Gender Ideologies in East and West Germany: Studies on their Nature, Predictors and Trends from the 1980s to the early 2020s

Inauguraldissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor rerum politicarum an der
Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg

vorgelegt von

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Bamberg 2025

Diese Arbeit hat der Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg als Dissertation vorgelegen.

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Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 04.02.2025

URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:473-irb-1070169
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20378/irb-107016

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1 Introduction

Gender roles structure social co-existence, power relations and the division of labour in societies and families, and are therefore of pivotal importance for the formation of families and the shaping of educational and labour markets as well as of politics (Pfau-Effinger, 2000). In Germany, as in most industrialised countries, gender roles are subject to constant development, which can be observed at least on three levels: behaviour, institutions and ideologies (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldin, 2006; McDonald, 2000). The focus of this dissertation is on gender ideologies, but a brief overview of the development on all three levels is relevant as they are closely related.

Regarding the gender role behaviour, during the division of Germany from 1949 to 1990, in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), it was common for men to devote themselves to gainful employment and women to caring and housework (Rosenfeld, Trappe, & Gornick, 2004; Trappe, Pollmann-Schult, & Schmitt, 2015). In line with the educational expansion in the 1970s, the emerging trend towards individualisation or self-actualisation and the associated women's movements (Beck-Gernsheim, 2006; Lesthaeghe, 1995), women's participation in the labour market, especially in part-time work, increased. This was particularly the case from the end of the 1980s (Beblo & Görges, 2018). But this increase paled in comparison to that taking place in the eastern part of the divided country, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Here, full-time employment for mothers had been encouraged and in fact demanded since the state's foundation, and had risen to internationally record levels during the course of the GDR's existence. Nevertheless, also in the GDR, the female gender role included responsibility for the household and childcare (Nickel, 1998; Trappe, 1996). Although many women in East Germany lost their jobs during the reunification process, there has been a remarkable upward trend in maternal employment rates in Germany as a whole since around the turn of the millennium (Kreyenfeld & Geisler, 2006). Despite this narrowing gender gap in labour force participation, a large gender gap persists in unpaid labour in the domestic domain. Even though more and more fathers are taking parental leave and have increased the hours they spend with their children, mothers still invest significantly more time on childcare. Furthermore, to women's detriment, the gender gap in housework responsibility has remained almost unchanged (OECD, 2017; Schulz, 2021; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2024; Walper & Lien, 2018). Since there has been a 'masculinisation' of the female role, but hardly any change in the male role, which would imply primarily a change in men's domestic behaviour (Esping-Andersen, 2009), research speaks of an 'uneven gender revolution' (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; England, 2010; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015).

An uneven development towards gender equality can also be observed in the institutions that shape and manifest gender relations. While 'individual-oriented' institutions such as the education system or the labour market have adapted to the changing gender role of women, 'family-oriented' institutions such as family policy and services, childcare and tax systems are still lagging behind

this development (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000). For instance, with German reunification, the explicit familialistic policies of the West (Leitner, 2003) were initially transferred to both parts of the country, which incentivised mothers to focus on childcare through very long but low-paid parental leave and, particularly in the West, very poorly developed institutional childcare. However, a paradigm shift in family policy began in the mid-2000s, when the expansion of institutional childcare started and generous parental leave including a paternity quota was introduced (Bujard, 2013). But until today, 'family-oriented' institutions in Germany, above all the provision of institutional daycare for under-threes or school-age children, as well as spousal taxation, have not yet fully adapted to the changing role of women. They only facilitate the reconciliation of family and work for both parents to a limited extent.

Finally, an uneven gender revolution can also be identified in gender ideology. In Germany, as in other western industrialised countries, since the measurement of gender ideologies, there has been a trend towards equality (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; K. S. Lee, Alwin, & Tufis, 2007; Lois, 2020). However, support for equality is more or less pronounced depending on whether beliefs about the private or public domains of life are considered. As recent research shows that people can simultaneously hold egalitarian and traditional beliefs depending on the life domain in question, it is argued that gender ideology is multidimensional (Grunow, Begall, & Buchler, 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Scarborough, Sin, & Risman, 2019). Compared to other western industrialised countries, the trend in gender ideology in Germany is characterised by a special phenomenon: since the 1990 reunification, it can be observed that there are major differences in the gender ideologies of East and West Germans. East Germans are (still) more open to maternal employment or gender equality in general than West Germans, although a mutual convergence of gender ideologies seems to appear in both parts of the country (D. Barth, Jessen, Spieß, & Wrohlich, 2020; Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012; Ebner, Kühhirt, & Lersch, 2020).

To illustrate this, Figure 1-1 shows the support for the male breadwinner model, i.e. endorsement of a gendered division of labour in the family, as well as agreement with the view that children suffer due to the employment of their mothers, i.e. beliefs concerning whether women play a vital role in childcare, in West and East Germany from 1992 to 2021 based on the German General Social Survey (GGSS). It becomes clear that both beliefs, that young children suffer due to maternal employment and that women should concentrate on the household while men should be the family breadwinners, have lost importance since the 1990s in both German regions. However, agreement with negative consequences of maternal employment for children has always been higher than that with the male breadwinner model. In 2021, more than a third of respondents in the West and nearly a fifth in the East expected children to suffer if their mothers work, whereas 20 % of respondents in the West and less than 10 % of those in the East agreed with the male breadwinner model. As shown here by way of example, egalitarian gender ideologies are much more widespread concerning the public domain, e.g. the labour market participation, than concerning the private domain, e.g. in

the prioritisation of childcare by mothers and their associated responsibility. Moreover, the gender ideology differences that have existed between the two regions of the country since reunification are clearly illustrated by this figure. For example, West Germans were and are much more critical of maternal employment, and still in 2021, their share was more than twice as high as that of critical East Germans.

Figure 1-1: Agreement with the view that children suffer due to maternal employment and with male breadwinner model in West and East Germany, 1992-2021, in %



Source: GGSS Cumulation 1980-2018, doi: 10.4232/1.13748 and GGSS 2021, doi: 10.4232/1.13954; unweighted data. Own calculations.

In general, the investigation of gender ideologies and their predictors remains an important field of research, because first and foremost, ideologies are the basis for behavioural decisions, and therefore, ideologies and behaviour are strongly correlated. This close association is explained by the assumption that every behaviour is preceded by an individual intention, which is derived from ideologies concerning behaviours, perceived social norms and assumptions about one's own ability to act (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973), and that people strive for their behaviour to be in line with their ideology (Festinger, 1957). Therefore, some scholars argue that gender ideology is an important reason why the gender revolution is uneven (Scarborough et al., 2019). Gender ideologies have been shown to be associated with women's employment choices, educational, occupational and career aspirations, with relationship stability and satisfaction, with fertility and other relationship transitions, with domestic violence against women, with the division of care work in families and satisfaction with it, and with paternal involvement in childcare (for reviews see Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Steiber & Haas, 2012; Whitehead, 2012). It should be noted, however, that ideologies and behaviour are mutually dependent. Therefore, gender ideologies can also be aligned

with the previously chosen behaviour in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Kroska & Elman, 2009), and individuals' exposure to egalitarian or traditional circumstances also shapes their ideologies (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Second, the investigation of gender ideologies is important from a societal perspective as ideologies (re)produce or legitimise existing gender relations and the institutions that maintain them (Chatillon, Charles, & Bradley, 2018). Third, the examination is relevant from a policy perspective because comparing gender ideology and actual gender role behaviour provides an approximation of the extent to which intended behaviour can be realised under the given structural conditions. Knowledge of gender ideology is particularly informative if family policy is to respond to and be legitimised by the gender ideologies in society. Moreover, the impact of family policy can be either strengthened or weakened by existing gender ideologies (Budig, Misra, & Boeckmann, 2012; Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Fourth, identifying predictors of gender ideology is crucial for understanding which factors promote traditional or egalitarian tendencies, and for developing targeted measures to further strengthen gender equality. Finally, it is important to monitor trends in gender ideologies as they are indicators of social change (Alwin & Scott, 1996).

Therefore, the overall research objective of the dissertation is to trace trends in gender ideology, enhance the understanding of their multidimensionality and their predictors along the line of comparison between both former and current East and West Germany. This will be achieved in particular by exploring gender ideology profiles and explicitly investigating beliefs concerning maternal employment while differentiating between the regions, and by extending the observation period of previous research to encompass the situation before reunification and of contemporary Germany. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the development of gender ideology, the congruence between macro-level factors (policy frameworks) and existing gender ideologies, as well as their association with micro-level predictors (socio-demographic characteristics, primary socialisation and individual life priorities) will also be analysed. To this end, this cumulative dissertation investigates several research questions in four individual studies:

- To what extent was the employment of mothers with young children supported by society in the former GDR and FRG? What role did politically-shaped life priorities for work and family play here? [Study 1]
- What did gender ideologies look like in the former GDR? Were they consistent and congruent with the gender role behaviour of GDR citizens or with the socialist gender equality agenda? [Study 2]
- Which gender ideology profiles can be identified in today's East Germany in comparison to West Germany? Which socio-demographic characteristics increase the probability of holding a certain gender ideology? [Study 3]

- What do young people in Germany today consider to be the ideal form of maternal and paternal labour force participation? To what extent are their ideologies shaped by their socialisation experiences at home? [Study 4]

By investigating these questions, this dissertation seeks to address several gaps in the existing research on trends in gender ideologies in Germany (see also section 3.1).

First, the historical period for which findings on gender ideologies in Germany are available (see Ebner et al., 2020; Lois, 2020) will be extended to include the past and present. On the one hand, the ideological situation in East Germany during the 40 years of German division has not yet been considered due to a lack of data. Research to date can only describe the post-reunification gender ideologies of cohorts born during the existence of the GDR (Ebner et al., 2020). However, according to exposure-based and lifelong socialisation explanations (Bandura, 1977; Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004), it has to be assumed that the reunification process left its mark on the gender ideologies of East Germans. This dissertation provides the missing piece of the puzzle by describing what gender ideologies looked like in the former GDR and to what extent they were congruent with or contradictory to socialist equality policies and propaganda. This knowledge is important in order to better categorise the ideological differences between East and West that still exist today, to gain a more nuanced picture of the ideology under the state socialism of the GDR, especially in comparison to the gender role behaviour at the time, and thus to assess the extent to which political regimes can shape social gender norms. On the other hand, the observation period of the available trend studies on gender ideologies in Germany ends several years before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic (Lois, 2020), especially for those studies that explicitly consider the multidimensionality of gender ideology (A. Barth & Trübner, 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Sievers & Warner, 2022). By analysing data from 2021, this dissertation adds a very recent point of observation, which makes it possible to describe today's gender ideology profiles in the East and West, and thus also to determine whether the pre-pandemic trend has continued. This is particularly important as it is still unclear whether parents' experiences with the division of paid and unpaid work during the pandemic-related restrictions have contributed to a subsequent trend reversal in gender ideologies. A very recent study is also instructive in view of the significant changes in family policy in Germany since the early 2000s. It can be assumed that the norm-setting function of these policies takes several years to unfold (Gangl & Ziefle, 2015) and may therefore not have been reflected in previous studies, which are based on older data.

The second contribution of this dissertation is to extend the few findings on the multidimensionality of gender ideology in the comparison between East and West Germany (A. Barth & Trübner, 2018; Sievers & Warner, 2022) by applying appropriate statistical methods like latent class analysis. Gender scholars argue that it is important to move away from a dichotomous view of gender ideology, and instead of assuming that people are either for or against gender equality or that the development of gender equality is linear from traditional to egalitarian, more complex approaches

should be considered (England, 2010; Pepin & Cotter, 2018; Yu & Lee, 2013). This can make an important contribution to explaining the discrepancy between increasingly egalitarian ideologies and more entrenched gender role behaviour, and thus to understanding the uneven gender revolution in the public and private domains.

The third contribution is to deepen our knowledge of a key factor in the persistence of gender role behaviour and ideology: gender socialisation and the intergenerational transmission of traditional ideologies (Bussey & Bandura, 1999). The importance of parental socialisation for individual's gender ideology, as well as the mechanisms at work are well documented internationally (see Halimi, Consuegra, Struyven, & Engels, 2016; Kågesten et al., 2016 for reviews), but an investigation in the German context is lacking (the only exception as far as I am aware of is Hess, Ittel, & Sisler, 2014). This dissertation therefore examines the role of parents' gender behaviour and gender ideology in Germany for their children's later gender ideology.

The fourth contribution of this dissertation follows on from the methodological discussion on the measurement of gender ideology (Walter, 2018). It criticises the fact that the gender role items collected in surveys since the 1970s or 1980s do not reflect changes in gender roles and that this explains the ceiling effects and lack of variance in the responses that can now be observed. The focus of the survey items on assessing the traditional male breadwinner model and the consequences of maternal employment (Davis & Greenstein, 2009) is seen as problematic. Scholars argue that the items should be more concrete and realistic in terms of parental employment at different ages of the children in order to obtain valid results (Walter, 2018). The dissertation presents the substantive results of such a specification through the analysis of a concrete and comparable measure, which was presumably implemented for the first time in a survey by the German Youth Institute in 2018.

After this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an outline of the historical and current family policy conditions in East and West Germany, and as a complement, the development of childcare and maternal employment rates in both parts of the country. Chapter 3 then presents relevant previous (inter-)national research on the trends, nature and predictors of gender ideologies and the research gaps that this dissertation addresses. This is followed by an overview of the two central theoretical concepts for the dissertation, the multidimensionality of gender ideology and the interplay of ideology and policy, as well as the theoretically assumed mechanisms behind the predictors and trends of gender ideology. Chapter 5 summarises the data and methods that were applied in the dissertation's studies. Chapter 6 first briefly introduces each of the four studies that make up the cumulative dissertation, and then presents each of them in the form in which they were published or in the case of Study 3, accepted for publication. This is followed by a summary and discussion of the main findings and limitations of the studies on the nature, predictors and trends of gender ideologies in East and West Germany. The final chapter also offers a conclusion, suggestions for further research and implications of the findings.

2 Contextualising East- and West Germany

This chapter outlines the most important measures and developments of family policy in Germany before and after reunification, as well as the situations regarding childcare and female employment.

Under state socialism in the GDR, doing paid work was assigned enormous importance in people's lives. This was emphasised by state propaganda, a law that foresaw criminal prosecution if people did not work despite being able to, and the linkage of many social activities, claims and networks to the workplace (Gysi & Meyer, 1993; Leitner, Ostner, & Schmitt, 2008). In addition to state socialist ideology, this was also done for pragmatic reasons, due to the high demand for labour resulting from the planned economy and the lack of immigration (Trappe, 1996). Moreover, under state socialism, the full-time employment of women and mothers was seen as the key to women's emancipation, so they were to be relieved of their family responsibilities in order to be able to participate fully in the labour market (Helwig, 1993). Already in the GDR's constitution, which came into force in 1949, and a year later in the first law on the protection of mothers and children, women were guaranteed economic independence, and it was determined that the state should enable them to reconcile their duties as citizens and mothers. In response to falling birth rates from the end of the 1960s, a wide range of policies were implemented and held in place until the end of the GDR to enable mothers to combine full-time employment (part-time work was virtually non-existent in the GDR) and family (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). These included, amongst others, the high income substitute paid for one year after the birth of a child ('Babyjahr') after several months of maternity leave, the reduction of weekly working hours to 40 with full pay compensation if mothers had two children, one paid homework day per month, and especially the broad coverage of institutional care that extended from coverage for children from the age of six months through after-school programmes with meals and daycare (Leitner et al., 2008; Nickel, 1998; Winkler, 1990). Thus, the 'dual breadwinner/state carer model' (Pfau-Effinger & Smidt, 2011) was actively established.
Ultimately, all these political framework conditions, the economic necessities at the private and national level, the state socialist propaganda in favour of full-time employment, as well as the women's personal desire for financial independence and social participation resulted in very high female employment and childcare rates, even in international comparison (Gysi & Meyer, 1993; K. S. Lee et al., 2007; Trappe et al., 2015). Female labour force participation rate rose steadily and reached 91 % in the year before reunification (Beblo & Görges, 2018). Nevertheless, women still bore the main burden of care work in the GDR, there was a gender pay gap, women were less likely to be in management positions and the like (Banaszak, 2006; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). And so, family policy could not be considered a gender equality policy, as although it aimed at reconciliation for women, it did not affect the gender-specific division of unpaid labour or men's gender roles. Following Leitner's (2003) categorisation of those family policy measures that support the family in its care function as 'familialistic' and those that relieve families of care functions as 'de-

familialising', the GDR would fall into the 'de-familialism' cluster. Especially the extensive provision of childcare provided few incentives for family care and comprehensive regulations that relieved families of childcare.

In contrast, the former FRG fell into the cluster of 'explicit familialism' (Leitner, 2003), or has been categorised as a 'conservative welfare state'[1] (Esping-Andersen, 1990), as in the first decades after its foundation, the focus was on supporting the 'bourgeois' nuclear family with intra-familial, maternal childcare and gender-specific division of labour. The family was thus seen as central to the welfare production of individuals, and decommodification was rather low. First changes occurred in the 1970s with the expansion of education and the second women's movement, as well as some political reforms. Then, the previously predominant housewife-breadwinner model became less important and women began to participate somewhat more in the labour market, albeit predominantly on a part-time basis (Beck-Gernsheim, 2006). However, the cultural norm in society and politics continued to prevail: women should prioritise caring for children over paid work, and children need their mothers and the care that only they can provide, especially in infancy (Hank & Berth, 2024; Oechsle, 1998; Schütze, 1986). Institutional childcare for infants and toddlers was often considered appropriate only when the quality of care within the family was perceived to be poor (Ahnert & Lamb, 2001). In 1977, family policy partly turned away from the promotion of the bourgeois family with a comprehensive reform of marriage and family law, that abandoned the official model of the housewife marriage (Gerlach, 2008). The new law stipulated that both spouses were entitled to be employed, and that women were allowed to work without their husband's permission, as well as introducing an equitable division of pension entitlements and property acquired during marriage to provide social security for divorced women. This was followed by the first introduction of six months' paid maternity leave, but only for employed women.
However, it was not until the mid-1980s that the first parental leave schemes were introduced for all mothers (and theoretically also fathers) (Erler, 2009). These included a comparatively low, means-tested childcare allowance for six months (the duration and amount were gradually adjusted in the subsequent years), parental leave during which parents were protected against dismissal with a length which was extended to maximum three years over time, and the recognition of childcare periods in pensions. Family policy continued to focus on promoting the family as an institution, with the emphasis on compensating families for economic losses through transfer payments rather than providing family-related social services (Leitner, 2003). Although the number of kindergarten places was increased in the 1980s, these could only be used from the age of three, and on a half-day basis (Rauschenbach & Berth, 2022; Ahnert & Lamb, 2001). At that time the employment participation (predominantly part-time) of women or mothers also began to rise significantly, which was certainly also linked to a growing demand for labour. In the year before reunification, the

[1] There is a controversial debate about whether and to what extent the GDR could have been categorised along the welfare state typology (see e.g. Burdumy, 2013). This, however, is not the focus of this thesis.

female labour force participation had reached 59 % (Beblo & Görges, 2018). Thus, the model of the 'male breadwinner/female part-time carer' (Pfau-Effinger & Smidt, 2011) became even more entrenched.

With reunification in 1990, the socialist state of the GDR with its extensive family and women's policy was dissolved and the regulations of the West were transferred to the new federal states. Since then, enormous changes have taken place in the area of institutional childcare. In the new federal states, childcare places were initially reduced, as the high unemployment in the East mainly affected women and meant that many mothers were now at home, and because there were also fewer births due to the 'reunification shock' (Goldstein & Kreyenfeld, 2011). Later, at the end of the 1990s, a legal entitlement to a kindergarten place from the age of three until school entry became effective (Rauschenbach & Berth, 2022). The most significant step, however, was the expansion of institutional daycare, especially in the old federal states, which was initiated by various acts in the early 2000s and ultimately led to a legal entitlement to a place in child daycare from the age of one in 2013. Nevertheless, even more than ten years later the demand for crèche places cannot be met, and thirty years after reunification, the situation in East and West Germany is still very different (BMFSFJ 2022). In 2019, just over half of under-three-aged children in East Germany were cared for outside of the family, while the childcare rate in West Germany was one third (see Figure 2-1).

Figure 2-1: Proportion of actively employed mothers to all mothers 1996-2019 and childcare rate 2006-2019, by region and child's age



Source for maternal employment rates: Statistisches Bundesamt (2023), own illustration. Note: West/East maternal employment rate, child U3 refers to the employment rate of mothers in West/East Germany with the youngest child under the age of three. West/East maternal employment rate, child 3-6 refers to the employment rate of mothers in West/East Germany with the youngest child aged 3-6. From 2005 onwards: Microcensus switched from a survey with a fixed reporting week to a continuous survey with a floating reporting week. From 2011 onwards: extrapolation using the population update based on the 2011 census. From 2016 onwards: updated sample selection basis based on the 2011 census. East including Berlin. Source childcarerate: BMFSFJ (2022), own illustration. Note: childcare rate is only shown from 2006 onwards, as only supply rates are available for the period before that.

In addition, major adjustments have been made to parental leave schemes since reunification. In the beginning, the already-existing means-tested low parental allowance was gradually increased and extended and could ultimately be taken for two years; parental leave with time off from paid work was possible for three years (Erler, 2009). Finally, parental leave was fundamentally reformed in 2007, which meant a paradigm shift in German family policy (Bujard, 2013). The 'Elterngeld' parental leave scheme now replaces 67 % of the average monthly net income of the last twelve months before the birth of a child, but with a maximum of €1,800 and a minimum of €300 per month (Blum, Reimer, & Schober, 2022). The maximum period of entitlement for parents is 14 months in total, provided that both parents take Elterngeld for at least two months each. If only one parent receives the benefit, for example the mother, the duration is reduced to twelve months after the birth, meaning that the two 'partner months' (named in a gender-neutral way) do not apply. Moreover, the period of entitlement can be extended by reducing the monthly payment amount accordingly. In general, the parental allowance months can be divided freely between the parents, and since 2024, only one month can be taken in parallel. In 2019, the paternal share of Elterngeld was already 44 % (Deutschlandatlas, 2019). In addition, since 2015 regulations have been introduced – 'ElterngeldPlus' and the 'Partnerschaftsbonus' – which are intended to make part-time employment (of both parents) of up to 32 hours per week during parental leave more attractive.

These family policy measures were introduced not only for equality reasons, but also as a reaction to a declining labour force, falling birth rates and shortcomings in children's education and equal opportunities (Bujard, 2013). Germany can now be assigned to the cluster of 'optional familialism', which is characterised by simultaneously supporting and relieving the family in its caring role (Leitner, 2003). However, as Germany is still only on its way to a coherent modern family policy (Bertram & Bujard, 2012; OECD, 2017), simultaneous policies exist that work towards gender equality or that tend to support the male breadwinner model. In addition to the basically gender-neutral parental allowance, the tax deductibility of childcare costs and the legal entitlement to childcare in a day-care centre, there are still measures that discourage a substantial second earner, such as non-contributory co-insurance in the health insurance of unemployed spouses or the spousal taxation system (Bujard, 2011). In this context, the 2008 alimony reform should also be mentioned. Since then, the principle of personal responsibility after divorce has been applied in Germany, meaning that women are no longer entitled to permanent alimony payments after marriage (Gerlach, 2008). This contradicts the fact that the state continues to encourage a gender-specific division of labour through its spousal taxation. This is because the larger the income difference between the spouses the larger the tax benefit from splitting and marriages with dual earners do not benefit from tax relief (Blömer, Brandt, & Peichl, 2021).

In parallel to these significant changes in the two policy areas that are crucial for reconciliation – childcare and parental leave – the labour market participation of mothers with children between the ages of three and six has increased significantly, especially in the West (see Figure 2-1). In 2019,

65 % of mothers with children aged 3 to 6 in the West and 72 % in the East were in employment[2]. In contrast, the labour force participation of mothers with children under the age of three has increased only slightly since 2006. In 2019, 31 % of mothers with children under the age of three were in employment in the West and 39 % in the East. Overall, parents in Germany continue to face difficulties in reconciliation, even though German family policy has made enormous steps towards supporting working mothers and parents, and the egalitarian division of tasks in families. This policy change was also accompanied by a change in gender ideologies, which will be described in more detail in the next chapter.

In sum, Germany is a very interesting case study for examining the trends, nature and predictors of gender ideologies. The legacy of forty years of division into two distinct states means that there are still enormous differences between the East and West in terms of gender ideologies, but also in terms of maternal labour force participation and childcare coverage. In addition, the country has experienced an enormous shift in family policy over the last two decades, from explicit to optional familialism. At the same time, the current family policy framework offers ambivalent orientations and incentives with regard to gender role behaviour, encouraging both the dual earner and the male breadwinner model. Moreover, there are certain discrepancies between ideologies and behaviours regarding gender roles as the trend towards equality in gender ideology is not yet fully reflected in the division of labour within the families. The majority of mothers work part-time and remain responsible for care work, while fathers continue to work full-time (BMFSFJ, 2021), and at the same time research indicates that parenting couples have the comparatively highest level of life satisfaction when they live according to the male-breadwinner model in which the woman works less than full-time (Schröder, 2018; Florean & Engelhardt, 2020).

[2] A person is considered to be in employment only if he/she actually carried out a job or business during the reference week. If the activity was not carried out during the week, the person is not considered to be in employment (Hochgürtel, 2018).

3 Overview of Previous Research on Gender Ideologies

In the following, the current state of research for Germany on trends in gender ideologies, their nature and predictors is reviewed, and the findings and research gaps on which the dissertation is based are identified. The focus is on substantive findings, but methodological aspects are also addressed. The theoretical explanatory mechanisms behind these empirical findings will then be discussed in Chapter 4.

3.1 Trends

The historical development of gender ideologies in Germany since reunification or in West Germany since the 1980s is characterised by two phenomena. The first phenomenon is that in both regions of Germany, as in most Western industrialised countries, there has been a strong decline in traditional gender ideology in recent decades, which supports traditional roles for women and men. In particular, the employment of mothers with young children has become increasingly accepted, it is less often assumed that this is associated with negative consequences for the children, and also beliefs concerning the division of paid and unpaid work within the family have become more egalitarian (Banaszak, 2006; Berth, 2019; Ebner et al., 2020; K. S. Lee et al., 2007; Pfau-Effinger & Euler, 2014; Wenzel, 2010).

In one of the most recent and historically comprehensive studies on this subject, Lois (2020) analysed the GGSS waves from 1982 in the West and 1992 in the East up to 2016. He used two summative gender ideology indices, one for beliefs concerning gender roles (including items on support for the male breadwinner model, for a wife's duty to support her husband's career, and for women's access to jobs) and one index for beliefs concerning maternal employment (including items on the suffering of the mother-child relationship or the children, and the question of whether a working mother is better for a child than a stay-at-home mother). This analysis showed a pronounced egalitarian trend in beliefs concerning gender roles in West Germany in the 1980s, which levelled off in the 1990s and had continued steadily since the turn of the millennium. In East Germany, there was a marked increase in egalitarian beliefs concerning gender roles, especially from the time of reunification until shortly after the turn of the millennium, but this levelled off between 2004 and 2016. The study interpreted this as a ceiling effect, as East Germans already had very egalitarian beliefs concerning gender roles. Looking at the results for the belief index on maternal employment, there was a steady but moderate decline in sceptical views in both parts of the country from the very beginning. This decline was particularly strong between 2004 and 2008, which seemed to be linked to the changes in family policy during this period. There has been little change in beliefs concerning maternal employment in either part of the country since 2012. Taken together, the general egalitarian trend in beliefs concerning appropriate gender roles and the consequences of maternal employment in Germany was by no means linear. It also varied between

the two belief domains. In addition, the level of egalitarianism has always been higher for beliefs regarding gender roles than regarding maternal employment. These developments can be explained by socio-historical events such as the expansion of education and the increasing participation of women in the labour market and are thus period effects (Lois, 2020).
One shortcoming of the existing research is that it does not provide information on how the development of gender ideology has continued after 2016 (both Lois (2020) and Ebner et al. (2020) refer to the GGSS up to 2016). This information will be provided by Study 3 of the dissertation: it uses the first wave of the FReDA survey (Bujard et al., 2023) conducted in 2021 to describe in detail the contemporary gender ideologies in East and West Germany. Adding such a recent observation point to the existing research is very important, not least against the background of the experiences of families during the Covid-19 pandemic, where it was feared that the burden of domestic childcare while working at home would lead to a re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies.

The second phenomenon concerning the historical development of gender ideologies in Germany is the East-West gap that has persisted over time, and even if differences in individual characteristics such as education, age, religiosity, employment status or the presence of children are taken into account (Banaszak, 2006; Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012). People living in East Germany have always been much less likely to see negative consequences for children and family from maternal employment and have a more egalitarian understanding of gender roles within the family than those in West Germany (Adler & Brayfield, 1997; Braun, Scott, & Alwin, 1994; Pampel, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2004; Zoch, 2021). As the trend towards egalitarianism is discernible in both parts of the country, these differences remain even 30 years after reunification.
This is shown, for example, in a very recent study by Ebner et al. (2020) who used a gender ideology index that included all gender role items surveyed in the GGSS from 1992 to 2016. The authors emphasised that East and West Germany have converged in terms of gender ideology since the 2010s. On the one hand, this was due to stagnation in the development of egalitarianism in the East (which is also interpreted as a ceiling effect). On the other hand, as no significant ideology changes were observed in the West since the 1965 cohorts, the convergence was a cohort effect resulting from the fact that post-reunification cohorts in East Germany hold less egalitarian ideologies than cohorts born before reunification, and not because later-born West German cohorts are more egalitarian. Ebner et al. (2020) concluded that egalitarianism in East Germany is mainly driven by cohorts socialised in the GDR.

However, previous research has been unable to provide findings on gender ideologies in East Germany *before* reunification, as only data collected after the fall of the Berlin wall was available. A solution to this was to analyse those cohorts that were born in and had lived for some time in the GDR. However, this approach can lead to biased results, as it has to be assumed that the gender ideologies of East Germans are not stable, but that reunification may have had period effects on

ideologies. It is therefore important to observe gender ideologies during the existence of the GDR, and this dissertation aims to contribute here. To this end, Studies 1 and 2 for the first time analyse data on individuals' gender ideologies collected during the existence of the GDR. For this purpose, a previously unexploited data set from the GDR's Central Institute for Youth Research (ZIJ) is used. Overall, this dissertation will be able to extend previous findings on trends in gender ideologies in Germany with the period before reunification and with a very recent observation point that also comprises the time after the Covid-19 pandemic restrictions, both of which are still blind spots in extant research.

3.2 Nature

The described non-linear trend in the egalitarian development of gender ideologies is not only found in Germany, but also internationally, and researchers have attributed this empirically to the fact that gender ideologies refer to different life domains (e.g. politics, employment, care work), i.e. are multidimensional, and the beliefs concerning these domains change differently over time (Cotter et al., 2011; Scarborough et al., 2019). The analysis of long observation periods has revealed that the consistent traditional gender ideology has been replaced by multidimensional or heterogeneous ones, meaning there might not only be people that hold consistent beliefs concerning gender roles in the public and private domains, but also there are those that combine egalitarian and (still) traditional beliefs (A. Barth & Trübner, 2018; Dernberger & Pepin, 2020; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Scarborough et al., 2019).

Extant research approaches the multidimensionality of gender ideology using two different methodological strategies. Firstly, studies distinguish between beliefs concerning gender equality and those concerning maternal employment and therefore also what is considered the best care for children (for Germany see Banaszak, 2006; Berth, 2019; K. S. Lee et al., 2007; Lois, 2020; Pfau-Effinger & Euler, 2014). For example, based on three waves of the European Values Study in 1990, 1999 and 2008, Pfau-Effinger and Euler (2014) showed that gender ideologies have clearly moved in the direction of supporting gender equality over time. However, they also show that in Germany, as in other countries with a strong tradition of the male-breadwinner-model, endorsement of young children suffering when their mothers work had always been significantly higher than endorsement of traditional roles for women and men (see also Figure 1-1). They explained this by the insufficient supply of institutional childcare, but also by the West German family ideal according to which young children are best cared for by their mothers and can only receive 'motherly love' from them (Ehnis, 2008; Schütze, 1986). On the basis of these findings, the dissertation also focuses particularly on beliefs concerning maternal employment in the 1980s in the GDR and the former FRG (Study 1), and more recently, on the beliefs of today's young people (Study 4). The dissertation thus extends previous findings with Study 1 providing insights into societal beliefs concerning

maternal employment under the state-socialist regime in the GDR, which promoted and demanded maternal employment, in comparison to the situation in the former FRG. A second extension is offered by Study 4, which takes a very concrete look at beliefs about maternal employment – in the form of ideals on weekly working hours for mothers – instead of analysing the abstractly formulated statements on maternal employment that have been used in almost all surveys to date. These items often suffer from ceiling effects in the support of maternal employment and have not been sufficiently adapted to the changes in female gender roles (Walter, 2018).

Another methodological strategy for uncovering the multidimensionality of gender ideology is to identify different belief patterns from people's responses. Here, gender ideology is understood as a latent construct, and the beliefs addressed through the survey items on different life domains are considered in their interplay. Statistically, the method of latent class analysis (LCA) is used (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968). A detailed comparison of the results of studies using this method is difficult, as the studies differ in the surveys they analyse, in the number of gender ideologies they identify, and in the labels they introduce for the various gender ideologies. Overall, however, the results show three things both internationally and for Germany: (a) that in addition to the two consistent endpoints of the gender ideology spectrum – egalitarian or traditional – there are multidimensional, heterogeneous belief patterns, (b) that the consistent egalitarian gender ideology is the most widespread, and (c) that the traditional ideology is found only rarely (studies that include the German case are Begall, Grunow, & Buchler, 2023; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Knight & Brinton, 2017).

The gender ideologies most commonly identified in previous research and their prevalence are presented in the following by reviewing two very recent studies on this topic: Grunow et al. (2018) analysed West Germany and seven other European countries using the European Values Study from 2008, and Diabaté, Grunow, and Braack (2023) looked at East and West Germany together drawing on the German Leitbild Survey from 2012. In both studies, the consistent *egalitarian* gender ideology was most frequently represented in the populations (in Grunow et al.'s study around half of respondents in West Germany and 43 % internationally were assigned to it; in Diabaté et al. 34 % of respondents in Germany fell into this category). This ideology was characterised by a high level of support for maternal employment and for the equal division of labour between partners. In general, the egalitarian gender ideology strongly emphasises equality, which is why there is support for women and men being equally suited to and responsible for caregiving and income-generating so that both domains should be shared equally (see also Davis & Greenstein, 2009)[3]. Moreover,

[3] Sometimes a different form of egalitarianism is additionally identified, 'choice egalitarianism'. This ideology emphasises the freedom of choice of women and men instead of gender equality. Here, e.g., both the employment of mothers, as well as their concentration on domestic tasks are supported. This belief pattern reflects the second, later type of feminism (alongside second-wave feminism, which primarily focused on equality) and emphasises that everyone should choose the role they want and that any choice will be respected. For example, Begall et al. (2023) showed, based on EVS 2008, that this ideology was held by less than 5 % of Germans and 17 % of international respondents.

both studies found the *traditional* gender ideology (consisting of the two classes of 'moderate traditional' and 'traditional' in Grunow et al. (2018), and of 'moderate traditional' in Diabaté et al. (2023)), which Grunow et al. (2018) showed was more common in West Germany than internationally at just under 20 % of the respondents assigned to it (international average 13 %; in Diabaté et al.'s study 6 %). People holding a traditional gender ideology support gender-segregated domains of life and assign women to the domestic and care domains, and men to the public domain of earning. Besides that, multidimensional gender ideologies were revealed by the two studies, which can be described as intensive parenting and egalitarian essentialism. *Intensive parenting*[4] is based on the belief that parents should invest a considerable amount of time and commitment in the rearing, education and care of their children. In order to achieve this, it is crucial that both parents strive for the best possible support and development conditions for their children and prioritise these over their own needs (see generally on this: Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Doepke & Zilibotti, 2019; Faircloth, 2014; Gerlach, 2017; Ruckdeschel, 2015). Grunow et al. (2018) categorised 22 % of the international respondents as holding this ideology and around 17 % of West German respondents (Diabaté et al.: 21 %). Another belief pattern identified in these two – but also many other – studies is described as *egalitarian essentialism* (Charles & Grusky, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; England, 2010). It combines support for gender equality, especially in the public domain, with the belief in an inherent, biologically determined difference between women and men, which leads to different competences, preferences and interests, and thus to a natural superiority of women in care work. In the study by Grunow et al. (2018) almost a fifth of respondents in West Germany (22 % internationally) held this ideology. Diabaté et al. (2023) identified a 'secondary earner ideology' that was supported by 39 % of German respondents, which also fits with the framework of egalitarian essentialism.

One limitation of these two studies and others (Begall et al., 2023; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Knight & Brinton, 2017) on Germany is that they combine East and West in the analyses, or that they focus only on the West, probably due to the small number of respondents from the East. To my knowledge, there are currently only two studies applying LCA that look separately at the two regions of the country (A. Barth & Trübner, 2018; Sievers & Warner, 2022). Based on the International Social Survey Programme from 1994, 2002 and 2012, Sievers & Warner (2022) identify two gender ideologies in East Germany and three in West Germany. The study by A. Barth & Trübner (2018), which draws on data from the GGSS from 1991 and 2012, reveals five gender ideologies in each case. Taken together, the egalitarian gender ideology ('unconditional' and 'moderately egalitarian'

[4] Very similar to this is the belief pattern of *intensive mothering* (Hays, 1996; Park and Banchefsky, 2019), which, however, was not identified by the two studies. It also emphasises that the child's needs should always be prioritised, which is why mothering is also 'emotionally absorbing' (Hays, 1996, p. 110). According to this, children should ideally be cared for by their own mother, also because childcare is a genuinely female task and competence. Maternal employment is acceptable as long as it is primarily for financial reasons and the mother still has enough time for childcare. E.g., Begall et al. (2023) showed that around 15 % of respondents in Germany held this belief pattern (10 % internationally).

in the study by A. Barth & Trübner) was the most widespread in both regions in 2012, while the traditional gender ideology (described by A. Barth & Trübner (2018) as 'family-orientated traditional') was significantly less common or not found at all in East Germany. The heterogeneous ideology of intensive mothering ('child-oriented traditional' and 'conflicted egalitarian' in A. Barth & Trübner (2018)) is evident in both parts of the country, and both studies confirm that this is more moderate and significantly less common in the East than in the West. Thus, these two studies confirm the East-West differences already known from studies based on summative belief indices (as described in Section 3.1), but take into account the multidimensionality of gender ideology.

As the data analysed in these two studies is more than ten years old, no current examination of multidimensional gender ideology in East compared to West Germany is available. This is what the dissertation aims to address with Study 3. A more recent analysis of the multidimensionality of gender ideology is worthwhile because the political framework in Germany has changed enormously since the mid-2000s and currently offers an ambivalent orientation for gender roles. It is plausible that the normative effects of these political changes will only become visible over time (Gangl & Ziefle, 2015). Therefore Study 3 uses data from wave 1 of the FReDA survey from 2021 (Bujard et al., 2023) because it contains a sufficiently large number of items on gender roles and respondents living in East Germany. In addition, the dissertation builds on the reported findings on the multidimensionality of gender ideology for the post-reunification period and links them for the first time to the former GDR. The existing discourse on gender ideology in the GDR often ignores the fact that gender equality has actually only been reached in terms of labour market participation. Study 2 of the dissertation takes this as an opportunity to apply the new methodological approaches for determining the multidimensionality to data from the former GDR in order to see whether varieties of gender ideology existed here too, or whether, as is often assumed, only the consistent egalitarian ideology existed.

3.3 Predictors

A great deal is already known about the factors which are crucial to the development of gender ideologies. Socialisation, individual characteristics and policy frameworks have been proven to be the most important ones.

Socialisation experiences in the parental home have repeatedly been found to be formative for an individual's gender ideology. Numerous international studies have shown that gender role behaviours of parents, especially with regard to the division of paid work or housework, as well as parents' beliefs concerning gender roles, correlate strongly with the gender ideologies of their children at the same time or later on, and even become relevant for their later life decisions (Burt & Scott, 2002; Cunningham, 2001a; Evertsson, 2006; Farré & Vella, 2013; Moen, Erickson, & Dempster-McClain, 1997; Platt & Polavieja, 2016; Sánchez Guerrero & Schober, 2021; Vidal,

Lersch, Jacob, & Hank, 2020). In summary, it has been shown that individuals tend to have more egalitarian gender ideologies and support maternal employment more strongly if they experienced a more equal division of paid and unpaid labour in the parental home during their childhood and adolescence, if they were exposed to egalitarian ideas (through their parents' high levels of education or especially through their mothers' employment), or if their parents themselves held egalitarian gender ideologies[5]. As far as I am aware, there are no studies on the relevance of parental gender ideologies or gender role behaviour for children's gender ideologies *for Germany* (the only exceptions are Hess et al. (2014) or Cordero-Coma and Esping-Andersen (2018) and Wirth (2017) on children's housework contribution). The dissertation fills this research gap with Study 4, which investigates the association of parental gender ideology and the division of labour in their households and children's later ideals on the division of paid labour of parents with young children.

Further decisive predictors of gender ideology are individual characteristics (for an overview see Chatillon et al., 2018; Davis & Greenstein, 2009). It was consistently found that women are more egalitarian than men, which has been attributed to the fact that women are more likely than men to be affected by the (e.g. economic or power-related) disadvantages that are related to traditional gender roles (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Fan & Marini, 2000; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). In contrast, people who identify as religious or frequently attend religious services tend to support the dominance of men in the public domain and the responsibility of women for the private domain, with denominational differences in the strength of traditionalism (Banaszak, 2006; Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002; Peek, Lowe, & Williams, 1991; Read, 2003). This is because Western religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) transmit the idea that women and men are inherently different and that men are superior to women. Regular exposure to these ideas and interaction with 'like-minded' individuals within religious communities affects believers' gender ideologies. There are also normative expectations historically associated with the role of husband and wife that expect more traditional gender role behaviour from married people, for example women focusing on the domestic sphere. Studies tend to show that married people are less egalitarian than divorced or never-married people, although the findings are inconsistent (confirmed by Alwin et al. (1992), Davis (2007), Fan and Marini (2000); no/weak support: Charles and Cech (2010), Corrigall and Konrad (2007), Vespa (2009)), which may be because marriage has been declining in importance for individual lives for some time. For the transition to parenthood, however, it has consistently been shown that people become more traditional after childbirth, that parents are more traditional than childless persons, and traditionalism increases with the number of children (Baxter & Kane, 1995; Katz-Wise, Priess, & Hyde, 2010; Perales, Jarallah, & Baxter, 2018). Crucially, normative expectations of parental roles refer to a more traditional division of labour, with mothers

[5] There are also studies that look at socialisation agents other than parents, most notably the partner/spouse. These studies confirm that the gender ideology of the partner/spouse has an influence on the individual's gender ideology, and that ideological alignment in partnership or marriage occurs over time (see Hudde, 2020; Kalmijn, 2005; Kroska and Elman, 2009).

concentrating on childcare. Also, age has emerged as a predictor of gender ideology as studies have found that younger people are more egalitarian than older people (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brewster & Padavic, 2000). The explanations are that cohorts are socialised differently concerning gender equality or that younger people have had fewer experiences with, or were less often exposed to conditions that encourage traditional behaviour (e.g. multiple children, reduced employment, etc.). The increasing egalitarianism with the cohort succession is explained, in part, by increasing education, as more educated people are more egalitarian than less educated people (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Higher education increases cognitive skills and knowledge, so more highly educated people are more enlightened, more open to new ideas and better able to question gender stereotypes and their own roles. Decisive for gender ideology is also if women are in paid work, as they are then more egalitarian than women who are not employed (men are not discussed here because they are predominantly in full-time work) (Banaszak, 2006; Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Schober & Scott, 2012). It is argued that women's experiences in the labour market provide them with examples of women who are successful in the public domain and financially independent, demonstrate to them that mothers can be employed without their children suffering, and reveal to them that women are exposed to disadvantages in the public domain.

The example of women's employment as a (traditional gender-role-deviating) behaviour illustrates that behaviour can also have an impact on gender ideologies, as it was shown that a more equal sharing of housework is also likely to contribute to husbands' egalitarian gender ideologies (Carlson & Lynch, 2013). Yet, is also possible that individual characteristics and ideology are mutually dependent. For example, individuals who hold an egalitarian gender ideology may be more likely to engage in situations characterised by equality. So far, there are only a few longitudinal studies that provide a better understanding of the direction of causality, but both directions are confirmed. Some longitudinal studies find, for example, that the transition to parenthood leads to more traditional gender ideologies (Baxter, Buchler, Perales, & Western, 2015; Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Evertsson, 2013), while others show that the more egalitarian women had already been the more frequently and to a greater extent they are employed (Lietzmann & Frodermann, 2023; Schober & Scott, 2012).

This dissertation builds on the already well-documented findings on individual-level predictors of gender ideology by attempting to replicate them for Germany in 2021, and by examining whether different predictors are important in East or West Germany (Study 3). In addition, Study 2 investigates whether the results on predictors gained from research on Western countries can be transferred to the former state-socialist GDR.

A third group of predictors of gender ideology previously investigated is family policy. On the one hand, the congruence between family policy frameworks and gender ideologies or beliefs concerning maternal employment were examined in cross-country comparisons. Without claiming

causality, in the main, the studies have shown that there is a high degree of congruence between family policy settings and the gender ideologies of citizens. Individuals living in countries that promote the dual-earner model more strongly show higher support for equality and for maternal labour force participation (Grunow et al., 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Pfau-Effinger & Euler, 2014; Sjöberg, 2004; Treas & Widmer, 2000). On the other hand, some studies analysed the relationship between individual policy measures, mostly the provision of childcare and parental leave arrangements, and gender ideologies or beliefs about maternal employment in different countries. The results are contradictory in that both significant and insignificant correlations were found (André, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2013; Hofäcker & Lück, 2008; Lomazzi, Israel, & Crespi, 2019; Sjöberg, 2004). This dissertation (Study 1 and 2) builds on these findings by asking whether the congruence between family policy and gender ideology could also be found in the former GDR, where family policy was accompanied by excessive propaganda, comprising moral obligations for mothers to work. Or whether the opposite was true, so that demarcation from the regime led to a major incongruence between citizens' ideologies and the family policy framework.

Having presented what is already known about the trends, nature and predictors of gender ideology, the next chapter introduces the theoretical mechanisms that might underlie these empirical observations.

4 Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents a theoretical discussion of gender ideology, including its differentiation at the macro-, meso- and micro levels, even though these are hard to separate in empirical analyses, and elucidates the concept of the multidimensional nature of gender ideology. Furthermore, it covers the explanatory mechanisms of socialisation, exposure- and interest-based predictors of gender ideology, as well as theories on the interrelations between gender ideology and family policy. The final section of this chapter presents theoretical explanations for macro-level trends in gender ideology, including cohort and period effects.

4.1 Gender Ideology on the Macro-, Meso- and Micro Levels

Like any other social phenomenon, gender ideology is relevant at the macro-, meso- and micro levels of society or at the institutional, interactional and individual levels (Risman, 2004), which are closely interwoven. At the micro level, there is the gender ideology of each individual; at the macro level, intersubjectively shared gender ideology has emerged as a social consensus and institutions (re-)produce gender ideology; and at the meso level, gender ideologies structure interpersonal interaction and communication (Chatillon et al., 2018; Lück & Diabaté, 2015).

Various terms have been introduced by the literature to describe gender ideology at the macro level of society, e.g. Schneider, Diabaté, and Ruckdeschel (2015) and Mühling, Rost, Rupp, and Schulz (2006) have used the term ‘Leitbild’, Duncan and Edwards (1997) speak of ‘gendered moral rationalities’, Pfau-Effinger (2000) and Grunow and Veltkamp (2016) discuss ‘gender culture’. Whichever term is used, there is agreement in the literature that the constitutive at the macro level is the consensually defined and intersubjectively shared set of beliefs and ideas about what is desirable, socially acceptable, morally required and taken-for-granted concerning gender roles (Chatillon et al., 2018; Duncan & Edwards, 1997; Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000; Grunow & Veltkamp, 2016; Lück & Diabaté, 2015; Mühling et al., 2006; Park & Banchefsky, 2019; Pfau-Effinger, 2000). Diabaté and Lück (2014) state that gender ideology at the macro level includes aspects of values, attitudes, norms and frames, as it is perceived by individuals as desirable, taken for granted and socially expected, that it is unquestioned and unconsciously adopted. Gender ideology relates to multiple dimensions (it encompasses several beliefs and ideas) meaning that instead of just one hegemonic ideology being present, several ideologies can exist at the macro level, which may even be in conflict with each other (Diabaté & Lück, 2014; Mühling et al., 2006). Since gender ideology at the macro level is a collective and socially constructed phenomenon, it is socially stratified and may differ between certain milieus, regions, countries, etc. It is reflected in and reproduced through the concrete gender role behaviours (e.g. in the lived family models and the division of labour in partnerships), the legal and institutional framework of a state (e.g. in family policy or in the labour market), and it is disseminated, as well as consolidated via the mass media,

popular culture, religions or others (Chatillon et al., 2018; Grunow & Veltkamp, 2016; Ridgeway, 2009). Therefore, changes in gender ideology can be initiated by one of the actors involved in its reproduction, e.g. through changes in family policy (Lück & Diabaté, 2015).

Although gender ideology at the macro level is a collective phenomenon, in the end, it is individuals who hold and incorporate sets of beliefs and ideas concerning gender roles. Thus gender ideologies at the micro and macro level do not have to be congruent (Hakim, 2003), but they do mutually affect each other. Macro level gender ideology shapes individual gender ideologies through socialisation arising from experiences in interpersonal interactions and communication where it is a guiding factor (Lück & Diabaté, 2015). This is because macro level gender ideology also features social normative expectations of conformist gender role behaviour, i.e. the probability that important reference persons (dis-)approve of a certain behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Since in interpersonal interactions individuals try to meet these expectations in order to avoid negative social sanctions, macro level gender ideology has an action-guiding effect on the micro level[6] (Eagly et al., 2000; Ridgeway, 2009; Risman, 2004; West & Zimmerman, 1987). In addition, individuals cope with their imperfect information about alternative actions and consequences ('bounded rationality'), e.g. when choosing the 'best' balance between childcare and working, they refer to hegemonic cultural beliefs and thus use macro level gender ideology as a point of reference for appropriate, socially acceptable behaviour (Grunow & Veltkamp, 2016; Mühling et al., 2006). At the same time, at micro and meso levels, individuals share their subjective gender ideologies with others in their social communication and interactions, which ultimately leads to a social consensus from which the gender ideology at the macro level emerges (Eagly et al., 2000; Lück & Diabaté, 2015). Nevertheless, gender ideology at the macro level is not only the sum of individual gender ideologies, but can also gain its own independent reality, e.g. through its institutionalisation in legal frameworks like family policies (Pfau-Effinger, 2000; Risman, 2004).

Following this, macro level gender ideology can empirically be approached either by surveying what individuals state what they think is the social consensus on gender roles (as implemented in the German 'Leitbild survey', see Schneider et al. (2015)) or by statistically aggregating individual gender ideologies. The latter is the most common approach, implicitly equating the most prevalent set of beliefs with the hegemonic gender ideology. This intuitively makes sense since the greater the number of individuals in a society who hold a certain gender ideology, the more relevant it is for social interactions and behaviour. This dissertation is also orientated towards this strategy.

[6] This is the cultural explanation for gender role behaviour. The economic mechanisms, on the other hand, (which are not the focus of this dissertation) refer to individual or household utility maximisation and preferences, like the new home economics (Becker, 1991), bargaining-models (Ott, 1992), time availability (Coverman, 1985), or preference theory (Hakim, 2000). Here, resources (e.g. education, time), preferences and structural conditions (e.g. political-institutional framework) are seen as decisive for gender role behaviour decisions.

4.2 Multidimensionality of Gender Ideology

Gender ideology at the micro level needs to be distinguished from individual's gender identity[7] as Kroska (2000, p. 368) emphasises: 'Generally, an ideology refers to a belief system, and an identity refers to meanings an individual and others apply to the self in a social role'. Individuals' gender identities and gender ideologies may even contradict each other as they may hold specific beliefs, whilst their own behaviours and lived experiences may deviate from these, for example due to external constraints in the labour market (Hochschild & Machung, 1989; Kroska, 2000).

Gender ideology as a belief system thus comprises the interplay of subjective beliefs concerning appropriate gender relations, the social roles of the genders, and innate gender differences, as well as the behaviour and responsibilities of women and men within and outside the family (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Kroska, 2000). More specifically, these include beliefs concerning the role of the male breadwinner, the division of housework or childcare, women's employment, the male privilege and others (for an overview see Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Empirically, these beliefs are measured in surveys by the degree of agreement with various statements about gender roles (usually referred to as 'gender role attitude items').

Some of the literature assumes that the various beliefs are aligned within individuals and that they can therefore be clearly categorised along a continuum between traditional and egalitarian on the basis of their gender ideologies (Scanzoni, 1975). In such a *one-dimensional* understanding of gender ideology, its different aspects (collected through multiple survey items) are methodically combined into a single composite measure, technically speaking into a summative index (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brewster & Padavic, 2000). However, this one-dimensional conception of gender ideology has been criticised as it would imply that, for example, the steadily increasing support for maternal employment would have to go hand in hand with increasing support for an egalitarian division of childcare (Kroska, 2000; Pepin & Cotter, 2018; Yu & Lee, 2013) and eventually assumes that a consistent egalitarian gender ideology would be the end point of the development of modernisation (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). All this is theoretically doubtful and empirically refuted, as studies have also shown that there is simultaneous support for both equality in the area of employment and women's responsibility for care work are supported at the same time (see Section 3.2), and thus that individuals' beliefs about different domains of life can be divergent. Therefore recent research suggests a *multidimensional* conception of gender ideology

[7] Gender identity concerns the active performance of gender roles in the context of everyday actions, statements and interaction processes (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), with which normative role expectations are met. Thereby, gender identity is reproduced and validated towards others and oneself, receiving positive feedback that leads to higher self-esteem and a sense of belonging and security (Akerlof and Kranto, 2000; West and Zimmerman, 1987). Thus, gender identity has to be actively constructed by the individual and behaviour that deviates from expectations can lead to anxiety, insecurity and loss of gender identity (West & Zimmerman, 1987).

acknowledging that beliefs concerning gender roles in different domains of life might vary and develop differently (Cotter et al., 2011; Knight & Brinton, 2017). Thus, it is theoretically possible for individuals to combine traditional beliefs for one life domain with egalitarian beliefs for another, resulting in a heterogeneous gender ideology – in contrast to a traditional or egalitarian gender ideologies that are predominantly consistent for all life domains (Brinton & Lee, 2016; Grunow et al., 2018; Scarborough et al., 2019) (for the empirical prevalence of different gender ideologies, see Chapter 3.2).

There are various theoretical considerations regarding how to differentiate these life domains. Pepin and Cotter (2018) distinguish between beliefs concerning gender in families, women in the marketplace and mothers at work. Davis and Greenstein (2009) differentiate gender ideologies in a more detailed manner with six dimensions (primacy of the breadwinner, belief in gendered separate spheres, working women and relationship quality, wife/motherhood and the feminine self, household utility, and acceptance of male privilege). This dissertation follows other scholars' broad division of life domains into public, i.e. labour market, politics, education, and private, i.e. housework, childcare and caring – because this differentiation is suitable for application across a variety of different surveys (Grunow et al., 2018; Yu & Lee, 2013). Despite this differentiation, the public and private domains of life are interlinked in beliefs. This is particularly evident in beliefs concerning maternal employment. Here, beliefs concerning the public and private domains overlap as they relate to individualism, equality, femininity, good parenting and child well-being (Berth, 2019; Pfau-Effinger & Euler, 2014).

4.3 Predictors of Gender Ideology

The literature has focused on three strands to explain gender ideology development. These comprise interest-based and exposure-based predictors (the latter including socialisation) as well as explanations that focus on the relationship between gender ideology and gender role behaviour.

Socialisation

It is hypothesised that individuals' gender ideologies are very much shaped by their primary socialisation in the family in their childhood (e.g. Cunningham, 2001a; Fan & Marini, 2000). The theory of social learning states that gender role behaviour and gender ideology are developed through modelling, enactive experiences and direct tuition, and are thus transmitted across generations (Bandura, 1977; Bussey & Bandura, 1999). Gender ideology can thus become a 'cultural legacy' (Rosenfeld et al., 2004), which provides one explanation for the persistence of gender ideology differences between East and West Germany. In particular, due to their social closeness, availability and children's identification with them, parents (but also peers or gender role representations in the mass media) serve as behavioural role models for children. This modelling mechanism assumes that children's exposure to their parents' gender-role conformant or deviant

behaviour provides them with examples of gender roles and ideologies, which they observe, imitate and internalise. The mechanism of enactive experiences suggests that socialisation also happens through positive or negative reactions to children's behaviour on the part of their parents or significant others. In their evaluation, parents draw on their own gender ideology and strive for consistency between it and their children's behaviour, sanctioning deviant behaviour accordingly (Bisin & Verdier, 2001; Escriche, 2007). Children thus learn which behaviours lead to which outcomes in their significant others or which consequences it provokes; accordingly, they orient themselves towards socially accepted gender role behaviour after such experiences. Finally, parents also shape their children's gender ideology through direct tuition, i.e. verbal instructions in which they actively communicate their own gender ideology and explain what constitutes appropriate gendered behaviour (Bussey & Bandura, 1999).

The theory of the development of gender ideology through primary socialisation in childhood therefore distinguishes between the verbal instruction or explanation of gender roles by parents – referred to as 'saying gender' – and the gender role behaviour of parents as role models – referred to as 'doing gender' (McGinn, Ruiz Castro, & Lingo, 2018; Moen et al., 1997; Platt & Polavieja, 2016). When the two are aligned, it is reasonable to assume that they are mutually reinforcing. However, there might be a discrepancy between what parents say and what they do (see section on gender ideology discrepancy below). In social psychological theory, parents' doing gender is said to have a greater socialising effect on their children because behaviour can be observed and imitated more intuitively, whereas saying gender is more abstract and complex (Bussey & Bandura, 1999).

One critique of the theory of primary socialisation is that it fails to explain why the period of childhood should be so influential compared to adolescence (see debates in Cano & Hofmeister, 2023; Cunningham, 2001b). Theoretical considerations on the so-called 'impressionable years' actually suggest that it is not childhood but late adolescence and early adulthood that is the most formative period for gender ideologies (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). Because of the reflective capacity of children, their maturity and better understanding of complex ideas like gender at this stage, the greatest changes in beliefs take place and socialising influences are particularly effective only then. When the formative phase ended, it is assumed that gender ideology becomes more stable with age and that the socialising influence, such as that of parents, that took place during the impressionable years is sustained and effective throughout the life course (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989).

Even further goes the life course approach (Elder, Kirkpatrick Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003) to the development of gender ideology, that is linked to the argument of lifelong socialisation, i.e. that socialisation is not complete with the reaching of adulthood (Hurrelmann, Bauer, Grundmann, & Walper, 2015). It assumes that actively brought about life course events or transitions, such as motherhood or marriage, are also socialisation experiences. This is because the transitions are associated with changes in gender roles and related behaviour and routines, which have a formative

effect on gender ideologies (see paragraph on exposure-based explanations below). Additionally, new life circumstances are shaped by the values and expectations that are socially assigned to these life stages (Kohli, 1976, 1985). For example, the transition to motherhood is associated with expectations of women prioritising childcare. In addition, life course research argues that earlier events, relationships and actions shape those that occur later in the life course, and that socialising life experiences are embedded in period-specific contexts and places, that they arise through social interactions, and that they are shaped by connections with the life courses of other individuals, e.g. the employment of spouses (Bernardi, Huinink, & Settersten, 2019; Elder, 1994; Elder et al., 2003). According to this, due to multifactorial changes in life circumstances and the integration of individuals into interpersonal interactions, gender ideology would be subject to constant development throughout the life course. Although there is disagreement between socialisation theories about when the most enduring socialisation experiences occur, the theories described all refer to 'exposure-based' explanations for gender ideology, which are now reviewed.

Exposure- and interest-based explanations

Exposure-based explanations for the development of gender ideology start from the fact that individuals are repeatedly exposed to new situations, contexts and experiences that contain certain gender (in)specific role expectations or, more generally, that are characterised by traditional or egalitarian ideas (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). In response to encountering such new situations or ideas, individuals re-evaluate beliefs and adapt their gender ideology. This happens not only in primary socialisation, but also in the acquisition of education, in general interpersonal experiences and events throughout the life course. Individuals are guided by the social roles and expectations related to these situations and the assumption that the associated gender ideology is something desirable and taken for granted (see section 4.1). Individual characteristics determine who can have which experiences in which situations. For example, working women have different experiences in the workplace than housewives in the home. Among the most important of such characteristics are religious affiliation and religiosity, marital status and parenthood, labour force participation and level of education (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). It is important to note, however, that the various characteristics of a person are not to be considered singularly, but that they interact in the constitution of situations and experiences.

Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) also provide the interest-based explanation for the development of gender ideology. According to this, individuals who stand to benefit from gender equality are more likely to support an egalitarian ideology because it helps them to achieve their goals. These goals may include self-actualisation, access to politics or leadership positions or economic motives. Because of the gendered structure of power relations and the division of labour to the detriment of women, women benefit from greater equality and therefore hold more egalitarian gender ideologies than men. This may be reinforced if women have a high level of education or are employed. For

example, working women may have a greater interest in equality because they want the same earning potential as men and equal levels of economic independence (interest-based). At the same time, in the workplace, women may encounter other women in leadership positions or successful working mothers (exposure-based), which leads to the adoption of egalitarian gender ideologies (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004).

The last example illustrates a main critique of the exposure-based and interest-based explanations, namely that the mechanisms cannot always be distinguished from each other. Another critique refers to the fact that the relationship between gender ideology and exposure induced through individual characteristics, in particular marital status, number of children, labour force participation and education, does not necessarily have to be causal, but may also be correlative. It is also conceivable that e.g. individuals with a traditional gender ideology are more likely to select into marriage and having children, or be less likely to be employed, and therefore have already invested less in their education in the past compared to those with an egalitarian ideology (for empirical results see chapter 3.3).

Gender ideology discrepancy

The central assumption here is that the adaptation of gender ideology is triggered by discrepancy between ideology and behaviour. When their gender ideology and their gender role behaviour are inconsistent, individuals adapt their ideology to avoid cognitive dissonance and alleviate the stress that arises from the conflict between expected and actual behaviour (Festinger, 1957; Hochschild & Machung, 1989; Kroska, 1997; Kroska & Elman, 2009). Thus, if individuals' behaviour is less egalitarian than their ideology, their ideology will become more traditional to align with their behaviour (or vice versa). An example would be a couple who actually holds an egalitarian gender ideology, but who for various reasons practises a traditional division of childcare, adjust their attitudes away from gender equality after the birth of a child (e.g. Perales et al., 2018). The discrepancy between gender ideology and gender role behaviour can have various causes including the couple's relative resources, legal-, institutional- or labour market constraints, as well as social norms (for an overview see Kroska, 1997). For example, the economic need for two incomes in the family may prevent a traditional-minded mother from giving up paid work and concentrating fully on care work. Or, unequal income potentials might hinder egalitarian-minded couples from practising an equal division of labour.

The causal sequence assumed in this theoretical explanation, gender ideology – deviant gender role behaviour – gender ideology adaptation, can be criticised. The critique corresponds with that of exposure-based mechanisms, where it was noted that the specific exposure as it occurs could just as well have been 'determined' by the individuals' ideology. It is therefore also plausible that gender ideology and gender role behaviour are mutually dependent, i.e. that ideology is adapted to behaviour, but also that ideology determines behaviour (Carlson & Lynch, 2013). The latter is

suggested by the theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour. It assumes that behaviour is preceded by an individual intention to act, which is derived from individual ideologies concerning behaviour, perceived social behavioural norms and perceptions about one's own ability to act (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973). To solve this chicken-and-egg problem concerning gender ideology and behaviour, either longitudinal data to which the appropriate causal methods are applied (e.g. Carlson & Lynch, 2013), or qualitative data are needed (e.g. Grunow & Evertsson, 2019).

4.4 Complex Interplay of Gender Ideology and Policy

As already mentioned in section 4.1, macro level gender ideology is reflected, as well as reproduced through the policy framework, which indicates that the two are interrelated and impact each other (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015; Kremer, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2005). First, how can the impact of gender ideology on family policy be explained? In order for policy to be accepted and its measures to be utilised by citizens, they need to be legitimised by the hegemonic gender ideology, i.e. they need to be reasonably in line with the gender ideology (Grunow & Veltkamp, 2016; Kremer, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Sjöberg, 2004). For example, the parental leave scheme ('Elterngeld') in Germany actually allows an equal sharing of the total 14 months of paid leave between the parents, yet this is usually not realised by parents. The non-acceptance of this feature might also be due to its discrepancy with the hegemonic gender ideology, that predominantly attributes childcare to the mother. In addition to its levels of utilisation by citizens, family policy is evaluated by the support or disapproval in elections and in order to continue to exist, policy needs to be adapted if gender ideology has changed (Raven, Achterberg, van der Veen, & Yerkes, 2011; Svallfors, 2010). Therefore, family policy reflects, depends on, and institutionalises the hegemonic gender ideology.

Second, the explanatory mechanisms for the inverse relationship, that family policy shapes gender ideology, are found in the theories of institutional learning and regime socialisation (Rohrschneider, 1996), which are essentially based on exposure-based explanations (see section 4.3). These are also able to explain the initial emergence of different gender ideologies in East and West Germany. These theories assume that individuals adapt their gender ideologies to the beliefs that underlie, and are disseminated by, the family policy framework. Political measures, and especially political changes, send normative signals, redistribute the citizens' resources and provide certain behavioural incentives or control the individual scope for action, which obviously also affects gender role behaviour (Campbell, 2012; Gangl & Ziefle, 2015; Sjöberg, 2004; Soss & Schram, 2007). The active fulfilment of those politically shaped gender roles then leads to individuals' identification with them, to positive social feedback due to behavioural conformity, and thus to a (re)evaluation of gender role behaviours and also to the development of gender ideology based on these experiences (Bielby & Bielby, 1989; Gangl & Ziefle, 2015). If the gender role behaviour shaped by

the political framework and the individual gender ideology are no longer congruent, individuals align them due to the subjective avoidance of cognitive dissonance which eventually leads to gender ideology adaptation at the macro level (see Section 4.3) (Festinger, 1957; Hochschild & Machung, 1989; Kroska, 1997; Kroska & Elman, 2009). In addition, the visibility of family policy, e.g. through targeted and widespread information about a policy measure and observable changes in people's behaviour, such as the media coverage of the introduction of 'Elterngeld' in Germany (Bujard, 2013) or the reporting on the increasing take-up of parental leave by fathers, can reinforce the policy-induced adaptation of gender ideology and expectations regarding appropriate gender role behaviour (Gangl & Ziefle, 2015; Grunow & Veltkamp, 2016; Zoch & Schober, 2018).

Pfau-Effinger (2000) expands on the theoretical concept of the interplay between family policy and gender ideology outlined above by describing their conjunction. She argues that, in addition to gender ideology at the macro level, there is a 'gender order' in every society, i.e. the gender relations that have manifested themselves in politics, but also in the two other relevant societal institutions, the labour market and the family. The gender order describes both the way in which labour and responsibilities are distributed between women and men, and the way in which these distributions are influenced and maintained by societal institutions. The complex interplay between gender order and gender ideology, and their harmonisation, gives rise to country-specific 'gender arrangements', i.e. the prevailing relationship between women and men in a given society. Because of these country-specific gender arrangements, the consequences of similar family policy measures tend to differ from country to country. The concept of gender arrangement can therefore also explain why gender roles in East and West Germany still differ today, even though these regions have shared the same policy framework for more than thirty years (Pfau-Effinger & Smidt, 2011).

Figure 4.4-1 provides an overview of the intricate relationships between gender ideologies at the three levels of society, as described above. The figure demonstrates that the gender ideologies of individuals, which are understood as the interplay of multiple beliefs concerning gender roles and which are shaped by socialisation, behaviour and socio-demographic characteristics, flow into the interaction and communication of the individual with relevant others (e.g. with peers). Such exposure to others' gender ideologies thus feeds back at the micro level. The figure also illustrates how gender ideology at the macro level emerges as a social consensus from the processes between the micro and meso levels and that it ultimately has an impact on the micro level. Furthermore, it indicates the complex interplay between the political framework and gender ideology at the macro level and thus the relevance of these framework conditions and other actors (e.g. the mass media or religion) for the (re-)production of gender ideology at the macro level. Additionally, the figure illustrates the development of gender ideology over historical time, which will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section.

Figure 4.4-1: Complex interplay of gender ideologies on the three levels of society



Source: Own depiction, inspired by Grunow and Veltkamp's figure (2016, p. 13) 'Institutions as reference points for mothers- and fathers-to-be'.

4.5 Trends in Gender Ideology

The distinction between cohort, period and age is crucial to derive the theoretical mechanisms behind the trends in gender ideology at the macro level, as well as gender ideology change at the micro level (Alwin & Scott, 1996; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Lois, 2020).

Cohort replacement theory provides an important explanation for historical trends in gender ideology at the macro level: the natural replacement of older by younger cohorts over time, i.e. population turnover (Alwin & Scott, 1996; Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Ryder, 1965). Compared to other cohorts, each cohort has had specific socialisation experiences in its childhood and adolescence (i.e. at the same age) that were decisive for its gender ideology. Older cohorts who grew up in a specific social-, economic- and political context are replaced by younger cohorts who grew up in a different environment and so, at the macro level, different gender ideologies emerge over time. For example, in Germany, cohorts whose childhood and youth took place in the GDR, in the former FRG or in reunified Germany had very different socialisation experiences with regard to feminist movements, gender equality and women's employment (Lois, 2020). Cohort replacement theory is thus based on two central assumptions: firstly, that primary socialisation in childhood and adolescence is of great importance for the development of gender ideology, and secondly, that the gender ideology formed at this time remains stable over the life

course (see section 4.3). This leads to the conclusion that cohort differences persist over historic time. The strict assumption of the stability of gender ideology has already been criticised above, and it should therefore be assumed that intra-cohort changes also contribute to gender ideology trends at the macro level.

Intra-cohort change can, on the one hand, be due to period effects. This is based on the assumption of lifelong socialisation and thus the possibility that gender ideologies can change later in life (see section 4.3). Political transformations, historical events, socio-structural developments and the like bring about changes that affect all cohorts at the same historic time (Alwin & Scott, 1996; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Ciabattari, 2001). Examples include the expansion of education in Germany, which was accompanied by an increase in female labour force participation (Lois, 2020), the pluralisation of forms of family life (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004), or the changes in German family policy since the mid-2000s. According to exposure-based explanations of gender ideology, it is exposure to such new social environments, and the experiences that individuals have in these environments that lead them to adjust their gender ideology. Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for example, argue that educational expansion, or Inglehart and Norris (2003) that economic development in modern societies is accompanied by a shift towards a more egalitarian gender ideology.

On the other hand, intra-cohort change might follow from intra-individual changes in gender ideology due to life course events and transitions (Alwin & Scott, 1996). Even though gender ideology change at the individual level is not the research objective of this dissertation, it is briefly mentioned here. When analysing those effects, age is understood as a proxy for the stage of the individual's life course. Again, exposure-based and lifelong socialisation explanations are then used to explain how individuals at different ages experience life course events, transitions and related new circumstances, e.g. the birth of a first child, which may lead to adjustments in their gender ideology (see section 4.3).

5 Data and Methods

This chapter provides a brief overview of the data sets and methods used in the four studies of the dissertation, based on general descriptions of them. The study-specific adjustments to the samples, the use of variables and the concrete application of the methods can be found in Chapter 6.

Data

The 'Women's study 1984' (Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung [ZIJ], 1984) is used to investigate the gender ideologies of GDR citizens. It was carried out by the GDR's politically controlled ZIJ as a paper and pencil interview and covers beliefs and behaviours regarding gender equality, political opinions, everyday behaviour, life goals and many more. Six items from the survey can be used to measure beliefs concerning gender roles, including one that explicitly addresses the employment of mothers with young children. The sample consists of men and women between the ages of 18 and 37, as well as some of the women's mothers (although this sub-sample is not used in this dissertation), and initially included a total of 1635 respondents. Interviewees were reached via the nationally-owned enterprises in the two districts of Erfurt and Karl-Marx-Stadt, i.e. the sample does not include unemployed people, students or people in vocational training. After reunification, the numerous data records of the ZIJ were processed, documented and archived by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences for further use (Brislinger, Hausstein, & Riedel, 1998). Nevertheless, the current analysis of the data required quite some preparation, for which I received additional information from a researcher involved in the Women's study, as well as from the ZIJ archive, some of which is stored at the German Youth Institute in Munich. All in all, and despite its limitation of not being representative, the Women's study offers a great opportunity to examine the gender ideology of people who were brought up in the DDR, were of reproductive age and were living in the DDR when the survey was conducted.

The only data set available for the former FRG from the same period as the Women's study is the GGSS, which is conducted by GESIS (GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, 2024). Since 1982 and regularly every four years since 1992 (due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021), the internationally harmonised gender role items have been collected in the GGSS for Germany. The GGSS is therefore very well suited for a period-specific analysis of beliefs concerning maternal employment in the former FRG and GDR and for tracing the development of those beliefs to the present day, as done in Figure 1-1. The GGSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey with a representative sample of about 3,000 respondents in each wave aged 18 and older living in private households in Germany. As the survey oversamples respondents in East Germany, an East-West weight is provided, but this does not need to be used if the two regions are considered separately (as is done in this dissertation). In addition, for the years 1982 and 1992 a weight is available because the sample was drawn at the household level, as opposed to the population register sample that is used for the other waves. The weighting was tested in this dissertation, but as only marginal

deviations from unweighted analyses were found, it is not used. The GGSS interviews were conducted face-to-face and in 2000, the paper and pencil interview was replaced by computer assisted personal interviewing. Since 2021, the GGSS has been completed by the respondents by themselves, either online or on paper.

Moreover, another research objective of the dissertation is to determine the gender ideologies currently found in East and West Germany, taking into account their multidimensionality. This requires a current data set providing sufficiently large sample sizes, including for the East, as well as several indicators for beliefs concerning gender roles in different life domains or concerning gender essentialism that can be used in a LCA. These requirements are met by the new study programme 'FReDA – The German Family Demography Panel' (Bujard et al., 2023), which is initiated by the Federal Institute for Population Research, GESIS and representatives of the pairfam consortium. Amongst others, FReDA addresses fertility, aspects of familial relationships, gender role behaviour, life satisfaction, well-being, attitudes and values. Respondents complete the web-based questionnaires autonomously. FReDA surveys a representative sample of people aged 18-49 living in Germany twice a year from 2021 onwards drawn in a random two-stage sampling process. Additional refresher samples will be taken regularly to replace those who have dropped out of the panel. The partners of the anchors are also interviewed. Every three years, FReDA corresponds to the German Generations and Gender Survey and, from wave 2, it will also survey those respondents who participated in the pairfam panel up to 2021. The dissertation utilises FReDA waves 1A and 1B, which were conducted between August 2021 and July 2022 and initially comprised more than 20 000 respondents. The weight provided by FReDA to adjust the sampling design and reduce non-response bias is used in the analyses.

Additionally, the dissertation's investigation of the role of socialisation in the parental home for the development of gender ideology places a number of demands on the data to be analysed. It has to contain information on both the socialisation context and the children's gender ideologies, which additionally have to be collected at different points in time. These demands are met by two instalments of the German Youth Institute's regular 'AID:A – Growing up in Germany: Everyday Worlds' survey, which has been conducted since 2009. AID:A records the everyday living habits of children and their families, their well-being, attitudes towards gender roles, values on parenting and much more. The representative, cross-sectional survey AID:A II (Rauschenbach & Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2018) was conducted between 2013 and 2015 and was based on a random selection of addresses drawn from local population registers. In total, AID:A II initially included 22 691 target persons between the ages of 0-32, and as it used a multi-actor approach, the parents of minor target persons were additionally interviewed. Then in 2018, only the adolescent children of those parents who had already participated in AID:A II between 2013-2015, were interviewed as part of the AID:A Panel III survey (Kuger et al., 2021), resulting in an initial sample of 1469 young women and men aged 15 to 27. Among other questions, the AID:A Panel III focused on respondents'

partnership status and sexual orientation, on their role models, value orientations, gender roles, and self-efficacy. It was conducted as computer-assisted telephone interview. This AID:A survey design made it possible to combine information provided by parents on their own gender ideology and division of labour, i.e. the socialisation context of 2013-2015 with information provided by their adolescent children on their ideals concerning parental employment in 2018.

Methods

In this dissertation, a variety of analytical techniques are employed to examine the cross-sectional data, with the specific methods selected according to the outcomes of interest. In Study 1, the measures for the support of maternal employment are dichotomised as they were measured completely differently in the GDR and FRG surveys. Due to these binary outcomes, logistic regressions are used to estimate the relationship between support for maternal employment and the life priorities of having children or a job under control of individual characteristics. In general, logistic regression is based on the maximum likelihood estimation and the regression coefficients initially refer to the logarithmised odds, or the odds ratios that can be calculated from these. Both can only be meaningfully interpreted in their direction (Best & Wolf, 2010). Therefore, the dissertation interprets the average marginal effects (AME), i.e. the marginal effects as the average of all individual marginal effects. This is because it allows the coefficients of the explanatory variables to be compared with AMEs hardly being affected by uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity (Mood, 2010). The AMEs can be interpreted as a change in the probability of supporting maternal employment – on average across all respondents – in percentage points.

In Studies 2 and 3 the multidimensionality of gender ideology is assessed by applying LCA. In short, this method uses observed variables (indicators) to reveal the underlying subgroups (latent classes) within the sample (Bacher & Vermunt, 2010). In the three-step approach of LCA, the first step is to estimate the parameters of the underlying probability distribution of the data (without the inclusion of covariates) using maximum likelihood estimation, and to identify the number of classes. The second step estimates the posterior class membership probabilities, and respondents are assigned to classes according to the largest probability. Additionally, the indicator-response probabilities are estimated, i.e. the conditional probability that latent class members give affirmative responses to a specific indicator. In the third step, the estimated class membership is regressed on the independent variables by applying multinomial logistic regressions. Because the three-step approach implemented in Mplus (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014) at the same time ‘fixes’ the unconditional class solution and corrects for classification errors that occur due to the probabilistic class assignment of respondents in the second step (Vermunt, 2010), this dissertation uses it instead of conducting LCA in Stata. Finally, LCA enables the estimation of the class sizes or, in the case of the dissertation, the spread of the different gender ideologies in the samples (based on the posterior class membership probabilities), as well as the interpretation of the classes, or the qualitative description of gender ideologies (based on the indicator response probabilities).

In Study 4 the dependent variable, namely the ideal weekly working hours for parents ranging between 0 and 40, is a metric measure. Therefore, multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are employed to estimate the relationship between the socialisation context and the parental work ideals as reported by young respondents. The general premise of OLS regression is the minimisation of the sum of the squared divergences between observed values and those predicted by the model (residuals) (Wolf & Best, 2010). This is pursued with the objective of attaining the most precise fit of the regression line to the data points. The OLS regression is contingent upon several specific conditions, e.g. the residuals have to be normally distributed to ensure the best linear unbiased estimators, which is referred to as 'BLUE'. Here, the regression coefficient indicates by how many units the dependent variable changes when the explanatory variable changes by one unit, controlling for the other independent variables included in the model, i.e. when they are held constant. Moreover, Study 4 asks whether the predicted association between the socialisation context and children's ideals differed by their gender, i.e. whether the gender of the children systematically moderates the effect between the ideals and the socialisation context. Therefore, interaction terms, which multiply the binary gender variable with the two main independent variables, are additionally included in the OLS models.

6 Contribution of the Four Empirical Studies

The four studies of this dissertation examine the issue of gender ideology in East and West Germany from a historical and contemporary perspective while taking into account its multidimensionality by both separately analysing beliefs concerning maternal employment and using appropriate statistical methods. The studies also assess the relevance of family policy conditions, individual characteristics and socialisation for the formation of gender ideologies. Study 1 compares the societal beliefs concerning maternal employment that existed under the different family policy regimes of the GDR and the former FRG in the 1980s. Study 2 looks at the multidimensional gender ideologies of people residing in the GDR and their congruence with the state socialist equality agenda. Studies 3 and 4 examine the current situation of multidimensional gender ideologies in East and West Germany, as well as young people's beliefs concerning the ideal involvement of mothers and fathers in paid work. Table 4.5-1 provides an overview of the studies, their publication status and my contributions.

Table 4.5-1: Overview of the four studies, publication status and own contribution

Study	Journal	Status	Own Contribution
1	Comparative Population Studies	published 04/2023	100 %
2	The History of the Family	published 08/2023	70 %
3	Zeitschrift für Soziologie	accepted 09/2024	100 %
4	Families, Relationships and Societies	published 08/2024 (online first: 01/2023)	50 %

The dissertation thus extends previous research on trends in gender ideologies in Germany by extending the observation period to, first, include the ideological situation in East Germany prior to reunification. This provides an important basis for interpreting the gender ideology disparities that persist between the regions, and for the first time, insights into the gender ideologies of the population under state socialism in the GDR. Secondly, this dissertation extends the observation period by offering insights into gender ideologies in contemporary Germany. This provides indications as to whether the trend towards egalitarianism of the last decades is continuing, especially in the wake of the experiences of the Covid-19 pandemic, and whether a norm-setting effect of the enormously changed, but currently ambivalent German family policy framework can be deduced. Moreover, the studies draw on the latest findings from international research on the multidimensionality of gender ideologies, thus extending the sparse evidence on this topic in comparison between East and West Germany. There is also a lack of empirical research for Germany on the extent to which the development of gender ideology is related to socialisation in the parental home, which is why this dissertation provides such an investigation. This offers important insights into the possible causes of the persistence of traditional gender ideologies or ideological changes. Additionally, the dissertation contributes to the methodological discourse on measuring gender ideologies by presenting results from an innovative, comparable, and concrete measure (beliefs concerning parents' ideal weekly working hours).

The following sections provide the abstracts of the studies giving a brief overview of their framing and contribution, research questions, theoretical links, data and methods, and main findings. Each of the four studies is then included in a slighty different version as it was published or, in the case of Study 3, accepted for publication. A comprehensive discussion of the studies' findings and how they relate to the overall research objective of this dissertation is presented in Chapter 7.

Study 1: Gender norms under socialism and capitalism: A historical examination of attitudes towards maternal employment in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany

The first study focuses on the observation period before reunification, and compares the beliefs concerning maternal employment in the two societies under the disparate family policy regimes of the two former German states. Furthermore, it examines whether individuals residing under these regimes ascribed differing levels of importance to having children or being employed, and how this was associated with their beliefs concerning maternal employment.

In the final phase of Germany's division, the most significant differentiating factor in the context of family life between the two regimes was maternal employment. In the FRG, maternal employment was not widespread, or was only very limited, and maternal childcare was attributed high importance. In contrast, in the GDR, full-time maternal employment (and institutional childcare) in every phase of the family cycle was strongly promoted and demanded politically, economically and ideologically, but was also realised by mothers (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Accordingly, family policy and the media, political and social discourse about it differed enormously in the two former states.

While beliefs concerning maternal employment in the FRG prior to reunification have already been delineated by means of survey data (Lois, 2020), the shape of such beliefs in the GDR society remain incompletely known. In prior research, conclusions regarding this matter were drawn from data derived from post-reunification surveys. Yet, according to exposure-based and lifelong socialisation explanations for the development of beliefs (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004), this methodology is problematic. The study represents a significant contribution to the field, as it is the first to complement a period-specific, historical comparison of beliefs concerning maternal employment in the FRG and GDR in the 1980s. Building upon the theoretical arguments regarding the complex relationship between policy and ideology (Pfau-Effinger, 2005), the study analyses the beliefs concerning maternal employment and the extent to which they were in line with the respective family policies in the GDR and the FRG. It also analyses whether the individual importance of children or employment for one's own life was aligned with the underlying ideologies of the two regimes, and the role this evaluation played for individuals' beliefs concerning maternal

employment. The study thus provides a foundation for a more comprehensive understanding of the post-reunification differences in beliefs between the two regions of Germany.

The study employs the representative GGSS from 1982 (GESIS, 2002) to analyse the FRG, and the Women's Study 1984 (ZIJ, 1984) from the former ZIJ, which has not yet been analysed in research, to gain insights into the GDR. This data was collected in two districts during the GDR's existence, thus providing information that is not 'distorted' by the experiences of reunification. The respondents were socialised and still living in the GDR at the time of the survey. The samples in both countries consisted of individuals between the ages of 18 and 37. However, the GDR data was not representative as such surveys were not feasible at the time. In addition to descriptive analyses, I employ logistic regressions to ascertain whether there was an association between the importance individuals ascribed to having a job or children and the probability of agreeing that a mother with small children can or should not be in paid work.

The analyses reveal that in the former FRG 82 % of respondents were in favour of mothers with small children not engaging in paid work. In the GDR, 64 % of respondents indicated that mothers of small children can work full-time, also meaning that a substantial portion of the respondents (more than a third) rejected this idea. In both countries, respondents considered having children and the pursuit of employment to be of great importance in their lives. Nevertheless, these factors were associated with the beliefs concerning maternal employment in disparate ways. In the GDR, the individual importance of employment (but not of having children) was significantly associated with beliefs concerning maternal employment: women who rated paid work as highly important in their lives were significantly more likely to endorse full-time maternal employment than those who rated work as unimportant. No similar association was found for men. Conversely, female and male respondents in the FRG who considered children to be of high importance in their lives were significantly more likely to agree that mothers with young children should not be employed at all (such an association was not found for the importance of employment).

The study demonstrates that policies and societal beliefs concerning maternal employment were largely consistent in both former states. This corroborates the extant findings on the belief differences between East and West Germany after reunification. Nevertheless, the study demonstrates that a notable proportion of critical assessments of maternal full-time employment existed in the GDR, which was greater than that which is often assumed from a Western perspective, or than the high maternal labour force participation in the GDR would lead us to expect. The positive association between the importance of paid work for one's own life and the endorsement of full-time maternal employment in the GDR indicates that children were less often regarded as a rationale for women to restrict their employment. Conversely, the finding for the FRG that individuals who placed high importance on having children were more likely to reject maternal employment indicates that motherhood and employment were perceived as mutually exclusive options.

In interpreting the results, it is important to consider that the ZIJ was subject to strict political control, and that the GDR data was not representative. Moreover, a direct comparison of the two former states was not possible due to the use of different data sets and indicators in the analyses.

Study 2: Varieties of egalitarianism: Gender ideologies in the late socialism of the German Democratic Republic

The second study (co-authored by F. Berth and M. Bujard) focuses on the historical observation point and moves beyond the beliefs concerning maternal employment in examining multidimensional gender ideologies in the GDR and assesses the extent to which these were congruent with the state socialist equality agenda. The study is inspired by the previous article's conclusion that beliefs concerning gender roles in the late GDR were not as uniform as has often been assumed from a Western perspective and by the consistent findings from post-reunification research, albeit mostly based on summative belief indices, which show that people living in East Germany consistently exhibit greater egalitarianism than those living in West Germany (Ebner et al., 2020). In addition, for the first time in the context of the GDR, the study aims to test the findings from Western democracies that individuals can combine egalitarian beliefs with traditional ones depending on the life domain in question (Knight & Brinton, 2017).

The multidimensionality of gender ideologies in the GDR is worked out through LCA and is contrasted with a content analysis of the GDR's family policy and institutional conditions. The study uses the aforementioned ZIJ data from 18-37 year-olds from 1984, and six items on gender roles, which essentially address beliefs concerning the dominance of men in politics and partnerships, female or maternal employment, and the division of household labour. Subsequent multinomial logistic regressions test if respondents differed in their predicted gender ideology across gender, age or marital status.

Applying the theoretical arguments of an uneven gender revolution derived from research on Western countries (Goldscheider et al., 2015), according to which an increase in women's labour market participation is not accompanied by comprehensive gender equality in all life domains, together with the concept of multidimensional gender ideologies to the late GDR, one would expect that the extensive involvement of mothers in the labour market at that time did not need to be accompanied by a consistent egalitarian gender ideology in society. At the same time, the GDR was characterised by pronounced propaganda about the 'achieved' emancipation of women and numerous de-familialistic policies to promote reconciliation for women (but not for men). However, the de facto and politically enforced equality related almost exclusively to employment participation.

The study's descriptive results show clear gender differences in beliefs, particularly with regard to beliefs concerning male dominance in relationships and whether women should be responsible for

household labour. The men surveyed were significantly more often in favour of both than women. The LCA reveals two egalitarian but distinct gender ideologies in the surveyed GDR population. On the one hand, the 'all-inclusive egalitarian' ideology comprised very egalitarian beliefs concerning both the public and the private domains and was held by more than half of the respondents. On the other hand, 44 % of respondents, the 'not-in-my-backyard-egalitarians', held an ambivalent gender ideology. They supported equality in the public domain, i.e. the participation of women in politics, employment and leadership positions. However, they had less egalitarian beliefs concerning the private domain, as they supported male dominance in the partnership, women's responsibility for housework, and that women should not develop professionally and become mothers at the same time. Men and partnered (but non-married) respondents were more likely to hold this ideology than women or singles.

The results show that even when we take the multidimensionality of gender ideology into account, the majority of GDR citizens can be characterised as egalitarian thus confirming previous findings based on post-reunification data. Obviously, there was a substantial congruence between the state socialist equality agenda and societal gender ideologies. At the same time, the gender ideology of 'not-in-my-backyard-egalitarians' showed a certain variety in beliefs concerning gender roles, which was not expected to be found in the late GDR where equality had been propagated for almost 40 years, and numerous corresponding family policy measures had been introduced. In actual fact, to a certain extent the 'not-in-my-backyard-egalitarian' ideology reflected the GDR's equality policy. This focussed on equality in the public domain by targeting the reconciliation of paid work and children for women, and a high female labour force participation rate, while increasing the birth rate. In contrast, these policies did not address the existing unequal gender division of labour within families (Gysi & Meyer, 1993). Overall, we conclude that the phenomenon of an uneven gender revolution observed by recent gender research on Western countries was already evident in the GDR in the 1980s, both at the ideological and behavioural levels.

The study is limited by the non-representativeness of the data, and that it cannot be ruled out that the totalitarian regime of the GDR reinforced socially desirable response behaviour. To better assess this potential problem, the study also includes a detailed description of the conditions and activities of social science research under the GDR regime. Furthermore, the cross-sectional data did not allow for the investigation of a causal relationship between the GDR regime's equality policy and societal gender ideology.

Study 3: Consistent Egalitarianism or Heterogeneous Belief Patterns? Gender Ideologies in Contemporary East and West Germany

The third study then shifts the focus to the present and asks which gender ideologies can currently be found in East and West Germany, whether these are multidimensional, and whether gender

differences can be identified in the regions.

The study builds on international research suggesting that a long process of constant liberalisation of beliefs concerning gender roles has levelled off in recent decades (Cotter et al., 2011). In the search for explanations, there is a consensus that a one-dimensional understanding of gender ideology as a consistent structure between traditional and egalitarian is too simplistic. Recent international comparative studies applying a multidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology show that, alongside consistently traditional or egalitarian gender ideologies, there are heterogeneous ones, in which beliefs along several dimensions are structured independently. In addition, egalitarian tendencies are still observed, as heterogeneous ideologies replace the consistent traditional ones. For Germany, however, the very few available studies that are methodologically able to reveal this multidimensionality of gender ideologies are based on older data and only seldom differentiate between East and West. However, current and differentiated insights into gender ideologies are very important, especially in view of the paradigm shift in German family policy since the early 2000s and the experiences of families during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Therefore, this study uses recent representative data for Germany from 2021 from the newly established FReDA Panel (Bujard et al., 2023). In line with current research, LCA is applied to both the East and West German sample to identify multidimensional gender ideologies. Eight items from FReDA on working mothers, male dominance in the public domain and the division of care work can be used for this purpose. Following exposure- and interest-based theoretical considerations, subsequent multinomial logistic regressions within the three-step approach (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014) analyse whether there are robust gender differences in the ideologies, which other individual characteristics (e.g. education, relationship status) contribute to holding a certain gender ideology and whether these differ between the regions.

The study shows that a consistent egalitarian ideology was the most widespread in both East and West Germany (held by 76 % of respondents in the East and by 52 % in the West) in 2021. But the egalitarian essentialist gender ideology was also represented in both regions. This ideology sees women as better suited to and responsible for the tasks in the family and private domain, while supporting equality in the public domains of politics, education and labour market participation. A quarter of people in East Germany and 21 % of those in West Germany held this gender ideology. The East-West difference already identified in existing research was confirmed by the fact that only in the West (11 % of respondents) was a traditional gender ideology found in which traditional beliefs concerning gender roles were supported (apart from supporting equal access to university and politics). Likewise, only in the West did 17 % of respondents endorse intensive parenting, which is characterised by the support of engagement on the part of both parents in childcare, and the prioritisation of childcare over maternal employment. Both the interest- and exposure-based explanations for gender ideologies were confirmed with women in both parts of the country more

likely to hold the egalitarian ideology than men, even when all other predictors were controlled for, and because lower (compared to higher) educated respondents had higher chances of holding any other gender ideology than the egalitarian one.

The study can thus show that even in the period following the experience of families during the Covid-19 pandemic, when people experienced the double burden of caring for children while working from home, the majority of people in East and West Germany had very egalitarian gender ideologies. In addition, there was the heterogeneous gender ideology of egalitarian essentialism which assumes an innate gender difference that is manifested in care work, which is why women are seen as better suited to it. This ideology was not identified in the two regions in previous studies. However, it could be a reflection of the now effective norm-setting of the changed German family policy, which is still in transition and currently offers ambivalent gender role orientations. The study again confirms the well-known East-West differences for the time of thirty years after reunification: egalitarian gender ideology was significantly more prevalent in the East, and there was no traditional gender ideology to be found there, although it still persisted in the West. Moreover, the importance of education in shaping egalitarian gender ideologies was highlighted, which places a particular responsibility on educational institutions.

The study's limitations primarily concern the indicators used, which focus mainly on the role of mothers and displayed little variance, as most respondents provided egalitarian answers. Additionally, the author's coding of the indicators, along with the interpretation and labelling of gender ideologies, warrants further discussion.

Study 4: Attitudes of Young People in Germany towards Parental Involvement in Paid Work: Evidence of Intergenerational Transmission

The fourth study (in collaboration with J. Bernhardt, V. Heintz-Martin, C. Zerle-Elsäßer) of this dissertation also looks at the present or, to some extent at the future, focusing again on beliefs concerning maternal (and paternal) employment. It investigates the beliefs of young people – i.e. future mothers and fathers – concerning the ideal involvement in paid work of parents with young children in relation to their own socialisation experiences in the parental home.

The study tests the exposure-based explanation of gender ideologies, in which parental socialisation is seen as a central predictor. In particular, the study looks at the weekly working hours of mothers and fathers that are considered ideal by young people, and the associations between these beliefs and their own parents' employment arrangements and gender ideologies a few years earlier. It also examines whether parental behaviour or ideologies represent the more significant socialisation channel and whether these are associated differently with daughters' or sons' beliefs.

Previous international studies showed that offspring hold more egalitarian gender ideologies if their mothers were employed during the offspring's childhood, if there was a more egalitarian division of housework between their parents, or if their parents supported egalitarian beliefs concerning

gender roles (see Halimi et al., 2016 for an overview). While international studies consistently demonstrate this 'intergenerational transmission' of gender ideology, such an investigation remains a research gap for Germany, probably due to a lack of appropriate data. Now, the German data from two waves of AID:A (Kuger et al., 2021) provide an opportunity to fill that gap. In 2018, young people aged 15-21, whose parents had already been asked a few years earlier about their labour force participation and gender ideologies, were interviewed about their ideals on parental employment. Another innovative aspect of the data is that it measures children's gender ideology not through abstract statements on gender roles, but through a concrete and comparable measure (weekly working hours for mothers and fathers with a child under the age of three). This enables to test the degree to which young people generally prefer fewer working hours for both parents or a gendered division of paid labour.

Applying linear regressions, young people's ideals on weekly working hours for parents are regressed on their own parents' doing gender – the way they divided paid work – and their parents' saying gender – which comprise the gender-role values that mothers held – while controlling stepwise for potential confounders. Interaction terms are introduced to identify differences between daughters and sons.

On average, the young people interviewed considered 20 hours of paid work per week for mothers of young children and 30 hours per week for fathers to be ideal. The regression results show that young people whose parents shared paid work (rather) equally and whose mothers held egalitarian gender ideologies some years ago, supported several weekly working hours for mothers more compared to those adolescents raised in a male breadwinner model or with less egalitarian mothers. At the same time, young people were in favour of fewer working hours for fathers the more egalitarian their mother was. There were no differences in these associations between daughters and sons. Additional analyses show a slightly stronger relationship between young people's ideals and their parents' division of paid labour than with their mothers' gender ideologies.

Descriptively, the study shows that young people who have not yet started a family were in favour of more working hours for mothers and fewer for fathers compared to the weekly working hours predominantly realised by parents in Germany. They therefore favoured a redistribution of paid work for parents of children under the age of three, but nevertheless a gender-specific division. Furthermore, the results for Germany show that socialisation in the parental home played a decisive role in shaping children's beliefs concerning maternal and paternal employment and that mothers in particular acted as agents of socialisation.

The main limitations of the study are the fact that neither the association with the gender ideologies of fathers, nor with part-time working fathers and young people's ideals could be taken into account. Furthermore, the cross-sectional data did not allow any conclusions on causal impacts or long-term effects of socialisation on children's ideals.

6.1 Study 1

Accepted Manuscript

Gender Norms under Socialism and Capitalism: A Historical Examination of Attitudes towards Maternal Employment in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany*

Published as:
Kleinschrot, L. (2023). Gender Norms under Socialism and Capitalism: A Historical Examination of Attitudes towards Maternal Employment in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. *Comparative Population Studies, 48,* 151–182.
https://doi.org/10.12765/CPoS-2023-07.

Abstract:
Research on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the 1980s shows a high level of congruence between conservative social policy deterring mothers from employment and traditional societal gender norms. In contrast, little is known about whether people in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) agreed with the socialist idea of continuous full-time maternal employment. Based on unexploited GDR data from 1984 and a description of contemporary social policy, this study examines attitudes towards maternal employment, whether they were related to individual preferences for work or children, and their congruence with the socialist policy. The same questions are examined for the FRG using data from 1982.
Results for the GDR indicate that one third of respondents rejected the socialist idea of maternal full-time employment, with individual work preferences being decisive for respondents' assessments. In the FRG, there was a high degree of agreement with the gender norm of maternal non-employment, with this being dependent on individual preferences for children. These findings complement post-reunification evidence on East-West-differences in gender norms and provide insights into attitudes under Eastern European state socialism.

*This article belongs to a special issue on 'Demographic Developments in Eastern and Western Europe Before and After the Transformation of Socialist Countries'.

1 Introduction

The employment participation and reproductive behaviour of women in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) differed substantially. Women in the socialist GDR had children at an earlier age and were more frequently and extensively employed (Goldstein/Kreyenfeld 2011). Women in the capitalist FRG, on the other hand, focused more on housework and childcare. These behavioural differences are often attributed to the political frameworks (Pfau-Effinger/Smidt 2011). While the GDR – which constantly sought to simultaneously compete with and demarcate itself from the West (Trappe 1996) – pushed for the full integration of women into the labour force and provided for institutional childcare from the first months of life, social policy in the FRG strengthened the male-breadwinner model and the maternal provision of childcare, especially for young children (Adler et al. 2016). This article adds to the knowledge about the stark differences regarding maternal labour force behaviour and respective policy in the two former states by investigating individual attitudes towards maternal employment.

Adopting a historical sociological perspective enables the prevailing gender norms to be examined in the former FRG, and the extent to which they corresponded to the policy framework. West German survey data starting in the early 1980s show that social policy and cultural norms concerning maternal employment were largely consistent. For example, shortly before German reunification in 1990, almost three quarters of respondents in the FRG agreed with the statement that pre-school aged children are bound to suffer if their mothers go out to work (Berth 2019). For the GDR, a similar investigation of gender norms has not yet been possible because the surveys developed in the West were only conducted in East Germany after reunification.

This study addresses this research gap, as it aims to assess the congruence of gender norms and social policy in the GDR by analysing attitudes towards maternal employment and by describing the GDR's socialist women's policy. In detail, the study descriptively examines the data and applies logistic regressions to find out which attitudes existed towards the employment of mothers with young children in GDR society, what role individual preferences for work or children played here, and to what extent these attitudes corresponded to the socialist idea of continuous full-time maternal employment. Unexploited attitudinal data[1] from the time of the GDR are used for these analyses. These data are from a survey ('Women's Study') conducted by the Central Institute for Youth Research ('Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung') in 1984. They offer a hitherto unexploited opportunity to analyse the attitudes of cohorts who were socialised in the GDR, were of reproductive age, and lived in the GDR at the time of the survey. However, the methodological limitations of data collected by a politically controlled research institute in the GDR need to be considered. In

[1] So far, the data have only been analysed descriptively in the context of project reports by the ZIJ at the time of the GDR. An overview of the study reports that are accessible can be found on the GESIS homepage: https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA6138?doi=10.4232/1.6138.

addition, the results of an equivalent analysis addressing the same questions but using data from the FRG in the early 1980s, the German General Social Survey (GGSS) from 1982[2], are also presented. It should be noted that these two datasets do not allow a one-to-one comparison of the two former states.

This study not only enhances German attitudinal research by including the period before reunification, but it is also of interest to international discussions. First, it contributes to the comparatively scarce quantitative research on gender norms under socialist regimes in Eastern Europe (focusing on Hungary, e.g. Panayotova/Brayfield 1997; Braun/Scott 2009), and lays some groundwork for interpreting cultural developments after 1989. Second, the survey data from the GDR allow for a period-specific examination of a socialist and a capitalist European state in the early 1980s. In addition, the article takes a step towards accessing the wealth of survey data collected by the Central Institute for Youth Research in the GDR during its almost 25 years of existence (Friedrich 1991).

In the next section, an outline of the theoretical background of the study is given, followed by a description of the social policy frameworks in the GDR and FRG at the time of the surveys. In section 4, the current state of research, as well as the hypotheses for the analyses are presented. In section 5, the methodological approach is described. Finally, the results are reported and discussed.

2 Theoretical background

In the literature, gender norms are understood as consensually defined and socially known beliefs and expectations concerning the behaviour of women and men within and outside the family (Duncan/Edwards 1997; Pfau-Effi nger/Smidt 2011; Grunow/ Veltkamp 2016), e.g. beliefs about the extent to which men should participate in childcare or whether women should actively engage in politics. This study will be looking at one of the aspects of gender norms, namely beliefs concerning maternal employment.

Various mechanisms for the potential congruence of gender norms and social policy are theoretically discussed and, feminist literature in particular emphasises the complex interplay and continual mutual impacts of the two (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Kremer 2007). Social policy reflects and institutionalises the gender norms of a society, for instance, as demonstrated by the lack of institutional childcare for under 3-year-olds in the FRG in the 1980s. Since social policy instruments, according to this understanding, include consensual solutions to the motherhood-paid work arrangement, they function as an ‘institutional point of reference’ (Grunow/Veltkamp 2016: 12-13) for the appropriate employment behaviour of mothers (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Kremer 2007), and serve ‘as normative anchors’ (Gangl/Ziefle 2015: 519) in forming individual preferences and

[2] Since the relevant question was not asked in the GGSS 1984, the 1982 wave is used.

attitudes towards work and children (Sjöberg 2004). In this sense, social policy is embedded in and legitimised by the normative societal context, meaning that it may experience support or disapproval, for example in elections (Raven et al. 2011). Consequently, social policy is also assumed to be adapted in response to changing societal norms (Svallfors 2010).

At the same time, specific social policy instruments, such as the extensive supply of institutional day-care in the GDR, determine parents' scope of action (Sjöberg 2004). As a result of individuals' experiences in role behaviour within this policy framework, they adapt their preferences accordingly. Following exposure theory, greater exposure to a work-related setting, e.g. by being employed, will tend to increase mothers' preferences for work (Gangl/Ziefle 2015). In addition to individual experiences, 'social multiplier effects' (Gangl/Ziefle 2015: 519) can arise, as observing relevant others' role behaviour, e.g. other mothers working, leads an individual to internalise this behaviour and shape its preferences accordingly.

Indeed, the GDR's totalitarian regime even sought to actively harness the role of policy as a determinant of experiences and as a normative anchor. East German state socialism permeated social life and actively intervened in it. Freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly, but also free elections and culture were subject to the hegemony of the state party (Weber 2011). At the same time, there were areas, in which citizens could lead their 'private' lives more or less autonomously, as long as they did not challenge the state's monopoly on power (Wolle 1998; Lindenberger 2002; Bauerkämper 2005). Therefore, the question arises of how successful the GDR regime was in its endeavour to normatively shape society in terms of gender roles. This study tries to answer this broad question by looking at one part of it – i.e. attitudes towards maternal employment – in more detail.

How experiences with gender roles can become crucial for individual attitudes and preferences is described by Bielby and Bielby (1989). They argue that actively fulfilling family or work roles defined by gender norms leads to identification with these roles, and to commitment to the life domains of family or work. The strength of commitment depends on the extent to which the gender role behaviour is meaningful and identity-forming for the individual. Thus, commitments bind individuals to the gender norms of the society they live in (Bielby 1992). If mothers are employed, identities in both domains emerge. And in a society with traditional gender norms, a conflict arises, which forces mothers to trade off one domain against the other because they are expected to focus on care work. Working fathers, on the other hand, do not experience an identity conflict because their work identity coincides with the normative expectation of men as the family breadwinners.

In a way, Hakim (2002) argues the other way round, since she states that individual preferences for work or children are the main predictors of parents' work and care behaviour. Differentiating between women according to their preferences, leads to three ideal typical categories in any society

(Hakim 2002). First, adaptive women prefer to combine employment and children without giving absolute priority to either of the two. They therefore react strongly in their preferences to social and labour market policy. Second, there are work-centred women, for whom employment or an equivalent activity in the public sphere (e.g. sport, politics) is most important to their lives, and thus they arrange their family life around their work and are more responsive to opportunities than to policies. Third, home-centred women prioritise children and the household and prefer not to work outside the home. This group is strongly responsive to social, but not to labour market policies. According to Hakim (2002), men differ significantly from women in their preferences, as they are very homogeneously work-centred – something that is also shaped by societal norms.

Even though an empirical disentanglement of the discussed mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper and not possible with the data used here, the theoretical background on the complex interplay is important for understanding why not only gender role behaviour and social policy might be congruent, but also social policy and attitudes or preferences towards work and children. Before the hypotheses for the analysis are derived in section 4, the social policy framework of both former states in the early 1980s will be described.

3 Social policy in the FRG and GDR

This section presents both states' social policies focusing on maternal employment at the time of data collection ('GGSS' in 1982 and 'Women's Study' in 1984).

The FRG in 1982[3]

In the FRG, the policy framework of the conservative-corporatist welfare state not only supported the male-breadwinner model, but also conformed to the gender norm according to which women should prioritise childcare over employment, and children especially at a very young age need their mothers and the care only she can provide (Schütze 1986; Oechsle 1998; McDonald 2000; Pfau-Effinger 2004). For many years, the domestic responsibilities of married women were even prescribed by the marriage and family law in the FRG. Only in 1977 was this law reformed, removing the wife's duty to maintain the household, and the husband's de jure final decision on his wife's employment. While many kindergarten places for 3-6 year-olds were created before 1982, there were hardly any day-care places for under 3-year-olds or school-aged children. The tax and social security system favoured the male-breadwinner model. Paid maternity leave for employed mothers consisted of just 14 weeks of full wage compensation, which could be followed by another

[3] The description for the FRG is briefer than for the GDR, but see Gerlach (2008) for a detailed description of individual family policy measures, and Ostner (1993) and Kolinsky (1989) for comprehensive overviews of social policy in the FRG in the 1980s.

four months in which 750 Deutsche Mark per month were paid, and child (sickness) benefits were available (Helwig 1993; Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Leitner et al. 2008)[4].

Women's employment rates (51 percent in 1982) were considerably lower than those of men (83 percent) (Statistisches Bundesamt 1984: 96), and almost one third of employed women did not work in a full-time job of 40 hours per week, mainly for family reasons. Mostly, part-time jobs involved less than 21 hours of work per week (Statistisches Bundesamt 1984: 97; Rosenfeld et al. 2004). The male-breadwinner model, in which men were mainly responsible for paid work and women for care work, was the most frequent family model in the FRG (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Despite this, in the FRG there were working mothers, mostly in part-time and often due to financial reasons, but also because they did not want to leave the workplace (Becker- Schmidt 2010). In 1982, 36 percent of mothers whose youngest child was under six years of age were employed (Statistisches Bundesamt 1984: 103). Nevertheless, maternal employment remained the exception if there were children under the age of three, not least because of the lack of institutional childcare for this age group. In 1982 only 26 245 places were available for under 3-year-olds, which amounted to a childcare rate of 2 percent (Bundesminister für Jugend Familie, Frauen und Gesundheit 1986: 36).

The GDR in 1984

The GDR state party regime followed 'the Marxist conviction that women's emancipation requires their formal participation in the labor force' (Adler/Brayfield 1997: 248), so the socialist gender norm was that of a mother who worked fulltime throughout all phases of the family and who put her children (of any age) into institutional day-care (Gysi/Meyer 1993). Theoretically, generous policies were put in place to enable formal gender equality, but in real life women came to be treated as 'reproducers and producers' while men were seen only as 'producers' (Trappe 1996: 358). In fact, women remained primarily responsible for care work (Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Banaszak 2006; Lee et al. 2007). Although, since employment was regarded as crucial for emancipation, the regime did promote women's employment for reasons of gender equality, economic motives were also at play, as women constituted an important resource for the socialist planned economy (Trappe 1996).

Consequently, the GDR had one of the highest female employment rates[5] in the world (Lee et al. 2007), standing at 79 percent in 1984 (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik 1986), and at the same time, the total fertility rate of 1.7 was slightly higher than that of the FRG (1.5 in 1982) (Winkler 1990: 25; GENESIS online 2021). Although women were almost as likely as men to be

[4] The paid parental leave ('Erziehungsurlaub') for all parents was only introduced in 1986.

[5] The employment rates in the GDR and FRG cannot be compared directly, as the definition of employed persons differed (in the GDR mothers on 'baby year', apprentices and employees of certain sectors, e.g. state security, were excluded), as did data collection (the GDR had full data collection via employers, whereas the FRG statistics are based on surveys, partial and random sample collection and on secondary statistical collections). For details see Fritz (2000). There is no information on maternal employment in the published statistical yearbooks of the GDR. However, this should not differ greatly from the female employment rate, since childlessness was very low (Gysi/Meyer 1993; Goldstein/Kreyenfeld 2011).

employed in the GDR, they more often held positions of lower responsibility, often below their qualifications, and were paid less than men[6] (Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Banaszak 2006; Lee et al. 2007). Most employed women worked full-time, although part-time employment (which mostly meant working between 25 and 35 hours per week) was not entirely unusual (Winkler 1990). The 27 percent of women not working the regular 43.75 hours per week (Winkler 1990: 107) were mostly over 35, i.e. not mothers with young children, and worked less for health reasons, or because they were in their pre-retirement phase (Winkler 1990; Rosenfeld et al. 2004). One of the factors contributing to the high female employment rate was the high availability of day-care places, also for children under three years of age. In 1984, 330 812 young children attended day-care, which resulted in an official childcare rate of 69 percent[7] (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik 1986). Further factors might have been that work avoidance was prosecuted by law and could even be punished by imprisonment, being employed was seen as a moral obligation in East German socialism, many social entitlements were connected to full-time employment, and often one wage alone was not sufficient to support the family (Trappe et al. 2015). In addition, women worked for self-affirmation and financial independence, in order to be part of social networks (the nationally-owned enterprises even offered leisure events, holiday trips etc.), and because work was considered a core value in life (Gysi/Meyer 1993; Lindenberger 2002; Leitner et al. 2008).

As birth rates declined from the mid-1960s onwards, a wide range of policy measures were introduced to better support women in reconciling family and paid work (Nickel 1998; Leitner et al. 2008; Trappe et al. 2015). Public childcare was further expanded (children could enter from the age of five months); mothers with two children were allowed to reduce their weekly working hours to 40 without a wage reduction; maternity leave with full wage compensation covered 26 weeks and could be followed by a well-compensated (50-90 percent) paid 'baby year' (before 1986 only mothers with a second child were eligible); a birth bonus of 1 000 Mark was paid; extra holidays and child (sickness) benefits were given to mothers; and mothers were entitled to one paid day off work per month for housework (Winkler 1990; Helwig 1993; Schmidt 1996; Nickel 1998). Since gender equality (that was predominantly focused on employment) was 'issued' by the male-dominated political leadership, in contrast to equality evolving from a feminist movement, Nickel (1998: 26) speaks of 'patriarchal equality' in the GDR.

[6] Studies showed that the gender pay gap was quite similar in both states (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). For the time of reunification, Szydlik (1994) calculated a gender pay gap of 18 percent in the FRG and 15 percent in the GDR.

[7] The childcare rate was the ratio of children in day-care to those who were eligible for institutional care. Thus, those children whose mothers were eligible for paid leave, e.g. during the 'baby year', were not taken into account.

4 Literature review and hypotheses

The numerous social policy instruments in the GDR and state socialist propaganda about the importance of employment – which had already been in place for 35 years by the time of the survey and thus had had a great impact on the respondents' socialisation – can be expected to have functioned as a 'normative anchor' (Kremer 2007; Gangl/Ziefle 2015; Grunow/Veltkamp 2016), and therefore to have set the norm of combining motherhood and full-time employment. The exposure to employment and institutional childcare might have also strengthened maternal preferences for full-time employment, which, since almost all mothers in the GDR were employed, could have been reinforced by a 'social multiplier effect' (Gangl/ Ziefle 2015). Several empirical studies – e.g. using the available GGSS waves from 1991 until now – show that over this time period, people in East Germany were far less negative in their opinion about maternal employment than those in West Germany (Banaszak 2006; Lee et al. 2007; Bauernschuster/Rainer 2012; Ebner et al. 2020). In 2016, nearly 30 years after reunification, East German women born between 1950 and the mid-1970s – who were primarily socialised in the GDR – are those who most often agree with the statement that a full-time working mother can usually have just as meaningful a relationship to their toddler as a mother who does not work (around 90 percent agreement), compared to the East cohorts born after 1975 (79 percent agreement), or West German cohorts born before 1950 (69 percent agreement), between 1950 and 1975 (63 percent), and after 1975 (58 percent) (Barth et al. 2020). Following the theoretical arguments and post-reunification findings, it is expected that the vast majority of people in the GDR supported the socialist idea of full-time maternal employment (hypothesis 1).

Referring to the same theoretical mechanisms (social policy as a normative anchor and social multiplier effects), the FRG's conservative-corporatist social policy, including the lack of institutional childcare and its tax and social security system that favoured the male-breadwinner model, could have supported the norm of maternal childcare. Furthermore, the role experience of being a housewife, as well as the observation of other non-working mothers in the FRG might have led individuals to adapt their attitudes accordingly. Thus, it is expected that in the early 1980s people in the FRG were more negative in their opinion about maternal employment than people in the GDR (hypothesis 2).

Since living up to gender norms in the GDR meant full-time employment for mothers, following identity formation theory (Bielby/Bielby 1989) one could expect that women in the GDR were strongly committed to both work and children. And in fact, studies show that shortly after reunification and until recently, people in East Germany had high preferences for children and work, and did not prioritise one over the other (Braun et al. 1994; Adler/Brayfield 1997; Arránz Becker et al. 2010; Beblo/Görges 2018; Görges 2021). This is particularly true for the oldest cohorts, who

had experienced the social policy of the GDR regime (Beblo/Görges 2018; Görges 2021). Thus, it is expected, that people in the GDR with high preferences for work, had a higher likelihood of agreeing with the socialist idea of full-time maternal employment compared to those with low preferences for work (hypothesis 3a). With regard to preferences for children, it can be stated that female employment in the GDR was not affected by motherhood because of the extensive availability of institutional childcare and other reconciliation measures. Therefore, no association between individual preferences for children and the likelihood of agreeing with fulltime maternal employment is expected (hypothesis 4a). Due to the equally high participation rates of men and women in the labour market, which was probably also accompanied by a high commitment to employment among women, it is expected that the association between the preferences for work and the likelihood of agreeing with mothers' employment did not differ between women and men in the GDR (hypothesis 5a).

In the FRG, due to the high prevalence of traditional gender norms (Lee et al. 2007) and the corresponding social policy framework supporting the male-breadwinner model, one could expect an identity conflict for mothers who planned to work (Bielby/Bielby 1989), which would compel them to trade off children for work. Thus, it is hypothesised that either people who had low preferences for work, or those who had high preferences for children, were more likely to agree that mothers with young children should not work (hypothesis 3b and 4b).

However, a gender difference in the impact of preferences for children or work on attitudes towards maternal employment could be expected in the FRG. Empirically, it has been shown that women in the FRG rate work as less important, and having children as more important to their lives than men (Beblo/Görges 2018; Görges 2021). Following the theoretical arguments on identity formation, men in the FRG particularly emphasised their identity as the family breadwinner, and according to Hakim (2002) could be categorised as 'work-centred'. Thus, regardless of whether they had high preferences for children or for work, they are expected to be more likely to agree that their female partners should not be employed, but should care for the children. In contrast, 'work-centred' women would be expected to arrange their lives around employment (Hakim 2002), and to be less likely to agree that small children suffer if their mothers work. However, if they were 'home-centred' (Hakim 2002) and had developed a strong family identity, it could be expected that they were more likely to agree to maternal non-employment to avoid a conflict of identities. It is thus hypothesised that the impact of preferences for children or work on attitudes towards maternal employment differed by gender in the FRG (hypothesis 5b).

5 Method

5.1 Sample and measures: GDR

In the GDR, social science research was strictly politically controlled. Representative studies were rare because an elaborate approval procedure at the highest political level was required, which interfered with research topics and survey instruments. The empirical studies were therefore mostly regionally confined so that only the subordinate political authorities had to be involved (Brislinger et al. 1998). The data collection then took place independently, and predominantly in the form of paper-pencil surveys conducted anonymously in group settings (Brislinger et al. 1998; Griese 1991). Even though respondents might not have had full confidence in the promised anonymity, the surveys were also seen as an opportunity to express opinions without fear of consequences[8] (see also Griese 1991). Besides, the questions of the 1984 'Women's Study' were rather innocuous compared to those of other surveys, which asked, for example, about the personal evaluation of the socialist regime. Even though the results of studies had to be kept secret and evaluated in line with political convictions, empirical research in the GDR followed western scientific standards (Bertram 1997; Brislinger et al. 1998; Griese 1991).

One of the two datasets used in this paper, the 'Women's Study' 1984, was conducted by the GDR's Central Institute for Youth Research (ZIJ) (Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung, Leipzig 1984)[9]. The ZIJ existed from 1966 to 1989 in Leipzig and undertook – mostly quantitative – social science research on the attitudes and living conditions of youths and young people (for example regarding work, family, education, sexuality or leisure) in the GDR. In its later phase, it additionally included a small working group on women's studies (Friedrich 1991).

The ZIJ 'Women's Study 1984' asked women and men about, among other things, their life planning, general goals in life, leisure activities, preferred ways of living, political opinions and attitudes, as well as behaviour relating to gender equality. The respondents answered the questionnaires partly at their workplace and partly at home. The sample came from the former districts of Erfurt and Karl- Marx-Stadt[10] where respondents were approached via their workplace. The data are not representative of the population of the GDR as a whole, but consist of an initial sample of 1623 respondents who were between 18 and 37 years old. The following analyses only include respondents who gave information on their gender (N=112 missing values) and the dependent variable (N=192 missing). Due to some further missing values, the final sample consists of 1300 respondents, of whom 76 percent are female and 24 percent are male (see Table 6.1-1). The overrepresentation of women needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results.

[8] This assessment originates from Dr Uta Schlegel, with whom we spoke in preparation for this paper on 17.12.2020. She was a former researcher and department head at the ZIJ.

[9] After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the majority of social science data collected in the GDR were checked, the content and methodology were specified and were then archived for secondary analyses (Brislinger et al. 1998).

[10] Karl-Marx-Stadt is now called Chemnitz.

The dependent variable for the GDR regression analyses is whether the respondent agreed with the socialist norm of full-time maternal employment. This is captured by respondents' answers to the following question: 'Is it desirable to limit your own/a mother's employment activity if children under three are part of the family?' The three answer options were 'by all means', 'under certain circumstances only', 'not at all'. To construct the binary coded dependent variable, the last two answers are combined and coded as '1'. Since mothers with at least two young children could reduce their working time to 40 hours per week on full pay, the answer option 'under certain circumstances only' is also in line with the socialist idea of full-time maternal employment. The answer 'by all means' indicates disagreement with full-time maternal employment with young children, as it prioritises childcare over employment. It is coded as '0'.

Table 6.1-1: Descriptive statistics

	GDR 1984		FRG 1982	
	% / Mean	SD	% / Mean	SD
Agreement with the Norm concerning Maternal Employment:				
No	36.5		17.8	
Yes	63.5		82.2	
Preferences for Work:				
Low	15.2		10.1	
High	84.8		89.9	
Preferences for Children:				
Low	14.3		11.4	
High	85.7		88.6	
Family Status:				
Single	13.0		41.7	
LAT / Married, living apart	15.5		2.1	
Cohabiting	13.6		2.8	
Married	57.9		53.4	
Employment Status:				
Not employed	n.a.		37.2	
Part-time	8.3		11.1	
Full-time	91.7		51.7	
Education:				
Low	9.9		10.3	
Middle	76.9		62.2	
High	13.2		27.5	
Age	24.3	3.5	27.8	5.5
Gender:				
Female	76.2		53.6	
Male	23.9		46.4	
N	1300		1009	

Source: Women's Study 1984, GGSS 1982; own calculations.

The two central explanatory variables reflect respondents' preferences for work or children, measured by the question: 'Indicate how important the life goals or areas of life mentioned are for you'. Respondents rated the items from 1 = totally unimportant to 4 = very important. For the analyses, the variables were dichotomised by grouping the first three response categories as not

very important as an indication of low preference, and the last category as very important (high preference), since the vast majority of responses for these items fell into category four.

The logistic regression models control for respondents' gender, age, education, employment status, and family status, as several studies have shown that these factors are significant predictors of attitudes towards maternal employment (Alwin/Scott 1996; Panayotova/Brayfield 1997; Bolzendahl/Myers 2004; Brooks/Bolzendahl 2004). The problem of the limited cross-national comparability of educational qualifications has already been pointed out (e.g. Hadjar/Berger 2010; Schneider 2016). Here, the recommendation made by Hadjar and Berger (2010) of classifying education into three categories (low, middle, high) is followed (see Appendix Table A 6.1-1). Employment status was categorised by respondents as part-time or full-time, but their weekly working hours were not recorded. Because respondents were recruited via their employers, the category 'not employed' did not exist in the GDR data, which has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, this does not substantially limit the data, since in the GDR, unemployment in the surveyed age group was almost non-existent. Family status is coded into single, living-apart-together (LAT), cohabiting and married.

5.2 Sample and measures: FRG

For the FRG analyses, the dataset of the German General Social Survey cumulation 1980-1986 for the year 1982 is used (GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften 2002). The survey was conducted in West Germany (including West Berlin), and only persons with German citizenship were interviewed. The population from which the sample was drawn, consisted of all persons eligible to vote and living in private households. In the early GGSS waves (1982-1992, 1998), the representative sample was generated through ADM sample design with the selection stages 1) electoral districts, 2) households, 3) persons in households. Since with this procedure, a respondent's chance of selection depends on the size of the household, a weight should be applied for analyses at the individual level. In research practice, this requirement is usually not met because (un-)weighted results do not differ or do so only slightly (GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften 2021). This is also the case for this paper: the use of weighted data changes the results only marginally, thus the results presented are unweighted.

In the 1982 GGSS wave, 2991 persons initially took part. To ensure better comparability with the GDR sample, the FRG sample is also adjusted to the age range of 18-37. The final analytic sample for this paper comprises N=1009, of whom 54 percent are female and 46 percent are male respondents (see Table 6.1-1). The dependent variable for the FRG regression analyses is whether respondents agreed with the norm of maternal non-employment. It is operationalised by respondents' agreement with the statement 'A small child is bound to suffer if his or her mother goes out to work'[11] on a four-point scale from 'completely agree' to 'completely disagree'. For

[11] The English translations were taken from Terwey/Baumann (2013).

comparability with the GDR analyses, the dependent variable is also dichotomised. The two affirmative response options are taken together and coded as '1', which signifies support for the idea that mothers with small children should not be employed. The two negative answer options are coded as '0', meaning a person did not agree with the then prevailing norm concerning maternal employment.

The two central explanatory variables are also the preferences for work and children. Respondents answered the question, 'The cards here list various spheres of life. We would like to know how important each of these spheres of life is for you', on a seven-point scale with only the two endpoints headed '(1) unimportant' and '(7) very important'. For the analyses, as it was not made explicit what the middle category actually meant and 'important' was given one additional rating ('very') which 'unimportant' did not receive, the variables are dichotomised by grouping 1 to 3 as unimportant, meaning low preferences and 4 to 7 as important, meaning high preferences.

The same control variables as in the GDR analyses are included. For the employment status respondents' self-categorisation[12] as 'not employed' (which includes unemployed, housewife, doing compulsory military/alternative community service, retired, at school/university/in training, not working for other reasons), 'part-time' and 'full-time' is used. Family status is coded as 'single', 'married but living separately'[13] , 'cohabiting' and 'married'.

5.3 Analytical strategy

Binary logistic regression models are applied to agreement with the prevailing norm concerning maternal employment considering the preferences for work and children after controlling for gender, age, education, employment and family status. The models are estimated separately for each dataset, i.e. for each state. To be able to compare coefficients of the explanatory variables, average marginal effects (AME) are predicted, as AME are hardly affected by uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity (Mood 2010; Wooldridge 2010). The question of whether there are differences between women and men is investigated by including interaction terms. For sensitivity analyses in both country models, the two main explanatory variables are also tested in separate models (see Appendix Table A 6.1-2 and Appendix Table A 6.1-3). However, the results do not differ from those reported below. To further test the robustness of the results, additional controls were included for the size of the community respondents lived in and the number of children they had, as individuals might differ in attitudes due to differing social environments concerning maternal employment rates (urban vs. rural), or role exposure experiences (parenthood vs. childlessness) (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). However, including them in the FRG analysis neither changes significance levels and coefficient sizes, nor improves model fit. Including them in the GDR models results in better model fits and partly reveals significant associations with the dependent variable.

[12] Weekly working hours were not surveyed in GGSS 1982.
[13] This category can represent LAT relationships, but also separated couples that are still married.

Nevertheless, it was decided not to include community size and the number of children in the GDR regression analysis as the sample size would be dramatically reduced from 1300 observations to 786 or 871.

6 Results

6.1 Descriptive results on agreement with the prevailing norm concerning maternal employment

In the GDR, 9 percent of the respondents thought that mothers with children under the age of three should not limit their employment, 55 percent thought they should only limit it under certain circumstances. Thus, 64 percent agreed with the socialist idea of full-time working mothers (see Table 6.1-1). This also means that more than one third (37 percent) of the respondents thought that a mother should by all means limit her employment activity if young children were part of the family (see Table 6.1-1). When looking at the attitudes of different subgroups, it becomes clear that they were quite homogenous (see Figure 6.1-1). However, respondents in part-time and fulltime employment differed significantly (p=0.000) in their attitudes towards full-time maternal employment, with 44 percent of the former and 65 percent of the latter agreeing with it. The small number of part-time employees has to be considered here. Female and male respondents in the GDR neither differed significantly in their attitudes towards maternal full-time employment (62 percent of women agreed and 67 percent of men), nor in their preferences for work or children. The majority of both female and male respondents had high preferences for work (84 percent of women and 87 percent of men), as well as for children (86 percent of women and 84 percent of men).

Figure 6.1-1: Responses to the question: 'Is it desirable to limit your own/a mother's employment activity if children under three are part of the family?', in %, GDR 1984



Source: Women's Study 1984, own calculations.

In the FRG, women and men differed significantly in their preferences for work (p=0.003) or children (p=0.004). 87 percent of women and 93 percent of men rated work as important, and 91 percent of women rated having children as important compared to 85 percent of men. But men and women did not differ in their assessment of maternal employment. In the FRG, 82 percent of the respondents completely agreed/tended to agree with negative consequences for young children if their mother went out to work, and only 18 percent tended to disagree/completely disagreed. Thus, the vast majority endorsed the corresponding norm of maternal non-employment (see Table 6.1.1). Figure 6.1.2 shows that in the FRG, the proportion of non-employed respondents who thought young children suffer because of their mother's employment was significantly greater (87 percent) than that of the part-time employed (75 percent, p=0.01) and that of the full-time employed (80 percent, p=0.04).

Summarising the descriptive findings, it appears that around two thirds of respondents in the GDR agreed with the socialist norm of full-time maternal employment if there are children under the age of three in the family. Yet, the fact that more than one third disagreed with this norm indicates greater heterogeneity in attitudes than expected according to hypothesis 1. The second central descriptive finding is consistent with hypothesis 2: compared to respondents in the GDR, those in the FRG more often evaluated maternal employment negatively and assumed that young children would suffer if their mothers were employed.

Figure 6.1-2: Responses to the question: 'A small child is bound to suffer if his or her mother goes out to work', in %, FRG 1982



Source: GGSS 1982, own calculations

6.2 GDR: Results on the relation between preferences for work or children and attitudes towards maternal employment

The multivariate analyses examined whether agreeing with the maternal employment norm in the two states depended on the individual preferences for work or children (Hakim 2002). Due to the different data sets and measurements, the regression results of the two states cannot be compared directly. The influence of preferences for work or children can only be considered within the countries. Logistic regression models are estimated for each state and the results are given as AME. In model 1, only the preferences for work and children are included, while model 2 additionally includes all control variables. To identify potential differences between women and men, interaction terms are also included.

Table 6.1-2 shows the results for the GDR. On average across all respondents, those who had high preferences for work had a higher probability (11 percentage points) of agreeing with the norm of full-time maternal employment with young children than those who rated work as not very important[14]. This finding remained robust after including all control variables and is in line with hypothesis 3a. While the preferences for work were significantly and substantially associated with agreeing with the norm of full-time maternal employment, preferences for children showed a non-significant coefficient, as expected in hypothesis 4a.

Table 6.1-2: Agreement with the norm of full-time maternal employment, GDR 1984, average marginal effects

Model		**(1)**	**(2)**
Preferences for Work (ref.: low)			
	high	0.119**	0.110**
		(0.038)	(0.038)
Preferences for Children (ref.: low)			
	high	0.054	0.067
		(0.039)	(0.040)
Sex (ref.: male)			
	female		-0.030
			(0.032)
Age			0.001
			(0.004)
Family Status (ref.: single)			
	married		-0.023
			(0.043)
	LAT		-0.039
			(0.050)
	cohabiting		0.006
			(0.051)
Education (ref.: low)			

[14] As mentioned above, the sample did not include people who were not employed. However, unemployment was – due to the reasons given previously – almost non-existent in the GDR in the age group considered, and the two variables ‘employment status’ and ‘importance of career and work’ were uncorrelated.

	middle	-0.004
		(0.045)
	high	0.011
		(0.055)
Employment Status (ref.: part-time)		
	full-time	
		0.200***
		(0.052)
N	1300	1300
Pseudo R^2_{MF}	0.007	0.019

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$
Source: Women's Study 1984, own calculations.

The interaction of the preferences for work and respondents' gender, which was included in model 2, was significant and tests confirmed that the effect of the preferences for work among women differed significantly from that of men. This is in contrast to hypothesis 5a, which expected no difference. As can be seen in Appendix Figure A 6.1-1, a significant association between preferences for work and attitudes towards maternal employment was only found among women.

For the GDR, it can be summarised that female respondents' preferences for work (but not for children) were associated with their agreement with the socialist idea of full-time maternal employment with children under the age of three. In other words, women who placed high importance on being employed did not even see children as a reason for limiting their employment activity.

6.3 FRG: Results on the relation between preferences for work or children and attitudes towards maternal employment

Analyses of the FRG data show that respondents' preferences for work were not significantly related to their attitudes towards maternal employment with young children, contradicting hypothesis 3b suggesting an association (see Table 6.1-3).

Yet, the preferences for children were significantly related to attitudes towards maternal employment, based on a comparatively powerful coefficient. On average across all respondents, those who had high preferences for children, had a higher probability (12 percentage points) of agreeing with the statement that young children suffer if their mothers work than those who had low preferences. This is in line with hypothesis 4b.

To test whether the effect of the preferences for children differed significantly between women and men, an interaction term with the respondents' gender was integrated into the model. However, the interaction term was not significant, and neither the models with and without the interaction term, nor the effect in the group of women and men differed significantly (see Appendix Figure A 6.1-2).

Thus, there was no significant difference in the effect of the preferences for children between women and men, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 5b assuming gender differences.

For the FRG, it can be stated that respondents who had high preferences for children were more likely to agree with the norm that mothers of young children should not work. At the same time, the preferences for work were not relevant for their attitudes towards maternal employment.

Table 6.1-3: Agreement with the norm of maternal non-employment, FRG 1982, average marginal effects

Model	**(1)**	**(2)**
Preferences for Work (ref.: low)		
high	-0.043	-0.036
	(0.036)	(0.038)
Preferences for Children (ref.: low)		
high	0.114*	0.124*
	(0.045)	(0.049)
Sex (ref.: male)		
female		-0.042
		(0.027)
Age		0.002
		(0.003)
Family Status (ref.: single)		
married		-0.006
		(0.030)
LAT		0.048
		(0.073)
cohabiting		-0.039
		(0.079)
Education (ref.: low)		
middle		0.037
		(0.044)
high		0.005
		(0.049)
Employment Status (ref.: part-time)		
full-time		
		0.046
		(0.049)
not employed		0.128**
		(0.047)
N	1009	1009
Pseudo R^2_{MF}	0.008	0.025

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Source: GGSS 1982, own calculations.

7 Discussion and conclusion

This study firstly investigated the congruence of social policy and gender norms in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by analysing the attitudes of 18-37-yearold respondents towards maternal employment, and describing socialist women's policy. Using previously unanalysed survey data, the 'Women's Study' from 1984, this study examined how GDR respondents viewed the employment of mothers with young children, whether this was related to individual preferences for work or children, and to what extent these attitudes were consistent with the socialist idea of continuous full-time maternal employment. Secondly, a similar analysis was carried out with same-age respondents from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), using the German General Social Survey from 1982. The results were presented side by side, and are now interpreted separately because it is not possible to directly compare the two former states on the basis of the datasets used.

The study found that more than one third (37 percent) of the respondents in the GDR rejected the socialist idea of mothers with children under the age of three working full-time. This proportion is surprising, since the GDR had already existed for 35 years at the time of the survey, and cohorts who grew up under East German state socialism were interviewed. Furthermore, theories about social policy being a normative anchor, about the consequences of exposure to work-related environments, as well as arguments on social multiplier effects arising from high maternal labour force participation (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Kremer 2007; Gangl/Ziefle 2015; Grunow/Veltkamp 2016), would have suggested a higher agreement with maternal full-time employment in the GDR. However, exposure to the double burden of paid and unpaid work that many mothers experienced, which was associated with time pressures and mental strain, may have promoted preferences for maternal non-employment (Adler/Brayfield 1997; Nickel 1998; Becker-Schmidt 2010; Adler et al. 2016). Similarly, experience with day-care centres for under 3-year-olds ran by the socialist state might have reinforced maternal non-employment preferences, and with it the desire to raise children in the family according to the family's own values rather than to socialist ideas. Logistic regressions revealed that women in the GDR who had high preferences for work were substantially more likely to agree with full-time maternal employment with children under three years of age than those who rated work as not very important. This association could not be shown for men, which suggests that fulfilling the socialist gender norm of being employed led to a high commitment to employment among women and led work to become identity-forming (Bielby/Bielby 1989). This is in line with what other researchers (Gysi/ Meyer 1993; Leitner et al. 2008) have already pointed out: employment was highly valued in the GDR, especially for emancipation. Thus, women not only worked for financial, but also for personal reasons like self-affirmation. This and the second finding from the study, that individual preferences for children were not associated with attitudes towards full-time maternal employment, indicate a lack of conflict between work- and family-identities for mothers. Thus, under the GDR's framework of high availability and societal acceptance of

institutional childcare for children of any age, women were not forced to trade off work against children or vice versa. This is also mirrored in the descriptive finding that women (just like men) had very high preferences for both paid work and children.

The study's finding that the vast majority of respondents in the FRG had the opinion that children suffer if their mothers work supports the notion of social policy – in this case the conservative-corporatist policies supporting the male-breadwinner model and maternal childcare – simultaneously reflecting societal gender norms, and functioning as a normative anchor (Gangl/Ziefle 2015). That people in the FRG in the 1980s had more negative attitudes towards maternal employment than their neighbours in the GDR strengthens the post-reunification evidence on East-West differences in gender norms (e.g. Pfau-Effinger 2005; Bauernschuster/Rainer 2012; Ebner et al. 2020). Regression analyses showed that in the FRG, respondents who had high preferences for children were more likely to agree with maternal nonemployment, but attitudes towards maternal employment did not depend on preferences for work. These findings can be interpreted in line with preference theory (Hakim 2002) as well as identity formation theory (Bielby/Bielby 1989). Firstly, preference theory categorises women in the FRG as 'home centred' and thus expects them to prioritise family, which is also backed by the study's finding that women in the FRG placed more importance on children and less importance on paid work than men (see also Beblo/Görges 2018). Secondly, identity formation theory (Bielby/Bielby 1989) argues that employment and child raising were conflicting identities for women in the FRG which provoked an either/or decision between either being childless and employed or having children and not being employed (at least as long as they could financially afford not to be employed) (Braun et al. 1994; Becker-Schmidt 2010; Goldstein/Kreyenfeld 2011). Thus, if women in the FRG had a strong desire to work, they – due to the policy framework and societal gender norms – might have already ruled out becoming a mother, so that maternal employment was not something that was thought about.

Taken together, the findings for both former states suggest congruence between social policy and gender norms at the time, but under the totalitarian regime in the GDR there was greater heterogeneity in attitudes towards maternal employment than expected. This insight cannot be gained by solely observing maternal employment rates, and it confirms previous social-historical research showing the dialectical relationship between the regime and society in the GDR (Wolle 1998; Lindenberger 2002; Bauerkämper 2005; Jarausch 2012). Moreover, it contributes to a more differentiated understanding of gender norms in a socialist East European state, and at the same time highlights the need to reflect on the frequently applied Western perspective – which assumes very high attitudinal conformity – in researching former socialist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The study is limited by, firstly, the fact that a direct comparison between the FRG and the GDR was not possible because the indicators for the (in-)dependent variables were measured using different scales and the items for the dependent variables were not identical in wording. Secondly, whereas

the FRG sample was representative of the 18-37-year-old population, the sample in the GDR was recruited via employers in certain districts only and women were overrepresented. These data cannot claim to be representative of the GDR. Nevertheless, it is a unique source for historical attitudinal research in a socialist East European state. Thirdly, the 'Women's Study 1984' has to be treated with caution, as social science was strictly politically controlled. Nevertheless, it would be enlightening if further research could make use of the unexploited data potential of the ZIJ for more indepth analyses of the GDR, especially as contemporary witnesses of the study processes can still be consulted. The Women's Study 1984, for example, also measured respondents' division of housework and childcare as well as the degree of agreement with gendered responsibilities. Future analyses of these aspects could provide a more comprehensive understanding of societal gender norms in the GDR, which were reflected in both behaviour and attitudes.

Acknowledgements

This study was conducted within a project funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Project number 434947732.

I appreciate the helpful comments by the guest editors, anonymous reviewers and Felix Berth which contributed to significant improvements in the manuscript.

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Appendix for Study 1

Appendix Table A 6.1-1: Classification of education

Classification for analysis	**FRG**		**GDR**		**CASMIN equivalent**
	Education	**Vocational Training**	**Education**	**Vocational Training**	
Low education	No school-leaving qualification	With/without training/ internship	Up to 7th grade	With/without (semi-)skilled worker qualification	1a, 1b, 1c
	Lower secondary school (Volksschule, Hauptschule)	Without training/ internship	8th/9th grade school leaving	Without training or skilled worker qualification	
			8th grade	With apprenticeship	
Middle education	Lower secondary school	With apprenticeship	9th grade	With apprenticeship	2a, 2b
	Secondary school (Mittlere Reife, Realschule)	With/without apprenticeship	10th grade (POS graduation[15]) or 11th grade	With/without (semi-)skilled worker qualification	
High education	Abitur	With/without apprenticeship	12th grade EOS[16]/Abitur	With or without apprenticeship	2c, 3a, 3b

[15] POS=Polytechnische Oberschule. The ten-year 'Polytechnische Oberschule' with compulsory vocational lessons was introduced in the GDR in 1959 and replaced the previous eight-year schools (Schmidt 1996: 82).
[16] EOS=Erweiterte Oberschule.

	University of applied sciences Master University	Technical college Master University	

Source: Own illustration based on Hadjar, Berger (2010).

Appendix Table A 6.1-2: Agreement with the norm of full-time maternal employment, GDR 1984, average marginal effects, separate models

Model	**(1a)**	**(2a)**		**(3a)**	**(4a)**
Preferences for Work (ref.: low)			*Preferences for Children (ref.: low)*		
high	0.123**	0.116**		0.063	0.076
	(0.098)	(0.038)		(0.039)	(0.040)
Sex (ref.: male)					
female		-0.025			-0.033
		(0.032)			(0.032)
Age		0.001			0.002
		(0.004)			(0.004)
Family Status (ref.: single)					
married		-0.008			-0.030
		(0.042)			(0.043)
LAT		-0.033			-0.042
		(0.050)			(0.050)
cohabiting		0.016			0.010
		(0.051)			(0.051)
Education (ref.: low)					
middle		-0.002			-0.006
		(0.046)			(0.046)
high		0.012			0.010
		(0.055)			(0.055)
Employment Status (ref.: part-time)					
full-time		0.200***			0.203***
		(0.052)			(0.052)
Observations	1300	1300		1300	1300
Pseudo R^2_{MF}	0.006	0.018		0.002	0.014

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: Women's Study 1984, own calculations.

Appendix Table A 6.1-3: Agreement with the norm of maternal non-employment, FRG 1982, average marginal effects, separate models

Model	**(1b)**	**(2b)**		**(3b)**	**(4b)**
Preferences for Work: (ref.: low)			*Preferences for Children: (ref.: low)*		
high	-0.024	-0.009		0.103	0.113*
	(0.038)	(0.041)		(0.043)	(0.046)
Sex (ref.: male)					
female		-0.039			-0.041
		(0.027)			(0.027)
Age		0.001			0.002
		(0.003)			(0.003)
Family Status (ref.: single)					
married		0.019			-0.003
		(0.030)			(0.030)
LAT		0.064			0.051
		(0.073)			(0.073)
cohabiting		-0.015			-0.037
		(0.077)			(0.079)
Education (ref.: low)					
middle		0.035			0.035
		(0.044)			(0.043)
high		0.003			0.002
		(0.049)			(0.048)
Employment Status (ref.: part-time)					
not employed		0.127**			0.130**
		(0.05)			(0.047)
full-time		0.044			0.046
		(0.050)			(0.050)
Observations	1009	1009		1009	1009
Pseudo R^2_{MF}	0.0004	0.017		0.007	0.024

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Source: GGSS 1982, own calculations.

Appendix Figure A 6.1-1: Average marginal effects of preferences for work with 95% CIs, GDR 1984



Source: Women's Study 1984, own calculations.

Appendix Figure A 6.1-2: Average marginal effects of preferences for children with 95% CIs, FRG 1982



Source: GGSS 1982, own calculations.

6.2 Study 2

Accepted Manuscript

Varieties of egalitarianism: gender ideologies in the late socialism of the German Democratic Republic

Published as:
Kleinschrot, L., Berth, F., & Bujard, M. (2023). Varieties of egalitarianism: gender ideologies in the late socialism of the German Democratic Republic. *The History of the Family, 28*(4), 688–710. https://doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2023.2258852.

Abstract:
The socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the east part of former divided Germany, which existed between 1949 and 1990, saw the emancipation of women as a national objective. In this paper we examine the gender ideologies of young people in the GDR in relation to state socialist ideas of gender equality. First, we outline the GDR's socialist state policy in favour of maternal full-time employment, even with young children, between the 1950s and the 1980s. We then present the results of our analysis of gender ideologies using survey data collected by the GDR's Central Institute of Youth Research in 1984. By applying latent class analysis, we identify two patterns of egalitarianism in the analytic sample, which we term '*all-inclusive-egalitarians'* and '*not-in-my-backyard-egalitarians' ('nimby-egalitarians')*. The former supported gender equality in both the public and familial spheres. The *nimby-egalitarians*, by contrast, had ambivalent attitudes, as they supported gender equality in the public sphere and at the same time held more traditional attitudes towards the private sphere. Our study demonstrates that after almost 40 years of propagating gender equality, state socialism in the GDR had some success in shaping societal gender ideologies. However, we reveal ambivalences which researchers have previously often overseen, especially in contrast to the Western part of Germany. The top-down shaped GDR patterns of egalitarianism also bear similarities to the stalled gender revolution in contemporary Western democratic societies. Beyond the results, the paper proves the richness and principle usability of hitherto rarely used data sets preserved from the GDR.

1 Introduction

For more than forty years, from the end of World War II until the fall of the Iron Curtain, the socialist states of the Eastern bloc – including the German Democratic Republic (GDR) – strove to shape the attitudes and beliefs of their populations. Opinions that deviated from official policy were partly criminalised by politics and the judiciary, people's private sphere was in many cases monitored by secret services, and the media was organised, instructed and controlled by the state (Jarska, 2021; Lindenberger, 2002; Siegelbaum, 2006; Wolle, 1998).

In the GDR, the socialist idea of gender equality – comprising full legal equality for women, high maternal employment and greatly expanded day-care – was publically propagated and backed by a policy of nudge and boost (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016), whereby mothers were nudged to work by an ideological duty, which was furthermore boosted by comprehensive family policies and public childcare (Nickel, 1998). It could be argued that this socialist idea of gender equality was accepted by the population of the GDR or at least tolerated without criticism (Fulbrook, 2005), since labour force participation of women and mothers as well as childcare rates were extremely high in international comparison (Nickel, 1998; Rosenfeld et al., 2004; Trappe, 1996). Even after the end of state socialism, societal attitudes in favour of maternal employment as well as remarkable attitudinal differences between East and West Germany, for example with regard to institutional childcare or full-time employment of mothers, were found (Alwin et al., 1992; Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012; Ebner et al., 2020).

Our socio-historical analysis will examine whether patterns of gender ideology in GDR society were as homogeneously egalitarian as the high maternal employment rates would suggest, and whether they were consistent with socialist equality policy. We provide an overview of socialist gender policies and draw on survey data from GDR's social science research, as collected in Western democratic states since the late 1970s (Cotter et al., 2011; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). In principle, such data is suitable for examining, among others, (changes in) societal and personal beliefs concerning family and gender roles. So far overlooked by historical research, such data was also collected in the late GDR of the 1980s, when socialist policy had already been trying to influence gender relations for almost four decades. This data allows an analysis of gender ideologies in a state with the self-image of being particularly gender-equal due to its very high female labour force participation (Lee et al., 2007). Specifically, we use survey data from the 'Women's Study' which was conducted by the state socialist Central Institute for Youth Research in 1984 (Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung, 1984) and has to our knowledge not been analysed before[1]. We apply the method of latent class analysis (LCA), which has become a much-discussed and

[1]The data have only been analysed by the survey project team at the ZIJ. An overview of the reports is available at: https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA6138?doi=10.4232/1.6138

recognised statistical method in sociology in recent years (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018; Vermunt & Magidson, 2002), and is a person-centred, model-based approach that enables the identification of an initially undefined number of latent classes whose members each have very similar patterns of attitudes.

The contribution of this paper is to complement international gender ideology research with insights from the historical example of the GDR. To that end we combine the theoretical and methodological perspective of the Western dominated gender research with data collected by a state socialist institute in Eastern Europe. We assess the success and failures of the GDR gender policy in shaping societal gender ideologies. And by identifying varieties of egalitarianism we link historical attitude research with recent insights on the multidimensionality of gender ideologies as well as with gender revolution theories.

In the following, we describe the theoretical framework of gender revolution and gender ideology, which we refer to in our study. In Section 3, we present extant results from social science research on gender ideology in the GDR, including work by GDR scientists as well as work done after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We then outline the gender-relevant policy of the GDR regime between 1949 and 1990 and describe the selfrepresentation of the socialist leadership (Section 4). In Section 5 we explain the conditions of social sciences in the GDR, the data set used and discuss whether valid findings can be drawn from this data obtained under socialism, followed by the methodological approach of LCA (Section 6) and the descriptive as well as LCA results (Section 7). Finally, we discuss the results in the social and political context of state socialism as well as in relation to gender revolution research (Section 8).

2 Theoretical framework

Theoretically, our study is informed – firstly – by findings of gender scholars focusing on Western democratic countries who noted that increasing women's labour force participation in recent decades has not yet brought about full gender equality. This 'stalled', 'uneven' (England, 2010; Goldscheider et al., 2015; Sullivan et al., 2018) or 'incomplete' (Esping-Andersen, 2009) gender revolution is reflected in the fact that the closing of gender gaps on the labour market is proceeding much faster than in domestic care work and that policy has not yet adapted to changes in women's roles sufficiently (Esping-Andersen, 2009). These theories are based on a distinction proposed by McDonald (2000, 2002) when analysing fertility and gender equity in modern societies: gender equity within family-oriented institutions, such as family services, childcare or tax systems, versus gender equity within individual-oriented institutions such as education and employment. Gender equity within individual-oriented institutions has increased in many countries since the 1960s, while the adaptation of gender equity within family-oriented institutions has often lagged behind

(McDonald, 2000). Such incoherence has led to low fertility rates, as seen in southern European countries, German-speaking countries and Japan (Bujard, 2011). While McDonald (2002) focused mainly on the insufficient adaptation of family policies, e.g. regarding institutional childcare or short-term parental leave (which existed in the GDR), other scholars referred to the lack of adaptation of men's roles in the face of considerable changes in women's roles and corresponding gender ideologies as gender equality incoherence or as a stalled, uneven gender revolution (England, 2010; Goldscheider et al., 2015). The question of whether such incoherence was present in the GDR, is a research gap, particularly as there is a link between family policy and beliefs about gender equality (Beringer et al., 2022; Zoch & Schober, 2018). Against this background, historical analyses of the extensive gender equality policy and propaganda in the GDR and societal gender ideologies – particularly regarding the roles of women and men – are highly relevant.

Secondly, our analysis is based on recent discussions in gender role attitude research, according to which gender ideology at the individual level is not a monolithic block located one-dimensionally between the poles of traditional and egalitarian (Grunow et al., 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Scarborough et al., 2019). Based on the conception of gender ideology as the degree of individual agreement with statements concerning the behaviour of men and women within and outside the family (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Kroska, 2000), these theories instead assume that gender ideology has multiple dimensions. Empirically, recent studies showed that people can have both gender-egalitarian and gender-essentialist attitudes, e.g. they express egalitarian attitudes on female labour force participation, but traditional attitudes on childcare, which they believe is inherently better provided by mothers (Cotter et al., 2011; Grunow et al., 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Scarborough et al., 2019) and such a gender ideology can be understood as a normative mirroring of the different levels of gender equality. The multidimensionality remains unnoticed as long as attitude analyses work with summarised gender ideology indices. Therefore, we will try to carve out gender ideology patterns in the GDR in the 1980s by employing LCA.

Applying the theoretical arguments of a stalled, uneven gender revolution together with the concept of multidimensional gender ideologies to the late GDR, one would expect that the extensive involvement of mothers in the labour market was not accompanied by one-dimensional egalitarian gender ideologies in society. Rather, one would expect nuanced attitudes towards gender equality to have prevailed. We will therefore test whether this hypothesis holds under the conditions of the GDR regime's extensive propaganda for maternal employment. Furthermore, differences in gender ideologies along socio-demographic lines might be expected. It has been argued that women are more likely to be egalitarian because they benefit more than men from greater equality (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004), and, the GDR's gender equality policies were aimed primarily at women. In addition, the literature suggests that younger people may be more egalitarian than older people as they have not yet been involved for so long and so extensively in structures (multiple children,

reduction in employment, etc.) that favour traditional role behaviour (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Marital status may also be relevant, as marriage is normatively associated with more traditional behavioural expectations, e.g. regarding the gender-specific division of labour – which also existed in the GDR (Rosenfeld et al., 2004) – and may therefore lead to less egalitarian ideologies among married versus single people (Fan & Marini, 2000). We, therefore, examine whether these predictors of gender ideologies known from the literature on Western democratic countries can also be found in the late GDR. We expect that women, younger and single respondents were more likely to belong to egalitarian gender ideology classes than men, older or married respondents[2].

3 German social science research and its findings on gender ideologies

Empirical research on gender ideologies in the GDR and East Germany has always been determined by the political context. It can be systematised on the basis of two questions: Who conducted the research? And when? If we take into account the temporal caesura of the German reunification process in 1989/90 and the regional origin of the researchers, four variants of empirical research on gender ideologies in East Germany emerge (see Table 6.2-1).

Table 6.2-1: Empirical research on gender ideologies in East Germany

	East German research	**West German research**
Before 1989/90	Numerous sociological and psychological surveys, research mainly unpublished	None
After 1989/90	Little sociological and psychological research, as East German science institutions were dissolved	Numerous surveys by social sciences, transferred from West Germany

Source: Own presentation.

These four variants of attitudinal research differed in many ways, including methods, scope of research activity, publication practices and scientific impact.

- East German research before 1989/90: In the GDR, some smaller social science working groups dealt with women's issues, for example at the Central Institute for Youth Research and at the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy at the Academy of Sciences of the GDR.

[2] We refrain from testing 'education' as a predictor of gender ideologies (van Berkel & Graaf, 1999) as the late GDR had an universal school system and access to higher education was regulated and strongly dependent on regime loyality (Hadjar & Berger, 2010; Mayer & Solga, 1994). Thus, a selection bias of highly regime loyal individuals in the higher education groups cannot be ruled out in the cohorts included. We were also unable to include the number of children (Fan & Marini, 2000) as a predictor of gender ideology due to missing information.

They did not conduct feminist research in today's sense, but rather research on women, and this to a considerable extent (Nickel, 2008). One of the most comprehensive works developed here was a study on women on the occasion of the International Year of Women proclaimed by the UN in 1975 (Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung, 1975). It demonstrated that young people in the GDR were strongly in favour of women or mothers working, but that in the case of mothers with small children, they often considered an interruption of employment to be appropriate. Attitudinal differences between women and men were evident concerning family obligations: women often rejected being the main person responsible for childcare and household, while men were more positive about this idea. Other studies came to similar results (for an overview see Fulbrook, 2005; Winkler, 1990).

- West German research before 1989/90: Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was impossible for Western social scientists to collect data in the GDR, so 'detours' had to be found. One such attitude analysis was undertaken by the West German Infratest Institute: West Germans who had recently visited the GDR were asked about the attitudes of a particular East German person they had met. These 'proxy surveys' were commissioned by the West German government and were not published (Gieseke, 2015). The focus was on political attitudes. Gender attitudes were not observed, presumably because this topic did not seem important to the West German government before 1989.

- East German research after 1989/90: After reunification, all important political decisions concerning social science were made in the country's West. It was decided that the East German social science research institutes would be dissolved. Biographically, reunification meant the end of academic careers for many GDR researchers (Bertram, 1997) and East German social science research strands were largely cut off. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the smaller group of GDR women's researchers published mainly overview articles describing their earlier results, the political conditions of the GDR and the living situation of women at that time in order to explain this to the West German research community (Dölling, 1993; Gysi & Meyer, 1993; Helwig & Nickel, 1993; Schlegel, 1990). Only a few researchers who had worked in the field of women's studies at the Academy of Sciences of the GDR succeeded in establishing themselves in the West-dominated scientific community after 1990 (see e.g. Nickel, 1998; Trappe, 1996).

- West German research after 1989/90: With the fall of the Berlin Wall, a boom in survey research began in East Germany. Within a short time, all the big West German social science institutes conducted their surveys in the former GDR (e.g. Bertram, 1992; GESIS, 2014, Huinink & Mayer, 1995; Wagner, 2008). Immediately after reunification, the high

> societal acceptance of maternal employment – with partial support for a reduction as long as the children are under three years old – was shown (Keiser, 1992). In the following years, these East German attitude patterns did not quickly and completely converge with those of the West, as was often expected because of the shared cultural heritage and the imposition of the social policy framework of the West on the East. Post-reunification studies showed that East Germans continued to be less sceptical about women's and mothers' employment, less likely to expect negative consequences for family and children from it, and more egalitarian about women's role in the partnership than West Germans (Alwin et al., 1992; Banaszak, 2006; Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012; Lee et al., 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2004).

Recent work still finds a gender role attitude gap: two to three decades after reunification, East Germans still have more egalitarian gender ideologies than West Germans (Diabaté et al., 2017; Zoch, 2021). However, it was observed that the attitude gaps between East and West were increasingly narrowing. On the one hand, younger East Germans (especially birth cohorts 1986–1997) had somewhat more traditional attitudes than older ones; on the other hand, West German cohorts from 1971–1975 to 1981–1985 approached East Germans in their attitudes (Ebner et al., 2020). Apparently, it was not only the former socialist part of the country that converged with the capitalist part, as was initially expected, but rather changes happened in both parts.

4 Gender from the socialist state's perspective

The GDR saw itself as a state that placed great value on the emancipation of women. The theory founders Marx and Engels did not consider gender as a central category of difference, but important Marxist theorists, especially in the German-speaking countries, turned their attention to women's issues already in the 19th century (Bebel, 1879). Lenin, for example, was quoted as follows:

> In short we are serious about our programmatic demand to transfer the economic and educational functions of the individual household to society. In this way, women will be redeemed from the old domestic slavery and from any dependence on their husbands. (Zetkin, 1929, p. 75)[3]

Socialist gender policy should – firstly – create services that would make life easier for women; men were not affected by these issues or did not need to play an active role in this process. The numerous service offers would – secondly – lead to ever greater equality between men and women, which would emanate primarily from the sphere of employment. The GDR took great effort to follow this path (see Nickel, 1998 for an overview): Already one year after the founding of the state in 1949, an Equal Rights Act came into force (GBl. 111). It contained a long list of future benefits and regulations: The state promised financial help when a child was born; it created maternity advice centres in every district and paediatric polyclinics throughout the country. Pregnant women received

[3] All translations from German are ours.

paid leave before and after birth. Single parents could place their children in infant homes free of charge and were entitled to preferential institutional childcare in crèches and kindergartens. For children under three years of age, 60000 places in residential care were announced (out of a total of 720,000 babies and toddlers in 1950); for the then total of 570,000 three to six year olds, the law provided 160,000 places in kindergartens. The legal privileges of the husband over his wife, codified in German law since the 19th century, were abolished. Non-marital children were given the same legal status as marital children. Even the number of female politicians was to be increased by this 1950 law (although this only included the mayors, not the party leadership or the Politburo; in the highest positions, the legislative men wanted to remain among themselves).
About fifteen years after the introduction of the law, fertility rates began to fall considerably, which policymakers successively countered with numerous targeted measures to help mothers reconcile maternity and full-time employment in the following decades (Trappe, 1996; Winkler, 1990). The most important measures were probably the introduction of extended maternity leave and a year's paid leave after childbirth, the further expansion of public day-care centres for all age groups and, the reduction of weekly working hours for mothers in full-time employment (Nickel, 1998; Winkler, 1990).

Discussing to what extent the GDR could be categorised as a welfare state or classified along the types of Western democratic welfare states is not the focus of this paper (Burdumy, 2013; Jarausch, 2012; Schmidt, 2001). Nevertheless, it can be argued that GDR's gender policy was primarily targeted at increasing fertility and women's employment (Schmidt, 2001) and the corresponding policies could be categorised as defamilialistic in the sense of feminist welfare state theory (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003; Orloff, 1993). However, family and gender policies in the GDR were functioning 'top-down': They were developed and implemented by the male-dominated political leadership – thus different from policies in Western states, which mainly developed as an adaptation to the 'revolution of women's roles' (Esping-Andersen, 2009, p. 19).

Due to the described de-familialistic gender policies and other factors – like economic necessity, great importance of and an ideological duty to employment, linkage of social entitlements to full-time employment etc. – maternal employment rates in the GDR rose to world highs (Lee et al., 2007). In 1974, one of the highest-ranking East German women's politicians stated that the issue of gender equality had been successfully resolved:

> We can therefore also say without reservation that equality for women has been realised in the German Democratic Republic. (Lange, 1974, p. 6)

The official position was defined: Socialist legislation had improved the status of women through equality in the legal system, through promotion in the educational system and labour market and through support in the social system. However, over 80 % of the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party were men throughout the GDR period and remained completely among

themselves as voting members in the most important body, the Politburo (Bock, 2018). The situation was just as unequal in terms of pay and managerial positions. Equality was also far from being achieved in the family, with women doing the lion's share of housework and childcare despite equal participation in the labour force (Banaszak, 2006; Lee et al., 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2004).

5 Social science in the GDR: conditions and activities

5.1 Restrictions on scientific activity in the GDR

It is important to consider the possibilities and limitations of social science in the GDR to understand the historical context of the data used in this study. For almost thirty years social scientists in the GDR collected quantitative data in enormous amounts but were not allowed to disseminate it most of the time. After German reunification in 1990, about 350 GDR data sets were archived at the Central Archive for Empirical Social Science Research in Cologne and described in terms of content and methodology (Brislinger et al., 1998). Many of them were processed to be accessible for secondary use and therefore represent a rich source for historical-sociological research. In addition, a bibliography gives an impression of the research activities of GDR social scientists (Schwefel & Koch, 1992– 1996): these ten (!) volumes present several hundred research papers written during GDR times, which remained largely unpublished at the time.

Every nationwide survey required the approval of the Politburo, whose members intervened massively in the questionnaires (Brislinger et al., 1998; Winkler, 1992). If a topic was only surveyed at the regional level, the highest state body was not involved, but the lower instances of party and state also censored the questionnaires considerably. If a survey was allowed after months and sometimes years of negotiations, the publication of results was usually prohibited (Brislinger et al., 1998; Friedrich, 1991; Winkler, 1992). Scientists were allowed to write analyses and reports at the typewriter, but these manuscripts were kept strictly confidential. Thus, only a few numbered copies were produced, marked with secrecy levels. If a topic was considered particularly sensitive – which usually meant that criticism of actual socialism could not be missed – reports were often given the highest security levels, so that sometimes not even ministers of the GDR were allowed to access them (Friedrich, 1999; Zinnecker, 1992). Approved book and journal publications were then again highly disputed: scientists sometimes argued with party functionaries over individual formulations, as a GDR scientist reported (U. Schlegel, personal communication, 17 December 2020)[4].

[4] Schlegel was a research assistant and then head of department at the Central Institute for Youth Research from 1972 to 1990. After 1990, she was one of the few researchers from the Institute who continued to find employment in the German academic system. She was also the only scientist from the Institute who was willing to give us an interview; numerous other attempts to contact former researchers failed. We suspect this is due to the feelings of frustration of former researchers who were catapulted out of the science system after 1990, but we cannot prove this.

In this fragile environment, the Central Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig was founded in 1966 and became the largest institute in its area (Brislinger et al., 1998; Zinnecker, 1992). All the staff of the Central Institute for Youth Research knew the political framework. Any research had to tie in with the current Marx-Engels interpretations (Friedrich, 1991; Griese, 1991; Koch & Becker, 1998). Quoting Soviet research was mandatory, quoting Western research was suspicious. From today's point of view, it is remarkable that solid research according to (Western) scientific standards emerged under these conditions (Bertram, 1997; Brislinger et al., 1998; Griese, 1991; Starke, 1991). Thus, numerous methodologically ambitious, longitudinal studies on the socialisation of young people had been developed at the Central Institute for Youth Research, the like of which did not yet exist in neighbouring West Germany (Griese, 1991; Schlegel, 1997). The focus of the institute was on the living conditions and attitudes of pupils, trainees and students; the topics ranged from political opinions, leisure activities, school performance to career and family ideas, behaviour in partnerships and sexuality. It is noticeable that questions were also asked in which the young people could articulate critical views. This concerned, for example, their attitude towards the socialist authorities (e.g. one question in the longitudinal study 'Factors and Forms of Development of Young People in the GDR', which was conducted in twelve waves between 1968 and 1980 was: 'In your opinion, is state power exercised in the GDR as you see appropriate?', (Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung, 1998)) or their use of the actually unwanted West German television. However, it is not certain if the respondents gave honest answers.

5.2 Validity of the 1984 Women's study

From a historical perspective, the question is essential how valid the data of the Women's Study 1984 is, which we analyse in this study. Certainly, this survey was developed under strict state control; it is also sure that the results were subject to secrecy (U. Schlegel, personal communication, 17 December 2020). However, these criteria do not limit the validity in principle: Although the questionnaire had blind spots, the questions that passed censorship could in principle have measured attitudes reliably. And the nondisclosure only showed how the GDR regime dealt with its research results, not their validity.

Therefore, the crucial question is, how the response behaviour of the interviewees was to be assessed. Most likely, citizens of the GDR knew to live in a surveillance state and therefore did not have much confidence in the survey's complete anonymity, even if the questionnaires claimed it (Kowalczuk, 2017). It seems plausible that the response behaviour strongly depended on the topic of the survey: If, for example, a survey asked about the use of TV programmes from the capitalist neighbours, which was at times forbidden and always undesirable, some of the respondents probably denied this for fear of repression. Questions on the evaluation of the political system surely had the same limitations. However, this was probably less the case, if at all, in the 1984 Women's Study. Respondents did probably not anticipate risks if they answered honestly in terms of family and

gender issues, since, after all, the actual female and maternal employment as well as childcare rates were very high in the late GDR (Rosenfeld et al., 2004), and thus the socialist ideal was met.

It was nevertheless conceivable that the respondents were in particular oriented towards social desirability. It was well known that the state promoted and demanded women's and mothers' full-time employment. It is therefore possible that citizens who were obedient to the authorities oriented themselves to these norms, even if they thought somewhat differently in their private lives. In this case, the 1984 Women's Study may have underestimated sceptical positions on gender equality, especially on maternal full-time employment.

5.3 Description of the data and indicators

The data analysed in this paper was collected by the Central Institute for Youth Research (Zentralinstitut Für Jugendforschung, 1984) in a smaller working group on women's studies (Schlegel, 1997; Starke, 1991). The survey was conducted in 1984, five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The study intended to measure young women's lifestyles, assessments of equality, possibilities of reconciliation etc (Bertram, 1986; Zentralinstitut Für Jugendforschung, 1984). This is probably why considerably more women (68%) than men (32%) took part in the survey[5]. Respondents completed the questionnaires partly at work and partly at home. The sample included persons between the ages 18 to 37. It was drawn in the two GDR districts of Erfurt and Karl-Marx-Stadt[6], and respondents were contacted through their employers. Due to this sampling strategy and the high proportion of women, the data is not representative for the total GDR population, but include a comprehensive net sample of 1635 respondents. We excluded those who gave no information on their gender, but the LCA is based on full information maximum likelihood (Masyn, 2013), eventually 1511 respondents were included (see Table 6.2-2). The survey reflected the views of a young generation born after the Second World War and of reproductive age; the time of the survey was in late socialism, when the GDR had already existed for more than thirty years.

[5] Methodologically innovative was the fact that the study planned to interview not only the women but also their mothers (Zentralinstitut Für Jugendforschung (1984). This twogeneration approach was implemented in Western research many years later. However, we decided not to include the data of the elders because our focus is not on a generational comparison (as e.g. in Kreher (2002), but on the attitudes of the younger generation at reproductive age. Moreover, only about half of the elders participated and the questionnaire did not ask for their gender, which is why we cannot ensure whether fathers did also answer.

[6] The districts of the GDR were named after the district cities and included not only these cities but also other counties. The district of Erfurt in the south-west of the GDR was a mediumsized district in terms of area and population (1984: 1.2 million) and had an industrial character. The district of Karl-Marx-Stadt in the south was the most populous (1984: 1.9 million) and most densely populated district of the GDR and was the second most important for industrial production (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik Ed., 1986). Its former district city is now called Chemnitz. Regional disparities, e.g. in terms of the economy or health care, income or education of the population, were not very pronounced in the late phase of the GDR (Beyme, 1988; Kind, 1997).

Table 6.2-2: Descriptive statistics for analysed sample

Women's Study 1984	**% / Mean**	**SD**
Gender:		
Female	68.4	
Male	31.6	
Age	24.0	3.4
Education:		
Low	10.3	
Middle	76.8	
High	12.9	
Employment Status:		
Part-time	7.4	
Full-time	92.6	
Family Status:		
Single	18.3	
Living-Apart-Together / Married, living apart	17.1	
Cohabiting	12.8	
Married	51.9	
N	1488-1511	

Source: Women's Study 1984 (doi.org/10.4232/1.6138). Own calculations.
Note: Education was coded into low (up to 7th grade with/without (semi-)skilled worker qualification; 8th/9th grade school leaving without training or skilled worker qualification; 8th grade with apprenticeship), middle (9th grade with apprenticeship; 10th or 11th grade 'Polytechnische Oberschule' with/without (semi-)skilled worker qualification); high (12th grade 'Erweiterte Oberschule'/Abitur with or without apprenticeship; technical college; master; university degree). Employment status is based on respondent's self-report of part-time or full-time, weekly working hours were not surveyed.

For the analysis of the gender ideologies of the respondents in the GDR, we used six items that were collected in the 1984 Women's Study (see Appendix Table A 6.2-1). Three were to be assessed using a four-point scale. Respondents were asked to which extent they (dis-)agreed, that

(1) 'within a marriage/partnership, the man should basically be the leader (i.e. he should make all the important decisions in the family)' (decisions),

(2) 'if possible, a woman should only have children when her professional development is complete' (child delay),[7]

(3) 'politics should be left to men' (politics).

[7] We included this item as it measures the belief whether professional development is compatible with the responsibilities of motherhood (rather than parenthood or fatherhood) or the well-being of the child, i.e. the degree of agreement that mothers are responsible for childcare and that children's needs should take precedence over their employment and career. Nevertheless, we tested the LCA model without this item, which did not change the results presented.

Three further items were collected in a different way or were constructed by us (see Appendix Table A 6.2-1):

(4) 'Women can be successful in leadership positions' (leadership) could be answered with 'Yes, I am sure' – 'Yes, but I am not sure' – 'No, I don't think so'.

(5) 'A mother can work full-time if there are children under three' (limit employment) was based on slightly different questions for women and men.

(6) 'The main responsibility for the household lies with the woman' (household responsibility) was also based on gender-differentiated questions.

Due to the different scales and partly skewed distribution of responses, we dichotomised and – where necessary – recoded the items for the analyses so that all item endorsements (indicated by a value of 1) represented egalitarian attitudes.

6 Latent class analysis

To identify gender ideology patterns in our sample we applied LCA using Mplus 8.7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017). With the person-centred, model-based LCA it is possible to categorise individuals based on their response patterns into a number of k classes (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018; Vermunt & Magidson, 2002). Individuals within the same latent class are assumed to share some underlying, unobservable association which can be assessed using the manifest, dichotomised survey items (so-called indicators). In consequence, the response patterns for individuals within one latent class are more similar than the patterns across classes. With LCA the class membership posterior probabilities are estimated, which assign the respondent a probability of belonging to each of the identified classes based upon her/his response pattern. Additionally the item response probability is estimated, meaning the conditional probability of an individual residing in a latent class giving an egalitarian answer to each of the six gender ideology indicators.

We examined LCA with one to four classes and used theoretical considerations and model fit statistics BIC, adjusted BIC, AWE as well as Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test to decide on the number of latent classes (see Appendix Table A 6.2-2) (Masyn, 2013). The lower the BIC, adj. BIC and AWE, the better the model fit. A significant p-value of the VLMR LRT indicates that the k class model is a better fit than the k − 1 model. To replicate the best log likelihood and avoid local maxima, each LCA was performed starting with a sufficient set of random start values. Also, we examined if respondents differed in their predicted class membership across gender, age or marital status. To do this, we performed multinomial logistic regressions with the predicted class assignment as the outcome by applying the so-called 'three-step procedure'[8] which is established in

[8] The first step estimates the unconditional class model. The second step assigns respondents to classes based on posterior probabilities of membership resulted from the first step.

Mplus (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). The advantage of this approach is its correction for classification errors that can result from probabilistic class assignments (Vermunt, 2010).

7 Results

7.1 Descriptive results

Figure 6.2-1 shows the agreement and disagreement values for the six indicator variables, separately for women (left bars) and men (right bars). The majority of respondents did not think that the man should be the leader in a relationship or marriage, although there were significant gender differences here (p = 0.000). Almost three quarters of women (71.6%) disagreed that the man should dominate his partner, while only slightly more than half of men (53.1%) did so. Significant gender differences also existed in attitudes towards the division of housework (p = 0.000). Here, the majority of men (85.9%) saw women as responsible, while three quarters (75.3%) of women defined housework as a shared responsibility.

Figure 6.2-1: (Dis-)agreement with gender ideology indicators, women and men, in %



Source: Women's Study 1984 (doi.org/10.4232/1.6138). Authors' calculations.

The genders were more similar in their attitudes when it came to the professional development of mothers in connection with questions of childbearing. At least three quarters (75.0% of women and 79.7% of men) of the respondents agreed that this should take place one after the other. There were few gender-specific differences, but there was overall a heterogeneous picture of attitudes with regard to full-time employment of mothers with children under the age of three. In both gender groups, about one third (37.7% of women, 32.5% of men) were sceptical about fulltime maternal

employment with small children. There was agreement that women should be able to participate in politics and that this field should not be reserved for men (76.4% of women, 72.3% of men). In addition, almost all female and many of the male respondents stated that women can be successful in leadership positions (93.3% of women, 85.9% of men).

In summary, the greatest heterogeneity existed in respondents' attitudes with regard to full-time maternal employment with young children. The most pronounced gender differences in attitudes were found with regard to male dominance in the partnership and female responsibility for housework.

7.2 Results of latent class analysis

For identifying gender ideology patterns, we applied LCA which estimates the size of gender ideology classes and respondents conditional response probabilities for each of the six indicators. In our case, a two class solution turned out to fit best (see Appendix Table A 6.2-2).

Figure 6.2-2 shows the class sizes and the conditional probabilities of giving egalitarian responses to each of the six indicators, which we used to label the classes. The larger gender ideology class in our sample, which we labelled 'all-inclusive-egalitarians', comprised 56.1% of respondents. They had a high conditional probability of giving egalitarian responses (more than 65%, partly considerably greater) on five out of six indicators, so they were highly egalitarian. Accordingly, the class was characterised by opposing male dominance in a relationship, by endorsing women's participation in politics and leadership, by supporting full-time employment of mothers with children under the age of three and by refusing a gender-traditional division of household labour. Only the belief that professional development and getting the first child should happen successively for women was more strongly supported (29% were likely to reject this).

Figure 6.2-2: Conditional probability of giving an egalitarian response and class size.



Source: Women's Study 1984 (doi.org/10.4232/1.6138). Authors' calculations. N=1511.

The second gender ideology class covered 43.9% of our sample. The members of this second class, which we called 'not-in-my-backyard-egalitarians' ('nimby-egalitarians'[9]), were ambivalent. On three of the six indicators, nimby-egalitarians had a low probability of an egalitarian response (below 40% in each case). These indicators mainly concerned the intra-familial, private sphere: Members of this class endorsed male primacy in relationships, female responsibility for housework and that women should only become mothers when they have completed their professional development. For the other three indicators concerning women's role in the public sphere – women in politics, leadership positions and fulltime employment – members of this class had higher probabilities of egalitarian responses. For nimby-egalitarians, this revealed an ambivalence: the support for gender equality in the public sphere was contrasted with rather less egalitarian attitudes in the familial, private sphere.

The multinomial logistic regression (see Appendix Table A 6.2-3) suggested that women had a lower chance of belonging to the nimby-egalitarians class (than to the class of all-inclusive-egalitarians) compared to men. And respondents in cohabiting or living-apart-together relationships had higher chances to be members of the nimby-egalitarian class compared to singles. Thus, it can be derived that men and partnered but not married respondents were less egalitarian regarding the private sphere.

8 Discussion

This article combined quantitative analyses of historical survey data for 18–37-year-old respondents in the GDR in 1984, which had not previously been used, with qualitative analyses of the East German socialist regime's gender-relevant policies and policy guidelines to assess societal gender ideology patterns in relation to the socialist conception of gender equality.

Using LCA, we showed that while egalitarian gender ideology patterns were widespread among young people in the GDR, considerable differences nevertheless appeared in the form of two gender ideology classes. The class which we termed all-inclusive- egalitarians comprised more than half of the sample (56.1%) and endorsed gender equality in both the public and familial spheres. The class of not-in-mybackyard-egalitarians (nimby-egalitarians), which included 43.9% of the respondents, was characterised by ambivalent attitudes, as its members supported gender equality in the public sphere of employment and politics, but held less egalitarian attitudes towards the

[9] The term 'Nimby' is originally used in political science to describe local resistance to the siting of politically planned facilities (such as wind turbines, landfills, drug addicts' homes). The concept's central hypothesis is that people may agree with the overall goal of the measures (e.g. climate protection or social facilities), but disagree with implementing them in their immediate surroundings for various reasons (Dear, 1992; van der Horst, 2007; Wolsink, 1994). The concept is controversial in the literature, but it can be used figuratively to aptly describe the ambivalence of the gender ideology class in question (support for gender equality at the public level versus less support at the private level).

private, familial sphere, e.g. towards the division of housework. And men – who benefited more from a traditional division of care work (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004) – had higher chances of belonging to this class. What could not be found was a class with a consistently traditional gender ideology pattern as was most common in the neighbouring FRG at that time (Braun et al., 1994; Lois, 2020): For example, in West Germany in 1982, eight out of ten (young) adults thought that young children suffer due to their mothers' employment (Kleinschrot, 2023; see also Alwin et al., 1992), while our analyses for the GDR show that more than half of the respondents held gender ideologies supporting full-time maternal employment with young children. Therefore, we conclude that the socialist gender equality policy and propaganda were successful to some extent in shaping the population's gender ideologies. However, the political interventions of the GDR regime aimed at reconciling family and employment for mothers without taking earnest political measures aimed at addressing the existing gender-unequal division of unpaid labour (Braun et al., 1994; Gysi & Meyer, 1993; Nickel, 1998; Trappe, 1996). In this sense they matched well with the ambivalent gender ideology class of nimby-egalitarians.

Our results point to the existence of varieties of egalitarianism and challenge monolithic interpretations of gender ideologies in the GDR society. They also complement research on the dynamics of gender ideology in Western Europe and the USA since the 1970s (Cotter et al., 2011; Knight & Brinton, 2017) which indicates that individuals' attitudes towards gender roles in the public and private spheres are not always consistently traditional or egalitarian, but rather that individuals can maintain differing, and hence ambivalent, gender ideologies in relation to different domains (Pepin & Cotter, 2018; Scarborough et al., 2019). Our historical analysis points to the fact that this multidimensionality can also be found in the late socialism of the GDR.

In addition, the findings of our research can also be set in relation to the latest theories of gender revolution by quantifying the diversity of egalitarian gender ideologies in the late GDR. In recent decades, researchers have found that Western democratic states have made significant advances in gender equity within individual-oriented institutions (McDonald, 2000), but that at the same time, equity in family-oriented institutions has lagged behind as well as that (attitudes towards) women's and men's roles in the familial sphere have also not changed to the same extent. Thus they speak of a 'stalled', 'uneven' (England, 2010; Goldscheider et al., 2015; Sullivan et al., 2018) or 'incomplete' gender revolution (Esping-Andersen, 2009). It can be argued that a stalled gender revolution was also observed in the GDR on at least two levels, although equity was given within individual-oriented institutions and more or less also within family-oriented institutions (McDonald, 2000). Firstly, a stalled gender revolution was observed at the behavioural level, since there was gender equality in terms of full-time employment but not in the area of domestic work, with women doing most of the housework and care work (Gysi & Meyer, 1993; Lee et al., 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Secondly, as we were able to show in this paper, at the attitudinal level,

since the ambivalence towards equality in the public versus familial spheres was evident in the class of the nimby-egalitarians. Even though there are certain similarities between developments in the former GDR and contemporary Western democratic states concerning the gender revolution in behaviour and attitudes, the gender equality policy of the state socialist regime was prescribed by the male-dominated political leadership (Nickel, 1998), whereas the gender equality measures of recent years in the West were to some extent initiated through women's movements (Esping-Andersen, 2009).

Despite these insights, our study is limited by the fact that the sample was not representative. The survey was only conducted in two districts of the country, women were overrepresented in our sample and the age cohort only included young adults, who, furthermore, were recruited via the workplace, meaning that students and the unemployed (the latter hardly existing in the GDR) were excluded. Furthermore, our interpretation of the two attitude classes loses some of its validity since members of the class of all-inclusive egalitarians had a high probability for egalitarian responses on five, but not all six indicators. Moreover, we cannot reliably assess the extent to which citizens who lived under the totalitarian GDR regime responded in a socially desirable way. With cross-sectional data, it is also not possible to investigate causal relationships between GDR's policy and societal gender ideology. Panel data, which would be necessary for such interpretations to be drawn conclusively, does not exist for our analyses. Nevertheless, the present study can contribute to the description of societal gender ideology patterns under late socialism in the GDR and their comparison with the regime's gender equality conception. We were able to show that after almost 40 years of propagated gender equality and numerous political interventions, state socialism in the GDR did not encounter a uniformly egalitarian attitude profile in the population, but that varieties of egalitarianism existed. These findings allow for a comparison of experiences concerning gender equality in the former GDR with recent developments in Western democratic states and thereby enrich current gender ideology research. Furthermore, the study can be understood as a plea to recognise the potential of historical-sociological research based on the numerous well preserved but rarely used data sets collected by the Central Institute for Youth Research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This study was conducted within a project funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG,

German Research Foundation) – Project number 434947732. The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in GESIS Data Archive, at https://doi.org/10.4232/1.6138, ZA6138 Data file Version 1.0.0.

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Appendix of Study 2

Appendix Table A 6.2-1: Coding of the indicator variables

Question wording	**Constructed Variable**	**Coding**	
		Agree	Disagree
Within a marriage/ partnership, the man should basically be the leader (i.e. he should make all the important decisions in the family). 1=completely agree to 4=completely disagree		1 + 2	3 + 4
If possible, a woman should only have children when her professional development is complete. 1=completely agree to 4=completely disagree		1 + 2	3 + 4
Politics should be left to men. 1=completely agree to 4=completely disagree		1 + 2	3 + 4
Women can be successful in leadership positions. 1='Yes, I'm sure.' 2='Yes, but I'm not sure.' 3='No, I don't think so.'		1	2 + 3
Is it desirable to limit your own/a mother's professional activity if children under three are part of the family? 1='by all means', 2='under certain circumstances only', 3 ='not at all'.	A mother can work full-time if there are children under three.	2 + 3	1
At women: 'How would you prefer to arrange your life?' [1/2'always/mainly working' to 3/4'always/mainly housewife'.	The main responsibility for the household lies with the woman.	3 + 4: women 1 + 2: men	1 + 2: women 3: men

At men: 'As a man, could you imagine being the homemaker instead of being employed??' [1='No, I would always like to be employed' 2='Yes, possibly for a short time' 3='Yes, even for years']		

Appendix Table A 6.2-2: Model fit statistics

Classes	BIC	Adj. BIC	AWE	p-value Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin LRT k-1 vs. k classes
1	10006.17	9987.11	10068.09	n.a.
2	9892.18	9850.88	10026.35	0.000
3	9927.53	9863.99	10133.94	0.281
4	9964.72	9878.95	10243.38	0.198

Source: Women's Study 1984. Own calculations.

Appendix Table A 6.2-3: Multinomial logistic regression of class membership on gender, agegroup and marital status; Odds ratios.

Base category: All-inclusive egalitarians	**Nimby-Egalitarians**	
	OR	SE
Gender (ref.: male)		
female	0.174***	(1.264)
Agegroup (ref.: 18-27)		
28-37 years	1.209	(0.313)
Marital Status (ref.: single)		
LAT/married, living apart	2.699**	(0.870)
Cohabiting	2.480**	(0.832)
Married	1.608	(0.446)
N		1481

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Source: Women's Study 1984, own calculations.

6.3 Study 3

Accepted Manuscript

Consistent Egalitarianism or Heterogeneous Belief Patterns? Gender Ideologies in Contemporary East and West Germany

Published as:
Kleinschrot, L. (2024). Consistent Egalitarianism or Heterogeneous Belief Patterns? Gender Ideologies in Contemporary East and West Germany. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, *53*(4), 387–403. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2024-2027.

Abstract:
Studying gender ideologies is crucial for understanding the work and family related behaviors of women and men. This paper analyzes the gender ideologies of respondents living in East and West Germany, and whether these belief patterns differ by socio-demographic characteristics. To this end, latent class analysis is applied to eight gender role items from the FReDA 2021 survey. The results show the presence of a consistent and widespread egalitarian gender ideology in both regions, as well as a less prevalent traditional one in the West. Additionally, heterogeneous gender ideologies are to be found with egalitarian essentialism present in both regions, and intensive parenting only in the West. Respondents with a lower level of education and males have higher chances of holding non-egalitarian ideologies. The findings align with the literature on persisting East-West differences in gender ideology, and with research on the diversification of gender ideology.

1 Introduction

International research has identified a 'stalled gender revolution' in the area of gender roles since the late twentieth century in the USA and large parts of Europe, including Germany (Esping-Andersen 2009; England 2010; Goldscheider et al. 2015; Brinton & Lee 2016; Sullivan et al. 2018). This is not in line with the predictions of modernization theory, which assumes continuous progress in gender equality (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). In the case of gender role behaviors, the stalled gender revolution refers to the increased gender equality in education or labor force participation, but a failure to reach equality in the area of unpaid care work, which is still predominantly performed by women (Samtleben 2019; Schulz 2021; Vargha et al. 2023). The pervasiveness of beliefs that suppose innate gendered abilities might have contributed to this development. This is because beliefs are the basis for behavioral decisions (Ajzen & Fishbein 1973) which have been shown to influence, amongst others, the employment trajectories of women and the division of childcare and housework in families (for an overview see Chatillon et al. 2018; Davis & Greenstein 2009).[1] This makes their investigation and that of their predictors important for understanding persistent gender inequality in work and family behavior. Furthermore, international research shows that also beliefs regarding gender roles have long been subject to a steady liberalization, but one which has been leveled off since the 1990s (Cotter et al. 2011).

In the search for explanations for the stalled gender revolution, or the leveling off of egalitarian developments in beliefs regarding gender roles, there is agreement that a one-dimensional understanding of beliefs as a consistent structure ranging between traditional and egalitarian – methodically implemented mostly through summative belief indices – is over-simplistic.[2] Therefore, recent and mainly international comparative studies use an adapted way of examining beliefs regarding gender roles, in which the conceptualization of gender ideology as a latent construct makes it possible to consider various belief dimensions (Chatillon et al. 2018). These studies show, first, that in addition to the traditional or egalitarian gender ideology, which include consistent traditional or egalitarian beliefs regarding the various dimensions, there has been a diversification in beliefs regarding gender roles. This is because heterogeneous belief patterns have emerged in which beliefs on multiple dimensions are structured independently of each other. Here, for example, an endorsement of gender equality in the public domain, e.g. in terms of paid work, is combined with varying degrees of support for gender equality in the private domain. A second finding has been that the gender revolution in beliefs has not come to a halt. There is still a trend toward egalitarianism, as the consistent traditional ideology has been replaced by heterogeneous

[1] Beliefs and behaviors are mutually dependent, which does not necessarily mean that the two must be congruent.

[2] In order to make it clear that this study refers to a multi- and not a one-dimensional (summary index of several belief items) understanding of gender ideology, I use the term gender ideology (or synonymously: belief pattern) – as is common in similar studies, e.g. Grunow et al. (2018) or Begall et al. (2023).

belief patterns (Cotter et al. 2011; Knight & Brinton 2017; Grunow et al. 2018; Pepin & Cotter 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019).

Germany is a particularly interesting case for examining heterogeneous belief patterns due to the former division of the country, which was associated with very different norms and policies on maternal employment and childcare (Rosenfeld et al. 2004), and decades after reunification, differences in beliefs persist between East and West Germany (Ebner et al. 2020; Sievers & Warner 2022; Zoch 2021). In addition, the German family policy framework has undergone considerable transformation since the early 2000s, in that maternal employment and extra-familial childcare are more strongly encouraged, while certain policies promoting the male breadwinner model are maintained (Pfau-Effinger 2018). Political support for different work-family ideals might be accompanied by heterogeneous belief patterns on gender roles, which can empirically captured most appropriately by latent class analysis (LCA). However, gender ideology studies that apply this method to the German case are still scarce and they seldom differentiate between East and West Germany or investigate the socio-demographic characteristics of people who hold a particular ideology in the two regions (see Barth & Trübner 2018; Sievers & Warner 2022). The latter is crucial in order to understand predictors that contribute to a trend toward egalitarianism.

Moreover, the few existing studies that explicitly analyze the multidimensionality of gender ideology in Germany utilizing LCA are based on data collected more than ten years ago (Barth & Trübner 2018; Sievers & Warner 2022; Diabaté et al. 2023). Recent data on the multiple dimensions of gender ideology and their interplay are instructive against the background of the significant changes in family life that took place during the Covid-19 pandemic. In the first Covid-19 wave, German educational and childcare facilities were shut down, and at the same time many employees were asked to work from home, which led to an increase in paternal, but also maternal childcare time (Boll et al. 2021; Kreyenfeld & Zinn 2021). These experiences could have long-term effects on gender ideologies, such as a stronger endorsement of a gendered division of labor. At the moment, however, it is unclear what the current, i.e. post-Covid-19 pandemic, status of multidimensional gender ideologies in Germany is. Another argument for the importance of current data is that political changes, such as the expansion of day-care in Germany since the early 2000s, set normative orientation points for gender roles (Sjöberg 2004; Gangl & Ziefle 2015). Research on Germany has shown that certain policy changes have had short-term impacts on particular dimensions of gender ideology. For example, the introduction of a fathers' quota within the paid parental leave scheme in 2007 led to less support for the statement that mothers should be more concerned about their family than about their career among grandmothers (not among grandfathers) in East and West Germany (Unterhofer & Wrohlich 2017). The substantial expansion of public childcare since the mid-2000s led to more egalitarian beliefs regarding maternal employment among mothers without a college degree in West Germany (not in East Germany) (Zoch & Schober 2018),

and the extension of parental leave to three years in 1992 led mothers in West Germany to judge work as less central to their lives (Gangl & Ziefle 2015). As it is conceivable that policy-induced norm-setting may evolve more strongly over time (Sjöberg 2004; Gangl & Ziefle 2015), a re-examination of multidimensional gender ideologies based on recent data may yield important insights.

This study extends the aforementioned research by a) providing very recent insights into the prevalence of gender ideologies in Germany using representative data from FReDA – the Family Demography Panel Study (Schneider et al. 2021; Bujard et al. 2023b) – from the year 2021, b) by examining the multidimensionality of gender ideology using the person-centered approach of LCA, and c) by investigating whether the gender ideologies of people who live in East or West Germany vary, and whether the associations between socio-demographic characteristics, especially gender, and gender ideology differ within the regions.

The article is structured as follows. First, the German context will be discussed. Then the theoretical and empirical state of research on gender ideologies (in East and West Germany) will be reviewed and expectations derived for the present study. After a description of the FReDA data and the method of the three-step approach of LCA is provided. Finally, the results will be presented and discussed.

2 Contextualizing the German Case Study

There are still clear differences in gender roles between East and West Germany which can be traced back to its division into a state-socialist East and a capitalist West from 1949 until reunification in 1990. The extensive labor market and childcare policies of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East resulted in very high institutional childcare rates and high levels of labor force participation of women and mothers. However, despite the presence of many policies aimed at reconciling women's full-time work and family lives, an egalitarian division of unpaid work in the family was not achieved. In the GDR, women were mainly responsible for housework and childcare, although they usually worked to the same extent as men (Trappe 1996). In contrast, the policies of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) supported the male breadwinner model, with women focusing on the care of the household and children (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Still today, maternal employment, as well as the availability and acceptance of extra-familial childcare, is significantly higher in East than in West Germany, and people in the East still hold more egalitarian beliefs regarding gender roles than those in the West (Barth et al. 2020; Ebner et al. 2020). In 2022, in East Germany the institutional childcare rate of children under three was 53%, the employment rate of mothers (in 2018) with minors was 74%, with most mothers working full-time. At the same

time, in West Germany, the childcare rate for under-threes was 32%, and the maternal employment rate was 68%, which in most cases meant part-time work (BMFSFJ 2020, 2023).

In addition, reunified Germany has undergone a paradigm shift in family policy since the early 2000s, mainly due to the following factors: the introduction of a total of 14 months' paid parental leave, including a quota for fathers in 2007 and the expansion of day-care particularly for under-threes which, since 2013, has included the right to day-care places from the age of one (Blum et al. 2022). A planned two-week paid paternity leave immediately after the birth of a child from 2024, and an agreed legal entitlement to full-time childcare for primary school children from 2026 are further steps to support working parents and promote gender equality. At the same time, there are still political, as well as labor market-related factors in Germany that encourage a gender-specific division of labor, such as the system of joint income taxation that favors single earner families, an insufficient supply of day-care places especially for under-threes or school-aged children and the widespread existence of the ideal worker norm, which expects fathers to work full-time, to work overtime, and to always be available for their employer (Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2013; Gangl & Ziefle 2015). Most parents in Germany live the 'male breadwinner/female part-time carer' model (Pfau-Effinger 2018; BMFSFJ 2020). West Germans appear to be satisfied with this model (Florean & Engelhardt 2020), but it is often associated with negative long-term consequences for women's wages and derived entitlements, as well as their careers as a whole (OECD 2017).

This gendered division of labor also persisted during the closures of school and childcare institutions due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Mothers were more likely than fathers to reduce their working hours, they continued to do more housework, and took on the greater share of childcare (Hipp & Bünning 2021). This was despite the fact that fathers – particularly those with low- and medium-levels of education, who were more likely to be on short-time work or not employed – increased their childcare time compared to the pre-pandemic period (but mothers did so also) (Boll et al. 2021; Kreyenfeld & Zinn 2021). However, the increase in paternal childcare time was not sustained, as it was no longer observed in the following months (Boll et al. 2021). According to current evidence, there were no lasting changes in beliefs regarding gender roles. Fathers' support for maternal employment declined significantly in West Germany at the time of the strictest closures of childcare and educational institutions (there were no changes for mothers and East Germans), but rose sharply again in the following period (Huebener et al. 2022).

Generally speaking, there are three main factors that render the investigation of multidimensional gender ideologies in Germany on the basis of current data a fruitful terrain for research. The first is the transformation of the political framework, which currently offers ambivalent orientations with regard to gender roles, as some policies promote the male-breadwinner model and others the dual-earner model. This heterogeneity is exacerbated by the structural and normative differences that still exist between East and West Germany. Second, the impact of the pro-equality family policies

in recent years on multidimensional gender ideologies may not have been fully captured in previous studies utilizing LCA, as these only evolve over time, but the studies use data from ten years ago. Third, many months after families' experiences during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is worth examining whether multidimensional gender ideologies are consistent with those before the pandemic or whether differences can be observed.

3 Theoretical Perspectives, Expectations and Previous Research

3.1 The Multidimensionality of Gender Ideology

Previous quantitative attitudinal research differs in its approach to the multidimensionality of gender ideology by applying either deductive or inductive procedures. Drawing on the theoretical considerations behind the survey items, the former rejects the use of summative gender role belief indices, as the various survey items address different domains of life, e.g. the employment or the household (Pfau-Effinger & Euler 2014; Pepin & Cotter 2018). Thus, in the deductive approach, the gender role belief items are analyzed separately and in the inductive procedure, on the other hand, different belief patterns are derived from the survey responses (cf. Knight & Brinton 2017; Chatillon et al. 2018). Gender ideology is thus understood as a latent construct, and beliefs regarding the multiple dimensions addressed by the survey items are considered in their interplay (Brinton & Lee 2016; Knight & Brinton 2017; Grunow et al. 2018; Begall et al. 2023). This is predominantly done by using person-centered, model-based LCA (Lazarsfeld & Henry 1968; Masyn 2013).

In order to gain a comprehensive picture of gender ideology in an open-ended way, this study also follows the methodology of an inductive approach. Thus, gender ideology is understood as the interplay of individual beliefs about the behavior and responsibilities of men and women within and outside the family, and is therefore multidimensional (Scanzoni 1975; Kroska 2000; Davis & Greenstein 2009). Following this, beliefs refer to different domains of life (Brinton & Lee 2016), and are measured in surveys by the degree of agreement with various gender role items. The domains of life can be broadly differentiated into the public, i.e. the labor market, politics, education, and the private, i.e. housework, childcare, and care for other family members (Yu & Lee 2013; Pepin & Cotter 2018). In addition to women's and men's behaviors or responsibilities, beliefs may also refer to innate gender differences. In gender essentialism, differences in interests, preferences, and abilities between women and men are attributed to biological-natural factors and are therefore seen as relatively stable and immutable. Closely linked to an essentialist gender ideology are stereotypes that assign certain traits to individuals based on their gender (Smiler & Gelman 2008; Ridgeway 2009).

In this study, a consistent traditional or essentialist gender ideology is understood as the holding of aligned beliefs regarding the two domains, i.e. the support of male dominance or greater abilities of

men in the public (politics, education, labor market), and the emphasis on the responsibility and better suitability of women for the private (household, childcare) (Davis & Greenstein 2009). A consistent egalitarian or non-essentialist ideology, on the other hand, indicates that the public, as well as the private domains, are understood as shared, or not gender-specific, meaning also that no innate differences between women and men are assumed (Davis & Greenstein 2009). In a multidimensional understanding of gender ideology, in addition to these two consistent ends of the ideology spectrum (egalitarian/non-essentialist – traditional/essentialist), there can also exist heterogeneous gender ideologies. Those are characterized by combining traditional or essentialist with egalitarian or non-essentialist beliefs regarding the different domains of life.

The theoretical considerations on the multidimensionality of gender ideology are very relevant in the German context. The legacy of the former regimes in the East and West, which differed significantly in the promotion of female employment and institutional childcare, can still be observed in normative disparities regarding gender roles (e.g. Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Barth et al. 2020). Concurrently, the political framework in reunified Germany has shifted in favor of gender equality, but contradictory policies are currently creating ambivalent normative orientations with regard to gender roles (Pfau-Effinger 2018). Moreover, the international phenomenon of a stalled gender revolution is evident in Germany through a trend towards egalitarianism in gender ideology, increasing gender equality in education and paid work, while at the same time traditional roles in the area of unpaid work persist, even if men are becoming more involved, especially in childcare (e.g. Schulz 2021; Knight & Brinton 2017). In light of the theoretical considerations on the multidimensionality of gender ideology in conjunction with the state of gender equality in Germany, I expect to find – besides a consistent traditional or an egalitarian gender ideology – heterogeneous gender ideologies combining traditional and egalitarian beliefs regarding the public and private domains in Germany (Hypothesis 1).

Multiple empirical studies, mostly based on European and US data and focusing either on individual countries (Barth & Trübner 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019; Koo et al. 2020; Diabaté et al. 2023), or on international comparisons (Brinton & Lee 2016; Grunow et al. 2018; Begall et al. 2023), have identified several multidimensional gender ideologies prevalent in populations, and some studies have traced their spread over decades (Knight & Brinton 2017; Scarborough et al. 2019; Sievers & Warner 2022). One shortcoming of this research is that it is difficult to compare the results in detail, as each study refers to different survey indicators, finds a different number of gender ideologies, and introduces its own labels for each gender ideology. Nevertheless, the results agree that in addition to the two consistent endpoints of the gender ideology spectrum, there are heterogeneous gender ideologies that vary in their degree of egalitarianism or traditionalism toward the private and public domains. One of the most frequently identified (see e.g., Grunow et al. 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019) heterogeneous gender ideologies can be categorized within the framework of

'egalitarian essentialism' (Charles & Grusky 2004; England 2010; Cotter et al. 2011). This represents a gender ideology that supports equality between women and men in the public domain, but at the same time believes in an innate superiority of women in care work or in the private domain that also leads to gendered preferences. Another frequently observed (see e.g. Begall et al. 2023; Diabaté et al. 2023) gender ideology is described as intensive mothering (Hays 1996), or intensive parenting (Lee et al. 2014). These concepts emphasize the child-centeredness of parents, which is considered necessary for children's healthy development. Intensive mothering espouses the primary role of mothers in childcare. It is seen as a naturally female attribute, as something that should always be prioritized – even at the expense of maternal employment – and for reasons of better children's development, as something that should be predominantly carried out by mothers (Hays 1996; Liss et al. 2013; Dechant & Rinklake 2016; Diabaté & Beringer 2018). Intensive parenting places greater emphasis on the need for both mothers and fathers to be involved in childcare in order to meet the high demands that are essential for children's optimal development (Wall 2010; Faircloth 2014; Lee et al. 2014; Ruckdeschel 2015). It can therefore be seen as a more gender-neutral extension of intensive mothering.

Moreover, a common finding of gender ideology studies that observe longer periods of time (Knight & Brinton 2017; Barth & Trübner 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019) is that the consistent traditional gender ideology has declined and been replaced by heterogeneous ideologies that combine egalitarian beliefs regarding the public domain with less egalitarian beliefs toward the private domain. Thus these studies, based on the conception of multidimensional gender ideology, state that there has been less of a stagnation in the egalitarian development of gender ideology, but rather a diversification that continues to embrace egalitarian tendencies concerning some domains (Scarborough et al. 2019). One of the few gender ideology studies that applies LCA and includes the whole of Germany in a longitudinal comparison is that of Knight & Brinton (2017) comparing 17 OECD countries in Europe using the European Values Study and World Values Survey waves 1990 to 2009. They show that by 2009 the traditional gender ideology had declined significantly in Germany (about 15% of respondents in 2009), while the prevalence of a consistently egalitarian ideology had increased substantially (from 40% to almost 60%). In addition, the authors found that two heterogeneous gender ideologies gained in importance between 1990 and 2009: one that combines egalitarian views on women's participation in the labor force with support for the high importance of home and family for the female role (prevalence of around 25%), and another that supports mothers' individual choices between working or focusing on the traditional family role (around 8%). Like the study by Knight & Brinton (2017), all other studies available for Germany which explicitly analyze the multidimensionality of gender ideology by utilizing LCA are based on data collected a decade ago. The present study provides a further, recent observation of the development of multidimensional gender ideology in Germany, which seems relevant in view of

the possible delayed ideology adaptation to the changing political framework and the Covid-19 pandemic.

3.2 Differences in Gender Ideology between East and West Germany

Institutional learning combined with intergenerational transmission are two important mechanisms for the differences in gender ideology between East and West Germany that have been consistently shown in previous research (e.g. Ebner et al. 2020). The theory of institutional learning (Rohrschneider 1996) posits that individuals adapt their beliefs to those underlying the political framework, thus a socializing function is attributed to the political regime regarding citizens' beliefs. This occurs because political measures provide normative orientation and at the same time determine behavioral opportunity structures, including gender role behavior (Gangl & Ziefle 2015). Fulfilling the gender roles shaped by the political framework leads to identification with them (Bielby & Bielby 1989), and thus to a re-evaluation of gender role behaviors and an adaptation of beliefs based on this experience (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004). For example, the numerous policy measures of the GDR regime to promote maternal employment were highly congruent with supportive beliefs in society on this topic. And in the former FRG, where policies supporting the male breadwinner model were particularly prevalent, skepticism about maternal employment was widespread in society (Kleinschrot 2023). Since the sample examined in this study includes cohorts who experienced the divided Germany and extends to cohorts born a decade after reunification, the mechanism of intergenerational transmission is also decisive for understanding the gender ideology differences between today's East and West Germany. According to theories of intergenerational transmission, the gender-role-related behavior and ideology of parents shape those of their children through observation and imitation as well as direct tuition, as parents act as role models, provide normative orientation and actively pass on their gender ideology to their children (Bussey & Bandura 1999). Consequently, families or societies have a tendency to mold gender roles, often influenced by past practices, a concept encapsulated by the phrase 'legacies matter' (Rosenfeld et al. 2004: 110).

Due to the disparate gender role socialization experiences under the former different German regimes as well as the intergenerational transmission of gender ideologies, I expect a stronger prevalence of a consistent egalitarian gender ideology in East than in West Germany (Hypothesis 2a). Neither the former FRG nor the GDR regime enforced a gender equal division of care work, and the current German family policy regime offers ambivalent orientations regarding gender roles. Therefore, as a consequence of the mechanisms of regime socialization and intergenerational transmission, I expect to additionally find an egalitarian-essentialist gender ideology that sees the public domain as egalitarian, but supports the greater suitability of women for the private domain in West and East Germany (Hypothesis 2b).

Although the political system of the GDR was replaced by that of the former FRG in 1990, and the same political framework conditions have been applied in both regions since reunification, empirical research concurring shows that there are still clear differences between East and West Germany in terms of gender ideology (e.g. Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Barth et al. 2020). Regarding the development of the gender ideology gap since reunification, it has been shown that the gap persists – which is due to the fact that a general egalitarian trajectory can be discerned in both regions which, however, started from disparate baseline levels – but also that it is diminishing: Ebner et al. (2020) present recent evidence for this using data from the German General Social Survey (GGSS) from 1992 to 2016 and a summative index that includes all items surveyed pertaining to gender role beliefs. The convergence between East and West occurs because there is only a moderate trend towards egalitarianism in the West among cohorts born after 1965 and at the same time cohorts in the East born after reunification are less egalitarian than those born before. The authors demonstrate that the high level of egalitarianism in the East is mainly due to those cohorts who were primary socialized in the GDR, and that the political shift towards support for traditional gender roles with reunification has led to a re-traditionalization among younger East German cohorts (see also Lois 2020). The gender ideology gap between East and West can be attributed primarily to beliefs regarding maternal employment, as Zoch (2021) has shown using pairfam data from 2008 to 2019 to separately analyze certain dimensions of gender ideology. In this dimension the strongest differences are observed among cohorts born before reunification, however differences are still discernible among post-reunification cohorts, even when controlling for compositional effects (see also Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012). In contrast, the East-West gaps in beliefs regarding women's prioritization of family over career and the division of housework chores are less pronounced, and here a convergence between the regions can be observed (Zoch 2021). This is mainly due to younger West German cohorts becoming more egalitarian on these dimensions, rather than to younger East German cohorts becoming more traditional.

These findings underscore the need to consider the various dimensions of gender ideology, as some studies have done, by analyzing the interplay of beliefs and utilizing the LCA approach while distinguishing between East and West Germany. Such as Barth & Trübner (2018), who employ the GGSS from the years 1991 and 2012 and find five multidimensional gender ideologies in both regions, or Sievers & Warner (2022), who use the International Social Survey Programme from 1994, 2002 and 2012 and identify two multidimensional gender ideologies in East- and three in West Germany. Taken together, they show that in 2012 the consistent egalitarian gender ideology is the most widespread in both regions and the traditional gender ideology is much less prevalent (if at all) in East Germany than in West Germany. Moreover, the studies reveal that there are heterogeneous gender ideologies in both regions that can be consolidated under the concept of

intensive mothering. This ideology is the second most common in each region, and is more strongly represented in the West than in the East.[3]

This study builds on the well-documented gender ideology gap between East and West by explicitly addressing the multidimensionality of gender ideology, reanalyzing it for contemporary Germany, and complementing it with findings on the sociodemographic characteristics of people who hold certain belief patterns.

3.3 Gender as an Important Predictor for Gender Ideology

Several studies have shown that gender is one of the most important predictors of gender ideology (Brewster & Padavic 2000; Davis & Greenstein 2009; Knight & Brinton 2017; Grunow et al. 2018; Scarborough et al. 2019). Following Bolzendahl & Myers' (2004) interest-based explanation, individuals are more egalitarian if equality helps them to achieve their objectives. Since women benefit more than men from gender equality, e.g. from an equal division of housework, they are more likely than men to be egalitarian. Thus, I expect that women in both contemporary East and West Germany have a higher chance of holding a consistent egalitarian gender ideology than men (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, men in West Germany may benefit even more from a gender-unequal division of labor than men in the East due to certain structural conditions, such as the insufficient availability of institutional child care. Therefore, gender differences in gender ideology – in that men are more traditional than women – may be more pronounced in the West than in the East.

Despite that, gender ideology can be shaped by other socio-demographic characteristics. According to the exposure-based explanation, individuals form their gender ideology through exposure to situations or circumstances that are characterized by egalitarian or non-essentialist (or traditional/essentialist) ideas (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004), and individual characteristics determine these experiences (see Bolzendahl & Myers 2004; Davis & Greenstein 2009; Chatillon et al. 2018 for reviews on empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for the following). The exposure-based explanation predicts that older cohorts had different or less egalitarian socialization experiences than younger ones, and older people are more likely to have been exposed to non-egalitarian situations, such as a gender-specific labor division, more frequently and over longer periods of time. This is why there is a tendency for older portions of the population to be more traditional. Yet, in East Germany, where the former state-socialist regime was characterized by high maternal employment and institutional child care, it is more probable that individuals who are older, and therefore had direct experience of this regime, hold more egalitarian beliefs than those who are

[3] The prevalence of each gender ideology in West Germany in Barth & Trübner (2018) are 47.9% egalitarian (termed as 'unconditionally' and 'moderately egalitarian'), 11.8% traditional (termed as 'family-oriented traditional'), 40.2% intensive mothering (termed as 'child oriented traditional' and 'conflicted egalitarian'). And in East Germany 88.3% egalitarian, 3.5% traditional, 8.3% intensive mothering. In Sievers & Warner (2022) they are in West Germany 70.6% egalitarian, 13.3% traditional, and 16.1% intensive mothering and in East Germany 89.7% egalitarian, and 10.3% intensive mothering.

younger and have only experienced the more traditional family policy of reunified Germany. Additionally, marriage and the transition to parenthood are often associated with a gendered division of labor and, accordingly, with normative expectations of more traditional roles, in which women focus on unpaid- and men on paid work. As a gender-specific division of unpaid labor in families was common in both former German states and remains in reunified Germany, the exposure-based explanation for both regions suggests married people[4] and parents to be more traditional than those who are unmarried, divorced, or childless. As women's gender roles are more strongly affected by these characteristics or the associated normative expectations than men's roles, they may be particularly relevant to women's gender ideology. The same goes with employment. Employed women (compared to not employed) hold more egalitarian or non-essentialist beliefs as they experience or observe that women can be successful in the public domain and be financially independent, and that children do not suffer when their mothers are employed.

Overall, I investigate to what extent there are robust gender differences in gender ideology supporting the interest-based explanation, or whether differences are attributable to experiences determined by socio-demographic characteristics, and whether this differs between the two regions. Moreover, this enables a socio-demographic description of respondents that hold a particular gender ideology and thus provides information about the factors that contribute to egalitarian beliefs.

4 Data and Method

4.1 Data and Sample

I utilized data from the German 'Family Research and Demographic Analysis (FReDA)' wave 1 panel study from the end of 2021 (Schneider et al. 2021; Bujard et al. 2023b). FReDA wave 1 is well suited for the objective of this study as – at the time of analysis – it provides very recent data on several gender role items for a representative German sample, and has a sufficiently large sample size to check for differences between people residing in East or West Germany. Additionally, wave 1 was conducted after the periods of strict Covid-19 lockdowns.[5] While some other surveys may share these characteristics (e.g. the GGSS 2021 (GESIS 2022)), FReDA has the advantage in that it covers not only beliefs regarding gender roles or gender essentialism in the private domain, but also in the public domain (education, politics, jobs), which is crucial for studying the multidimensionality of gender ideology.

[4] Evidence on gender ideology differences between married and unmarried people are inconsistent, see e.g. Fan & Marini (2000) or Vespa (2009).

[5] Wave 1 was split into two survey periods for the anchor persons. The first half of wave 1 was surveyed from July to September 2021, the second half from November 2021 to January 2022. The nationwide closures of childcare and educational facilities during the so-called 'second lockdown' due to the Covid-19 pandemic lasted from mid-December 2020 to March 2021. Depending on the infection situation, childcare facilities and schools in the federal states were (partially) closed until June 2021. That means FReDA started after the closures ended.

FReDA is a large-scale bi-annual survey which asks respondents and their partners in Germany about – among other things – their partnership and family life situations, their family planning, life satisfaction, gender role behavior and beliefs. The study was conducted via self-administered web- or paper-based surveys (Gummer et al. 2020). The representative sample of the 18-49-year-old population in Germany was drawn in a random two-stage sampling process (primary sampling units: municipalities; secondary sampling units: individuals).

For the analyses at hand, I restricted the two samples for East and West Germany to respondents holding German citizenship, identifying themselves as women or men and who were in the 18 to 49 age range, which resulted in 2,765 respondents living in East- and 15,765 in West Germany. The classification of East and West Germany is based on respondents' current place of residence, rather than the region in which they grew up, which seems legitimate since these two places coincide for 93% of respondents.

4.2 Methods

In light of the theoretical and empirical findings on the multidimensionality of gender ideology, I chose an inductive approach, the LCA, which develops belief patterns regarding gender roles from responses. For the subsequent identification of respondents' gender or other socio-demographic characteristics as important predictors of gender ideology class membership, I estimated multinomial logistic regression models with the use of the three-step approach, as suggested by Vermunt (2010) and Asparouhov & Muthén (2014). All analyses were conducted separately for the East- and West German samples. In order to test the robustness of the results, all analyses were also carried out with an East-West pooled sample and with samples separated by gender.

Indicators for Latent Class Analysis

I used the following observed eight indicator variables for the LCA:

1. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. *(child suffers)*
2. Women should be more concerned about their family than about their career. *(focus on family)*
3. A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. *(relationship)*
4. On the whole, who would make better political leaders, men or women? *(politics)*
5. For whom is a university education more important, men or women? *(university)*
6. For whom is having a job more important, men or women? *(job)*
7. For whom is looking after the home and children more important, men or women? *(care work)*
8. Who are better at caring for small children, men or women? *(young children)*

Respondents answered items 1 to 3 on a five-point scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'. For each item, I combined the two 'agree' response categories (item 3 was reversed) and the neutral middle category ('neither agree nor disagree') to form the traditional group, because no clear egalitarian stance can be identified here, and the majority of respondents chose the two egalitarian response categories. Items 4 to 8 featured the response categories 1/2 = 'men definitely/slightly', 3 = 'both sexes equally', 4/5 = 'women slightly/definitely'. In these items, I contrasted the response categories that describe traditional gender segregation with those that stand for the opposite in the sense of 'reverse traditionalism' (Grunow et al. 2018: 44) or equality ('both sexes equally'). Due to the different item answer scales and the skewness of responses (many respondents chose the egalitarian answer options), I dichotomized[6], and where necessary, reversed items so that the value '1' reflects an egalitarian- and the value '0' a traditional belief (the distribution based on the initial answer scale can be found in Appendix Table A 6.3-1).

Procedure of Latent Class Analysis

With the use of LCA, respondents can be grouped into unobserved classes based on their response behavior to the above-mentioned eight indicators (Lazarsfeld & Henry 1968; Yamaguchi 2000; Vermunt & Magidson 2002; Masyn 2013; Nylund-Gibson & Choi 2018; Weller et al. 2020). Thus, the underlying assumption is that response patterns are conditioned by latent class membership. Consequently, respondents in the same class have similar item response probabilities for the indicators and thereby differentiate themselves from members of other classes. To conduct LCA, I used the three-step approach established in Mplus 8.7 (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2017). To adjust for the sampling design and reduce biases due to nonresponse, I used the scaled and truncated total weight provided in FReDA (Bujard et al. 2023a).

In the three-step approach, the parameters of the underlying probability distribution of the data were estimated first (without the inclusion of covariates) using maximum likelihood estimation, i.e. the unconditional class model (Vermunt 2010; Asparouhov & Muthén 2014). The treatment of missing data in Mplus in this step was based on a full information maximum likelihood estimation (Masyn 2013). To avoid local maxima, and to ensure that the best log likelihood was replicated, I used a sufficient set of random start values. I estimated models with one to seven gender ideology classes using the two samples. The decision regarding which class solution was the most appropriate was based on fit and diagnostic statistics as well as interpretability (Masyn 2013; Weller et al. 2020). The lower the adjusted BIC values, the better the fit of the model. Furthermore, the significant p-value of the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test (VLMR-LR test) indicates that a k-class model fits the data better than the k-1 class model. Additionally, to evaluate the ideology classification, I report entropy, which provides information on how clearly the classes can be

[6] For a more detailed justification for dichotomizing the indicators see Yamaguchi (2000) or Weller et al. (2020).

demarcated from each other, and should approach the value 1 (Weller et al. 2020) (see Appendix Table A 6.3-2).

In the second step, the assignment of respondents to each of the identified latent classes was undertaken (Vermunt 2010; Asparouhov & Muthén 2014). The classification was based on the largest posterior class membership probability, which follows from the measured response patterns and the estimated latent class model parameters from the first step. The classification error that occurs here due to the varying individual probabilities used for the class assignment was corrected in the third step. In addition, the item response probabilities were calculated in the second step, i.e. the conditional probability that the respondents in a latent class give an – in this case – egalitarian response to the indicator in question. I based the interpretation of the classes on the item response probabilities.

Subsequent Multinomial Logistic Regressions

In the third step, the estimated class membership was regressed on gender (based on respondents' self-report) to identify gender differences in belief patterns. For these multinomial logistic regressions, I used the three-step approach implemented in Mplus (Asparouhov & Muthén 2014), which at the same time 'fixes' the unconditional class solution, and corrects for classification errors that occur due to the probabilistic class assignment (Vermunt 2010). To test whether gender remained an important predictor when exposure-based factors are included, and to describe the association between socio-demographic characteristics and gender ideology, the covariates age, marital status, whether the respondent has children, respondent's level of education, and employment status were also included in the models. Age was measured in years. Relationship status differentiated between respondents who were married, who were partnered but not married (including living apart together, cohabiting, divorced/widowed with a new partnership), and those who were not partnered (also those divorced or widowed). Parenthood distinguished whether the respondent had children (including biological, adopted, step- or foster children) or not. For education, the educational attainment classified according to the International Standard Classification of Education 2011 (ISCED-11) was used and grouped into low (ISCED levels 0 to 2), medium (ISCED levels 3 and 4) and high (ISCED levels 5 to 8) levels of education. Employment status differentiated between not being employed (in education/training, parental leave, homemaker, unemployed, retired, military/civic service, ill, other), working part-time (self-stated part-time or marginal employment), and working full-time (including self-employed). Respondents with missing data on these predictors were not taken into account, resulting in a sample size of 2,399 for East Germany and 13,720 for West Germany.

5 Results

According to the fit and diagnostic statistics (see Appendix Table A 6.3-2) and the provision of reasonable interpretation possibilities, for West Germany the 4-class solution emerges as the best fit to the data. This is because the values of the adjusted BIC improve considerably up to the 4-class-solution, and only marginally thereafter. Also, the VLMR-LR test shows that the 4-class solution fits significantly better than the 3-class solution. In addition, an entropy value of 0.71 indicates a satisfactory precision of the classification of individuals into the four classes. In the sample of people living in East Germany, there is not a very clear class solution. If the model selection is guided by the VLMR-LR test, a 2-class solution is superior to a 3-class solution, and especially with the 2-class solution the adjusted BIC improves significantly and only moderately thereafter. The two classes can be clearly distinguished from one another (entropy of 0.73).

Figure 6.3-1 (West Germany) and Figure 6.3-2 (East Germany) show the class sizes or the prevalence of the various gender ideologies, as well as the conditional probabilities for egalitarian/non-essentialist responses (plotted between 0 and 1 on the x-axis) to each of the eight indicators (given on the y-axis). In these figures, a high probability of egalitarian responses on the indicators 'child suffers', 'focus on family', and 'relationship' can be interpreted as an endorsement of maternal employment. A high probability for egalitarian/non-essentialist answers to the indicators 'politics', 'university' and 'job' reflects support for gender equality in the public domain. And a high probability of egalitarian/non-essentialist responses on the indicators 'care work' and 'young children' reveals the belief that women and men are equally suited and responsible for housework and the care of (young) children, i.e. an innate gender difference is rejected. In labeling the gender ideologies, I have been guided by class members' response patterns, but for comparability with other studies I tried to choose labels that have previously been used: *egalitarians, egalitarian essentialists, intensive parenting endorsers, traditionals.* The fact that in addition to the two consistent gender ideologies at the edges of the gender ideology spectrum, i.e. egalitarian/non-essentialist and traditional/essentialist ideologies, others are identified, confirms the multidimensionality of gender ideology and thus also hypothesis 1.

In the following, the gender ideologies are described in descending order of prevalence. Their spread in the two regions and their content will be presented. For each gender ideology, I will also specify which socio-demographic predictors, focusing on gender, contribute to the chances that someone will hold a given ideology (the results of the corresponding multinomial logistic regression can be found in Table 6.3-1). The most widespread gender ideology in both East and West Germany is labeled egalitarians because those respondents hold egalitarian or non-essentialist beliefs toward all indicators (as can be seen in Figure 6.3-1 and Figure 6.3-2), the probability for giving egalitarian responses is above 80% for almost all indicators). Thus, this ideology is consistent, or one-

dimensional egalitarian, irrespective of whether the indicator addresses the public or private domain. Accordingly, individuals holding this ideology do not expect any negative consequences from maternal employment for children, support gender equality in access to politics, university, or employment, and reject an innate greater ability of women for care work. In East Germany, three quarters of the respondents can be assigned to this class, in West Germany half of the sample, which indicates a higher prevalence of the egalitarian gender ideology in East Germany, confirming Hypothesis 2a.

The second largest latent class or gender ideology in both regions is the heterogeneous egalitarian essentialism. It covers a fifth of the people living in West Germany and a quarter of those living in East Germany (see Figure 6.3-1 and Figure 6.3-2). These respondents believe that women should focus on family rather than on career, that it is more important for women than for men to look after the home and children, as well as that women are the better caregivers for young children (because these respondents have low probabilities for giving non-essentialist responses to the indicators 'focus on family', 'care work' and 'young children'). Thus, egalitarian essentialists expect women to be naturally better suited for care work than men, and therefore believe in an innate difference between the genders. At the same time, egalitarian essentialists are likely to endorse gender-equal access to politics, university and employment. Egalitarian essentialists in West Germany have a high probability to not expect negative consequences for children from maternal employment, while those in East Germany are ambivalent in this regard. Since egalitarian essentialists, who combine beliefs about shared responsibilities and equal opportunities in the public domain with essentialist beliefs about the private domain are identified in West and East Germany, hypothesis 2b is confirmed, which expected to find this gender ideology in both regions. There are relevant predictors for being assigned to this class. In both regions, respondents with a low or medium level of education and males (in West Germany additionally parents) have higher chances to be egalitarian-essentialists than egalitarians compared to highly educated respondents or women (or those without children).

Within the sample of people living in West Germany but not in East Germany, two additional gender ideologies can be identified. The class labeled intensive parenting endorsers contains 17.2% of the West German sample. Intensive parenting endorsers are likely to expect negative consequences of maternal employment for young children (they are ambivalent concerning the worsening of the mother-child-relationship due to employment), and they strongly support mothers focusing on children and family rather than on their careers. At the same time, they think that it is important for both parents to engage in housework and childcare, and that parents of both genders are equally suited for the care of young children – something that distinguishes them from the egalitarian essentialists. In this, the child-centeredness of this class becomes very clear. Additionally, intensive parenting endorsers have a high likelihood for egalitarian beliefs concerning the public domain.

Older respondents, those with low or medium levels of education, and males have higher chances of endorsing intensive parenting than of supporting consistent egalitarianism.

Additionally, the class of traditionals can be identified in the West German sample only, which has low probabilities for egalitarian responses on six of the eight indicators. This is the smallest class, however, comprising 10.5% of the respondents living in West Germany. Traditionals endorse women focusing on family, and believe them to be better suited for care work and childcare. The members of this class also believe that children and the mother-child-relationship will suffer from maternal employment, and consequently, that a job is less important for women than for men. Only in terms of political competence and access to university education do they believe in male and female equality. Respondents who have a partner but are not married (compared to those without a partner) and women have lower chances to be traditional than egalitarian, while respondents with medium or low levels of education have higher chances to hold a traditional gender ideology.

Summarizing the gender differences, it can be noted that women have significantly lower chances than men of being assigned to a non-egalitarian class, and that this gender difference is of comparable significance and magnitude in East and West Germany. The gender difference continues to hold true when other socio-demographic characteristics are considered. In other words, women in both regions are more likely to hold an egalitarian gender ideology than men, which is in line with the expectation of hypothesis 3.

To test the robustness of the reported results, all analyses were additionally conducted with an East-West pooled sample and separately for women and men. They confirm the prevalence and interpretation of the four gender ideologies. Moreover, the regressions with the pooled sample validate the East-West differences in gender ideology as East Germans' chances of being assigned to a non-egalitarian class are significantly lower (see Appendix Table A 6.3-3). Gender and level of education are confirmed as important predictors for gender ideology. In addition, in the gender-separated analyses (see Appendix Table A 6.3-4 and Appendix Table A 6.3-5), the aforementioned gender differences are confirmed as the egalitarian gender ideology is more widespread in the female sample, while the less egalitarian ideologies are more prevalent in the male sample. Also, in these regressions level of education is the most powerful predictor and region of Germany remains a significant predictor overall (there were single significant coefficients for other predictors).

Figure 6.3-1: Conditional probability for giving egalitarian responses by classes, West



Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N West=15 765; N East=2 765.

Figure 6.3-2: Conditional probability for giving egalitarian responses by classes, East



Reading example: The conditional probability of giving an *egalitarian* response to the indicator 'child suffers' – i.e. *not* believing that a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works – is 87% for egalitarians and 50% for egalitarian essentialists.

Table 6.3-1: Results from multinomial logistic regressions for West and East Germany predicting class membership derived from 3-step procedure in Mplus, odds ratios.

	WEST						**EAST**	
Base category: egalitarians	**Egalitarian essentialists**		**Intensive parenting endorsers**		**Traditionals**		**Egalitarian essentialists**	
	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	SE
Age	1.001	0.008	1.038***	0.008	1.016	0.010	1.015	0.016
Relationship status *(ref. no partner)*								
Married	1.233	0.183	1.044	0.160	0.751	0.128	0.748	0.217
Partnered but not married	1.083	0.141	0.932	0.121	0.592***	0.089	0.810	0.200
Parent *(ref.: childless)*	1.738***	0.231	0.802	0.120	1.430*	0.237	1.147	0.317
Female *(ref.: male)*	0.561***	0.055	0.318***	0.035	0.205***	0.028	0.382***	0.076
Education *(ref.: high)*								
Low	2.122**	0.514	4.342***	0.969	4.557***	1.079	3.464**	1.343
Medium	1.666***	0.147	2.476***	0.248	2.089***	0.238	2.346***	0.468
Employment status *(ref.: full-time)*								
Not employed	0.983	0.121	1.150	0.158	1.007	0.164	1.099	0.296
Part-time	0.964	0.124	0.972	0.166	0.985	0.200	1.578	0.436

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N West=13 720. N East=2 399. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper examined gender ideologies in East and West Germany using data from the representative FReDA survey (Schneider et al. 2021; Bujard et al. 2023b) conducted in 2021. The multidimensional conception of gender ideology applied in this study, and its examination using LCA ties in with recent findings of (inter-)national research on the existence of various belief patterns regarding gender roles (Scarborough et al. 2019; Sievers & Warner 2022; Begall et al. 2023). The analysis of current data from Germany expands on prior findings by contributing to the identification of potential adaptations in gender ideology in the context of the transformation of family policy since the early 2000s. Furthermore, this study represents an initial attempt to describe multidimensional gender ideologies in the aftermath of families' experiences during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, it extends the research on multidimensional gender ideologies differentiating between East and West Germany (Barth & Trübner 2018; Sievers & Warner 2022) by not only providing contemporary insights into enduring disparities, but also by shedding light on gender differences and socio-demographic characteristics associated with the ideologies within the regions.

Three main findings emerged from the analyses. First, the majority of the 18- to 49-year-old respondents (three quarters of respondents in East-, and more than half of the sample in West Germany) had a consistent egalitarian gender ideology, though in both regions the heterogeneous egalitarian-essentialist ideology was the second most common in 2021. Egalitarians were very likely to reject innate gender differences and to support gender equality in both the public and private domains. However, this very widespread support for gender equality contrasts with often observable gender role behaviors of women and men, such as the gendered division of labor in the private domain, that previous research has found to be predominant among parenting couples in Germany (OECD 2017). Closer to these behaviors is the gender ideology of egalitarian essentialists, who supported gender equality in the public domain, but at the same time held essentialist beliefs regarding the private domain as they saw women as better suited for childcare and housework, although for them this did not conflict with mothers working. Thus, they assumed an inherent gender difference relevant for care work. This multidimensional ideology was not identified in comparable studies using 2012 data (Barth & Trübner 2018; Sievers & Warner 2022). In those studies, the only heterogeneous ideology was intensive mothering. The main difference between this and the egalitarian-essentialist ideology is that the latter does not view the employment of mothers as negative for children. Obviously, the findings do not imply causality, but the existence of the egalitarian-essentialist ideology in 2021 may reflect the now effective norm-setting (Gangl & Ziefle 2015) of the changed family policy, which promotes maternal employment, but continues to incentivize the gender-specific division of care work. In East Germany, it may also be the normative legacy of the gender role socialization experiences associated with the former GDR regime, which

implemented many measures to reconcile paid and unpaid work for mothers, but not for fathers (Trappe 1996). Moreover, the experiences during the closures of school and childcare institutions at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in Germany might be associated with egalitarian-essentialism. This situation in which mothers carried out the lion's share of the childcare, but also saw that share grow during the closures (Hipp & Bünning 2021) might have contributed to the essentialist belief that they are better suited to this type of domestic work than fathers. However, it has to be noted that the return to gender traditionalism in response to the burden of working while caring for children at home that was feared at the beginning of the pandemic, has apparently not occurred – as earlier findings on fathers' restored support for maternal employment already suggested (Huebener et al. 2022) – since still in 2021, the majority of respondents were egalitarians.

Second, the results showed strong differences in gender ideologies between East and West Germany – even after thirty years under the same political framework, and in a sample that was born or came of age after reunification in 1990. The egalitarian gender ideology was considerably more prevalent in East Germany, which suggests lasting effects of regime socialization, and in West Germany there was greater heterogeneity in gender ideology. Here, the traditional gender ideology and the belief pattern of intensive parenting were additionally found. The traditionals were characterized by a strong emphasis on gendered spheres and innate gender-specific abilities. Although it was the least prevalent gender ideology, accounting for only about one-tenth of the sample, its prevalence was comparable to that of a decade ago (Barth & Trübner 2018; Sievers & Warner 2022). The persistence of this belief pattern might also be due to former regime socialization or institutional learning (Rohrschneider 1996) in combination with the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology (Bussey & Bandura 1999). It suggests that the historic gender regime in West Germany, which for decades emphasized the domestic role of women, is still important for today's gender ideologies. The data used in this study presents an opportunity to delve more deeply into the potentially enduring effects of disparate regime socialization in West and East. A comparative analysis of the gender ideologies of cohorts who underwent their primary socialization before and after reunification represents a promising avenue for future research. The intensive parenting endorsers identified in West Germany focused on the well-being of the child. On this basis, they expected children to suffer if their mothers were employed, while at the same time supported fathers' involvement in childcare. The fact that this belief pattern was only found in the West may indicate that the care of young children was historically understood to best take place within the family, while in the East extra-familial childcare was and is common (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Even today, there is still less institutional care available for young children in the West, and consequently a higher level of care within families than in the East (BMFSFJ 2023). However, egalitarian developments like increasing maternal employment rates and family policy measures to promote the childcare involvement of fathers may have led to the belief that the lack of institutional care no longer needs to be compensated for by mothers alone, but that fathers should and can also take on

this task. As men were more likely than women to support the ideology of intensive parenting, this could in fact be an expression of their desire to be more involved in childcare.

Third, the analyses revealed that women had significantly higher chances than men to hold a consistent egalitarian gender ideology, confirming the findings on gender differences from a decade ago (Grunow et al. 2018; Begall et al. 2023; Knight & Brinton 2017), and the gender difference was observed to be consistent across both East and West Germany. The robustness of gender to the inclusion of other predictors for gender ideology strengthens interest-based explanations (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004), which assume that women are more egalitarian because they would benefit from greater gender equality. In addition to gender, educational attainment also emerged as a robust predictor in both regions. This corroborates the exposure-based explanation (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004), which assumes that greater education increases the likelihood of encountering egalitarian ideas and developing a greater ability to challenge gender stereotypes. As a result, in both regions of the country, the egalitarian ideology was more likely to be supported by women and highly educated people, while men and people with low and medium levels of education had higher chances to be egalitarian-essentialists.

There are a number of limitations of this research which should be borne in mind. First, the distribution of responses to some indicators was rather skewed as most respondents gave egalitarian answers. One potential explanation for this is that the survey only inquired about the familial consequences of maternal employment in general, rather than considering the extent of employment depending on the age of the children or the impact of paternal employment. It would be advantageous to develop new indicators that address these aspects (see Walter 2018), which could potentially reveal less egalitarian belief patterns. Second, the coding of the indicators, especially the coding of reverse traditionalism as 'egalitarian', must also be considered when interpreting the results. Third, the labeling of the classes already required some interpretation, so this might have been done differently by other researchers. Nevertheless, the study refrained from inventing new labels, instead referring to those used in previous studies for greater comparability. Fourth, due to the novelty of the FReDA survey, the study could only look at the year 2021, and therefore could not make statements on trends in gender ideology. However, the following waves of the FReDA panel study in the next years will make it possible to examine the stability of gender ideologies in East and West Germany over time, whereby the information gathered in this study can serve as a 2021 baseline. Fifth, the FReDA sample included 18-49-year-olds, but a sample comprising older people might reveal different gender ideologies. However, age was not a significant predictor in most analyses.

From a societal and political perspective, the study's findings on the prevalence of heterogeneous belief patterns and East-West differences are relevant as they suggest that both 'legacy' and 'policy' (see Rosenfeld et al. 2004) matter for current gender ideologies. There are ideologies which are still

congruent with the historical gender regimes in East and West Germany, but pro-equality policies have the potential, through regime socialization and norm-setting, to further advance the egalitarian trend in gender ideologies and thereby establish new legacies. And since the majority of respondents in 2021 supported gender equality in both the public and private domain and since beliefs are a driver for behavioral decisions, more equality-oriented institutional and labor market conditions could also contribute to reduce gendered labor divisions within families. Moreover, the study made clear that higher levels of education and thus higher awareness of gender-specific stereotypes, as well as knowledge about, and the experience of the potential consequences of gender inequality contribute to strengthening egalitarianism, which is why educational institutions have a particular responsibility for raising awareness here. Finally, the finding that in both regions a substantial proportion of the respondents held heterogeneous gender ideologies that cannot be traced along a continuum between traditional and egalitarian confirms both the multidimensional conception of gender ideology, and the findings of previous international studies, which have shown that the revolution in gender ideology has not stalled, but that there is a greater diversification of belief patterns.

Acknowledgments:

This study uses FReDA panel data from the release 2.0.0. DOI: 10.4232/1.14065, Bujard et al. (2023). A detailed study description can be found in Schneider et al. (2021).

I thank Alexander Kanamüller and Nicki Nils Seitz for their feedback on the analytical aspects of the study, and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on the manuscript.

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Appendix of Study 3

Appendix Table A 6.3-1: Distribution of indicators, responses of people living in West or East Germany, in %

Indicator *(Abbreviation)*		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works. *(child suffers)*						
	West	29.7	33.0	18.1	15.5	3.8
	East	44.7	33.4	13.5	6.7	1.8
Women should be more concerned about their family than about their career. *(focus on family)*						
	West	32.7	22.5	28.3	12.7	3.8
	East	38.5	24.7	26.3	7.9	2.6
A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. *(relationship)*						
	West	2.0	9.0	6.9	29.1	53.0
	East	0.7	4.4	4.4	22.5	68.1
		Men definitely	**Men slightly**	**Both sexes equally**	**Women slightly**	**Women definitely**
On the whole, who would make better political leaders, men or women? *(politics)*						
	West	2.4	6.7	81.5	7.5	2.0
	East	0.9	5.9	83.2	7.9	2.1
For whom is a university education more important, men or women? *(university)*						
	West	0.6	3.4	91.7	3.5	0.7
	East	0.4	1.9	94.3	3.0	0.5
For whom is having a job more important, men or women? *(job)*						
	West	2.6	11.9	84.6	0.6	0.3
	East	2.6	6.7	89.9	0.6	0.3
For whom is looking after the home and children more important, men or women? *(care work)*						
	West	0.0	0.2	75.3	22.0	2.5
	East	0.0	0.1	80.7	17.7	1.5
Who are better at caring for small children, men or women? *(young children)*						
	West	0.0	0.2	63.4	30.1	6.2
	East	0.2	0.0	67.4	27.8	4.6

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N West=15761-15764, N East=2763-2764.

Appendix Table A 6.3-2: Latent class models fit statistics and entropy

Class solution	Region	Adjusted BIC	VLMR-LR-Test (p-value)	Entropy
1	West	123618.18	n.a.	n.a.
2	West	112743.53	0.0000	0.70
3	West	110223.40	0.0000	0.75
4	West	108863.94	0.0000	0.71
5	West	108728.40	0.1103	0.71
6	West	108607.04	0.7098	0.71
7	West	108565.76	0.2159	0.75
1	East	18173.04	n.a.	n.a.
2	East	16672.56	0.0205	0.73
3	East	16285.37	0.0781	0.77
4	East	16136.60	0.1538	0.78
5	East	16130.08	0.6521	0.78
6	East	16129.27	0.3722	0.84
7	East	16130.15	0.5571	0.81

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N West=15 765; N East=2 765.

Appendix Table A 6.3-3: Results from multinomial logistic regressions for Germany (pooled sample) predicting class membership derived from 3-step procedure in Mplus, odds ratios.

Base category: Egalitarians (53.5%)	**Egalitarian Essentialists (20.1%)**		**Intensive Parenting Endorsers (16.9%)**		**Traditionals (9.5%)**	
	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Age	1.005	0.007	1.028***	0.008	1.017	0.009
East-Germany *(ref.: West)*	0.689**	0.081	0.471***	0.077	0.252***	0.065
Relationship status *(ref. no partner)*						
Married	1.201	0.162	1.012	0.146	0.770	0.123
Partnered but not married	1.087	0.130	0.998	0.119	0.607**	0.087
Parent *(ref.: childless)*	1.633***	0.196	0.861	0.123	1.317	0.213
Female *(ref.: male)*	0.560***	0.050	0.342***	0.036	0.211***	0.026
Education *(ref.: high)*						
Low	1.928**	0.442	4.104***	0.827	4.482***	0.998
Medium	1.717***	0.140	2.439***	0.224	2.110***	0.230
Employment status *(ref.: full-time)*						
Not employed	0.993	0.114	1.119	0.141	1.129	0.176
Part-time	1.067	0.123	0.977	0.156	1.031	0.197

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N=16119. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix Table A 6.3-4: Results from multinomial logistic regressions for women predicting class membership derived from 3-step procedure in Mplus, odds ratios.

Base category: Egalitarians (62.4%)	**WOMEN Egalitarian Essentialists (17.5%)**		**Intensive Parenting Endorsers (13.1%)**		**Traditionals (7.0%)**	
	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	SE
Age	1.003	0.010	1.054***	0.012	1.043**	0.014
East-Germany *(ref.: West)*	0.791	0.122	0.598*	0.138	0.262**	0.115
Relationship status *(ref. no partner)*						
Married	1.683**	0.329	1.028	0.204	1.642	0.429
Partnered but not married	1.514*	0.277	1.095	0.194	1.168	0.302
Parent *(ref.: childless)*	1.772**	0.302	0.762	0.165	1.131	0.297
Education *(ref.: high)*						
Low	1.232	0.420	3.939***	1.317	6.514***	1.983
Medium	1.614***	0.174	3.291***	0.486	2.743***	0.478
Employment status *(ref.: full-time)*						
Not employed	1.004	0.149	1.346	0.275	1.870**	0.450
Part-time	1.397*	0.190	0.975	0.211	1.109	0.306

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N=8948. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix Table A 6.3-5: Results from multinomial logistic regressions for men predicting class membership derived from 3-step procedure in Mplus, odds ratios.

Base category: Egalitarians (45.4%)	**MEN Egalitarian Essentialists (22.0%)**		**Intensive Parenting Endorsers (20.3%)**		**Traditionals (12.3%)**	
	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	SE
Age	1.007	0.011	1.012	0.010	0.998	0.012
East-Germany *(ref.: West)*	0.692*	0.119	0.389***	0.086	0.199***	0.074
Relationship status *(ref. no partner)*						
Married	0.817	0.159	0.828	0.173	0.480**	0.103
Partnered but not married	0.732	0.120	0.803	0.131	0.454***	0.083
Parent *(ref.: childless)*	1.178	0.200	0.908	0.173	1.583*	0.335
Education *(ref.: high)*						
Low	2.270*	0.768	4.720***	1.346	4.797***	1.427
Medium	1.549***	0.181	2.008***	0.246	2.065***	0.286
Employment status *(ref.: full-time)*						
Not employed	0.764	0.137	0.819	0.142	0.691	0.147
Part-time	0.335**	0.132	0.706	0.227	0.858	0.242

Note: FReDA W1, weighted data. N=7171. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

6.4 Study 4

Accepted Version

Attitudes of young people in Germany towards parental involvement in paid work: evidence of intergenerational transmission

Published as:
Kleinschrot, L., Bernhardt, J., Heintz-Martin, V., & Zerle-Elsäßer, C. (2024). Attitudes of young people in Germany towards parental involvement in paid work: evidence of intergenerational transmission. *Families, Relationships and Societies, 13*(3), 366–388.
https://doi.org/10.1332/204674321X16709502741946.

Abstract:
This article examines young people's attitudes towards parental involvement in paid work and their association with two channels of intergenerational transmission – parents' employment arrangements and gender ideologies – the relative importance of these channels and if young people's gender moderates the association. The data came from a German two-wave panel study of 609 adolescents (aged 15–21) surveyed in 2018 and their mothers in 2013–15. Analyses show that young people's preferred weekly working hours for mothers were positively related to their parents' employment arrangements and gender ideologies four years earlier. In contrast, the more progressive their mother's gender ideology was, the fewer working hours young people preferred for fathers. The two transmission channels were nearly equally important and their impact did not differ between female and male adolescents. Our findings suggest that the intergenerational transmission of gender roles might be one of multiple factors contributing to stalling trends in gender equality.

1 Introduction

Parents' division of labour is a primary area in which gender inequality is found. Mothers still participate less in the labour force than fathers, work fewer hours and earn lower wages – often receiving fewer welfare state benefits as a result (OECD, 2017). Levels of gender inequality differ widely across Europe. While the Nordic countries are highly gender-equal, and France has also a high proportion of dual breadwinner households and external childcare, in many Eastern European countries the gender gap in working hours is comparatively small because part-time work is not widespread among mothers (most of them either work full-time or are not employed), while southern European countries have relatively low female labour force participation and less developed day-care (Hook, 2015). Germany is a particularly interesting case due to persisting differences between the formerly divided East and West, and a paradigm shift in family policies since the 2000s, which led to a rising maternal labour force participation. However, this shift mainly resulted in the growth of the modernised male breadwinner model (Pfau-Effinger, 2005), which refers to arrangements where fathers work full-time and earn the family income, whereas mothers work part-time and assume the main responsibility for care work (Adler et al, 2016; Lechevalier, 2019). Existing studies suggest that today's youth might also be supportive of the male breadwinner model (Albert et al, 2019), despite general trends toward egalitarian gender ideologies in Germany (Ebner et al, 2020; Lois, 2020). This leads to the question of whether this is reflected also in our data and if, what the drivers for these settings might be.

Conceptual and empirical research on the driving forces of parents' gendered labour force participation has highlighted the role of differences in time availability and relative resources (for example, Bianchi et al, 2000), as well as the impact of institutional barriers and the intergenerational transmission of gender roles. Explanations about institutional constraints have advanced our knowledge of the role of legal regulations and employment conditions (for example, van der Lippe and van Dijk, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012), yet are inadequate to understand young people's support for the male breadwinner model. Evidence on intergenerational transmission has suggested that gender role socialisation during childhood plays an important role in work and family decisions during adulthood; in other words, gender role behaviours and gender ideologies tend to be transmitted across generations (see Halimi et al, 2016, for an overview). More specifically, research has proposed two transmission channels: parents' behavioural role modelling, such as the way they divide (un)paid work, and parents' gender ideologies, which comprise the gender-role values that parents teach their children (Moen et al, 1997; Cunningham, 2001b; Platt and Polavieja, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018). However, research on the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology has still no definite answers to the questions of whether either of the two transmission channels has a more powerful impact on children, and whether this impact differs between daughters and sons. It is also little known about young people's preferences for concrete amounts of mothers' and

fathers' involvement in paid work and how they may be influenced by socialisation experiences in the parental home.

Our study extends previous research on young people's attitudes towards maternal labour force participation (for example, Johnston et al, 2014; Platt and Polavieja, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018) by examining their preferences for weekly working hours for mothers and for fathers with young children. This enables us to test whether young people generally prefer fewer working hours for both parents or a gendered division of paid labour. Our indicators provide concrete and comparable measures, which enable us to examine the degree to which young people prefer a gendered division of paid work.

Using German dyadic data collected from mothers in 2013–15 and their adolescent children in 2018, we examine the lagged impact of employment arrangements and gender ideologies of partnered mothers on their adolescent children's working time preferences for parents with a child under three years of age. The preferences thus refer to a stage of parenthood that is characterised by intensive childcare demands and is often accompanied by a gendered division of labour (Kühhirt, 2012; Nomaguchi and Milkie, 2020). In our investigation, we consider four dependent variables: preferred weekly working hours for mothers, for fathers, and for couples in total, as well as attitudes towards mothers' ideal contributions to the total parental working hours. First, we analyse associations of these indicators with parents' employment arrangements and gender ideologies. Second, we assess the relative importance of the two transmission channels of parental gender role behaviours compared to their gender ideologies. Third, we test whether these two transmission channels have a differential impact on daughters and sons.

2 Changing gender ideologies and persisting gendered patterns in Germany

As gender ideologies vary across political and cultural contexts (Grunow and Evertsson, 2021), we first contextualise our study and provide a brief overview of the institutional and cultural conditions in Germany.

Gender ideology in Germany – like in most Western industrialised countries – has changed over the last few decades from traditional to egalitarian (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Lois, 2020). After the Second World War, cultural norms of fathers as breadwinners and mothers as caregivers supported by the belief that children need their mothers in the first years of life prevailed for a long time (Pfau-Effinger, 2004). Also sociopolitically, the country was characterised by a moderately conservative-familial welfare regime with tax, social security and public childcare systems that promoted the single-earner model (Hook, 2015; Adler et al, 2016).

Nowadays, maternal labour force participation is widely accepted (Lois, 2020), and a progressive reform of the German parental leave system in 2007 has increased fathers' take-up of parental leave and accelerated the mothers' return to the labour market (Huebner et al, 2016). However, although today almost four out of ten fathers take parental leave and three out of four mothers are in paid work, the reform has not led to a substantial change in parents' division of (un)paid work as the majority of mothers work part-time and fathers remain in full-time employment (BMFSFJ, 2021). This gendered division of labour often has its starting point in the transition to parenthood when mothers refrain from employment and increase their hours of care work (Kühhirt, 2012). At the same time, it does not necessarily reflect parents' preferences, as a significant proportion of mothers would prefer more involvement in paid work, while many fathers would like to reduce their working hours, but labour market constraints or insufficient institutional childcare provision might discourage them from doing so (for example, Weber and Zimmert, 2018).
Furthermore, there are still important differences in gender roles and ideologies between the formerly separated socialist East Germany and capitalist West Germany. For example, the maternal labour force participation rate (72.4 per cent) and the proportion of full-time employed mothers (51.4 per cent) are still higher in the East, compared with the West (66.8 per cent and 25.8 per cent: Keller and Kahle, 2018). Institutional childcare arrangements are still better available and more accepted in East Germany (Zoch and Hondralis, 2017; Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2020). Prevailing differences also extend to gender ideologies: West Germans still report more traditional gender ideologies than East Germans (Ebner et al, 2020).

In sum, German society is characterised by shifts towards more egalitarian gender ideologies, while progress towards a gender-equal division of (un)paid work has stalled. This inconsistency is also reflected in the findings of recent German youth studies. Some suggest that young people are supportive of arrangements that allow both mothers and fathers to pursue satisfying careers while fulfilling their family responsibilities (Allmendinger et al, 2013). In contrast, others found prevailing preferences for conventional work-family models, with fathers working full-time and mothers working part-time (Albert et al, 2019). The question as to whether and how young people's ideas on parental working hours today are shaped by their own parents' gender role behaviours and ideologies thus remains open.

3 Theoretical perspectives

Parents can transmit gender behaviour and ideology to their children in different ways. The most influential theoretical approaches to explain intergenerational transmission are theories of doing gender (West and Zimmerman, 1987) and social learning (Bandura, 1977). West and Zimmerman (1987) have argued that gender is actively constructed and acquired through gender role-compliant behaviour in interactions with others, thus through doing gender. Studies focusing on transmission

processes of gender ideology contend that parents serve as role models of appropriate gender role behaviour (Moen et al, 1997). Thus, parents' gender role-compliant or deviant behaviour in dividing (un)paid work can provide their children with examples of gender roles to imitate, and thus provide normative orientation. In this regard, mothers appear to have a vital function as role models (Tenenbaum and Leaper, 2002; Johnston et al, 2014: 655).

Social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; Bussey and Bandura, 1999) highlights the influence of parents' behavioural role modelling and verbal instruction on the transmission of gender ideology and behaviours across generations. Building on this theory, scholars have argued that it is necessary to differentiate between doing gender and saying gender of parents (Moen et al, 1997; Cunningham, 2001b; Platt and Polavieja, 2016). For instance, Platt and Polavieja (2016: 831) state, 'that investigating intergenerational gender-role transmission in a world of increasingly incongruent gender roles requires addressing both active (saying) and passive (doing) forms of gender-role enactment'. In addition to doing gender, saying gender can support the transmission of gender ideology. Parents can act as verbal instructors or provide direct gender role tuition (Bandura, 1977; Bussey and Bandura, 1999) by expressing their gender ideologies and explaining to their children what constitutes appropriate gendered behaviours (Bussey and Bandura, 1999: 685). In seeking to ensure that their children are prepared for adulthood, parents actively pass on preferences similar to their own and values they believe to be advantageous for a good and healthy life (Escriche, 2007; Johnston et al, 2014).

4 Empirical evidence on the intergenerational transmission of gender ideologies and hypotheses

4.1 Absolute and relative importance of parents' employment arrangements and gender ideologies

Several studies have found evidence for either of the two transmission channels of doing and saying gender, showing their association with children's gender ideologies, preferences, behaviours and even with important decisions in lives, such as family formation (Starrels and Holm, 2000; Keijer et al, 2018).

Studies on parents' behavioural role modelling found links between parents' division of (un)paid work and their children's gender ideologies and behaviours (Moen et al, 1997; Valk, 2008; Cordero-Coma and Esping-Andersen, 2018; Giménez-Nadal et al, 2019; Olivetti et al, 2020). For example, survey research on the role of maternal employment found that respondents reported more egalitarian gender ideologies if their mothers were involved in paid work (Fan and Marini, 2000; Cunningham, 2001b; Farré and Vella, 2013; Halpern and Perry-Jenkins, 2016; Platt and Polavieja, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018; Pepin and Cotter, 2018; Sánchez Guerrero and Schober, 2021). In particular, daughters' preferences for having paid work and their actual employment participation

appeared to depend on whether their mothers used to work when they were children (Valk, 2008; McGinn et al, 2018). Against this backdrop, and because women are more likely than men to adjust their working hours to parenthood (for example, Misra et al, 2011; Keller and Kahle, 2018), we expect an association between young people's preferred working hours for mothers and their own mothers' involvement in paid work.

> H1: Young people prefer a higher level of paid work involvement of mothers with young children, the higher their own mother's share in the parents' employment arrangement was.

In contrast, the few existing studies that have examined fathers' involvement in paid work found little evidence of a role-modelling effect on their children (Halimi et al, 2016). In addition, only a very small proportion of fathers in Germany work less than full-time (BMFSFJ, 2021), so there is hardly any variance in the paternal behavioural role modelling. Thus, we do not expect any association between parents' employment arrangements and young people's preferred working hours for fathers.

Research examining saying gender has suggested that parent-child communication is an important channel through which parents reveal their gender ideology and deliberately teach their children about appropriate gender roles (see McHale et al, 2003 for a review; Park and Banchefsky, 2019; Daniels and Rittenour, 2020). Numerous studies – mostly based on US and British data – found a significant relationship between the attitudes of mothers and their children towards the roles of men and women in the division of (un)paid work. Children tended to have egalitarian ideologies if they had been raised by gender-egalitarian mothers (Moen et al, 1997; Cunningham, 2001b; Tenenbaum and Leaper, 2002; Johnston et al, 2014; Halimi et al, 2016; Sánchez Guerrero and Schober, 2021). We, therefore, anticipate that young people are supportive of higher maternal and lower paternal involvement in paid work if their mothers supported ideas of gender equality, irrespective of whether or not they lived up to those ideals.

> H2a: Young people prefer a higher level of paid work involvement of mothers with young children, the more egalitarian the gender ideology of their own mother was.

> H2b: Young people prefer a lower level of paid work involvement of fathers with young children, the more egalitarian the gender ideology of their own mother was.

Research examining the two transmission channels also raised the question of what matters more for children's gender role socialisation: what parents do, or what they say. Findings on these questions have been inconsistent. Some studies found a stronger influence of parental (mostly maternal) gender ideology (Moen et al, 1997; Cunningham, 2001a; 2001b; Dawson et al, 2016),

others of parental gender behaviour (Evertsson, 2006; Farré and Vella, 2013; Halpern and Perry-Jenkins, 2016; Platt and Polavieja, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018). Again, others have shown that both channels are equally important (Johnston et al, 2014; Keijer et al, 2018) or are additive (Platt and Polavieja, 2016).

Cunningham (2001b) argued that the relative impact of parents' gender ideologies compared to their actual labour division may change over the early lifecourse of children. The role modelling of parents might become more relevant during adolescence and early adulthood when young people start to plan for their future and seek orientation for appropriate gender role behaviour (Park and Banchefsky, 2019). Empirical evidence for the outcomes of parents' impact on the life stage of adolescence is still scarce. Existing studies have largely focused either on childhood when children may be too young to reflect on gender ideologies, or have measured offspring's gender ideologies in adulthood when important lifecourse experiences such as the transition to parenthood are likely to have shaped them (Fan and Marini, 2000; Endendijk et al, 2018; Giménez-Nadal et al, 2019). Therefore, this study focuses on young people in their late adolescence, a phase when young people usually start thinking about important life choices and are still attached to their parental home. We expect that in late adolescence parents' previous gender ideologies may not be as important as their former actual labour division (for example, Halpern and Perry- Jenkins, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018).

> H3: Young people's preferences for the involvement of mothers with young children in paid work are more strongly associated with their own mother's actual involvement in paid work than with her gender ideology.

4.2 Differences in the impact of parents on daughters and sons

The socialisation impact of parents might differ between daughters and sons. Early research on parent-child relationships reported that parents tended to interact with their children in sex-typed patterns, which could result in stronger bonding and gender-ideology transmission between parents and children of the same gender (Bandura, 1977; Siegal, 1987; McHale et al, 2003). Some recent research reinforced this argument by showing that parent-child associations of gender ideologies were stronger for same-sex dyads than different-sex dyads (for example, Platt and Polavieja, 2016), and that mothers' employment was more strongly associated with egalitarian ideologies among daughters than sons (McGinn et al, 2018). In contrast, other research has suggested the exact opposite, showing a stronger correlation of gender ideologies between mothers and their adolescent sons than between mothers and daughters (Burt and Scott, 2002). McGinn et al (2018) argued that daughters and sons may rely on their mothers in different ways. While daughters might draw on a range of alternative role models in developing their gender ideologies, sons might learn about female gender roles, especially from their mothers. Most of the previous research, however, contradicts both the same-sex and different-sex hypotheses. These studies indicated that the impact

of mothers' gender ideologies and involvement in paid work did not differ by the child's gender (Fan and Marini, 2000; Cunningham, 2001b; Kulik, 2002; Valk, 2008; Farré and Vella, 2013; Johnston et al, 2014), suggesting that mothers interact with daughters and sons in similar ways.
The contradictory arguments and inconsistent findings of previous research do not allow us to derive a clear hypothesis concerning different impacts on sons and daughters. As only a few studies explicitly accounted for gender differences, we test all hypotheses for differences between daughters and sons.

5 Methods

5.1 Data and sample

This study is based on data from the AID:A Survey (Growing up in Germany: Everyday Worlds), which has been conducted by the German Youth Institute at regular intervals since 2009. This multi-actor panel study provides information on the activities and wellbeing of children, adolescents and adults in Germany, from lifecourse and family systems perspectives. For our study, we used the second instalment collected in 2013–15 (Rauschenbach and Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2018) and a follow-up study administered in 2018 (Kuger et al, 2021). The survey in 2013–15 was based on a probability sample of 0-to-32-year-old target persons drawn from local population registers. Target persons or their parents were then interviewed via standardised computer-assisted telephone interviews. In 2018, only adolescent children (by then 15–28 years old) of those parents who had given their panel consent were invited for a follow-up study that on average lasted 46 minutes. Largely based on rating scale questions, adolescents were asked about their current activity status, their leisure habits, their values and plans including their family life as well as different aspects of their gender ideologies.

Drawing from these two data sources, we paired information collected from mothers (who also gave some information on their partners) of minors in 2013–15 with the information provided by their adolescent children in 2018. We included those 816 children who lived with their parents in 2013–15 and had grown up in different-sex two-parent families, as the vast majority of children in Germany do (BMFSFJ, 2021). Some cases had to be excluded because of missing data from one of our dependent variables on mothers' gender ideologies or on parents' international socioeconomic index of occupational status (ISEI) (N = 146). Moreover, we had to exclude a number of observations (N = 61), which either had missing information on parents' labour force participation, or both parents were not employed, or the parents' employment arrangement represented one of the following rare combinations: the father was not employed while the mother worked part- or full-time; the father worked part-time while the mother worked full-time or was not employed. For a robustness test, we grouped these rare arrangements into an additional fourth category of parents' employment arrangements and reran the models. The results did not differ substantially from those

shown below and can be found in Appendix Table A 6.4-3. The final study sample comprised 609 pairs of mothers and their adolescent children, of which 321 (52.7 per cent) were male and 288 (47.3 per cent) were female (see Table 6.4-1). At the time of the follow-up study, adolescents' ages ranged from 15 to 21 (mean 17.9 years) and most (88.7 per cent) still lived with their parents.

Table 6.4-1: Descriptive statistics

	% / Mean	SD
Preferred weekly working hours for mothers at T2	19.9	9.4
Preferred weekly working hours for fathers at T2	30.2	9.2
Total amount of working hours preferred for parents at T2	50.1	15.3
Mothers' shares of total working hours preferred for parents at T2	0.4	0.1
Parents' employment arrangements at T1:		
Egalitarian model	19.4	
Modernised MBM[1]	58.8	
Male breadwinner model	21.8	
Mothers' gender ideologies at T1 (Index ranging from 1=traditional to 6=egalitarian)	4.4	1.0
Mothers' ISEI at T1:	53.1	19.1
Fathers' ISEI at T1:	57.7	21.4
Part of Germany at T1:		
East	14.8	
West (+ Berlin)	85.2	
Sex:		
Female	47.3	
Male	52.7	
Age	17.9	1.8
N		609

Note: T1 = 2013-2015; T2 = 2018. [a]MBM = male breadwinner model.

5.2 Measures

Dependent variables

The basis of our four dependent variables was young people's preferred working hours for parents, measured in 2018 by the following questions: 'How should parents with one child ideally share involvement in paid work when the child is one or two years old? How many hours per week should the mother work? How many hours should the father work?' The question thus explicitly addressed the time shortly after the transition to parenthood. The first and second dependent variables referred to young people's preferred weekly working hours for mothers or fathers. The third dependent variable was created by taking the sum of the two, thus representing the preferred total amount of weekly working hours for parents with young children. The fourth dependent variable was a relative measure, which was constructed by dividing the preferred weekly working hours for mothers by the total amount of working hours for both parents.

Explanatory variables

Based on information collected from adolescents' mothers in 2013–15, we constructed the indicator parents' employment arrangements, which comprised both partners' work status. We created three types of employment based on self-reports: full-time, parttime or not employed[1]. Combining the employment types of both partners resulted in three arrangements: (a) an egalitarian model in which both parents worked either full-time or part-time, (b) the modernised male breadwinner model where fathers worked full-time and mothers part-time, and (c) the male breadwinner model where fathers worked full-time and mothers were not employed. Of these, 19.4 per cent had an egalitarian employment arrangement (mostly in full-time work), 58.8 per cent practised the modernised male breadwinner model, and 21.8 per cent lived in a male breadwinner model (see Table 6.4-1).

The second of the two main covariates was mothers' gender ideologies: that is, their degree of support for a gendered behaviour of men and women within and outside the family (Kroska, 2000; Davis and Greenstein, 2009). Fathers' gender ideologies could not be considered due to the very restricted number of cases that were available for our analyses. While acknowledging recent research suggesting that gender ideology is a complex, multidimensional construct (for example, Grunow et al, 2018), we use a composite score consisting of three items measured in 2013–15 (see Perales et al, 2020). Mothers stated their degree of agreement – on a scale from 1 = strongly agree, to 6 = strongly disagree – with the following statements: (a) 'If there are children, the man should work and the woman should stay at home and look after the children'; (b) 'There should be more women in political and public leading positions'; and (c) 'If there are young children, not only the woman but also the man should work part-time'. Response scales for items (b) and (c) were inverted. The gender ideology index (alpha of 0.5) was coded from 1 = traditional to 6 = egalitarian, by summing up the scores and dividing the sum by three.

Confounders

The multivariate analyses controlled for individual and household characteristics that could confound the hypothesised association between parents' employment arrangements and/or mothers' gender ideologies and young people's preferred working hours for parents. Specifically, since parental characteristics seem to have a direct influence on children's gender ideologies (for example, Fan and Marini, 2000; Cunningham, 2001b; Dotti Sani and Quaranta, 2017), we controlled for the socioeconomic status of parents by using the ISEI[2] (see Ganzeboom et al, 1992). Due to the persistent differences in gender ideology and behaviour among East and West Germans (Ebner et al, 2020), we further controlled for the part of the country where the family lived at the time of the first survey. We also accounted for adolescents' age and gender, because gender ideology changes

[1] 'Not employed' includes the self-reported categories of unemployed, maternity/parental leave, stay-at-home parent, job search, pension, occasional employment, vocational training/studying.

[2] The ISEI contains ISCO-08 (International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008) and this refers, where necessary, to the last occupation held.

with age and young women tend to be more egalitarian than young men (Fan and Marini and 2000; Dotti Sani and Quaranta, 2017).

Analytic strategy

After conducting descriptive analyses, we estimated OLS regression models for each of our four dependent variables: young people's preferred weekly working hours (WWH) for mothers (DV 1), preferred WWH for fathers (DV 2), the total amount of preferred WWH for parents (DV 3) and mothers' share of the total preferred WWH for parents (DV 4). We regressed young people's attitudes on their own parents' employment arrangements and their mothers' gender ideologies while controlling stepwise for parents' ISEI, young people's age, gender and region. We tested the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of additional regional factors (urban or rural), young people's education levels and their degree of religiosity, as well as to the inclusion of the above-mentioned rare combinations as a fourth category of parents' employment arrangements. However, including them did not change the direction of the explanatory variables' coefficients and it changed their sizes or significance levels only marginally. To compare the strength of the two explanatory variables, we additionally estimated all models with standardised beta coefficients. Finally, we included interaction terms to examine whether the predicted associations differed by adolescents' gender.

6 Results

Figure 6.4-1 shows violin plots for each dependent variable, which can be interpreted like boxplots and provide additional information on the density shape. The sample distributions of the four dependent variables suggested similar attitudes among female and male adolescents and t-tests confirmed that there are no significant differences. On average, the adolescents studied preferred 19.9 WWH for mothers if children are younger than three years, and 30.2 WWH for fathers, resulting in 50.1 WWH for parents in total, and a mother's share of 0.4. Adolescents from East Germany preferred significantly ($p=0.006$) more WWH for mothers (22.5) than those from West Germany (19.5) (see Appendix Table A 6.4-1). In our study sample, adolescents whose parents practised an egalitarian model four years earlier supported a gendered division of labour for the time when the first child is younger than three. However, they still preferred the comparatively smallest difference in WWH between mothers and fathers (see Appendix Table A 6.4-2). Thus, on average, adolescents rejected the conventional full-time employment for fathers, but at the same time, preferred a gender-specific division of paid work among parenting couples in the early family phase.

Figure 6.4-1: Violin plots of preferred weekly working hours for parents (left) / preferred mothers' share of total working hours for parents (right) by young people's gender



Note: WWH=weekly working hours.

Table 6.4-2 shows unstandardised regression coefficients, which can be interpreted as WWH in models 1–3, and as percentage points in model 4.

Table 6.4-2: OLS-regression models of young people's preferred weekly working hours for mothers (Model 1), preferred weekly working hours for fathers (Model 2), total amount of working hours preferred for parents (Model 3), and mothers' shares of total working hours preferred for parents (Model 4)

Variables	**Model 1** WWH for mothers	**Model 2** WWH for fathers	**Model 3** WWH for parents	**Model 4** Mothers' shares
Parents' employment arrangements (ref.: MBM[a]) at T1				
Egalitarian	4.71***	-1.92	2.79	0.09***
	(1.22)	(1.22)	(2.05)	(0.02)
Modernised MBM	2.25*	-1.00	1.26	0.04**
	(0.95)	(0.95)	(1.59)	(0.01)
Mothers' gender ideologies (index) at T1	1.44***	-1.27**	0.16	0.03***
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.68)	(0.01)
Mothers' ISEI at T1	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.00)

Fathers' at T1		-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.00)
Part of Germany at T1 (ref.: West)					
	East	2.11	0.53	2.64	0.02
		(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.82)	(0.02)
Gender (ref.: male)					
	Female	-0.61	-0.59	-1.20	-0.01
		(0.74)	(0.75)	(1.25)	(0.01)
Age		-0.24	0.22	-0.02	-0.00
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.00)
Constant		16.03***	31.48***	47.52***	0.29***
		(4.35)	(4.36)	(7.28)	(0.06)
N		609	609	609	609

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardised coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. T1 = 2013-2015, T2 = 2018. [a]MBM = male breadwinner model.

The first model showed a significant association between parents' employment arrangements and young people's preferred WWH for mothers with young children, even after controlling for all confounders. Young people raised under a modernised male breadwinner model supported a 2.25-hour longer working week for mothers than those who grew up under a male breadwinner model. Young people whose parents had an egalitarian employment arrangement supported a 4.71-hour longer work week for mothers. The same pattern emerged for the mother's share of total WWH preferred for parents (see model 4). Compared to young people whose parents practised the male breadwinner model, those whose parents had an egalitarian arrangement preferred a 9-percentage point higher mother's share of total parental WWH. Those whose parents practised a modernised male breadwinner model still preferred a 4-percentage point higher mother's share. In short, the greater the contribution of mothers to the parents' employment arrangement, the greater young people's preferred absolute and relative maternal involvement in paid work.

In contrast, model 2 revealed no significant association between young people's preferred WWH for fathers with young children and their own parents' employment arrangements. Similarly, results revealed only weak support for an association between parents' employment arrangements and young people's preferred total amount of WWH for parenting couples. In sum, results support hypothesis H1, indicating a positive impact of their mothers' involvement in paid work on children's preferred WWH for mothers.

Furthermore, the results presented in Table 6.4-2 provided evidence for the expected impact of mothers' gender ideologies on young people's preferred WWH for both mothers and fathers. Model 1 showed that each unit increase in the mothers' genderideology scores – in which higher values indicate more egalitarian ideologies – was associated with a 1.44-hours increase in young people's preferred WWH for mothers. In other words, young people with highly egalitarian mothers (index value 6) supported 7 more working hours for mothers with children under the age of three than

those with highly traditional mothers (index value 1). The impact of mothers' gender ideologies was also reflected in young people's preferences for the mother's share of the total work amount of parents. Model 4 indicated that each unit increase in mothers' gender-ideology scores was associated with a 3-percentage point increase in the mother's share of the total WWH preferred for parents. This is in line with hypothesis H2a.

Also, young people's preferred WWH for fathers were significantly associated with mothers' gender ideologies. As expected in hypothesis H2b, a more egalitarian maternal gender ideology was associated with fewer preferred WWH for fathers. Model 2 showed that each unit increase in mothers' gender-ideology scores was associated with a 1.27-hour decrease in the preferred WWH for fathers. Young people with the most egalitarian mothers (index value 6) supported a 6.5-hour shorter work week for fathers compared to those with the most traditional mothers (index value 1).

Concerning hypothesis 3, we calculated and compared the beta coefficients for parents' employment arrangements and mothers' gender ideologies in all models (not shown). Regarding young people's preferred WWH for mothers, these additional calculations only revealed a slightly stronger impact of parents' egalitarian employment arrangements (beta of 0.20) compared with mothers' gender ideologies (beta of 0.15). Thus, the difference in strength was not particularly pronounced, meaning that hypothesis H3 found only weak support.

Finally, we tested whether the expected impact of parents' employment arrangements and mothers' gender ideologies on young people's preferred WWH for parents with young children differed by gender. The interaction models did not reveal any significant differences in the coefficients of the main explanatory variables between female and male adolescents (see Appendix Figure A 6.4-1 and Appendix Figure A 6.4-2). Additionally, it should be mentioned that in all models, none of the confounders was significant, including differences between East and West Germany.

7 Discussion and conclusion

This study examined the potential socialisation impact of two intergenerational transmission channels – parents' behavioural role modelling or gender ideologies – on young people's attitudes towards parental involvement in paid work. Our analyses drew on data from Germany, a country whose tax and social security systems, and shortage of public childcare still encourage parents to choose a modernised male breadwinner model (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Hook, 2015; Adler et al, 2016). We combined information that was collected from mothers in 2013–15 and their adolescent children four years later. Using those 609 mother-child dyads we analysed associations of parents' employment arrangements and mothers' gender ideologies with their adolescent children's attitudes towards the ideal weekly working hours for parents with one child under the age of three. We also tested which of the two transmission channels mattered more for young people's attitude formation

and whether the child's gender moderated these associations. In contrast to previous studies that measured offspring's attitudes in adulthood (for example, Giménez-Nadal et al, 2019; Fan and Marini, 2000), our study focused on a period within the lifecourse when attitudes have not yet been shaped by important lifecourse experiences such as the transition to parenthood.

Our analyses revealed five main findings. First, both female and male adolescents in our sample on average thought that mothers with young children should ideally spend approximately 20 hours and fathers 30 hours a week on paid work. Thus, they preferred reduced working hours for mothers and for fathers but still supported gender differences shortly after family formation, when a gendered division of labour often occurs (Kühhirt, 2012). Further research is needed to transfer our findings to other family phases.

Second, the results showed a robust association between parents' employment arrangements and young people's work preferences for mothers. Young people preferred more working hours for mothers and a higher contribution of mothers to the total working hours of parenting couples, the higher the involvement in paid work of their own mothers was. These findings are in line with previous research, which suggested that parents act as socialisation agents and thereby play an important role in forming young people's gender ideologies (for example, McHale et al, 2003; Johnston et al, 2014; McGinn et al, 2018). However, our results did not reveal any behavioural role modelling concerning young people's preferred working hours for fathers. This could be explained by the fact that the majority of fathers in Germany work full-time, and thus differences in preferred working hours for fathers must be the result of other factors than their own fathers' work involvement. In sum, our results suggest that mothers' behavioural role modelling is particularly relevant for young people's formation of attitudes towards maternal labour market integration.

Third, we found robust associations between mothers' gender ideologies and young people's preferred weekly working hours for both mothers and fathers. The more egalitarian their mothers' gender ideologies were, the more working hours young people preferred for mothers, and the fewer hours they preferred for fathers. On the one hand, our findings are supported by previous studies that revealed the impact of mothers' gender ideologies on their offspring's attitudes towards intra- and extra-familial roles (Platt and Polavieja, 2016; Sánchez Guerrero and Schober, 2021), and on their partner's employment behaviours (Farré and Vella, 2013; Johnston et al, 2014). On the other hand, our results extend these findings by concretely showing, based on preferences for weekly working hours for each parent, that young people raised by egalitarian mothers tend to prefer more egalitarian work arrangements and the redistribution of working hours between parents during the early family phase.

Fourth, our findings suggested that for young people's preferred working hours for mothers, both channels – parents' employment arrangements and mothers' gender ideologies – matter. Concerning

preferred working hours for fathers, however, our results only revealed a significant influence of mothers' gender ideologies. This is in line with existing research that points to differences in the importance of the two transmission channels – saying and doing gender – (Moen et al, 1997; Cunningham, 2001b; Farré and Vella, 2013; Platt and Polavieja, 2016; McGinn et al, 2018), and emphasises the necessity of differentiating between these when analysing gender role socialisation.

Fifth, the analyses indicated consistent patterns across female and male adolescents. Interaction analyses did not show any differences in the relevance of parents' employment arrangements or mothers' gender ideologies between daughters and sons. This contradicts the same-sex hypothesis of a stronger transmission between mothers and daughters (see also Fan and Marini, 2000; Kulik, 2002; Valk, 2008; Johnston et al, 2014). It not only suggests that mothers' labour market integration has a signalling effect on both genders but also implies that mothers tend to interact with daughters and sons in similar ways.

In addition, all our findings were robust to the inclusion of potential confounders such as regional differences between East and West Germany (Ebner et al, 2020). This suggests that correlations between generations were not driven by more egalitarian ideologies or more frequent maternal employment in East Germany, but by the socialisation impact of mothers. Future studies with larger sample sizes may use moderation analyses to shed light on regional differences in the strength of the two transmission channels, or mediation analyses to test causal paths between the family's place of residence, parents' saying and doing gender and their offspring's attitudes.

Limitations and future directions

Our study is not without limitations. We could not consider the impact of fathers' gender ideologies or their non-full-time employment on their adolescent children. A growing body of literature suggests that fathers' gender ideologies are also very relevant (Platt and Polavieja, 2016) and like fathers in many other European countries, German fathers are becoming increasingly active in child-rearing (Dermott, 2008). Future research based on larger samples is required to examine the socialisation impact of rare parents' employment arrangements where, for example, fathers worked part-time while the mother worked full-time.

Another limitation is that our analyses relied on cross-sectional data of young people's attitudes and their socialisation context, which was collected at different points in time but by only one measurement point each. Thus, it is not possible to draw causal conclusions concerning parents' impact on their children. Due to the relatively short time between parent and child interviews, the long-term consequences of parents' gender behaviour and ideologies could not be examined with our data. Neither do the data allow us to reconstruct the entire childhood, which is why studies with multiple measurement points could shed light on differences in intergenerational transmission depending on the age at which the children experienced parents' saying or doing gender.

Finally, the sample size did not allow us to account for adolescents' migration background or their family types. Because previous evidence suggests that parental influence on children's gender ideologies may differ by sociodemographic factors, more research is needed to test the robustness of this study's findings across young people from different ethnic backgrounds as well as different family forms such as lone parents, step-parents or LGBTQ parents (Halimi et al, 2016).

Practice implications and conclusion

This study is among the first to provide evidence of parents' impact on young people's preferred working hours for mothers and fathers with young children in Germany. Using innovative indicators, we present comprehensive and fine-grained insights into the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology. Certainly, this German case study will be of interest to further Western industrialised countries because it suggests that the intergenerational transmission of gender ideology may delay the effects of policy reforms intended to decrease gender inequalities in the division of (un)paid work. Many young people in our study rejected full-time employment if the children are younger than three years, not only for mothers but also for fathers. It is therefore essential to further improve institutional conditions for parents to reconcile work and care roles.

Funding

This work was funded by the internal research budget of the German Youth Institute Munich.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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Appendix of Study 4

Appendix Table A 6.4-1: Means of dependent variables by East and West Germany

	Mean West	SD	Mean East	SD
Preferred weekly working hours for mothers	19.5	9.2	22.5	10.3
Preferred weekly working hours for fathers	30.1	9.2	30.7	9.2
Total amount of working hours preferred for parents	49.6	15.1	53.1	16.5
Mothers' shares of total working hours preferred for parents	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1
N		519		90

Appendix Table A 6.4-2: Means of dependent variables by parental employment arrangement

	Mean Egalitarian	SD	Mean Mod. MBM	SD	Mean MBM	SD
Preferred weekly working hours for mothers	23.2	9.3	20.0	9.2	16.9	9.4
Preferred weekly working hours for fathers	29.4	9.4	30.1	9.2	31.3	9.1
Total amount of working hours preferred for parents	52.6	16.3	50.1	15.4	48.2	14.0
Mothers' shares of total working hours preferred for parents	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2
N		118		358		133

Note: (Mod.) MBM = (modernised) male breadwinner model.

Appendix Table A 6.4-3: OLS-regression models of young people's preferred weekly working hours for mothers (Model 1), preferred weekly working hours for fathers (Model 2), total amount of working hours preferred for parents (Model 3), and mothers' shares of total working hours preferred for parents (Model 4)

Variables	**Model 1** WWH for mothers	**Model 2** WWH for fathers	**Model 3** WWH for parents	**Model 4** Mothers' shares
Parents' employment arrangements (ref.: MBM[a]) at T1				
Egalitarian	4.78***	-1.76	3.03	0.08***
	(1.22)	(1.22)	(2.02)	(0.02)
Modernised MBM[a]	2.27*	-0.94	1.33	0.04**
	(0.95)	(0.95)	(1.57)	(0.01)
Other Arrangement[b]	1.42	1.36	2.78	0.02
	(1.75)	(1.75)	(2.91)	(0.03)
Mothers' gender ideologies (index) at T1	1.22**	-1.29**	-0.07	0.03***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.65)	(0.01)
Mothers' ISEI at T1	0.04	0.03	0.07*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.00)
Fathers' ISEI at T1	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.00)
Part of Germany at T1 (ref.: West)				
East	1.84	0.11	1.96	0.02
	(1.06)	(1.06)	(1.76)	(0.02)
Gender (ref.: male)				
Female	-0.71	-0.70	-1.42	-0.01
	(0.72)	(0.72)	(1.20)	(0.01)
Age	-0.17	0.21	0.03	-0.00
Constant	15.31***	31.87***	47.18***	0.28***
	(4.20)	(4.21)	(6.98)	(0.06)
Number of observations	646	646	646	646

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardised coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
T1 = 2013-2015, T2 = 2018. [a]MBM = male breadwinner model. [b]Other Arrangement = Father was not employed while the mother worked part- or full-time, or father worked part-time while the mother worked full-time or was not employed.

Appendix Figure A 6.4-1: Predictions of young people's preferred WWH for mothers (upper left)/ fathers (upper right)/ parents (lower left) and mothers' shares of total WWH (lower right), marginal effects from full models interacting parents' employment arrangements with young people's gender



Note: T1 = 2013-2015. (moder.) MBM = modernised male breadwinner model

Appendix Figure A 6.4-2: Predictions of young people's preferred WWH for mothers (upper left)/ fathers (upper right)/ parents (lower left) and mothers' shares of total WWH (lower right), marginal effects from full models interacting mothers' gender ideologies with young people's gender



7 Discussion and Conclusion

This concluding chapter provides a brief summary of the dissertation's research questions and the key findings from a broader perspective together with an explanation of their limitations. It also offers a conclusion on the overall research objective, emphasising its contribution to and integration with existing research. Furthermore, it suggests avenues for further research and offers insights into the potential implications of the findings.

This dissertation was motivated by the fact that gender ideologies (re-)produce and legitimise gender relations and are central to women's career choices, the shaping of families and the division of labour within them, and much more (for a review see e.g. Chatillon, Charles, & Bradley, 2018). It was also motivated by the well-documented phenomenon of an uneven gender revolution (e.g. England, 2010). Previous research has observed that in western industrialised countries, including Germany, support for gender equality in the public domain, e.g. concerning labour market participation, outpaced that in the private domain, e.g. concerning the division of childcare. However, there are two particular aspects that give relevance to the study of gender ideology in Germany. One is that the country was divided into two very different states for forty years, also in terms of family policy, gender equality etc., and even today, more than thirty years after reunification, there are still clear differences in gender ideologies between East and West (e.g. Sievers & Warner, 2022). Another German peculiarity is the paradigm shift in family policy towards optional familialism over the last two decades, which currently offers ambivalent orientations with regard to gender roles (e.g. Bertram & Bujard, 2012).

The overall research objective of this dissertation was to gain deeper knowledge about the nature, predictors and trends of gender ideologies in former and current East and West Germany. This was pursued within the framework of four empirical studies that analytically considered the multidimensionality of gender ideology and analysed relevant predictors for its development at two observation periods, the 1980s and the present. More precisely, it was investigated how people living under the formerly very distinct family policy frameworks of the FRG and the GDR viewed the employment of mothers with young children, as well as how great the congruence between the GDR's state socialist equality agenda and the societal gender ideologies at that time was. Two additional analyses were conducted to examine the present situation, including an investigation of the multidimensionality of gender ideology in the two regions of Germany and its relevant predictors. A further study delineated the ideals of today's young people concerning the employment of mothers and fathers with young children, elucidating the role of their own socialisation in the parental home in this regard.

Summary of main findings

By analysing a data set from two districts of the former GDR from 1984 (ZIJ, 1984), in parallel with the GGSS from the FRG (GESIS, 2002), which was surveyed two years earlier, the dissertation was able to compare beliefs concerning maternal employment in the two former states on a period-specific basis for the first time – given the limitations of comparability. As anticipated, the data revealed a striking level of scepticism among the respondents in the former FRG regarding the employment of mothers with young children in general. It was unexpected, however, that even in the GDR, around one-third of those surveyed rejected the full-time maternal employment that was common at the time. In particular, women for whom work was of low importance in their lives (in comparison to those for whom it was of high importance) were critical of maternal employment, while the importance of children was not associated with this sentiment. In contrast, in the FRG, a high reported importance of having children (and not that of having a job) was found to be related to opposing maternal employment.

The dissertation's more comprehensive study of gender ideologies in the GDR based on the mentioned data – which analytically took into account ideology's multidimensional nature – provided further evidence on the existence of greater variety in gender ideologies in this region than was often assumed from a Western perspective. This was despite the fact that the two gender ideology profiles identified in the GDR were egalitarian, and that there was no consistent traditional ideology. The majority of respondents were identified as 'all-inclusive egalitarians' who endorsed gender equality in both public and private domains. The somewhat less frequent 'nimby-egalitarians' (an acronym for 'not-in-my-backyard-egalitarians') held egalitarian views concerning the public domain, as they supported women and men's equal participation in politics, the labour market and leadership positions. Conversely, they held less egalitarian beliefs regarding the private domain, as they supported women's responsibility for housework, the male dominance within partnerships, and the incompatibility of professional development and childbearing for women. Comparing the statistically identified gender ideologies with the results of a qualitative analysis of the GDR's state-socialist equality agenda indicated a high degree of congruence between the two, even though varieties in ideologies were revealed.

With regard to the current situation of gender ideologies in East and West Germany, the findings of this dissertation based on the FReDA data (Bujard et al., 2023) from 2021 substantiate the well-documented disparities between the regions while also underscoring the multidimensional nature of gender ideology. The results demonstrate that the majority of individuals in both East and West Germany nowadays adhere to a consistently egalitarian gender ideology. Furthermore, the heterogeneous gender ideology of egalitarian essentialism was the second most prevalent in both regions. This was characterised by support for gender equality in politics, labour market participation and university access, with the simultaneous assumption that women should concentrate on the family, be responsible for housework and are better suited to childcare. In

contrast, only in West Germany was the traditional gender ideology found to have been present – even though it was the least common there – which favoured equality only in terms of access to university education and politics and otherwise supported traditional gender roles. In addition, the ideology of intensive parenting was identified only in the West, which favoured both parents focusing on childcare, and at the same time supported gender equality in the public domain. The analysis of the socio-demographic predictors of gender ideology indicated that women and those with higher levels of education were more likely to espouse gender ideologies in the egalitarian spectrum.

A more profound examination of the beliefs concerning the employment of mothers and fathers with young children, as held by young people – future mothers and fathers – was made possible by the use of two waves of the German AID:A data (Kuger et al., 2021). The dissertation's analyses demonstrated that for the formation of young people's beliefs concerning gender roles, socialisation within the parental home is a pivotal factor. Those who were raised in a family where the mother was more engaged in paid work and where her gender ideology was less traditional were more supportive of the idea of mothers working longer hours than those who were raised in a family where the father was the primary breadwinner or where the mother was less egalitarian. Conversely, the more egalitarian their mothers were, the fewer working hours young people were in favour of for fathers. The analyses demonstrated that today's young people supported an increase in the number of paid work hours for mothers and a reduction in those for fathers, in comparison to the status quo of German parents' actual labour division. Thus, they supported a redistribution of paid labour for parenting couples, while maintaining the gender-specific division.

Limitations

A first limitation pertinent to highlight are the problems associated with the gender role items employed in the analyses, as has the previous literature (cf. Walter, 2018). These relate to the fact that the items predominantly address aspects of the female gender role and seldom men's gender role behaviour, and do not reflect the changes that have occurred in gender roles over time. In the literature, this is seen as the reason why the answers to items often show ceiling effects, as they are predominantly answered in an egalitarian manner and therefore hardly show any variance. It is quite possible that the use of gender role items other than the conventional ones that were also analysed in this dissertation would have brought other gender ideology profiles to light. Additionally, it was necessary to recode the gender role items in all the analyses of the dissertation. This entailed assigning responses to the rather egalitarian or to the rather traditional spectrum. In Study 1, this was necessary due to the two distinct surveys that were analysed for the GDR and the FRG, and in Studies 2 and 3, due to the different response scales of the indicator variables used in the LCA. Ultimately, the decision to recode was taken by the author, which may be open to criticism. However, justification was provided in the studies, and alternative codings were tested in each case.

The same applies to the labelling of the latent classes or gender ideologies, which might have been designated differently by other authors.

Another limitation of all studies of the dissertation is the age restriction of respondents. Studies 1 and 2 were limited to individuals between the ages of 18 and 37, in study 3 the interviewees were 18-49 years old, and in study 4 between 15 and 21. Consequently, the dissertation's investigations did not encompass older individuals. In light of the theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence indicating that gender ideologies vary across age groups (Brewster & Padavic, 2000), it is essential to consider this when interpreting the results on gender ideologies. It may be inferred from previous research that the inclusion of older respondents would have resulted in a shift towards more traditional gender ideologies.

A limiting factor in the analyses of historic gender ideologies is that the GDR sample was not representative and the survey was conducted during the late period of state socialism. Thus the results cannot be generalised to the whole of the GDR. Additionally, the institute responsible for data collection was subject to rigorous state supervision. This was particularly the case in relation to the analysis and dissemination of results, but to some extent also regarding data collection, given the difficulties in conducting representative surveys. When interpreting the results, the socially desirable response behaviour of the respondents in the GDR, which could have been caused by the strictness of the regime, also needs to be borne in mind. Besides that, a direct comparison between the gender ideologies of respondents residing in the GDR and the former FRG was not feasible in the dissertation. This is because two distinct surveys were employed for the analyses, each of which was conducted in one of the two states. It was therefore unsurprising that there were significant differences between the survey samples, items, data collection methods and dates.

Furthermore, limitations in the dissertation's analyses of predictors of gender ideology should be emphasised. The predictors examined were not comprehensive as there are potentially relevant additional ones, such as the gender ideology of the respondent's partner or spouse. The identified association of socio-demographic characteristics and gender ideology in this dissertation is correlative. This is because the cross-sectional data did not allow any causal conclusions to be drawn. Also, it can be assumed that individual characteristics and gender ideologies are mutually dependent, and clarifying the direction of the relationship, which was not the focus of this dissertation, would have required appropriate longitudinal data.

Moreover, the analysis of the role of early socialisation as a predictor of later gender ideologies is limited by the fact that the socialisation context could not be recorded in its entirety due to data limitations. It solely encompassed the parents' employment and the mother's gender ideology, without incorporating other factors or other socialisation agents. Furthermore, it was not possible to cover the entire period of primary socialisation, as there was only one measurement point for it a few years before the children's gender ideologies were measured. The data did not allow for an examination of the long-term effects of primary socialisation on children's gender ideologies.

Lastly, this dissertation was not able to conduct any causal or correlative statistical analyses regarding the effect of the family policy context on gender ideology. Due to its complexity and the lack of variance on the national level, policy could not be tested as an explanatory variable to predict gender ideology. Instead, this dissertation aimed to discursively explore the congruence or disparities between political concepts and gender ideologies (cf. Grunow et al., 2018).

Conclusion on the overall research objective and contribution

Keeping these limitations in mind, this dissertation provides novel insights into the *nature* of gender ideology in the eastern and western parts of Germany in the 1980s as well as in the present. By showing that a not insubstantial minority of respondents in the GDR rejected the full-time employment of mothers with young children, even though most mothers worked full-time, this dissertation provides the first empirical evidence of what many researchers have already discussed (cf. Lindenberger, 2002; Wolle, 1998): that GDR's state-socialist ideology, its institutions and people's frequent conformist behaviour on the one hand, and individual beliefs on the other hand were in many cases at odds, and that people appear to have been distancing themselves from the regime's ideas. Additionally, the dissertation's findings suggest that the two phenomena identified in more recent Western research regarding gender ideologies – their multidimensional nature (e.g. Cotter et al., 2011) and the uneven gender revolution (e.g. England, 2010) – could also be observed in the GDR. Gender ideologies in the GDR were more heterogeneous than would be expected from the state socialist regime's equality propaganda or the high female employment rate, and gender essentialist beliefs ('nimby-egalitarian') also existed. Additionally, this dissertation has revealed that also in today's East Germany an egalitarian-essentialist ideology is to be found which combines support for equality in the public domain with a belief in inherent gender differences, which form the basis for assigning responsibilities to women in the private domain. These findings extend the scant research on the multidimensional nature of gender ideology in East Germany (A. Barth & Trübner, 2018; Sievers & Warner, 2022) by highlighting intra-regional variation and the existence of gender essentialism alongside the predominant egalitarian ideology. All this provides important clues for interpreting persistent East-West differences.

For contemporary West Germany, this dissertation contributes to the knowledge on the nature of gender ideology by showing its diversification and identifying four different belief patterns. Thereby it confirms the theoretical assumptions that several belief patterns can exist alongside each other (Diabaté & Lück, 2014; Mühling et al., 2006). The egalitarian ideology is the most prevalent, but less so than in East Germany, confirming that previously demonstrated differences between East and West persist even in 2021 (cf. Ebner et al., 2020; Sievers & Warner, 2022). The rarest ideology is the traditional one which encompasses traditional beliefs particularly for the private domain. In addition, beliefs concerning childcare proved to be a distinguishing dimension between the ideologies identified in West Germany (cf. Berth, 2019; Pfau-Effinger & Euler, 2014). Both, gender

essentialist beliefs which assume women's natural superiority in this regard, and the ideology of intensive parenting which emphasises the need for both parents to be intensively engaged in childcare, were identified. Young people's ideals on the extent to which parents of young children should work also examined in this dissertation, point in a similar direction. They support a redistribution of paid work in parental couples compared to the status quo, i.e. a greater engagement of fathers in childcare, but still a gendered division of labour.

Apart from that, the investigation of the nature of gender ideology by utilising ideals concerning parental work hours as espoused by young people enables the dissertation to present a novel measure for gender ideologies, thereby facilitating a more concrete and comparable understanding of them.

In terms of the *predictors* of gender ideology, this dissertation reinforces previous evidence showing that women are more egalitarian than men, confirming the interest-based explanation (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). That women's experiences of being disadvantaged by traditional gender roles makes them more likely to support egalitarian ideologies, may also explain why the dissertation did not find any gender difference among young people in their ideals concerning parental paid work: young women might not yet have experienced as much discrimination as older women, i.e. gender differences only evolve as people grow older.

The findings also strengthen the exposure-based explanation for the development of gender ideology, as people with higher levels of education were more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). This tends to support the explanation that they are more often exposed to egalitarian ideas and are better able to reflect on gender roles.

Besides the evidence for well-documented predictors this dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature by showing for Germany that parental socialisation is a decisive factor for the development of gender ideologies, and thus that ideologies are intergenerationally transmitted. In particular, mothers' gender ideologies and role behaviours were formative for their children's beliefs, providing important insights into the causes of persistence or potential changes in gender ideologies.

Although the dissertation was not able to test causal relationships between gender ideologies and family policy, the continued distinction between GDR and FRG or East and West Germany in the analyses in combination with the discussions of political contexts allows for an assessment of the policy-ideology congruence. In the 1980s, a high degree of congruence was evident in both states. The FRG's family policy was based on maternal childcare, and the overwhelming majority of respondents rejected maternal employment because the child was felt to suffer. In addition, children and employment were perceived as conflicting life priorities for mothers. In the GDR, the promotion of and demand for maternal employment met with majority approval. And women who placed a high importance on being employed did not consider children to be a limiting factor for their employment, although opposing beliefs were not uncommon. Even the heterogeneous gender ideology of the nimby-egalitarians in the GDR could to some extent be interpreted as being

congruent with the gender equality policy that was actually implemented at that time (in contrast to the equality agenda messages that were propagated). This is because GDR's policy focussed on the reconciliation of work and family for mothers, while the gendered division of unpaid work was not on its agenda. Even in today's Germany, the existence of different, to some extent contradictory gender ideologies is highly congruent with the ambivalent orientations offered by current German family policy with regard to gender roles. These findings underpin theories that a paradigm shift in German family policy has set a new norm (Gangl & Ziefle, 2015), or more generally that there is a complex interplay and interdependence between policy and gender ideology (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

Moreover, the dissertation offers new insights into *trends* in gender ideology by extending the observation period of previous research to the situation in the past and present, specifically the 1980s and the year 2021. It is important to note that this approach is less about a continuous, direct comparison of gender ideologies, which was not possible as very different data sets had to be used in this dissertation, but more about a description of the tendency in gender ideology development.
The results of the dissertation for West Germany indicate a fairly clear trend in the beliefs concerning maternal employment towards ever greater acceptance, which represents an enormous social change in this regard. In the 1980s, the negative evaluation of maternal employment was widespread, with the prevailing view that maternal childcare was in the best interest of the child. Presently an egalitarian essentialist ideology exists which no longer perceives maternal employment as problematic, but maintains the assumption of the superiority of mothers in childcare. There is also an ideology that places a significant emphasis on the necessity of prioritising childcare. However, this intensive parenting ideology posits that fathers are equally capable in childcare as mothers. Previous evidence based on data from about ten years ago indicated that this intensive parenting ideology is not a novel phenomenon, as it was already evidenced more than a decade ago, and the results of this dissertation reveal that it has remained relatively stable since then (cf. Diabaté et al., 2023). Similarly, as previous research has found, this dissertation confirms that the consistent egalitarian ideology has remained prevalent and unchanged in West Germany, whereas the traditional ideology has lost importance (cf. Grunow et al., 2018). This decline was therefore not in favour of the egalitarian ideology, but – as the results of this dissertation suggest in line with Grunow et al.'s study – in favour of heterogeneous gender ideologies, above all the egalitarian essentialist ideology. This makes the uneven gender revolution visible, with the egalitarian trend continuing to a certain extent, but accompanied by a greater diversification of gender ideology.
Concerning trends in gender ideology in East Germany, this dissertation's results from the 1980s and from the present time suggest the continued prevalence of two distinct belief patterns. Both historically and in the present, a heterogeneous ideology, comprising egalitarian and gender essentialist beliefs, can be observed alongside a consistently egalitarian ideology. The results indicate that the spread of the heterogeneous gender ideology has declined somewhat in East Germany (44 % of respondents in 1984 were identified as nimby-egalitarians, and 25 % were

identified as egalitarian essentialists in 2021). This finding aligns with the conclusion of previous studies that gender ideologies in the East are tending to become more one-dimensional (Sievers & Warner, 2022). However, a major difference between the dissertation's results and existing research lies in this dissertation's identification of a heterogeneous ideology, which combines gender essentialist beliefs with egalitarian ones. It is my contention that the findings of this dissertation are more closely akin to the historical context of East Germany, as maternal employment and the associated institutional childcare were rarely perceived as problematic, yet a gender-specific division of labour within the family was nevertheless practised (e.g. Trappe, 1996).

Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that the trend towards egalitarianism and a greater diversification of gender ideology as identified by previous research (e.g. Knight & Brinton, 2017), continue to the present day in Germany. The majority of people in Germany today hold egalitarian gender ideologies and are therefore in favour of equality in the public and private domains. From this it can be concluded that the egalitarian trend in gender ideology has not been broken even by the experiences of families during the restrictions due to the Covid-19 pandemic which resulted in a tightening of gender-specific childcare times due to the closure of educational and childcare facilities (Kreyenfeld & Zinn, 2021). The dissertation corroborates the well-documented diversification of gender ideologies (also in East Germany), thereby providing substantial support for the proposition that the beliefs concerning various dimensions of life in which gender roles are relevant can be structured independently of each other.

Ideas for future research

In light of the results from the four studies and their interpretations, several indications concerning potential directions for future research on gender ideologies emerge.

It appears beneficial to further analyse the survey data obtained from the GDR, only one set of which was used in this dissertation. In addition to beliefs concerning gender roles, these data sets contain information about the division of unpaid work in couples, the respondents' ideas about family or their sexuality. The data is archived at GESIS and individual researchers involved in the survey management can still be consulted at the moment. The results of such analyses would facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the 'inner life' of the GDR, which could prove valuable for making further period-specific comparisons with the former FRG, the assessment of citizens' relationships with the regime, and for evaluating current results on East-West differences.

Moreover, future research should aim at analysing the further development of the multidimensional nature of gender ideology in East and West Germany. This dissertation provides a 2021-baseline for this, and the subsequent FReDA waves will facilitate an investigation of how the identified belief patterns evolve in terms of both form and prevalence over time. The then longitudinal FReDA data will also enable future research to identify the underlying causes of these changes. Building on this dissertation and the subsequent FReDA waves, for example, it would be beneficial in future

research to examine how similar partners or spouses are in their multidimensional gender ideologies (see Hudde (2020), who was unable to take the interplay of several beliefs concerning gender roles into account, but had to analyse the beliefs separately). This could then be taken further by examining whether dyadic similarity in multidimensional gender ideology affects the partnership, for instance with regard to fertility (see Hudde and Engelhardt (2021), also based on separate consideration of beliefs concerning gender roles).

This dissertation was able to show that also in Germany parental socialisation, and thus intergenerational transmission, is a crucial predictor of children's gender ideology. Generally, research on this topic should be expanded for Germany, starting with the collection of suitable quantitative or qualitative data. Then, it is recommended that future (inter-)national research seek to shed more light on the role of fathers in gender socialisation (for England see Dawson, Pike, & Bird, 2016), as they play a greater role in children's lives than they did in the past due to the increasing frequency of parental leave take up and increased amount of time they spend with their children (Schulz & Engelhardt, 2017). In addition, socialisation should be studied in other family constellations than the core family, e.g. in single-parent families (for the USA see Carlson & Knoester, 2011), which are an increasingly common family type. Also, the investigation of the relevance of other agents of socialisation, such as caregivers or teachers, is an important avenue for further research as this relates to gender-sensitive education, which is also a relevant policy area for promoting gender equality.

Another avenue for future research concerns the measurement of gender ideologies. This dissertation provides an analysis of an innovative, concrete and comparable measure, namely what respondents report as the ideal weekly working hours for mothers and fathers with two-year-old children. When study 4 was carried out, the measure was collected in the AID:A survey, but it has now been introduced in FReDA and in the Generations and Gender Survey Round II. Therefore, further research could be carried out on the validity of this measure, for example by comparing it with respondents' answers to the conventional gender role items, or by analysing the predictors or outcomes of this new measure in relation to existing results based on the conventional gender role items.

Implications for policy and society

The findings of this dissertation lead to the insight that the gender ideologies identified do not align fully with the division of labour among parents observed in Germany (OECD, 2017). The majority of respondents currently are in favour of gender equality, not only in the public domain, but also within the family. Furthermore, the future mothers and fathers analysed in the dissertation view an egalitarian division of paid labour as ideal and would like to see a reduction in paternal working hours. Yet, extant research shows that approximately half of the parents in Germany adhere to a model where the father works full-time and the mother part-time, while nearly a third follow a

model where only the father works (BMFSFJ, 2021). The discrepancy between this behaviour and the observed gender ideologies may indicate a need for adjustments to family policy and structural conditions in order for people to better realise their egalitarian intentions. At the same time, this dissertation's observation that between one-fifth and one-quarter of people expressed support for ideologies that strongly favour maternal or parental childcare could either be interpreted as an indication that these individuals would prefer to maintain childcare within the family. In this case, it would be necessary for family policy to ensure the 'parental freedom of choice' between different forms of childcare and related employment arrangements. An alternative interpretation is that this reflects the perception that the existing institutional alternatives to familial childcare are inadequate, which would further reinforce the call for qualitative and quantitative improvements to institutional childcare in Germany.

Moreover, the dissertation has provided further evidence for the well-documented significance of education and gender in shaping gender ideologies (e.g. Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). The correlation between more egalitarian gender ideologies and a high level of education, or being female, places a particular responsibility on educational institutions. In particular, it falls to them to disseminate knowledge about the consequences of gender-based discrimination, or of the gender-specific division of labour, for example in relation to female income- or pension potential or the father-child relationship. This could eventually facilitate the spread of egalitarian ideologies.

In accordance with the hypothesis of Rosenfeld et al. (2004) it can be posited that legacy and policy matter for gender ideologies. Despite the 40-year period of division of Germany being relatively brief considering Germany's longer history, the distinct gender ideologies that emerged during that time remain discernible. Nevertheless, this dissertation has also consistently shown a high degree of congruence between ideologies and policy, suggesting that profound shifts towards a consistently gender equality-oriented family policy can also result in the establishment of new legacies.

Finally, this dissertation's findings substantiate arguments in favour of moving away from a dichotomous conceptualisation of gender ideology and instead considering its multidimensionality. This illustrates the diversification of gender ideologies, thereby providing an explanation for the discrepancy between the widespread one-dimensionally conceived egalitarian ideology and the entrenched gender role behaviour. A multidimensional perspective allows for the recognition that gender ideologies have multiple underlying dimensions, which have undergone varying degrees of change over time. Consequently, ideologies representing traditional or essentialist beliefs concerning the private domain remain evident. Moreover, this dissertation demonstrates the potential of new indicators for measuring gender ideology to reveal its variance.

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Acknowledgements

Ich danke allen, die in unterschiedlichster Weise zur Entstehung dieser Dissertation beigetragen haben. Allen voran meinen beiden Betreuungspersonen, Prof. Dr. Henriette Engelhardt-Wölfler und Prof. Dr. Martin Bujard für ihre wertvollen Anregungen und kritischen Anmerkungen. Mein besonderer Dank gilt Martin Bujard für die Förderung und das Engagement während des gesamten Promotionsprozesses sowie für die Gewährung von Freiräumen für meine Dissertation. Ebenfalls danke ich PD Dr. Florian Schulz für die Übernahme der Gutachtertätigkeit bei der Disputation.

Besonders bedanken möchte ich mich auch bei Dr. Felix Berth, dem Leiter des von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) geförderten Projekts am Deutschen Jugendinstitut (DJI), in dessen Rahmen meine Dissertation maßgeblich entstanden ist. Seine hilfreichen Ratschläge, motivierenden Worte und konstruktiven Anmerkungen waren für mich immer sehr hilfreich. So danke ich auch der DFG für die finanzielle Förderung meiner Promotionsstelle im Rahmen des Projektes 434947732.

Auch Prof. Dr. Sabine Walper danke ich dafür, dass sie mich an ihrer Expertise und Erfahrung teilhaben ließ und für ihr wertvolles Feedback. In ihren Promovierendenkolloquien und Season Schools für Promovierende am DJI erhielt ich immer wieder neue Denkanstöße.

Darüber hinaus möchte ich mich bei meinen ehemaligen Kolleg*innen am DJI, insbesondere in den Abteilungen Familie und Familienpolitik sowie Kinder und Kinderbetreuung, herzlich für den Austausch, die Unterstützung und die freudige Zusammenarbeit bedanken. Auch bei meinen Kolleg*innen des Forschungsbereichs Familie und Fertilität am Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung möchte ich mich besonders bedanken für den Austausch und die Motivation in der Endphase meiner Promotion.

Außerdem bin ich dankbar für die Ablenkung und Erheiterung durch meine Freund*innen und meine Familie, ohne die ich die Promotionsphase nicht überstanden hätte. Insbesondere danke ich meinen Eltern, die mir meine Ausbildung ermöglicht und immer an mich geglaubt haben.

Und schließlich danke ich dir, Tony, für deine Ermutigung, deine Unterstützung, dein Zuhören, deine Gelassenheit und die wohltuende ‘Erdung’, die ich immer wieder durch dich erfahren kann.