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

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Do domestic institutional actors matter in Georgian foreign policy? Unpacking national role conceptions of bureaucracies and political parties in Georgia

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How do national role conceptions (NRCs) of domestic institutional actors change in response to external and internal shocks? Using role theory in foreign policy analysis, this article explores how bureaucratic agencies and political parties in Georgia respond to shocks, such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and changes in political leadership. Content analysis of 18 hand-coded documents, including all security, military, and foreign policy strategies as well as ten party manifestos of three ruling parties of Georgia, shows that NRCs are modified in response to shocks. While bureaucracies are more stable, party responses have varied between radicalisation and compensation strategies.

Keywords: role theory; foreign policy analysis; Georgia; political parties; bureaucratic politics

Introduction

To what extent do external shocks influence the foreign policies of small states and what are the factors limiting and/or facilitating these influences? In this article, I use the role theory of foreign policy analysis, apply it to the case of Georgia and argue that domestic actors respond to external shocks by modifying their conceptions of national roles. However, the extent and direction of this modification depends on the nature of the actor and its position in domestic political competition over power vis-à-vis other actors. To provide evidence for this argument, I analyse two sets of domestic actors in Georgia: bureaucratic institutions and political parties. To ensure consistency and comparability, I use content analysis of the formal documents these actors produce. These include eight strategic conceptual documents, such as national security concepts as well as foreign policy and military strategies. Furthermore, I analyse ten political party manifestos from the three political parties that have held power in Georgia and have produced at least one strategic document. These parties include the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), the United National Movement (UNM), and the Georgian Dream (GD). Consequently, the evidence presented in this article is a unique dataset of eighteen documents spanning the two decades between 1999 and 2020.

The goal of this article is to show how the structure, manifested in external shocks serving as critical junctures, and the agency of small states, are intertwined when it comes to foreign policy making. For this purpose, the article departs from international relations

(IR) theories and focuses on foreign policy analysis (FPA). The added value of FPA to the IR theory is its ability to unpack the black box of the state. Without an FPA's actor-specific focus and incorporation of human beings, Hudson (2005, 3) argues, IR theories would paint "a world of no change." Using FPA this article reveals the mosaic of foreign policy visions that exists within the black box of the Georgian state. These visions are regularly adapted to the ever-changing environment, or are re-written in the case of shocks, which according to Gustavson (1999), can happen in external structural conditions, the domestic arena of leadership, or in the form of crises of some sort.

Even though FPA is often criticised for its focus on stability (da Vinha 2017), which it is argued is a result of the rarity of significant foreign policy changes (Welch 2005), recent research on role theory has shown the opposite. According to role theorists, changes in national role conceptions (NRC), that are facilitators of changes in foreign policy, are "ubiquitous" (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011, 261). Therefore, the role theory in FPA makes it possible to observe two aspects of foreign policy-making. Firstly, it allows observation of the differences between the NRCs of various domestic actors, e.g., bureaucratic institutions and political parties. According to role theory, these differences represent the horizontal contestation of NRCs in foreign policy (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016). Secondly, it allows the tracing of incremental changes over time to identify any turning points. This article unpacks domestic contestation surrounding NRCs in Georgia and explores the potential causes of change, including external shocks, such as the August War of 2008, and internal shocks, such as government changes in 2003 and 2012. Due to the lack of continuity following the 2003 change, however, the empirical analysis focuses more on the 2012 change of leadership.

As a result, this article offers three contributions. Firstly, the article contributes to the understanding of Georgian foreign policy by unpacking not only the black box of the state, but also the black box of the elite. By focusing on institutional actors, such as bureaucracies and political parties, I explore whether there is a difference between the two sets of actors in terms of how they conceive Georgia's national role and how they react to shocks. This allows evaluation of the relative importance of bureaucracies and political parties in terms of foreign policy making. Secondly, the article creates a unique dataset and cultivates comparable data across two decades. This kind of comparable empirical data in research on Georgia, or other former Soviet countries, is rare. Finally, the article offers a new measurement tool to capture, map and analyse NRCs, which may be of interest for role theorists in FPA.

The article proceeds with a section reviewing the literature on role theory and an overview of what is known about Georgian foreign policy. This is then followed by a detailed description of the methodology and data. The penultimate section offers the analysis and interpretation of the data, while the final section offers the conclusion.

Role theory and foreign policy analysis: Can NRCs offer a new way of thinking about Georgian foreign policy?

Literature on role theory in FPA takes its origin from the seminal article by Holsti (1970), who in his turn borrowed the concept of roles from social psychology. Holsti

(1970, 239) defined a role conception as a set of prescriptions of the alter and conceptions of the ego about "position(s) and functions, and the behaviour appropriate to them." Consequently, the source of national role conceptions are policymakers and their definition or "images" regarding "the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems" (Holsti 1970, 245-246). Following Holsti's (1970) article, there have been, according to Thies and Breuning (2012), two waves of role theory literature: the first wave focused mostly on setting up the conceptual apparatus, identifying sources of NRCs, and empirical tests; the second wave, however, tried to integrate FPA and IR theories.

The definition of the NRC, though, has not changed much (Breuning 2011; Harnisch 2011, 2014; Krotz 2002). Building on previous research in role theory, Harnisch (2012), offers the most comprehensive conceptualization of roles in foreign policy, one that is composed of three dimensions. Contrasting identity and roles with each other, Harnisch (2012), posits that the first dimension is "I" *versus* "me." This dimension essentially gives a possibility for actors to move between an ego-dominated role set and an alter-dominated role set (Harnisch 2012). The second dimension involves a distinction between "significant" and "generalized" others – actors – which role-taking behaviour addresses (Harnisch 2012). Finally, the third dimension is a nexus of the degree of commitment between strong obligations, on the one hand, involving high internalization through institutionalization, and weak obligations on the other (Harnisch 2012).

Such detailed conceptualization of roles has allowed meaningful conception of changes in roles, which, Harnisch (2012) argues, happens through learning by moving on these three continuous dimensions of the concept. Building on Levy's (1994) argument of learning as a process, Harnisch, Frank, and Maull (2011) offer three degrees of role change. The first degree of change is role adaptation, which implies change of means but not goals (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). The second degree of change is role learning and involves changing foreign policy goals (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). Finally, the third degree of change is role transformation, which implies change of identity and interests (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). These three degrees of role change are a result of learning and socialization-based causal mechanisms (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011). Although socialization would imply a slow process of change, learning can happen in response to external or shocks. Therefore, the first task of empirical analysis is to identify whether domestic actors in Georgia responded to critical events, such as the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 and leadership changes, by modifying their NRCs.

Although the framework of degrees of role change is valuable for advancing the conceptual apparatus of role theoretic research, it assumes that role changes will lead to foreign policy change. However, scholars of role theory have demonstrated that there are multiple roles (Breuning 2011) and that these may conflict with each other (Breuning and Pechenina 2020; Thies 2013; Wehner 2015). Therefore, role changes do not necessarily lead to foreign policy change. However, one way change in NRCs can result in change in foreign policy behaviour is by emphasizing one role and de-emphasizing another (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996).

Multiple roles can belong to the same actor or can be conceived by different actors though competing against each other. The latter would be horizontal role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016). Studying role contestation among various actors is important to avoid elite black-boxing and unravel a mosaic of NRCs that can otherwise remain unexplored. For this reason, various studies have explored a range of domestic actors and their NRCs. Wehner and Thies (2014), for example, investigate the process of contestation within small groups of foreign policy elites. Brummer and Thies (2015) expand the arena for domestic role contestation and find that party politics plays the key role in this process, with the government-opposition divide being the primary source of role contestation.

Bureaucratic politics have not escaped scholars' attention, either. Since Allison's (1969, 1971) seminal works, scholars of FPA have recognised the influence of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision-making. Role theorists, therefore, have explored how bureaucratic agencies contest NRCs. Crowcroft and Heartly (2012, 497) demonstrate the conceptual contrasts of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence in the UK through "language used, and the factors which receive attention in statements of policy." Furthermore, studying the case of China, Jones (2017) investigates how bureaucratic contestation occurs in practice and how the alter's endorsement or rejection of the NRC can influence the centre's choice of NRC.

Consequently, the second task for empirical analysis is to identify how domestic actors contest Georgian NRCs. The article aims to identify patterns, which bureaucratic and political parties follow in their responses to critical events. However, before moving to empirical analysis, it is necessary to identify what NRCs scholars of Georgian foreign policy have studied.

What are the NRCs for Georgia?

Georgia is not a country of particular interest for role theorists. Therefore, there is no rich literature on Georgian NRCs. One of the rare exceptions, however, is a recent work by Nilsson (2019) who studies Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency and identifies two role conceptions characteristic of this period, specifically in the context of Georgian-US relations: Georgia as a beacon of democracy and Georgia as a net-security contributor. Nilsson (2019) studies these two NRCs vis-à-vis the 2007 November crisis and the 2008 August War respectively. Nilsson (2019) argues that these two crises created role conflicts leading Georgian actors to adopt two strategies: rationalization of role expectations and compensation for departing from them. These strategies were necessary to retain credibility with US counterparts (Nilsson 2019). It is indisputable that the USA is a significant other for Georgia. More often than not, the USA as well as NATO and EU countries are collectively referred to as the West. Therefore, Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy, as opposed to pro-Russian foreign policy, is the key issue that scholarly literature has investigated.

Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy has been labelled as a "primary puzzle of Georgian foreign policy" (Kakhishvili 2021, 176). The conventional wisdom about Georgian foreign policy is that Tbilisi faces a dichotomous choice between aligning itself with either the West or Russia, even though some authors have argued against this

dichotomy (Buzogany 2019; Kakhishvili 2016b, 2021). Therefore, scholarship is concerned with determinants of Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy. The main strand of literature, informed with constructivist approaches, focuses on so-called small groups of decision-makers and their ideas, values, perceptions, and identities (Davtyan 2021; German 2015; Gvalia et al. 2013; Kakachia and Minesashvili 2015; Kakachia, Minesashvili, and Kakhishvili 2018; Kolstø and Rusetskii 2012; Minesashvili 2021; Naskidashvili and Kakhishvili 2016; Ó Beacháin and Coene 2014). Another strand in the literature, informed with neoclassical realism, focuses more on structural factors, such as perceived relative power capabilities in the international context (Oskanian 2016), and factors such as elite cohesion and state capacity (Gvalia, Lebanidze, and Siroky 2019). More recently, Lebanidze and Kakachia (2023) have argued that, during 2012-2022, elite ideas led Georgia to choose Russia-accommodating policies, but this was limited by overwhelmingly pro-Western public opinion. Therefore, the authors argue, during the last ten years Georgia has been undertaking "bandwagoning by stealth" foreign policy (Lebanidze and Kakachia 2023). Overall, however, save in a few exceptions (e.g., Jones and Kakhishvili 2013; Kakhishvili 2016a, 2021), there is a heavy focus on decision-makers, while the institutional dimension of foreign policymaking remains overlooked. Even when authors try to analyse Georgian foreign policy from the perspective of critical theories, they remain limited to key decision-makers, such as presidents and prime-ministers (Bibilashvili 2022).

Due to the ignoring of institutions as actors, a range of theoretical approaches have gone unexplored in terms of their capacity to explain Georgian foreign policy. For example, liberal theories focusing on societal actors and their impact on foreign policy behaviour (Moravcsik 1997), or indeed the role theory of foreign policy analysis promising to potentially incorporate structure and agency in IR (Breuning 2011), have gone unnoticed. In this article, I follow the conventional approach of categorising Georgian foreign policy into the two dimensions – the West and Russia – and argue that Georgia can enact four roles as a "friend" or "enemy" with its two significant others: West-positive, West-negative, Russia-positive, and Russia-negative. However, I differ with most scholars in terms of the focus on institutional actors in the domestic arena – bureaucratic agencies and political parties. This article maps and analyses the role conceptions of these institutional actors.

Methodology: Capturing, mapping, and analysing NRCs in Georgia

Literature on role theory relies on text as data. However, there is no universal approach to what counts as data for role theory. Empirical studies have relied mostly on speeches, parliamentary debates, press conferences, official documents, elite interviews, and cable communications among other sources of data (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996; Hermann 1987; Holsti 1970; Karim 2021; Melo 2019; Simon 2019; Wish 1980). Furthermore, Schafer and Walker's (2021) recent edited volume draws on operational code analysis and even offers computational models of foreign policy roles. Other studies, however, rely more on secondary sources, such as historiography or scholarly accounts, to understand and interpret roles in foreign policy (Bengtsson and Elgstrom 2012; Harnisch 2012; Shih 2012; Thies 2012, 2013, 2017). Consequently, most scholars, in their

effort to explore roles, either focus on an individual level of analysis or adopt a meta approach and draw conclusions from scholarly accounts. The framework I use in this study identifies four role conceptions from the literature on Georgian foreign policy and measures these roles as conceived by institutional actors that produce formalised speech acts in the shape of documents.

I select two types of actors: political parties and government agencies directly relevant to foreign policy decision-making (see Appendix 1 in supplementary information file). As sources of data, I select party manifestos produced prior to elections, which normally include pledges on external relations, and strategic documents produced by various government agencies, such as national security strategy, national military strategy, and national foreign policy strategy (see Appendix 2 in supplementary information file). This approach has four benefits. Firstly, it explores what Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 2016) call horizontal role contestation, by identifying NRCs upheld by political parties and bureaucratic agencies. This means that the Georgian political elite is not black-boxed. Secondly, it is possible to extend analysis to the government-opposition divide in party politics. Thirdly, focusing on strategic documents helps explore how NRCs are contested among bureaucratic agencies. Furthermore, role conceptions of bureaucratic agencies are not dependent on single individuals as leaders of a given agency. Normally, these national strategic documents, as well as manifestos of political parties, are a result of internal deliberative processes and represent a least common denominator of possibly competing views within any given institution. Finally, the transparency and comparability of data make it possible to systematically trace continuity and change in NRCs.

Often, party manifestos are seen as unimportant in Georgia and in the wider post-Soviet context. This is because it is assumed that voters rarely read these documents, and party platforms are not able to alter voting behaviour. Instead, charisma and electoral clientelism can be more decisive in party-voter linkages. It is true that most voters do not read party manifestos, that voters identify with party leader's charisma and not the party as an organization or a policy platform, and that voting behaviour is likely to be determined by clientelist transactions. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable, albeit indirect, impact of manifestos on voters, which happens through experts, media, or individual politicians (Dolezal et al. 2012). Manifestos fulfill a range of functions in electoral campaigns (Eder, Jenny, and Müller 2017) and are disseminated in various forms through different channels, including social media. Consequently, the importance of manifestos as official party documents goes beyond the direct readership of these documents. Indeed, the number of voters who read manifestos is insignificant compared to the fact that parties make policy statements through manifestos. This, in its turn, makes it possible to estimate policy positions, including in the area of foreign policy, and to inform foreign policy analysis (Kakhishvili 2021).

Taking the view that Russia is a negative significant other for Georgia, while the West is positive, I define the relational conception of the national role of Georgia in terms of the intensity of positive and negative views that domestic actors hold about Russia and the West. This means that Georgia can enact four different roles: a friend or an enemy of

the West and a friend or an enemy of Russia. I do not assume that any pair of these role conceptions vis-à-vis Russia and the West are mutually exclusive of each other. Consequently, there are two dimensions to the NRC of Georgia: the dimension of the West and the dimension of Russia. To ground these dimensions in empirical data, I employ content analysis.

I borrow the method of content analysis from the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and use sentences or quasi-sentences as coding units (Budge 1987; Werner, Lacewell, and Volkens 2015). Although I follow the general guidelines of the MRG, the coding framework is more nuanced compared to what MRG suggests. This is because MRG focuses on seven different policy domains when coding party manifestos, while in this article I only focus on external relations. Additionally, I use the same coding framework for the strategic documents as has been adopted by various government institutions. This allows for consistent comparisons across a wide range of actors (for the coding framework and raw frequency data see Appendix 3 in supplementary information file).

At the end of the coding procedure, I use positive and negative references to the two significant others of Georgia – Russia and the West – and aggregate them into two dimensions of the Georgian NRC. The aggregated coded categories create two worlds: one is the Russian-led world, and includes Russian-led organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union. Additionally, this dimension also includes other former Soviet countries that are members of these three organizations. Similarly, the Western dimension includes a US-led world, including NATO, the EU, and members of these organizations (see Appendix 4 in supplementary information file). This approach yields a two-dimensional plane with four quadrants – four possible values of the Georgian NRC defined in relation to the West and Russia: (1) friend of the West and friend of Russia; (2) enemy of the West and friend of Russia; (3) enemy of the West and enemy of Russia; (4) friend of the West and enemy of Russia. That positive perception of both the West and Russia is a meaningful analytical category has been demonstrated in previous research (Buzogany 2019; Kakhishvili 2016b, 2021).

To translate the text data into numerical values, three methods have been employed in the literature on party politics: simple percentages (Budge 1987), estimate of relative proportional difference (Kim and Fording 2002), and logarithmic proportions or log odds-ratios (Lowe et al. 2011). The latter is the most valuable because it decreases the influence of the overall length of a given document on the resulting numerical estimates. According to the logarithmic method (Lowe et al. 2011), I use the following formula to estimate positions of individual actors as given in the respective document or documents:

$$\theta = \log (F + 0.5) - \log (E + 0.5) \qquad (1)$$

θ is the point estimate on a given dimension of a given actor's position based on a given document. F and E are the poles of the dimension denoting friendship and enmity with a respective significant other. As such, this method yields numerical values that are

unbounded by any maximum or minimum value and theoretically can range between negative and positive infinities. However, empirically speaking, in the case of Georgia, for which I have coded and analysed 18 documents, positions have ranged between 0 and 2.52 on the dimension of the West, and between (-0.85) and 1.11 on the dimension of Russia.

Ten of the coded documents are party manifestos and eight are strategic documents. This covers a twenty-year period between 1999 and 2020. I take 1999 as the starting point because this is when the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), a political party led by the late president Eduard Shevardnadze, won parliamentary elections. Following this victory, in 2000 the CUG government adopted the first document that was strategic in nature, entitled "A Vision and Strategy for the Future." This was not a typical strategic document, as the Georgian state was still young and was in the process of establishing a culture of codifying foreign policy.

There have been two more parties in government. Between 2003 and 2012 Georgia was led by the United National Movement (UNM). During its first term, the UNM adopted a national security concept (NSC) and national military strategy (NMS) in 2005 and a foreign policy strategy (FPS) in 2006. In 2011, however, during its second term in office, the UNM adopted a new NSC. Since 2012, a new party, the Georgian Dream (GD), has been in power in Georgia, and has won three parliamentary elections – in 2012, 2016, and 2020. The GD government adopted an NMS in 2014 and an FPS in 2015, as well as another FPS in 2019 during its second term. Since the 2020 election, the GD has not yet updated any strategic documents.

Consequently, along with these eight strategic documents, I analyse the CUG 1999 and 2003 manifestos, the UNM 2003, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020 manifestos, and the GD 2012, 2016, and 2020 manifestos. With these manifestos, I observe how political parties contested the Georgian NRCs during critical junctures of government change in 2003 and 2012, as well as how they responded to the 2008 August War. Four manifestos up until and including the UNM 2008 manifesto were written and published before the war, while the remaining six manifestos were produced after the war. Furthermore, the strategic documents allow analysis of how individual bureaucratic agencies conceive of the Georgian foreign policy role. Finally, as I use the same coding framework for party manifestos and strategic documents, I can observe interaction between party-adopted NRCs and bureaucracy-adopted NRCs.

Stability and change of bureaucratic and party NRCs for Georgia

In this section, I analyse the empirical data in two parts. In the first part, I describe the general patterns in the data. In the second part, I investigate the response of the domestic actors to the external and internal shocks and identify which actors modify their NRCs, if at all. It must be mentioned, however, that the arguments presented below are limited to the adoption of NRCs as observed in the formal speech acts. The article does not analyse the enactment of these NRCs and possible changes in these enactments.

The mosaic of the institutional NRCs for Georgia between 1999 and 2020

I start with describing the overall picture of results. Figure 1 maps all 18 analysed documents into a two-dimensional plane. The horizontal axis is the West dimension and vertical axis is the Russia dimension of NRCs. The documents are depicted in the figure with their institutional author and the year of publication. There are ten pre-election manifestos of three political parties: two manifestos from the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG 99 and CUG 03), five manifestos from the United National Movement (UNM 03, UNM 08, UNM 12, UNM 16, and UNM 20), and three manifestos from the Georgian Dream (GD 12, GD 16, and GD 20). From these manifestos, CUG 99, UNM 03, UNM 08, GD 12, GD 16, and GD 20 are election-winning manifestos.

Additionally, along with the manifestos, eight strategic documents are mapped on Figure 1. These include one document created by the president's office under the CUG in 2000, denoted as GoG 00; two national security concepts created by the president's office under the UNM government denoted as GoG 05 and GoG 11; two national military strategies created by the Ministry of Defence under UNM – MoD 05 – and under the GD – MoD 14; and finally three foreign policy strategies created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the UNM – MFA 06 – and under the GD – MFA 15 and MFA 19.

Consequently, I analyse three types of strategic documents adopted by three different bureaucratic agencies. However, it should be emphasised that under GoG – the Government of Georgia – I have combined essentially two stylistically different documents. The first strategic document adopted in 2000 under the CUG is not entirely similar in its structure to the two national security concepts adopted under the UNM governments. The 2000 document was a visionary document aimed at placing Georgia on the world map and defining its strategic priorities, which had never been done before. In the absence of the culture of creating such documents, this was still a crucial document, one which, for the first time, defined Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation (Jones and Kakhishvili 2013). The document was created under the office of President Eduard Shevardnadze, during whose rule the National Security Council, established in 1996, Jones and Kakhishvilli (2013, 23) argue, "became the most powerful state security body, and played a vital role in foreign policy." The National Security Council inherited the function of creating national security concepts under the UNM rule and remained accountable only to the president of Georgia.

Following the constitutional changes in 2013, when Georgia converted from a presidential to a parliamentary system, the Council became accountable to the Prime Minister. Yet, there have been no national security concepts published since 2011. Therefore, there is a sufficient continuity between the first conceptual document and the subsequent NSCs for them to be considered a product of the same bureaucratic agency. Because the Council is a coordinating agency and collects inputs from all other relevant ministries, I refer to the creator of NSCs as the GoG. Besides, the NSC is the only strategic document out of the three that requires parliament's approval, while the FPS and NMS are approved by the government only.

From the list of documents analysed, it is clear that there are multiple layers of data opening a range of avenues of exploration. Firstly, there are three different party governments and three different bureaucratic agencies, each of which has created more

than one strategic documents under two different party governments. Therefore, it is possible to observe how change in leadership may have affected a given bureaucracy's NRC. Secondly, in the case of the UNM and GD it is possible to observe their NRCs both when they entered electoral competition as an incumbent, and as a challenger for political power. Thirdly, the data spans two decades of Georgian foreign policy, with the 2008 August War dividing the timeline into two comparable parts. Therefore, it is possible to explore if the war has affected the NRCs.

Figure 1. Two-dimensional map of all documents analysed and of the adopted NRCs



In terms of more immediate information, Figure 1 shows that domestic actors in Georgia have been adopting NRCs that are West-positive and Russia-positive or West-positive and Russia-negative. There is no evidence for any actor adopting a role of an enemy of the West. Furthermore, in the whole dataset, there is no single negative reference to the West, which is why the role of a friend of the West is all about the intensity of the conception, i.e., higher the frequency of positive references in a document to the West the more West-positive it appears in the figure. However, the logarithmic proportion ensures minimization of the impact of frequencies. Overall, it seems that while Georgia has found its role in its relations with the West, the same has proved challenging with the northern neighbour.

Furthermore, the dotted blue line in Figure 1 shows the value of R^2 – a linear measure of correlation between the two sets of NRCs. As it stands, there is virtually no correlation, either positive or negative, between adopting a West-friendly NRC and a Russia-friendly NRC. The value of R^2 is practically zero. This means that adopting a more West-positive NRC does not correlate to the adoption of a Russia-negative NRC as most

literature on Georgian foreign policy would suggest. Overall, in their formal documents domestic actors in Georgia do not seem to perceive good relations with the two significant others as mutually exclusive from each other.

The first question to ask, however, is whether there is a meaningful difference between the two sets of actors: bureaucratic agencies and political parties. Figure 2 maps the NRCs adopted by the two types of actors to explore what patterns emerge. The data shows that significant correlation is still absent in the two sub-sets of the data. There is a weak correlation, but it can only explain about 18 and 11 percent of the variance in what sort of NRCs are adopted vis-à-vis Russia by political parties and bureaucracies respectively. This is insufficient to argue that bureaucracies and parties view Georgia's national roles differently.

On the other hand, there is a clear visual divide between bureaucracies and political parties in terms of intensity of their NRCs on the West dimension. In fact, the least West-positive bureaucracy is the MoD, but it still adopts more West-friendly NRCs at any elections than either the CUG or the UNM. Only the GD registers more West-friendly NRCs. This significantly higher degree of variation of political parties in their positioning may suggest that they are more capable of swift adaptation to the environment than more rigid bureaucracies that prioritise stability.

Figure 2. Comparison of NRCs adopted by bureaucratic agencies and political parties in Georgia.



Finally, one more interesting aspect that can be observed from the data, indicating the levels of contestation within the same administration, is the distances between the NRCs adopted by bureaucratic agencies during the same electoral period. For example,

after the UNM came to power in 2003, Georgia adopted a national military strategy, a national security concept, and a foreign policy strategy during 2005-2006. While the NRCs adopted in these documents by three bureaucratic agencies tend to be consistent in terms of their friendliness towards the West, they display diverging positions towards Russia. In 2005, the MoD adopted the role as an enemy of Russia, while the MFA and the GoG adopted roles as a friend of Russia. In fact, in 2005 the MoD was the only bureaucracy before the August War of 2008 that conceived a Russia-negative role for Georgian foreign policy.

The degree of hawkishness of the MoD can be evaluated by measuring Euclidean distances between the MoD and MFA, on the one hand, and the GoG, on the other. Considering that all these NRCs were adopted under the same administration of the UNM within 2003-2008 is indicative of the degree of contestation among the bureaucracies. The data shows that the distance between the MoD and the MFA is 1.74 units, while the same measure between the MoD and the GoG is 0.85 units. For comparison, these distances are respectively 69 percent and 34 percent of the longest distance between two data points in the dataset – the UNM party manifesto of 2003 and GD foreign policy strategy of 2015. A similar story emerges with the GD government of 2012-2016, which adopted two documents: a national military strategy in 2014 and foreign policy strategy in 2015. The distance between the NRCs adopted in these documents is 1.02 units, which is 40 percent of the largest distance in the dataset. This means that Georgian decision-makers have had different role-sets from which they could choose what parts to enact. Therefore, there is more to Georgian bureaucratic politics when it comes to foreign policymaking than meets the eye, and this dimension should receive more scholarly attention.

Do domestic actors in Georgia respond to shocks by modifying their NRCs?

As suggested in the literature on FPA, shocks can be external or internal. This article explores the impact of the 2008 August War on the NRCs domestic institutional actors have adopted through formal documents. On the other hand, it also investigates the possible effects of change in leadership on institutional NRCs.

Figure 3 below divides the data into two sub-sets with the temporal turning point of the 2008 August War. This allows two conclusions to be drawn. The first conclusion can be expected, as a clear distinction emerges between the two sub-sets of the data. The sub-set before the August War still shows no correlation with R^2 being 0.012, meaning that only 1.2 percent of the variation in the NRC positions on the Russia dimension can be explained by the positions on the West dimension. This can be interpreted as due to practically unrelated variables. On the other hand, in the second sub-set, which is composed of nine NRCs adopted in post-war documents, there is a strong linear correlation suggesting that almost 87 percent of the variation in the positioning on Russia-dimension can be explained by the value of the NRC on the West dimension. It seems that the external shock of the war with Russia was interpreted by the domestic actors as intrinsically connected to Georgia's foreign policy towards the West.

This leads to the second conclusion that can be made from the data. Surprisingly enough, the correlation between the positions on the West dimension and positions on the

Russia dimension is positive. This means that the more West-positive an NRC is, the less Russia-negative it will be. Instead of causing antagonism and radicalisation of pro-Western ideas among the domestic institutions in Georgia, the effect of the August War seems to have been the opposite. It must be noted here that the data is clearly limited, and the number of observations is low. However, the data does not represent a sample of a larger population of documents. At the same time, none of the post-War NRCs have registered a Russia-positive position. Some of the NRCs did approach the threshold, but it has not yet been crossed.

Figure 3. NRCs adopted by domestic actors before and after the 2008 August War.



How can this trend be interpreted? There are ten NRCs that were adopted in the aftermath of the August War. These include six party manifestos – three each for the UNM and GD as well as four strategic documents: one national security concept by the UNM, one military strategy by the GD and two foreign policy strategies by the GD. From these documents two clear visual clusters can be noticed on Figure 3. Five of them are more West-positive and less Russia-negative, while the other five are less West-positive and more Russia-negative. The first group includes two GD manifestos of 2016 and 2020, when the party was participating in the elections as an incumbent, as well as two GD foreign policy strategies, and one UNM security concept. The second group includes all three post-war UNM manifestos and one GD manifesto of 2012, when the party was a challenger of the incumbent UNM, as well as the GD military strategy of 2014.

It seems that UNM as a political party was indeed radicalised after the August War, but this radicalisation was not expressed in more West-positive NRC, as the conventional dichotomous approach to Georgian foreign policy orientation would expect.

Instead, it was radicalised vis-à-vis Russia and adopted NRCs conceiving of the role of an enemy of Russia. At the same time the 2011 national security concept, which was written by the UNM government, did not display similar levels of anti-Russian positioning, which is, perhaps, the result of institutional path-dependency. As the concept was produced by a bureaucratic agency it remained closer to the previous concept produced a few years prior. In fact, the Euclidean distance between the NRCs by GoG 05 and GoG 11 adopted consecutively is 0.38 units, while the distance between the consecutive UNM 08 and UNM 12 NRCs adopted in party manifestos is about 4.4 times higher, at 1.68 units. Thus, this distance is greater than any other distance between two consecutively adopted NRCs by the same actor. Therefore, the party response to the August War can be claimed to be more radical than the bureaucratic response. The fact that all three UNM's post-war NRCs are closely clustered together indicates that the party has been consolidating its conception of Georgia's role in foreign policy.

On the other hand, the GD as a party displays a different pattern. In 2012, in the same elections the GD's adopted NRC was close to the UNM's NRC. However, the GD departed from its position in the subsequent elections and adopted NRCs that are more West-positive and less Russia-negative. In 2016, the GD came close to crossing the threshold and adopting a Russia-positive role. The important change for the GD between 2012 and 2016 is, however, the fact that its status changed from a challenger party to that of the incumbent. Therefore, its considerations of how it can position itself, and what it can allow itself to say and promise the voter, has changed, too. Although the data is insufficient to make a conclusion, it would seem that the GD is also going to consolidate its positioning vis-à-vis Georgia's significant others by adopted a less Russia-negative, and possibly a Russia-positive, role for Georgia.

To sum up the party responses to the August War, it can be argued that the UNM displays signs of radicalisation, while the GD shows a strategy of compensation. The GD attempts to compensate its less anti-Russian positioning by adopting an increasingly West-positive role. In this context, however, it is also important to remember that the change of status of the GD from challenger to incumbent also changes its position in the context of domestic political competition for power. At the same time, the GD's rational considerations would push the party to offer an alternative to what the UNM offers voters. The latter, which fought a war with Russia, is unlikely to be outgunned in the competition to be the enemy of Russia. Therefore, it is only logical for the GD to occupy the space on the spectrum which UNM has not filled. Meanwhile, the strategy of compensation seems to be the way that the GD seeks to ensure that Georgia remains pro-Western in its foreign policy. Whether or not this strategy is effective is a matter of further research.

Since its coming to power in 2012, there have been doubts about the GD's commitment to pro-Western foreign policy. It has been argued that Georgia is becoming pro-Russian by bandwagoning with it "in stealth" because the full-scale implementation of this strategy is deterred by the pressure of the pro-Western public (Lebanidze and Kakachia 2023). This conclusion seems to be increasingly valid during the last few years of GD rule. For example, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the GD has been rather reluctant in its rhetoric to unequivocally support Ukraine (Kakhishvili 2022) and

initially even refused to submit an application for membership of the European Union (EU) along with Ukraine and Moldova. However, in this context the key is to draw two distinctions. On the one hand, the GD as a political party and the GD as a government bureaucracy should be differentiated from each other. On the other hand, formal and informal speech acts should be treated differently. Formal speech acts are the documents analysed in this article, while informal speech acts include the speeches of individual politicians for the domestic audience in the local language. Increasing understanding of these differences is among the contributions of this article.

The GD as a party is concerned with maintaining power and being re-elected, which means its rhetoric and actions should be viewed in this light. The GD as a government bureaucracy is concerned with implementing strategies it has designed and in following the interests it has identified. Consequently, even when the rhetoric of the GD representatives seems rather anti-Western, the performance of the government bureaucracy can be positive. This is exactly what the recent report of the EU Commission demonstrates (European Commission 2023). The analytical report evaluates the overall capacity of Georgia to uphold membership obligations, i.e. full body of the EU law. The positive evaluation in this report is a sign that while individual politicians, i.e., GD as a party, may engage in domestic power competition and allow itself to adopt anti-Western rhetoric, the bureaucracy, i.e., the GD as a government, will continue to follow its priorities as set out in the documents. This is where the importance of formal documents lies.

Even in the case of political parties, manifestos as formal institutional documents have more weight in terms of communicating the formal position of a given party than statements of politicians. Of course, this is not to argue that such statements do not matter. They allow politicians a degree of flexibility, which can be crucial in the domestic competition for winning votes and gaining political power. Furthermore, informal speech acts can indeed be a preceding phase in changing formal priorities. However, this goes beyond the scope of this research.

As for the remaining bureaucratic actors – the MoD and MFA – a contrasting pattern can be observed. With military strategy and the MoD under GD's administration, no compensation strategy can be deduced. In fact, the MoD conceived of an even more Russia-negative role than its counterpart under the UNM administration pre-war, even though in 2005 the UNM's MoD was a unique case of a bureaucracy adopting a Russia-negative war even before the August War. On the other hand, for example, the MFA under the same UNM administration a year after publishing the military strategy, adopted the most Russia-friendly role in the entire dataset. This difference should perhaps be attributed to the different nature of the two institutions. The MoD's goal is to ensure national security through military means, while the MFA aims at preventing conflicts through diplomacy and resolving confrontations through negotiations and compromise. Therefore, it seems fitting that, under the same administration, the MFA adopts a rather Russia-positive role while the MoD adopts the opposite – a Russia-negative role.

This pattern holds under the GD administration too. Although in the post-war context there are no Russia-positive roles, in relative terms the MoD is significantly more

anti-Russian than the MFA. The latter adopted roles closer, and sometimes virtually coinciding, with the NRCs adopted in the GD manifestos in 2016 and 2020. It must be noted, however, that the MFA is the bureaucratic agency that has undergone the greatest change among bureaucracies. This change is a response to two shocks: the war and the leadership change in 2012. Even so, with a distance of 1.34 units between MFA 06 and MFA 15, this is still not as high as the UNM's response to the war, and, unlike UNM's response, it is within two standard deviations from the average distance between consecutive NRCs by the same institution. Therefore, isolating the impact of the war and that of the new leadership, which opted for a compensation strategy instead of radicalisation, is impossible with the data at hand.

Overall, it seems that the political parties are relatively freer to modify with ease their conceived roles for Georgian foreign policy compared to the bureaucratic institutions. Political parties, as data suggests, can choose radicalisation or compensation strategies when responding to external shocks. At the same time, their status as a challenger or incumbent also seems to influence their adopted NRCs. Incumbents, being more confident because of their electoral success, can choose to be less radical and opt for compensation strategy instead. Bureaucracies, on the other hand, remain more stable over time, exhibiting lower degrees of change and do not seem to have a strategy for their response. However, at the same time, they need to respond to not only external but also internal shocks manifested in leadership changes, even if this response is relatively slower. Finally, bureaucracies differ in terms of their nature and the degree of their antagonistic positioning vis-à-vis the negative significant other of the country and this seems to be higher with the MoD than the MFA.

Conclusion

This article unravelled the diversity of NRCs for Georgian foreign policy adopted by domestic institutional actors and traced how they changed in response to two types of shocks – external and internal. As an external shock, I explored the impact of the 2008 August War on how institutional actors modified their NRCs for Georgia, while as an internal shock I used the change in political leadership and institutional responses in terms of adjusting adopted NRCs.

For the empirical data, I hand-coded 18 formal documents and created a unique dataset. From these, eight were strategic documents adopted by three different bureaucratic agencies, such as the president's office and the National Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence. The eight documents represent all the strategic documents that Georgia has adopted since independence. Additionally, I used ten party manifestos from three different parties that have won elections and adopted at least one strategic document during their time in government. The three political parties include the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), the United National Movement (UNM), and the Georgian Dream (GD). Overall, these 18 documents span the period of two decades between 1999 and 2020.

Empirical analysis shows that domestic institutional actors in Georgia have adopted a whole mosaic of NRCs that I have mapped on a two-dimensional plane: friend or enemy of the West and friend or enemy of Russia. Although on the West dimension

actors only register West-positive NRCs, on the Russia dimension there is more qualitative variation. However, the 2008 August War serves as a clear turning point, after which Russia-friendly NRCs disappeared. Yet, Georgian bureaucracies have still offered variations of role-sets to subscribe to decision-makers, as demonstrated by the high degrees of bureaucratic contestation under the UNM 2003-2008 and GD 2012-2016 administrations.

Furthermore, the article has shown that Georgian political parties are more flexible and relatively freely change their NRCs compared to the more rigid bureaucracies. Following the August War, the UNM adopted a radicalisation strategy in response to the external shock, while the GD seemed to be compensating for its less anti-Russian role, adopting a more West-friendly NRC compared to UNM. These two strategies are likely to be dependent also on domestic political competition between the two parties and their strategic choices about what they can or cannot promise the voters.

Overall, the article finds evidence that domestic institutional actors in Georgia modify their NRCs in response to external and internal shocks. These institutions represent the first line of response, and modified NRCs then have the potential to facilitate change in foreign policy behaviour. The latter part of the equation is beyond the scope of this study, however, which opens avenues for further research in three main directions. Firstly, clearly scholars of Georgian foreign policy need to investigate domestic institutional actors more closely to depart from the focus on individuals as a unit of analysis. Secondly, the agency of the institutional actors should not be ignored, not only in terms of how they respond to shocks, but also in terms of how their responses translate into policy behaviour. Finally, it is necessary to trace and explore the meaning of incremental changes, such as the GD's compensation strategy, in order to prevent the gradual transition into large-scale changes escaping the attention of scholars. In the latter sense, role theory still lacks the necessary empirical strategy, but the method used in this article may be of interest to some scholars.

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Supplementary information file for the article: Do domestic institutional actors matter in Georgian foreign policy? Unpacking national role conceptions of bureaucracies and political parties in Georgia

Levan Kakhishvili

Appendix 1. Institutional actors

#	Institutional actor	Type	Background
1	National Security Council (the Council)	Bureaucratic agency	The Council is a consultative body, directly subordinated to the Prime-Minister (until 2018 to the President) of Georgia, which makes decisions at the highest level on national security issues. The Council is the main coordinating institution in the field of national security policy planning. The Council drafts national security concepts and collects inputs from other government agencies and external stakeholders (e.g. experts). NSCs are approved by the Parliament of Georgia. The Council creates committees to provide feedback to other ministries on their strategic documents.
2	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Bureaucratic agency	The MFA manages and coordinates Georgia's relations with foreign governments and organisations. The MFA implements foreign and economic policies defined by the parliament and implemented by the government of Georgia. The MFA drafts agency-level documents and collects feedback from the NSC and other relevant agencies as well as external stakeholders. These agency-level documents are approved by the government of Georgia. The MFA participates in producing policies aimed at ensuring Georgia's national security and defence.
3	Ministry of Defence (MoD)	Bureaucratic agency	The MoD plans and implements the defence policy of Georgia, aiming to build up the defence forces, ensure military preparedness, and prevent any potential aggression or violation of Georgia's independence. The MoD drafts agency-level documents and collects feedback from the NSC and other relevant agencies as well as external stakeholders. These agency-level documents must be approved by the government of Georgia in order to be implemented. The MoD participates in producing national-level conceptual documents in the field of Georgia's security and defence.
4	Georgian Dream (GD)	Political party	The GD was established in February 2012. Its founder is billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili whose net worth at the time – around 6 bn USD – was equal to roughly one third of Georgia's annual GDP. Initially, the GD was a coalition of five parties: GD proper, Conservative Party, Social Democratic Party, Republican Party, and Free Democrats. This coalition won the 2012 parliamentary elections. However, in the 2016 and 2020 elections, the GD ran as a stand-alone party and won both. GD has been in power since 2012. Bidzina Ivanishvili, who was GD's initial leader,

			served as a prime minister for about a year. He resigned in 2013 and since then is widely believed to be an informal ruler. On a left-right ideological spectrum, the GD places itself centre-left. GD is an observer member of the Party of European Socialists (PES).
5	United National Movement (UNM)	Political party	UNM was established in early 2000s. Its first success was in the local elections of 2002, when in Georgia's capital Tbilisi, UNM received about a quarter of the votes. Led by Mikheil Saakashvili, the UNM became increasingly popular and in the 2003 parliamentary elections emerged as the main challenger to the incumbent. The 2003 elections were declared fraudulent and large-scale public protest was quickly mobilized. As a result of about three weeks of demonstrations, the incumbent president Eduard Shevardnadze resigned and the results of the 2003 elections were annulled. The UNM was overwhelmingly victorious in the elections of January 2004, with its leader Mikheil Saakashvili becoming the president of Georgia. The UNM won the May 2008 elections and lost power in 2012. Saakashvili was re-elected in January 2008 and served his term until the end of 2013. On a left-right ideological spectrum, the UNM places itself centre-right. The UNM is an associate member of the European People's Party (EPP).
6	Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG)	Political party	The CUG was established in 1993 by the then head of state of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, who was the foreign minister of the Soviet Union between 1985-1990. The CUG won pluralities in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, while its leader, Shevardnadze won presidential elections in 1995 and 2000. The extent to which these four elections were free and competitive was questionable. Therefore, in 2003, when the CUG was officially declared to have won a plurality of votes, the opposition mobilised public protests, which led to the Rose Revolution – Shevardnadze resigned and the results of the parliamentary elections were annulled. On a left-right spectrum, the CUG was a centre-left party. However, the ideological positions of Georgian political parties in the 1990s do not necessarily correspond to the same ideological categories as established in Western democracies.

Appendix 2. Coded documents

#	Document code	Document type	Author	Date	Party in government at the time of adoption	Electoral performance (for party manifestos)	Number of meaningful coded units
1	CUGpm1999	Party manifesto	CUG	1999	CUG	Victory	26
2	CUGgv2000	Strategic document	Government of Georgia	2000	CUG	N.A.	433
3	CUGpm2003	Party manifesto	CUG	2003	CUG	Defeat*	17
4	UNMpm2003	Party manifesto	UNM	2003	CUG	Victory*	4
5	UNMnsc2005	Strategic document	Government of Georgia	2005	UNM	N.A.	371
6	UNMnms2005	Strategic document	Ministry of Defense	2005	UNM	N.A.	284
7	UNMfps2006	Strategic document	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2006	UNM	N.A.	260
8	UNMpm2008	Party manifesto	UNM	2008	UNM	Victory	9
9	UNMnsc2011	Strategic document	Government of Georgia	2011	UNM	N.A.	425
10	UNMpm2012	Party manifesto	UNM	2012	UNM	Defeat	40
11	GDpm2012	Party manifesto	GD	2012	UNM	Victory	162
12	GDnms2014	Strategic document	Ministry of Defense	2014	GD	N.A.	182
13	GDfps2015	Strategic document	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2015	GD	N.A.	451
14	GDpm2016	Party manifesto	GD	2016	GD	Victory	304
15	UNMpm2016	Party manifesto	UNM	2016	GD	Defeat	85
16	GDfps2019	Strategic document	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2019	GD	N.A.	357
17	GDpm2020	Party manifesto	GD	2020	GD	Victory	241
18	UNMpm2020	Party manifesto	UNM	2020	GD	Defeat	44
						Sum	3695

**Due to the claims of electoral fraud, elections were followed with mass demonstrations resulting in the Rose Revolution and annulment of the electoral results. New elections were conducted a few months later, which saw UNM win the vote, while CUG disappeared from the political landscape.*

Appendix 3. Coding framework

Code System	Frequency
Code System	3610
001. Anti-imperialism	29
002. Diaspora	89
003. FSU: Positive	6
004. FSU: Negative	7
005. Integration in EU	264
006. Integration in NATO	302
007. International peace	68
008. International terrorism: Negative	67
009. Internationalism: Positive	463
010. Internationalism: Negative	2
011. Military: Expansion	404
012. Military: Limitation	14
013. National interest and security: General	493
014. Non-alignment	3
015. Sovereignty	42
016. Foreign special relations	864
016.100. Foreign special relations\Africa	12
016.101. African Countries General	8
016.102. Egypt	1
016.103. Ethiopia	1
016.104. Nigeria	1
016.105. South Africa	1
016.200. Foreign special relations\Asia	64
016.201. Asian Countries General	7
016.202. Central Asian Countries	19
016.203. China	15
016.204. India	5
016.205. Indonesia	1
016.206. Japan	6

016.207. Malaysia	1
016.208. Pakistan	1
016.209. South Korea	4
016.210. South-East Asia General	3
016.211. Thailand	1
016.212. Vietnam	1
016.300. Foreign special relations\Australia and Oceania	15
016.301. Australia	4
016.302. Countries in Oceania General	4
016.303. Island Nations	3
016.304. New Zealand	4
016.400. Foreign special relations\Latin America and the Caribbean	23
016.401. Argentina	3
016.402. Brazil	2
016.403. Cuba	1
016.404. Latin American Countries General	14
016.405. Mexico	3
016.500. Foreign special relations\Middle East and Arab World	36
016.501. Arab Countries General	6
016.502. Iran	7
016.503. Iraq	1
016.504. Israel	4
016.505. Jordan	1
016.506. Middle Eastern Countries: Positive	15
016.507. Middle Eastern Countries: Negative	2
016.600. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region	446
016.601. Armenia	38
016.602. Azerbaijan	50
016.603. Belarus	3
016.604. Black Sea	36
016.605. Caucasus: Positive	14
016.606. Caucasus: Negative	5

016.607. Moldova	9
016.608. Nagorno Karabakh	7
016.609. Neighbourhood General: Positive	27
016.610. Neighbourhood General: Negative	3
016.611. North Caucasus General	10
016.612. South Caucasus General	27
016.613. Russia: Positive	51
016.614. Russia: Negative	93
016.615. Turkey	42
016.616. Ukraine	31
016.700. Foreign special relations\Western Countries	268
016.701. Austria	3
016.702. Baltic States General	15
016.703. Benelux Countries General	2
016.704. Bulgaria	1
016.705. Canada	7
016.706. Central and Eastern Europe General	14
016.707. Europe General	38
016.708. France	7
016.709. Germany	9
016.710. Greece and Cyprus	2
016.711. Ireland	1
016.712. Italy	1
016.713. Nordic Countries General	4
016.714. Poland	4
016.715. Romania	1
016.716. Spain and Portugal	2
016.717. Switzerland	5
016.718. United Kingdom	7
016.719. USA	108
016.720. Visegrad Countries General	4
016.721. West General	29

016.722. West Balkan Countries	4
017. Territorial integrity	493
017.100. Territorial integrity\Mobilizing Western support	165
017.200. Territorial integrity\Peaceful conflict resolution	130
017.300. Territorial integrity\Russia's role: Positive	14
017.400. Territorial integrity\Russia's role: Negative	105
017.500. Territorial integrity\Territorial integrity: General	79

Appendix 4. Dimensions of the Georgian NRC and their content

Dimension 1: West	
Role: Friend of West	**Role: Enemy of West**
005. Integration in EU 006. Integration in NATO 016.700. Foreign special relations\Western Countries (entire sub-category) 017.100. Territorial integrity\Mobilizing Western support	There are no negative references to Western countries or organizations
Dimension 2: Russia	
Role: Friend of Russia	**Role: Enemy of Russia**
003. FSU: Positive 016.202. Foreign special relations\Asia\Central Asian Countries 016.601. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Armenia 016.602. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Azerbaijan 016.603. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Belarus 016.605. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Caucasus: Positive 016.607. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Moldova 016.609. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Neighbourhood General: Positive 016.613. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Russia: Positive 016.612. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\South Caucasus General 017.300. Territorial integrity\Russia's role: Positive	001. Anti-imperialism 004. FSU: Negative 016.606. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Caucasus: Negative 016.610. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Neighbourhood General: Negative 016.611. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\North Caucasus General 016.614. Foreign special relations\Neighbours and the region\Russia: Negative 017.400. Territorial integrity\Russia's role: Negative