Secondary Publication

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk

Macro- And Micro-Level Analyses

Date of secondary publication: 02.11.2024

Accepted Manuscript (Postprint), Bookpart

Persistent identifier: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-583782

Primary publication

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk: Macro- And Micro-Level Analyses. In: Democracy under Pressure : Resilience or Retreat. Beek, Ursula van (Hg). Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. S. 89-140. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-09123-0_5.

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Macro- And Micro-Level Analyses

Ursula Hoffmann-Lange and Dirk Berg-Schlosser

1 Introduction

As has been pointed out in the preceding part, democracy is facing new challenges worldwide. Recent assessments show a mixed pattern of democratic resilience and decline. Many of the hopes created by the latest major 'wave' of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) have not come true. It was not 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992). These democratic transitions led to some dramatic breakdowns, gradual erosion or stagnation of democracy, but advances in democratic stability and resilience at a high level have also been noted (Mainwaring & Bizzarro, 2020). The reasons

U. Hoffmann-Lange (✉)
Bamberg University, Bamberg, Germany
e-mail: ursula.hoffmann-lange@uni-bamberg.de

D. Berg-Schlosser
Marburg University, Marburg, Germany
e-mail: bergschl@staff.uni-marburg.de

for these developments are manifold. Many studies point to the long-term *socio-economic* developments (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000), others emphasise the underlying *cultural* traditions and attitudinal changes (Inglehart, 2018; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013a, 2013b). In addition, the diverse impacts of *globalisation* have blurred the borderlines between domestic factors and international conditions and developments. The impacts include an increasing division of production, technological advances of the digital world, international travel and communication, as well as international migration, cross-border conflicts, worldwide financial speculations, and ensuing crises like the Great Recession (e.g. Grusky et al., 2011; Scholte, 2000). All this has triggered a new wave of studies concerned with increasing authoritarianism, populism and even the 'death' of democracy (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2019; Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Przeworski, 2019) based on both some broad statistical macro-quantitative assessments and more detailed case studies.

The purpose of this part of the book is a comparative longitudinal analysis of democratic resilience both globally and in 16 countries between roughly 1990 and 2020. Here, we consider a range of different factors that had played a key role in the breakdown or decreased resilience of democracy in twentieth-century inter-war Europe. Some of these factors have been analysed in a comprehensive study by Berg-Schlosser and colleagues (Berg-Schlosser, 1998; Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell, 2000, 2002). The study included structural determinants, primarily socio-economic development, sociocultural pluralism, party system fragmentation and length of democratic experience. It also examined public support for democracy as an important cultural factor. Government effectiveness, observance of the rule of law as well as actions of individual political leaders who intervened in favour of preserving the democratic order were included as contingent factors.

Since the present global political situation differs starkly from that of the post-World War I era, three new factors need to be considered as well. First, the legacy of communism confronted the post-communist democracies with the daunting challenge of a simultaneous transition from one-party rule to multi-party competition and the transformation from a state-socialist economy into a market economy. The latter required

citizens to cope with considerable personal and economic insecurity and had disruptive effects on society (Elster et al., 1998). Likewise, the communist ban on autonomous civil society associations had left atomised societies with weak associational structures where citizens had to learn how to organise for collective action. Communist legacy distinguished these countries from those emerging from other authoritarian systems where the intermediary structure was less atrophied. The legacy resulted in the formation of a multitude of new political parties with only weak ties to societal groups, a great deal of fluctuation within the new party systems as well as a high degree of party system fragmentation and voter volatility. At the same time, the formation of broad-based interest associations was also hampered. Both conditions contribute to persisting difficulties for the process of interest aggregation in these countries.

Another new factor is the current availability of much broader opportunities for interpersonal communication provided by the internet. This has facilitated a proliferation of new media, interest associations and political parties as well as single issue groups for various political causes. While these aspects have broadened the pre-existing spectrum of political interests articulated in public, this development has its downsides, too, as Jönsson states in Chapter 2. The new channels of communication can also be used for distributing fake news increasing thereby the risks for the spread of misleading perceptions regarding politics, especially among the politically less well-informed.

A third factor is value change. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that the value change from traditional to self-expression values has considerably increased citizen demands for democracy which have become a major driver of recent democratisations. At the same time, it is obvious that demands for democracy can be motivated by intrinsic as well as extrinsic considerations (Bratton & Mattes, 2001: 473). In their seminal study on political culture, Almond and Verba (1989: 318), for instance, found that West German respondents in the late 1950s, about ten years after democratisation, lacked 'a more general attachment to the system at the symbolic level'. In their model of civic culture, a balance between 'instrumental and affective orientations to politics' is indispensable for an effective democracy because purely pragmatic considerations are an unstable basis of loyalty (1989: 354).

Many people tend to have unrealistically high hopes that the toppling of corrupt governments and the introduction of a democratic system of government will improve their personal living conditions. This implies that new democracies and their governments are usually confronted with high expectations for economic success. This is especially true in poorer countries. Therefore, it can be expected that the share of citizens favouring democracy for purely extrinsic reasons is high in all new democracies, but even higher in poor countries. Extrinsically motivated citizens are at the same time less likely to understand the complexity of democratic procedures and they are more impatient once economic improvements take longer than expected. This makes such democracies more vulnerable to losing political support if they cannot deliver. We will investigate the validity of this assumption in our concluding Chapter 15 of this section.

In this chapter, the investigation is limited to a macro-level analysis of different dimensions of democracy and a micro-level analysis of value orientations, legitimacy beliefs and personal well-being. We begin with a global macro-level overview of developments in the quality of democracy over time. Next, we turn to the micro-level looking at global assessments of democratic value orientations and attitudes. We will explain the choice of the macro and micro indicators and trace their global development back to 1990. This will be followed by an analysis of differences between world regions, which are not considered as purely geographical entities. Instead, value research has shown that geographical regions also represent persistent cultural and religious traditions (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart, 2018; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 2006; Welzel, 2013a, 2013b).

Since geographical proximity facilitates the dissemination of political institutions and value orientations, it can be expected that it fosters institutional as well as attitudinal similarities. The idea of popular sovereignty that mobilised the democratic movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century is a good example of such cultural dissemination. Originally developed by philosophers of the European Enlightenment, the demand for democracy gradually spread from Europe to the American settlers fighting for independence from the British Empire and eventually developed into a global movement. Even after reaching their independence, the former British colonies in North America, Australia and New Zealand

decided to copy the British democratic institutions and have retained close ties with the former British Empire. Therefore, Western Europe and these four countries can rightfully be considered as belonging to one cultural zone and will be treated as one region in our analysis.

In the tradition of the TRI and TRU projects—as explained in the introduction to this volume—this analysis follows a mixed research design that considers *both* broader global developments *and* more detailed regional and case-based analyses. At the same time, we look at both macro- and micro-level conditions, the corresponding meso-level and, possibly, macro-level consequences in an integrated framework (Coleman, 1990). For the macro-level analysis, we draw on the recent and most comprehensive 'Varieties of Democracy' (V-Dem) data set, the 'Human Development Index' (HDI), World Bank Governance indicators, and similar sources. Micro-level attitudes and perceptions are assessed on the basis of several waves of the 'World Values Surveys' (WVS) and the 'European Values Study' (EVS) including the most recent ones.

The original TRI project (van Beek, 2005) covered seven cases based on three criteria:

- Regional diversity of recent 'third wave' democracies
- Variety of authoritarian legacies
- Relatively successful democratic transitions in the respective regions

For these reasons, we selected Chile, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. Two 'benchmark' cases of consolidated democracies, Germany (with its mixed East–West background) and Sweden, were also included. This was thus a 'Most Different Systems Similar Outcomes' (MDSO) cross-area research design.

For the present purpose, we have added (somewhat) contrasting cases in each region, one of which showed a decline in its liberal democratic quality in recent years. In this way, we employ a 'Most Similar (in each region) Different Outcomes' (MSDO) design. This approach allows to 'control' for broader regional geo-political, historical, and cultural similarities and to focus the attention on the contrasts between the selected cases. This can be illustrated as follows (see Fig. 1):



Fig. 1 Comparative research designs

The shaded areas indicate where the explanation for the respective outcome may be sought (Berg-Schlosser, 2015).

The selected pairwise and triple comparisons are the following:

- North America: United States and Canada
- Europe: Germany and Italy
- Post-communist Eastern Europe: Estonia and Poland
- Latin America: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
- East Asia: South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines
- Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa and Kenya

The upper and lower 'benchmark' cases of Sweden and Turkey, which has experienced the most drastic democratic decline in recent years, were also retained. This leaves us with 16 cases for the 'cross-area' analysis (see also Ahram et al., 2018).

In their analysis of the outcomes after the democratic transitions of Third Wave democracies, Mainwaring and Bizzarro (2020) found that a higher level of socio-economic development and prior democratic experience decreased the risk of a democratic breakdown and resulted in a higher score on the Index of Liberal Democracy. For the ten Third Wave democracies in our study, they found the following trajectories of democratic development:

- Democratic breakdown: Turkey
- Erosion: Poland
- Stagnation: Argentina, Philippines, South Africa
- Advance: South Korea, Taiwan
- Continuously high liberal democracy score: Chile, Estonia, Uruguay.

We will investigate whether we can confirm these with our own data. The two overarching research questions are:

1. Why is democracy in trouble globally?
2. Why do some democracies in the same region remain stable while others regress?

Our comparisons in this chapter are limited by the fact that only a few valid and reliable comparative data are available on civil society organisations because associational structures and party systems are too diverse to be captured by a few global indicators. Therefore, we will also rely on the results of the in-depth country studies provided in the subsequent chapters for crucial information on the structure of the intermediary systems in our 16 countries. We will draw conclusions on the impact of the intermediary systems in Chapter 15 of the volume. That chapter will also provide an assessment of the performance of democracies compared to other major regime types.

2 Macro Level: The State of Democracy Globally

The first graph (Fig. 2) shows the overall worldwide development of democracy since the latest broad wave of transformations in the early 1980s, indicating 'advances' and 'declines'. The latter have prevailed over the former in recent years (see Fig. 2). As mentioned above, we use the V-Dem data set for a more detailed analysis because it is the most comprehensive and valid data to date. Varieties of Democracy is based on a broad range of *expert judgements* both from inside and outside the respective countries. A number of these are 'bridge coders' who code more than one country in order to enhance cross-national comparability. Varieties of



Fig. 2 The global state of democracy

Democracy covers practically all independent states today. The contemporary data range from 1900 up to the present and are updated annually, and there is also a historical data set for the years 1789 to 1900. In contrast to other data bases and indices of democracy such as *Freedom House* or *Polity* all procedures and assessments are entirely transparent (for critical reviews of the earlier indices see, e.g., Berg-Schlosser, 2007; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002a, 2002b). The indices can also be disaggregated to their specific components and different levels of analysis (national, sub-national, local). The data set also includes the respective 'codelow' and 'codehigh' versions of the coders and the standard deviations for each index and indicator. For reasons of simplicity, we only use and report the standard versions here. This does not mean, however, that these data do not have some limitations and, inevitably, some bugs and assessments where one may wonder about the coding of cases with which the reader is familiar. They remain 'expert' judgements of the respective macro-levels and do not include micro-level data of representative population surveys. It also seems that the assessments of the quality of democracy for recent years are more differentiated and more accurate than those for historically more distant periods. But, again, this is probably inevitable (for the detailed background and procedures of this huge and continuing project see Coppedge et al., 2020).



Fig. 3 The development of liberal democracy by major world regions

The global developments using the V-Dem 'liberal democracy' index on a worldwide and regional basis are shown in Fig. 3. The broad regional sub-division follows the categorisation and the included countries as in the V-Dem dataset: 'Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratisation (e.g. post-Communist)' (V-Dem codebook v10: 338).

1. Western Europe and North America (also including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand)
2. Asia and Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
3. Post-communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Mongolia)
4. Latin America and the Caribbean
5. Sub-Saharan Africa
6. The Middle East and Northern Africa (including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Cyprus)

Table 1 Liberal democracy 1990–2018, by region

Region	*1990*	*2007*	*2019*
Asia and Pacific	0.26	0.32	0.36
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	0.29	0.44	0.41
Latin America and Caribbean	0.39	0.51	0.47
MENA	0.14	0.19	0.19
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.15	0.31	0.30
Western Europe and North America	0.78	0.81	0.78
World	0.31	0.41	0.40

The detailed values are presented in Table 1.

As can be seen, during the last three decades there has been a strong increase in democratic developments in the beginning with a peak in the mid-2000s, i.e. before the Great Recession. The subsequent decline has been relatively weak. It was strongest in Western Europe and North America, post-communist Europe and Latin America. The other regions remained stable, albeit at very low levels in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region. This already indicates that region-specific factors have to be considered in addition to global trends.

Empirical democratic theory has been concerned for a long time with the underlying *causes* of global and regional trends of democratisation, but also occurring *crises* and ultimate *breakdowns* (for brief reviews of the vast body of literature on this topic see, e.g., Berg-Schlosser, 2007, 2015, 2019). Here, we first test some of the prevailing hypotheses on the basis of the most recent V-Dem and similar data. Broadly speaking, we find some general support for hypotheses concerning the ***level*** of democracy. Most prominent among these is Lipset's socio-economic *'modernisation'* hypothesis using indicators like GDP per capita and level of education (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000). A linear regression analysis of V-Dem's more limited 'electoral democracy' (or 'polyarchy') index with these indicators for all cases worldwide produced an adjusted R square (i.e. the per cent of variance explained) of 0.279 and for the 'liberal democracy' index of 0.377. This is adequate but leaves many cases unexplained.

We have achieved a considerably better result when checking up on another set of hypotheses concerning social-structural variables indicating high levels of *social inequality* (measured by the '*equal distribution of*

resources' index) and strong *social polarisation* together with political-cultural factors like *strong clientelism* as a negative one and *political empowerment of women* as a positive one (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2019; Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019). Again on the basis of the V-Dem data for these indicators worldwide (for the detailed definitions see V-Dem codebook v10: 54, 311, 273–280), we get the following finding for electoral democracy: Adjusted R square 0.667 (with political empowerment of women as the strongest single factor in a stepwise procedure). As before, such factors are even stronger for liberal democracy (adjusted R square 0.704), with political empowerment of women as the strongest positive and clientelism as the strongest negative factor in a stepwise procedure. These are important findings for the future of democracy as they expose the impact of strong clientelist patterns and (conversely) the empowerment of women across cultures!

Against the background of longer-term factors affecting the stability and survival of democracies, we now turn to the impact of more ***recent changes***. When we checked for the *difference* of the level of *electoral democracy* between 2007, the year before the beginning of the Great Recession, and 2019, 67 out of the total of 178 cases in the V-Dem dataset showed some improvement, the others declined. The greatest positive changes occurred in Bhutan (+0.42), Armenia (+0.46) and Tunisia (+0.53). The greatest negative changes could be observed in Venezuela (−0.21), India (−0.23), Nicaragua (−0.25), Burundi (−0.26), and, on top of this list, Turkey (−0.40). The total sum of all changes is a slightly negative value of −1.34. The *liberal democracy* index showed positive changes in 70 cases, in particular for Bhutan (+0.31), Armenia (+0.45) and Tunisia (+0.56). India (−0.23), Brazil (−0.26), Poland (−0.32), Hungary (−0.36) and, again, Turkey (−0.41) had the strongest declines. The overall sum is −1.78.

When we tested the extent of these changes with standard correlation and regression procedures checking for levels and changes of socio-economic factors (GDP/cap, education), 'good governance', social inequality, clientelism, corruption or empowerment of women, none of these turned out to be statistically significant. This means that our relatively 'rough' macro-indicators do not capture these more fine-tuned changes. Therefore, we had to turn to actual public ***perceptions*** of these developments at the micro-level and, later, to the ***case-specific*** and ***regional*** assessments.

3 Micro Level: Value Orientations and Democratic Legitimacy

Studies on the impact of socio-economic structures, cultural traditions and value orientations on the development of democracy have a long tradition in the social sciences. The classic modernisation theory primarily emphasised the relevance of socio-economic development on democratisation. The theory held that industrialisation had brought a fundamental change in living conditions. The rise in economic productivity, the increasing division of labour, urbanisation and educational expansion were associated with a diversification of the occupational structure (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Vanhanen, 2003). These changes were assumed to undermine traditional hierarchies of authority and to liberate individuals from the limitations of life chances in rigidly stratified traditional societies. Already Immanuel Kant (1784), a leading philosopher of the era of enlightenment, expressed the expectation that what is today called cognitive mobilisation would liberate people from their 'self-inflicted immaturity', an early acknowledgement of the impact of structural changes on politically relevant orientations of people. Therefore, a broader understanding of modernisation theory assumes that socio-economic change provides the structural preconditions for changes in the mentality of people that, in turn, are conducive to an increasing public pressure for democratisation.

Ronald Inglehart is certainly the most well-known scholar studying the relationship of value orientations and democracy. He developed his theory of value change over the past fifty years, starting with his seminal article on 'The Silent Revolution' in 1971. He portrays value change as a process that started in the highly industrialised democracies during the period of unprecedented economic growth and increasing existential security after World War II. He has amply demonstrated that these conditions enabled the emergence of *postmaterialist values* in the younger generation, which first manifested itself in the student movement of the late 1960s and continued to spread through generational replacement (Inglehart, 2018: Chapter 3).

The theory also posits that value change was accelerated by the vast expansion of educational opportunities starting in the 1960s. Inglehart (2018) holds that the increasing cognitive mobilisation associated with higher education has made citizens less dependent on the political guidance by traditional elites and more assertive in articulating political demands. Over the years, Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Welzel (2013a,

2013b) and Inglehart (2018) have developed a comprehensive theory of *human development* associated with the global rise of *emancipative values*. They claim that value change is a major driver of global democratisation. The rise of emancipative value orientations in the post-industrial democracies proceeded by generational displacement of older cohorts with predominantly traditional values by younger ones in which support for emancipative values was more widespread. The authors claim that this trend started in the late 1960s and persisted until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. The post-communist democracies in Central-Eastern Europe lag behind their Western European counterparts, however. The lowest level of value change was found in Muslim countries, where it is still below ten per cent even in the youngest cohort (Inglehart, 2018: Chapter 3).

3.1 Data Base

The following individual-level analysis studies the development of value orientations, legitimacy indicators and indicators of personal well-being. It is based on data from two large series of cross-sectional comparative surveys. The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS) are replicative surveys, representative of the adult population (18+ years) of each participating country. These surveys started in the early 1980s and have been repeated twice per decade since the late 1990s. Although designed as independent studies, their questionnaires overlap to a considerable degree, so the data files of the surveys can be merged. We are in the fortunate situation to have been granted access to the first version of the integrated file combining all seven waves of both survey series from 1981 to 2020.[1] This Integrated Values Surveys data set (IVS) includes altogether 636,542 respondents. Since it is the main purpose of the analysis to trace developments since the early 1980s, only those countries are included that either participated in more than two survey waves or in at least two waves one of which was conducted during the 2010s (2010–2014 or 2017–2020). Thereby, we gain a *longitudinal* perspective combined with recent developments. A small number of respondents below the age of 18—the official lower age limit—were eliminated from the analysis as well. These two conditions reduced the number of countries to 87 out of 114 countries with altogether 592,070 respondents.

Out of the 174 countries included in the V-Dem data file for which information on the resident population is available, these 87 countries cover more than 80% of the world population in 2017. In terms of the major democracy indices employed here, they have a mean score of 0.62 on the 'electoral democracy' (polyarchy) index and of 0.51 on the 'liberal democracy' index compared to 0.53 and 0.40 in the V-Dem data. This means that, on average, our sample has a somewhat higher score for both democracy indices—whose components will be explained more fully in the next section of the chapter. On the other hand, the sample also includes a considerable number of non-democracies (China, Russia, etc.). Since the average democracy scores in the IVS countries still lie within the confidence interval of these means for both groups of countries, our 87 cases can be taken as roughly representative of the world's total.

Conducting values surveys is difficult in some countries, partly for political reasons—for instance due to government restrictions on survey research—and partly for lack of funding. For the interpretation of the micro-level findings one has to keep in mind that the coverage of the sample of altogether 87 countries is not necessarily representative for all waves and world regions because it has changed across the different waves. For instance, only 23 countries (14 European and nine non-European) participated in the first wave of the survey. The number rose to 43 already in the second wave and increased to 70 countries in the seventh wave of which 32 were European.[2] Therefore, especially the scores for the first wave should be interpreted with caution. Since the number of participating countries per region varies across the different waves, changes in the regional means between waves do not only reflect attitudinal changes but are also influenced by changes in the composition of countries included. This impairs their comparability over time and needs to be considered in the interpretation of the regional results.

We will first discuss the validity and reliability of the various indicators used to measure value orientations, political legitimacy and personal well-being. Next, we will study the global results for all 87 countries to determine possible global changes in the orientations of citizens. Since the number of respondents varies across countries, an equilibrated weight was used for the global and regional analyses.[3] This equalises the number of respondents in each country to 1000. It ensures that all countries that participated in each survey wave have the same influence on the results.[4]

3.2 The Emancipative Values Index (EVI) and the Secular-Rational vs. Traditional Values Index

Based on assumptions of *cultural* modernisation theory (as opposed to the socio-economic modernisation theory of the Lipset type), Inglehart and Welzel claim that value change is a crucial factor driving democratisation. Welzel (2013a, 2013b) constructed two indices of value orientations, the *Index of Emancipative Values* (EVI) and the index of '*Secular-Rational Values vs. Traditional Values*' (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 51).[5] The theory of human development considers both groups of value orientations as being conducive to democratisation and the stability of democracy in a country.

Both indices are composed of four sub-dimensions. Each of them is based on three items. Our replication of the original index in the data followed as closely as possible the instructions provided by Welzel (2013a, 2013b).[6] The index construction involves a two-step process. In a first step, the mean scores for the items of each sub-dimensions are determined. In a second step, the mean scores of the sub-dimensions of each index are combined, provided that a respondent has valid scores on all four sub-dimensions. All variables, sub-dimensions and indices were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1.

The *Emancipative Values Index (EVI)* is the centrepiece of Welzel's theory of human development.It is made up by four sub-dimensions:

- *'Autonomy'* includes the qualities considered as important goals for raising children: independence, imagination and obedience (reversed).
- *'Equality'* includes attitudes towards gender equality: Equal access of women to university education, jobs and political offices.
- The *'Choice'* sub-dimension measures tolerance for divorce, abortion and homosexuality.
- *'Voice'* is the mean importance assigned to more rights for people at the workplace and in the community, more influence of citizens on policies, and a high priority for the right of free speech.

Welzel's EVI has been severely criticised by methodologists for showing low construct validity.[7] Construct validity implies that the components of an index (variables and sub-dimensions) show similar

statistical relationships across the different countries included in the analysis. This is the precondition for ensuring that the meaning of the index is the same in different countries, even though the scores may differ between individuals and across countries (see also the brief comment on the recent debate between Foa et al. (2022) and Welzel et al. (2021) in Chapter 15 below).

The inter-correlations among the items of the EVI's sub-dimensions in the new IVS file—including the data of all seven survey waves in the 87 countries—confirm the methodologists' verdict regarding the low construct validity of the EVI.[8] All inter-correlations for the sub-indices *Autonomy* and *Voice* are below $r = 0.30$ and the reliability coefficients measuring the scalability of the items (Cronbach's α) are even far below 0.50, although a minimum of $\alpha = 0.70$ is usually required for assuming their one-dimensionality. The coefficients for the sub-dimensions *Choice* ($\alpha = 0.80$) and *Gender Equality* ($\alpha = 0.65$) are considerably higher.[9] Therefore, only the latter two sub-dimensions can be considered as sufficiently reliable indicators of the value orientations they are supposed to measure and will be included in the analysis.

Welzel's second dimension, the *Secular-Rational vs. Traditional Values Index*, is again made up of four sub-dimensions with three items each:

- *'Defiance'* combines low respect for traditional authorities, low national pride and a disregard for parents' demands.
- *'Disbelief'* ('secularism') combines low importance assigned to religion, a self-identification as non-believer and irregular attendance of religious services.
- *'Relativism'* ('permissiveness') combines the evaluation of 'Cheating on taxes', 'Avoiding fares on public transportation' and of 'Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties' as acceptable behaviours.
- *'Scepticism'* combines low confidence in the military, the police and the judicial system.

The inter-correlations among the three items of the defiance sub-index are all below $r = 0.3$, while the coefficients for the other three sub-indices are above this threshold. At the same time, the four sub-indices of the index show rather low inter-correlations and a low reliability of only $\alpha = 0.39$. Therefore, only the sub-indices secularism and relativism will

be included as separate indicators of secular-rational values. We decided against using Welzel's *Relativism* index, though. The distribution of these three items is extremely skewed because the great majority of all respondents evaluated all three behaviours as 'never justifiable' on a scale from 1 to 10. Welzel dichotomised them by interpreting all deviations from outright rejection as indicating a relativist value orientation. Thereby, he reduced the information provided by the answering scale that allowed a grading of the answers and artificially increased the prevalence of relativism. The *Relativism* index used here is based on the mean scores of the original ten-point scale instead.

Finally, the scepticism index shows a strong inverse relationship with confidence in governmental institutions ($r = -0.60$) which is one of our measures for political legitimacy. It is an ambivalent index measuring both a traditional vs. secular-rational value orientation and support for the existing state institutions. Theoretically, it cannot really be considered as measuring a value orientation at all, but rather a critical disposition towards political authorities. While such a disposition can be expected to influence the tendency to provide higher or lower confidence ratings for governmental institutions, it can be assumed that such confidence also depends on perceptions of the actual performance of governments. The latter assumption is confirmed by its relationship with support for the parties in government (Miller & Listhaug, 1999). Therefore, confidence in governmental institutions is treated here as an indicator of political legitimacy.

3.3 Indicators of Political Legitimacy and Personal Well-Being

Legitimacy theory distinguishes objects (actors, regime, political community) as well as modes (specific, generalised specific and diffuse) of political support (Easton, 1965; Fuchs & Klingemann, 2009). Both objects and modes are ordered by their level of generality. At the lowest level, support for the authorities is primarily specific and based on instrumental considerations. The electoral mechanism allows voters to withdraw electoral support if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their government. This mechanism is assumed to shield democracies from a loss of legitimacy in situations of perceived deficits in government performance. At the intermediate level, trust in the regime is based on a generalised evaluation of regime performance. At the highest level, identification with the political community is a diffuse commitment. We follow Fuchs (2007) who

operationalised and simplified Easton's model by distinguishing support for political authorities, based on the evaluation of process, support for the existing regime, based on the evaluation of its institutional structure, and support for the regime's basic values. Although national pride—which in Easton's model measures identification with the political community—is not part of Fuchs' model of political support, he acknowledges that it plays an important role because it is a 'prerequisite for producing binding decisions for a community' (2007: 169). National pride will be included in the analysis here because questions of cultural and national identity—whose compatibility with democracy is tenuous—have assumed an increasing role in recent years (Fukuyama, 2018; Heyes, 2020).

For measuring the legitimacy of the political system, we distinguish five different levels of political support ordered from specific to general:

- *Support for political authorities*: Confidence in political parties.
- *Support for governmental institutions* (government, parliament, civil service, police).
- *Positive evaluation of system performance*: Perception of the political system's democratic quality and perceived protection of human rights.
- *Support for the ideal of democracy*: *Evaluation of democracy* and the more demanding index *support for democracy*, measured as the difference between the evaluation of democracy as a system of government minus the higher score for either an autocratic or a military regime. The latter index has been recommended by various authors, for example Klingemann (1999), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) and Diamond (2008).
- *Identification with the political community*: National pride.

Since citizens tend to differentiate between the different objects of support, the correlation coefficients (see Table 1 in the Online Appendix) between indicators for the different levels of political support should not be expected to be particularly high (Dalton, 2004; Klingemann, 1999: Chapter 4). They should be high only among objects at the same level of generality (for instance, confidence in different governmental institutions), moderately high between objects of adjacent levels and lowest between objects at the most specific and the most general level. These

assumptions are by and large confirmed by the correlation coefficients. They are highest between confidence in political parties and governmental institutions ($r = 0.645$), between perceptions of the quality of democracy and respect for human rights ($r = 0.413$) and between the evaluation and support of democracy ($r = 0.668$). The correlation coefficients between the lowest and the next higher level are lower. Evaluation and support for democracy as well as national pride are statistically unrelated to the other indicators.

In his book, Inglehart (2018: 153) emphasised that personal happiness and life satisfaction increase as societies become economically more secure, more democratic and more tolerant. He (ibid: Chapter 9) argued that liberal democracy increases feelings of well-being among their citizens even beyond the increase produced by the higher standards of living in modern societies. Although personal well-being is not as closely related to liberal democracy as are emancipative values, its relevance derives from its immediate impact on the perceived prospects for leading a good life which is an important precondition of an optimistic outlook on society and politics. Since economic prosperity is known to increase personal well-being, too, it allows to determine whether increasing socio-economic inequality has nurtured political dissatisfaction that can be exploited by populists. The same can be expected for the respondents' satisfaction with their financial situation.

While life satisfaction and satisfaction with the financial situation of the respondents' household are the most obvious indicators of personal well-being, generalised interpersonal trust is included as well (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 256). It influences the opportunities for the formation of a personal social network that transcends people's primary social environment (family, friends) and ties them to their wider social and political community. Those who distrust other people by expressing doubts about their good intentions will tend to limit their contacts to their own in-group and are less likely to engage in collective action to achieve a common goal. Robert Putnam has emphasised that such inclusive social networks constitute an important *social capital* for political communities. They are the basis for the formation of 'norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness' (Putnam, 2000: 19). Similarly, Almond and Verba (1989: 361) argued that a lack of interpersonal trust 'inhibits the ability of citizens to cooperate with each other in their relations with the government'. This assumption was corroborated by Putnam's study on social capital

in Italy (1993) in which he found an inclusive network of civic associations in Northern Italy which historically has been considerably less dense in Southern Italy. The impact of this regional divide on the quality of Italian democracy will be explored in Chapter 10.

3.4 The Global Development of Value Orientations, Political Legitimacy and Personal Well-Being

Table 2 below provides means for the value orientations, legitimacy beliefs and indicators of well-being in the 87 countries which permit a first assessment how they have developed over time and whether the results conform to theoretical expectations. It also includes the share of respondents with postmaterialist value orientations based on Inglehart's four-item postmaterialism index because that index has been frequently used to corroborate Inglehart's theory of value change.[10]

Overall, the level of support for the five value orientations shows remarkable stability over the last three decades. At the same time, support levels vary considerably. The share of postmaterialists is not particularly high and has taken values between a low of 8.6% in the sixth wave and a high of 15.0% in the second survey wave. Even though the share increased somewhat in the latest survey, these figures do not support Inglehart's expectation that postmaterialist value priorities would spread as a result of improving living conditions, thus leading to ever larger shares in ever more parts of the world. He expected this to happen gradually in a process of the replacement of older age cohorts raised under more adverse conditions by younger cohorts who grew up under more favourable circumstances. Figure 4 confirms only part of this assumption by showing that the share of respondents with a postmaterialist value orientation increases linearly in each successive birth cohort. However, the differences between the cohorts have declined considerably over time. The difference between the oldest (born before 1936) and the youngest cohort (born after 1985) decreased from 10.5 percentage points in the second wave to only 2.2 in the most recent survey wave. Therefore, the overall share has remained remarkably stable over time and has remained lower than predicted by the theory. Even if the recent reversal of the trend should continue, it seems unlikely that generational replacement will boost the overall share of people with a postmaterialist value orientation in the near future.

Table 2 Global results for micro-level indicators (means, unless otherwise indicated)

	1981–1984	*1989–1993*	*1994–1998*	*1999–2004*	*2005–2009*	*2010–2014*	*2017–2020*
Value orientations							
% Postmaterialists	13.3%	15.0%	10.9%	10.7%	11.1%	8.6%	12.4%
Relativism	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.14
Secular orientation	0.46	0.47	0.43	0.39	0.41	0.38	0.42
Equality of women		0.56	0.54	0.60	0.64	0.56	0.62
Choice of lifestyle	0.32	0.34	0.36	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.39
Political legitimacy							
Confidence in political parties		0.47	0.34	0.38	0.34	0.35	0.32
Confidence in governmental institutions	0.54	0.47	0.45	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46
Democratic quality of regime					0.61	0.57	0.56
Perceived respect for individual human rights			0.38	0.53	0.56	0.54	0.55
Evaluation of democracy			0.77	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.79
Support for democracy[1]			0.34	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.29
National pride	0.76	0.77	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.82	0.81
Personal well-being							
Life satisfaction	0.71	0.67	0.58	0.60	0.66	0.65	0.68
Satisfaction with financial situation of respondents' household	0.63	0.56	0.46	0.48	0.54	0.55	0.56
% Interpersonal trust	38.2%	34.4%	27.0%	28.6%	29.0%	23.7%	26.3%

Source IVS 1981–2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight 1000

[1] Support for democracy was operationalised as a preference for democracy by deducting the score for either an autocratic or military regime—whichever had a received a higher score—from the score for democracy.

All original scores were rescaled to a range from 0 to 1 except for preference for democracy which has a range from −1 to +1.



Fig. 4 Share of postmaterialists by birth cohort. *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

The equally low and stable scores for the relativism index indicate that a large majority of people disapprove of illegal behaviours and consider avoiding a fare on public transportation, cheating on taxes or the acceptance of bribes as improper. The disapproval of corruption is probably not a good indicator of actual behaviour, however. Instead, it primarily confirms the existence of a widespread feeling that corruption undermines government effectiveness and increases the chances of the well-to-do to assert their interests, while the poor have to pay bribes for receiving government services they are entitled to by law. Therefore, the fight against corruption is frequently one of the foremost demands of anti-government protests in authoritarian systems, as well as in new democracies in cases where high levels of corruption were inherited from authoritarian predecessors.

Secularism has not increased as much as Inglehart had originally expected and ranges between 0.38 and 0.46. Therefore, the fight for a separation of state and religion continues to be hotly contested in many countries. Religion plays an important role for about half the people

around the globe. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 17–27 and Chapter 11) explained that a secular orientation is increasing only in rich societies that offer a high level of existential security, while religion remains important for the people in poorer societies. Since rich societies have lower fertility rates than poor societies, the authors assumed that traditional religious values can be expected to increase globally since poorer societies make up a rising share of the world's population. An increase in religious values is not borne out by our data, however.

At the same time, some change can be observed with respect to support for *gender equality*. It has slightly increased over the last three decades from 0.56 to 0.64. Still, gender equality is far from being universally accepted. Support for a free choice of lifestyle has increased as well, from 0.32 to 0.39, even though traditional norms regarding divorce, abortion or homosexuality have remained rather strong.

Indicators of *political legitimacy* show more change over time. Confidence in political parties has decreased from 0.47 to 0.32. Confidence in governmental institutions has remained consistently higher and more stable with scores of around 0.45. The higher mean in the first wave (0.54) should be disregarded because that wave included only a small sample of primarily liberal democracies. The perception that one's country is governed democratically is slightly higher which is in line with legitimacy theory that claims that the political institutions should be less controversial.

The ideal of democracy enjoys high and stable support. The picture changes, however, once we consider steadfast *support for democracy*. Because support requires an explicit rejection of authoritarian regime types, its scores are not only lower than those for the other legitimacy indicators but have even slightly decreased since the first half of the 2000s. Since the purpose of the present volume is to study democratic decline vs. democratic resilience, the latter index is more demanding but also more meaningful because it allows to distinguish between mere lip service paid to democracy and the appreciation of the fundamental differences between democracy and authoritarianism.

National pride is equally widespread as is a positive evaluation of democracy, even though these two indicators are not statistically related. The former is probably based on an identification with one's country which seems to be independent of the existing level of democracy.

More pronounced changes can be found for the variables measuring personal well-being. *Life satisfaction* has fluctuated over time. After the

end of the Cold War and the initial enthusiasm for democracy, it fell from 0.67 in the second wave to 0.58 in the third survey wave (1994–1998) but returned to the previously higher levels around the turn of the millennium. The same is true for satisfaction with the *financial situation* of the respondents' household for which the recovery started only in the fifth wave (2005–2009), however. Since the most recent survey wave was conducted before the onset of the Corona pandemic, we cannot gauge the latter's effect on levels of income which can be expected to depress personal well-being.

Welzel (2013a: 212–213) has claimed that *interpersonal trust* is a component of emancipative value orientations, even though he did not include it in his EVI index. While choice and equality values have increased globally, however, interpersonal trust has decreased from 38.2% to 26.3% since the early 1980s. This unexpected and troubling result will be analysed more thoroughly below.

Since it is obvious that global figures may conceal considerable differences across world regions and countries, in a next step we try to determine the existence of differences across world regions which are associated with long-standing cultural differences. As was shown above, Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism is of little relevance beyond the relatively small number of established democracies. This supports the assumption that more differentiated analyses are needed.

4 Regional Developments at the Macro-Level

As noted before the global picture may conceal important differences in the major world regions. Therefore, we now look in greater detail at the components of liberal democracy as included in the V-Dem index and their more specific 'qualities' and the respective changes over time. Here we consider the period between the latest 'wave' of democratisation in the early 1990s, the year 2007 (before the 'Great Recession'), and the present.

4.1 Europe

In addition to the total for the region, we show contrasts between the former TRI cases of Germany and Poland assessed against Italy and Estonia, respectively. The benchmark case of Sweden is included as well. These developments are shown in Table 3:

Table 3 Liberal democracy, Europe

Cases	*1992*[1]	*2007*	*2018*
Sweden	0.89	0.90	0.86
Estonia	0.38	0.81	0.84
Germany	0.86	0.85	0.77
Italy	0.78	0.78	0.78
Poland	0.78	0.79	0.55
Europe	0.64	0.68	0.62

[1]Estonia became independent in 1992, for this reason the comparative data for our European cases begin at this point

As can be seen, the overall level of liberal democracy in Europe has not changed significantly since the transitions in the early 1990s. After the 'Great Recession' in 2008 and in the following years some decline can be observed. Among the cases considered here in detail, this was strongest in Poland, Germany also shows some decline. Estonia improved considerably, Italy (at a somewhat lower level) and Sweden (maintaining very high scores) remained stable.

These more general developments can be broken down by the specific components of V-Dem's 'liberal democracy' index. These include the components of the 'polyarchy' index:

- freedom of association,
- freedom of expression and alternative sources of information,
- clean election index,
- per cent of population with suffrage,
- elected officials,

plus, the 'liberal' components:

1. rule of law
2. judicial constraints on executive,
3. and legislative constraints on executive. (Coppedge et al., 2019; V-Dem Codebook, p. 45)

The much more differentiated picture shown in Table 4 makes it apparent that freedom of elections and freedom of information suffered

Table 4 Liberal democracy, components and quality, Europe

Europe	*1992*	*2007*	*2018*
Components			
Freedom of information	0.84	0.85	0.78
Elections free and fair	1.31	1.35	1.25
Freedom of association	0.83	0.86	0.83
Judicial constraints on exec	0.82	0.82	0.78
Legislative constr. on exec	0.77	0.81	0.77
Suffrage	97.37	100.0	99.76
Quality			
Civil liberties	0.85	0.90	0.87
Egalitarian component	0.87	0.85	0.82
Horizontal accountability	1.14	1.26	1.15
Participatory component	0.54	0.63	0.62
Party competition across regions	1.33	1.26	1.21
Rule of law	0.81	0.81	0.79
Vertical accountability	1.14	1.27	1.22

somewhat in the recent period, followed by the judicial and the legislative constraints on the executive. The other indicators show little or no variation. In addition to these more differentiated definitional elements of a 'liberal democracy', concerns about the overall 'quality' of democracy and the well-functioning and performance of democratic systems have become more pronounced in recent years (see, e.g., Diamond & Morlino, 2005). Such criteria include basic democratic values such as liberty and equality, broad-based participation and party competition, horizontal (inter-institutional) and vertical (elected incumbents—society) accountability, and (also) the rule of law (Morlino et al., 2017). There is hardly any variation during this period. Variation here is also very low. Participation has increased somewhat, and broader party competition has diminished. The values for the most recent year are generally a bit lower.

4.2 The Americas

The development of liberal democracy over time in all of the American cases is shown in Table 5. Over the last period, liberal democracy has improved somewhat in Argentina, remained stable in Canada, declined somewhat in Chile and Uruguay, and most strongly in the United States.

Table 5 Liberal democracy, Americas

Cases	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Argentina	0.61	0.62	0.68
Canada	0.80	0.76	0.76
Chile	0.58	0.84	0.77
United States	0.81	0.84	0.74
Uruguay	0.81	0.84	0.78
Americas	0.43	0.53	0.50

Table 6 Liberal democracy, components and quality, Americas

Americas	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Components			
Freedom of information	0.74	0.80	0.75
Elected officials	0.85	0.94	0.99
Elections free and fair	0.48	1.07	0.83
Freedom of association	0.76	0.83	0.80
Judicial constraints on exec	0.62	0.67	0.64
Legislative constr. on exec	0.59	0.65	0.62
Rule of law	0.55	0.60	0.61
Suffrage	96.3	100	100
Quality			
Civil liberties	0.74	0.83	0.78
Egalitarian component	0.57	0.62	0.58
Horizontal accountability	0.46	0.61	0.56
Participatory component	0.51	0.57	0.56
Party competition across regions	0.64	0.77	0.75
Rule of law	0.55	0.60	0.61
Vertical accountability	0.84	1.10	1.01

The overall (already low) regional value also declined somewhat. A breakdown by the components of this index shows this more closely Table 6) The generally strong upturn after the transitions in Latin America in the 1980s thus has suffered somewhat in the meantime. In a similar way, the 'quality of democracy' can be differentiated by its components. Here, the picture is similar. The detailed paired and triple comparisons (Chapters 7 and 8 in this book) reveal some more contrasts.

4.3 Sub-Saharan Africa

First, we show the overall picture for the selected cases again in Table 7 (Ghana and Namibia have been added here for further illustrations). The detailed values are presented in Table 8. Thus, over the last decade, liberal democracy has improved somewhat in Namibia, remained stable at a low level in Kenya and has considerably declined both in Ghana and South Africa. On the continental level, the achievements after the democratic transitions in the early 1990s have been maintained. As becomes apparent, considerable improvements after 1990 have occurred in all respects. This level was kept in the last decade. The 'quality of democracy' shows a very similar picture; party competition, in particular has increased more recently.

Table 7 Liberal democracy, Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Ghana	0.10	0.62	0.53
Kenya	0.13	0.32	0.30
Namibia	0.42	0.53	0.57
South Africa	0.15	0.65	0.57
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.16	0.31	0.31

Table 8 Liberal democracy, components and quality, Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Components			
Freedom of information	0.34	0.66	0.66
Elected officials	0.63	0.91	0.94
Elections free and fair	−1.08	−0.32	−0.30
Freedom of association	0.27	0.67	0.66
Judicial constraints on exec	0.40	0.46	0.47
Legislative constr. on exec	0.32	0.52	0.51
Rule of law	0.38	0.42	0.45
Suffrage	73.76	92.00	94.12
Quality			
Civil liberties	0.44	0.63	0.61
Egalitarian component	0.47	0.53	0.53
Horizontal accountability	−0.38	0.2	0.20
Participatory component	0.30	0.43	0.43
Party competition across regions	0.02	0.08	0.28
Rule of law	0.38	0.42	0.45
Vertical accountability	−0.21	0.46	0.48

4.4 Asia

Overall, liberal democracy in Asia shows considerable improvements, as can be seen in Table 9. This is particularly true for our two selected cases South Korea and Taiwan, whereas the situation in the Philippines has declined (for details see Chapter 9 below). These general improvements can be observed across all the components of this index in Table 10. Similarly, the quality of democracy has improved.

Table 9 Liberal democracy, Asia

	1990	*2007*	*2018*
Philippines	0.47	0.36	0.32
South Korea	0.57	0.76	0.8
Taiwan	0.23	0.66	0.7
Asia	0.22	0.29	0.33

Table 10 Liberal democracy, components and quality, Asia

Asia	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Components			
Freedom of information	0.42	0.57	0.57
Elected officials	0.61	0.61	0.79
Elections free and fair	−0.65	−0.24	−0.1
Freedom of association	0.42	0.56	0.57
Judicial constraints on exec	0.46	0.53	0.55
Legislative constr. on exec	0.34	0.49	0.57
Rule of law	0.45	0.51	0.56
Suffrage	82.13	78.35	93.29
Quality			
Civil liberties	0.46	0.6	0.60
Egalitarian component	0.55	0.59	0.58
Horizontal accountability	−0.24	0.15	0.30
Participatory component	0.29	0.4	0.45
Party competition across regions	0.40	0.76	0.70
Rule of law	0.45	0.51	0.56
Vertical accountability	0.09	0.33	0.58

Table 11 Liberal democracy, MENA

	1990	*2007*	*2018*
Tunisia	0.10	0.10	0.68
Turkey	0.38	0.52	0.14
MENA	0.15	0.18	0.19

4.5 Mena

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) still prove the most resilient to democratic developments, with the 'Arab Spring' having largely failed. The only notable exception so far is Tunisia, which we have included here to show the contrasts. Most components are relatively stable at a low level. Nevertheless, in the longer run, freedom of information and association, the fairness of elections and suffrage have improved. This is confirmed by some elements of 'democratic quality' where civil liberties, horizontal and vertical accountability and party competition have improved. The level of democracy in Turkey, after earlier improvements, has also declined dramatically (see Table 11 and Chapter 13 of this volume). The detailed values are presented in Table 12.

5 Regional Differences at the Micro-Level

As was mentioned at the outset, value research has shown the impact of persistent cultural traditions across world regions. Therefore, we now turn to the development of selected value orientations, legitimacy beliefs and indicators of well-being in different world regions. We again follow V-Dem's distinction of six major regions that were explained above.[11] These regions correspond roughly to the cultural regions found by Schwartz (2006: 154–161) as well as Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 61–65; 2013a, 2013b). The only deviation from the principle of geographical proximity is made for the established Western democracies located, as they are, over several continents.

Regional results will be reported only if at least three countries of a region participated in the respective wave. Therefore, results for the first survey wave can only be reported for the established Western democracies. Post-communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South and South-Eastern Asia and Latin America will be included from the second wave

Table 12 Liberal democracy, components and quality, MENA

MENA	*1990*	*2007*	*2018*
Components			
Freedom of information	0.31	0.45	0.45
Elected officials	0.42	0.48	0.51
Elections free and fair	−1.00	−0.44	−0.26
Freedom of association	0.24	0.35	0.38
Judicial constraints on exec	0.35	0.38	0.40
Legislative constr. on exec	0.35	0.40	0.46
Rule of law	0.39	0.42	0.43
Suffrage	54.81	73.27	72.58
Quality			
Civil liberties	0.33	0.45	0.436
Egalitarian component	0.49	0.52	0.52
Horizontal accountability	−0.34	−0.10	0.02
Participatory component	0.21	0.30	0.32
Party competition across regions	−0.51	−0.01	−0.13
Rule of law	0.39	0.42	0.43
Vertical accountability	−0.30	0.11	0.02

onwards, for Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region unfortunately only for the last four waves.

Since the publication of Samuel Huntington's book on 'The Clash of Civilisations' (1997), the compatibility of religion and democracy has been widely discussed. At the same time, Inglehart (2018: 47) posits that 'a society's religious values leave a lasting imprint' that remains even after controlling for socio-economic development. Therefore, we include region and religion simultaneously in the analysis in order to determine whether religious traditions can explain some of the regional differences found for value orientations.

The variable religion included in the data file encompasses a broad range of religious communities. To reduce the bewildering variety, it was recoded into six categories plus a seventh category for respondents who did not indicate membership in a religious community (see Table 2 in the Online Appendix). All Christian denominations were combined, just as were the different strands of Islam. This is justified because both Christianity and Islam are revealed religions based on holy scriptures and are

devoted to a common set of values, considerable differences in the religious teachings as well as in religious rituals between different religious communities within each of these major religions notwithstanding.

Since the religious composition of East Asian societies differs from those in South and South-East Asia, the latter two regions were analysed separately. Four of these seven world regions are predominantly Christian: The Western democracies, Latin America (including the Caribbean), the European post-communist region including Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The MENA countries are dominated by Muslims who also form strong minorities in post-communist Central Asia, South-(East) Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. People without religious affiliation constitute a majority in East Asia and sizeable minorities in the Western democracies, the post-communist countries, and Latin America, while they are virtually absent in the MENA region. It can be suspected, however, that the very large number of respondents in East Asia who stated that they do not belong to any religion do in fact follow the traditional custom of ancestor worship or the teachings of Confucianism, even though they do not consider this to be a religion in the same sense as Christianity and Islam.

Buddhists are to be found in East and South-(East) Asia, while Hindus live primarily in South-(East) Asia. The residual category is not shown in the following tables and figures because it is too diverse to display a distinct profile.

For the reasons discussed above, we only analyse the results for the 'choice' and 'equality' sub-dimensions of Welzel's *Emancipative Values Index (EVI)*. For the analysis of the impact of religion on these value orientations, the data of the last three survey waves were combined for this purpose to ensure that the scores are based on enough respondents even for smaller religious communities (see Table 3 in the Online Appendix).

Respondents without religious affiliation tend to be more *tolerant of different lifestyles* than those with a religious affiliation. This is especially the case in the Western democracies and much less so in the other regions. In the two Asian regions with sizeable minorities of Buddhists and Hindus, Buddhists turned out to be more pro-choice (0.29) while Hindus (0.19) shared the less permissive position displayed by Muslims (0.18). The results confirm that religion influences value orientations. They also show that Christians in more conservative regions are considerably less supportive of choice values, while Muslims living in Western

democracies are more supportive of those values. Therefore, it can be concluded that religious communities tend to adapt their values to the values prevalent in the region in which they live.

The line-up for *gender equality* is similar, while overall support is considerably higher (0.61 compared to 0.35). Additionally, support is relatively higher in Latin American and relatively lower in East Asia. For both value orientations, South-(East) Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA countries have the lowest rank among the seven regions. The figures confirm once more that both region and religion influence value orientations, but that the regions are internally more homogeneous than the religious groups.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that the lower support for free choice of lifestyle and gender equality in South-(East) Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region can be explained by the larger share of Muslims in these three regions. The mean scores of Christians in these regions are more like those of Muslims in the same region than those of Christians in the Western democracies. Conversely, Muslims in Western democracies are much more supportive of different lifestyles and gender equality than those in regions with a high share of Muslims. Thus, the prevailing regional culture does have an impact on these value orientations, while religious affiliation is of only secondary relevance.

Figure 5 confirms that the established Western democracies do not only espouse more tolerance for divorce, abortion and homosexuality, but that *permissiveness* has even substantially increased over time. This can be explained both by the more permissive value orientations of Christians as well as by the rising numbers of citizens without religious affiliation. The mean scores for the five Western democracies that are part of our detailed comparative study of 16 countries do not deviate much from the average of all Western democracies which is 0.67 in the most recent survey wave. The Swedish scores are highest and have steadily increased from 0.49 to 0.83. The other four countries (Germany, Canada, Italy and the United States) achieve somewhat lower scores, but all of them are higher than the scores found in the other regions. Individual countries in each region tend to be close to the region's average, thus confirming a remarkable regional homogeneity. The single exception is Japan, the largest democratic country in East Asia. The Japanese score is far above the mean for East Asia in all waves (0.57 to 0.32 in wave 7) and closer to the mean of the Western democracies (0.66), while the scores of Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan do not deviate much from their regional mean. Except for



Fig. 5 Support for freedom of choice by world region. *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

Sub-Saharan Africa, all regions show slight increases in recent years, but these are not pronounced and stable enough to warrant the interpretation that choice values have greatly increased in the past decades.

Respondents were coded as having a *secular orientation* if they indicated that they had only loose ties to their religious community, seldom attended religious services, and that religion was not important for their life. It is of course not surprising that a secular orientation is highest among respondents without religious affiliation. Their average global score is 0.76, followed by Buddhists (0.43) and Christians (0.32). Muslims and Hindus ranged considerably lower with 0.23 and 0.22. East Asians and citizens of Western democracies are leaders in secularisation, while the MENA and Sub-Saharan African countries have the most religious populations. As Norris and Inglehart assumed, the five poorer regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA,[12] South and Southeast Asia, the post-communist countries and Latin America) have considerably lower scores, while the richer Western democracies are much more secularised. The high level of secularisation in East Asia, however, cannot be explained with that region's economic development. Despite being a global economic power, China still has a relatively low GDP per capita,

but the highest secularism score (0.84), closely followed by Hongkong (0.74), Japan (0.72) and Korea (0.71), and finally Taiwan (0.56).

Globally, the regional secularism scores show a good deal of fluctuation, as can be seen in Fig. 6. They have neither increased much in the Western democracies, nor have they decreased overall. The only apparent trend is the decrease of secular orientation in the post-communist countries which was probably due to the turning away from the officially professed secularism of communism and the renewed mobilisation efforts by religious leaders in its wake. Thus, the overall pattern does not support the assumption of diverging trends in the rich and the poor regions as expected by Norris and Inglehart.[13]

The line-up of the different regions is like that for choice values, except for East Asia. The high level of secularism in that region contrasts with its relatively low level of tolerance of different lifestyles and a small percentage of postmaterialists, confirming that a secular orientation is not incompatible with conservative social value orientations.

Since it can be assumed that political legitimacy depends primarily on the character of the political regime and on country-specific factors such as government effectiveness, we will not report individual results for the different regions. On the other hand, *support for democracy* is a value orientation that is supposed to be relatively immune to short-term



Fig. 6 Secular orientation by world region. *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

fluctuations in government effectiveness (Fuchs, 2007). It is of central importance for gauging citizens' backing of a democratic regime which is unlikely to collapse because of a temporary economic crisis or poor government effectiveness.

Figure 7 shows the results in the seven regions over time. It shows a downward trend in support for democracy in five of the seven world regions. One needs to keep in mind, however, that this indicator is rather demanding since it is based on independent ratings of democracy, autocratic leadership and a military regime rather than forcing respondents to choose between them. Since the score for authoritarian regimes was deducted from the score assigned to democracy, the range of scores runs from −1 to +1. All means in Fig. 13 are positive, which implies that positive evaluations of democracy outnumber positive evaluations of authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the global mean declined since the turn of the millennium from 0.39 in wave 4 of the survey to 0.29 in the most recent wave. While this drop was not particularly pronounced, it supports the assumption that many of the high hopes associated with democracy were not borne out, especially in the countries that democratised after 1990. This fostered disappointment and has damaged the reputation of democracy.



Fig. 7 Support for democracy by world region. *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

In East Asia, the decrease in support for democracy started already in the 1990s and has continued ever since. The decline of the index scores was most pronounced here (from 0.36 to 0.20) followed by Latin America (0.26 to 0.11) and the MENA region (0.25 to 0.14). The decline started somewhat later in Sub-Saharan Africa where initially the hopes had been especially high. Here, the scores declined from 0.46 in wave 5 (2005–2009) to 0.30 in wave 7. In South-(East) Asia, the level was much lower at the outset, but the drop was extremely steep as well, from 0.21 to 0.05. The post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia first experienced a conspicuous decline from 0.31 to 0.17 but have increased to 0.27 in the most recent wave. The steep decline in the MENA region from the first to the second half of the 2010s suggests the existence of considerable disappointment about the failure of the Arab Spring.

Support for democracy is not only much higher in the Western democracies than in the other regions. It has also been rather stable between waves 3 and 6 and climbed even from 0.50 to 0.58 in wave 7. This confirms once more the exceptional status of these democracies, which remain the only group of countries in which a high quality of democracy is matched by stable support by their citizens as well as by more tolerance of different lifestyles and greater support for gender equality.

Since the compatibility of Islam and democracy has been frequently disputed, we also checked whether Muslims show lower scores than the members of other religions in the same region. This is indeed the case in the Western democracies where they have a considerably lower score (0.36 to 0.55), in Sub-Saharan Africa (0.29 to 0.36) and in the post-communist Central Asian countries (0.17 to 0.23), but not in the other regions. The results show a remarkable homogeneity within regions (see Table 4 in the Online Appendix). The support scores of the different religious communities in all regions tend to gravitate towards the regional mean. Thus, our results confirm that religion does influence social and political value orientations, but that its effect is considerably modified by the historical and political traditions in the different regions.

Notwithstanding the rather low scores for support for democracy, the *ideal of democracy* continues to enjoy widespread support. A large majority of the respondents in all regions also claim that it is important for them to live in a country that is democratically governed. To get a better understanding for these seemingly contradictory results, support for the statement ‘Having a strong leader who does not have to bother

with parliament and elections' is included in Fig. 8. It confirms that many respondents obviously have not adequately understood that horizontal constraints on the government are a central precondition of a functioning democracy. They want both democracy and a strong government but fail to understand that abolishing institutional checks and balances will pave the way for an autocratic system of government.

The results for individual countries also confirm the influence of country-specific factors. The country scores for support for democracy show considerable deviations from their regional averages. Among the developed democracies, this is particularly true for the United States where support for democracy declined in successive steps from 0.53 in wave 4 to 0.34 in wave 7, while the regional mean increased from 0.53



Fig. 8 Support for democracy, evaluation of democracy, importance of living in a democracy and support for a strong leader who does not have to deal with parliament and elections by world region (wave 2017–2020 only). *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

to 0.58. In the most recent wave, both Estonia's (0.53) and Poland's (0.43) scores were much higher than the mean of 0.27 for the entire post-communist region, while Russian support (0.18) is below that average. Likewise, Argentina (0.31) and Chile (0.24) have higher scores than the mean of the Latin American countries (0.14). The fact that Argentina's score is higher than Chile's is remarkable because of the latter's higher quality of liberal democracy. Ghana is an outlier in Sub-Saharan Africa with a score of 0.57 in wave 6 compared to the regional average of 0.30, while South Africa had an even lower score (0.02) than Nigeria. In East and South-East Asia with an average score of 0.20, the Japanese show the highest support for democracy (0.47), while Koreans (0.11) and Filipinos (−0.09) achieve even lower scores than the Chinese (0.15). Finally, Tunisians (0.23) and Turks (0.21) show higher support for democracy than the average of the MENA countries (0.14).

Even if we apply a relatively modest yardstick[14] of 0.35 as sufficiently high public support for democracy, eight of the 15 democracies included in our smaller comparative study remained below this threshold in the last survey wave in which they participated: Argentina, Chile, Korea, the Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey and the United States. While three of the eight (the Philippines, Taiwan and Turkey) never reached the threshold, the other five had been above it in earlier surveys but experienced a considerable decline over the last two decades (Table 13).

The development of *interpersonal trust* in Fig. 9 provides a fairly clear picture. It is relatively high and stable in both Western democracies and East Asia but has declined in the other regions. Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa display the lowest scores. The high values achieved in the East Asian countries indicate that their relatively high interpersonal trust levels can be considered as compensating for the dismally low support for democracy found in that region. Interpersonal trust provides a solid basis for collective action and thereby may contribute to stabilising democracy against anti-democratic actions of governments. This result contrasts with South(-East) Asia that shows a considerable increase from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, followed by a steep decrease afterwards. We have no explanation for this particular trend and do not know whether this can be explained by regional peculiarities.

The shares for individual countries indicate a considerable variability, too. Among the Western democracies, the Swedish percentages are above the average, while the Italian ones are considerably lower. In the United States, interpersonal trust has fallen from 45.3% in the first survey wave to

Table 13 Mean support for democracy[1] in individual countries and world regions

Countries/Regions[2]	*1994–1998*	*1999–2004*	*2005–2009*	*2010–2014*	*2017–2020*
Canada		0.52	0.55		
Germany	0.67	0.64	0.62	0.61	0.67
Italy		0.61	0.64		0.53
Sweden	0.55	0.62	0.67	0.56	0.67
United States	0.53	0.42	0.38	0.34	0.34
Western Europe and English-speaking countries	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.50	0.58
Republic of Korea	0.39	0.31	0.15	0.13	0.01
Philippines	0.04	0.05		0.04	-0.09
Taiwan ROC	0.24		0.17	0.13	0.12
Asia and Pacific minus AUS & NZ	0.27	0.25	0.22	0.19	0.11
Estonia	0.35	0.37	0.32	0.34	0.53
Poland		0.30	0.30	0.28	0.43
Post-communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia	0.31	0.32	0.23	0.17	0.27
Argentina	0.45	0.34	0.42	0.34	0.31
Chile	0.23	0.27	0.39	0.43	0.24
Uruguay	0.41		0.39	0.41	
Latin America and Caribbean	0.30	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.14
South Africa	0.39	0.38	0.29	0.02	
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.39	0.46	0.34	0.30
Turkey	0.26	0.13	0.20	0.24	0.21
MENA		0.36	0.29	0.26	0.14
Total	0.34	0.39	0.34	0.27	0.29

Source IVS 1981–2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

[1] Range of index from −1 to +1.

[2] Totals for regions based on all countries that participated in the respective wave. A minimum number of three countries in a region was required to show the total of that region. The grand total is based on all the 87 countries that participated in that wave. For individual countries weighted data, for regions equilibrated weight 1000.

37.2% in the latest. This was accompanied by declining confidence levels in governmental institutions (0.59 to 0.44), life satisfaction (0.75 to 0.70) and satisfaction with the financial situation of one's household (0.63 to 0.58). It seems that the increasing political polarisation (Carothers, 2019) has had a debilitating effect on the entire American society.



Fig. 9 Interpersonal trust by world region. *Source* IVS 1981-2020, 87 countries, equilibrated weight

In East Asia, the high average share is strongly influenced by the Chinese result. 64.0% of the Chinese respondents appear to have high interpersonal trust, while the result for the entire region is only 40 per cent. The two East Asian countries included in our smaller comparative study (South Korea, and Taiwan) range between 30 and 40%. The percentage in the Philippines is only 5.3% and even below the already low share of 17.6% for the South-(East) Asian region. This confirms once more that combining the two Asian regions conceals considerable differences between them.

6 The Rise of Populism and the Decline in Support for Established Political Parties

As was shown in the first part of this chapter, democracy has come under pressure since the mid-2000s and a decline in democratic quality has been observed even in some long-established democracies. Inglehart (2018: 29) has traced this back to the fact that 'Western levels of economic security have not continued to rise during the past two decades', due to a combination of sluggish economic growth and rising income inequality. This has fostered dissatisfaction with the life chances and living conditions

even in the established liberal democracies and shattered the belief that established political parties and governments are committed to fighting the inequities produced by neoliberal economic policies. The negative impact of rising economic inequality on democracy has been discussed by economists (Piketty, 2014), historians (Tooze, 2018), political scientists (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019; Fukuyama, 2020; Inglehart, 2018; Mounk, 2020) and sociologists (Wilterdink, 2017).

Increasing *political dissatisfaction* has primarily occurred among citizens with lower educational qualifications whose economic prospects have suffered from the demise of traditional industries and the increase in precarious employments (temporary or part-time) and whose incomes have stagnated or even declined. This is particularly pronounced in peripheral areas that have fallen behind the thriving and growing metropolitan centres. The latter have profited from globalisation and the rise of new industries (electronics, new media, logistics), while the peripheral areas suffer from a mixture of unprofitable old industries, population loss and a decaying infrastructure (Iversen & Soskice, 2019: xiv; Salomo, 2019). The combination of these negative factors has opened up electoral opportunities for *populist parties* that blame the rise of socio-economic inequities on globalisation, rising numbers of immigrants and the inability of the established political parties and their elites to effectively cope with these developments.

Many social scientists and intellectuals have expressed concerns that populist political parties once they come to power may start dismantling liberal democratic rights and institutional cheques and balances by weakening judicial constraints on governments and independent media (Fukuyama, 2020; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2020; Wilterdink, 2017, van Beek in this volume). This would imply that not only new and fragile democracies, but also established liberal democracies are in danger of experiencing a decline in support for democracy. Iversen and Soskice (2019) have argued, however, that such negative effects of economic modernisation are not inevitable, but that national governments do have the power to fight the negative consequences of globalisation and capitalism, that the backsliding of peripheral regions can be avoided, and that it is also possible to keep up satisfactory levels of income for people with lower educational qualifications.

Norris and Inglehart (2019) have explained the surge of populism as a cultural backlash against the rise of self-expression values, globalisation and the increase of societal pluralism due to rising international migration.

At the same time Inglehart (2018) conceded that the increasing emphasis on questions of national and religious identity does have an economic basis. While this development manifests itself primarily in increasing electoral support for populist parties for which we unfortunately do not have global data, it is also observable in survey data on value orientations and indicators of political legitimacy. If Inglehart's assumption is correct, we should see a decline in postmaterialist value orientations, secular and emancipative values as well as an increase of emphasis on national identity. As Table 14 shows, however, these trends have not reached the established democracies yet.

7 Conclusions

The macro- and micro-level findings at the **global level** can be summarised as indicating that, overall, the level of liberal democracy worldwide had increased between 1990 and the mid-2000s and remained stable thereafter. More general hypotheses concerning levels of socio-economic development, education, good governance, political empowerment of women as positive factors underlying these developments could be confirmed with usual statistical regression procedures. Some adverse effects such as increasing social inequality, social polarisation, strong clientelism and high levels of corruption could also be shown. This is partly reflected in the *perceptions* of the respondents in the IVS surveys. The overall positive evaluation of democracy remained very high. Stable levels of life satisfaction, satisfaction with the financial situation of the respondents' households, confidence in governmental institutions, respect for human rights and equality of women support this perception.

The relative preference for democracy (as compared to autocratic regimes), however, has decreased in the most recent decade. Confidence in political parties also shows a strong decline. This was most pronounced in the 24 longer established (before 1980) democracies. There, contrary to Inglehart's original expectations, the share of postmaterialists also declined strongly since the early 1990s. In the other regime types, the share of postmaterialists has remained low throughout. The influence of *religion* is mostly confined to choice and lifestyle values and has only a limited effect on the (relative) preference for democracy. This also reflects the *geographical distribution* of religious communities with a high percentage of Muslims living in autocratic regimes.

Table 14 The development of value orientations, political legitimacy and personal well-being in established democracies (means, unless otherwise indicated)

	1981–1984	*1989–1993*	*1994–1998*	*1999–2004*	*2005–2009*	*2010–2014*	*2017–2020*
Value orientations							
% Postmaterialists	15.0%	21.4%	23.2%	18.8%	17.0%	14.3%	21.3%
Relativism	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.11
Secular orientation	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.48	0.52	0.58	0.60
Equality of women		0.62	0.70	0.75	0.78	0.73	0.81
Choice of lifestyle	0.36	0.41	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.55	0.68
Political legitimacy							
Confidence in political parties		0.48	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.34	0.33
Confidence in governmental institutions	0.54	0.51	0.48	0.50	0.49	0.48	0.51
Democratic quality of regime					0.65	0.66	0.67
Perceived respect for individual human rights			0.56	0.63	0.62	0.59	0.62
Evaluation of democracy			0.80	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.87
Support for democracy[1]			0.52	0.55	0.53	0.48	0.59
National pride	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.79	0.80
Personal well-being							
Life satisfaction	0.72	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.70	0.73
Satisfaction with financial situation of respondents' household	0.65	0.64	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.60	0.58
% Interpersonal trust	42.6%	44.3%	43.8%	39.0%	42.1%	42.1%	49.2%

Source IVS 1981–2020, 23 countries that were liberal democracies already in 1980, equilibrated weight 1000

[1] Support for democracy was operationalised as a preference for democracy by deducting the score for either an autocratic or a military regime—whichever had a received a higher score—from the score for democracy.

All original scores were rescaled to range from 0 to 1 except for support for democracy, which has a range from −1 to +1.

The **regional analysis** presented a more differentiated picture. At the macro-level, the various components of liberal democracy and the overall democratic quality could be specified with the help of the V-Dem data for both the broader regions and our selected cases.

In **Europe,** the overall levels of liberal democracy and democratic quality have not changed very much. Among the liberal components, freedom of elections and freedom of information suffered somewhat. For our selected cases, Poland showed the strongest declines, Estonia improved considerably. Our positive 'benchmark' case, Sweden, retained a high level (see Chapters 11 & 12).

In **the Americas,** considerable improvements of liberal democracy after 1990 were to some extent reversed since the Great Recession. This applied mostly to the freedom of elections, freedom of information and civil liberties. Among our cases, the United States and Chile had the strongest declines of liberal democracy in the most recent period (see also Chapters 7 & 8).

In **Sub-Saharan Africa**, the democratic progress after the transitions in the 1990s has, on the whole, been maintained. This is the case for both the components of liberal democracy and its quality. A differentiation by cases shows, however, considerable declines in South Africa and Ghana, some improvement in Namibia and relative stability at a low level in Kenya (see also Chapter 6).

Liberal democracy has also made some headway in **East Asia**. This is true for all of its components and its overall quality. Among our cases, progress was very pronounced in South Korea and Taiwan, whereas the conditions in the Philippines deteriorated (Chapter 9). Value orientations and, in particular, a more sophisticated understanding of the institutional preconditions of democracy have lagged.

The overall democratic situation in the **MENA** region remains dismal. Only Tunisia has made some permanent progress after the 'Arab Spring'. Some improvements could, however, be observed with regard to freedom of information and association, suffrage and civil liberties. Turkey, as our negative 'benchmark' case, shows the strongest declines (see Chapter 13).

The results from the micro-level data confirm considerable differences in value orientations, political legitimacy and personal well-being across the seven world regions. Western democracies achieve consistently high and stable scores for permissiveness of different lifestyles (choice) and support for democracy. An intermediate group of regions is made up of East Asia, the post-communist region and Latin America, while

South-(East) Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA form a third group of countries with even lower support.

When religion was considered as an additional factor, the regional differences remained strong, while the differences across the religious groups within each region were rather low, except for Muslims in the Western democracies. The latter have more traditional value orientations and their support for democracy is lower, even though they are considerably more permissive in their value orientations and more supportive of democracy than Muslims in other regions. Since the settlement of Muslims in this region is still a relatively recent development, their different outlooks are not surprising and can be interpreted as a phenomenon of ongoing acculturation.

The results do not support the assumption that religion is of only minor relevance, however. In fact, religion was historically a major force in shaping these regional cultures in the first place. East Asia is an interesting example in this respect. Organised religion plays a lesser role here than anywhere else, but traditional value orientations rooted in religious-philosophical beliefs, the so-called *Asian values*, have remained strong. Because these beliefs emphasise a strong state and deference to governmental authority, the citizens in most East Asian countries—with the exception of Japan - have not embraced the Western notion of democracy as a set of institutions restraining the power of governments.

The relatively low scores for support for democracy in regions other than the Western democracies where democracy was originally invented, indicate that most citizens in those regions are not adequately aware of the dangers posed by insufficient constraints on governments. While democratic constitutions tend to rely primarily on the constraints provided by an independent judiciary and free media, a politically sophisticated citizenry constitutes an additional safeguard against attempts by popularly elected governments at gradually dismantling basic democratic freedoms. The crucial relevance of this safeguard can be observed in many countries, among them Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey and even the United States, that have recently experienced assaults on the independence of the judiciary and the media as well as attempts at delegitimising opposition parties (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Although democracies may survive in the absence of a strong civil society as long as political leaders share a consensus on democratic institutions and respect the basic rules of the game, the lack of a critical mass of politically active citizens may pose

a danger for the future of democracy in countries with a passive and deferent civil society.

The following chapters present detailed case-based comparisons within each region. Their findings are subjected to a systematic cross-area analysis in Chapter 14. Overall conclusions are then drawn in Chapters 15 and 16.

Notes

1. TRU is an official partner of the World Values Survey Association (WVSA). We wish to express our gratitude to WVSA for providing preferential access to the new data.
2. It should be noted that these number do not include all countries in which surveys were conducted, but only the 87 that fulfilled our selection criteria. The number of participating countries for all waves among these 87 countries were: 23, 42, 51, 63, 75, 53 and 70. With respect to regions, the coverage was best for the established Western democracies, for the Post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as for East Asia. Conversely, it was worst for Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region.
3. Countries with sizeable ethnic minorities or with several distinct regions such as Belgium, Germany (after unification), Russia, South Africa, Switzerland or Turkey usually include more than the required 1000 respondents in their samples. For some small countries such as Luxemburg or Malta, the rules require only 500 respondents instead. The equilibrated weight takes care of such discrepancies in sample size.
4. Since some countries participated in both the EVS and the WVS and are included twice for the same wave, the equilibrated weight for those cases was divided by 2.
5. As Welzel (2013a, 2013b: 81) explained, the EVI is an improved version of the older *Self-Expression Index* used in Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 51). That index included only the postmaterialism index, feeling of happiness, tolerance for homosexuality, signing a petition and interpersonal trust.
6. The rules for the construction of the two indices are included in an internet appendix to Welzel's book under *'Data and Documentation'* and *FAQ* (2013b). For the present analysis, Welzel's overly complicated rules of treating missing values were slightly simplified. Mean scores for the sub-dimensions were calculated if at least one of the variables had a valid score, while respondents needed to have a valid score on each of the four sub-dimensions for the two composite indices. The deviations from Welzel's procedures did not significantly affect the correlation coefficients among items and sub-dimensions.

7. Alemán & Woods (2016) and Sokolov (2018) tested the construct validity of Welzel's EVI with WVS data and found that it is rather low and that its scores can be meaningfully compared only among advanced post-industrial democracies. Sokolov found sufficient construct validity across different cultural zones only for the two sub-dimensions Choice and Equality. Welzel and Inglehart (2016) and Welzel et al. (2019) refuted the arguments of their critics insisting that construct validity at the individual level is irrelevant because their macro-level explanations do not require intercultural invariance of meaning. As Sokolov rightfully remarked, this implies that the EVI index is supposed to measure an ideal type and that the results primarily indicate the degree to which the results in each country are consistent with the theory of value change that was originally developed for explaining trends in liberal democratic societies only. If this is so, however, one wonders why Inglehart and Welzel based their choice of indicators on factor analytical techniques at all.
8. Since not all 87 countries participated in all seven survey waves, countries that participated in more waves influence the overall results more strongly. To check if the inclusion of all seven survey waves resulted in biased results, we also calculated the correlations for wave 5 only. With a participation of 72 countries, this wave has been the most encompassing so far. The resulting coefficients were nearly identical.
9. The reliability of the overall EVI index is barely above $\alpha = .5$..
10. The two materialist items are 'maintaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices,' the two postmaterialist items are 'giving people more say in important government decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech'.
11. The sample includes 23 Western democracies, 14 Asian and Pacific countries (5 in East Asia and 9 in South-(East) Asia), 25 post-communist countries, 10 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 in Sub-Sahara and 9 in the MENA region.
12. The MENA region includes some of the richest countries per capita such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. However, these countries have rarely ever participated in the World Values Survey. The countries included in this region are all relatively poor countries.
13. It is probably not by chance that Norris and Inglehart did not include a chapter on East Asia in their book because this region does not fit into their secular-religious scheme. It is at the same time secular and supports conservative social values.
14. Since Almond and Verba (1989: 339) correctly recognised that even in well-functioning democracies most voters do not live up to the ideal of well-informed and politically active citizens, they acknowledged that the civic culture they found in the advanced Western democracies is a mixed

political culture in which the 'participant role has been added to the subject and parochial roles'.

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