal dominant coalition in between elections may influence the nomination of the top candidate for the next election. Political parties are not unitary actors; they are composed of several factions and groups who compete with each other for the party’s internal and external resources, including patronage. Furthermore, they compete to influence their party’s strategic decision-making in terms of people and policies, namely the selection of different candidates, and the drafting of the party manifesto. Party factions also compete among themselves to influence the leadership selection, the composition of the party’s executive committee, and the approval of policy resolutions in the party conference. Intra-party conflicts are difficult to capture empirically due to parties’ secrecy. However, some of their consequences will be reflected in a party’s strategic decisions. For instance, a party with a high leadership turnover signals a very unstable organization filled with internal battles, and probably also highly fractionalized. The social composition of a party can change after experiencing a “dramatic” event, such a split. It is more than reasonable to speculate that this sort of event can change selectors’ decision criteria in between

elections. For instance, party selectors may be more risk-averse after a party suffers a split, and favour a party insiders as candidates. In this chapter, I am going to test how two different sources of intra-party conflict can change selectors' criteria from one election to the next.

The guiding hypothesis of this chapter is whether a change in the party's dominant coalition should result in parties nominating less partisan candidates as sign of political renovation (hypothesis 8). In addition, and in line with competing hypotheses 9A and 9B, we can expect different types of selectors to process changes differently. The results show that changes within the dominant coalition have a strong impact on the turnover of candidates, but not on their characteristics. Namely, I consider that changes in the dominant coalition consist of party splits, merges and name changes, on the one hand, and change of the party leadership on the other. One of the contributions of this chapter is on how to measure changes within a party's dominant coalition in a consistent way despite the difficulty in accessing data on parties' internal lives.

## 6.1 Party splits, merges and name change

Parties can use certain events to reposition themselves for the electorate and to rebuild their internal coalition. For example, in January 1989, the Spanish conservative party *Alianza Popular* (Peoples' Alliance) changed its name to *Partido Popular* (Peoples' Party). The name change was a symbolic moment that represented the transition of a party created by former ministers of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to a mainstream centre-right European party (López Nieto, 1988; Baón, 2001; Ramiro, 2005). In addition to a new name, the party adopted a much more centrist policy platform and a new generation of young politicians occupied the key roles within the party (García-Guereta, 2001; Penella, 2005). This section explores how name change, in addition to suffering a party split, or merging with another political party can affect selectors' criteria by changing the internal demand-side factors.

Splits, mergers and name changes constitute changes within a party's dominant coalition, and therefore can have profound consequences on the internal life of parties, and modify selector preferences. In line with hypothesis 7, we would expect that a change in the dominant coalition would trigger a renovation in the party's candidacy in terms of who stands as candidate and what their characteristics are. After a change in a party's dominant coalition, we would expect more electable and less reliable candidates. However, through which mechanism does this occur? First, parties change their name when they want to distance themselves from failure (Deschouwer, 2004) – usually electoral failure. Name changes signal a desire for party renewal, and should also translate to nominating less party-entrenched candidates. Second, mergers change the social composition of a party. However, a party can decide to merge with another party for two reasons, which can result in two different changes in the dominant coalition. On the one hand, a party might merge if their organizational existence were threatened. A dying organization can seek to merge with another instead of dissolving itself. In this case, the primary partner in the merger would retain most of the power in the new organization, and the change in the dominant coalition would be small. On the other hand, parties can strategically decide to merge with one another to achieve goals – above the mere maintenance of the party activity – they cannot reach by themselves, such as parliamentary representation or

entering into government (Bolleyer, Correa and Katz, 2019). In this case, parties who merge will seek to have some complementary advantage, and the power-relationship between the partners will be more balanced. This should result in a greater change in the dominant coalition and most likely in different types of candidates with lower levels of partyiness. Finally, a split implies that parties lose organizational resources. When a section of a party breaks away, they will take a share of the party resources, such as members, activists, or even donors. Moreover, some of the party's elected officers may follow and bring with them access to public funding. This will result in the party losing organizational capacity in the very short term, with a higher impact than exiting from government. At the same time, a split can destabilize the current leadership, push for a renewal of the party elite, and change the party's dominant coalition. What the three events have in common is that they will all change the party's dominant coalition, either replacing one by another (name change), shrinking it (split) or enlarging it (merger). Unfortunately, although I can test the expected effect, here, I am not able to do so for each of the possible mechanisms involved, neither am I able to tackle the reasons that initially trigger these events.

I have opted for a set of dichotomous variables to operationalize if a party suffered a split, merger or name change, indicating if a party has experienced any of these circumstances in the period between the current and the past election. I define *split* as the foundation of a new political party by former members of another political party (Ceron, 2015; Ibenskas and Sikk, 2017), *merger* as the union of two political parties into the same organizational form<sup>1</sup>, and by *name change*, a change in the party's registered name. However, not all events may be meaningful enough to change the internal structure of a party. I only considered as "relevant" the parties resulting from splits and mergers that obtained parliamentary representation at any point in the past or the future, either alone or in a coalition with a third party. This operationalization excludes fringe factions within parties that may split without changing the party's dominant coalition. For example, I consider the WAGS party to be a split of the SPD in Germany in 2005 because soon after its foundation the party made a coalition partner with the PDS, and obtained representation in the Bundestag. Another well-known split is that of Eusko Alkartasuna from the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in 1986, when the Basque prime minister broke up with the PNV and formed his own political platform. An example of a merger would be that of the Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta and the Wildrose party to form the United Conservative Party of Alberta. This was also the case in the Basque Country, when the PSOE's regional branch merged with the left nationalist party Euskadiko Ezquerria in 1994. In both cases, both parties had obtained parliamentary representation at some point. In addition, there have been several name changes, like the Canadian Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) into the New Democratic Party (NDP) or the Spanish conservatives, already mentioned. Finally, some political events can be considered differently depending on the party branch that experiences it. For example, I consider the union between the German Greens and the East German party *Bündnis 90* only as a merger in the former East Germany, as the latter did not exist in the West, and the member composition of these branches remained unchanged. For the West German branches of the Greens, the same event is coded as a name change.

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<sup>1</sup> By organizational form, I refer to either a single entity or a federation of parties, through the formation of joint bodies. This excludes electoral alliances, even if they last for several elections.


In total, I found 115 candidacies out of almost 2000 in the dataset where the associated parties experienced one of these events during the preceding inter-electoral period. In other words, only around 5% of the observations were influenced by such events, making them rather rare. In concrete, between the previous and the current election, 30 party branches – or party-region dyads – experienced a split, 14 a merger and 71 a name change. Being able to locate enough of these events to include them in a statistical analysis without them being “idiosyncratic” is one of the advantages of studying the sub-national arena in my study; this task would be substantially more challenging if it focussed on national politics. However, the long historical period in combination with the variety of parties and countries in my datasets allows for a meticulous analysis of splits, mergers and name changes in party behaviour. Figure 6.1 reports the results of regressing these variables against top candidate levels of partyiness. Like in the previous chapter, I use a two-step Heckman decision model where the first equation calculates the probability of a party nominating a new candidate, and the second equation calculates the degree of partyiness of a new candidate, correct for the sample-selection bias (see section 4.1.2 for further detail). Therefore, the coefficients in the second equation have to be interpreted on the conditionality of the party nominating a new candidate. I include as controls in the second equation the variables indicating the party screening capacity studied in the previous chapter, as well as the year, country, region and party-fixed effects. The first equation remains unchanged, but I include the main independent variable. All models have been calculated through a jack-knife procedure by party-region dyad to account for outliers. The effect of the main independent variables should be distinguished according to whether they affect the first or the second equation.

The results show that the nomination of a new candidate, experiencing a split, a name change, or all three, have a positive impact on the turnover of top candidates, and are associated with the nomination of a new top candidate. However, only the split and the combined variable have a statistically significant effect on new candidate characteristics. Parties are more likely to nominate a new candidate with a lower degree of partyiness when experiencing a split. These results can be explained in two different manners. First, an internal split would change a party’s composition and shape the dominant coalition, affecting both the selectors’ preferences and the structure of opportunities. Losing a significant part of the membership will leave the party with fewer available options. Alternatively, a split can open a window of opportunity for renewal in the party’s top ranks, and thus selectors would favour a top candidate with a lower level of partyiness. Second, name change also appears to open a window of opportunity for partisan renewal, despite not achieving the standard levels of statistical significance. After a change of name, it is more likely that a party will nominate a new candidate, but one with a similar degree of partyiness as her predecessor.

Nevertheless, we can consider that these events have deeper effects within parties and that they extend over time. A split can have profound consequences, and we may observe these beyond just the first election after a split has occurred. For this reason, I run a robustness check extending the effect to two and three elections after a split. The results are available in appendix B and show that the effect on the candidate turnover disappears, but the negative association with partyiness remains. In regard to the previous possible mechanisms, this long-time effect points more towards a decrease in party capacity due to losing part of the party, rather than to changes in the preferences of the selectorate. If the effect were due to a short-term change in the party selectorate, we would not expect it to

be so long-lasting (up to twelve years). I now proceed to comment on some examples of how a split, merger or name change may alter a party's internal dynamics.

Fig. 6.1: The role of splits, merges and name changes on top candidates' nomination.



The Liberal Party of Quebec is a good example of a political party that has experienced three significant splits over its history. Interestingly, all three splits contributed to shaping Quebec's political system, and eventually became the Liberal Party's main competitor. First, in 1934 during the Great Depression, a group of Liberal MPs broke away from the party and formed the *Action Libérale Nationale* party, with a more Quebec nationalist and social-catholic approach than the Liberals. The party obtained 29% of the vote in the 1935 general election, and a year later would merge with Quebec's conservatives to form the *Union Nationale*. This party would go on to govern Quebec for the following 20 years. In 1935, the Liberals managed to remain in power albeit as a minority government, but the poor electoral results, in addition to several corruption scandals pushed Liberal members to force the resignation of long-standing prime minister and party leader Louis-Alexandre Taschereau. Cabinet member, Adélar Godbout, replaced him in both positions, and tried to distance himself from Taschereau, calling a snap election in 1936. He lost the election against the recently formed *Union Nationale*. In terms of partyness, in the last election in which he competed, Taschereau had a score of 88 and Godbout of 22. However, the first time Taschereau ran, he already had plenty of political experience, showing a partyness score of 61.

Almost 30 years later, in 1966, the Liberals suffered a remarkable defeat after two terms in office. Then a wing of the party decided to move the party towards a more nationalist position. This wing, led by the former Liberal minister René Lévesque, was defeated in a party conference and left the Liberals to found the *Parti Québécois* (PQ). This contributed towards pulling the remaining Liberal party members into a more moderate position that, in 1970,

chose Robert Bourassa as their new party leader. With a partyness score of 11, Bourassa shows a remarkably lower score than his predecessor, Jean Lesage, who had a score of 50. Third, in 1994 during a negotiation for reforms in Canadian federalism, the most nationalist wing of the liberals opposed the policies of Bourassa, Quebec's prime minister at that time, and split from the party to create the *Action Democratique de Québec*. The split pushed Bourassa to resign, and he was replaced by one of his ministers, Daniel Johnson Jr. Unlike the former examples, both leaders had closer levels of partyness – 48 and 35 respectively. All three examples show how party splits occur in extraordinary circumstances, rarely more than once in a generation. Splits seem to happen when parties face increasing polarization on any of the issues of political competition, and suffer (the expectation of) an electoral defeat. However, splits have deep consequences for a party, and the results reveal them as a catalyst for party change. It is reasonable to believe that after a split, the remaining party members will push for internal party renewal, and thus favour the nomination of a new top candidate.

In contrast neither mergers nor name changes have a significant statistical effect on the selection of new candidates. For instance, in the main name changes that the dataset covers, such as CCF to NDP, or AP to PP, the top candidate changed around 60% of the time between the election before and after the name change. Although this number seems considerable, once we control for the screening capacity of the party and the determinants of the re-selection of the previous candidate, they do not show any statistically significant association. In addition, there may be some other relationship that we fail to capture in our model, in particular the change of leadership in Germany and Spain. We can speculate that both tend to happen altogether. A split or a merger can dramatically change the composition of a party, and the previous leadership may cease to possess the necessary support to stay in office, while a name change may push for change in the leadership. Indeed, in 68% of cases where a party experienced a split, merger or a name change, there was also a change in the party leadership. The next section looks into the effect of leadership change on top candidate selection.

## 6.2 Change of party leadership


Together with the top candidate, the party leader is the other most prominent figure within a party. Although the same person occupies both roles most of the time, and in Canada they always do, they differ in their purpose. In this section, I investigate how a change in party leadership shapes the selection process of top candidates. As Pilet and Cross (2015) recall, the prerogatives of party leaders are crucial for the successful functioning of parties in democratic states. Party leaders shape the selection of ministers (Dowding and Dumont, 2008) and legislative candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). In addition, they help to draft the party manifesto (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000), and ensure intra-party discipline by allocating promotions and punishments (Müller, 2000). Party leaders ensure that all elements of the party contribute to the organization's common goal, prevent free-riding and protect the party's reputation and common brand (Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, obtaining information on party leaders' selection procedures and tenure is extremely challenging, and only recent studies (Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and Pilet, 2015) have been able to obtain fine-grained data for more than a handful of countries.

To address how changes in the leadership of extra-parliamentary party organizations may affect top candidate nomination, it was necessary to collect information on the sub-national party leaders for all regional party branches over a long period of time (see details in section 3.3 for details on the data collection). I have been able to collect information on the tenure of 2442 party leaders – day of election and exit – as well as information on their selection procedure for more than 750 of them, including type of selectorate, number of aspirants and result. This allowed me to construct two different variables for measuring a change in the dominant coalition through change in party leadership. First, I consider that the dominant coalition changes when the party leader changes between the current and the previous election. I found that, of the 1885 observations for which I have data on this variable, 49.97% experienced a leadership change between any two given elections. Second, I consider an alternative operationalization which only counts as a change in the dominant coalition those leadership changes where the new leader had to contest their position. In other words, only leadership races with at least two candidates count as a change in the dominant coalition. This way, "smooth" transitions where the new leader is "crowned" rather than elected are excluded. This distinction is crucial, as we may assume that when there is an orderly transition, the dominant coalition does not change. Looking into the descriptives of this second operationalization, in 23.26% of cases, parties experience a contested change of leadership in between elections (out of the 1234 observations for which I have this variable available). Interestingly, this number decreases to around 16% of the time for German and Spanish parties, but increases to 35% for the Canadian cases, showing how German and Spanish party elites are more likely to reach an internal agreement before publicly exposing internal differences and being subsequently subjected to electoral punishment (Astudillo and Detterbeck, 2018; So, 2020).

A change in leadership can be the trigger for, or the ultimate consequence of an intra-party fight, thus providing evidence of a shift within a party's dominant coalition. When there are such shifts, previous top candidates become open to challenge, especially if they are also the current party leader. Figure 6.2 shows how a change in leadership in between elections is highly associated with the nomination of a new top candidate. As in the previous models, I use a two-step Heckman decision model to disentangle the variables associated with a higher turnover of candidates and those explaining the characteristics of top candidates when there is a new one. The effect is similar when considering all leadership changes or only those who were contested (marked with a C). To put the result in context, the coefficient size is bigger than the coefficient indicating whether the previous candidate was the standing prime minister. However, change in leadership does not seem to be associated with the level of partyness of the next candidate in any of the two operationalisations. If this were be the case, a negative coefficient in the second equation would suggest that internal renewal follows a change of leadership. Interestingly, and despite their lack of statistical significance, the effect is bigger for "consensual" leadership changes than for contested ones. This result suggests that party renewal actually happens when there is a consensual change in the party, but not when there is contested change of leadership, as this probably is the consequence of factional battles within the party.

However, it is necessary to take into account how the top candidate was nominated. There is a high variance in the type of selector, and different selectors may behave differently due to varied reasons. On the one hand, different types of selectors may hold different preferences, with party activists being more ideologically-minded than grassroots members and party elites (hypothesis 9A). On the other hand, transaction and coordination costs

Fig. 6.2: The role of leadership change and selectorate type on top candidates' nomination.




may increase with the size of the selector body, as discussed in chapter 2 (hypothesis 9B). Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of the selectorate across time and country. On the one hand, Canada has undergone a transition in the selection methods employed, shifting from the party elite as selectorate, which in Canada corresponds to the parliamentary party group, to party conferences, and more recently to primaries. (open or closed)<sup>2</sup>. In contrast, Spain and Germany are marked by their respective traditional selection systems, party conferences in Germany and the party elite in Spain; only recently did their parties start to experiment with other selection methods. In Spain, delegated bodies such as "electoral committees" have traditionally appointed candidates. There, the recent importance of primaries is due to the emergence of new parties that have used them by default, like *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos*, and some of the traditional parties gradually adopting them, such as the PSOE. The conservatives and most of the regionalist parties stayed with their traditional selection method. German parties, in contrast, have traditionally nominated their candidates through the party conference. This procedure is even codified in the 1967 party law, which states that party conferences are responsible for selecting the party leader on all political levels – national, regional and local – (Detterbeck, 2013), and this procedure has been extended to the selection of top candidates. However, some German parties have also experimented with primaries, mainly as a way to overcome internal divides by letting the members decide on the candidate (Astudillo and Detterbeck, 2018).

Hence, what is the effect of different selectorates? Figure 6.2 also tests for the impact of the selectorate in the nomination of top candidates. Interestingly, the same variable has significant effects in each of the two equations of the model, but with an opposite sign. Please bear in mind that I always take the party conference as the ref-

<sup>2</sup> As discussed earlier for Canada, the role of party leader and top candidate are merged, and thus I consider that the selection method of the top candidate is the same as that of the party leader.

Fig. 6.3: Distribution of selectorate by country over time.



erence category. This is done for two reasons. First, it is the most common selection method. Second, some of theoretical predictions based on May's Law (1973) and captured in hypothesis 9A tend to consider this as the most ideologically-minded selectorate; they attribute party activists a greater weighting than the other types of selectorate. The results in the model show that if a party selects a candidate in a primary, the candidate is more likely to be new. However, this new candidate will not necessarily show more or less partyiness than we would have expected in that party given their level of screening and recruitment capacity. This result is in agreement with the body of literature arguing that party primaries tend to benefit party insiders, and the traits traditionally associated with them. These traits include being male, Caucasian and middle-aged, partly because these kinds of individuals tend to have better political networks and enjoy greater name recognition. Conversely, if the party elite are responsible for nomination, it is not more likely that the top candidate will change. However, if the candidate

chosen by the party elite is new, the candidate will tend to show a higher degree of partyness than average – around 8 points more. As a consequence, party elites tend to nominate more experienced candidates, which is what we would have expected following both the preferences approach based on May, and the transactional approach. The fact that primaries behave in an undistinguishable manner from party conferences makes this result inconclusive in so far as it does not fit any of the two competing hypotheses.

Selectors do differ in their baseline preferences for a candidate, but they can also differ in how they react to a given stimuli. Figure 6.4 plots the results of interacting both variables, and we can see that leadership change continues to have a significant effect on top candidate turnover. However, the interaction term between change of leadership and the selectorate does not show significant results in any of the operationalisations. It is interesting to highlight the change of the role of the party elite in the two situations, despite the coefficients not reaching standard levels of statistical significance. When there has been a leadership change, party elites seem to favour new candidates with less experience. However, when the leadership change has been contested, elites seek candidates that are more experienced. This interesting result points to how intra-party battles shape the selection criteria of top candidates, even when the same type of selectorate is responsible for the nomination. Figure 6.5 reflects the change in more detail by plotting the average marginal effect of leadership change in each selectorate. This reflects how party elites may be more willing to change their criteria depending on the political circumstances, and even rally around certain candidates when the internal situation is delicate. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction between selecting the top candidate through primaries and a change of leadership remains almost unchanged in both operationalisations. In comparison to party elites, primary selectors seem to maintain their criteria whether the leadership has been contested or not. This result suggests how coordination among different political scenarios may be more difficult in large selectorates, following the argument proposed by (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and hence providing some support for hypothesis 9B.

In this section, I have offered systematic evidence of how intra-party battles shape selector criteria. We can conclude that changes in party leadership have a large impact on the turnover of candidates, as new candidates tend to follow a new party leader, revealing how intra-party battles are developed in regard to both partisan offices and candidacy positions. However, these new candidates do not seem to be significantly different in terms of partyness after a leadership change. Two different types of arguments could contravene this result. First, there is the fact that Canadian party leaders automatically become top candidates, and these cases may be driving the results in the first equation. However, this finding is robust when Canada is excluded from the sample (appendix B). Second, it could be argued that party selectors anticipate that a new leader will very likely run as the party's next top candidate, and therefore they choose the new leader according to the criteria for nominating a top candidate and not for choosing a new party leader. I will go on to explore this possibility in more depth for the cases of Germany and Spain. In order to do this, I run a modification of the selection equation where I consider three possible outcomes: first, the party nominates the previous candidate; second, the party nominates a new candidate who is the party leader; and third, the party nominates a new candidate who is not the party leader. The distribution of these variables shows that half the time parties re-nominate their previous candidate. However, in 25% of cases, parties nominate a new

Fig. 6.4: The selectorate as a mediator of a change in the internal demand.





Fig. 6.5: Average marginal effect of leadership change according to the type of selectorate.



candidate who is simultaneously the party leader, and in another 25% of cases, parties select a new candidate who is not the party leader.

Table 6.1 presents a multinomial regression model exploring the determinants of parties nominating a new candidate who may, or may not be the party leader. The action of the party nominating the previous candidate versus a new candidate that may, or may not be the party leader acts as reference category. The first model reproduces the variables of the selection model. The second model adds the change of party leadership since the last election, and whether the current leader is a caretaker, as we can expect that caretaker leaders<sup>3</sup> are less likely to compete for the top candidacy. The final model adds the selection method of the party leader, and whether their selection was contested or not. I include these variables in a separate model, as I do not have this information available for the whole sample.

The analysis shows, regarding the performance of the previous candidate, that if the former candidate obtained better results than their predecessor (in  $t - 2$ ), it is more likely that they will repeat as top candidate. In a similar vein, the qualitative definitions of success express interesting results. If the previous candidate achieved the prime ministership, it is very likely that they will repeat as top candidate. However, when the previous top candidate succeeded in obtaining parliamentary representation or accessing government, this achievement only increases their re-election chances *vis-à-vis* the party leader, but not in regard to a new candidate that is not the leader. It can be speculated that previous achievements boost top candidates' re-selection chances when they compete against party leaders willing to run themselves, but not when competing against popular new candidates that may emerge. In other words, according to the results from the previous models, in the event of a party finding an especially attractive alternative candidate, previous aspirants have very few chances of being re-nominated unless they are the standing prime minister.

### **6.2.1 Party leaders and top candidates**

The most interesting finding here concerns change in leadership. The results show that a change of leadership opens an opportunity window for change of candidate. Interestingly, this does not seem to only benefit new party leaders. The coefficient is positive and significant for the outcome of nominating new candidates that are the party leader or not the party leader, although the effect is greater for nominating a new candidate who is the party leader. This result can be interpreted in two different ways. First, that new party leaders will generally seek their nomination as top candidates, possibly to consolidate the internal coalition that elected them in the first place. Second, not all new party leaders will seek the nomination, and some of them will instead focus on intra-party matters – perhaps in anticipation of assuming that they would lose a nomination contest. We can even speculate that some leaders that gained party office might have to compromise regarding the top candidate selection with another party faction. However, it remains an open question if such an agreement could be reached before or after the selection of the party leader. In general, change in leadership opens a window of opportunity for new candidates, but not

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<sup>3</sup> I consider caretaker leaders as those appointed temporarily after a party leader's resignation.

necessarily for the new leader to become top candidate. Interestingly, when including the leader's selection method, the effect remains, and selection through a primary election is revealed to be highly and positively associated with the nomination of a party leader as top candidate. When leaders are selected by the whole membership, they seem to have a kind of additional sense of legitimacy compared to those selected by the party elite of party conferences, to become the top candidate almost automatically. Interestingly, the coefficient shows that contested leaders are less likely to run as top candidates despite it not achieving the standard levels of statistical significance.

We can conclude this section by referring back to hypothesis 8, which states that changes within a party's dominant coalition should lead to a party nominating less partisan candidates. Considering that changes in party leadership are a proxy for observing changes within the dominant coalition, the results show these have significant consequences for the selection of candidates. Leadership changes are strongly associated with a change of candidate, and so it is very likely that a new candidate is nominated after this event. However, the candidates selected after a change of leadership do not show a higher or lower degree of partyness after controlling for the party's degree of screening and recruitment capacity. This has two important implications for the nomination of candidates. First, intra-party politics matter, and the only reason to substitute a candidate may be that they belong to an opposing faction, without further strategic considerations and regardless of other personal characteristics. A change of leadership implies a change in the dominant coalition, and the new dominant coalition will seek to consolidate their power by occupying the most pivotal positions within the party, including the top candidacy. Second, parties' screening and recruitment capacities (chapter 5) remain key to understanding top candidate characteristics. Even when parties experience a change in their dominant coalition, represented by a change in the leadership, parties will be able to generate new candidates with similar degrees of partyness if they manage to maintain their screening and recruitment capacities.

Table 6.1: The nomination of party leaders as top candidates in Germany and Spain

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL
Pre-electoral coalition	-0.455 (0.585)	0.772 (0.617)	-0.315 (0.687)	0.696 (0.663)	-0.178 (0.987)	1.107 (1.033)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0751*** (0.00980)	0.0510*** (0.00966)	0.0774*** (0.0113)	0.0493*** (0.0104)	0.0865*** (0.0149)	0.0586*** (0.0141)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0266* (0.0133)	-0.0347** (0.0131)	-0.0330* (0.0155)	-0.0335* (0.0140)	-0.0433* (0.0199)	-0.0478** (0.0185)
Performance:						
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.780** (0.302)	-0.00769 (0.291)	-1.132*** (0.342)	-0.220 (0.321)	-0.224 (0.539)	0.0753 (0.544)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.028*** (0.248)	-0.285 (0.235)	-1.022*** (0.293)	-0.198 (0.249)	-1.259** (0.404)	-0.470 (0.347)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.896*** (0.223)	-1.071*** (0.222)	-1.793*** (0.265)	-0.990*** (0.239)	-2.294*** (0.335)	-1.355*** (0.310)
Caretaker leader			-0.353 (1.106)	2.177* (0.990)		
No leadership change			Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Leadership change			1.026* (0.420)	0.229 (0.334)	2.592* (1.192)	2.089* (1.034)
Months as leader			-0.00713* (0.00315)	0.00204 (0.00208)	-0.0107* (0.00517)	0.00443 (0.00296)
Leader in t-1			-1.358***	-1.231***	-0.0420	0.429

Party Elite	(0.388)	(0.338)	(1.139)	(1.007)
Party Conference			0.0747 (0.514)	-0.209 (0.519)
			Ref.	
Primary			3.972* (1.927)	2.191 (1.795)
Contested leader			-0.0813 (0.268)	0.106 (0.249)
Constant	-3.004*** (0.653)	-4.257*** (0.943)	-2.660** (0.851)	-3.471*** (0.992)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1314	1256	781	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.134	0.244	0.298	

Standard errors in parentheses


TC stands for Top Candidate, PL stands for Party Leader

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### 6.3 Change in the dominant coalition

So far, I have studied each of the individual elements that may provoke a change in the dominant coalition of a party at a given moment in time. For the last analysis of this chapter, I pool together all the possible sources of internal coalition change – splits, mergers, name changes and changes of leadership – into a single and comprehensive dichotomous variable. Figure 6.6 shows the result of the analysis. Similar to the previous analyses, I find that a change in the dominant coalition in between elections has a strong and significant impact on candidate turnover, as it clearly increases the chances of a party nominating a new candidate. This effect is reinforced when primaries are used as the selection method. However, a change in the dominant coalition does not have a direct effect on the top candidate’s degree of partisanship. Candidates nominated after a change in their party’s dominant coalition do not show a significant change in their degree of partyiness. Moreover, this association is not conditional on the type of selectorate, as indicated by the interaction term, although there are indications that primaries tend to lead to top candidates with higher levels of partyiness.

Fig. 6.6: The effect of change in the party’s dominant coalition.



Regarding party splits, in the previous analyses, I only found a direct effect of party splits on partyiness. Furthermore, and also in line with the previous analysis, party elites seem to be especially risk averse, tending to nominate candidates with higher levels of partyiness. Therefore, this leads us to reject hypothesis 8, as more electable candidates are not nominated after a change within parties’ dominant coalitions, with only the exception of the party experiencing a split. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that party splits have the profound effect of favouring top candidate turnover. This phenomenon was not initially theorized, but has revealed some of the internal

dynamics driving the nomination of top candidates. This variable measuring change in the dominant coalition will be used in the following chapter for assessing the interaction between external and internal demand.

## 6.4 Discussion

The previous chapter explored the variance regarding differences in parties' opportunities, and established that access to public funding and other resources is key for parties' capacity to recruit, train and nominate candidates with high levels of partyiness. This chapter has explored part of the variance link to the divergence on preferences, in other words, how different events can shape the decision-making of party selectors and push them to nominate top candidates with higher or lower levels of partyiness. Factions within the party compete for internal and external resources that can help them to acquire or maintain a dominant position within the party. The external resources they can compete for are the support of interest groups and ancillary organizations (i.e. trade unions), but also the patronage capacities that come from accessing public office. In the previous chapter, I showed that patronage possibilities and stable funding sources – represented by access to public institutions – are essential for developing a party's screening and recruitment capacities. Internally, factions compete to have their members included in influential party bodies, such as the executive committee or the committee that draws up the party manifesto. In addition, party factions also compete to place their members in the party leadership and the top candidacy at the electoral time.

Internal battles produce changes in the internal coalition, which translates into changes in the internal demand, which in turn affect selectors' criteria. This chapter offered a large-N analysis of fine-grained variables assessing different intra-party dynamics. Following Panebianco's (1988) concept of change in the party's dominant coalition, I operationalize it as a party experiencing a split, merger, change of name or a change of leadership. The posterior empirical analyses show that while splits have a negative and durable effect on top candidates' degrees of partyiness, no other tested factor has significant effects on top candidate characteristics, which led me to refute hypothesis 8. However, we consistently find an effect of the different elements that signal a change in the dominant coalition on top candidate turnover levels. When a party experiences an event that changes its dominant coalition, the party is much more likely to nominate a new candidate in the next election. I interpret this as a sign of intra-party competition. When an internal coalition changes in between elections, the new dominant coalition will seek to consolidate its position by nominating a new top candidate. Moreover, regarding competing hypotheses 9A and 9B, the results show that primaries tend to nominate new candidates, but that these candidates continue to display expected levels of partyiness considering the party screening and recruitment capacity. Conversely, party elites are more reluctant to change the top candidate, and when they do so, they tend to nominate people with higher levels of partyiness. However, the interaction between selector type and change in dominant coalition is not significant. As a consequence, this chapter does not offer conclusive results in regard to competing hypotheses 9A and 9B.

In the light of this approach and results, here I have also shown that some parties' behaviour could be explained more accurately when the traditional unitary actor assumption is relaxed. Most studies consider parties as unitary

actors whose actions can be rationalized according to a discrete selection of explanatory factors, most likely environmental, like changes in the electorate or their competition. However, sometimes parties will behave according to internal factors that may have a much greater effect on their behaviour than external factors. Here I have shown that candidate turnover can be explained by an internal logic that seeks the consolidation of the new dominant coalition rather than the overall wellbeing of the organization. Despite many scholars having stressed the importance of intra-party politics for explaining parties' behaviour (Giannetti and Benoit, 2009; Haber, 2015; Ceron, 2019), this element remained largely absent in the candidate selection literature. Here I have made a first contribution in this direction. In the next chapter, I apply the unitary actor assumption, as I study how parties react to external changes when nominating their candidates. I explore how changes in the electorate may push parties to nominate more electable candidates in order to remain electorally competitive, – in particular when the electorate becomes more fluid and detached from parties.

## Chapter 7

### External demand

This chapter studies political parties' differences in preferences related to external stimuli, and more specifically to changes in the electoral market. In the previous chapter, I have established that changes in a party's dominant coalition have a substantive impact on the candidate turnover but not on candidate characteristics. Top candidates nominated after a change of leadership or a party name change tend to be new, but do not show a higher or lower degree of partyness. Furthermore, new party leaders aim to consolidate their position by running as top candidates. Here I inquire about how different changes in the electoral market could incentivize parties to nominate more electable rather than reliable candidates. In other words, acting in a more competitive electoral market should lead parties to nominate top candidates with lower levels of partyness. The rationale behind this proposition is that the progressive partisan de-alignment of the electorate in post-industrial democracies (Dalton, 2002; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 2009) is making electorates much more volatile and sensitive to valence issues such as top candidate characteristics and personalities (Bittner, 2011; Garzia, 2011).

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I will test for the effect of electoral defeat in the nomination process of top candidates. Second, I argue that parties not only respond to immediate electoral losses but also to the overall state of the electorate. For this, I consider how different measures of electoral competitiveness can appropriately capture the inputs that political parties are experiencing. The third section studies the effect of electoral competitiveness on top candidate nomination, including variations linked with time, party size and the electoral system. This section also includes several robustness checks. The fourth section studies the relationship between changes in the internal- and the external demands. The fifth section investigates name recognition as one of the possible causal mechanisms behind the different behaviour observed in party primaries. The final section concludes.


#### 7.1 Electoral defeat as a trigger for party change

The most studied trigger of party change, behavioural or institutional, is electoral defeat. This is the clearest negative signal voters can give to parties in order for them to change their trajectory course, thus rejecting their policy platform and personnel selection. In these instances, parties will see their parliamentary contingent reduced, and may experience exit from government, and even from parliament. In this way, they suffer direct consequences

in the form of loss of access to funding and other resources. This has been one of the single most widely used factors in the literature to explain party organizational change (Müller, 1997; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2004; Chiru et al., 2015), leadership renewal (Cross and Blais, 2012; Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher, 2015; Fernandez-Vazquez and Somer-Topcu, 2017) or candidacy renewal (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994; Astudillo, 2015; Gouglas, Maddens and Brans, 2018). In line with hypothesis 4, we should expect that parties nominate candidates with a lower level of partyness in the election following an electoral defeat. Such a result would be in line with Sandri, Seddone and Venturino’s (2015) finding that parties tend to renovate their leadership after an electoral defeat.

Figure 7.1 shows the results of including electoral defeat in our baseline model, which controls for the party screening capacity. As in the rest of the models, it displays a two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) where the first model controls for the determinants of a party nominating a new top candidate and the second explores this top candidate’s characteristics, namely their level of partyness. Electoral defeat is coded as a dichotomous variable indicating whether in the last election a party exited from government or from parliament. This straightforward operationalization seeks to distinguish true electoral shocks from more gradual changes like a decreasing vote share. Please bear in mind that the difference of votes between  $t - 1$  and  $t - 2$  is already included in the selection equation and the party vote share in  $t-1$  in both equations. In line with previous models, I also include an interaction with the type of selectorate to test if each selectorate may react differently to an electoral defeat.

Fig. 7.1: The role of electoral defeat in top candidates’ nomination.



The results of the statistical analysis indicate that electoral defeat plays an important role in determining the nomination of a new candidate. Despite the size of the effect being a third of that observed in chapter 6 for leadership change, the positive and highly significant coefficient in equation 1 indicates that parties are more likely to nom-

inate a different person as candidate after experiencing an electoral defeat. However, although it is an important determinant of candidate turnover, electoral defeat does not play a role in shaping top candidate characteristics as the coefficient is statistically undistinguishable from 0. Finally, testing for the selectorate type as a mediator of electoral defeat does not show a conclusive result. The positive coefficient of the interaction between the type of selectorate and electoral defeat suggests that these party elites and primary electors tend to nominate candidates with a higher level of partyiness after an electoral defeat, but the coefficient fails to achieve the standard levels of statistical significance. The individual effect of the selectorates types remain unchanged. Party primaries tend to nominate new candidates with similar levels of partyiness, while party elites are less likely to nominate new candidates. However, if they do, the candidates will show higher levels of partyiness than their predecessors. However, parties do not necessarily need to experience an ousting from government or parliament to perceive a change in the electorate. In the following sections, I explore how changes in electoral volatility or the composition of the party system can signal deep changes in the electorate to parties.

## **7.2 Alternative measures of electoral market change**

Direct electoral losses are not the unique environmental peril parties can face, neither the only way parties can feel under pressure from a change in their electoral market. An increase in the electoral competition, real or perceived, is also widely assumed to be one of the main factors triggering party change. Political parties are risk-averse organisations that only change when their current position – electoral or governmental among others – is in jeopardy (Harmel and Janda, 1994; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004). This has produced a fruitful literature studying both how parties react to an increase in the electoral competition (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski, 2016; Dassonneville, 2018; O’Grady and Abou-Chadi, 2019), as well as on how to measure changes in the electoral market (Kayser and Lindstädt, 2015; Stoffel and Sieberer, 2018; Cox, Fiva and Smith, 2019).

Here, I have selected three different conceptualisations of electoral competitiveness to test party responses in regard to the nomination of the top candidate. First, I use the traditional conceptualisation of electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1979). More volatile electorates imply more promiscuous voters and an overall lower degree of party loyalty. This measure is somewhat standard for measuring electoral competitiveness, and has been widely used in previous studies (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Powell and Tucker, 2014; Rahat and Kenig, 2018c). Second, I use electoral contestation as a proxy of electoral competitiveness. Contestation captures another widely employed measure in the literature. Namely using “100 minus the share of the largest party” (Vanhanen, 2000; Gerring et al., 2015), which should provide an approximation of how fractionalized the party system is. Thereby, party systems where the largest party obtained a higher share of the votes will be considered less competitive than those where the largest party received a smaller share of the votes, regardless of the number of parties in the system.

However, both measures capture the competitiveness of an election and therefore cannot be disaggregated into a party-level measure. Thus, all parties at the same time in the same party system receive the same value, regardless of the party levels of electoral support, and also without taking into consideration which electoral margins they

may enjoy vis-à-vis their competitors. It is more than reasonable to think that not all parties will face the same level of electoral competitiveness at the same time. To solve this problem, I developed an adaptation of Stoffel and Sieberer's (2018) unified measure of re-election prospects for both first-past-the-post and list-based electoral systems. Previous operationalizations of electoral competitiveness have measured it at the election – or party system – level (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2017, 2018; Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Najera, 2017), according to electoral district (Blais and Lago, 2009; Grofman and Selb, 2009; Lago and Torcal, 2019) or governing party (Kayser and Lindstädt, 2015). Stoffel and Sieberer (2018) measure electoral competitiveness at the individual candidate level; basically, their index seeks to answer how likely it is that a candidate would be (re)elected. Their measure is based on regressing certain characteristics of the electoral system (i.e. district magnitude) and parties' electoral margins against the outcome of being elected or not using the previous electoral results (up to  $t-3$ ). Then, the coefficients of that regression are used to predict the chances of re-election at  $t$  time of an individual candidate  $i$  running for party  $j$  in district  $k$ , given some characteristics of the candidate like list position or their electoral margin. I will use the same logic, but applied to each political party rather than to individual candidates. My adaptation of the index seeks to investigate how likely it is that a party keeps its position within the party system, given the historical results. In other words, what is the probability of an electoral swing that will change the role of a party in the party system? I consider that the "role of a party in the party system" is given by the party's ordinal position in terms of votes within that electoral system, which is a proxy for the party's importance. In general terms, the parties at the top of the list – who have a higher number of votes – will be those able to head the government. Those situated in the middle range of the list will likely more policy focussed individuals who can act as minor coalition partners, while those at the bottom will have a marginal role. It has to be noted that a change in the party's role can involve their losing importance, but also gaining it. I then go on to explain the calculation process of the variable. It is necessary to mention that I use Stoffel and Sieberer's (2018) characterization for first-past-the-post electoral systems. In the first step (equation 7.1), the original model takes the electoral margin of each party in each single member district and regresses it against a candidate winning an election or not<sup>1</sup>. The resulting slope provides an empirical measure of how likely it is that electoral margins will be surpassed at an election given the country's electoral history. Stoffel and Sieberer (2018) use the data from the three previous elections to calculate how safe or not a given electoral margin is. In a second step, the most recent electoral margin at time  $t - 1$ <sup>2</sup> is used to predict the probability of winning (equation 7.2), where 1 means re-election is highly likely and 0 very unlikely. Their original formulas are as follows:

$$\Pr(y_{ijt} = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha_j + \beta_j \cdot \text{margin}_{ijt-1}) \quad (7.1)$$

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<sup>1</sup> In the logit model, the winner receives the value of 1 and the rest 0. Similarly, the margin is a positive number for the winner (the distance to its closest competitor), while it is a negative number for the rest (their distance to the winner). Also, Stoffel and Sieberer (2018) use random intercepts to capture differences in the baseline for re-election probability due to regional differences. I do not use random intercepts as I calculate the values of each region independently.

<sup>2</sup> The election for which the party is nominating the top candidate is considered as  $t = 0$ .

$$\Pr(Y = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta X)}{1 + \exp(\beta X)} \quad (7.2)$$

To transform this candidate measure into a party level one, my modification uses each political party's electoral margins compared to their closest competitors. First, I order each political party at every election according to the number of votes they received. I consider that the ordinal position of a party within a party system at a given point in time reveals something about the role of the party within that system. Parties at the top of the classification will be parties competing for government, while those at the bottom will have a marginal role. Parties in the middle will probably be competing to influence policy or become junior coalition partners. Therefore, climbing or sinking in the ranking within a party system will be indicative of a party's ability to influence policy and obtain office.


The next stage is to calculate two distinct indicators separately: how likely is it that a party will climb in the party system ranking after the next election, and how likely is it that a party will descend?. Following Stoffel and Sieberer's (2018) original model, I calculate this probability according to parties' electoral margins. The electoral margins represent the percentage of votes separating a party from the party that obtained at least one vote more, and from the party that obtained at least one vote less. Each electoral margin will act as predictors of the logit model predicting whether a party will go up or down in the electoral system ranking after the next election. Thus, the dependent variable in the regression is as follows. For the observations measuring the distance to the competitor with at least one vote more, the parties will receive a 1 if they obtain more votes than that party in the following election, and 0 otherwise<sup>3</sup>. This measure thus indicates how likely it is that a given party can advance its electoral standing in the following election, given the voting patterns of that party system. For the margins measuring the distance to the competitor with at least one vote less, a party will receive a 1 if they obtain less votes than their competitor in the next election, thus indicating how likely it is that they will be surpassed given the electoral margin they currently enjoy. Afterwards, each of the two coefficients of electoral safety is converted to a 0 to 1 scale according to the second equation, and I calculate their average. The final number indicates how stable the overall electoral position of a party is in the context of that party system at that given point on time, and considering the electoral margins parties enjoy vis-à-vis their two direct competitors, which are defined as the parties with at least one vote more or less. Like Stoffel and Sieberer (2018), I use the electoral margins of the last three elections. The process has been developed for each region independently. I call this variable as *electoral safety*.

Let me illustrate the different measures of electoral market change using the example of the German state of Bavaria. A region where the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) has governed since 1957 with such a substantial electoral support that the state could be considered as a region with a dominant-party system (Hepburn, 2008). I use this example because we would expect the party-level degrees of competition to be very different between the CSU and the rest of parties. Figure 7.2 plots the evolution of all three measures in that region. On the one hand, the election-level measures show a similar trend; a relatively high level of volatility and contestation during the first years after democratization that drastically reduces until the 1970s, and then remains stable for around 30

<sup>3</sup> For the most voted party in an election, it receives a 1 if they remain the most voted party in the next election and 0 otherwise. For the parties at the bottom, they receive a 1 if they surpass another party and 0 if they remain the least voted one.

years. But since the late 2000s, both indicators have risen again. On the other hand, studying competitiveness at the party level reveals a very distinctive picture. The historical domination of the CSU is reflected in the safety index as, since the late 1960s, it takes a value close to 0. The index points to the fact that the CSU does not face any electoral challenger, and it cannot aspire to achieving a better electoral position. Hence, the party enjoys an extremely safe electoral position. For the rest of the parties the situation is very different. The SPD, FDP, the Greens and Die Linke have values close to 0.5 over the whole period, pointing to mid-level electoral safety, with some short-lived peaks in the case of the FDP. Interestingly, since the late 1990s the Greens have consolidated their position as third or fourth party in the system with stable electoral margins vis-à-vis their competitors, but their recent electoral growth and their transition to second most voted party has put them in a more unsafe position.


Fig. 7.2: Measures of electoral market change in Bavaria.



The party-level measure presents several advantages in comparison to previous works, besides disaggregating electoral competition at the party level rather than at the election level. For its calculation, it does not require survey data (Abou-Chadi and Orłowski, 2016) or disaggregated electoral data at the district level (Kayser and Lindstädt, 2015). Its calculation only requires the overall number of votes each party won for a given historical period. Furthermore, calculating it using only the electoral margins and the ordinal position of a party ensures comparison across time and countries, regardless of their electoral system, the number of parties involved, or the degree of fractionalization present within a political system. However, this will not be the only way parties perceive a change on the market, and in order to increase the robustness of my analysis I will use all three measures; safety, volatility, and contestation. Figure 7.3 deploys the distribution of each of the measures of electoral market change. To ensure comparability across the three measures, they have been standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The last panel in the figure shows the relationship between the three measures. Electoral safety is

uncorrelated with the other two, and volatility and contestation have little correlation with each other. It is important to mention that I use parties' value at  $t-1$ , as I assume that parties make their decision by considering their most recent experience. Therefore, I am not able to observe the changes that happen in between elections and that could be better captured by other indicators such as polling data. In section 7.3.2, as a robustness test, I introduce some time flexibility into parties' rationales by using different time weightings.

Fig. 7.3: Distribution of the measures of change in the electoral market.



### 7.3 Changes in the electoral market


In this section, I explore how reactive political parties are to changes in the electoral market. Electoral markets in western societies have experienced major changes in the past decades. The major economic and welfare achievements since WWII, like the growth of the middle class, fostered a change of social values towards liberal progressivism (Kriesi et al., 2006; Caughey, O'Grady and Warshaw, 2019), the erosion of class voting (Hout, Manza and Brooks, 1999; Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011; Heath, 2016), and the decline of party identification (Dalton, 2002; Heath, 2007). All in all, these parallel phenomena have contributed to making electorates more fluid nowadays than some decades ago. In addition, these electorates give more consideration to valence issues outside the traditional left-right paradigm such as candidate personality or likeability, or assessments of other personal traits like perceived competence (Bittner, 2011). In line with hypothesis 4, we should expect that higher levels of electoral competition result in parties nominating candidates with a lower level of partyness. This hypothesis relies on two assumptions. First, parties are reactive to changes in the electorate and they will adapt their behaviour in order

to remain electorally competitive (Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995). This proposition has repeatedly gained support in regard to parties' policy platforms and citizenry preferences (Adams et al., 2004, 2006) although some recent studies using more and more fine-grained data on citizens preferences have begun to challenge this assumption (O'Grady and Abou-Chadi, 2019) – which should make us cautious to some extent. The second assumption is that candidates with less political experience are more appealing for the electorate, as discussed in chapter 2. Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 63) discuss how in highly competitive environments, such as a presidential election, candidates with proven vote-drawing abilities as well as an appealing supra-partisan image are more successful. However, these skills “may only weakly correlate with the skills that make a candidate a faithful executor of the party's will”, namely, a good party agent. By using the partyness index, composed of all the previous political positions candidates have held in their careers, we are measuring how good a party agent that candidate may be, and therefore we would expect that more “popular” candidates present a lower level of partyness.

Figure 7.4 shows the results of including each of our three measures of market change – volatility, safety and contestation – in the baseline model. As when testing for the effect of electoral defeat, I also use a two-step Heckman model. The measures of electoral market change are z-standardized, and thus an increase of one unit represents an increase of one standard deviation. The results show that none of the three measures is associated with the selection process of top candidates, neither for determining candidate turnover, nor for influencing the level of partyness of the new candidate. As none of the coefficients achieve any of the standard levels of statistical significance, this raises several questions. Do parties really consider the electorate when selecting their top candidates? It could be argued that parties are only responsive to changes in the electorate when it comes to programmatic issues, but not those concerning who the candidate should be. Being over attentive to who is more popular within the electorate could well destabilize the power equilibrium within party organizations and trigger intra-party battles. Looking at the results of the previous chapter, we may conclude that internal, rather than external demand factors are far more critical for explaining the nomination of candidates. To illustrate how internal and external demand factors may interact, let me use the example of the 2015 election in the Canadian province of Alberta. Alberta is one of the richest and most conservative regions in Canada. In 2015 their voters elected a left-wing government for the first time in history, partly due to the division of the political right, which was running as three different parties. This change in the electoral market is captured by a value of 40 for volatility, a contestation of 59 and an average electoral safety of 0.49 – above the mean in volatility and contestation and close to the mean in electoral safety. That election generated a political earthquake in the province. First, the main conservative party merged with the two smaller ones, thus changing their dominant coalition, and later their leadership, indicating that losing government really triggered a party change. In the following election, in 2019, the conservatives nominated a new leader with a high level of partyness, and even with considerably more experience than the 2015 candidate. On the other hand, the centrist Liberals also changed their leadership in between elections, but the new candidate showed a very similar level of partyness to the previous candidate. The different screening capacities also play a role. Having been in government for more than 30 years, the conservatives enjoyed a high screening and recruitment capacity. They had plenty of resources – more after absorbing the two minor conservative parties – and they also had a much bigger pool of aspirants with high degree of partyness from which to choose. The liberals always had a precarious third-party role, which prevented them from gaining high organizational capacity. Finally, the left-wing NDP, the

winner of 2019 election, re-nominated their leader, who was PM at the time as their candidate. This example shows how all the different factors are intrinsically related. On the one hand, changes in the internal and the external demand are highly interconnected, and they tend to happen altogether. On the other hand, parties' screening and recruitment capacities act as a structural constraint on the decisions parties can take by limiting the range of their choices.

Fig. 7.4: The role of changes in the electoral market on top candidate selection.



However, the previous analysis pools together all political parties at any time without distinguishing the campaigning context including; when the parties competed, the type of political party involved, and who had the power to nominate candidates. Thus, before drawing final conclusions, it is necessary to study how different parties, or parties under different circumstances, react to a change in the electoral market. The rationale behind each type of selectorate is currently a main focus of candidate selection research. As discussed earlier, the type of selectorate can change parties' decision-making due to two different dynamics. On the one hand and as reflected in hypothesis 9A, different preferences are associated with each social stratum within a party (May, 1973). More specifically, middle-level elites, such as local organizers, are considered to be more ideologically-minded and radical than parties' grassroots or their elites. As party conferences are mostly composed of the most radical strata, these are considered to produce more radical and partisan nominees – and thus nominees with a higher degree of partyness – than party primaries or a committee consisting of a reduced party elite. On the other hand, and as reflected in hypothesis 9B, changes to the selection criteria generated by a change in the selectorate can result from transformations in transaction and coordination costs (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As the number of people involved in the candidate nomination decision increases, coordination around a specific candidate will become more difficult, and selectors' capacities to scrutinize and rate the candidate electability and reliability will be reduced. Thus, we

should expect smaller selectorates to nominate more party-entrenched candidates with higher degrees of partyiness. As a matter of fact, in the data regarding the selection of party leaders<sup>4</sup>, the mean size of the selectorate in a party conference is almost 600 people (standard deviation of 1500) and 10,000 in a party primary (standard deviation of 20,000), while we can assume that the party elite will barely comprise more than 100 individuals. This large standard deviation is mostly caused by country differences, as both party conferences and party primaries tend to involve many more people in Canada than in the other two countries.

Figure 7.5 includes the selectorate in the previous model as well as an interaction between the different measures of electoral market change and the type of selectorate<sup>5</sup>. In line with previous results, on average, party elites tend to nominate candidates with higher levels of partyiness than party conferences and primaries. Furthermore, party primaries tend to lead to higher candidate turnover. Interacting the selectorate with changes in the electoral market provides interesting results. In comparison with party conferences – the reference category – party elites do not nominate different candidates. However, there is some evidence that primaries are more likely to nominate more party-entrenched candidates when the party faces a more unstable electorate. The same result appears when operationalizing changes in the electoral market as volatility or as contestation, the two measures that capture changes at the election level. Although the sign of the coefficients is the same when using safety as an operationalization, the interaction of safety and primaries does not reach standard degrees of statistical significance. In other words, when the general electorate becomes more fluid, indicated by high levels of vote switch, electoral weakening of the main parties, and the appearance of new actors in the electoral arena, party primaries tend to rally around candidates with higher levels of experience, in comparison to party elites and party conferences which do not.


This finding is remarkable as it does not meet any of our initial theoretical expectations stated in hypotheses 9A and 9B. Under the approach linked to preferences, and that associated with transaction costs, we would expect party primaries to nominate less entrenched candidates – even more so when a party faces an electoral challenge. Considering that primary selectors are loosely coordinated party members, and according to May (1973), not particularly ideologically radical, – we would expect them to favour moderate candidates and to be more influenced by a candidate's personal charisma. Conversely, it would be expected that them to be disinclined to support candidates with long party trajectories with lower levels of electability. We would thus expect that primaries nominate less party-entrenched candidates. This effect should be stronger in open primaries. From the transaction costs perspective, party primaries constitute a highly disorganized and atomized environment, where a number of candidates compete for the votes of selectors that have little capacity to judge the policy proposals of the different contenders. Primary voters lack the time and resources to deduce how a contender to the party nomination would behave during the electoral campaign or as prime minister. In such a chaotic environment, we would expect that the electoral appeal of certain candidates for the general electorate will play out within the party. Thus, primaries should nom-

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<sup>4</sup> I use the data on party leaders as an example as this is more complete in regard to the size of party conferences. As many top candidates were voted for by assent, especially if they encounter no opposition, there is no record of the exact number of votes they obtained, and thus of the exact size of the selectorate. Party leaders are rarely voted for by assent, and we can assume that the size of party conferences will be very similar in both cases.

<sup>5</sup> Full regression models available in appendix B.

Fig. 7.5: Selectors' reaction to changes in the electoral market.




Note: All models include party, region and country FEs. Jackknife-robust models by party-region dyad. Control variables omitted from the plot. CI at 95%

inate more electable candidates with lower degrees of partyness. For these reasons, the previous result is highly surprising.

However, there is a factor that we have not considered, and which may contribute to explaining why party selectors tend to nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness when parties face an electoral challenge. This factor is name recognition. Already the target of study in the US context (Kam and Zechmeister, 2013), experimental evidence suggests that primary selectors use name recognition to infer candidates' viability, especially in an open contest when the incumbent is not running. Thus, primary voters – generally with poor information about the can-

didates – tend to support the more well-known aspirants. Although this effect may be present at any time, we can expect it to be stronger when selectors face more electorally unstable scenarios. If it is true that primary voters tend to nominate top candidates with higher levels of partyness when experience more competitive electoral scenarios this would provide some indirect evidence of party selectors increasingly relying on heuristics when transaction costs increase. I will further develop this point at the end of the chapter. To finish this section, we turn now to the predicted partyness level of a top candidate according to the type of selector, and changes in the electoral market. We can observe in figure 7.6 how party conferences seem to be the least risk averse selectorate. Conversely, primaries and party elites tend to nominate more party-entrenched candidates when competition increases, and party conferences tend to nominate candidates with lower levels of partyness. Despite the results only being statistically significant for primaries when I measure the change in the electoral market in terms of changes in volatility or contestation, this goes against what we would expect under May’s law (1973).

Fig. 7.6: Top candidates predicted partyness according to the type of selector and changes in the electoral market.



### ***7.3.1 How different parties react to a change in the electoral market: the mediating effect of electoral systems, party type and time***

The previous section asked whether parties adapt their top candidate nominations to changes in the electoral market. When the electorate becomes more fluid and willing to be influenced by non-ideological factors, nominating appealing top candidates may be a strategy for parties to gain votes. In addition, it was proposed that some selectorate types would be more likely to consider electoral factors, even to the detriment of the reliability of the candidate. Using top candidates' backgrounds as a proxy for electoral appeal, and using three alternative operationalisations of changes in the electoral market, the empirical analysis does not support the previous hypotheses. In addition, I find that primaries seem to generate more partisan candidates when the electoral competition becomes fiercer, which goes against the initial theoretical expectations. The latter point will be developed in section 7.5. In addition to the selectorate, in chapter 2 it was proposed that other factors may mediate party responses to a change in the electorate market. Namely, hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 stated that the reaction of a party to a change in the electoral market can be conditional on the electoral system, the party size and the historical time. It is necessary to note here that time is only considered as a proxy variable representing changes in the campaigning environment such as technological change, the rise of new media and the overall disintermediation of political communication.

First, the different electoral systems provide manifest incentives for parties to either opt for a candidate with wide public appeal or not. The number of votes that a popular candidate could bring to a party, in contrast to a less popular but more reliable candidate, are more important in a majoritarian electoral system. When there is a high distortion in the conversion of votes to seats, the marginal utility of the votes that a top candidate brings increases. To test this proposition empirically, I interact the changes in the electoral market with the Gallagher Index of electoral disproportion (Gallagher, 1991). More specifically, I use the mean of the last three elections to account for outliers.

Second, we can expect that major political parties would experience changes in the electoral market more dramatically. Parties with broader electoral support are those that in practice compete for access to the executive power, and an electorally-appealing candidate may provide critical votes for achieving that objective. These parties tend to compete for the median voter, who can be more influenced by non-policy factors such as candidate characteristics (Rodon, 2013). Moreover, minor political parties are more likely to be niche parties that compete over a limited segment of the population, and their more ideological voters may not be influenced by the personal appeal of the top candidate. Then we would expect that changes in the electoral market play a more significant role in the decision-making of major political parties than in that of minor ones. Thus, I include an interaction term between change in the electoral market and the size of the party, measured by its number of votes in  $t - 1$ .

Finally, we may expect some variation over time. On the one hand, the data in this study goes back to a point in time when class identity and party loyalty were considered to be much stronger than nowadays. On the other hand, this historical perspective allows me to account for a variation in the campaigning environment, namely, how new media – first the television and then the internet – has changed the way political campaigns are developed and how

parties canvass for voter support. Many studies have identified a trend of increasing personalization (Karvonen, 2010; Rahat and Kenig, 2018) – and even presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005) – of politics in recent decades, a process that is intrinsically associated with the change of the electorate. Empirically, some authors like Bittner (2011) have found that valence issues like candidate personality have become more significant for voters in recent decades (Rahat and Kenig, 2018). Following this argument, we should expect that parties’ reactions to a change in the electoral market should be stronger nowadays than in the past. To study this possibility, I include an interaction with a categorical variable indicating the decade when each candidate was nominated, and using 2010 – the most recent election year – as the reference category<sup>6</sup>.

Fig. 7.7: The conditional effect of the electoral system, party size and time on parties’ reaction to changes in the electoral market.




Figure 7.7 shows the marginal effect of a change in the electorate in each of the three variables of interest. The full statistical models are available in appendix B. Starting with the effect of the electoral system (panel b), I do not find any conditional effect of the degree of electoral disproportion on parties’ reactions to a change in the electoral

<sup>6</sup> In this model, due to the inclusion of the decade, I remove the variable year from the control variables.

market. The effect, in all three operationalisations, is statistically indistinguishable from 0. Parties' non-reaction to changes in the electoral market is independent of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. Second, minor and major political parties do not differ in how they react to a change in the electoral market (panel c). The capacity to credibly compete for the executive power, or a possible niche status, shapes parties' decision-making when nominating top candidates after a change in the electoral market. Third, the decade when the candidate is nominated also seems to have little effect. We would have expected parties to have become more aware of changes in the electoral markets during recent decades, but this is not supported in the empirical evidence. Using all three operationalizations, only contestation in the 1940s shows a statistically significant effect. However, this was a decade marked by WWII both in Germany and in Canada, and so we should consider these results with caution.

In brief, in the previous section, I showed that parties do not generally react to change in the electoral market when nominating their top candidates. However, party primaries seem to work differently. In this section, I showed that the general null effect is not conditional on some of the traditional factors – electoral system, size and historical time – that could explain why some parties behave differently than others. Therefore, I have to reject hypotheses 5, 6 and 7. In general, parties may react to changes in the electorate by changing their policy platform but not necessarily their top candidates. Electoral changes may trigger intra-party battles that result in new candidates running, but these will not necessarily have different backgrounds to their predecessors.

### **7.3.2 Robustness checks**

In the previous sections, I have shown that parties do not seem to react to changes in the electoral market when nominating their top candidates. The effect is not conditional on the electoral system, party size or historical time, but party primaries behave differently. In this section I am going to provide some additional evidence supporting the results stated above. In the previous section, the operationalization of volatility, safety and contestation relied on parties considering events in  $t-1$  as their primary source of information about the state of the electoral market, and thus the main driver of their decision-making. It is plausible to consider that parties will have a longer memory than  $t - 1$ , and that the events that happened before  $t - 1$  also play a role in parties' decision-making at time  $t$ . For that reason, and as a robustness test, I propose two alternative ways of operationalizing each indicator of electoral market change, taking time into consideration. First, following Dassonneville (2018), I will consider that when nominating their candidates, parties take into account the events that happened in the last three elections, and I will use the mean of the three values for the three indicators.

Second, we may consider that parties take into account the events before  $t - 1$ , but that they do not weight them equally, as more recent events may have higher import for parties' decision-making. Drawing on work on polling aggregation (Silver, 2014), I propose to weight each past value using an exponential decay function, meaning that the weight of a value will exponentially decrease as far as they are more distant of  $t$ . The pace of the decay depends on the value assigned to  $\lambda$ . Here I opted for a value of 5, which with an average 4 years gap in between elections entails that the value at  $t - 1$  will approximately carry half of the weight in the final indicator, the events in  $t - 2$

a quarter of the weight, the events in t-3 an eighth, and so on. In the operationalization based on Dassonneville's (2018) method, all three previous elections bear the same weightings. The three following equations illustrate how the value of a change in the electoral market – either volatility, safety and contestation – marked by the acronym EMC, varies according to each of the time operationalisations.

$$EMC_t = EMC_{t-1} \quad (7.1 \text{ Original})$$

$$EMC_t = \frac{EMC_{t-1} + EMC_{t-2} + EMC_{t-3}}{3} \quad (7.2 \text{ Three period mean})$$

$$EMC_t = \frac{\sum(EMC_{t-x} \cdot e^{-\frac{x}{\lambda}})}{\sum(e^{-\frac{x}{\lambda}})} \quad (7.3 \text{ Exponential decay})$$


Interestingly, the correlation between the two election-level variables, volatility and contestation, increases when more elections are taken into account. From a previous correlation of 0.22 it increases to 0.24 using the exponential decay function, and to 0.36 when using the mean. Safety remains highly uncorrelated with the other variables, with all values below 0.10. Repeating the previous models with the new operationalization does not substantially change the results in either the baseline model or in the interaction models. The effect shown by interacting contestation with the party primaries remains stable in the two additional models. The effect of interacting selectorate with volatility becomes statistically insignificant, but the effect of the interaction with contestation remains. In addition, the interaction with safety becomes significant in the model that uses the mean of the last three elections for operationalizing changes in the electoral market. The complete statistical models are available in appendix B. To conclude, this section provides a robustness check showing that the previous results were not driven by using the value in t-1 for operationalizing how parties perceive a change in the electoral market. Taking into account time when considering party behaviour does not significantly alter the results.

## 7.4 When the external demands meet the internal demand

In the previous sections, I showed how parties do not react to changes in the electorate when nominating their top candidates, and that this is not a function of party size, electoral system or historical period. Only party primaries seem to react differently to changes in the electoral market by nominating more party-entrenched candidates. In this section, I analyse to what extent external and internal demands interact with each other. The previous example of the 2019 election in Alberta clearly shows how changes in the electoral market are followed by changes in parties' dominant coalitions – either by provoking merges and splits or by pressing for leadership changes – and both types of demands contribute to explaining the nomination of the top candidate afterwards. Here I include in the same model the variables measuring changes in the electoral market and changes in parties' dominant coalitions. I also

interact the two variables with each other. Considering that both factors are highly interconnected, the reason for including both is to assess which may have a stronger effect in explaining parties' decision criteria. The results can be seen in figure 7.8.

Fig. 7.8: The effect of changes in the electoral market and type of selectorate on popularity and recognition.



On the one hand, after including changes in the electoral market, a change in the dominant coalition continues to have a powerful effect on candidate turnover. Thus, as observed before, it is more likely that a party nominates a new candidate after experiencing a change within its dominant coalition. However, more competitive electoral markets are not associated with a change of top candidate. On the other hand, none of the variables has a consistent impact on the degree of partyness that top candidates exhibit. In addition, the interaction between changes in the internal and the external demand point towards less party-entrenched candidates when both factors occur together, but the coefficient does not reach any of the standard levels of statistical significance.

These results reinforce the view that the selection of who runs as top candidate is mostly determined by internal factors – mainly who controls the dominant coalition. At the same time, candidates' degree of partyness is primarily a function of the party's screening and recruitment capacity. The only situation where I find a reaction to a change in the electorate is when the selectorate constitutes a party primary, which increases the likelihood of a party nominating a candidate with a higher degree of partyness. As I will argue in the next section, that result is caused by an increasing reliance of party selectors on name recognition when the electorate becomes more fluid.

## 7.5 Why primaries are different? An approximation to the possible causal mechanism

In the last empirical section of this chapter, I will delve deeper into one of the most striking results found so far: party primaries tend to nominate candidates with higher partyiness when they face electorates that are more fluid. From both the curvilinear disparity perspective (May, 1973) and the transaction costs approach (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002), party primaries would have been expected to nominate less party-entrenched candidates – and thus more electable candidates – in general, and especially when parties face changes in the electoral market. This finding prompts us to reconsider our theoretical approach, and look for a plausible explanation. One mechanism that can explain this finding is “name recognition”. This concept describes the capacity of some candidates to attract electors’ attention – and even their votes – because they are recognizable. The reasons why they are more recognizable may vary, for instance, some political outsiders enjoy remarkable media attention because of their non-political activities, but some candidates can have a high name recognition because they have long political careers and have held important political offices.

This phenomenon has already been studied in the US context, and previous research shows that name recognition is one of the most important determinants of winning a party primary (Steger, 2000; Lawless and Pearson, 2008; Dowdle, Adkins and Steger, 2009; Stone and Simas, 2010; Kam and Zechmeister, 2013). Primaries can be a highly disorganized and even chaotic environment, where a relatively high number of party members have to scrutinize all aspirants in order to make their choice their choice. Given that, party members have limited time and resources to scrutinize all aspirants, they may rely on name recognition as a heuristic tool. This would involve a section of the selectors, probably those who are least ideological or those with fewer resources to devote to the party organization, instinctively supporting one of the most recognizable aspirants, as they would consider them the most viable and likely to win the nomination (Kam and Zechmeister, 2013). This effect can be present in all primary elections, as a part of the selectorate will always be prone to using name recognition as a heuristic tool to make their choice. However, the share of the primary selectorate using this tool will vary. Given that political parties are conservative and risk-averse organizations (Harmel and Janda, 1994), it is reasonable to think that primary voters would be more likely to rely on name recognition when their party faces adversity. In the following, I will show some empirical evidence supporting this argument.

To study the role of name recognition in top candidate selection, I am going to use the same model as above in section 7.3, but will change the dependent variable. Instead of using the degree of partyiness of new candidates, I use top candidates’ popularity and recognition rates in pre-electoral surveys. In pre-electoral surveys, citizens are asked to rate candidates according to a certain scale, where a higher number indicates a better perception of the candidate and a lower one a worse assessment. I consider that survey results provide hints about candidates’ overall popularity among the electorate. Moreover, these ratings are extensively used in electoral studies to account for the personal influence of candidates on elector vote choice (Aarts, Blais and Schmitt, 2013; Bittner, 2018). In addition, the same surveys provide another interesting source of variation. The surveys report how many people respond the previous question in the first place, i.e. how many people are able to recognize the name of the person to rate them. There are huge differences in terms of which recognition percentages candidates obtain. For instance,

long standing presidents like Jordi Pujol in Catalonia, Esperanza Aguirre in Madrid, Oskar Lafontaine in Saarland or Ernst Albrecht in Lower Saxony, all had recognition rates of above 95%. In contrast, candidates that belong to minor political parties often only have a 20% recognition rate. If primary selectors were driven uniquely by name recognition, we would expect party primaries to nominate candidates with higher name recognition than party conferences and party elites. In contrast, if selectors were driven by the “electability” of a candidate, we would expect them to nominate more popular candidates.

Using these new dependent variables offers some advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it provides an alternative way to measure the “electability” of a candidate. This allows us to relax the assumption that electability and reliability constitute a one-dimensional trade-off where an increase in one entails a decrease in the other. However, this data also has its faults. First, the data is far more restricted than the dataset used so far. In contrast to the more than 2500 observations in the original dataset, I have found survey data for only 803 candidacies. Second, these observations are biased in terms of territories and time-periods covered. No survey data was found for Canada, meaning that all observations refer to the German and Spanish cases. Excluding all Canadian observations from the analysis involves excluding the country that has held the most primaries. To the best of my knowledge, there is no publicly available survey data for provincial elections in Canada. In addition, despite an exponential increase in data collection through surveys since the 1960s, studies at the sub-national level mostly date back to the 1980s. In empirical terms, this restricts our sample to the last 40 years. In theoretical terms, this has important consequences. When the surveys become available, some of the changes in the electoral market described above – voter realignment or changes in social values – were already under way, if not close to completion. Therefore, we lack a benchmark for comparison where traditional party-alignments were critical to explaining voting behaviour. Moreover, voters were not systematically asked to assess the overall performance and likeability of candidates for all parties from the very beginning, which leads to several time discontinuities and the underrepresentation of minor political parties (i.e. the Communists in Spain and the Greens in Germany). Most importantly, it is more than likely that these types of questions started to be asked in surveys when voters, parties or polling companies started to perceive the increasing importance of candidates in the electoral arena. Finally, the score is constructed by averaging all survey responses. For all these reasons, the results have to be considered with caution. For the post-electoral data, I relied on the surveys carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)<sup>7</sup> in Spain and by GESIS in Germany<sup>8</sup>

Figure 7.9 reproduces the results of figure 7.5 with the two new dependent variables. The right panel shows the effect of a change in the electoral market and the type of selector on popularity (in a 0 to 10 scale), while the left panel displays candidate recognition percentages. I excluded the first equation of the Heckman model from the visualization. The full models are available in appendix B. In the previous models, primary electors facing an increasing level of contestation were more likely to nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness. The new models show that these candidates will also be more likely to have a higher recognition rate, but lower popularity among voters. The result is reproduced when using volatility for measuring changes in the electoral system,


<sup>7</sup> *Barómetros electorales elecciones autonómicas*

<sup>8</sup> Studien zu Landtagswahlen

although only at a 0.9 level of statistical significance. These results provide some evidence in favour of the name recognition argument, as they concern candidates that have longer political careers, and thus are more recognizable for rank-and-file party members that vote in primary elections. In addition, these results provide some indirect support for hypothesis 9B. On the one hand, primaries nominate candidates with higher partyiness when the status quo changes, like the electoral environment becoming more unstable. A change within the dominant coalition pushes parties in the same direction. On the other hand, the mechanism of name recognition becomes reinforced, as top candidates nominated when the electoral competition increases show higher levels of partyiness and a higher survey recognition rate. Hypothesis 9A and 9B proposed that primaries could behave differently based on the preference differences of each type of selector, or because transaction costs increase as the selectorate grows. However, I found no direct support for either explanation. Nevertheless, here I found evidence that primary selectors tend to rely more on heuristic tools, such as name recognition, when the external – and possibly also the internal – environment becomes more uncertain. In other words, when the transaction and informational costs increase further, selectors are more likely to use a tool aimed at overcoming that cost increase. This provides indirect and partial evidence in support of Hypothesis 9B, which I cannot completely support. On the other hand, neither can I completely refute Hypothesis 9A. However, this constitutes a first step for understanding how different selection methods shape the selection of candidates.

In brief, this section has shown that the unintuitive result that primaries were more likely to nominate more party-entrenched candidates when facing electorates that are more unstable can be partly explained by name recognition. In addition, this result should also make us consider the role of name recognition for this dissertation and for the wider literature on candidate selection, as this appears to be crucial. Although thoroughly documented in the US context, name recognition has been completely absent from the European literature on party primaries and candidate selection. Because European parties are increasingly relying on open and closed primaries, we should give this mechanism further consideration in European settings. We can speculate that the reason for neglecting this factor in Europe is the difference between closed and open primaries. In the US context, primaries are open and all ordinary citizens are able to vote. In Europe, primaries tend to be closed and only party members can vote. This entails two differences. First, having joined a specific party in the first place, European primary voters should be more ideologically minded than their American equivalents. In addition, they should have far more knowledge about their party's internal organization. Second, the means through which primary voters get to know candidates may be different in each context. In the US, recognition may be linked to media exposure (Dowdle, Adkins and Steger, 2009; Shomer, 2009), and in Europe party members may be more likely to know – and recognize – those with more experience within the party organization, which may be coupled with long careers in public office. These arguments go in line with some of the findings in the literature about women, younger people or ethnic minorities facing increasingly difficulty winning nominations when primaries are held (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994; Indridason and Kristinsson, 2015). In comparison to middle-aged white men, these social groups are less likely to have long-standing political careers that make them recognizable within their party organization. However, future research will have to address how the same mechanism may act differently in the US and European contexts. Concerning competing hypotheses 9A and 9B, these results do not directly identify which of the two theoretical approaches – differences in the preferences of each selector type or changes in the transaction costs – can explain

Fig. 7.9: The effect of changes in the electoral market and type of selectorate on popularity and recognition.



Note: All models include party, region and country FEs. Jackknife-robust models by party-region dyad. Control variables omitted from the plot. CI at 95%

the results above. On the one hand, party primaries do not directly behave in any of the expected directions. On the other hand, the results suggest that party elites behave closer to what we would expect under the approach of differences in selectors' preferences. However, interacting type of selectorate with changes in the electorate shows that when the electorate becomes more unstable, primaries tend to nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness. I also observe that when these two factors coincide, top candidates also tend to hold a higher recognition rate in surveys. Observing that changes in the electorate and conjunction with primaries has a consistent impact in top candidates' degree of partyness, rate recognition and survey popularity provides stronger evidence for the transaction cost approach. When the electorate becomes more unstable, primaries tend to nominate candidates with

higher partyness, higher recognition rate and smaller popularity, which points to the fact that party selectors may be guiding their decision through name recognition. In the disorganized environment of a party primary where voters could hardly coordinate behind an aspirant, primary voters will be more likely to support those who they can recognise, which in a European setting is more likely to be those aspirants with longer political careers and party experience.

## 7.6 Discussion

This chapter has explored to what extent parties are reactive to changes in the electorate when nominating their top candidates. The well-documented party de-alignment from voters predicts that voters become more prone to deciding their vote on the basis on non-policy issues, such as the candidate personality and popularity. Following this argument, we would expect that parties give increasing weight to top candidates' electability to the detriment of their reliability. Empirically, we should observe candidates with lower levels of partyness when the electorate becomes more fluid. Furthermore, it can be argued that this effect is mediated by the selector type, the electoral system, the party size and the historical time (as a proxy of the increasing disintermediation of politics).

Using several alternative operationalisations of electoral market change – electoral defeat, volatility, safety and contestation – the empirical analysis has shown that parties do not respond to any of these phenomena when nominating their top candidates. They do not appear as determinants of either the turnover of candidates (with the exception of electoral defeat) or of their level of partyness. Moreover, reacting to an electoral defeat or an increase in volatility, safety or contestation is revealed to not be dependent on the electoral system, the size of the party and the historical time period (as a proxy of the increasing disintermediation of politics). However, there is some evidence pointing to differences when it comes to party primaries. When the whole electorate becomes more fluid, and party primaries are those in charge of nominating top candidates, parties tend to nominate top candidates with higher levels of partyness. This finding contradicted the initial theoretical expectations and therefore it required further exploration. I proposed that the mechanism behind this result could be name recognition. Further analyses using data on candidates' popularity and recognition obtained through survey data bring some support to this idea, as party primaries facing increasing contestation within the electorate tend to nominate more recognizable candidates. Furthermore, I propose that the differences between name recognition in the US and the European context may be linked to the different preferences primaries selectors may have in each context, as well as to the fact that primary electors differ in how they come to know aspirants. In summary, this chapter has refuted several of the main hypotheses of this dissertation, as parties do not react to changes in the electorate when nominating top candidates, and regardless of possible mediating factors. However, I also found some indirect support for party selectors adapting their behaviour to an increase in the transaction costs, and name recognition as the mechanism guiding different behaviours.

The findings in this chapter have important consequences for the research on candidate selection, and also on parties' responsiveness. On the one hand, there is an extensive body of research claiming that parties adapt their policy

platform to changes in the electorate in order to remain electorally competitive, and especially after an electoral setback (Adams et al., 2006; Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013). However, some later studies have started to challenge parties' perceived responsiveness (O'Grady and Abou-Chadi, 2019). On the other hand, previous studies on candidate and leadership selection also claimed that parties tend to react to electoral defeats and changes in the electorate by renovating their candidacies (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015). This chapter has offered some evidence against the idea that parties will nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations. More broadly, this implies that parties change their behaviour – i.e. policy positioning – following changes in voters' preferences but not all their behaviour will be influenced by voters' consideration like the nomination of top candidates. Parties are more responsive in relation to certain dimensions than to other, which should invite us to think about the internal cost decision-makers will face regarding each specific type of action. Changing policy positions may encounter less internal opposition than changing a top candidate, for example.

In contrast, considering findings of this chapter together with those from chapters 5 and 6, the overall picture that arises is one of parties being far more concerned about internal rather than external factors. First, in regard to the differences in opportunities, parties' screening and recruitment capacities become critical for understanding how the characteristics of top candidates clearly are a function of the circumstances of the party that nominates them. Parties with more access to public funding and other organizational resources are more able to generate candidates with higher levels of partyiness, regardless of their organizational form. Second, when assessing differences in preferences, I find that changes within the dominant coalition have a pivotal effect on the turnover of candidates, but not on their characteristics. Third, preferences of the electorate do not seem to have an impact on parties' decision-making, I find no evidence supporting parties' assessment of the electorate when nominating a top candidate. Furthermore, when primaries behave differently, the effect seems to be caused by a change in the transaction costs rather than differences in preferences within the different party elements. These results have opened the door to understanding how party primaries behave differently, by studying name recognition outside the US context. All things considered, parties seem to be more self-referential as organizations than originally predicted. Parties will seek voter support at election time, but the more important decisions they make appear to be determined by structural constraints and internal party dynamics rather than voter states of mind.



## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

The selection and nomination of candidates for political office is one of the most crucial functions political parties perform in liberal democracies. In addition, it is one of the most secretive processes, posing problems for party scholars wishing to investigate it. Opening the gate to "the secret garden of politics" (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) is a challenging task that requires deep knowledge of the cases under study, a solid grounding in the literature on party change and decline, and very rich data to uncover the nuances behind the different processes and their outcomes. This dissertation has provided a glance into the garden behind the gate by offering a holistic approach to investigating how parties nominate candidates for the executive in parliamentary democracies. Here I have shown that factional battles within parties play a much greater role in determining who becomes top candidate than attention to the electorate. The selection of the top candidate follows an internal, rather than external logic. Changes in the composition of a party's dominant coalition have a deep impact on the turnover of candidates, but not on candidate characteristics, while changes in the electoral market do not influence either candidate turnover or their degree of partyiness. In addition, access to organizational resources structurally constrains parties' capacities to generate top candidates with a high degree of partyiness. In the following pages, I will offer a summary of the results, an assessment of the current state of the literature on candidate selection, and possible areas for future research. I will conclude by offering a provocative new theory about the evolution of party organization and an optimistic approach to the future of party government.

Previous works have focussed their approach to parties' selection criteria on discrimination. They have studied whether certain personal traits such as gender, age, ethnicity or immigrant origin hinder candidate chances of being nominated for political office. In addition, they have looked into how having one of these traits could dissuade people from seeking the nomination. Here I opted for a more general approach, looking into the general criteria parties use. This is partly motivated by this study's sole focus on top candidates. The nomination of a top candidate is always a strategic dilemma for parties. They are one of the most important candidates a party nominates, but one of the least studied in comparative perspective. Top candidates serve two main functions. On the one hand, they can function as a heuristic tool for voters to infer how a party might behave after an election. Citizens will judge parties' competence and policy proposals partly based in the behaviour of their top candidates during the campaign, and thus the candidates can critically shape voter choice. On the other hand, if a party accesses government, its top candidates will hold the prime ministership – or at least become senior cabinet members – which entails that

parties need to be careful about who they nominate for such roles. Therefore, when nominating a top candidate, parties can face the critical decision of prioritizing a short-term gain in votes against long-term policy coherence. This dissertation sought to answer three different, but highly inter-related questions on the nomination of top candidates. First, what criteria do political parties use when nominating a top candidate? Second, to what extent do political parties nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations? Third, under which conditions is electoral competition more likely to shape party decision-making?

I consider that top candidates perform two types of functions, one of which occurs before, and one after elections. These functions translate to the two criteria that I consider parties use when nominating a candidate: *electability* and *reliability*. Electability stands for how many votes a candidate can bring to a party, while reliability refers to how likely it is that the candidate will diligently implement their party's policy platform once in government, and remain loyal to the party organization. Considering these two criteria as situated on a one-dimensional continuum, it would be expected that changes in the internal and the external demand shape selectors' preferences, and push them to nominate candidates placed on one or the other end of this continuum. Hence, changes in the internal and the external demand-side alter parties' preferences. However, I have also taken into consideration changes in differences of opportunities. This is important because parties differ in their capacity to recruit, train and socialize members within the party organization, and hence to generate political candidates with high degrees of reliability. The main findings of this dissertation are as follows.

## 8.1 Summary of the main results

First, differences in opportunities have a crucial role in explaining the nomination of top candidates. Parties' access to state institutions – specifically to the associated public funding and patronage resources – clearly shapes parties' capacity to produce high quality candidates. Obtaining parliamentary representation, and even government participation, emerges as a necessary condition for generating candidates with high levels of partyness. Without these resources, parties seem to be structurally constrained and the quality of their candidates will grow only very slowly. However, once parties gain access to parliament and government, the quality of their candidates increases almost exponentially, as the organization is able to offer political office in parliament and in government, positions which can act as “training grounds” for their most ambitious members – those who will later aspire to becoming top candidates. Interestingly, the organizational form of the party, in terms of number of members and the density of ancillary organizations, does not seem to play a key role in determining candidates' degrees of partyness. These results, led me to support hypothesis 1, which stated that parties with higher screening and recruitment capacities should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness. However, in light of my results, hypotheses 2 and 3 must be rejected. Hypothesis 2 theorised that parties with higher organizational complexity should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness, while hypothesis 3 supposed that parties with more members should nominate candidates with higher levels of partyness. These findings point towards a very “cartelized” (Katz and Mair, 1995) view of political parties. The results suggest that parties can only develop a functional organization – or “institutionalize” as some authors would say (Randall and Svåsand, 2002) – able to train quality candidates, among

many other functions, once they acquire a minimal organizational capital. Parties seem to struggle to develop this capital on their own, and access to state institutions provides a short cut to this initial accumulation, allowing them to develop their own internal opportunity structure, and thus grow and attract new members. Without the degree of organizational stability that this initial capacity offers, parties seem to behave erratically. This is true regardless of their degree of organizational complexity, or their links with other social and political groups. In this sense, having roots in the state becomes more efficient than having roots in society.

Second, and moving on to differences in preferences, changes in the composition of a party's dominant coalition have an interesting effect on top candidate nomination. On the one hand, parties tend to nominate top candidates with significantly lower levels of partyness after suffering a split within the organization, while party mergers and name changes do not show an effect. However, this result is not conclusive, as it could be explained by a decrease in parties' screening capacity, rather than a change in the preferences of selectors. On the other hand, changes in party leadership have a profound impact on the turnover of candidates, but not necessarily on the degree of partyness top candidates express. This leads to only a partial rejection of hypothesis 8, which theorised that a change in a party's dominant coalition should result in a party nominating less partisan candidates, as the variable appears to have a profound impact on the nomination process, but not in the direction initially expected.

Third, on the topic of changes in preferences, it has also been studied how changes in external demand can explain parties' nomination rationales. External demand is characterized by the changes that parties face in the electoral market at a given moment in time. The result contradicts the original expectation that parties would nominate less partisan candidates when facing increasing electoral competition. Here I found no evidence suggesting that there is a relationship between the two factors. Moreover, different operationalisations support this null finding, as does testing for different mediators such as party size, historical time period – as proxy for the campaigning environment – and the type of electoral system. Therefore, I reject hypotheses 4, 5, 6 and 7. All four hypotheses referred to the role of the electorate in parties' nomination considerations. Namely, that higher levels of electoral competition should result in a party nominating less partisan candidates, and that this should be conditional on the electoral system, the party size and the campaigning environment. These null findings prompt further questions about the current role of political parties, and how responsive are they towards their voters and the citizenry in general. It could be argued that parties only seek to address voters when it comes to policy position, and that the process of selecting the people to develop these policies – the candidates – is independent, with its dynamics far more dependent on internal factors.

Fourth, the results point out that party primaries react differently when facing increasing electoral competition. In concrete, when these two factors happen altogether, parties tend to nominate more party-entrenched candidates. This finding directly contradicted the original expectation. Further exploration of the data using candidate survey assessments and recognition rates as dependent variables suggest that the reason behind this striking result is name recognition, a factor that is very present in the US literature, but which has hardly been touched upon in European contexts. In volatile times, voters in a party primary – with lower capacities to investigate and scrutinize all aspirants – may rely on name recognition as a heuristic for candidate viability. The results regarding the role of the selectorate

are inconclusive. The two competing hypotheses 9A and 9B, stated that the role of the different selectorates could be understood as differences in preferences or in terms of transaction costs. On the one hand, each of the party strata that constitute the majority of each type of selectorate are assumed to have different inherent preferences. Specifically, grassroots party members and the party elite are considered to be more ideologically moderate. On the other hand, enlarging the selectorate implies that coordination among the individuals that make up the selectorate becomes harder, and thus transaction costs increase. The empirical results fail to explain conclusively if selectors are influenced by differences in their preferences, or by transaction costs, as the results yield no direct effect (hypotheses 9A and 9B). However, findings on interaction terms and the analysis of survey data indirectly provide some evidence supporting hypothesis 9B. It remains for future research to finally disentangle their relationship.

In conclusion, this dissertation has explored the different factors that shape partisan decision-making when parties nominate top candidates, with special attention paid to disentangling which part of the variance is related to differences in opportunities or in preferences. The four main factors are; party screening and recruitment capacity, changes in a party's dominant coalition (internal demand), changes in the electoral market (external demand), and selectorate composition. In regard to the three original research questions, this dissertation has shown that a focus on electability and reliability constitutes a valid approach to studying the selection criteria parties use when nominating a political candidate. Each criterion summarizes the different factors that parties may seek in a candidate. On the one hand, parties assess all the factors that may harm or benefit political candidates and their parties in the electoral arena. In other words, personal characteristics of candidates can enhance or hurt their election chances. Here, I have focussed on general appeal to the electorate, but these factors can be disaggregated into many other personal characteristics that may impact election chances such as gender, ethnicity, social class or geographical origin – what Norris and Lovenduski call *imputed discrimination* (1994). Here I show that some of the considerations behind nominating a candidate may not involve candidate characteristics and electoral considerations, but instead function according to a logic of internal consolidation within the party organization. On the other hand, political parties weigh up how well candidates would perform their functions, and to what degree they would remain faithful to the party line once elected. To this aim, according to the principal-agent approach (Samuels and Shugart, 2010), they will rely on aspirants' previous behaviour as the best predictor of future actions. Both aspects represent the expected utility a political party can obtain from a given political candidate before and after an election, and as such they should be considered as more general selection criteria than those specified in the literature so far. It has to be said that the applicability of these criteria goes beyond top candidates; the criteria can be applied in all political areas, and to all political candidacies, as well as to intra-party bodies. These criteria seek to provide a general understanding of how parties nominate their candidates and thus answer the first research question.

In regard to the second question, and unlike initial hypotheses, I do not find any support for parties nominating their top candidates on electoral considerations; only party primaries tend to behave differently when facing increasing competitive electorates. In addition, and in regard to the third question, other conditions that could enhance the role of electoral competition in shaping party decision-making, such as the electoral system, or the party size also fail to play a significant role. In contrast, the most important factors determining the overall degree of partyyness of a top candidate, as well as candidate turnover, are changes in parties' internal coalitions and parties' screening

and recruitment capacities, the latter of which is highly dependent on access to state institutions. In brief, this dissertation has answered its three initial research questions and complemented them with other factors, such as changes in internal demand, that help to provide a more fine-grained approach to the political candidate nomination process.

Theoretically, this dissertation is located within the rich literature of candidate selection. Since Gallagher and Marsh's (1988) publication on "the secret garden", several generations of researchers have inquired into the dynamics that lead parties to prefer to nominate some type of people over others. This selection bias has long attracted the attention of party scholars, as it can have profound normative consequences. Women, people of colour, and other social minorities systematically find higher barriers to accessing public office, which hinders the descriptive and substantive representation of these social groups in parliament and government. In addition, this dissertation also speaks to the broader literature on party organization. On the one hand, its treatment of differences in preferences, engages with the more traditional literature on party organization that seeks to explain how and why parties change their political strategies, organizational features and policy positions (Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Janda, 1994; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004). On the other hand, this dissertation is also relevant to the literature seeking to explain the origin of organizational differences between parties, and whether new phenomena, such as political personalization, may shape them (Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017; Rahat and Kenig, 2018). Furthermore, this dissertation also speaks to scholars interested in explaining the functioning of political parties within a delegation framework (Strøm, 1990; Müller, 2000; Lupia, 2003; Samuels and Shugart, 2010), in particular regarding differences in opportunities. Considering the nomination of candidates as a delegation process between a party—principal and a candidate—agent forces us consider further elements such as the capacities of the principal to establish effective and accountable relations between it and the agent.

## **8.2 Scientific contributions**

The broad spectrum of works to which this dissertation speaks makes its classification within the established literature challenging, but this aspect also constitutes an asset. This dissertation makes several scientific contributions. From a theoretical point of view, first, this study provides a holistic approach to the study of top candidates by taking into consideration not only the features of candidates, but also the differences between selection and re-selection – which the current studies tend to analyse separately – as well as the capacities of the principal to produce different types of candidates. This dissertation contributes to the study of political candidates in general, and top candidates in particular, complementing the few existing works (Peter M Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008; Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Astudillo, 2015; Verge and Astudillo, 2018).

Second, this dissertation, is to the best of my knowledge, the first to distinguish political parties according to their differences in opportunities, or screening capacity, for generating different types of candidates, specifically candi-

dates with a high degree of partyiness<sup>1</sup>. Party screening capacity refers to the ability of some political organizations to recruit more aspirants and mould them to party values, which will result in parties having a lower risk of experiencing adverse selection or moral hazard when nominating a candidate. Further screening capacity allows parties to nurture bigger pools of aspirants, who on average have higher degrees of reliability. It is important to remark that differences in opportunities is different concept to that of supply-side differences. Variation in the supply-side indicates differences in the number and quality of aspirants to a given candidacy, be this the top candidacy or a nomination for a legislative seat, for example. The availability, attractiveness, cost of running and likelihood of election determines the number and quality of aspirants a party can choose from. Given that the top candidacy is one of the most attractive positions a political party can offer, I assumed that everybody within the organization will aspire to it, and therefore find it attractive. This assumption can be problematic, but it is a necessary given the virtual inexistence of data on aspirants that are not selected. Therefore, while supply side conditions determine who is willing to be nominated, party screening capacity explains the overall political quality and reliability of those willing to be nominated.

Third, I distinguish between the process of selection and re-selection. I argue that each presents a different rationale, and that parties evaluate them in different steps. Except for the first time a party runs, the first decision a party must take when nominating a candidate is to decide whether to re-nominate the previous candidate. When deciding to re-nominate a candidate, the party will take into account environmental factors as well as the performance of the candidate in the previous election. In contrast, if the party decides not to re-nominate the previous candidate, then environmental factors will play a bigger role in explaining the characteristics of the new candidate. This difference in the rationale behind each decision invites us to split the process into two, and I account for this in the empirical models using a two-step Heckman selection model. Including candidates who repeat and those who do not in the same model can inflate the overall degree of partyiness, as candidates who compete for a second or third time will always have a higher degree of partyiness than those running for the first time.

Fourth, drawing on Panebianco's work, I include some nuances in Norris and Lovenduski's (1994) model of political selection by distinguishing between the internal and the external demands of gatekeepers, in this case the selectorate. Including these factors provides a more complete picture of the different incentives parties face at any given moment in time. On the one hand, parties are formed of multiple groups that compete between each other for power and influence, including for party candidacies to different public offices, and internal party bodies. Because changes in the internal-power equilibrium will trigger changes in the candidacy, it is crucial to know who occupies certain positions, as well as how strong the different party factions are, and how this influences selectors' decision-making. Sometimes, the nomination of the top candidate will involve a faction competing with another for power and resources. This kind of situation prompts us to reconsider if the unitary action assumption stands

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<sup>1</sup> Samuels and Shugart (2014) introduce the concept of party capacity, although they define the term in a broader manner. For them, party capacity refers to what extent parties are able to develop their functions as vehicles of political representation, while my screening capacity only refers to the recruitment and selection of political candidates. However, they do not test that concept empirically at the level of individual political parties. They test it using an aggregated indicator at the country level – age of democracy – and only on a sample composed of parties who were in government.

when analysing particular party behaviour. On the other hand, and alongside their internal dynamics, parties would pay attention to their electorates. In order to achieve their long-term objectives, parties need to remain electorally competitive and attract as many votes as possible. Following this reasoning, parties can be expected to tailor their candidates to the demands of the electorate. However, as the empirical results have shown, the first proposition finds broad support, but the second does not. When nominating top candidates, parties are far more sensitive to internal than to external demands.

From a normative point of view, this empirical result presents interesting consequences for the working of party government. In contemporary liberal democracies, political parties compete to represent people's preferences in public institutions, and voters keep parties accountable through elections (Caramani, 2017). This function of mediation between the state and broader society requires that parties regularly update their preferences and roles according to changes among their voters and broader society. On the one hand, people and policies can be interpreted as two different and independent processes that do not necessarily interact with each other. On the other hand, both people and policies could be interpreted as acting within one process, which leads to two different interpretations. First, parties could be considered to be evolving into more self-referential organizations. A sort of organization that increasingly becomes out of touch with society and that takes its important decisions – such as the nomination of top candidates – exclusively on internal considerations. This raises important questions about the future role of political parties in the democratic system. In contrast, the opposite trend would be the existence of hypersensitive parties, who make all their decisions based on public opinion trends, thereby lacking any ideological anchorage, or a medium- or long-term conception of their purpose.

Besides the theoretical contribution, this dissertation also makes several empirical contributions to the study of political parties in general, and candidate selection in particular. First, this dissertation employs one of the first longitudinal large-N datasets studying how political parties select their candidates for public office. The dataset includes a considerable amount of political parties over a long period of time in three countries. There are more than 265 party-region dyads, and each is observed an average of 9.61 times, mostly over periods of more than 50 years. In regard to the study of party change and data availability, Gideon Rahat and Ofer Kenig (2018, p. 259) comment that "our experience tells us that it may be impossible to make a cross-national, multi-variable study of these fluctuations". Within its limitations of using three countries at the sub-national level, this dissertation performs a cross-national, multi-variable and longitudinal study of the changes related to the nomination of top candidates. This has been possible thanks to an intensive codification of primary and secondary sources, most of which were obtained in the physical and digital archives of several political parties and newspapers<sup>2</sup>. In addition to the personal, partisan and political characteristics of top candidates, other types of data have been collected as contextual variables, with each linked to one of the different party faces. Concerning the party in central office, information has been collected on party age, splits, mergers and name changes, as well as party leadership turnover and selection methods. Concerning the party on the ground, I collected information on the size of party memberships and the existence of different ancillary organizations. To study the parties in public office, I collected information on government composition, as well as on electoral results. The latter were also used in conjunction with survey data

<sup>2</sup> See chapter 3 for further information on the construction of the dataset.

to assess the role of parties in the electoral arena. In total, and excluding observations for which data on any of the covariates is not available, there are more than 2300 data points representing 1406 different people competing for the position of top candidates across the three different countries. All these fine-grained different variables allowed me to statistically model which factors lead political parties to nominate candidates with lower or higher levels of partyiness, as well as what determines the turnover rates of candidates.

My second empirical contribution concerns measurement. Previous studies had to rely on several indicators to show how entrenched within the party organization a candidate is (Samuels and Shugart, 2014; Astudillo, 2015; Verge and Astudillo, 2018). For example, as indicators they have used time in the legislature, in any public office, or as party member. Each indicator stresses a different aspect of service to the party organization, but a parsimonious indicator was missing. In chapter 4, I have shown that using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as a data reduction technique on candidates' personal characteristics provides a simple and reliable way of summarizing all the different characteristics of top candidates. Despite PCA being widely employed in other fields of research such as voting behaviour, its use in party organization and candidate selection literatures has been absent. In contrast, a significant part of the literature is devoted to the construction of indexes and composed measures aspiring to conceptualize complex and multi-dimensional phenomena like political personalization (Rahat and Kenig, 2018), or the institutionalization of political parties (Harmel, Svåsand and Mjelde, 2018). When there are no clear theoretical reasons for using certain weightings in the construction of an index, researchers should reconsider the use of data-driven methods such as principal component analysis or item response theory. PCA offers a way to summarize the data but also to unveil other dimensions which may be of interest. In addition, other data-driven methods allow for a categorical classification of candidates. If party scholars were interested in how the different career paths of candidates can affect parties' behaviour – such as a traditional bottom-up career enhancing reselection chances after a bad electoral result – sequence analysis could be used to determine different career paths. Alternatively, if the main interest were the overall time spent in a previous position, rather than in specific career-paths, then clustering techniques could be more useful for unveiling the latent categories in the data structure. For example, researchers could even manually code a small sub-set of the candidates and rely on a naïve Bayes classifier or support vector machine to classify the rest of observations. Although party organization is one of the oldest sub-fields within political science, it should be open to embracing new methods and techniques for quantitative analysis. The fact that it is extremely demanding to obtain rich longitudinal data on party organization should not be a barrier to using the newest methods to investigate this field.

### **8.3 Limitations of this study and future venues of research**

In this section, I will acknowledge the limitations and possible critiques of this work, both empirical and theoretical, as well as to propose areas for future research. The main theoretical and empirical limitation of this dissertation is its inability to disentangle electability and reliability as two orthogonal dimensions. Right now, and following previous studies (Samuels and Shugart, 2010), I consider that these two dimensions constitute a trade-off, where higher reliability implies lower electability and vice versa. However, as suggested in chapter 2, this is a convenient

simplification and in reality, it is perfectly possible for aspirants to exist with high or low values on both dimensions simultaneously. The main barrier to distinguishing between these two factors is not theoretical but empirical. The different waves of research have not found a way to independently measure electability and reliability other than by using surveys, where voters are asked to rate a given candidate. This option presents an important drawback, as electability can only be measured for those who have been nominated by their parties. On very few occasions, is it possible to observe those who were not selected. In addition, as discussed in chapter 7, these surveys are limited in time and present some additional problems, which prevents us from using them to infer parties' selection criteria in general terms.

There is clearly a measurement problem. In a world of perfect information, it would be possible to observe the predicted reliability and electability of all aspirants to a candidacy, and determine who is more likely to obtain that candidacy. On the one hand, it is possible to compare the different past experiences of top candidates to extract their overall degree of partyness, as developed in chapter 4. On the other hand, it would be possible to obtain an empirical indicator able to signal the electability of each aspirant, such as pre-electoral surveys, where voters are asked to rate all aspirants. However, even if such rich data existed, it would be impossible to obtain it for past elections, and thus to compare how parties behaved when voters' alignment with parties was far stronger than nowadays. One possible means to overcome the restrictions of survey research could be to rely on a quantitative analysis of newspapers electoral coverage. Newspapers have covered democratic elections since their very beginnings, and thus comparing how personalized the electoral coverage is over time can provide empirical evidence regarding the increasing importance of top candidates. For instance, an analysis could compare how many times a candidate is mentioned vis-à-vis their political party. The fact that more and more newspapers are digitalizing their historical archives provides a unique opportunity for historical research on political personalization and party behaviour. However, I leave this line of inquiry to future researchers.

Regarding generalization, this study has performed a statistical analysis on more than 2000 nominated top candidates. This number of observations greatly exceeds those used in similar studies, and thus provides greater statistical power to our analysis. On the other hand, these observations refer to only three countries at the regional level. Disaggregating parties into their different territorial branches presents the advantage of achieving a higher number of observations while keeping contextual factors relatively stable, and making data collection more efficient. However, parties at the regional level may differ in their behaviour from their national organizations due to the effect of *second-order-elections* (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Parties can use these to test new approaches in terms of ideological positions or governmental coalitions (Downs, 1998). It could be argued that parties use regional elections to test new types of candidates, such as those considered more electable to the detriment of more reliable candidates, when the electorate changes. The fact that I have found no support for this argument at the regional level, where the phenomenon should be more prominent, leads us to believe that it will also be lacking at the national level.

Furthermore, concerning the selection of political parties, this dissertation is not limited to studying the two main political parties of a system, i.e. those that usually access to government. Unlike previous studies, I take into consideration a broader universe of political parties, including medium-sized parties and some that are even marginal

in some periods. This broader perspective on parties should help us to better understand parties' behaviour, and represents a clear advantage of this study. In this sense, future research might seek to engage more with the literature on organizational ecology and the birth, death and survival of organizations.

Regarding whether this study could claim any sort of causality between the different elements – external demand, the internal demand, the type of selector and the party's screening and recruitment capacity – it should be stressed that this study does not seek to establish causal relationships between the different variables, but to study possible associations. The design of the study does not permit causal relationships to be established. Here there is no control group that remains unaltered, as the all parties are affected by the main independent variables in one way or another at all times. This is a common problem for studies on party organization, and future research would benefit from developing a causal inference agenda to tackle this issue. In particular, future research should reconsider the endogenous or exogenous relations that can be established between the different elements specified above. The order on which some of this elements can affect each other as well as the underlying mechanism that could drive the association. Here, I contributed to this debate by highlighting the importance of name recognition for explaining the different behaviour of party primaries in comparison with party elites and party conferences. Once these theoretical relations have been determined, some tools of causal inference such as matching and instrumental variables, could be extremely helpful for party scholars.

For example, matching could be used to compare parties with similar characteristics – party size, ideology, or state of electoral market – that may or may not have experienced a change in their dominant coalition. Similarly, instrumental variables can be a helpful approach to measuring how a factor related to the treatment – change in the dominant coalition, the selectorate or in the electoral market – but not to the outcome, can help us to identify which part of the change in the outcome results from the treatment. However, the application of this method needs to rely on strong theoretically driven hypotheses about the direction of the relationship, and which variables could be considered as an appropriate treatment. In addition, there should a discussion within the research community about how to use the different concepts of causal inference, such as pre- or post-treatment bias or the stable unit treatment value assumption, when studying political parties. The design of the study prevents me from making causal claims, but by exposing all the different factors that can influence partisan decision-making, I aim to expose the possible relationship so future research can be able to identify causal relationships and clear mechanisms. Party scholars should bring together the traditional and very rich literature on party organization change and its consequences with the latest methodological advancements on causal inference. Such effort will advance the state of knowledge on political parties, and should push the scholar community to reconsider the validity of traditional theories for understanding political parties.

The scholarship on candidate selection has grown at a slower pace than some neighbouring fields, mostly due to limitations in obtaining data. Parties are extremely protective about the secrecy of their internal lives and seek to hide party battles from the public eye. This dissertation contributes to advancing the scholarship by providing a longitudinal study, and by raising some questions about how to develop better inferences in this field. To summarize, it is possible to identify two significant issues that future research should develop. First, it is necessary to theoretic-

cally and empirically transform electability and reliability from an assumed trade-off into two different orthogonal dimensions. Current research, including this dissertation is constrained by the lack of an appropriate indicator for measuring electability across time and different political systems. Second, future research should reconsider the associations highlighted in this study from a causality perspective by developing possible counterfactuals and isolating some of these relationships from possible confounders.

## **8.4 A new theory of party organization change**

This dissertation has shed light on how parties nominate candidates for the executive office in parliamentary democracies. Given that one of parties' key functions as organizations is to recruit and train political elites seeking governmental office (Key, 1964), what have we learned about the overall behaviour of political parties? In this last section, and drawing on my results, I will take a different approach. On the one hand, starting from my empirical results, I will "zoom out" in order to evaluate how research on top candidates can help to understand the role of political parties in contemporary democracies. On the other hand, I will speculate on how parties have changed across time and circumstances. In particular I will suggest a new provocative theory of party organization change to be tested in future research. My results reflect, firstly, that political parties are extremely dependent on their access to organizational resources, such as public funding, for growing as organizations. Without these resources, parties seem to behave erratically and are unable to train candidates with high levels of partyiness. Second, when nominating a top candidate, parties are far more reactive to internal, than to external changes. This raises questions about parties' overall responsiveness, is in line with some recent research suggesting that parties are not so responsive after all (O'Grady and Abou-Chadi, 2019). Although caution is necessary, due to the study only analysing three countries at the subnational level, the study does cover an extensive period of time, and include very different types of political parties. The picture that emerges is one of very self-referential and even cartelized parties (Katz and Mair, 1995), which are extremely dependent on the resources they obtain from their environment. Top candidates appear to be professional politicians whose previous experience in public office is dependent on the opportunities that parties have provided them. They do not appear to be the ultimate representatives of any social group the party seeks to represent in particular, and the existence of organizations that articulate those interest do not seem to play a role when the top candidate is chosen. Katz and Mair (1995) have criticized the cartelization of political parties because it makes them unresponsive to voters policy-wise, and ultimately unaccountable<sup>3</sup>.

Mair (2013, p. 67) considers that the criterion guiding party choice is popularity rather than political ability and commitment. In his own words: "Although political leaders continue to be recruited by party, for example, they are less likely to be recruited through parties, in that the choice of leader is now less often determined by the strength of a candidate's support within the party and more often by the candidate's capacity to appeal to the media and thence to the wider electorate". His vision of how top candidates ought to be, fits with a particular vision of how political parties should be. Katz (2014) exposes two different visions of how to conceptualize political parties. On the one hand, they can be conceived of as an association of citizens that seeks to represent "discrete ideologies

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<sup>3</sup> See Mair (2013).

or clusters of policy positions and discrete classes of citizens” (Katz, 2014, p. 185). Parties emerge from within society aiming to represent a particular social group, and even to broaden their base by appealing to other groups with close interests. This is the model of the traditional mass party that ensures intra-party accountability, as the party on the ground is a clear representative of a particular social group. There the party in public office and in central office remain relatively independent of each other but the party on the ground holds both accountable. This is the traditional vision that has been used to explain intra-party policy-making and candidate selection. It is also how party elites have commonly been understood – as representatives of “discrete classes of citizens”, most commonly the working class or the bourgeoisie. Therefore, party elites are considered as agents of the party on the ground.

Approached from a different angle, parties can be conceptually understood as teams of politicians. In this vision, parties compete over a policy continuum and a fluid society (Downs, 1957). Party elites offer a set of policies for voters to choose from, aiming to appeal to as many segments in society as possible. Here, intra-party accountability is almost absent. The party in public office is the dominant element within the party organization, and the other two faces are only activated for campaign purposes. According to this Downsian model of political parties, parties change due to internal competition among elites, while according to the mass party perspective, grassroots pressure can be an element of change. The mass party perspective views party elites not as representatives of their party’s social base, but as individuals that help a party to achieve its objectives, and who have a vested interest in the success of their organization.

Mair’s (2013) vision on top candidate selection is clearly rooted in the traditional mass party approach that conceives of parties as the ultimate representative of a given social group. A significant part of the scholarship on party organization and on candidate selection subscribes to this view as part of its analysis of the role of candidates as delegates of the party on the ground (Norris and Lovenduski, 1994; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). My dissertation has relied more on a Downsian approach, where candidates are part of a party’s dominant coalition, and constitute an electoral and governmental asset. My empirical results partly support the Downsian approach. On the one hand, I found that the most critical factor explaining the degree of partyiness of top candidates is a party’s screening and recruitment capacity. Also, turnover of candidates is revealed to a great extent as a result of changes in the dominant coalition, and the existence of ancillary organizations that should act as anchorage in society play no role in the nomination of top candidates. However, the results are not completely consistent with this vision, as I find no evidence supporting the claim that parties react to changes in the electorate when nominating their top candidates.

Some questions may arise at this point. To what extent is the mass party a historical anomaly? The mass party emerged in the very specific context of Western Europe during the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, in a process that often ran parallel to the democratization of countries, as well as the extension of electoral franchise. In addition, it can be questioned whether party scholars should continue to measure parties according to the gold standard of the mass party? Party grassroots had a very specific function in mass parties as representatives of the initial social group that formed specific parties. However, this role has become blurred as parties have changed. Nowadays, in many parties grassroots supporters have become mere “cheerleaders” for

the leadership (Katz, 2014), rather than organized groups of citizens holding party elites accountable. Building on these thoughts, I now proceed to present a new and provocative theory for understanding party change, which at this stage does not aim to explain all party change but rather to raise some questions about the current stage of party research.

I propose that the organizational form with which parties are born depends on the state of two different factors at the time of their birth<sup>4</sup>. First, is the size of the electoral franchise. Countries like the UK, France or the Netherlands progressively enlarged their electorate until they achieved universal male suffrage, followed by the women's vote. Plotting this trend over time should result in something similar to a logistic cumulative distribution function, where the size of the franchise rapidly increases until it incorporates most of the population. However, the majority of today's democratic countries had universal suffrage at birth, or at least male suffrage. Therefore, the periods of gradual extension that Western Northern European countries experienced are not actually the most common route to democracy. Given that mass parties played a crucial role in the extension of the franchise in North Western European countries, the overall role of this type of could have been overstated.

The second factor refers to the changing importance of labour versus capital in campaigning, or labour/capital ratio for short. Historically, when the electorate was very small, parties campaigned through the personal network of their relatively small number of members, the party of notables. However, the increasing size of the electorate increased the importance of labour in campaigning. New political parties and movements who did not have access to that specific political capital created the mass party, for example the traditional social democratic party. They articulated their movements through labour, and thus overcame the high political entry costs of the time. In addition, the increasing importance of labour forced other parties to adapt their organization, a phenomenon Leon Epstein (1967) calls "contagion from the left". This equilibrium remains stable as long as the franchises expands, and the importance of labour continues to grow. However, technological advancements such as the radio, TV and the internet lead to a decrease in the importance of labour and an increase in the importance of capital in campaigning efforts. This generates a continuous need for capital in campaigning – for buying advertisements, hiring PR agencies, etc. – that over time gives birth to the catch-all party, the entrepreneurial-party, and the cartel-party, depending on the different needs and sources of capital. Parties that are born during historical periods when labour was more important than capital may retain some characteristics from this time in their organizational structure, such as the way the different party dimensions interact with each other, even decades after the importance of labour has decreased.

From a global and cross-time perspective, mass parties are an uncommon form of party organization, even if only taking into account those parties formed shortly after a country democratizes. Mass parties are very uncommon in countries that democratized after WWII, and almost inexistent in countries that transitioned to democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union. Even in older democracies such as Canada and Australia, traditional mass organizations are uncommon (Carty, 2004). In Latin America, their role was more prominent than in former British colonies during

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<sup>4</sup> All parties, as organizations, have definitive moments that shape how their organization looks. For most, this will be their moment of birth, but for others it could be when they became politically significant, or when they first accessed parliament and / or government.

the first part of the twentieth century, but few have survived the different periods alternating between democracy and authoritarianism that these countries experienced. However, a significant proportion of the party scholarship has adopted these particular type of political parties, born and developed under very specific circumstances, as the gold standard of party organization. Most democratic states, like the countries that democratized in the second half of the twentieth century, as well as former British colonies, experienced universal suffrage from the very beginning, and were born – on average – in times when capital was already more important than labour for political campaigning. This should result in “cartelized parties” from the very beginning of democratic periods, with access to state resources playing a critical role in deciding which parties survive in newly democratized countries.

Parties in these countries should behave more similarly to what Katz calls “Downsian” parties. They should display only low levels of social-rootedness, and will probably hold pragmatic policy positions. Furthermore, their internal lives can be understood more in terms of elite competition, rather than grassroots members holding the rest of the party accountable. This view fits better with the empirical results presented in this study, and future research should take a broader view of how parties adapt their behaviour according to the environmental factors they face, but also to their internal factors. Here I focussed on the selection of top candidates, which is only one of the many functions that political parties perform. However, party scholars be cautious about the extent to which the research on party politics tends to take a very specific group of political parties as the benchmark for classifying all types of political parties around the globe and across many different time periods. Maybe cartelized parties should not only be considered as the new normal, but even as the historical norm around the globe. Parties in new democracies are already born as cartelized organizations, whereas those mass parties that remain are the product of the very specific circumstances of democratization in North and Western Europe. The consideration of such changes in campaigning, or the extension of the franchise were not the main purpose of this dissertation, but the above question, emerging from this theoretical and empirical study of top candidates, does constitute ripe terrain for future research.

## **8.5 Conclusion**

This dissertation has contributed to understanding the behaviour of political parties, in particular through the study of top candidates. Top candidates have a pivotal function within parties. However, their role had been overlooked until now by the literature, especially in parliamentary democracies. This dissertation helps to fill this gap by proposing a new theoretical approach to the study of top candidates, and by providing a fine-grained empirical analysis of the conditions that lead to the nomination of certain types of candidates.

Theoretically, here I have drawn both on the principal-agent literature applied to political parties, as well as the literature on party organization change. This allowed me to draw a clear separation between parties’ differences in opportunities and differences in preferences, which in turn helps to disentangle which part of the variance can be attributed to each factor. More specifically, I proposed four different factors that interact with each other: parties’ screening and recruitment capacities, changes in the dominant coalition, changes in the electorate, and the type

of selectorate. The results show that differences in opportunities play a critical role in explaining top candidates' characteristics, while variance in parties' internal lives play a much bigger role than external changes in the parties' electorate. Furthermore, in the case of party primaries, I have shown some evidence pointing to name recognition as one of the mechanisms that explains why these behave differently to other types of selector. Empirically, this dissertation has also made a considerable contribution by collecting novel data on top candidates' personal characteristics in three countries, 44 regions and 44 political parties, leading to more than 2300 observations. In addition, the data was complemented with data on party features and electoral environments. I also discussed how to better measure some of the latent traits – such as partyness – that can be observed in political candidates. Overall, this dissertation has taken a holistic approach to the selection of top candidates, and constitutes an important step for furthering the understanding not only of how parties select political candidates, but also of how top candidates are an important part of the chain of democratic delegation. Top candidates may be becoming more important for voters, and during campaigns, but parties nominate them mostly on internal considerations.



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# Appendix A

## Appendix A: Top candidates' degree of *partyness*

This appendix shows the distribution top candidates' calculated degree of partyness over time, political party and region. In each country, the first type of graph plot the distribution of partyness within each party. The second type of graph plots the individual partyness of each top candidate. In concrete, it plots the top candidate partyness against time and in each party-region dyad, and the though the colour it displays if the top candidate runs for the first time or not. This way, the two primary sources of variation in the dependent variable of this dissertation can be appreciated.

### A.1 Canada

Fig. A.1: Distribution of partyness in Canadian parties.




Fig. A.2: Distribution of partyiness in Canadian non-state-wide parties.




Fig. A.3: Top candidates of the Liberal Party degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.4: Top candidates of CCF/NDP degree of partytyness.




Fig. A.5: Top candidates of the Conservatives and Progressive Conservatives degree of partytyness.




Fig. A.6: Top candidates of Social Credit degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.7: Top candidates of the Greens degree of partyiness.





Fig. A.8: Top candidates of Canadian non-state-wide parties degree of partyiness.



**A.2 Germany**

Fig. A.9: Distribution of partyiness in German parties.




Fig. A.10: Top candidates of CDU/CSU degree of *partyness*.




Fig. A.11: Top candidates of SPD degree of *partyness*.




Fig. A.12: Top candidates of FDP degree of partyyness.




Fig. A.13: Top candidates of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen degree of partyyness.




Fig. A.14: Top candidates of PDS/Die Linke degree of partyiness.





Fig. A.15: Top candidates of AfD degree of partyiness.



**A.3 Spain**

Fig. A.16: Distribution of partyiness in Spanish parties.




Fig. A.17: Distribution of partyiness in Spanish non-state-wide parties.




Fig. A.18: Top candidates of AP/PP degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.19: Top candidates of PSOE degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.20: Top candidates of PCE/IU degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.21: Top candidates of Podemos degree of partyiness.




Fig. A.22: Top candidates of Ciudadanos degree of *partyness*.




Fig. A.23: Top candidates of Vox degree of *partyness*.





Fig. A.24: Top candidates of Spanish non-state-wide parties.





## Appendix B

### Appendix B: Regression tables

As in the main body of the dissertation, I almost exclusively use graphical representations of the regression coefficients – or *coefplots* –, here I include the full tables for the statistical models. I also include here the different robustness tests when I repeat a model with a slight change on the operationalization of the main variables. If not indicated otherwise, the model consists of a two-step Heckman selection model.

## B.1 Appendix: Chapter 4

### B.1.1 Determinants of nominating a new candidate

Logit model.

Table B.1: Determinants of a party nominating a new top candidate

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>DV: New candidate</b>					
Party Age (Log).	-0.203 (0.107)	-0.0558 (0.132)	-0.171 (0.113)	-0.0756 (0.121)	-0.167 (0.136)
Year	0.00723* (0.00354)	0.00806* (0.00370)	0.00664 (0.00353)	0.00603 (0.00319)	0.00904** (0.00336)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.687** (0.256)				0.528 (0.376)
Top candidate gender <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0254 (0.151)			-0.0824 (0.163)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0486*** (0.00550)			0.0613*** (0.00616)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>			0.00745 (0.00571)		-0.0123 (0.00735)
Performance:					
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>				Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.500** (0.171)	-0.448* (0.187)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.494** (0.176)	-0.684*** (0.199)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-1.283*** (0.107)	-1.580*** (0.130)
Constant	-12.97 (6.643)	-17.63* (6.957)	-11.96 (6.615)	-10.68 (5.913)	-19.25** (6.249)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2308	2215	2201	2229	2105
Pseudo $R^2$	0.039	0.061	0.036	0.077	0.114

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**B.2 Appendix: Chapter 5****B.2.1 Screening capacity**

Table B.2: Determinants of a parties screening capacity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	10.09*** (1.706)	11.40*** (1.640)	12.95*** (1.535)	11.02*** (1.687)
Year	-0.0809 (0.0562)	-0.133** (0.0463)	-0.127* (0.0504)	-0.101* (0.0485)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.375*** (0.0505)			0.115* (0.0555)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.267*** (0.0345)		0.140** (0.0447)
Cum. time in Parl.		0.0594 (0.0466)		0.0146 (0.0455)
Cum. time out of Parl.		-0.270 (0.244)		-0.275 (0.251)
Cum. time in Gov.			0.433*** (0.0644)	0.319*** (0.0618)
Cum. time in Opp.			-0.197*** (0.0425)	-0.100* (0.0417)
Constant	128.2 (106.3)	231.3** (87.11)	225.8* (95.25)	173.7 (91.33)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.101 (0.0929)	-0.0646 (0.0888)	-0.0662 (0.0884)	-0.111 (0.0981)
Year	0.00565* (0.00232)	0.000167 (0.00267)	0.00482* (0.00222)	0.00288 (0.00270)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0107*** (0.00303)			0.0191*** (0.00376)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.150 (0.363)	0.212 (0.337)	0.116 (0.303)	0.184 (0.387)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0371*** (0.00406)	0.0398*** (0.00414)	0.0372*** (0.00401)	0.0379*** (0.00417)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00367 (0.00469)	-0.0100* (0.00443)	-0.00590 (0.00454)	-0.00988* (0.00437)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.135 (0.125)	-0.185 (0.122)	-0.288* (0.122)	-0.0710 (0.127)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.376**	-0.358**	-0.425**	-0.339*

	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.132)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.990*** (0.100)	-0.589*** (0.114)	-0.981*** (0.116)	-0.662*** (0.126)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.0113*** (0.00319)		-0.0173*** (0.00381)
Cum. time in Parl.		0.00630** (0.00231)		0.00361 (0.00229)
Cum. time out of Parl.		0.0294* (0.0146)		0.0406** (0.0138)
Cum. time in Gov.			0.00491 (0.00451)	0.00181 (0.00450)
Cum. time in Opp.			-0.00269 (0.00235)	-0.00172 (0.00242)
Constant	-12.38** (4.341)	-1.489 (5.002)	-10.53* (4.147)	-6.830 (5.086)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	5.359* (2.290)	-0.195 (2.372)	0.508 (2.186)	-1.706 (2.556)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<hr/>				
Obs.	1970	1986	2002	1970
Censored Obs.	1006	1014	1022	1006
$\rho$	0.380	-0.0146	0.0383	-0.130
$\sigma$	14.09	13.37	13.28	13.08
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.2.2 Robustness test: Using time as party member as DV.

Table B.3: Determinants of a parties screening capacity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Years of party membership (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	5.056*** (0.979)	5.549*** (0.972)	5.999*** (0.874)	5.282*** (1.003)
Year	-0.0124 (0.0322)	-0.0259 (0.0300)	-0.0293 (0.0280)	-0.0165 (0.0308)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.129*** (0.0293)			0.0181 (0.0350)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.117***		0.0766*

		(0.0229)		(0.0301)
Cum. time in Parl.		0.0112		-0.00163
		(0.0306)		(0.0304)
Cum. time out of Parl.		0.0492		0.0206
		(0.148)		(0.148)
Cum. time in Gov.			0.192***	0.142**
			(0.0482)	(0.0514)
Cum. time in Opp.			-0.0575*	-0.0275
			(0.0228)	(0.0247)
Constant	12.06	38.66	47.72	22.89
	(60.95)	(56.41)	(53.05)	(58.08)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.0994	-0.0633	-0.0622	-0.109
	(0.0922)	(0.0884)	(0.0879)	(0.0976)
Year	0.00552*	-0.000181	0.00463*	0.00263
	(0.00230)	(0.00264)	(0.00220)	(0.00267)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0113***			0.0200***
	(0.00306)			(0.00386)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.151	0.212	0.117	0.185
	(0.364)	(0.337)	(0.303)	(0.389)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0370***	0.0399***	0.0372***	0.0379***
	(0.00403)	(0.00411)	(0.00398)	(0.00414)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00369	-0.0101*	-0.00598	-0.00998*
	(0.00469)	(0.00445)	(0.00456)	(0.00439)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.124	-0.178	-0.284*	-0.0573
	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.126)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.368**	-0.352**	-0.422**	-0.332*
	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.133)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.003***	-0.592***	-0.991***	-0.673***
	(0.101)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.125)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.0114***		-0.0176***
		(0.00318)		(0.00386)
Cum. time in Parl.		0.00664**		0.00384
		(0.00229)		(0.00226)
Cum. time out of Parl.		0.0295*		0.0413**
		(0.0146)		(0.0137)
Cum. time in Gov.			0.00519	0.00209
			(0.00451)	(0.00448)
Cum. time in Opp.			-0.00289	-0.00175
			(0.00235)	(0.00241)

Constant	-12.13**	-0.803	-10.14*	-6.342
	(4.320)	(4.962)	(4.125)	(5.027)
mills				
lambda	1.480	-0.935	-0.645	-1.908
	(1.257)	(1.456)	(1.277)	(1.601)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1966	1982	1998	1966
Censored Obs.	1006	1014	1022	1006
$\rho$	0.195	-0.125	-0.0864	-0.255
$\sigma$	7.583	7.499	7.466	7.491
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.2.3 Ancillary organizations

Table B.4: The effect of parties' ancillary organizations on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02***	10.90***	10.98***	10.89***
	(1.348)	(1.777)	(1.709)	(1.782)
Year	-0.101**	-0.109*	-0.110	-0.114*
	(0.0381)	(0.0479)	(0.0557)	(0.0544)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115*	0.115*	0.115*	0.116*
	(0.0560)	(0.0555)	(0.0557)	(0.0561)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140**	0.141**	0.140**	0.140**
	(0.0446)	(0.0442)	(0.0450)	(0.0449)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146	0.0158	0.0115	0.0138
	(0.0342)	(0.0471)	(0.0441)	(0.0475)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275	-0.269	-0.270	-0.265
	(0.187)	(0.256)	(0.257)	(0.259)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319***	0.321***	0.319***	0.320***
	(0.0658)	(0.0610)	(0.0620)	(0.0613)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100*	-0.100*	-0.103*	-0.102*
	(0.0406)	(0.0417)	(0.0421)	(0.0421)
Organizational complexity		0.291		0.260
		(0.730)		(0.769)
Sub-org.: Youth.			0.0177	0.0116
			(0.0564)	(0.0591)

Constant	173.7*	190.2*	190.9	199.8
	(71.59)	(90.30)	(106.1)	(103.5)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111	-0.126	-0.105	-0.119
	(0.0982)	(0.101)	(0.0969)	(0.0989)
Year	0.00288	0.00143	0.00377	0.00267
	(0.00284)	(0.00287)	(0.00321)	(0.00327)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191***	0.0193***	0.0192***	0.0195***
	(0.00355)	(0.00377)	(0.00381)	(0.00385)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173***	-0.0173***	-0.0174***	-0.0175***
	(0.00294)	(0.00381)	(0.00381)	(0.00379)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361	0.00375	0.00396	0.00436
	(0.00245)	(0.00227)	(0.00239)	(0.00233)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406**	0.0418**	0.0405**	0.0418**
	(0.0151)	(0.0137)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181	0.00194	0.00177	0.00188
	(0.00499)	(0.00458)	(0.00447)	(0.00451)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172	-0.00183	-0.00149	-0.00145
	(0.00299)	(0.00242)	(0.00247)	(0.00246)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184	0.191	0.186	0.195
	(0.304)	(0.382)	(0.385)	(0.378)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379***	0.0382***	0.0379***	0.0383***
	(0.00384)	(0.00417)	(0.00418)	(0.00419)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988*	-0.00989*	-0.0100*	-0.0101*
	(0.00438)	(0.00439)	(0.00447)	(0.00450)
<b>Performance:</b>				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710	-0.0842	-0.0672	-0.0799
	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.129)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339**	-0.335*	-0.340*	-0.335*
	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.134)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662***	-0.667***	-0.659***	-0.664***
	(0.121)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.125)
Organizational complexity		0.0488		0.0567
		(0.0375)		(0.0396)
Sub-org.: Youth.			-0.00186	-0.00308
			(0.00350)	(0.00387)
Constant	-6.830	-4.017	-8.568	-6.444
	(5.347)	(5.392)	(6.081)	(6.188)
<b>mills</b>				
lambda	-1.706	-1.805	-1.631	-1.692
	(2.126)	(2.511)	(2.583)	(2.529)

Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1970	1970
Censored Obs.	1006	1006	1006	1006
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.138	-0.125	-0.129
$\sigma$	13.08	13.09	13.08	13.08
Chi <sup>2</sup>	814.2			

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.2.4 Party membership

Table B.5: The effect of parties' membership on top candidates selection in Germany

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	10.51*** (2.441)	9.876*** (2.691)	11.11*** (2.477)	10.47*** (2.693)
Year	0.0231 (0.0857)	0.0462 (0.0946)	0.00799 (0.0872)	0.0307 (0.0951)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.171 (0.187)	0.135 (0.189)	0.159 (0.185)	0.127 (0.188)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.178 (0.198)	0.145 (0.204)	0.176 (0.200)	0.147 (0.205)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0647)	0.00564 (0.0663)	0.00405 (0.0655)	-0.00316 (0.0671)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.264 (0.424)	-0.189 (0.422)	-0.261 (0.424)	-0.193 (0.421)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.281*** (0.0679)	0.287*** (0.0682)	0.287*** (0.0692)	0.292*** (0.0696)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.113 (0.0864)	-0.121 (0.0878)	-0.112 (0.0864)	-0.120 (0.0877)
Party members (log)		1.607 (1.822)		1.485 (1.775)
$\Delta$ Party members (log)			-2.044 (2.072)	-1.847 (2.019)
Constant	-56.24 (166.4)	-114.0 (190.7)	-27.09 (169.2)	-83.20 (190.3)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.293 (0.180)	0.233 (0.186)	0.359 (0.186)	0.299 (0.194)

Year	0.0000132 (0.00608)	0.00226 (0.00621)	-0.00155 (0.00612)	0.000715 (0.00634)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0552*** (0.00973)	0.0519*** (0.0104)	0.0536*** (0.00961)	0.0501*** (0.0104)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0601*** (0.00991)	-0.0652*** (0.0114)	-0.0595*** (0.00989)	-0.0648*** (0.0114)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.00438 (0.00415)	-0.00545 (0.00441)	-0.00612 (0.00424)	-0.00724 (0.00446)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0692 (0.133)	0.0774 (0.132)	0.0681 (0.131)	0.0768 (0.131)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.000347 (0.00547)	0.000474 (0.00556)	0.000913 (0.00545)	0.00107 (0.00554)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.000775 (0.00505)	0.000813 (0.00504)	0.00133 (0.00496)	0.00136 (0.00495)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0451*** (0.00672)	0.0458*** (0.00676)	0.0460*** (0.00671)	0.0468*** (0.00679)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0115 (0.0122)	-0.0155 (0.0133)	-0.0100 (0.0123)	-0.0143 (0.0136)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0616 (0.214)	-0.0854 (0.219)	-0.119 (0.229)	-0.140 (0.233)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.249 (0.176)	-0.229 (0.181)	-0.248 (0.176)	-0.229 (0.182)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.442* (0.171)	-0.415* (0.176)	-0.436* (0.170)	-0.408* (0.175)
Party members (log)		0.170 (0.147)		0.175 (0.145)
$\Delta$ Party members (log)			-0.343 (0.199)	-0.350 (0.192)
Constant	-2.757 (11.68)	-8.538 (12.33)	0.182 (11.74)	-5.662 (12.60)
mills				
lambda	1.811 (2.934)	1.678 (2.877)	1.624 (2.956)	1.503 (2.918)
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	734	734	734	734
Censored Obs.	342	342	342	342
$\rho$	0.135	0.126	0.122	0.113
$\sigma$	13.37	13.35	13.35	13.33
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

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Standard errors in parentheses

Only German subsample. Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**B.3 Appendix: Chapter 6****B.3.1 Splits, merges and name changes**

Table B.6: The effect of splits, merges and name changes on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>					
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	11.01*** (1.684)	10.99*** (1.704)	10.77*** (1.689)	10.74*** (1.688)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.0990* (0.0486)	-0.100* (0.0481)	-0.0994* (0.0486)	-0.0990* (0.0490)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.118* (0.0558)	0.115* (0.0555)	0.121* (0.0553)	0.126* (0.0546)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.137** (0.0450)	0.140** (0.0456)	0.136** (0.0444)	0.133** (0.0440)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0156 (0.0454)	0.0143 (0.0453)	0.0145 (0.0456)	0.0159 (0.0457)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.288 (0.253)	-0.274 (0.252)	-0.283 (0.253)	-0.294 (0.255)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.330*** (0.0633)	0.320*** (0.0614)	0.320*** (0.0615)	0.324*** (0.0626)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.0990* (0.0407)	-0.100* (0.0419)	-0.101* (0.0417)	-0.100* (0.0411)
Split		-7.795* (3.437)			
Merge			2.030 (10.35)		
Name change				-3.271 (2.207)	
Split, Merge or name change					-4.284* (1.949)
Constant	173.7 (91.33)	169.8 (91.55)	172.7 (90.62)	171.5 (91.75)	170.9 (92.40)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>					
Party Age (Log).	-0.111 (0.0981)	-0.115 (0.0984)	-0.112 (0.0983)	-0.0904 (0.100)	-0.0953 (0.0995)
Year	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.00284 (0.00271)	0.00293 (0.00272)	0.00272 (0.00271)	0.00284 (0.00272)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191*** (0.00376)	0.0192*** (0.00377)	0.0191*** (0.00377)	0.0185*** (0.00385)	0.0183*** (0.00384)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0169*** (0.00381)	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0168*** (0.00382)	-0.0166*** (0.00381)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361 (0.00229)	0.00348 (0.00230)	0.00360 (0.00230)	0.00374 (0.00230)	0.00361 (0.00231)

Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0415** (0.0140)	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0412** (0.0138)	0.0417** (0.0139)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181 (0.00450)	0.00130 (0.00454)	0.00183 (0.00450)	0.00188 (0.00452)	0.00165 (0.00455)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172 (0.00242)	-0.00174 (0.00242)	-0.00173 (0.00242)	-0.00151 (0.00242)	-0.00151 (0.00242)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184 (0.387)	0.191 (0.387)	0.184 (0.387)	0.189 (0.394)	0.195 (0.394)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0377*** (0.00415)	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0385*** (0.00421)	0.0384*** (0.00421)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988* (0.00437)	-0.00955* (0.00436)	-0.00989* (0.00438)	-0.00995* (0.00437)	-0.00982* (0.00438)
Performance:					
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710 (0.127)	-0.0771 (0.128)	-0.0720 (0.127)	-0.0675 (0.129)	-0.0746 (0.129)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.335* (0.133)	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.341* (0.131)	-0.339* (0.132)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.672*** (0.126)	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.663*** (0.126)	-0.667*** (0.127)
Split		0.749** (0.287)			
Merge			0.101 (0.507)		
Name change				0.353 (0.193)	
Split, Merge or name change					0.424** (0.153)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-6.715 (5.098)	-6.909 (5.108)	-6.611 (5.092)	-6.834 (5.118)
mills					
lambda	-1.706 (2.556)	-1.711 (2.585)	-1.688 (2.567)	-1.679 (2.531)	-1.647 (2.547)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970
Censored Obs.	1006	1006	1006	1006	1006
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.131	-0.129	-0.128	-0.126
$\sigma$	13.08	13.05	13.08	13.07	13.05
Chi <sup>2</sup>					

Standard errors in parentheses

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Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.3.1.1 Robustness test: Splits, merges and name changes up to t-3

Table B.7: Robustness check: the effect of splits, merges and name changes on top candidates selection over time (up to t-2)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.04*** (1.687)	10.86*** (1.712)	10.76*** (1.686)	10.83*** (1.700)
Year	-0.0964 (0.0489)	-0.0966* (0.0485)	-0.100* (0.0487)	-0.102* (0.0493)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.112* (0.0563)	0.113* (0.0552)	0.123* (0.0554)	0.124* (0.0552)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0456)	0.140** (0.0447)	0.132** (0.0451)	0.131** (0.0447)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0192 (0.0456)	0.0124 (0.0452)	0.0147 (0.0456)	0.0184 (0.0457)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.309 (0.255)	-0.277 (0.251)	-0.276 (0.254)	-0.292 (0.256)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.329*** (0.0617)	0.322*** (0.0611)	0.319*** (0.0613)	0.321*** (0.0615)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.0964* (0.0391)	-0.0995* (0.0419)	-0.102* (0.0418)	-0.101* (0.0404)
Split up to t-2	-9.836*** (2.215)			
Merge up to t-2	5.551 (5.933)			
Name change up to t-2	-3.570 (1.839)			
Split, merge or name change up to t-2	-4.505** (1.555)			
Constant	164.7 (92.28)	165.7 (91.39)	173.6 (91.97)	176.1 (92.96)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.114 (0.0984)	-0.120 (0.0989)	-0.115 (0.0986)	-0.109 (0.0983)
Year	0.00281 (0.00271)	0.00317 (0.00275)	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.00292 (0.00271)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0192*** (0.00376)	0.0190*** (0.00376)	0.0192*** (0.00378)	0.0191*** (0.00377)

Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0171*** (0.00382)	-0.0173*** (0.00382)	-0.0173*** (0.00386)	-0.0172*** (0.00384)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00353 (0.00229)	0.00351 (0.00231)	0.00360 (0.00229)	0.00359 (0.00231)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0410** (0.0139)	0.0406** (0.0139)	0.0406** (0.0139)	0.0407** (0.0138)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00139 (0.00452)	0.00190 (0.00450)	0.00183 (0.00450)	0.00173 (0.00450)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00168 (0.00242)	-0.00182 (0.00243)	-0.00180 (0.00242)	-0.00166 (0.00243)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.189 (0.387)	0.185 (0.387)	0.178 (0.385)	0.190 (0.388)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0378*** (0.00416)	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0378*** (0.00417)	0.0380*** (0.00418)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00981* (0.00437)	-0.00994* (0.00439)	-0.00982* (0.00437)	-0.00993* (0.00439)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0725 (0.127)	-0.0742 (0.127)	-0.0737 (0.127)	-0.0696 (0.127)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.337* (0.132)	-0.343* (0.133)	-0.340* (0.133)	-0.339* (0.132)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.661*** (0.126)	-0.661*** (0.126)	-0.663*** (0.125)	-0.661*** (0.126)
Split up to t-2	0.273 (0.202)			
Merge up to t-2		0.294 (0.566)		
Name change up to t-2			-0.0624 (0.134)	
Split, merge or name change up to t-2				0.0543 (0.111)
Constant	-6.673 (5.090)	-7.342 (5.175)	-6.795 (5.091)	-6.924 (5.109)
mills				
lambda	-2.005 (2.590)	-1.723 (2.559)	-1.441 (2.561)	-1.572 (2.568)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1970	1970
Censored Obs.	1006	1006	1006	1006

$\rho$	-0.154	-0.132	-0.110	-0.121
$\sigma$	13.03	13.07	13.04	13.02
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.8: Robustness check: the effect of splits, merges and name changes on top candidates selection over time (up to t-3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.15*** (1.682)	10.85*** (1.714)	10.91*** (1.685)	11.02*** (1.693)
Year	-0.0965 (0.0492)	-0.0963* (0.0486)	-0.102* (0.0489)	-0.104* (0.0492)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.108 (0.0566)	0.113* (0.0552)	0.117* (0.0552)	0.117* (0.0557)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.136** (0.0456)	0.141** (0.0446)	0.136** (0.0445)	0.132** (0.0445)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0188 (0.0458)	0.0124 (0.0452)	0.0140 (0.0455)	0.0169 (0.0454)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.305 (0.254)	-0.277 (0.251)	-0.287 (0.254)	-0.303 (0.257)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.334*** (0.0609)	0.322*** (0.0611)	0.320*** (0.0617)	0.324*** (0.0616)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.102* (0.0402)	-0.0994* (0.0419)	-0.102* (0.0417)	-0.104* (0.0410)
Split up to t-3	-7.793** (2.413)			
Merge up to t-3		5.370 (5.775)		
Name change up to t-3			-2.352 (1.657)	
Split, merge or name change up to t-3				-3.270* (1.414)
Constant	164.9 (92.82)	165.2 (91.49)	177.2 (92.30)	180.1 (92.84)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.113 (0.0986)	-0.119 (0.0996)	-0.106 (0.0987)	-0.109 (0.0984)
Year	0.00281 (0.00270)	0.00315 (0.00277)	0.00291 (0.00271)	0.00297 (0.00272)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0192***	0.0190***	0.0191***	0.0192***

	(0.00376)	(0.00377)	(0.00376)	(0.00376)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0171*** (0.00382)	-0.0173*** (0.00382)	-0.0172*** (0.00382)	-0.0170*** (0.00382)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00355 (0.00230)	0.00352 (0.00231)	0.00363 (0.00230)	0.00355 (0.00231)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0410** (0.0139)	0.0407** (0.0139)	0.0410** (0.0137)	0.0415** (0.0138)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00155 (0.00454)	0.00189 (0.00450)	0.00181 (0.00451)	0.00162 (0.00451)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00170 (0.00242)	-0.00180 (0.00243)	-0.00160 (0.00241)	-0.00156 (0.00242)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.186 (0.387)	0.186 (0.387)	0.195 (0.388)	0.200 (0.389)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0380*** (0.00418)	0.0380*** (0.00419)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00980* (0.00437)	-0.00993* (0.00439)	-0.00999* (0.00441)	-0.00998* (0.00441)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0716 (0.127)	-0.0730 (0.127)	-0.0648 (0.128)	-0.0640 (0.128)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.340* (0.132)	-0.342* (0.133)	-0.337* (0.132)	-0.338* (0.132)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.661*** (0.126)	-0.661*** (0.125)	-0.661*** (0.125)
Split up to t-3	0.119 (0.136)			
Merge up to t-3		0.257 (0.538)		
Name change up to t-3			0.0749 (0.105)	
Split, merge or name change up to t-3				0.100 (0.0845)
Constant	-6.687 (5.085)	-7.304 (5.197)	-6.925 (5.102)	-7.023 (5.125)
mills				
lambda	-1.859 (2.574)	-1.754 (2.559)	-1.602 (2.541)	-1.595 (2.556)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1970	1970

Censored Obs.	1006	1006	1006	1006
$\rho$	-0.143	-0.134	-0.123	-0.122
$\sigma$	13.04	13.08	13.06	13.04
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.3.2 Change of party leadership

Table B.9: The effect of party leadership change on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	10.64*** (1.674)	12.94*** (1.902)	12.63*** (1.907)
Year	-0.0859 (0.0475)	-0.115* (0.0561)	-0.107 (0.0562)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.123* (0.0549)	0.110* (0.0550)	0.111* (0.0558)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.145*** (0.0405)	0.122* (0.0499)	0.129** (0.0454)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00541 (0.0459)	0.0283 (0.0454)	0.0220 (0.0446)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.300 (0.263)	-0.234 (0.325)	-0.281 (0.348)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.301*** (0.0743)	0.326*** (0.0651)	0.321*** (0.0800)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.0992* (0.0432)	-0.109* (0.0462)	-0.0991* (0.0477)
No leadership change	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change	-6.307 (3.929)		-7.087 (3.734)
Party Elite		6.822** (2.208)	7.456* (3.765)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.
Primary		-0.287 (1.707)	-10.30* (4.358)
No leadership change X Party Conference			Ref.
Leadership change X Party Elite			-2.150 (2.737)

Leadership change X Primary			10.85* (4.307)
Constant	151.9 (90.20)	193.2 (105.4)	186.2 (105.5)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	-0.0349 (0.126)	0.0502 (0.117)	0.127 (0.152)
Year	0.000547 (0.00340)	-0.00404 (0.00353)	-0.00621 (0.00432)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0126** (0.00428)	0.0207*** (0.00429)	0.0145** (0.00486)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0114** (0.00372)	-0.0209*** (0.00394)	-0.0147*** (0.00395)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00272 (0.00260)	0.00437 (0.00280)	0.00370 (0.00313)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0395* (0.0170)	0.0603* (0.0270)	0.0640 (0.0369)
Cum. time in Gov.	-0.000701 (0.00724)	0.00211 (0.00470)	-0.00124 (0.00813)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.00100 (0.00325)	-0.00367 (0.00278)	-0.000992 (0.00366)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.142 (0.335)	0.244 (0.419)	0.186 (0.366)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0340*** (0.00507)	0.0401*** (0.00499)	0.0352*** (0.00605)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00808 (0.00516)	-0.0169*** (0.00429)	-0.0151** (0.00538)
Performance:			
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.150 (0.166)	0.00187 (0.146)	-0.110 (0.187)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.118 (0.160)	-0.453** (0.140)	-0.235 (0.180)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.488** (0.156)	-0.709*** (0.124)	-0.544*** (0.155)
No leadership change	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change	1.612*** (0.111)		1.619*** (0.118)
Party Elite		-0.0378 (0.185)	0.0163 (0.179)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.

Primary		0.548**	0.590***
		(0.165)	(0.169)
Constant	-3.286	5.992	9.261
	(6.328)	(6.662)	(8.020)
mills			
lambda	-4.296	-1.978	-5.271
	(3.898)	(2.451)	(3.884)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1887	1753	1694
Censored Obs.	960	897	863
$\rho$	-0.322	-0.151	-0.392
$\sigma$	13.36	13.12	13.46
Chi <sup>2</sup>			

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.10: The effect of party leadership change on top candidates selection (only contested leaderships)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	12.86***	12.94***	13.59***
	(3.444)	(1.902)	(3.578)
Year	-0.0676	-0.115*	-0.0769
	(0.0789)	(0.0561)	(0.0898)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0784	0.110*	0.0920
	(0.0747)	(0.0550)	(0.0770)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.110	0.122*	0.0902
	(0.0662)	(0.0499)	(0.0734)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0119	0.0283	0.0109
	(0.0521)	(0.0454)	(0.0538)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.0767	-0.234	0.0265
	(0.523)	(0.325)	(0.521)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.315***	0.326***	0.317***
	(0.0714)	(0.0651)	(0.0679)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.128*	-0.109*	-0.127*
	(0.0571)	(0.0462)	(0.0548)
No leadership change (C)	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change (C)	-1.857		-3.446
	(2.500)		(2.635)

Party Elite		6.822**	-0.427
		(2.208)	(5.524)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.
Primary		-0.287	-6.585
		(1.707)	(5.602)
No leadership change (C) X Party Conference			Ref.
Leadership change (C) X Party Elite			6.243
			(4.344)
Leadership change (C) X Primary			8.320
			(5.351)
Constant	101.3	193.2	116.6
	(143.5)	(105.4)	(164.3)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	-0.198	0.0502	-0.122
	(0.238)	(0.117)	(0.239)
Year	0.00530	-0.00404	0.00183
	(0.00554)	(0.00353)	(0.00612)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0323***	0.0207***	0.0333***
	(0.00594)	(0.00429)	(0.00618)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0255***	-0.0209***	-0.0277***
	(0.00497)	(0.00394)	(0.00496)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00396	0.00437	0.00399
	(0.00429)	(0.00280)	(0.00473)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0732	0.0603*	0.0747
	(0.0503)	(0.0270)	(0.0584)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00193	0.00211	0.00438
	(0.00849)	(0.00470)	(0.00920)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00223	-0.00367	-0.00252
	(0.00348)	(0.00278)	(0.00359)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.807	0.244	0.856
	(0.463)	(0.419)	(0.531)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0454***	0.0401***	0.0440***
	(0.00690)	(0.00499)	(0.00740)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0236***	-0.0169***	-0.0238***
	(0.00489)	(0.00429)	(0.00502)
Performance:			
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.241	0.00187	0.237
	(0.271)	(0.146)	(0.274)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.360	-0.453**	-0.399

	(0.227)	(0.140)	(0.226)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.824*** (0.161)	-0.709*** (0.124)	-0.842*** (0.157)
No leadership change (C)	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change (C)	1.632*** (0.195)		1.586*** (0.201)
Party Elite		-0.0378 (0.185)	-0.232 (0.316)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.
Primary		0.548** (0.165)	0.289 (0.211)
Constant	-12.40 (10.13)	5.992 (6.662)	-5.849 (11.33)
mills lambda	1.732 (2.827)	-1.978 (2.451)	2.550 (2.836)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1235	1753	1205
Censored Obs.	620	897	605
$\rho$	0.135	-0.151	0.199
$\sigma$	12.80	13.12	12.79
Chi <sup>2</sup>			

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.11: The effect of party leadership change on top candidates selection (only contested leaderships)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	12.86*** (3.444)	12.94*** (1.902)	13.59*** (3.578)
Year	-0.0676 (0.0789)	-0.115* (0.0561)	-0.0769 (0.0898)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0784 (0.0747)	0.110* (0.0550)	0.0920 (0.0770)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.110 (0.0662)	0.122* (0.0499)	0.0902 (0.0734)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0119 (0.0521)	0.0283 (0.0454)	0.0109 (0.0538)

Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.0767 (0.523)	-0.234 (0.325)	0.0265 (0.521)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.315*** (0.0714)	0.326*** (0.0651)	0.317*** (0.0679)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.128* (0.0571)	-0.109* (0.0462)	-0.127* (0.0548)
No leadership change (C)	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change (C)	-1.857 (2.500)		-3.446 (2.635)
Party Elite		6.822** (2.208)	-0.427 (5.524)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.
Primary		-0.287 (1.707)	-6.585 (5.602)
No leadership change (C) X Party Conference			Ref.
Leadership change (C) X Party Elite			6.243 (4.344)
Leadership change (C) X Primary			8.320 (5.351)
Constant	101.3 (143.5)	193.2 (105.4)	116.6 (164.3)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>			
Party Age (Log).	-0.198 (0.238)	0.0502 (0.117)	-0.122 (0.239)
Year	0.00530 (0.00554)	-0.00404 (0.00353)	0.00183 (0.00612)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0323*** (0.00594)	0.0207*** (0.00429)	0.0333*** (0.00618)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0255*** (0.00497)	-0.0209*** (0.00394)	-0.0277*** (0.00496)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00396 (0.00429)	0.00437 (0.00280)	0.00399 (0.00473)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0732 (0.0503)	0.0603* (0.0270)	0.0747 (0.0584)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00193 (0.00849)	0.00211 (0.00470)	0.00438 (0.00920)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00223 (0.00348)	-0.00367 (0.00278)	-0.00252 (0.00359)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.807 (0.463)	0.244 (0.419)	0.856 (0.531)

Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0454*** (0.00690)	0.0401*** (0.00499)	0.0440*** (0.00740)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0236*** (0.00489)	-0.0169*** (0.00429)	-0.0238*** (0.00502)
Performance:			
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.241 (0.271)	0.00187 (0.146)	0.237 (0.274)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.360 (0.227)	-0.453** (0.140)	-0.399 (0.226)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.824*** (0.161)	-0.709*** (0.124)	-0.842*** (0.157)
No leadership change (C)	Ref.		Ref.
Leadership change (C)	1.632*** (0.195)		1.586*** (0.201)
Party Elite		-0.0378 (0.185)	-0.232 (0.316)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.
Primary		0.548** (0.165)	0.289 (0.211)
Constant	-12.40 (10.13)	5.992 (6.662)	-5.849 (11.33)
mills			
lambda	1.732 (2.827)	-1.978 (2.451)	2.550 (2.836)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1235	1753	1205
Censored Obs.	620	897	605
$\rho$	0.135	-0.151	0.199
$\sigma$	12.80	13.12	12.79
Chi <sup>2</sup>			

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.3.2.1 Robustness test: Change of party leadership excluding Canada

Table B.12: The effect of party leadership change on top candidates selection in Germany and Spain

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>					
Party Age (Log).	8.605*** (2.276)	8.347 (5.236)	9.665*** (2.421)	9.355*** (2.606)	8.850 (5.059)
Year	0.0805 (0.0808)	0.151 (0.159)	0.0493 (0.0815)	0.0635 (0.0852)	0.145 (0.155)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.120 (0.0812)	0.0876 (0.122)	0.124 (0.0806)	0.107 (0.0808)	0.115 (0.127)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.218* (0.108)	0.0937 (0.148)	0.208 (0.107)	0.205 (0.109)	0.0678 (0.154)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0732 (0.0644)	0.0670 (0.0850)	0.0965 (0.0683)	0.0842 (0.0663)	0.0547 (0.0844)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.410 (0.395)	-0.119 (1.064)	-0.295 (0.433)	-0.331 (0.448)	0.0506 (1.058)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.267*** (0.0733)	0.318*** (0.0687)	0.281*** (0.0725)	0.300*** (0.0804)	0.322*** (0.0701)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.113 (0.0787)	-0.0972 (0.101)	-0.118 (0.0821)	-0.105 (0.0846)	-0.0929 (0.0996)
No leadership change	Ref.			Ref.	
Leadership change	-3.005 (1.923)			-4.543* (2.180)	
No leadership change (C)		Ref.			Ref.
Leadership change (C)		-0.752 (2.350)			-2.884 (2.812)
Party Elite			-3.836 (4.280)	-5.459 (5.190)	-3.691 (5.471)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary			-6.533 (4.162)	-17.69*** (5.205)	-10.21 (6.404)
No leadership change X Party Conference				Ref.	
Leadership change X Party Elite				-0.794 (2.721)	
Leadership change X Primary				13.47** (4.554)	
No leadership change (C) X Party Conference					Ref.
Leadership change (C) X Party Elite					2.844 (4.315)

Leadership change (C) X Primary					15.33* (7.564)
Constant	-153.8 (157.9)	-292.3 (306.7)	-93.57 (159.1)	-113.8 (165.7)	-279.6 (298.2)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>					
Party Age (Log).	-0.0247 (0.177)	-0.272 (0.400)	-0.00995 (0.174)	0.0260 (0.191)	-0.289 (0.397)
Year	0.00300 (0.00593)	0.0138 (0.0129)	0.00118 (0.00598)	0.000251 (0.00637)	0.0135 (0.0128)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0192** (0.00639)	0.0431*** (0.00961)	0.0275*** (0.00583)	0.0216*** (0.00630)	0.0451*** (0.0100)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0331*** (0.00765)	-0.0587*** (0.00904)	-0.0427*** (0.00667)	-0.0344*** (0.00761)	-0.0588*** (0.00942)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.00329 (0.00457)	-0.00963 (0.00739)	-0.00331 (0.00435)	-0.00236 (0.00501)	-0.00890 (0.00749)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0486 (0.0320)	0.136* (0.0646)	0.0613 (0.0345)	0.0655 (0.0550)	0.129 (0.0708)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00145 (0.00754)	0.00915 (0.00942)	0.00345 (0.00619)	0.000425 (0.00878)	0.0101 (0.0105)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.00419 (0.00471)	0.00192 (0.00438)	0.000532 (0.00388)	0.00121 (0.00433)	0.00184 (0.00453)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.0741 (0.340)	0.831* (0.333)	0.0900 (0.418)	0.0997 (0.385)	0.839* (0.411)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0378*** (0.00626)	0.0444*** (0.00773)	0.0405*** (0.00623)	0.0377*** (0.00717)	0.0426*** (0.00808)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0273** (0.00895)	-0.0392*** (0.00971)	-0.0346*** (0.00723)	-0.0323*** (0.00887)	-0.0397*** (0.00977)
<b>Performance:</b>					
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.268 (0.181)	0.0376 (0.289)	-0.126 (0.173)	-0.220 (0.196)	0.0200 (0.294)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.182 (0.153)	-0.478* (0.216)	-0.461** (0.146)	-0.308 (0.172)	-0.501* (0.221)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.516** (0.167)	-0.862*** (0.186)	-0.691*** (0.150)	-0.564** (0.173)	-0.878*** (0.185)
No leadership change	Ref.			Ref.	
Leadership change	1.084*** (0.106)			1.142*** (0.113)	
No leadership change (C)		Ref.			Ref.
Leadership change (C)		0.688***			0.682***

		(0.165)			(0.173)
Party Elite			0.253 (0.502)	0.380 (0.477)	0.0962 (0.629)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary			0.800 (0.480)	0.947* (0.458)	0.493 (0.577)
Constant	-7.180 (11.52)	-27.52 (24.81)	-3.202 (11.60)	-2.156 (12.31)	-26.97 (24.70)
mills					
lambda	-1.830 (2.541)	1.883 (2.694)	-1.112 (2.285)	-2.792 (2.601)	2.163 (2.676)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1191	754	1158	1122	745
Censored Obs.	588	362	577	558	357
$\rho$	-0.143	0.152	-0.0875	-0.219	0.175
$\sigma$	12.79	12.41	12.71	12.77	12.33
Chi <sup>2</sup>					

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.3.3 Party leaders and top candidates

Multinomial Logistic Regression

Table B.13: The nomination of party leaders as top candidates in Germany and Spain

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	New_TC_is_PL	New_TC_is_not_PL	
Pre-electoral coalition	-0.455 (0.585)	0.772 (0.617)	-0.315 (0.687)	0.696 (0.663)	-0.178 (0.987)	1.107 (1.033)			
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0751*** (0.00980)	0.0510*** (0.00966)	0.0774*** (0.0113)	0.0493*** (0.0104)	0.0865*** (0.0149)	0.0586*** (0.0141)			
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0266* (0.0133)	-0.0347** (0.0131)	-0.0330* (0.0155)	-0.0335* (0.0140)	-0.0433* (0.0199)	-0.0478** (0.0185)			
Performance:									
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.			
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.780** (0.302)	-0.00769 (0.291)	-1.132*** (0.342)	-0.220 (0.321)	-0.224 (0.539)	0.0753 (0.544)			
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.028*** (0.248)	-0.285 (0.235)	-1.022*** (0.293)	-0.198 (0.249)	-1.259** (0.404)	-0.470 (0.347)			
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.896*** (0.223)	-1.071*** (0.222)	-1.793*** (0.265)	-0.990*** (0.239)	-2.294*** (0.335)	-1.355*** (0.310)			
Caretaker leader			-0.353 (1.106)	2.177* (0.990)					
No leadership change			Ref.	Ref.	Ref.				
Leadership change			1.026* (0.420)	0.229 (0.334)	2.592* (1.192)	2.089* (1.034)			

Months as leader	-0.00713*	0.00204	-0.0107*	0.00443
	(0.00315)	(0.00208)	(0.00517)	(0.00296)
Leader in t-1	-1.358***	-1.231***	-0.0420	0.429
	(0.388)	(0.338)	(1.139)	(1.007)
Party Elite		0.0747	0.0747	-0.209
		(0.514)	(0.514)	(0.519)
Party Conference		Ref.	Ref.	
Primary			3.972*	2.191
			(1.927)	(1.795)
Contested leader			-0.0813	0.106
			(0.268)	(0.249)
Constant	-3.004***	-4.257***	-4.416**	-5.582***
	(0.653)	(0.943)	(1.482)	(1.471)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1314	1256	781	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.134	0.244	0.298	

Standard errors in parentheses

TC stands for Top Candidate, PL stands for Party Leader

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**B.3.4 Change on the dominant coalition**

Table B.14: The effect of a change in the party's dominant coalition on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	10.84*** (1.645)	12.74*** (1.865)	12.83*** (1.882)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.0903 (0.0470)	-0.101 (0.0559)	-0.112* (0.0565)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.119* (0.0510)	0.116* (0.0516)	0.110* (0.0523)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.138*** (0.0400)	0.120** (0.0446)	0.128** (0.0456)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0152 (0.0447)	0.0276 (0.0457)	0.0287 (0.0442)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.301 (0.258)	-0.286 (0.332)	-0.240 (0.323)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.322*** (0.0653)	0.328*** (0.0701)	0.331*** (0.0733)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.103* (0.0416)	-0.110* (0.0459)	-0.102* (0.0451)
No change of dominant coalition		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Change of dominant coalition		-5.087 (3.412)	-5.086 (3.260)	-6.151 (3.311)
Party Elite			6.539** (2.207)	5.869 (3.541)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.
Primary			-0.892 (1.877)	-10.19** (3.791)
No change of dominant coalition X Party Conference				Ref.
Change of dominant coalition X Party Elite				-0.725 (2.627)
Change of dominant coalition X Primary				10.66** (3.879)
Constant	173.7 (91.33)	158.5 (88.99)	171.9 (105.1)	193.1 (106.2)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111 (0.0981)	-0.0525 (0.120)	0.0835 (0.144)	0.0835 (0.144)
Year	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.000764 (0.00328)	-0.00527 (0.00421)	-0.00527 (0.00421)

Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191*** (0.00376)	0.0114** (0.00402)	0.0125** (0.00459)	0.0125** (0.00459)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0118** (0.00357)	-0.0156*** (0.00391)	-0.0156*** (0.00391)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361 (0.00229)	0.00258 (0.00254)	0.00310 (0.00305)	0.00310 (0.00305)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0383* (0.0161)	0.0607 (0.0344)	0.0607 (0.0344)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181 (0.00450)	-0.000393 (0.00637)	-0.000280 (0.00748)	-0.000280 (0.00748)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172 (0.00242)	0.000768 (0.00313)	-0.00194 (0.00347)	-0.00194 (0.00347)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184 (0.387)	0.0440 (0.333)	0.112 (0.353)	0.112 (0.353)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0353*** (0.00485)	0.0363*** (0.00580)	0.0363*** (0.00580)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988* (0.00437)	-0.00794 (0.00516)	-0.0155** (0.00539)	-0.0155** (0.00539)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710 (0.127)	-0.213 (0.150)	-0.160 (0.173)	-0.160 (0.173)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.195 (0.158)	-0.275 (0.176)	-0.275 (0.176)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.479** (0.148)	-0.527*** (0.155)	-0.527*** (0.155)
No change of dominant coalition		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Change of dominant coalition		1.552*** (0.104)	1.569*** (0.110)	1.569*** (0.110)
Party Elite			-0.000781 (0.173)	-0.000781 (0.173)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.
Primary			0.579*** (0.167)	0.579*** (0.167)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-3.581 (6.125)	7.721 (7.872)	7.721 (7.872)
mills				
lambda	-1.706 (2.556)	-3.539 (3.487)	-3.672 (3.367)	-4.444 (3.511)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1753	1753
Censored Obs.	1006	1006	897	897
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.268	-0.277	-0.334
$\sigma$	13.08	13.21	13.24	13.30
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**B.4 Appendix: Chapter 7****B.4.1 Electoral defeat**

Table B.15: The effect of an electoral defeat on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	10.90*** (1.722)	12.89*** (1.930)	12.81*** (1.938)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.104* (0.0481)	-0.117* (0.0560)	-0.116* (0.0558)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.109 (0.0556)	0.107 (0.0567)	0.103 (0.0569)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.142** (0.0449)	0.122* (0.0512)	0.124* (0.0500)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0187 (0.0460)	0.0308 (0.0458)	0.0328 (0.0463)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.265 (0.252)	-0.220 (0.327)	-0.205 (0.323)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.334*** (0.0643)	0.334*** (0.0679)	0.331*** (0.0676)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.0922* (0.0416)	-0.104* (0.0461)	-0.105* (0.0469)
No electoral defeat		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Electoral defeat		0.864 (1.461)	0.483 (1.540)	-0.732 (2.020)
Party Elite			6.776** (2.200)	6.036** (2.162)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.
Primary			-0.228 (1.716)	-0.837 (1.811)
No electoral defeat X Party Conference				Ref.
Electoral defeat X Party Elite				3.848 (3.428)
Electoral defeat X Primary				2.802 (4.529)
Constant	173.7 (91.33)	179.0* (90.60)	197.5 (105.2)	195.4 (104.9)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111 (0.0981)	-0.133 (0.0979)	0.0244 (0.116)	0.0244 (0.116)

Year	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.00206 (0.00267)	-0.00475 (0.00352)	-0.00475 (0.00352)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191*** (0.00376)	0.0162*** (0.00387)	0.0182*** (0.00441)	0.0182*** (0.00441)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0159*** (0.00383)	-0.0197*** (0.00394)	-0.0197*** (0.00394)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361 (0.00229)	0.00480* (0.00227)	0.00542* (0.00274)	0.00542* (0.00274)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0428** (0.0138)	0.0634* (0.0273)	0.0634* (0.0273)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181 (0.00450)	0.00577 (0.00471)	0.00571 (0.00499)	0.00571 (0.00499)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172 (0.00242)	0.000463 (0.00252)	-0.00155 (0.00283)	-0.00155 (0.00283)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184 (0.387)	0.176 (0.372)	0.236 (0.405)	0.236 (0.405)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0368*** (0.00421)	0.0390*** (0.00505)	0.0390*** (0.00505)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988* (0.00437)	-0.00820 (0.00440)	-0.0154*** (0.00429)	-0.0154*** (0.00429)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710 (0.127)	-0.0372 (0.127)	0.0405 (0.146)	0.0405 (0.146)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.329* (0.133)	-0.441** (0.140)	-0.441** (0.140)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.616*** (0.126)	-0.663*** (0.125)	-0.663*** (0.125)
No electoral defeat		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Electoral defeat		0.414*** (0.110)	0.382** (0.121)	0.382** (0.121)
Party Elite			-0.0464 (0.185)	-0.0464 (0.185)
Party Conference			Ref.	Ref.
Primary			0.544*** (0.160)	0.544*** (0.160)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-5.190 (5.013)	7.431 (6.632)	7.431 (6.632)
mills lambda	-1.706	-1.582	-1.824	-1.789

	(2.556)	(2.592)	(2.507)	(2.470)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1970	1753	1753
Censored Obs.	1006	1006	897	897
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.121	-0.139	-0.137
$\sigma$	13.08	13.07	13.10	13.08
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.2 Changes in the electoral market

Table B.16: The effect of a change in the electoral market on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	11.16*** (1.816)	10.91*** (1.707)	11.01*** (1.724)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.106 (0.0552)	-0.101* (0.0482)	-0.108* (0.0491)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.116 (0.0595)	0.114* (0.0538)	0.113* (0.0545)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.153** (0.0499)	0.144** (0.0515)	0.145** (0.0440)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0177 (0.0486)	0.0151 (0.0455)	0.0133 (0.0456)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.280 (0.262)	-0.273 (0.253)	-0.281 (0.254)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.296*** (0.0645)	0.328*** (0.0635)	0.322*** (0.0617)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.0995* (0.0431)	-0.108* (0.0415)	-0.0987* (0.0413)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.506 (0.689)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.267 (0.868)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.592 (0.622)
Constant	173.7 (91.33)	183.0 (104.1)	173.5 (90.43)	187.5* (92.46)

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<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111 (0.0981)	-0.126 (0.104)	-0.116 (0.0983)	-0.113 (0.0985)
Year	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.00341 (0.00293)	0.00294 (0.00262)	0.00264 (0.00273)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191*** (0.00376)	0.0197*** (0.00394)	0.0192*** (0.00382)	0.0188*** (0.00381)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0172*** (0.00398)	-0.0161*** (0.00396)	-0.0174*** (0.00395)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361 (0.00229)	0.00379 (0.00244)	0.00406 (0.00227)	0.00402 (0.00226)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0487*** (0.0141)	0.0420** (0.0140)	0.0414** (0.0140)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181 (0.00450)	0.00316 (0.00449)	0.00171 (0.00442)	0.00129 (0.00448)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172 (0.00242)	-0.000667 (0.00253)	-0.00188 (0.00247)	-0.00188 (0.00245)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184 (0.387)	0.201 (0.390)	0.187 (0.384)	0.188 (0.385)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0371*** (0.00438)	0.0391*** (0.00420)	0.0393*** (0.00422)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988* (0.00437)	-0.0112* (0.00468)	-0.0102* (0.00443)	-0.00988* (0.00449)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710 (0.127)	-0.0570 (0.131)	-0.0532 (0.130)	-0.0844 (0.131)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.348* (0.136)	-0.351* (0.139)	-0.360* (0.140)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.706*** (0.133)	-0.664*** (0.131)	-0.659*** (0.130)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0253 (0.0381)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0386 (0.0513)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.00512 (0.0405)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-7.826 (5.501)	-7.033 (4.915)	-6.400 (5.143)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	-1.706 (2.556)	-2.065 (2.732)	-1.856 (2.488)	-1.955 (2.532)

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Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1878	1951	1951
Censored Obs.	1006	959	998	999
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.157	-0.142	-0.149
$\sigma$	13.08	13.14	13.06	13.09
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.17: The effect of change in the electoral market and the type of selectorate on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	12.94*** (1.902)	13.32*** (1.919)	12.79*** (1.917)	12.82*** (1.967)
Year	-0.115* (0.0561)	-0.133* (0.0609)	-0.111* (0.0548)	-0.111 (0.0582)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.110* (0.0550)	0.0843 (0.0611)	0.0920 (0.0539)	0.0809 (0.0550)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.122* (0.0499)	0.150** (0.0564)	0.139** (0.0520)	0.141** (0.0506)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0283 (0.0454)	0.0380 (0.0459)	0.0258 (0.0460)	0.0253 (0.0445)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.234 (0.325)	-0.223 (0.328)	-0.262 (0.331)	-0.232 (0.329)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.326*** (0.0651)	0.305*** (0.0712)	0.329*** (0.0640)	0.338*** (0.0645)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.109* (0.0462)	-0.107* (0.0454)	-0.115* (0.0453)	-0.107* (0.0465)
Party Elite	6.822** (2.208)	5.448* (2.642)	6.764** (2.128)	7.696*** (2.230)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	-0.287 (1.707)	-1.338 (1.801)	-0.482 (1.762)	-0.116 (1.656)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.724 (0.902)		
Party Elite X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		2.155 (1.718)		
Primary X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		3.027* (1.250)		

Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-1.198 (1.191)	
Party Elite X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			2.831 (1.815)	
Primary X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			3.926 (2.860)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.724 (0.606)	
Party Elite X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			2.067 (1.427)	
Primary X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			6.151*** (1.324)	
Constant	193.2 (105.4)	226.8 (115.0)	186.2 (102.9)	187.1 (109.5)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.0502 (0.117)	0.0340 (0.122)	0.0514 (0.116)	0.0395 (0.118)
Year	-0.00404 (0.00353)	-0.00384 (0.00370)	-0.00389 (0.00347)	-0.00426 (0.00358)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0207*** (0.00429)	0.0213*** (0.00446)	0.0208*** (0.00440)	0.0206*** (0.00433)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0209*** (0.00394)	-0.0212*** (0.00422)	-0.0193*** (0.00404)	-0.0209*** (0.00410)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00437 (0.00280)	0.00446 (0.00301)	0.00477 (0.00276)	0.00478 (0.00274)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0603* (0.0270)	0.0907* (0.0375)	0.0610* (0.0272)	0.0614* (0.0273)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00211 (0.00470)	0.00291 (0.00462)	0.00198 (0.00458)	0.00130 (0.00458)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00367 (0.00278)	-0.00214 (0.00291)	-0.00405 (0.00282)	-0.00365 (0.00285)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.244 (0.419)	0.270 (0.425)	0.250 (0.414)	0.254 (0.416)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0401*** (0.00499)	0.0396*** (0.00527)	0.0411*** (0.00498)	0.0412*** (0.00499)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0169*** (0.00429)	-0.0188*** (0.00471)	-0.0172*** (0.00435)	-0.0170*** (0.00436)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.00187 (0.146)	-0.0151 (0.151)	0.00425 (0.149)	-0.0266 (0.150)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.453**	-0.439**	-0.452**	-0.446**

	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.147)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.709***	-0.741***	-0.686***	-0.706***
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Party Elite	-0.0378	-0.103	-0.0301	-0.0420
	(0.185)	(0.196)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.548**	0.489**	0.545**	0.548**
	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.165)	(0.165)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0189		
		(0.0379)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0732	
			(0.0550)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.00274
				(0.0460)
Constant	5.992	5.665	5.596	6.435
	(6.662)	(6.965)	(6.534)	(6.748)
mills				
lambda	-1.978	-2.597	-2.507	-2.616
	(2.451)	(2.608)	(2.380)	(2.464)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1753	1673	1738	1739
Censored Obs.	897	855	892	892
$\rho$	-0.151	-0.197	-0.192	-0.201
$\sigma$	13.12	13.19	13.05	13.04
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.3 Changes in the electoral market: Interactions

#### B.4.3.1 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with the electoral system

Table B.18: The effect of a change in the electoral market and electoral system disproportion on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.84***	12.21***	11.47***	11.53***
	(2.749)	(2.954)	(2.737)	(2.759)

Year	-0.122 (0.0739)	-0.142 (0.0815)	-0.115 (0.0716)	-0.126 (0.0759)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.142 (0.0825)	0.145 (0.0912)	0.131 (0.0847)	0.145 (0.0820)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.121* (0.0515)	0.135* (0.0564)	0.134* (0.0654)	0.124* (0.0525)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.00567 (0.0490)	-0.000482 (0.0520)	-0.00388 (0.0478)	-0.00618 (0.0491)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.141 (0.271)	-0.126 (0.280)	-0.132 (0.271)	-0.144 (0.272)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.321*** (0.0679)	0.296*** (0.0694)	0.317*** (0.0645)	0.323*** (0.0665)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.113* (0.0490)	-0.106* (0.0512)	-0.122* (0.0488)	-0.109* (0.0478)
Disproportion	-0.0202 (0.238)	-0.114 (0.271)	-0.0276 (0.243)	-0.0611 (0.248)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		2.014 (1.606)		
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Disproportion		-0.103 (0.0877)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.640 (1.339)	
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Disproportion			0.0614 (0.0931)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				1.065 (1.174)
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Disproportion				-0.0640 (0.0851)
Constant	212.4 (140.0)	252.8 (154.6)	200.7 (135.3)	221.8 (144.2)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.231 (0.175)	-0.266 (0.192)	-0.263 (0.182)	-0.275 (0.181)
Year	0.00780 (0.00401)	0.00917* (0.00425)	0.00797* (0.00401)	0.00818* (0.00412)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0318*** (0.00660)	0.0344*** (0.00690)	0.0319*** (0.00667)	0.0317*** (0.00665)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0213*** (0.00531)	-0.0221*** (0.00561)	-0.0206*** (0.00554)	-0.0215*** (0.00543)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00253 (0.00280)	0.00293 (0.00285)	0.00309 (0.00276)	0.00303 (0.00274)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0419* (0.0173)	0.0524** (0.0192)	0.0434* (0.0176)	0.0424* (0.0176)

Cum. time in Gov.	0.00304 (0.00529)	0.00417 (0.00511)	0.00266 (0.00520)	0.00205 (0.00518)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.000583 (0.00283)	0.00148 (0.00299)	0.000660 (0.00290)	0.000679 (0.00289)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.479 (0.451)	0.499 (0.462)	0.477 (0.452)	0.481 (0.451)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0437*** (0.00506)	0.0428*** (0.00536)	0.0449*** (0.00516)	0.0449*** (0.00511)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00796 (0.00490)	-0.00947 (0.00528)	-0.00816 (0.00492)	-0.00789 (0.00500)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.197 (0.189)	-0.229 (0.194)	-0.173 (0.192)	-0.221 (0.195)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.448** (0.145)	-0.457** (0.151)	-0.443** (0.149)	-0.439** (0.150)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.710*** (0.147)	-0.756*** (0.155)	-0.720*** (0.155)	-0.698*** (0.152)
Disproportion	0.00246 (0.0110)	0.00459 (0.0117)	0.00222 (0.0114)	0.00273 (0.0112)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0160 (0.0433)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0182 (0.0586)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.0130 (0.0472)
Constant	-16.73* (7.459)	-19.36* (7.860)	-17.03* (7.447)	-17.38* (7.662)
mills				
lambda	-1.194 (2.797)	-1.457 (3.020)	-1.181 (2.680)	-1.504 (2.841)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1621	1548	1607	1609
Censored Obs.	819	784	813	814
$\rho$	-0.0899	-0.110	-0.0892	-0.113
$\sigma$	13.28	13.28	13.25	13.28
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**B.4.3.2 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with time**

Table B.19: The effect of a change in the electoral market and time on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	8.942*** (1.694)	9.195*** (1.857)	9.189*** (1.787)	8.851*** (1.776)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.219*** (0.0466)	0.218*** (0.0501)	0.192*** (0.0516)	0.229*** (0.0481)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0319 (0.0409)	0.0389 (0.0434)	0.0300 (0.0436)	0.0346 (0.0399)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.263 (0.247)	-0.293 (0.258)	-0.268 (0.259)	-0.247 (0.251)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.351*** (0.0596)	0.343*** (0.0662)	0.339*** (0.0628)	0.354*** (0.0633)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.102* (0.0420)	-0.0945* (0.0456)	-0.103* (0.0453)	-0.0930* (0.0425)
1900	3.960 (5.920)	11.17 (9.616)	4.818 (7.207)	-8.875 (25.48)
1910	9.782 (6.757)	11.27 (8.440)	11.23 (7.048)	9.543 (13.78)
1920	14.18* (7.019)	17.57 (9.705)	14.96* (6.880)	14.30* (6.464)
1930	10.89* (4.640)	12.94** (4.642)	11.05* (4.824)	10.94** (4.112)
1940	8.125* (3.841)	10.46* (4.403)	8.961* (3.803)	12.21** (3.947)
1950	-1.482 (3.657)	-1.074 (4.176)	-1.302 (3.724)	-0.254 (3.723)
1960	1.215 (2.680)	2.559 (3.016)	2.748 (2.776)	1.331 (3.287)
1970	-1.055 (2.527)	-0.826 (2.818)	-0.341 (2.606)	-3.181 (2.660)
1980	-2.375 (1.867)	-1.961 (1.966)	-2.075 (1.972)	-1.634 (2.160)
1990	-0.797 (1.612)	-0.435 (1.670)	-0.460 (1.677)	0.0821 (1.809)
2000	1.036 (1.576)	1.298 (1.632)	0.787 (1.582)	1.534 (1.771)
2010	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		1.096 (1.250)		
1900 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		7.782		

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	(14.63)
1910 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	2.151 (3.763)
1920 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-3.663 (4.669)
1930 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-2.320 (3.510)
1940 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.767 (2.291)
1950 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.482 (1.725)
1960 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.951 (2.850)
1970 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-3.950 (2.214)
1980 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.835 (1.497)
1990 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.802 (1.891)
2000 X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.641 (1.879)
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-2.046 (1.375)
1900 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	1.869 (4.693)
1910 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	1.301 (3.070)
1920 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	1.579 (2.990)
1930 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	4.028 (2.782)
1940 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.212 (2.583)
1950 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	6.443 (3.861)
1960 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-2.013 (2.442)
1970 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.851 (1.627)
1980 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	2.880 (1.826)
1990 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.386 (1.473)

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2000 X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			2.261 (1.479)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			1.970 (1.436)	
1900 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-12.39 (21.25)	
1910 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-2.321 (9.914)	
1920 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-7.984* (3.292)	
1930 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-6.867** (2.506)	
1940 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			10.42** (3.404)	
1950 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-4.320 (3.260)	
1960 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-3.049 (2.922)	
1970 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-6.790* (2.719)	
1980 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-1.973 (2.089)	
1990 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.409 (1.786)	
2000 X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-1.262 (1.730)	
Constant	-22.56** (7.902)	-25.23** (9.098)	-22.55** (8.216)	-22.20** (8.342)

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**New candidate (Eq. 1)**

Party Age (Log).	-0.199 (0.105)	-0.206 (0.114)	-0.206* (0.104)	-0.201 (0.106)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0123*** (0.00324)	0.0129*** (0.00337)	0.0145*** (0.00353)	0.0121*** (0.00332)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00250 (0.00224)	0.00264 (0.00234)	0.00333 (0.00225)	0.00275 (0.00221)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0532*** (0.0135)	0.0604*** (0.0145)	0.0527*** (0.0136)	0.0536*** (0.0135)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00125 (0.00475)	0.00244 (0.00482)	0.00199 (0.00457)	0.000586 (0.00476)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.000524 (0.00227)	0.000337 (0.00229)	-0.00127 (0.00229)	-0.000623 (0.00230)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.223 (0.374)	0.243 (0.376)	0.216 (0.374)	0.226 (0.374)

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Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0401*** (0.00429)	0.0396*** (0.00454)	0.0409*** (0.00435)	0.0412*** (0.00434)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00223 (0.00474)	-0.00355 (0.00494)	-0.00444 (0.00470)	-0.00238 (0.00491)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.135 (0.127)	-0.130 (0.131)	-0.113 (0.130)	-0.151 (0.132)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.325* (0.134)	-0.335* (0.140)	-0.352* (0.142)	-0.349* (0.141)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.043*** (0.120)	-1.077*** (0.126)	-0.937*** (0.125)	-1.041*** (0.123)
1900	-0.665 (0.473)	-0.513 (0.498)	-0.745 (0.481)	-0.640 (0.484)
1910	-0.600* (0.294)	-0.744* (0.359)	-0.726* (0.305)	-0.575 (0.304)
1920	-0.162 (0.329)	-0.237 (0.365)	-0.221 (0.374)	-0.154 (0.330)
1930	-0.0495 (0.267)	-0.0187 (0.282)	-0.0434 (0.274)	-0.0459 (0.270)
1940	-0.410 (0.270)	-0.480 (0.298)	-0.422 (0.279)	-0.405 (0.277)
1950	-0.730*** (0.201)	-0.754*** (0.221)	-0.737*** (0.202)	-0.721*** (0.203)
1960	-0.652*** (0.176)	-0.646*** (0.183)	-0.648*** (0.178)	-0.615*** (0.181)
1970	-0.295 (0.159)	-0.327 (0.172)	-0.299 (0.163)	-0.279 (0.166)
1980	-0.0418 (0.147)	-0.0126 (0.152)	-0.0658 (0.147)	-0.0412 (0.154)
1990	-0.111 (0.113)	-0.122 (0.117)	-0.141 (0.115)	-0.133 (0.115)
2000	-0.177 (0.100)	-0.177 (0.102)	-0.182 (0.101)	-0.178 (0.106)
2010	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0233 (0.0419)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.142* (0.0565)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.0133 (0.0399)

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Constant	-0.826 (0.531)	-0.748 (0.578)	-0.925 (0.535)	-0.859 (0.544)
mills				
lambda	1.283 (2.038)	0.637 (2.189)	0.208 (1.988)	0.916 (2.018)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1878	1951	1951
Censored Obs.	1006	959	998	999
$\rho$	0.0993	0.0495	0.0163	0.0723
$\sigma$	12.92	12.88	12.76	12.67
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.3.3 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with party size

Table B.20: The effect of electoral a change in the electoral market and party size on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	11.23*** (1.828)	10.91*** (1.716)	10.87*** (1.741)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.108 (0.0559)	-0.101* (0.0475)	-0.103* (0.0498)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.153** (0.0514)	0.143** (0.0516)	0.156*** (0.0455)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0182 (0.0489)	0.0156 (0.0480)	0.00786 (0.0456)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.274 (0.261)	-0.276 (0.247)	-0.280 (0.249)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.293*** (0.0650)	0.326*** (0.0670)	0.316*** (0.0606)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.0991* (0.0430)	-0.108** (0.0414)	-0.0980* (0.0412)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.107 (0.0611)	0.114* (0.0545)	0.119* (0.0558)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.759 (0.994)		
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0433 (0.0248)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.410	

			(1.653)	
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.00421	(0.0443)
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.426	(0.971)
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0373	(0.0353)
Constant	173.7	187.2	174.2	177.9
	(91.33)	(105.6)	(89.08)	(93.70)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111	-0.126	-0.116	-0.113
	(0.0981)	(0.104)	(0.0983)	(0.0985)
Year	0.00288	0.00341	0.00294	0.00264
	(0.00270)	(0.00293)	(0.00262)	(0.00273)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173***	-0.0172***	-0.0161***	-0.0174***
	(0.00381)	(0.00398)	(0.00396)	(0.00395)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361	0.00379	0.00406	0.00402
	(0.00229)	(0.00244)	(0.00227)	(0.00226)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406**	0.0487***	0.0420**	0.0414**
	(0.0138)	(0.0141)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181	0.00316	0.00171	0.00129
	(0.00450)	(0.00449)	(0.00442)	(0.00448)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172	-0.000667	-0.00188	-0.00188
	(0.00242)	(0.00253)	(0.00247)	(0.00245)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184	0.201	0.187	0.188
	(0.387)	(0.390)	(0.384)	(0.385)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379***	0.0371***	0.0391***	0.0393***
	(0.00417)	(0.00438)	(0.00420)	(0.00422)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988*	-0.0112*	-0.0102*	-0.00988*
	(0.00437)	(0.00468)	(0.00443)	(0.00449)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710	-0.0570	-0.0532	-0.0844
	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339*	-0.348*	-0.351*	-0.360*
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.140)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662***	-0.706***	-0.664***	-0.659***
	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191***	0.0197***	0.0192***	0.0188***
	(0.00376)	(0.00394)	(0.00382)	(0.00381)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0253		
		(0.0381)		

Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0386 (0.0513)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.00512 (0.0405)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-7.826 (5.501)	-7.033 (4.915)	-6.400 (5.143)
mills lambda	-1.706 (2.556)	-2.191 (2.748)	-1.864 (2.480)	-2.070 (2.529)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1878	1951	1951
Censored Obs.	1006	959	998	999
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.167	-0.143	-0.158
$\sigma$	13.08	13.13	13.06	13.08
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.4 Robustness test: Exponential Decay

#### B.4.4.1 Changes in the electoral market

Table B.21: The effect of a change in the electoral market on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	11.03*** (1.736)	10.99*** (1.682)	11.06*** (1.703)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.105* (0.0513)	-0.102* (0.0479)	-0.108* (0.0491)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.120* (0.0563)	0.121* (0.0524)	0.123* (0.0553)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.138** (0.0447)	0.139** (0.0491)	0.141** (0.0449)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0169 (0.0456)	0.0168 (0.0451)	0.0157 (0.0456)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.266 (0.251)	-0.266 (0.252)	-0.257 (0.252)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.323*** (0.0621)	0.325*** (0.0647)	0.323*** (0.0608)

Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100*	-0.0994*	-0.101*	-0.0947*
	(0.0417)	(0.0422)	(0.0421)	(0.0414)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.112		
		(0.651)		
Competitivity <sub>(Mean)</sub>			0.0831	
			(1.021)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				0.604
				(0.624)
Constant	173.7 <sup>+</sup>	180.4 <sup>+</sup>	175.8 <sup>+</sup>	187.2*
	(91.33)	(96.11)	(90.08)	(92.57)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111	-0.111	-0.117	-0.121
	(0.0981)	(0.0990)	(0.0983)	(0.0986)
Year	0.00288	0.00282	0.00298	0.00327
	(0.00270)	(0.00272)	(0.00270)	(0.00278)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191***	0.0188***	0.0186***	0.0185***
	(0.00376)	(0.00376)	(0.00390)	(0.00377)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173***	-0.0175***	-0.0176***	-0.0177***
	(0.00381)	(0.00383)	(0.00396)	(0.00394)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361	0.00363	0.00360	0.00371
	(0.00229)	(0.00231)	(0.00234)	(0.00233)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406**	0.0404**	0.0402**	0.0399**
	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181	0.00131	0.00126	0.00129
	(0.00450)	(0.00438)	(0.00449)	(0.00435)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172	-0.00206	-0.00205	-0.00227
	(0.00242)	(0.00245)	(0.00250)	(0.00248)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184	0.193	0.191	0.190
	(0.387)	(0.383)	(0.383)	(0.384)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379***	0.0382***	0.0382***	0.0383***
	(0.00417)	(0.00420)	(0.00420)	(0.00422)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988*	-0.00990*	-0.00981*	-0.00960*
	(0.00437)	(0.00437)	(0.00438)	(0.00443)
<b>Performance:</b>				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710	-0.0917	-0.0909	-0.0929
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339*	-0.337*	-0.334*	-0.330*
	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662***	-0.648***	-0.650***	-0.642***
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.128)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.0112		

	(0.0382)			
Competitivity (Mean)			-0.00592	
			(0.0624)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)			-0.0278	
			(0.0454)	
Constant	-6.830	-6.711	-6.971	-7.546
	(5.086)	(5.118)	(5.065)	(5.229)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	-1.706	-1.640	-1.636	-1.599
	(2.556)	(2.582)	(2.594)	(2.582)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<hr/>				
Obs.	1970	1957	1957	1957
Censored Obs.	1006	1001	1001	1001
$\rho$	-0.130	-0.125	-0.125	-0.122
$\sigma$	13.08	13.10	13.10	13.09
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.22: The effect of a change in the electoral market and the type of selectorate on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	12.94***	12.75***	12.77***	13.07***
	(1.902)	(1.949)	(1.895)	(1.972)
Year	-0.115*	-0.122*	-0.106+	-0.122*
	(0.0561)	(0.0587)	(0.0548)	(0.0577)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.110*	0.108+	0.103+	0.0965+
	(0.0550)	(0.0573)	(0.0541)	(0.0545)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.122*	0.121*	0.130**	0.132*
	(0.0499)	(0.0504)	(0.0496)	(0.0510)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0283	0.0357	0.0305	0.0265
	(0.0454)	(0.0440)	(0.0448)	(0.0431)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.234	-0.205	-0.259	-0.176
	(0.325)	(0.331)	(0.329)	(0.329)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.326***	0.322***	0.327***	0.341***
	(0.0651)	(0.0687)	(0.0625)	(0.0648)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.109*	-0.111*	-0.119*	-0.104*
	(0.0462)	(0.0457)	(0.0486)	(0.0458)
Party Elite	6.822**	6.005**	7.740**	7.032**
	(2.208)	(2.238)	(2.352)	(2.250)

Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	-0.287 (1.707)	-0.819 (1.727)	0.132 (1.911)	-0.647 (1.606)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-0.211 (0.906)		
Party Elite X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-0.390 (1.323)		
Primary X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		1.899 (1.195)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			-1.087 (1.182)	
Party Elite X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			2.309 (1.944)	
Primary X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			5.128 (3.255)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				-0.538 (0.632)
Party Elite X Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				2.394 <sup>+</sup> (1.378)
Primary X Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				5.528 <sup>***</sup> (1.485)
Constant	193.2 <sup>+</sup> (105.4)	206.8 <sup>+</sup> (109.7)	176.7 <sup>+</sup> (102.9)	207.4 <sup>+</sup> (108.5)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.0502 (0.117)	0.0712 (0.117)	0.0510 (0.116)	0.0470 (0.118)
Year	-0.00404 (0.00353)	-0.00460 (0.00349)	-0.00371 (0.00355)	-0.00382 (0.00362)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0207 <sup>***</sup> (0.00429)	0.0205 <sup>***</sup> (0.00431)	0.0211 <sup>***</sup> (0.00447)	0.0202 <sup>***</sup> (0.00429)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0209 <sup>***</sup> (0.00394)	-0.0211 <sup>***</sup> (0.00394)	-0.0206 <sup>***</sup> (0.00403)	-0.0212 <sup>***</sup> (0.00406)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00437 (0.00280)	0.00444 (0.00281)	0.00451 (0.00284)	0.00447 (0.00284)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0603* (0.0270)	0.0612* (0.0273)	0.0599* (0.0269)	0.0597* (0.0270)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00211 (0.00470)	0.00139 (0.00456)	0.00228 (0.00464)	0.00157 (0.00451)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00367 (0.00278)	-0.00403 (0.00285)	-0.00436 (0.00283)	-0.00422 (0.00285)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.244 (0.419)	0.260 (0.414)	0.252 (0.414)	0.254 (0.414)

Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0401*** (0.00499)	0.0404*** (0.00502)	0.0404*** (0.00503)	0.0404*** (0.00505)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0169*** (0.00429)	-0.0171*** (0.00428)	-0.0171*** (0.00432)	-0.0169*** (0.00434)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.00187 (0.146)	-0.0223 (0.148)	-0.0112 (0.149)	-0.0185 (0.148)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.453** (0.140)	-0.450** (0.142)	-0.459** (0.144)	-0.445** (0.144)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.709*** (0.124)	-0.699*** (0.123)	-0.687*** (0.123)	-0.696*** (0.126)
Party Elite	-0.0378 (0.185)	-0.0401 (0.186)	-0.0305 (0.185)	-0.0314 (0.187)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.548** (0.165)	0.540** (0.167)	0.543** (0.167)	0.548** (0.167)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0402 (0.0414)		
Competitivity (Mean)			0.0430 (0.0638)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0129 (0.0497)
Constant	5.992 (6.662)	6.980 (6.593)	5.327 (6.706)	5.598 (6.819)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	-1.978 (2.451)	-1.838 (2.475)	-2.104 (2.499)	-1.963 (2.501)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<hr/>				
Obs.	1753	1742	1742	1742
Censored Obs.	897	894	894	894
$\rho$	-0.151	-0.140	-0.161	-0.150
$\sigma$	13.12	13.12	13.11	13.06
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

#### B.4.4.2 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with the electoral system

Table B.23: The effect of a change in the electoral market and electoral system disproportion on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	14.17*** (2.939)	14.13*** (2.977)	13.95*** (2.964)	14.01*** (2.911)
Year	-0.178* (0.0788)	-0.191* (0.0845)	-0.175* (0.0760)	-0.184* (0.0804)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.139 (0.0892)	0.149 (0.0913)	0.131 (0.0904)	0.150+ (0.0898)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.113* (0.0532)	0.110* (0.0529)	0.121+ (0.0617)	0.112* (0.0542)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.00124 (0.0499)	0.00294 (0.0501)	0.00371 (0.0476)	0.000791 (0.0494)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.166 (0.358)	-0.133 (0.354)	-0.149 (0.356)	-0.139 (0.356)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.341*** (0.0700)	0.342*** (0.0703)	0.336*** (0.0684)	0.346*** (0.0694)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.105+ (0.0532)	-0.102+ (0.0547)	-0.113* (0.0555)	-0.0992+ (0.0531)
Disproportion	-0.0716 (0.253)	-0.0959 (0.258)	-0.0622 (0.251)	-0.0893 (0.264)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.445 (1.104)		
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion		0.0292 (0.106)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			-0.778 (1.399)	
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion			0.0739 (0.146)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				0.754 (1.045)
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion				-0.0316 (0.0861)
Constant	312.8* (149.6)	338.2* (159.7)	309.5* (143.8)	326.2* (153.3)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.675*** (0.144)	0.676*** (0.145)	0.692*** (0.142)	0.679*** (0.143)
Year	-0.00914* (0.00382)	-0.00883* (0.00371)	-0.00867* (0.00390)	-0.00889* (0.00385)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0288*** (0.00633)	0.0280*** (0.00638)	0.0304*** (0.00666)	0.0278*** (0.00637)

Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0222*** (0.00511)	-0.0223*** (0.00511)	-0.0215*** (0.00516)	-0.0226*** (0.00523)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00348 (0.00341)	0.00341 (0.00343)	0.00360 (0.00347)	0.00356 (0.00342)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0586* (0.0271)	0.0576* (0.0271)	0.0577* (0.0266)	0.0574* (0.0271)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00371 (0.00541)	0.00324 (0.00515)	0.00462 (0.00518)	0.00314 (0.00512)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00221 (0.00330)	-0.00287 (0.00337)	-0.00330 (0.00337)	-0.00301 (0.00340)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.465 (0.405)	0.478 (0.401)	0.476 (0.399)	0.481 (0.399)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0451*** (0.00579)	0.0454*** (0.00585)	0.0455*** (0.00582)	0.0454*** (0.00585)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0125** (0.00475)	-0.0124* (0.00477)	-0.0130** (0.00479)	-0.0124* (0.00480)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.479** (0.177)	-0.522** (0.182)	-0.511** (0.180)	-0.525** (0.180)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.501*** (0.147)	-0.502*** (0.148)	-0.524*** (0.152)	-0.499** (0.150)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.757*** (0.127)	-0.747*** (0.126)	-0.721*** (0.126)	-0.742*** (0.128)
Party Elite	-0.0932 (0.208)	-0.0858 (0.210)	-0.0819 (0.209)	-0.0831 (0.210)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.479** (0.171)	0.481** (0.173)	0.470** (0.170)	0.479** (0.173)
Volatility (Mean)		-0.0144 (0.0451)		
Competitiveness (Mean)			0.0922 (0.0675)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0230 (0.0513)
Constant	13.04 <sup>+</sup> (7.155)	12.48 <sup>+</sup> (6.963)	11.97 (7.344)	12.56 <sup>+</sup> (7.220)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	-0.863 (2.595)	-0.815 (2.656)	-0.789 (2.623)	-0.869 (2.685)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1626	1615	1615	1615
Censored Obs.	897	894	894	894
$\rho$	-0.0648	-0.0611	-0.0592	-0.0652
$\sigma$	13.31	13.34	13.34	13.34
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.4.3 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with time

Table B.24: The effect of a change in the electoral market and time on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.06*** (1.943)	10.55*** (2.010)	11.15*** (2.100)	11.38*** (1.999)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.208*** (0.0465)	0.235*** (0.0494)	0.189*** (0.0488)	0.221*** (0.0476)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0298 (0.0432)	0.0292 (0.0452)	0.0344 (0.0466)	0.0349 (0.0412)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.257 (0.324)	-0.292 (0.333)	-0.244 (0.350)	-0.209 (0.320)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.359*** (0.0633)	0.369*** (0.0688)	0.363*** (0.0670)	0.357*** (0.0672)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.104* (0.0495)	-0.0953+ (0.0507)	-0.105* (0.0518)	-0.0930+ (0.0489)
1900	8.632 (6.596)	14.35 (9.530)	9.547 (6.645)	-5.390 (10.87)
1910	12.78 (8.056)	10.18 (7.989)	12.02 (8.800)	13.36 (10.31)
1920	18.61* (8.042)	13.67* (6.408)	19.53* (8.647)	19.95* (7.750)
1930	13.76** (4.819)	12.41* (5.580)	14.40** (5.279)	15.13*** (4.473)
1940	12.23** (4.342)	12.43* (5.214)	10.31+ (5.902)	11.75* (4.915)
1950	0.328 (4.182)	0.632 (4.424)	0.844 (4.297)	2.301 (4.314)
1960	3.955 (2.984)	4.030 (2.997)	4.477 (3.015)	4.261 (3.194)
1970	0.509	-0.0479	0.987	-0.671

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	(2.763)	(2.902)	(2.834)	(3.114)
1980	-1.355 (2.057)	-1.641 (2.166)	-0.866 (2.129)	-0.471 (2.376)
1990	0.157 (1.738)	0.0506 (1.783)	0.417 (1.781)	0.934 (1.968)
2000	1.333 (1.709)	1.219 (1.835)	1.428 (1.702)	1.942 (1.896)
2010	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.837 (1.081)		
1900 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		5.064 (3.806)		
1910 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-5.240 (6.280)		
1920 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-13.68 (10.58)		
1930 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-3.219 (4.906)		
1940 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.327 (4.561)		
1950 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-3.945 (2.673)		
1960 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		2.870 <sup>+</sup> (1.677)		
1970 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-1.478 (2.303)		
1980 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		1.005 (1.681)		
1990 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-1.481 (1.496)		
2000 X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-2.529 (1.796)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			-1.674 (1.419)	
1900 X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			1.913 (5.462)	
1910 X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			4.059 (4.675)	
1920 X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			2.246 (5.191)	
1930 X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			3.286 (5.189)	

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1940 X Competitivity (Mean)				-2.967 (4.735)
1950 X Competitivity (Mean)				2.617 (2.876)
1960 X Competitivity (Mean)				-4.255 (2.584)
1970 X Competitivity (Mean)				1.710 (1.648)
1980 X Competitivity (Mean)				1.141 (1.879)
1990 X Competitivity (Mean)				0.918 (1.450)
2000 X Competitivity (Mean)				3.510** (1.311)
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				1.621 (1.517)
1900 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-17.48* (6.934)
1910 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-2.040 (12.32)
1920 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-9.369* (3.970)
1930 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-4.587* (1.772)
1940 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				10.88*** (3.208)
1950 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-5.602+ (3.200)
1960 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-3.435 (2.918)
1970 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-5.173* (2.553)
1980 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-1.922 (1.895)
1990 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				0.901 (1.835)
2000 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.740 (1.742)
Constant	-33.08*** (9.408)	-32.27** (10.48)	-33.13*** (9.665)	-35.50*** (9.926)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.0174 (0.0887)	-0.00857 (0.0906)	-0.0000128 (0.0876)	-0.0154 (0.0895)

Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0127*** (0.00340)	0.0127*** (0.00346)	0.0151*** (0.00380)	0.0127*** (0.00352)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00263 (0.00219)	0.00251 (0.00226)	0.00328 (0.00220)	0.00246 (0.00222)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0713** (0.0266)	0.0720** (0.0266)	0.0700** (0.0262)	0.0717** (0.0264)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00243 (0.00476)	0.00170 (0.00464)	0.00386 (0.00478)	0.00192 (0.00463)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00123 (0.00262)	-0.00156 (0.00268)	-0.00249 (0.00266)	-0.00150 (0.00267)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.207 (0.397)	0.222 (0.394)	0.211 (0.395)	0.218 (0.393)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0400*** (0.00482)	0.0402*** (0.00484)	0.0404*** (0.00485)	0.0402*** (0.00485)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00872 <sup>+</sup> (0.00475)	-0.00876 <sup>+</sup> (0.00472)	-0.00979* (0.00465)	-0.00892 <sup>+</sup> (0.00478)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0231 (0.136)	-0.0493 (0.138)	-0.0206 (0.141)	-0.0398 (0.138)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.458** (0.138)	-0.455** (0.141)	-0.486*** (0.144)	-0.459** (0.142)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.116*** (0.119)	-1.113*** (0.119)	-1.045*** (0.119)	-1.112*** (0.120)
Party Elite	-0.0922 (0.176)	-0.0894 (0.176)	-0.0797 (0.174)	-0.0914 (0.175)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.423** (0.147)	0.408** (0.150)	0.423** (0.147)	0.419** (0.147)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0383 (0.0414)		
Competitivity (Mean)			0.127* (0.0620)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				0.0275 (0.0451)
Constant	-1.943*** (0.415)	-2.014*** (0.436)	-2.101*** (0.409)	-1.927*** (0.418)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	1.221 (2.139)	0.828 (2.232)	0.572 (2.041)	1.148 (2.164)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1753	1742	1742	1742
Censored Obs.	897	894	894	894
$\rho$	0.0940	0.0645	0.0444	0.0900
$\sigma$	12.99	12.85	12.87	12.76
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

#### B.4.4.4 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with party size

Table B.25: The effect of a change in the electoral market and party sized on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	13.06*** (1.969)	13.07*** (2.048)	12.98*** (2.015)	12.86*** (1.991)
Year	-0.148* (0.0575)	-0.152* (0.0622)	-0.150** (0.0564)	-0.148* (0.0586)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.120** (0.0444)	0.121** (0.0452)	0.118* (0.0466)	0.136** (0.0464)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0225 (0.0472)	0.0228 (0.0482)	0.0273 (0.0493)	0.0137 (0.0471)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.237 (0.318)	-0.233 (0.317)	-0.252 (0.300)	-0.220 (0.310)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.333*** (0.0650)	0.334*** (0.0670)	0.331*** (0.0716)	0.332*** (0.0625)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.103* (0.0479)	-0.103* (0.0489)	-0.105* (0.0483)	-0.0950* (0.0477)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.127* (0.0521)	0.125* (0.0543)	0.130* (0.0555)	0.150** (0.0532)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-0.665 (0.986)		
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0268 (0.0302)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			0.801 (2.160)	
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.0205 (0.0535)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				-0.912 (0.982)
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.0565+

				(0.0336)
Constant	257.7*	265.9*	262.3*	258.2*
	(108.5)	(116.7)	(106.1)	(110.6)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.167	0.178	0.159	0.155
	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Year	-0.00752*	-0.00777*	-0.00753*	-0.00695*
	(0.00340)	(0.00338)	(0.00345)	(0.00349)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0155***	-0.0158***	-0.0168***	-0.0163***
	(0.00323)	(0.00323)	(0.00356)	(0.00340)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00620*	0.00622*	0.00596*	0.00635*
	(0.00261)	(0.00262)	(0.00272)	(0.00269)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0498 <sup>+</sup>	0.0502 <sup>+</sup>	0.0504 <sup>+</sup>	0.0486 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.0284)	(0.0285)	(0.0288)	(0.0284)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00581	0.00511	0.00415	0.00510
	(0.00488)	(0.00469)	(0.00481)	(0.00460)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00585*	-0.00623*	-0.00588*	-0.00651*
	(0.00280)	(0.00286)	(0.00292)	(0.00287)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.215	0.229	0.231	0.225
	(0.380)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.378)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0413***	0.0416***	0.0414***	0.0416***
	(0.00493)	(0.00496)	(0.00497)	(0.00500)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0164***	-0.0165***	-0.0162***	-0.0161***
	(0.00459)	(0.00458)	(0.00454)	(0.00466)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.136	-0.156	-0.153	-0.154
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.530***	-0.526***	-0.506***	-0.515***
	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.146)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.709***	-0.697***	-0.711***	-0.689***
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.129)
Party Elite	-0.0539	-0.0532	-0.0530	-0.0417
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.564***	0.559**	0.569***	0.565***
	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0247		
		(0.0404)		
Competitiveness (Mean)			-0.0555	
			(0.0623)	

Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0378 (0.0513)
Constant	12.80* (6.397)	13.22* (6.363)	12.89* (6.491)	11.72+ (6.566)
mills lambda	-1.249 (2.209)	-1.341 (2.256)	-1.211 (2.273)	-1.326 (2.257)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1761	1750	1750	1750
Censored Obs.	905	902	902	902
$\rho$	-0.0949	-0.102	-0.0919	-0.101
$\sigma$	13.16	13.18	13.18	13.16
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.5 Robustness test: Mean

#### B.4.5.1 Changes in the electoral market

Table B.26: The effect of a change in the electoral market on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.02*** (1.687)	13.52*** (2.816)	11.68*** (2.930)	11.81*** (2.669)
Year	-0.101* (0.0485)	-0.137+ (0.0727)	-0.124+ (0.0716)	-0.139* (0.0693)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.115* (0.0555)	0.182+ (0.106)	0.138+ (0.0830)	0.164* (0.0778)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.140** (0.0447)	0.125+ (0.0681)	0.126* (0.0546)	0.119* (0.0504)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0146 (0.0455)	0.0151 (0.0466)	-0.00142 (0.0493)	0.00141 (0.0489)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.275 (0.251)	-0.0731 (0.331)	-0.169 (0.277)	-0.133 (0.275)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.319*** (0.0618)	0.262*** (0.0761)	0.348*** (0.0749)	0.340*** (0.0659)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.100* (0.0417)	-0.116* (0.0526)	-0.121* (0.0491)	-0.100* (0.0450)

Volatility (Mean)	0.851 (0.793)			
Competitivity (Mean)	0.280 (1.344)			
Vanhanen Index (Mean)	0.944 (0.748)			
Constant	173.7 <sup>+</sup> (91.33)	234.3 <sup>+</sup> (134.4)	217.4 (132.2)	244.6 <sup>+</sup> (128.8)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.111 (0.0981)	-0.264 (0.205)	-0.174 (0.179)	-0.148 (0.178)
Year	0.00288 (0.00270)	0.00990* (0.00482)	0.00570 (0.00384)	0.00471 (0.00417)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0191*** (0.00376)	0.0353*** (0.00756)	0.0319*** (0.00701)	0.0279*** (0.00633)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0173*** (0.00381)	-0.0244*** (0.00555)	-0.0210*** (0.00546)	-0.0205*** (0.00491)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00361 (0.00229)	0.00100 (0.00323)	0.00369 (0.00270)	0.00410 (0.00261)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0406** (0.0138)	0.0411 <sup>+</sup> (0.0219)	0.0448* (0.0178)	0.0385* (0.0168)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00181 (0.00450)	0.00475 (0.00552)	0.00237 (0.00516)	0.00145 (0.00512)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00172 (0.00242)	0.000460 (0.00320)	0.00127 (0.00300)	0.00113 (0.00292)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.184 (0.387)	0.520 (0.464)	0.463 (0.449)	0.567 (0.438)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0379*** (0.00417)	0.0436*** (0.00561)	0.0436*** (0.00526)	0.0444*** (0.00527)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00988* (0.00437)	-0.0100 <sup>+</sup> (0.00543)	-0.00712 (0.00488)	-0.00732 (0.00478)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0710 (0.127)	-0.248 (0.199)	-0.123 (0.196)	-0.204 (0.200)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.339* (0.132)	-0.494** (0.165)	-0.389* (0.157)	-0.436** (0.153)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.662*** (0.126)	-0.773*** (0.163)	-0.684*** (0.156)	-0.643*** (0.154)
Volatility (Mean)	0.00724 (0.0533)			
Competitivity (Mean)	0.00448			

	(0.0727)			
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0209 (0.0574)
Constant	-6.830 (5.086)	-20.64* (8.861)	-12.83+ (7.083)	-10.91 (7.735)
mills				
lambda	-1.706 (2.556)	0.0825 (2.642)	-2.063 (3.053)	-1.141 (2.811)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1424	1573	1593
Censored Obs.	1006	717	796	807
$\rho$	-0.130	0.00630	-0.154	-0.0862
$\sigma$	13.08	13.09	13.36	13.23
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.27: The effect of a change in the electoral market and the type of selectorate on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	12.94*** (1.902)	15.59*** (2.972)	14.16*** (2.994)	13.71*** (2.923)
Year	-0.115* (0.0561)	-0.171* (0.0806)	-0.144* (0.0729)	-0.153* (0.0769)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.110* (0.0550)	0.170 (0.116)	0.121 (0.0939)	0.132+ (0.0794)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.122* (0.0499)	0.109 (0.0709)	0.111* (0.0540)	0.120* (0.0557)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0283 (0.0454)	0.0267 (0.0457)	0.0154 (0.0476)	0.00827 (0.0440)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.234 (0.325)	0.0374 (0.495)	-0.206 (0.361)	-0.0339 (0.357)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.326*** (0.0651)	0.269*** (0.0780)	0.361*** (0.0686)	0.357*** (0.0682)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.109* (0.0462)	-0.121* (0.0536)	-0.139** (0.0528)	-0.102* (0.0476)
Party Elite	6.822** (2.208)	7.423* (3.214)	9.573** (2.944)	7.853** (2.740)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.

Primary	-0.287 (1.707)	0.978 (2.360)	1.130 (2.126)	0.361 (1.691)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.213 (1.018)		
Party Elite X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		0.386 (2.105)		
Primary X Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		1.752 (1.585)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			-0.807 (1.424)	
Party Elite X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			3.116 (2.640)	
Primary X Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			6.586* (3.270)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				-0.342 (0.771)
Party Elite X Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				3.146 <sup>+</sup> (1.861)
Primary X Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				5.894*** (1.705)
Constant	193.2 <sup>+</sup> (105.4)	289.9 <sup>+</sup> (149.1)	246.6 <sup>+</sup> (133.9)	263.9 <sup>+</sup> (142.1)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.0502 (0.117)	-0.192 (0.214)	-0.112 (0.197)	-0.0838 (0.200)
Year	-0.00404 (0.00353)	0.00383 (0.00547)	-0.000236 (0.00452)	-0.00174 (0.00494)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0207*** (0.00429)	0.0392*** (0.00841)	0.0365*** (0.00834)	0.0302*** (0.00703)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0209*** (0.00394)	-0.0287*** (0.00586)	-0.0247*** (0.00567)	-0.0240*** (0.00514)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00437 (0.00280)	0.00215 (0.00391)	0.00547 (0.00342)	0.00589 <sup>+</sup> (0.00323)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0603* (0.0270)	0.0840 <sup>+</sup> (0.0448)	0.0619* (0.0283)	0.0589* (0.0281)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00211 (0.00470)	0.00508 (0.00619)	0.00372 (0.00520)	0.00217 (0.00517)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00367 (0.00278)	0.000502 (0.00351)	0.000680 (0.00341)	0.000738 (0.00340)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.244 (0.419)	0.627 (0.499)	0.551 (0.488)	0.639 (0.463)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0401*** (0.00499)	0.0477*** (0.00675)	0.0455*** (0.00604)	0.0459*** (0.00613)

$\Delta \text{Votes}' \%_{(t-1 - t-2)}$	-0.0169*** (0.00429)	-0.0173** (0.00559)	-0.0142** (0.00474)	-0.0147** (0.00464)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.00187 (0.146)	-0.328 (0.204)	-0.180 (0.203)	-0.274 (0.210)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.453** (0.140)	-0.604*** (0.173)	-0.483** (0.163)	-0.526*** (0.156)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.709*** (0.124)	-0.833*** (0.145)	-0.716*** (0.141)	-0.699*** (0.143)
Party Elite	-0.0378 (0.185)	-0.158 (0.235)	0.0444 (0.206)	0.0510 (0.216)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.548** (0.165)	0.396* (0.195)	0.515** (0.172)	0.533** (0.177)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0638 (0.0584)		
Competitivity (Mean)			0.0563 (0.0811)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0109 (0.0622)
Constant	5.992 (6.662)	-9.328 (10.21)	-1.672 (8.397)	1.325 (9.215)
mills				
lambda	-1.978 (2.451)	-0.134 (2.604)	-2.418 (2.948)	-1.944 (2.721)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1753	1289	1427	1445
Censored Obs.	897	648	718	728
$\rho$	-0.151	-0.0103	-0.184	-0.148
$\sigma$	13.12	13.04	13.17	13.11
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

#### B.4.5.2 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with the electoral system

Table B.28: The effect of a change in the electoral market and electoral system disproportion on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	14.17*** (2.939)	14.72*** (3.148)	13.98*** (3.477)	14.01*** (3.201)
Year	-0.178* (0.0788)	-0.172* (0.0847)	-0.179* (0.0874)	-0.190* (0.0895)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.139 (0.0892)	0.181 (0.119)	0.133 (0.102)	0.157 (0.0967)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.113* (0.0532)	0.120 (0.0742)	0.117* (0.0574)	0.115* (0.0555)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.00124 (0.0499)	0.0204 (0.0475)	0.00727 (0.0497)	0.00461 (0.0500)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.166 (0.358)	0.0297 (0.482)	-0.168 (0.362)	-0.144 (0.357)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.341*** (0.0700)	0.282*** (0.0753)	0.362*** (0.0695)	0.365*** (0.0677)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.105+ (0.0532)	-0.107+ (0.0552)	-0.119* (0.0564)	-0.0895+ (0.0510)
Disproportion	-0.0716 (0.253)	-0.0419 (0.276)	-0.0817 (0.254)	-0.0660 (0.268)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		1.086 (1.246)		
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion		-0.0353 (0.106)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			-0.403 (1.548)	
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion			0.0594 (0.136)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				0.905 (1.067)
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Disproportion				-0.00316 (0.113)
Constant	312.8* (149.6)	298.5+ (158.0)	317.3+ (162.8)	336.8* (169.1)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.675*** (0.144)	-0.162 (0.220)	-0.0612 (0.193)	-0.126 (0.198)
Year	-0.00914* (0.00382)	0.00319 (0.00560)	-0.00132 (0.00445)	-0.0000571 (0.00463)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0288*** (0.00633)	0.0392*** (0.00840)	0.0367*** (0.00834)	0.0351*** (0.00738)

Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0222*** (0.00511)	-0.0285*** (0.00585)	-0.0245*** (0.00565)	-0.0250*** (0.00573)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00348 (0.00341)	0.00223 (0.00390)	0.00566+ (0.00340)	0.00537 (0.00338)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0586* (0.0271)	0.0816+ (0.0440)	0.0594* (0.0275)	0.0623* (0.0284)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00371 (0.00541)	0.00509 (0.00619)	0.00386 (0.00523)	0.00223 (0.00529)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00221 (0.00330)	0.000503 (0.00351)	0.000701 (0.00341)	0.00104 (0.00345)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.465 (0.405)	0.624 (0.499)	0.548 (0.489)	0.639 (0.475)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0451*** (0.00579)	0.0477*** (0.00678)	0.0456*** (0.00609)	0.0463*** (0.00619)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0125** (0.00475)	-0.0172** (0.00558)	-0.0140** (0.00473)	-0.0141** (0.00471)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.479** (0.177)	-0.328 (0.204)	-0.178 (0.203)	-0.238 (0.210)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.501*** (0.147)	-0.599*** (0.173)	-0.476** (0.163)	-0.509** (0.158)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.757*** (0.127)	-0.835*** (0.145)	-0.718*** (0.141)	-0.723*** (0.142)
Party Elite	-0.0932 (0.208)	-0.159 (0.235)	0.0406 (0.206)	0.0297 (0.207)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.479** (0.171)	0.399* (0.194)	0.521** (0.170)	0.512** (0.173)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0606 (0.0588)		
Competitivity (Mean)			0.0633 (0.0809)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.00174 (0.0618)
Constant	13.04+ (7.155)	-8.196 (10.43)	0.225 (8.276)	-1.947 (8.581)
<hr/>				
mills				
lambda	-0.863 (2.595)	0.592 (2.600)	-1.408 (2.814)	-1.209 (2.784)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1626	1287	1425	1438
Censored Obs.	897	648	718	728
$\rho$	-0.0648	0.0450	-0.106	-0.0908
$\sigma$	13.31	13.16	13.29	13.31
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.4.5.3 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with time

Table B.29: The effect of a change in the electoral market and time on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	11.06*** (1.943)	12.97*** (3.194)	13.03*** (3.681)	12.24*** (2.884)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.208*** (0.0465)	0.269** (0.0825)	0.254** (0.0838)	0.259*** (0.0688)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0298 (0.0432)	0.0198 (0.0510)	0.0214 (0.0489)	0.0136 (0.0443)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.257 (0.324)	-0.0403 (0.454)	-0.123 (0.398)	-0.105 (0.360)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.359*** (0.0633)	0.330*** (0.0732)	0.396*** (0.0686)	0.377*** (0.0702)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.104* (0.0495)	-0.105+ (0.0575)	-0.114* (0.0568)	-0.0821 (0.0532)
1900	8.632 (6.596)			
1910	12.78 (8.056)	-13.16 (14.15)	13.86 (12.18)	16.32 (22.45)
1920	18.61* (8.042)	20.50 (13.03)	22.09* (10.20)	19.63* (8.976)
1930	13.76** (4.819)	9.448 (7.754)	16.41* (7.001)	15.67** (5.722)
1940	12.23** (4.342)	16.99* (7.432)	6.185 (9.668)	12.27* (5.987)
1950	0.328 (4.182)	5.066 (6.609)	3.213 (6.170)	3.160 (5.307)
1960	3.955 (2.984)	4.198 (4.407)	7.521+ (4.189)	6.512+ (3.669)
1970	0.509	-3.743	2.225	0.114

	(2.763)	(3.795)	(3.612)	(3.702)
1980	-1.355 (2.057)	0.530 (2.628)	0.460 (2.659)	0.824 (2.843)
1990	0.157 (1.738)	1.368 (2.107)	1.868 (2.153)	1.949 (2.143)
2000	1.333 (1.709)	1.529 (1.907)	1.465 (1.923)	1.408 (1.998)
2010	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Volatility (Mean)		-1.306 (1.370)		
1910 X Volatility (Mean)		-50.88** (15.46)		
1920 X Volatility (Mean)		-11.14 (15.31)		
1930 X Volatility (Mean)		8.965 (6.630)		
1940 X Volatility (Mean)		7.547 (10.05)		
1950 X Volatility (Mean)		-5.394 (3.963)		
1960 X Volatility (Mean)		2.889 (3.043)		
1970 X Volatility (Mean)		-3.539 (2.914)		
1980 X Volatility (Mean)		3.929* (1.986)		
1990 X Volatility (Mean)		2.995 (2.062)		
2000 X Volatility (Mean)		2.457 (2.250)		
Competitiveness (Mean)			-0.855 (1.617)	
1910 X Competitiveness (Mean)			4.729 (6.672)	
1920 X Competitiveness (Mean)			1.346 (5.379)	
1930 X Competitiveness (Mean)			2.009 (6.046)	
1940 X Competitiveness (Mean)			-9.348 (8.989)	
1950 X Competitiveness (Mean)			-0.921 (3.315)	

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1960 X Competitivity (Mean)					-3.660 (3.147)
1970 X Competitivity (Mean)					2.579 (1.781)
1980 X Competitivity (Mean)					1.989 (2.065)
1990 X Competitivity (Mean)					1.659 (1.652)
2000 X Competitivity (Mean)					4.303** (1.462)
Vanhanen Index (Mean)					1.925 (1.499)
1910 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					0.450 (26.09)
1920 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-7.152 (4.740)
1930 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-3.155 (2.152)
1940 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					3.806 (8.360)
1950 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-7.182 (4.459)
1960 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-4.976+ (2.851)
1970 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-5.177+ (2.824)
1980 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-0.626 (2.253)
1990 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-0.296 (2.061)
2000 X Vanhanen Index (Mean)					-0.963 (1.917)
Constant	-33.08*** (9.408)	-42.79* (17.15)	-44.10* (17.96)	-41.77** (14.94)	
<hr/>					
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>					
Party Age (Log).	-0.0174 (0.0887)	-0.000419 (0.136)	-0.0369 (0.139)	-0.0657 (0.130)	
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0127*** (0.00340)	0.0205** (0.00637)	0.0224** (0.00695)	0.0183** (0.00557)	
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00263 (0.00219)	0.00152 (0.00302)	0.00414 (0.00281)	0.00383 (0.00274)	
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0713** (0.0266)	0.0935+ (0.0503)	0.0712* (0.0283)	0.0698* (0.0277)	

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Cum. time in Gov.	0.00243 (0.00476)	0.00575 (0.00562)	0.00464 (0.00509)	0.00291 (0.00505)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00123 (0.00262)	0.00247 (0.00325)	0.00237 (0.00320)	0.00309 (0.00326)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.207 (0.397)	0.524 (0.482)	0.466 (0.478)	0.553 (0.460)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0400*** (0.00482)	0.0458*** (0.00633)	0.0448*** (0.00572)	0.0455*** (0.00581)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00872 <sup>+</sup> (0.00475)	-0.00837 (0.00546)	-0.00562 (0.00531)	-0.00645 (0.00531)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0231 (0.136)	-0.347 <sup>+</sup> (0.206)	-0.209 (0.204)	-0.293 (0.209)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.458** (0.138)	-0.619*** (0.169)	-0.509** (0.159)	-0.546*** (0.153)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-1.116*** (0.119)	-1.269*** (0.149)	-1.147*** (0.143)	-1.146*** (0.138)
Party Elite	-0.0922 (0.176)	-0.322 <sup>+</sup> (0.194)	-0.0806 (0.175)	-0.0805 (0.187)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.423** (0.147)	0.343* (0.159)	0.419** (0.148)	0.414** (0.149)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0701 (0.0578)		
Competitivity (Mean)			0.0779 (0.0787)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				0.0386 (0.0583)
Constant	-1.943*** (0.415)	-2.645*** (0.629)	-2.599*** (0.642)	-2.357*** (0.580)
mills				
lambda	1.221 (2.139)	2.579 (2.314)	0.642 (2.416)	1.080 (2.484)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1753	1289	1427	1445
Censored Obs.	897	648	718	728
$\rho$	0.0940	0.200	0.0495	0.0831
$\sigma$	12.99	12.89	12.98	12.99

Chi<sup>2</sup>

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ **B.4.5.4 Interaction of changes in the electoral market with party size**

Table B.30: The effect of a change in the electoral market and party size on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	13.06*** (1.969)	15.14*** (3.060)	14.88*** (3.344)	13.70*** (3.046)
Year	-0.148* (0.0575)	-0.172* (0.0811)	-0.195* (0.0804)	-0.179* (0.0805)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.120** (0.0444)	0.137* (0.0629)	0.107* (0.0493)	0.121** (0.0462)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0225 (0.0472)	0.0125 (0.0482)	0.0116 (0.0539)	-0.00562 (0.0511)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.237 (0.318)	-0.0363 (0.460)	-0.216 (0.349)	-0.128 (0.344)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.333*** (0.0650)	0.281*** (0.0747)	0.360*** (0.0812)	0.357*** (0.0643)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.103* (0.0479)	-0.113* (0.0546)	-0.114* (0.0525)	-0.0869 <sup>+</sup> (0.0484)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.127* (0.0521)	0.160 (0.106)	0.173 <sup>+</sup> (0.0955)	0.199** (0.0739)
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub>		-0.515 (1.304)		
Volatility <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0476 (0.0421)		
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub>			1.775 (2.794)	
Competitiveness <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.0314 (0.0655)	
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub>				-0.610 (1.245)
Vanhanen Index <sub>(Mean)</sub> X Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.0593 (0.0415)
Constant	257.7* (108.5)	294.7 <sup>+</sup> (149.6)	341.0* (147.4)	313.6* (149.0)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	0.167 (0.107)	-0.0195 (0.215)	0.00564 (0.202)	0.0130 (0.195)

Year	-0.00752*	-0.00137	-0.00500	-0.00467
	(0.00340)	(0.00540)	(0.00455)	(0.00462)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0155***	-0.0168***	-0.0171***	-0.0164***
	(0.00323)	(0.00427)	(0.00443)	(0.00394)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00620*	0.00414	0.00633 <sup>+</sup>	0.00771*
	(0.00261)	(0.00373)	(0.00324)	(0.00320)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0498 <sup>+</sup>	0.0698 <sup>+</sup>	0.0458	0.0417
	(0.0284)	(0.0388)	(0.0300)	(0.0291)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00581	0.00892	0.00380	0.00559
	(0.00488)	(0.00624)	(0.00532)	(0.00521)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00585*	-0.00305	-0.00150	-0.00310
	(0.00280)	(0.00344)	(0.00344)	(0.00326)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.215	0.610	0.529	0.641
	(0.380)	(0.421)	(0.410)	(0.417)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0413***	0.0494***	0.0468***	0.0477***
	(0.00493)	(0.00641)	(0.00584)	(0.00596)
Δ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0164***	-0.0180**	-0.0137**	-0.0142**
	(0.00459)	(0.00552)	(0.00513)	(0.00518)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.136	-0.568**	-0.415*	-0.480*
	(0.140)	(0.213)	(0.201)	(0.208)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.530***	-0.709***	-0.541***	-0.620***
	(0.141)	(0.171)	(0.156)	(0.157)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.709***	-0.824***	-0.735***	-0.679***
	(0.127)	(0.149)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Party Elite	-0.0539	-0.187	-0.0267	0.00305
	(0.180)	(0.225)	(0.210)	(0.203)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.564***	0.433*	0.548**	0.554**
	(0.166)	(0.188)	(0.177)	(0.175)
Volatility (Mean)		0.0346		
		(0.0623)		
Competitivity (Mean)			-0.137 <sup>+</sup>	
			(0.0712)	
Vanhanen Index (Mean)				-0.0702
				(0.0658)
Constant	12.80*	0.969	8.082	7.306
	(6.397)	(10.05)	(8.417)	(8.559)
mills				
lambda	-1.249	-0.176	-1.498	-1.432

	(2.209)	(2.458)	(2.668)	(2.526)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1761	1289	1427	1445
Censored Obs.	905	648	718	728
$\rho$	-0.0949	-0.0134	-0.113	-0.108
$\sigma$	13.16	13.13	13.30	13.25
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### ***B.4.6 When the external demand meets the internal demand***

Table B.31: The effect of electoral competitiveness and change on the dominant coalition on top candidates selection

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Partyness (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	10.84*** (1.645)	10.99*** (1.777)	10.64*** (1.667)	10.80*** (1.684)
Year	-0.0903 (0.0470)	-0.0974 (0.0538)	-0.0879 (0.0473)	-0.0974* (0.0476)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.119* (0.0510)	0.127* (0.0549)	0.121* (0.0494)	0.118* (0.0503)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.138*** (0.0400)	0.143** (0.0440)	0.139** (0.0475)	0.143*** (0.0395)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0152 (0.0447)	0.0189 (0.0480)	0.0147 (0.0451)	0.0133 (0.0450)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.301 (0.258)	-0.289 (0.268)	-0.291 (0.256)	-0.312 (0.262)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.322*** (0.0653)	0.296*** (0.0676)	0.333*** (0.0664)	0.327*** (0.0648)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.103* (0.0416)	-0.102* (0.0435)	-0.106** (0.0407)	-0.0995* (0.0410)
No change of dominant coalition	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Change of dominant coalition	-5.087 (3.412)	-4.486 (3.690)	-4.972 (3.207)	-5.559 (3.378)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		1.323 (1.350)		
Change of dominant coalition X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.984		

	(1.466)			
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			1.834	
			(1.583)	
Change of dominant coalition X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-2.034	
			(1.397)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.917	
			(1.331)	
Change of dominant coalition X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.263	
			(1.461)	
Constant	158.5	170.3	154.3	173.3
	(88.99)	(102.3)	(88.86)	(90.03)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.0525	-0.0613	-0.0433	-0.0479
	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Year	0.000764	0.00130	0.000527	0.000583
	(0.00328)	(0.00339)	(0.00322)	(0.00329)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0114**	0.0123**	0.0106*	0.0102*
	(0.00402)	(0.00445)	(0.00410)	(0.00412)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0118**	-0.0120**	-0.0114**	-0.0119**
	(0.00357)	(0.00384)	(0.00378)	(0.00371)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.00258	0.00270	0.00282	0.00314
	(0.00254)	(0.00263)	(0.00252)	(0.00256)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0383*	0.0449*	0.0396*	0.0390*
	(0.0161)	(0.0176)	(0.0163)	(0.0165)
Cum. time in Gov.	-0.000393	0.00126	-0.00141	-0.00131
	(0.00637)	(0.00644)	(0.00624)	(0.00619)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.000768	0.00153	0.000485	0.0000518
	(0.00313)	(0.00320)	(0.00316)	(0.00312)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.0440	0.0639	0.0465	0.0373
	(0.333)	(0.334)	(0.334)	(0.332)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0353***	0.0348***	0.0370***	0.0376***
	(0.00485)	(0.00508)	(0.00490)	(0.00495)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.00794	-0.00966	-0.00758	-0.00722
	(0.00516)	(0.00532)	(0.00521)	(0.00531)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.213	-0.179	-0.201	-0.252
	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.195	-0.237	-0.182	-0.208
	(0.158)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.167)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.479**	-0.538***	-0.483**	-0.473**
	(0.148)	(0.158)	(0.152)	(0.151)

No change of dominant coalition	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Change of dominant coalition	1.552*** (0.104)	1.549*** (0.103)	1.569*** (0.105)	1.581*** (0.105)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0409 (0.0391)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.00378 (0.0520)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.0340 (0.0456)
Constant	-3.581 (6.125)	-4.646 (6.319)	-3.225 (6.013)	-3.346 (6.153)
mills lambda	-3.539 (3.487)	-3.009 (3.664)	-3.656 (3.274)	-4.092 (3.439)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1970	1878	1951	1951
Censored Obs.	1006	959	998	999
$\rho$	-0.268	-0.228	-0.278	-0.309
$\sigma$	13.21	13.19	13.16	13.26
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### ***B.4.7 The effects of a change in the electoral market on candidates' popularity and recognition***

Table B.32: The effect of a change in the electoral market on top candidates' popularity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Popularity (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.239 (0.332)	-0.259 (0.342)	-0.238 (0.335)	-0.223 (0.358)
Year	0.00269 (0.0112)	0.00311 (0.0110)	0.000155 (0.0113)	-0.000172 (0.0119)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0238* (0.0103)	0.0239* (0.0104)	0.0240* (0.0102)	0.0241* (0.0105)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.00213 (0.00807)	-0.00254 (0.00843)	-0.00446 (0.00961)	-0.00216 (0.00861)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0136* (0.00807)	-0.0118+ (0.00843)	-0.0133+ (0.00961)	-0.0134* (0.00861)

	(0.00671)	(0.00645)	(0.00683)	(0.00671)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.0192 (0.0248)	-0.0162 (0.0246)	-0.0177 (0.0251)	-0.0190 (0.0249)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00859 (0.00900)	0.00772 (0.00886)	0.00901 (0.00930)	0.00963 (0.00903)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00404 (0.00657)	-0.00408 (0.00663)	-0.00330 (0.00662)	-0.00375 (0.00709)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.0313 (0.0952)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.0448 (0.0849)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.00436 (0.0916)
Constant	-1.052 (21.71)	-1.876 (21.25)	4.074 (21.94)	4.638 (22.92)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-1.013* (0.499)	-0.994* (0.492)	-0.953+ (0.493)	-1.061* (0.504)
Year	0.0288 (0.0194)	0.0288 (0.0191)	0.0249 (0.0189)	0.0274 (0.0190)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0305*** (0.00823)	0.0321*** (0.00834)	0.0309*** (0.00850)	0.0308*** (0.00853)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0519*** (0.0106)	-0.0523*** (0.0108)	-0.0514*** (0.0115)	-0.0550*** (0.0110)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0116 (0.00875)	-0.0121 (0.00864)	-0.0102 (0.00860)	-0.00924 (0.00867)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0819+ (0.0487)	0.107 (0.0828)	0.0865+ (0.0491)	0.0867+ (0.0510)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00532 (0.00854)	0.00464 (0.00832)	0.00469 (0.00879)	0.00330 (0.00878)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.0110+ (0.00625)	0.0109+ (0.00621)	0.0110 (0.00666)	0.00938 (0.00660)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.243 (0.295)	0.277 (0.301)	0.254 (0.310)	0.235 (0.303)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0541*** (0.0101)	0.0536*** (0.0101)	0.0559*** (0.0101)	0.0564*** (0.0101)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0500*** (0.0107)	-0.0539*** (0.0108)	-0.0507*** (0.0107)	-0.0488*** (0.0109)
<b>Performance:</b>				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.394 (0.239)	-0.389 (0.247)	-0.289 (0.254)	-0.390 (0.271)

Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.678** (0.236)	-0.686** (0.236)	-0.678** (0.247)	-0.641** (0.244)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.854*** (0.195)	-0.912*** (0.197)	-0.823*** (0.200)	-0.813*** (0.207)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.111 (0.105)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0305 (0.120)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.163 (0.0992)
Constant	-55.37 (37.45)	-55.37 (36.89)	-47.87 (36.62)	-52.50 (36.72)
mills lambda	0.443* (0.193)	0.470* (0.185)	0.432* (0.191)	0.391* (0.195)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	735	725	723	723
Censored Obs.	374	366	369	369
$\rho$	0.662	0.701	0.650	0.599
$\sigma$	0.669	0.671	0.665	0.653
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.33: The effect of a change in the electoral market on top candidates' recognition

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Recognition (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-4.533 (5.389)	-5.002 (5.666)	-4.155 (5.376)	-6.026 (5.451)
Year	-0.0596 (0.283)	-0.0475 (0.288)	-0.0413 (0.292)	0.0341 (0.285)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.303 <sup>+</sup> (0.166)	0.304 <sup>+</sup> (0.169)	0.306 <sup>+</sup> (0.169)	0.314 <sup>+</sup> (0.167)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.360* (0.176)	0.350 <sup>+</sup> (0.179)	0.426* (0.187)	0.335 <sup>+</sup> (0.173)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.101 (0.174)	0.102 (0.178)	0.0890 (0.183)	0.0962 (0.178)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.667 (0.591)	-0.684 (0.589)	-0.711 (0.605)	-0.698 (0.589)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.187 (0.136)	0.194 (0.140)	0.198 (0.140)	0.169 (0.138)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.196 <sup>+</sup> (0.117)	0.192 (0.117)	0.191 (0.117)	0.168 (0.118)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-1.056 (1.838)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			1.066 (1.564)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-2.999 <sup>+</sup> (1.699)
Constant	161.1 (554.9)	138.1 (563.9)	121.6 (573.9)	-22.36 (558.3)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-1.013* (0.499)	-0.994* (0.492)	-0.953 <sup>+</sup> (0.493)	-1.061* (0.504)
Year	0.0288 (0.0194)	0.0288 (0.0191)	0.0249 (0.0189)	0.0274 (0.0190)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0305*** (0.00823)	0.0321*** (0.00834)	0.0309*** (0.00850)	0.0308*** (0.00853)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0519*** (0.0106)	-0.0523*** (0.0108)	-0.0514*** (0.0115)	-0.0550*** (0.0110)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0116 (0.00875)	-0.0121 (0.00864)	-0.0102 (0.00860)	-0.00924 (0.00867)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0819 <sup>+</sup> (0.0487)	0.107 (0.0828)	0.0865 <sup>+</sup> (0.0491)	0.0867 <sup>+</sup> (0.0510)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00532 (0.00854)	0.00464 (0.00832)	0.00469 (0.00879)	0.00330 (0.00878)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.0110 <sup>+</sup>	0.0109 <sup>+</sup>	0.0110	0.00938

	(0.00625)	(0.00621)	(0.00666)	(0.00660)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.243 (0.295)	0.277 (0.301)	0.254 (0.310)	0.235 (0.303)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0541*** (0.0101)	0.0536*** (0.0101)	0.0559*** (0.0101)	0.0564*** (0.0101)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0500*** (0.0107)	-0.0539*** (0.0108)	-0.0507*** (0.0107)	-0.0488*** (0.0109)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.394 (0.239)	-0.389 (0.247)	-0.289 (0.254)	-0.390 (0.271)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.678** (0.236)	-0.686** (0.236)	-0.678** (0.247)	-0.641** (0.244)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.854*** (0.195)	-0.912*** (0.197)	-0.823*** (0.200)	-0.813*** (0.207)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.111 (0.105)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0305 (0.120)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.163 (0.0992)
Constant	-55.37 (37.45)	-55.37 (36.89)	-47.87 (36.62)	-52.50 (36.72)
mills				
lambda	3.207 (3.284)	3.006 (3.262)	2.768 (3.549)	4.349 (3.492)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	735	725	723	723
Censored Obs.	374	366	369	369
$\rho$	0.223	0.209	0.194	0.302
$\sigma$	14.40	14.41	14.24	14.38
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.34: The effect of a change in the electoral market and the selectorate type on top candidates' popularity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Popularity (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-0.244 (0.343)	-0.272 (0.381)	-0.222 (0.353)	-0.276 (0.336)
Year	0.000830 (0.0113)	0.00105 (0.0114)	-0.00233 (0.0114)	-0.00801 (0.00955)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0237* (0.0104)	0.0239* (0.0109)	0.0243* (0.0102)	0.0284* (0.0112)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.00129 (0.00817)	-0.00219 (0.00895)	-0.00351 (0.00987)	-0.00203 (0.00862)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0137* (0.00673)	-0.0118 <sup>+</sup> (0.00654)	-0.0134 <sup>+</sup> (0.00689)	-0.0114 <sup>+</sup> (0.00687)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.0178 (0.0239)	-0.0120 (0.0242)	-0.0141 (0.0244)	-0.0166 (0.0245)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.0117 (0.00924)	0.0110 (0.00892)	0.0123 (0.00972)	0.0104 (0.00898)
Cum. time in Opp.	-0.00310 (0.00680)	-0.00287 (0.00682)	-0.00262 (0.00725)	0.00107 (0.00686)
Party Elite	0.403 (0.413)	0.414 (0.474)	0.365 (0.442)	0.0866 (0.388)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.521 (0.460)	0.442 (0.559)	0.580 (0.492)	0.279 (0.405)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0777 (0.184)		
Party Elite X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.137 (0.226)		
Primary X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.285 (0.421)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.0422 (0.112)	
Party Elite X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0316 (0.129)	
Primary X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-0.284 (0.351)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				0.396** (0.133)
Party Elite X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.569** (0.183)
Primary X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.531* (0.225)

Constant	2.259 (22.02)	1.840 (22.16)	8.609 (22.13)	20.09 (18.63)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-1.456** (0.507)	-1.446** (0.503)	-1.416** (0.504)	-1.534** (0.521)
Year	0.0399* (0.0188)	0.0406* (0.0186)	0.0359+ (0.0188)	0.0388* (0.0191)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0331*** (0.00866)	0.0345*** (0.00879)	0.0335*** (0.00887)	0.0336*** (0.00894)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0545*** (0.0114)	-0.0549*** (0.0116)	-0.0538*** (0.0123)	-0.0572*** (0.0118)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0118 (0.00941)	-0.0130 (0.00897)	-0.0102 (0.00965)	-0.00916 (0.00975)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0799 (0.0484)	0.102 (0.0783)	0.0846+ (0.0493)	0.0841+ (0.0506)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00922 (0.00878)	0.00823 (0.00845)	0.00882 (0.00910)	0.00769 (0.00904)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.0118+ (0.00667)	0.0113+ (0.00663)	0.0128+ (0.00712)	0.0110 (0.00711)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.303 (0.351)	0.328 (0.352)	0.307 (0.355)	0.285 (0.347)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0608*** (0.0115)	0.0602*** (0.0116)	0.0610*** (0.0117)	0.0614*** (0.0118)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0530*** (0.0112)	-0.0567*** (0.0112)	-0.0531*** (0.0111)	-0.0510*** (0.0113)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.423 (0.263)	-0.440+ (0.263)	-0.387 (0.268)	-0.483+ (0.291)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.761** (0.270)	-0.771** (0.273)	-0.709* (0.270)	-0.676* (0.268)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.859*** (0.202)	-0.922*** (0.204)	-0.826*** (0.211)	-0.810*** (0.217)
Party Elite	0.529 (0.754)	0.572 (0.910)	0.506 (0.777)	0.506 (0.806)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.997 (0.784)	1.009 (0.949)	0.978 (0.811)	0.991 (0.844)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0668 (0.111)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0180	

			(0.117)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.170 <sup>+</sup> (0.103)
Constant	-77.08* (36.31)	-78.59* (35.98)	-69.41 <sup>+</sup> (36.37)	-74.84* (37.00)
mills				
lambda	0.410* (0.193)	0.440* (0.191)	0.409* (0.199)	0.379 <sup>+</sup> (0.200)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	703	694	693	693
Censored Obs.	359	352	355	355
$\rho$	0.624	0.669	0.626	0.597
$\sigma$	0.657	0.658	0.654	0.634
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table B.35: The effect of a change in the electoral market and the selectorate type on top candidates' recognition

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Recognition (Eq. 2)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-4.594 (4.815)	-6.875 (5.157)	-4.540 (4.497)	-6.564 (5.212)
Year	-0.0307 (0.248)	0.0354 (0.251)	-0.00284 (0.244)	0.188 (0.256)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.313 <sup>+</sup> (0.168)	0.323 <sup>+</sup> (0.166)	0.307 <sup>+</sup> (0.173)	0.277 (0.170)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.356 <sup>+</sup> (0.182)	0.344 <sup>+</sup> (0.183)	0.398* (0.190)	0.331 <sup>+</sup> (0.181)
Cum. time in Parl.	0.0488 (0.171)	0.0443 (0.175)	0.0386 (0.181)	0.000853 (0.170)
Cum. time out of Parl.	-0.975 <sup>+</sup> (0.554)	-1.082 <sup>+</sup> (0.552)	-0.992 <sup>+</sup> (0.557)	-0.996 <sup>+</sup> (0.528)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.125 (0.146)	0.148 (0.156)	0.149 (0.147)	0.151 (0.149)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.148 (0.133)	0.163 (0.136)	0.132 (0.133)	0.0975 (0.133)
Party Elite	-14.18 <sup>+</sup> (7.192)	-16.50* (6.796)	-14.25* (7.094)	-9.620 (6.455)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	-11.84 (7.201)	-8.461 (6.653)	-12.18 <sup>+</sup> (7.303)	-8.421 (6.173)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-2.123 (3.484)		
Party Elite X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		-0.225 (4.054)		
Primary X Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		12.56 (7.845)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			2.759 (2.205)	
Party Elite X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-3.005 (2.591)	
Primary X Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			-1.643 (8.406)	
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-8.196* (3.239)
Party Elite X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				6.952 <sup>+</sup> (3.658)
Primary X Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				11.63* (5.275)

Constant	119.8 (487.7)	-4.731 (492.3)	62.63 (481.9)	-312.7 (502.8)
<b>New candidate (Eq. 1)</b>				
Party Age (Log).	-1.456** (0.507)	-1.446** (0.503)	-1.416** (0.504)	-1.534** (0.521)
Year	0.0399* (0.0188)	0.0406* (0.0186)	0.0359+ (0.0188)	0.0388* (0.0191)
Votes' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0331*** (0.00866)	0.0345*** (0.00879)	0.0335*** (0.00887)	0.0336*** (0.00894)
Seats' % <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.0545*** (0.0114)	-0.0549*** (0.0116)	-0.0538*** (0.0123)	-0.0572*** (0.0118)
Cum. time in Parl.	-0.0118 (0.00941)	-0.0130 (0.00897)	-0.0102 (0.00965)	-0.00916 (0.00975)
Cum. time out of Parl.	0.0799 (0.0484)	0.102 (0.0783)	0.0846+ (0.0493)	0.0841+ (0.0506)
Cum. time in Gov.	0.00922 (0.00878)	0.00823 (0.00845)	0.00882 (0.00910)	0.00769 (0.00904)
Cum. time in Opp.	0.0118+ (0.00667)	0.0113+ (0.00663)	0.0128+ (0.00712)	0.0110 (0.00711)
Pre-electoral coalition	0.303 (0.351)	0.328 (0.352)	0.307 (0.355)	0.285 (0.347)
Top candidate age <sub>(t-1)</sub>	0.0608*** (0.0115)	0.0602*** (0.0116)	0.0610*** (0.0117)	0.0614*** (0.0118)
$\Delta$ Votes' % <sub>(t-1 - t-2)</sub>	-0.0530*** (0.0112)	-0.0567*** (0.0112)	-0.0531*** (0.0111)	-0.0510*** (0.0113)
Performance:				
Loser <sub>(t-1)</sub>	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Representation <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.423 (0.263)	-0.440+ (0.263)	-0.387 (0.268)	-0.483+ (0.291)
Government <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.761** (0.270)	-0.771** (0.273)	-0.709* (0.270)	-0.676* (0.268)
PM <sub>(t-1)</sub>	-0.859*** (0.202)	-0.922*** (0.204)	-0.826*** (0.211)	-0.810*** (0.217)
Party Elite	0.529 (0.754)	0.572 (0.910)	0.506 (0.777)	0.506 (0.806)
Party Conference	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Primary	0.997 (0.784)	1.009 (0.949)	0.978 (0.811)	0.991 (0.844)
Volatility <sub>(t-1)</sub>		0.0668 (0.111)		
Safety <sub>(t-1)</sub>			0.0180	

	(0.117)			
Contestation <sub>(t-1)</sub>				-0.170 <sup>+</sup> (0.103)
Constant	-77.08* (36.31)	-78.59* (35.98)	-69.41 <sup>+</sup> (36.37)	-74.84* (37.00)
mills lambda	2.837 (3.155)	2.403 (3.251)	2.750 (3.361)	3.731 (3.325)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	703	694	693	693
Censored Obs.	359	352	355	355
$\rho$	0.202	0.173	0.199	0.271
$\sigma$	14.02	13.88	13.85	13.78
Chi <sup>2</sup>				

Standard errors in parentheses

Country, party and region FE are applied to both the selection and the outcome equations

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$