# IAT Faking Indices Revisited: Aspects of Replicability and Differential Validity



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# RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

## Theoretical Background

• Indices [slowing, speeding, increasing or reducing errors in congruent or incongruent blocks; Combined Task Slowing (CTS); Ratio 150-10000] allegedly detect faking in IATs (Agosta et al., 2011; Cvencek et al., 2010; Röhner et al., 2013)

## Faking Strategies and Faking Indices

IAT block	Faking goal									
	Low scores	High scores								
Faking indices t	hat are based on conceptually derived faking strategies (Röhner et al., <u>2013</u> )									
Congruent	Slowing down on the congruent block (i.e., Slow_Co; difference in reaction time between the congruent block under faking and the congruent block at baseline)  Increasing errors on the congruent block (i.e., IncErr_Co; difference in errors between the congruent block under faking and the congruent block at baseline)	Acceleration on the congruent block (i.e., Accel_Co; difference in reaction time between the congruent block at baseline and the congruent block under faking)  Reducing errors on the congruent block (i.e., RedErr_Co; difference in errors between the congruent block at baseline and the congruent block under faking)								
Incongruent	Acceleration on the incongruent block (i.e., Accel_In; difference in reaction time between the incongruent block at baseline and the incongruent block under faking)  Reducing errors on the incongruent block (i.e., RedErr_In; difference in errors between the incongruent block at baseline and the incongruent block under faking)	Slowing down on the incongruent block (i.e., Slow_In; difference in reaction time between the incongruent block under faking and the incongruent block at baseline)  Increasing errors on the incongruent block (i.e., IncErr_In; difference between the incongruent block under faking and the incongruent block at baseline)								
Faking indices t	hat are based on slowing behavior									
Faster and slower	CTS (i.e., difference between the slower IAT block under faking and the faster IA	AT block under non-faking; Cvencek et al., <u>2010</u> )								
Single and faster	Ratio 150–10000 (i.e., ratio between the faster IAT block and the single IAT block	ks under faking; Agosta et al., <u>2011</u> )								

Table 1 Faking strategies and indices. The content of this table is reprinted with permission from the publisher of Röhner et al. (2013) (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.02.009) under the CC-BY license (license number 5396380248068). Headers were amended according to this publication's content

#### **Shortcomings and Open Questions**

- Studies are inconclusive and statistically underpowered
- Results' stability, indices' unique predictivity, and variations in computing faking success are unexplored

#### **Hypotheses**

- 1) Faking detection in faking low and in faking high conditions would differ with respect to the faking indices. Faking low is shown by Slow\_Co, IncErr\_Co, and CTS. Faking high scores is shown by Accel\_Co. However, given the low power of previous research, we surmised that findings from a highly powered test may provide somewhat different results, especially concerning faking high (faking effects are typically smaller for faking high; e.g., Röhner et al., 2011).
- 2) Not all strategies that are implemented by fakers are successful. The results for faking low need to be replicated. We expect the following: Slow Co and CTS should be more strongly related to faking success than to repeated measurement effects. For faking high: Slow\_In and CTS would be positively related to faking success, whereas IncErr In would not. Slow\_In and CTS should be more positively related to faking success than to effects of repeated measurement.
- 3) Faking indices would show stability: Faking indices that correctly classified whether participants belong to the faking group or to the control group in the overall data set would also correctly classify whether participants belong to the faking group or to the control group in subsamples (and vice versa).
- 4) Increasing errors on the congruent block and on the incongruent block will have the most impact on faking detection, including unsuccessful faking attempts (Röhner et al., 2013). We expect the other indices to have only small or even a negative impact on faking detection (Röhner et al.,

# METHOD

## Participants and Data Sets

- Three data sets with extraversion IATs
- Final sample: 750 participants (258 faking low, 245 control, 247 faking high; 576 women, 173 men, 1 no response; 744 students); average age of 22.05 years (SD = 4.07)

#### Procedure

- Participants took part in exchange for feedback and/or partial credit
- In all studies, participants completed the extraversion IAT twice
- the first occasion (i.e., baseline), participants completed the IAT under standard instructions
- On the second occasion, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (i.e., control, faking high scores, or faking low scores)
- > Participants in the control condition again responded under standard instructions on the
- Fakers were asked to fake either high scores or low scores on the IAT according to a personnel selection scenario

#### Extraversion-IAT (Back et al., 2009)

 Self-relevant words (e.g., I, self) and non-selfrelevant words (e.g., they, yours); extraversionrelated words (e.g., talkative, active) and introversion-related words (e.g., shy, passive)

## Faking Strategies and Faking Indices

Computed as described in Table 1

## Analytical Strategy

- ANOVA with repeated measures on the extraversion IAT D scores as a manipulation check to investigate whether participants in the faking groups were able to fake the IAT (was successful)
- ROC curve analyses to evaluate how well each of the strategies predicted whether participants belonged to the control group or a faking group
- Correlation analyses to evaluate how strategies were related to faking success
- Fisher's z test (Fisher, 1950) to compare the correlations in the faking groups to those in the control group
- Multiple logistic regression analyses to investigate the unique contribution of each faking index in predicting whether participants belonged to the control group or a faking group

# MAIN FINDINGS


## Faking Low Scores

### Implementation and Success of Faking Strategies

Faking strategies and indices	Implem	nentation	Correlation with											
		Faking success Effects of re measureme			of repeated rement	-		Faking success			Effects of repeated measurement			
		Whe	n comp	uted a	as <i>D</i> change			Whe	n com	outed	as Interaction Effect			
	AUC	SE	r	p	n	r	р	n	r	p	n	r	p	n
Slowing down on the congruent block	.84	.02	.51	< .001	253	.36	< .001	241	.50	< .001	253	03	.686	241
Acceleration on the incongruent block	.37	.03	.41	< .001	256	.47	< .001	243	.33	< .001	256	07	.308	253
Increasing errors on the congruent block	.84	.02	.03	.587	258	.20	.001	243	.04	.580	258	13	.050	243
Reducing errors on the incongruent block	.29	.02	.23	< .001	258	.05	.422	244	.24	< .001	258	09	.173	244
CTS	.82	.02	.17	.006	253	11	.089	243	.21	.001	253	.25	< .001	243
Ratio 150–10000	.45	.03	12	.055	257	.15	.022	245	10	.111	257	21	.001	245

faking index and faking success in the faking low group was significantly higher than the correlation between the respective behavior and effects of repeated measurement in the control group according to Fisher's z tests at p < .05.

## Stability of Faking Indices



#### Unique Predictivness of Faking Indices


Faking strategies and indices	В	95 % C	l for odds ratio	SE (B)	R <sup>2</sup>			
		LL	Odds ratio	UL		H-L	C-S	Na
						.47	.48	.64
Constant	-0.05	0.11	0.95	8.50	1.11			
Slowing down on the congruent block	0.01***	1.00	1.01	1.01	0.00			
Increasing errors on the congruent block	0.22***	1.14	1.25	1.39	0.05			
CTS	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00			
Ratio 150–10000	-1.14	0.04	0.32	2.37	1.03			
Acceleration on the incongruent block	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00			
Reducing errors on the incongruent block	-0.18***	0.75	0.83	0.92	0.05			

## Faking High Scores

Faking strategies and indices Implementation Correlation with	

Fakir					Faking success Effects of repeated measurement					255	Effects of repeated measurement			
	When computed as D change				Whe	n comp	uted a	s Interac						
AUC	SE	r	p	n	r	p	n	r	p	n	r	P	n	
.70	.02	.64	< .001	246	.47	< .001	243	.53	< .001	246	07	.308	243	
.51	.03	.41	< .001	244	.36	< .001	241	.15	.019	244	03	.686	241	
.70	.02	.37	< .001	246	.05	.422	244	.37	< .001	246	09	.171	244	
.49	.03	.16	.016	236	.20	.001	243	.19	.004	236	13	.050	243	
.70	.02	.36	< .001	246	.11	.089	243	.50	< .001	246	25	< .001	243	
.43	.03	13	.050	245	15	.022	245	25	< .001	245	.21	.001	245	
	.70 .51 .70	.70 .02 .03 .70 .02 .70 .02 .03 .70 .02	Fakir Wher  AUC SE r  .70 .02 .64  .51 .03 .41  .70 .02 .37  .49 .03 .16  .70 .02 .36	Faking success   When comp	Faking success   When computed a   AUC   SE	When computed as D chain	Faking success   Effects of repeated measurement	Faking success	Faking success Effects of repeated measurement When computed as D change When .70	Faking success	Faking success	Faking success   Effects of repeated measurement   Faking success   Effects of measurement	Faking success   Effects of repeated measurement   When computed as D change   When computed as Interaction Effect	

AUCs in bold indicate that the strategy or index classified participants as belonging to the control or faking high group at levels above chance (> .50) Taking success = changes in IAT effects according to faking instructions. Effects of repeated measurement = changes in IAT effects in the control group (i.e., not due to faking instructions). Correlations printed in bold indicate that the significant positive correlation between the relevant faking strategy or faking index and faking success in the faking high group was significantly higher than the correlation between the respective behavior and effects of repeated measurement in the control group according to Fisher's z tests at p < .05.



Faking strategies and indices	В	95 % C	l for odds ratio	SE (B)	<b>R</b> <sup>2</sup>			
		LL	Odds ratio	UL		H-L	C-S	Na
						.20	.24	.32
Constant	0.39	0.18	1.48	12.50	1.08			
Slowing down on the incongruent block	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00			
Increasing errors on the incongruent block	0.16***	1.09	1.17	1.27	0.04			
CTS	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00			
Ratio 150–10000	-1.10	0.05	0.33	2.40	1.01			
Acceleration on the congruent block	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00			
Reducing errors on the congruent block	-0.06	0.86	0.94	1.02	0.04			

## Results in a Nutshell

- 1) Fakers use different faking strategies when faking low scores than when faking high scores
- 2) Not all faking indices are successful at levels above chance
- 3) Results are stable with respect to subsamples
- 4) Increasing errors impacts faking detection most strongly
- 5) Not all behaviors that revealed faking were successful in changing IAT effects as desired
- 6) Not all behaviors that were successful in changing IAT effects as desired revealed faking

## CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

- Apparently, fakers use goal-dependent strategies which are not necessarily successful
- To detect faking, we recommend combining indices and considering the context

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

# MAIN REFERENCES AND CONTACT INFORMATION