Political Psychology

Political Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2021
doi: 10.1111/pops.12700

The Relation Between Social Identities and Outgroup Hostility Among German Immigrant-Origin Citizens

Hayfat Hamidou-Schmidt
University of Duisburg Essen - Campus Duisburg

Sabrina Jasmin Mayer
University of Duisburg Essen - Campus Duisburg
German Center for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM)

One of the major drivers of societal conflict are the intergroup relations which rely mainly on social identity and which are rarely analyzed for immigrant groups. This article changes this point of view by investigating the extent to which national, ethnic, and religious identities relate to outgroup hostilities towards the majority of the German population, towards other immigrant groups, and towards Syrian refugees among immigrant-origin citizens. We employ a theoretical framework based on the social identity approach and use new representative survey data from 2017 for Germans of Turkish descent (N = 480) and Russian Germans (N = 471). Based on multivariate linear regression analysis, we show that ethnic identity has the strongest positive relation with outgroup hostilities, with the exception of the Russian-Germans' evaluation of the German majority population. National identity among Germans of Turkish descent lessens their hostility towards other immigrants. Our results show the importance of analyzing immigrant groups with different migration trajectories separately before making generalized claims. Not only are the identity relations different between an ingroup identification and various outgroup targets, but they are also different between the immigrant groups for the same ingroup identification and outgroup target.

KEY WORDS: social identity, outgroup evaluations, immigrants, Germany, outgroup hostility

Intergroup relations are one of the major drivers of societal conflict that can transfer deep into the political arena. Politicians' use of group-based conflicts to promote specific groups might lead to a deeply divided society (Curtis, 2014; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kranendonk, Vermeulen, & van Heelsum, 2018; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). There is a wide range of group memberships useable for this purpose, since individuals have many different ingroup identifications that affect how they relate to their social world (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Of all the different group memberships, some are more important for attitudes and behavior than others. Previous studies show that the importance of national, ethnic, and religious identity matters, especially for people of immigrant origin, because their minority status increases the salience of those sometimes contradictory group memberships (Kranendonk et al., 2018; Nandi & Platt, 2020; Reimer et al., 2017). These identities differ in their degree of inclusiveness, with ethnic identity being the most exclusive. National and religious identities are more inclusive, superordinate identities that may combine different subgroups under a



Figure 1. Model of analyzed outgroup attitudes of Germans with migrant backgrounds.

common ingroup (e.g., Espinosa et al., 2018; Van Dommelen, Schmid, Hewstone, Gonsalkorale, & Brewer, 2015).

Even though individuals identify with several ingroups, studies on outgroup hostility[1] often focus only on one specific identity without taking the others into account and/or with no control for other variables that are theoretically important (e.g., Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014). This does not allow us to see how much a specific identity actually adds to the explanation and might lead to unreliable results due to omitted variable bias or suppressor effects (e.g., Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Furthermore, focusing only on the majority of immigrants, or on others as an aggregated group (e.g., de Vroome, Martinovic, & Verkuyten, 2014), does not allow us to see how the same ingroup identification relates to different outgroup targets. In addition, most of these previous studies analyzed only adolescents or young adults (e.g., Birtel, Reimer, Wölfer, & Hewstone, 2020; Kosic & Caudek, 2005; Lauglo, 2017; Lee, 2019; Shelton & Richeson, 2006) or had to rely on data from convenient, nonrepresentative samples (e.g., Baysu, Coşkan, & Duman, 2018; Espinosa et al., 2018; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013) which do not allow generalizations to be made for the general population.

Our article analyzes how national, ethnic, and religious identities relate to outgroup hostilities between two groups of immigrant-origin citizens: Germans from Turkey and Germans from the former Soviet Union. We focus on three different outgroup targets: (1) the majority population in Germany and two groups of immigrants that came to Germany at different times; (2) the respective other immigrant group—the "oldcomers"; and (3) Syrian refugees—the "newcomers" (see Figure 1). To derive our hypotheses, we rely on a theoretical framework that draws mainly on the social identity approach by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) and its developments such as the common ingroup-identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Guerra, Hehman, & Saguy, 2016). For a more complete picture, besides sociodemographics, we also control for social integration and generational status—the two most central determinants of immigrants' identities—as well as religiosity and religious practices as additional aspects of religious identity (Hindriks et al., 2014; Lee, 2019; Martinovic, van Tubergen, & Maas, 2009; Tillie, 2004). We focus on Germany as it is a stable political system with a low level of ideological polarization. It is also a unique case, with the biggest immigrant groups having widely different trajectories:

[1]Previous research uses many different terms to refer to negative evaluations of outgroups. We will henceforth use the term "outgroup hostility" and will refer to "outgroup evaluations" for both positive and negative evaluations.

former guest workers (e.g., of Turkish descent) on the one hand and ethnic Germans (e.g., Russian Germans) on the other hand (von Alemann, Erbentraut, & Walther, 2018).

Our contribution thus is threefold: (1) We provide evidence of how outgroup hostilities are generally distributed among two groups of immigrant-origin citizens in German society; (2) By analyzing national, ethnic, and religious identity simultaneously, we are able to (a) observe the relative importance of each identity for its relation with the respective outgroup target and (b) explore whether identities have the same relation with different outgroup targets; (3) We determine whether those patterns are universal among the groups or vary between immigrant groups of different origins and status. After a short introduction to the German case in the next section, we continue by discussing our theoretical framework and the deduction of hypotheses for the empirical discussion. Afterwards, we present our data and the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables and display the results from our bivariate and multivariate analyzes. Last, we discuss our results and their implications for the integration of immigrants into the majority population.

The Case of Immigrant-Origin Citizens in Germany

In our study, we focus on the two biggest immigrant groups in Germany: individuals of Turkish descent and individuals who migrated from the Soviet Union and its successor states. Both groups have very different trajectories: The immigration of Turkish people dates back to the labor migration of the early 1950s and the 1960s. Most members of this group are (Sunni) Muslims. Today, this group comprises more than three million persons (Geiling, Gardemin, Meise, & König, 2011). In contrast, people coming from the Soviet Union and its successor states are largely ethnic Germans, most of whom are Protestant Christians and whose ancestors migrated to Russia in the 18th century.[2] Today, more than 2.8 million Russian Germans live in Germany (DESTATIS, 2017).

Both groups—Germans of Turkish descent and Russian Germans—not only have different migration histories, but they also differ vastly in how they were treated by the German government. Until 2000, the citizenship regime was restrictive towards all non-Germans, even if they were born in Germany, and expansive towards ethnic Germans from the East (Joppke, 2005). Ethnic Germans received full citizenship almost upon their arrival, whereas many second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants who were born in Germany remained as foreigners (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011). This set Russian Germans apart from other migrant groups as they had a privileged group status with respect to other immigrant groups (e.g., Bauböck & Perchinig, 2010). This difference was not only mirrored by their higher level of economic and social integration compared with other immigrant groups (Worbs, Bund, Kohls, & Babka von Gostomski, 2013) but also by public perception. For example: Russian Germans are evaluated more positively by the German public than are people of Turkish origin (Wagner, van Dick, & Zick, 2001).

Due to the long-term restrictive stance of the German government towards the naturalization of Germans of Turkish descent, only one third of Turkish immigrants in Germany, about 1.3 million of the 3.2 million people of Turkish descent, hold German citizenship (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011). The group of Germans from the former Soviet Union who hold German citizenship is twice that size and has a larger share: 2.6 million of the 2.8 million people from the former Soviet Union and its successor states (DESTATIS, 2017). Analyzing these two very different immigrant groups allows us to identify whether, and to what extent, immigrant status or specific ethnicity are systematic correlates of outgroup hostilities.

The Relation Between Social Identity and Outgroup Evaluations

The relation between social identity and intergroup relations has become one of the most researched topics in the field of political psychology in the last 20 years (e.g., for an overview, see

[2]Henceforth, we will call this group "Russian Germans."

Reimer, Schmid, Hewstone, & Al Ramiah, 2020). Most works rely on the social identity approach that draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), which offer explanations of how and why individuals react to members of their own (ingroup) and other groups (outgroups). Based on the social identity approach, outgroup evaluations can be explained as a consequence of group membership: All individuals are known to use social categories as cognitive instruments to order their social environment systematically into ingroups and outgroups. People identify with many different ingroups that strongly affects their attitudes, cognitions, and behaviors (e.g., Roccas & Brewer, 2002). When a specific identity is salient, individuals strive for a positive self-concept by comparing their own group with outgroups and making their ingroup more distinct from others in the process. In the case of unfavorable results, as well as group memberships that cannot be changed easily (as is the case for ethnic identity, and to a lesser degree, for national and religious identity), this might lead to ingroup favoritism, and to a lesser extent to outgroup hostilities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, pp. 40–45).

Previous research on social identity focuses mainly on three aspects: measurement and dimensionality, the complexity and representation of identity, as well as consequences and correlates of identity (Hogg, 2016). Studies on the first aspect, especially, have focused on the question of whether ingroup identification consists of separate facets or whether it is mainly the variability of a single factor. The first view was dominant in the 2000s, when complex multidimensional structures were proposed (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008). Later, however, Postmes, Haslam, and Jans (2013) showed that single items are adequate for measuring social identity when the specific dimensions of identity are not of interest. Research on the aspect of an identity's meaning and complexity offers insights into the individual cognitive representations of different identities. Previous studies showed that the same identities can be more or less exclusive, depending on their meaning (e.g., Politi, Roblain, Gale, Licata, & Staerklé, 2020). In the case of multiple identities, several frameworks exist that provide explanations for how those identities coexist, dominate, merge, or intersect. Such frameworks include the social identity complexity model (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), the common ingroup-identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2016), and the social identity inclusiveness model (Doucerain, Amiot, Thomas, & Louis, 2018; Van Dommelen et al., 2015). Concerning the correlates of social identity, research is vast and covers a wide range of topics from well-being to collective action. For our research on outgroup hostility, what matters most is that ingroup identification does not lead to outgroup hostility per se (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998), although previous research has shown rather high correlations between the strength of ingroup identification and the negative evaluations of outgroups (e.g., Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kosic & Caudek, 2005; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001).

Our research focuses on the correlates of three major identities—national, ethnic, and religious—whose relations with three outgroup targets are explored for two different groups. The three identities differ by their average degree of inclusiveness. Whereas ethnic identity refers to a person's ethnic group, defined by some exclusive criteria, national and religious identities can be conceptualized as more inclusive, superordinate identities (e.g., Baysu et al., 2018; Espinosa et al., 2018; Van Dommelen et al., 2015). In the following section, we present the theoretical background to the relations of three identities for outgroup hostilities among our groups of immigrant-origin citizens.

The Role of Exclusive Categories for Outgroup Hostility—Ethnic Identity

We start with the role of the most exclusive category: ethnic identity. It is a sense of belonging to a country of origin or to an ethnic group defined by language, origin, and/or race (for an overview, see Verkuyten, 2018). To a lesser degree, ethnic identity and its correlates are also studied in the majority population, especially in the United States for the White group (Negy, Shreve, Jensen, & Uddin, 2003). However, in nonsettler countries such as Germany, where one group clearly

represents a majority, no separate perception of ethnic identity exists among the majority population. In these countries, the majority population's national identity replaces the ethnic identity (Rodriguez, Schwartz, & Krauss Whitbourne, 2010).

Based on social identity theory, we would generally expect that the more committed individuals feel to their ingroup, the more they try to differentiate between the ingroups and the relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The stronger the ethnic identity is, the more committed individuals feel to their own ethnic ingroup, the closer they feel to its ingroup members, and the more pronounced group boundaries appear between the own group and other groups (Hindriks et al., 2014). In particular, high ethnic identity, further elevated by a low status of the own group, makes it likely that group members will evaluate other groups negatively (Hogg, 2016).

However, a contradicting theoretical explanation is proposed by multicultural theory. Contrary to social identity theory, a higher level of ethnic identity might be positively related to a greater acceptance of others (Fowers & Richardson, 1996). The more strongly ethnic minorities identify with their group, the more secure and stable they should feel about themselves, and the more likely they should be to evaluate other groups positively (Phinney, Jacoby, & Silva, 2007). However, previous studies found that ethnic identity is mostly related to outgroup hostility (e.g., Hindriks et al., 2014; Negy et al., 2003), even though a positive relation between ethnic identity and the evaluation of other (minority) outgroups is reported in several studies (e.g., Lauglo, 2017; Phinney et al., 2007).

We see no reason why the ethnic identity of immigrant-origin citizens should show different correlates from other ingroup identifications and thus do not expect it to act according to multicultural theory. Instead, we argue that, at least for our groups of immigrant-origin citizens, we can expect a positive relation between ethnic identity and outgroup hostility as it is proposed by social identity theory:

H1a: The stronger the ethnic identity of an individual, the more negative will be their evaluation of the other groups.

However, because the definition and characteristics of Russian-German ethnic identity are closely related to the German identity—they see themselves mostly as ethnic Germans from the East (Joppke, 2005)—we propose:

H1b: There is a negative relation for the Russian-German identity and their hostile evaluation of the German majority population.

The Role of Superordinate Categories for Hostile Attitudes Towards Outgroups—National and Religious Identity

Individuals belong to many social categories. These ingroup identifications can be conceptually ordered in several ways. How they interact depends on how they overlap concerning group members and identity content and whether they are hierarchically ordered or nested (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Some theoretical frameworks, such as the common ingroup-identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2016), concentrate on hierarchical social categories, where subordinate, more exclusive categories (for example, ethnic identity) are nested in superordinate, more inclusive categories (such as national identity). Even though the inclusiveness of the same social identities is not fixed, and the exact setup of the common ingroup varies between individuals (e.g., Van Dommelen et al., 2015), previous studies found national and religious identity to be more inclusive than ethnic identity (e.g., Baysu et al., 2018; Espinosa et al., 2018). Individuals might either solemnly adopt the superordinate identity or maintain both identities as a dual identity (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2016;

Simon, Reichert, Schaefer, Bachmann, & Renger, 2015; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2016). In either case, bias towards other groups is supposed to lessen when those groups share a superordinate category that leads to a greater perceived similarity between the groups (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2016; Reimer et al., 2020). Previous research, however, provides divergent results on whether all outgroups are evaluated more positively, or only those that are now part of the superordinate category (e.g., Curtis, 2014; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008).

First, we look at national identity. Being a social identity, from the view point of social identity theory, national identity is about establishing boundaries between insiders and outsiders and is an instrument for social closure that is mainly constructed through citizenship status (Joppke, 2005). Among the majority population, national identity in general is related to more negative evaluations of other groups (e.g., Curtis, 2014; Mummendey et al., 2001). However, we can expect national identity to function differently for immigrant citizens and would expect their identification with the host nation to act as a superordinate identity. Former outgroup members, such as other Germans who do not share the same ethnicity, become ingroup members. The psychological processes that lead to ingroup favoritism would now be applied to those former outgroup members, and thus the evaluation of those groups would become more positive (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Hindriks et al. (2014) and Munniksma, Verkuyten, Flache, Stark, and Veenstra (2015) show that this holds true for immigrants in the Netherlands. However, we need to account for the fact that the association of identities with the same outgroup target (e.g., national identity and the majority population) may depend on the characteristics of the immigrant groups themselves (i.e., being ethnic Germans or not).

For the Turkish group,

H2a: We assume that national identity—as was found in previous studies—is associated with less hostility towards both the majority population and the Russian Germans but with more hostility towards the non-German minorities as they are not part of the newly formed ingroup.

In the case of Russian Germans, ethnic group and national identity should be largely congruent, as the ethnic group encompasses those who are ethnic Germans from the East, a subgroup of all Germans. This would make national identity not as inclusive as for the Turkish group but more exclusively focused on the ethnic German part (Goerres, Mayer, & Spies, 2020).

H2b: We thus expect national identity among Russian Germans to be associated with less hostility towards the majority population and associated with more hostility towards the two immigrant outgroups.

Second, we focus on religious identity, which is one of the most important identities because it is directly related to moral positions and worldviews (e.g., Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). Indeed, previous studies show religious identity to be related to outgroup attitudes (Bilali, Iqbal, & Çelik, 2018; Hindriks et al., 2014). According to the common ingroup-identity model, identifying with a religious group can bridge differences between groups (Baysu et al., 2018; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), therefore religious identifiers should have a more positive attitude towards former outgroup members of the same faith. Previous studies have also argued for the need to distinguish between religious "social belonging," religious "belief," and religious "practice" to be able to differentiate between the consequences of these concepts (Bilali et al., 2018; Hindriks et al., 2014; Kranendonk et al., 2018). Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche (2015) argue that the social identity aspect—identifying with a religious group—is related to an increase in the social distance from other groups; religious belief, however, is traditionally related to being kind towards others. These concepts could lead in the same direction. For instance, when self-identifying, believing/practicing German Muslims are asked about their attitude towards Bosnian Muslims, their social identity and belief/practice would relate to

Table 1. Overview of Hypotheses for Both Groups

	Germans of Turkish Descent			Russian Germans		
	Hostile Evaluation of			Hostile Evaluation of		
	Majority	Russian Germans	Refugees	Majority	Turkish	Refugees
Ethnic identity	+	+	+	−	+	+
National identity	−	−	0	−	+	+
Religious identity	−	−	+	+	−	−

Note. +: Identity is related to higher levels of hostility towards an outgroup target; −: identity is related to lower levels of hostility towards an outgroup target; 0: no relationship expected. Reading example: For ethnic identity, we expect that the stronger the ethnic identity of an individual, the more negative the evaluation of other groups.

a more positive evaluation. However, in the case of German Muslims evaluating (Christian) Russian Germans, we propose that the Muslim social identity would be associated with outgroup hostility, whereas religious belief and practice would be associated with a more positive outgroup evaluation.

For the Turkish group,

H3a: We propose that Muslim identification is associated with lower levels of hostility towards the Syrian refugee group and to higher levels of hostility towards the majority population and Russian Germans.[3]

For the Russian Germans,

H3b: We expect that those who identify as Christians would evaluate the majority population more positively and would evaluate Turkish Germans and Syrian refugees more negatively.

We present an overview of all the proposed associations between the three types of identity and the three outgroup targets by immigrant group in Table 1.

Data and Methods

Data Set Description

For our analyzes of the two immigrant groups—Germans of Turkish descent and Russian Germans—the data we use were drawn from the Immigrant German Election Study (IMGES), a post-election survey of the German federal election on the September 24, 2017 (Goerres, Spies, & Mayer, 2018). This study was carried out from October 4 to December 3, 2017. IMGES targeted the Germans from Turkey and Germans from the former Soviet Union and its successor states. It imitated the design of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES; Roßteutscher et al., 2018) for the sampling framework (all Germans aged 16 and above) as well as for the survey mode and the field time. It also included many similar items to allow comparisons to be made. As its purpose was to survey eligible voters, only immigrants with German citizenship were included (for the most important sample characteristics, see Table S1.1 in the online supporting information).[4]

[3]We must point out that when analyzing the relation between Muslim identification and attitudes towards Syrian refugees—out of lack of official statistics and in line with the religious affiliation of the majority population in Syria (CIA, 2020)—we expect the group of Syrian refugees to be perceived as a Muslim group.

[4]The data are available from the GESIS Data Archive, ZA7495, doi:10.4232/1.13544. We provide the Stata Do-file for the variable codings and analyses at osf.io (https://osf.io/kztmj/?view_only=1b6f57725eda4635a8c451156b26af75).

A two-step sampling procedure was employed. First, 150 sampling points from all municipalities in Germany were drawn with a probability proportional to their size. Next, addresses of 1400 people aged 16 and above were randomly selected from local registers. Onomastic classification procedures were employed on the first and last names of the selected people to determine if they were likely to be of Turkish descent or from the former Soviet-Union or its successor states. Persons with a high likelihood of belonging to one of the two immigrant groups were then contacted by interviewers for computer-assisted personal interviews carried out in German.

In total, 1020 interviews were carried out. For our analyses, we only used all cases with a complete set of values for the dependent and independent variables, resulting in 480 cases in the Turkish group and 471 cases in the Russian-German group. Among the remaining cases, the mean age for the Turkish group was 38.3 (*SD* = 14.9) years, and 47.6% of participants were female. For the Russian-German group, the mean age was 44.2 years (*SD* = 15.5), and 53.1% of participants were female. We weighted the IMGES data with a poststratification weight that took into account the differences in selection probability due to the sample design and due to nonresponse (for more details, see Goerres et al., 2018). The weight is the product of three design weights that correct for the varying probabilities of being selected into an interview depending on the size of the community, the varying likelihoods of being a correct positive (being a member of the target universe) based on the onomastic classification by first-name-surname-combination and the differing likelihoods of unit nonresponse in the interview.[5]

Operationalization of Variables

Operationalization of the Dependent Variables

We rely on a measure for social distance towards an outgroup to operationalize outgroup hostility as it has been done by other researchers (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Hindriks et al., 2014; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). Previous studies, mostly from psychology, have used multi-item measures across different domains, for example, asking whether individuals would object to having a member of an outgroup as a neighbor, colleague, boss at work, son/daughter-in-law, and so on. (Hindriks et al., 2014). These measures are positively correlated and capture different degrees of ethnic distance (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008).

We used a single measure for social distance that asked about having a member of a certain group as a family member-in-law which was the only measure available in the data set. Asking about a family member is more likely to reveal deep-seated, hidden feelings of social distance compared with asking about a neighbor, which is likely to capture the most obvious hostility. In addition, the wording of our question also took into account social class, as it was explicitly specified that the fictive person was to be of the same socioeconomic background: "Somebody from your family marries an <outgroup member> from the same social class as you. What do you think about that?" The interviewer asked each respondent about each of several social groups: "German without a migration background"; "Person of Turkish descent"; and "Russian German." Furthermore, "Person of Syrian descent" was asked for the group of refugees because after the refugee influx in 2015 in the public discourse, Syrians have become strongly associated with people holding a refugee status as there were not many Syrians living in Germany before 2015. The question was asked on a 5-point rating scale, ranging from −2 (*totally oppose*) to +2 (*totally approve*). We reversed this scale for the analyses so that it ranged from 0 (*totally approve*) to 4 (*totally oppose*); the higher the value the greater the social distance, that is, the more hostile the evaluation. Hence, for our analyses we had

[5]We come to the conclusion that these weights must be employed in the main analysis to correct for sampling design decisions. Nevertheless, we provide the main regression models with unweighted estimates in Table S2.1 in the online supporting information.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables for the Three Outgroup Targets by Group

	Germans of Turkish Descent		Russian Germans		
Hostile Evaluation of	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Diff (Turk-Russian-German)
Majority	1.26	.98	1.00	.96	.25*
Other minority group	1.49	1.03	2.36	1.14	−.87***
Syrian refugees	1.64	1.17	2.45	1.13	−.81***
N	480		471		

Note. Hostile evaluations scale ranging from 0 (*no hostility*) to 4 (*very opposed*). Differences: *t*-test for mean differences.
*$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$.

three outcome variables: attitude towards the majority population, attitude towards the other migrant group (Russian Germans for the Turkish group and vice versa), and attitude towards Syrian refugees.

Mean values and standard deviations for the dependent variables are displayed in Table 2. In both groups, the majority population is evaluated as the most positive. This shows that intermarriage is generally not seen as taboo, which would have made the adequacy of our measurement a topic of discussion. On average, the group of Syrian refugees is evaluated by both immigrant groups as the least favorable. We also see that the average evaluation varies significantly between the immigrant groups for each outgroup target; among Russian-Germans, the evaluation is less hostile towards the majority and more hostile towards the other immigrant groups. These group differences for the different outgroup targets are significant at least on the 5%-level.

Correlations between the variables are displayed in Table 3, with values for the Turkish group displayed below the diagonal and values for the Russian-German group above the diagonal. Whereas for the Turkish group all attitudes are highly correlated, this is not the case for the Russian-German group. Only their attitudes towards the other migrant group and the refugees have a high correlation, meaning that there is a difference in the evaluations of Russian Germans, with a majority sentiment on the one side and an immigrant sentiment on the other side.

Operationalization of the Independent Variables

Regarding the operationalization of our independent variables (see for the correlations Table 3, and for distribution Table S1.1 in the online supporting information), we measured all ingroup identifications with a single item[6] by asking interviewees how strongly they identified/felt as a member of a certain group on a 5-point scale (−2 = *does not apply at all* to +2 = *totally applies*).[7] For *ethnic identity,* we asked Germans of Turkish descent how strongly they felt Turkish or Kurdish (we took the highest value of the evaluations of both groups), and we asked Russian Germans how strongly they felt Russian-German. For *national identity*, we asked both groups how strongly they felt German. Ethnic and national identities were both very weakly and nonsignificantly correlated: weakly positive for Russian Germans and weakly negative for Turkish Germans.

Analogously, people who indicated their religious affiliation as Christian or Muslim were asked how strongly they felt as a Christian or a Muslim respectively to measure *religious identity*. We only

[6]This is commonly done as such—due to time restrictions—in international large-*n* surveys such as the European Social Survey or the International Social Survey Programme as well as in large studies among the immigrant population (EURISLAM). Using multi-item measures for latent constructs such as ingroup identifications allows us to account for different facets as well as measurement error. However, the benefit of being able to use data from large-*n* surveys that allow generalizations for the population justifies our measure.

[7]This measure is most similar to measures asking about the centrality of identity in the sense of Cameron (2004), for example, but it does not touch on ingroup ties or ingroup affect. However, centrality is supposed to be most predictive to discrimination/outgroup attitudes, thus it seems appropriate for our analyses.

Table 3. Correlations Between the Independent and Dependent Variables

Variables	Hostility Majority	Hostility Other Group	Hostility Syrians	Ethnic ID	German ID	Religious ID	Religio-sity	Religious Practice	SocInt Partner	SocInt Friends	SocInt Colleag.	Age	Gender: Female	Education	Time in GER	
Hostility majority		−.11*	−.07	−.01	−.11*	−.12**	−.14**	−.09*	.09	.07	.03	−.15**	−.15***	.09*	.08	Russian-German group
Hostility other group	.68***		.81***	.01	−.01	.03	.03	.05	−.08	−.00	−.10*	.31***	−.01	−.06	−.20***	
Hostility Syrians	.48***	.61***		−.00	−.03	.05	.05	.10*	−.08	.00	−.09*	.30***	.07	−.04	−.23***	
Ethnic ID	.09	.10*	.01		.07	.13**	.06	.07	−.22***	−.15**	−.02	−.12**	−.02	−.14**	−.03	
German ID	−.15**	−.11*	−.02	−.09		.11*	.18***	.13**	−.02	.09*	.08	.02	−.00	.02	.13**	
Religious ID	.08	.10*	.02	.37***	−.13**		.42***	.34***	−.05	−.03	.00	.13**	.07	−.09	−.15**	
Religiosity	.08	.12**	.08	.17***	−.05	.62***		.52***	−.06	−.04	.03	.10*	.10*	−.06	−.06	
Religious practice	.11*	.14**	.06	.17***	−.07	.51***	.58***		−.06	−.08	−.01	.16***	.08	−.07	−.05	
SocInt Partner	−.06	−.05	−.05	−.16***	.07	−.20***	−.14**	−.18***		.18***	.08	−.16***	.11*	.17***	.17***	
SocInt Friends	−.11*	−.11*	−.02	−.16***	.15***	−.18***	−.15**	−.13**	.15***		.15**	−.00	−.08	.14***	.07	
SocInt Colleagues	−.03	−.01	−.01	−.00	.07	−.02	−.07	.01	.10*	.18***		−.10*	−.04	.12***	.07	
Age	.05	.08	.20***	−.15**	.03	−.17***	−.17***	−.13**	.02	.12**	.03		.11*	.08	−.66***	
Gender: Female	−.04	.05	−.02	.05	−.07	.07	.12*	−.02	−.04	−.07	−.06	−.11*		.07	−.18***	
Education	−.04	−.08	−.13**	−.03	.00	−.11*	−.12**	−.14**	.09	.00	.22***	−.08	.01		−.04	
Time in Germany	−.03	−.03	−.10*	−.06	.03	.10*	.13**	.06	.10*	−.04	.05	−.56***	.08	.11*		
	Turkish group →															

Note. Turkish group below the diagonal; Russian-German group above below the diagonal.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

included Christian identification for the analysis of the Russian-German group and included Muslim identification for the Turkish group due to low case numbers for the other religions. All other participants were coded as −2 (*does not apply at all*). Drawing on Hindriks et al. (2014), we accounted for two aspects of religious identity: a sense of belonging and religiosity/religious practice. We measured general *religiosity* by asking whether individuals considered themselves as religious on a scale ranging from 1 (*not religious at all*) to 4 (*very religious*), and we measured *religious practice* by asking about the frequency of worship attendance on a scale ranging from 0 (*never*) to 5 (*daily*). All three variables were moderately correlated.

Furthermore, we controlled for social integration and generational status/time spent[8] in the host country, which are central determinants of immigrants' identity (e.g., Tillie, 2004). For *social integration,* we used three dummy variables: having a German partner, having more than half of one's friends being German, and having more than half of one's colleagues being German. In addition, we included a variable for the *proportion of lifetime spent in Germany,* taking the time elapsed (in years) since the respondent had migrated to Germany and dividing it by their age. A similar procedure was used by Bergh and Bjørklund (2011). The resulting proportions ranged from 0.02 to 1. By using this measure, we could account for second-generation migrants and different age groups at the same time.

We also controlled for *age* (in years), *gender* (reference category female), and *education* for unobserved socialization effects. *Education* had four categories: on-going education, low-level education (less than 10 years), medium-level, and high-level education (university entrance exam/Abitur). All respondents still going to school were coded as missing ($n = 41$). As 39% of participants went to school in a foreign country, we asked for the number of years they had attended school and recoded this measure accordingly to reflect the German equivalent. Thus, respondents with less than 10 years of schooling were coded as 1, between 10 and 11 years of schooling (with no university studies) were coded as 2, and more than 11 years were coded as 3. Correlations between all variables are displayed in Table 3.

For the analyses, we normalized all independent, continuous variables to the range 0 to 1 so that we could use nonstandardized coefficients to compare across models as well as within models. We estimated multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. We estimated two models for each immigrant group and outgroup target: one baseline model without any controls and a full model with the aforementioned controls.

Results

The Relation Between Ethnic Identity and Outgroup Hostility

We start with the relations between the feelings of belonging to one's own ethnic group and the hostile attitudes towards the three outgroup targets. We expected a positive relation: the stronger the ethnic identification, the higher the level of hostility towards relevant outgroups. The only exception was the relation between Russian-German identification and the evaluation of the majority population since Russian Germans perceive themselves mostly as German (e.g., Worbs et al., 2013). The results of our multivariate analyzes are displayed in Table 4 (baseline models) and Table 5 (full models). Tables detailing the 95% confidence intervals can be found in Tables S3.1–S3.4 in the online supporting information.

[8]Language skills are also an important cognitive determinant that relates to identity (e.g., Phinney et al., 2007). We reran all analyses including a variable for interviewers' evaluation of German language skills, but this did not change the results (see Table S2.7 in the online supporting information).

Table 4. Linear Regression Models on Outgroup Hostilities, Baseline Models; Unstandardized Coefficients

	Germans of Turkish Descent			Russian Germans		
	Hostile Evaluation of			Hostile Evaluation of		
	Majority	Russian Germans	Syrians	Majority	Turkish	Syrians
	b (*SE*)	*b* (*SE*)	*b* (*SE*)	*b* (*SE*)	*b* (*SE*)	*b* (*SE*)
Ethnic ID	.48	.34	.10	−.07	.06	.05
	(.30)	(.30)	(.47)	(.18)	(.19)	(.20)
German ID	−.94**	−.99***	−.63	−.22	−.02	−.13
	(.29)	(.30)	(.36)	(.28)	(.30)	(.31)
Religious ID	−.24	.00	−.21	−.24	.30	.22
	(.20)	(.21)	(.23)	(.17)	(.20)	(.20)
Constant	1.70***	1.95***	2.10***	1.31***	2.19***	2.41***
	(.31)	(.31)	(.44)	(.25)	(.26)	(.27)
N	480	480	480	471	471	471
R^2	.07	.07	.02	.02	.01	.01
AIC	1320	1366	1508	1300	1465	1469
BIC	1337	1383	1524	1316	1482	1486

Note. Weighted data. All independent variables normalized to a 0 to 1 range.
**$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Indeed, we see a positive relation for the Turkish group that reaches conventional levels of significance for two out of three coefficients in the full models. Due to the confounding relation of age, which itself is related to the level of identification, none of these coefficients passes the 5% level of significance for the baseline model. We can thus partly confirm Hypothesis 1a for the Turkish group. In the Russian-German group, the coefficients show the proposed direction (negative for the majority, positive for the other groups) in both the full and baseline models, but they do not reach conventional levels of significance. Hence, we can neither confirm Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b for the Russian-German group. We also compare the respective coefficients for both immigrant groups to see if we can observe substantial differences between the groups (see Table 6). Compared to Russian Germans, the positive relation between ethnic identity and hostility towards the majority population is stronger, passing the 5% level of significance, among Germans of Turkish descent. However, the group dummy has no significant coefficient; thus, the group differences we saw in Table 2 can actually be explained by individual differences.

The Relation Between National and Religious Identity and Outgroup Hostility

Next, we turn to the superordinate categories and look first at the relation between national identity and outgroup evaluations. We proposed for the Turkish group that the stronger their German identity, the less hostile their evaluations of the majority population and other established German immigrant groups. Indeed, we find a consistent negative relation between national identity and outgroup hostility. On average, outgroups are evaluated almost 1 scale point less hostile when changing from the lowest to the highest category of German identity. German identity not only lessens hostility towards the majority population and the other immigrant group, but it also negatively affects hostile attitudes towards Syrian refugees in the full model. Thus, we confirm Hypothesis 2a. We find similar negative relations of German identification for Russian Germans, but those coefficients are not as strong as the ones of the Turkish group nor do they meet traditional levels of statistical significance. This pattern does not provide support for Hypothesis 2b, which cannot be confirmed. Comparing the two groups, we find strong differences for the relation of German identification with hostility towards the majority and the other immigrant: Identifying as German is more related, passing the 5% level, to a decrease in outgroup hostility among the Turkish group.

Table 5. Linear Regression Models on Outgroup Hostilities, Full Models; Unstandardized Coefficients

	Germans of Turkish Descent			Russian Germans		
	Hostile Evaluation of			Hostile Evaluation of		
	Majority	Russian Germans	Syrians	Majority	Turkish	Syrians
Ethnic ID	.70**	.59*	.47	−.01	.21	.13
	(.26)	(.28)	(.29)	(.16)	(.20)	(.20)
German ID	−.93***	−.97***	−.61*	−.16	−.14	−.22
	(.25)	(.26)	(.26)	(.27)	(.27)	(.28)
Religious ID	−.59*	−.38	−.80**	−.12	.01	−.13
	(.28)	(.27)	(.28)	(.15)	(.19)	(.20)
Religiosity	.71*	.57	1.01**	.08	−.02	−.23
	(.30)	(.31)	(.33)	(.27)	(.31)	(.31)
Religious practice	−.04	.20	.21	−.42	.22	.97**
	(.23)	(.26)	(.28)	(.34)	(.38)	(.36)
SocInt Partner	−.08	−.09	−.28	.40*	.00	−.08
	(.20)	(.22)	(.22)	(.20)	(.21)	(.22)
SocInt Colleagues	−.05	−.03	−.02	−.07	−.30*	−.17
	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)	(.12)	(.13)	(.14)
SocInt Friends	.02	−.06	.08	.18	.16	.08
	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)
Age	.90*	1.15**	1.98***	−.66	1.76***	1.27**
	(.40)	(.44)	(.46)	(.42)	(.46)	(.45)
Gender: female	−.14	.04	−.07	−.38**	−.02	.17
	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)
Education (Ref: high)						
Education: ongoing	.55**	.50**	.64***	−.23	−.33	−.46
	(.21)	(.18)	(.18)	(.38)	(.49)	(.47)
Education: low	−.05	.08	.15	−.12	.31	.27
	(.17)	(.19)	(.18)	(.16)	(.19)	(.19)
Education: med	−.07	.05	.30	−.01	.21	.15
	(.16)	(.17)	(.20)	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)
Share: Time spent in Germany	.29	.38	.39	−.50	.21	−.15
	(.39)	(.41)	(.42)	(.55)	(.55)	(.53)
Constant	.92	.90	.49	1.86***	1.42**	1.95***
	(.56)	(.59)	(.58)	(.39)	(.47)	(.45)
N	480	480	480	471	471	471
R^2	.16	.16	.26	.11	.17	.16
AIC	1296	1339	1398	1274	1402	1412
BIC	1359	1401	1460	1337	1465	1475

Note. SocInt = social integration. Weighted data. All independent variables normalized to a 0–1 range.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Last, we analyzed the role of religious identity as a superordinate category. Based on a previous study by Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015), we expected that religious social identity would lead towards more pronounced group boundaries with people of other faiths, whereas people of the same faith would be evaluated more positively. However, for the Turkish group, we find the opposite effect: Religious identity actually lessens outgroup hostility among all outgroups regardless of their common religious affiliation; two out of three coefficients reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In line with our hypothesis, the relation is the strongest towards the group of Syrian refugees but followed by a slightly weaker positive attitude towards the majority population. This means that those who identify strongly as Muslim become more favorable towards outgroups. Furthermore, religious belief is positively associated with all outgroup hostile evaluations. We thus reject Hypothesis 3a.

Table 6. Linear Regression Models on Outgroup Hostilities, Baseline and Full Models with Interactions for Migrant Group; Unstandardized Coefficients

	Baseline Model			Full Models		
	Hostile Evaluation of			Hostile Evaluation of		
	Majority	Other Group	Syrians	Majority	Other Group	Syrians
Main effects						
Ethnic ID	.48	.34	.10	.70**	.59*	.47
	(.30)	(.30)	(.47)	(.26)	(.28)	(.29)
German ID	−.94**	−.99***	−.63	−.93***	−.97***	−.61*
	(.29)	(.30)	(.36)	(.25)	(.26)	(.26)
Religious ID	−.24	.00	−.21	−.59*	−.38	−.80**
	(.20)	(.21)	(.23)	(.28)	(.27)	(.28)
Religiosity				.71*	.57	1.01**
				(.30)	(.31)	(.33)
Religious practice				−.04	.20	.21
				(.23)	(.26)	(.28)
SocInt Partner				−.08	−.09	−.28
				(.20)	(.22)	(.22)
SocInt Colleagues				−.05	−.03	−.02
				(.14)	(.15)	(.15)
SocInt Friends				.02	−.06	.08
				(.14)	(.15)	(.16)
Age				.90*	1.15**	1.98***
				(.40)	(.44)	(.46)
Gender: female				−.14	.04	−.07
				(.13)	(.14)	(.14)
Education (Ref: high)						
Education: ongoing				.55**	.50**	.64***
				(.21)	(.18)	(.18)
Education: low				−.05	.08	.15
				(.17)	(.19)	(.18)
Education: med				−.07	.05	.30
				(.16)	(.17)	(.20)
Share: Time spent in Germany				.29	.38	.39
				(.39)	(.41)	(.42)
Group (Ref. Turkish)	−.39	.24	.31	.94	.52	1.47*
	(.40)	(.41)	(.51)	(.68)	(.76)	(.73)
Product terms						
Ethnic ID * Group	−.55	−.28	−.05	−.70*	−.38	−.34
	(.35)	(.36)	(.51)	(.31)	(.34)	(.35)
German ID * Group	.72	.97*	.49	.77*	.83*	.39
	(.40)	(.42)	(.48)	(.36)	(.37)	(.39)
Religious ID * Group	.00	.30	.43	.47	.39	.67*
	(.26)	(.29)	(.30)	(.32)	(.33)	(.34)
Religiosity * Group				−.63	−.59	−1.24**
				(.41)	(.44)	(.46)
Religious practice * Group				−.38	.02	.76
				(.42)	(.46)	(.45)
SocInt Partner * Group				.48	.09	.21
				(.28)	(.30)	(.31)
SocInt Colleagues * Group				−.02	−.28	−.15
				(.19)	(.20)	(.20)
SocInt Friends* Group				.15	.22	.00
				(.19)	(.20)	(.21)
Age * Group				−1.56**	.61	−.71
				(.58)	(.64)	(.64)

(Continues)

Table 6. (Continued)

	Baseline Model			Full Models		
	Hostile Evaluation of			Hostile Evaluation of		
	Majority	Other Group	Syrians	Majority	Other Group	Syrians
Gender: female * Group				−.23	−.06	.24
				(.18)	(.19)	(.19)
Education (Ref: high)						
Education: ongoing * Group				−.78	−.84	−1.10*
				(.44)	(.52)	(.51)
Education: low * Group				−.08	.23	.12
				(.23)	(.26)	(.26)
Education: mid * Group				.06	.16	−.16
				(.21)	(.23)	(.25)
Share: Time spent in Germany * Group				−.79	−.17	−.54
				(.67)	(.69)	(.67)
Constant	1.70***	1.95***	2.10***	.92	.90	.49
	(.31)	(.31)	(.44)	(.56)	(.59)	(.58)
N	951	951	951	951	951	951
R^2	.06	.17	.12	.15	.28	.29
AIC	2620	2847	2976	2571	2750	2813
BIC	2659	2886	3015	2716	2896	2959

Note. Other group: Russian Germans for Turkish group and vice versa. SocInt = social integration. Weighted data. All independent variables normalized to a 0–1 range. Group: Turkish = 0, Russian German = 1.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

In addition, we find no relation between religious identity and belief among Russian Germans, thus we cannot confirm Hypothesis 3b either. Comparing the relations between the groups, we only find a stronger relation of religious identity and positive attitudes towards Syrians among Germans of Turkish descent that passes the 5% level of significance.

Robustness Checks

We conducted a series of robustness checks to see whether the results would hold true for different statistical methods and different model specifications that are displayed in Section B of the online supporting information. For this purpose, we first calculated ordered logistic regressions specifying the dependent variables as ordinals (Table S2.2). As the results of both models were consistent, this allowed us to treat the dependent variable as continuous. For the Russian-German group, a linear regression, including a second ethnic identity as Russian, shows more predictive power for the evaluation of the majority population although the coefficient itself is not significant (Table S2.3). Furthermore, we calculated three additional models: one without religiosity, another without religious identity and a third without worship attendance. These additional models (see Tables S2.4–S2.6) influence the predictive power of the models for Germans of Turkish descent and the size of the effect of social identity of both groups. Even though the size of the effects has changed marginally, their direction has not.

Discussion

Discussion of Findings

Based on the framework of social identity theory and its developments, we analyzed how ethnic, national, and religious identities relate to outgroup hostilities. We focused on three outgroup

targets: the majority population and two immigrant groups. We found both of the established groups, Germans of Turkish descent and Russian Germans, to be least hostile on average towards the German majority and most hostile towards the newly arrived Syrians. However, probably due to the shared characteristic of being Muslim, Germans of Turkish descent have a more positive attitude towards Syrian refugees than Russian Germans.

We show evidence that social identities relate to outgroup hostilities. Feeling a sense of belonging to their own ethnic group reinforces group boundaries among the Turkish group and is related to being more opposed to other groups, regardless of the other groups' status, whether newcomers, oldcomers, or the majority population (Hypothesis 1a partly confirmed for the Turkish group). We found no significant relation for the Russian-German group, but the direction of the relation was as we proposed and was also associated with greater hostility except for their evaluation of the majority population (Hypotheses 1a and 1b rejected for the Russian-German group). Thus, the relation between ethnic identity and outgroup hostility is largely negative. This indicates that the role of ethnic identity among immigrants can be explained by social identity theory and by the distinctive processes triggered by salient ingroup identification (e.g., Hogg, 2016).

The multicultural view that immigrants are very welcoming towards other immigrant groups has been refuted several times in the past (Archdeacon, 1984; Kivisto & Nefzger, 1993) but still prevails, and compatible findings are reported (e.g., Hindriks et al., 2014). Our study shows that indeed, immigrants have hostile attitudes towards other groups, towards the majority population, and even more towards other immigrant groups, especially those that newly arrived, and that those hostile attitudes are related to ethnic identity. This relation is important for policymakers to consider as previous studies showed, for example, that multicultural policies are related to higher levels of ethnic identity (Verkuyten, 2005). Outgroup hostilities could thus be an unintended consequence of more immigrant-friendly policies.

For the role of superordinate categories, we found, as proposed by the common ingroup-identity model (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010), a positive relation between German identity and the Turkish-German evaluation of Germans and immigrant groups in Germany (Hypothesis 2a confirmed) but not for Russian Germans (Hypothesis 2b rejected). In our study, national identity acts as a superordinate identity that lessens outgroup hostility only for immigrants who do not have the same ethnic background as the majority population. For the Turkish group, we found that the superordinate category of religious social identity does not lead to more negative evaluations of people of different faiths, but rather lessens outgroup hostility altogether (Hypothesis 3a rejected). Last, we found no statistically significant effect of religious social identities on outgroup evaluations of Russian Germans (Hypothesis 3b rejected). Analyzing the differences between the two immigrant groups, we find significant differences for four out of the nine possible relations between the three identities and the three outgroup targets. These results show that the same ingroup identification has different relations with various outgroup targets as well as different relations for different immigrant groups because, according to the common ingroup model (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Gaertner et al., 2016), the resulting ingroups vary. As a consequence, there is no single way for how national or religious identity, for example, could relate to outgroup attitudes among citizens. This relation depends on the identity content within the country and its relation with the characteristics of the identifier. Thus, for further studies it is important to take into account that the role of ingroup identifications, and especially their function as superordinate categories, is not fixed (e.g., see also Bilali et al., 2018). For example, national identity reinforces group boundaries for the majority population and for specific immigrant groups such as ethnic Germans, but it has an inclusionary role for most ethnic minorities and immigrants. Thus, to make the differences clearer, analyses should take the origins of immigrant groups into account rather than analyzing immigrants together in a single group.

Limitations

We must point out several limitations of our study. First, we used cross-sectional data and thus could not make any conclusions about causality. Using panel data, if available, could add to the question of how stable those relations are. Second, we could not analyze ingroup bias because we had no data on the evaluation of the "own group" except for the German majority group. Hence, we only analyzed outgroup hostilities. Third, we only analyzed those immigrants who already had German citizenship, so we could not draw conclusions about the group of immigrants without citizenship. As we found ethnic identity to have a positive relation with the rejection of other outgroups, and we expected levels of ethnic identity to be higher among nonnaturalized immigrants (e.g., Verkuyten, 2005), we expected that for the group of immigrants without citizenship levels of outgroup hostility would be even higher than for immigrants with citizenship. Last, all surveys are prone to problems of data collection. The data we used had the same response rate as the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)—about 28%—which is rather low. This might indicate that some groups of respondents did not participate, especially those who live more traditionally or who are suspicious of their data being collected by universities and public institutions. Furthermore, we had to rely on single-item measures. Most of the time when using representative survey data, there is a trade-off between being able to use data for a heterogeneous group on the one side—and being able to make generalizations—and measuring constructs with multi-item measures on the other side. Further studies using multi-item measures could provide a more thorough analysis of the relation of subdimensions of ingroup identifications, for example, while we would also be able to show relations across a whole population.

Conclusion

When faced with integrating immigrants into society, it is important to understand the underlying group boundaries and intergroup hostilities that might bring conflict into the political arena. We believe that our study is the first to examine outgroup hostilities towards the majority population and towards other immigrant groups within the two biggest immigrant groups in Germany. Our results show that some degree of outgroup hostility towards the majority and towards other immigrant groups can also be observed among immigrant-origin citizens, whose social identities are partly related. However, the relation between a specific social identity and outgroups is not static, as the same ingroup identification shows a different relation with various outgroup targets. Furthermore, our results point out the importance of analyzing immigrant groups with different migration trajectories separately before making generalized claims. This is because the relation between the same ingroup identification and an outgroup target also varies by immigrant group.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sabrina Jasmin Mayer, Lotharstrasse 65, University of Duisburg Essen - Campus Duisburg, 47057 Duisburg, Germany. E-mail: mayer@dezim-institut.de.

Both authors contributed equally and share first authorship. We thank Anne-Kathrin Fischer, Stephen Fisher, Achim Goerres, Nadine Meidert, Dennis Spies, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors for helpful comments. We also thank Jonas Elis, Jakob Kemper, and Erik Wenker for research assistance and John Revington for language editing. Earlier versions were presented at the 2018 Community in Crisis? workshop in Friedrichshafen, the 2018 ECPR General Conference in Hamburg as well as the 2019 EPSA Annual Conference in Belfast and the 2019 workshop of the Immigrant German Election Study. Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

REFERENCES

Archdeacon, T. J. (1984). *Becoming American*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Bauböck, R., & Perchinig, B. (2010). Evaluation and recommendations. In R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk, & H. Waldrauch (Eds.), *IMISCOE research. Acquisition and loss of nationality: Policies and trends in 15 European states* (pp. 431–478). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.

Baysu, G., Coşkan, C., & Duman, Y. (2018). Can identification as Muslim increase support for reconciliation? The case of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 64,* 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.02.002

Ben-Nun Bloom, P., Arikan, G., & Courtemanche, M. (2015). Religious social identity, religious belief, and anti-immigration sentiment. *American Political Science Review, 109,* 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000143

Bergh, J., & Bjørklund, T. (2011). The revival of group voting: Explaining the voting preferences of immigrants in Norway. *Political Studies, 59,* 308–327. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00863.x

Bilali, R., Iqbal, Y., & Çelik, A. B. (2018). The role of national identity, religious identity, and intergroup contact on social distance across multiple social divides in Turkey. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 65,* 73–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.04.007

Birtel, M. D., Reimer, N. K., Wölfer, R., & Hewstone, M. (2020). Change in school ethnic diversity and intergroup relations: The transition from segregated elementary to mixed secondary school for majority and minority students. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 50,* 160–176. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2609

Brewer, M. B., & Brown, R. J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed., pp. 554–594). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.

Cameron, J. E. (2004). A three-factor model of social identity. *Self and Identity, 3,* 239–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/13576500444000047

CIA. (2020). *The World Factbook. Middle East: Syria*. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html

Curtis, K. A. (2014). Inclusive versus exclusive: A cross-national comparison of the effects of subnational, national, and supranational identity. *European Union Politics, 15,* 521–546. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116514528058

DESTATIS. (2017). *Bevölkerung nach Migrationshintergrund und doppelter Staatsangehörigkeit* [Population by migration background and dual citizenship]. Retrieved from https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Tabellen/migrationshintergrund-doppelte-staatsangehoerigkeit.html

Doucerain, M. M., Amiot, C. E., Thomas, E. F., & Louis, W. R. (2018). What it means to be American: Identity inclusiveness/exclusiveness and support for policies about Muslims among U.S.-born Whites. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 18,* 224–243. https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12167

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 1084–1121). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Ersanilli, E., & Koopmans, R. (2011). Do immigrant integration policies matter? A three-country comparison among Turkish immigrants. *West European Politics, 34,* 208–234. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.546568

Espinosa, A., Guerra, R., Sanatkar, S., Paolini, S., Damigella, D., Licciardello, O., & Gaertner, S. L. (2018). Identity inclusiveness and centrality: Investigating identity correlates of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. *Journal of Social Issues, 74,* 674–699. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12293

Fowers, B., & Richardson, F. C. (1996). Why is multiculturalism good? *American Psychologist, 51,* 609–621. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.51.6.609

Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). *Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup-identity model*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Guerra, R., Hehman, E., & Saguy, T. (2016). A common ingroup identity: Categorization, identity, and intergroup relations. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination* (pp. 433–454). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Geiling, H., Gardemin, D., Meise, S., & König, A. (2011). *Migration-Teilhabe-Milieus: Spätaussiedler und türkeistämmige Deutsche im sozialen Raum* [Migration-participation-milieus: German resettlers and Germans of Turkish descent in the social sphere]. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer-Verlag.

Goerres, A., Mayer, S. J., & Spies, D. C. (2020). Immigrant voters against their will: A focus group analysis of identities, political issues and party allegiances among German resettlers during the 2017 bundestag election campaign. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46,* 1205–1222. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1503527

Goerres, A., Spies, D. C., & Mayer, S. J. (2018). *Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund bei der Bundestagswahl 2017: Erste Auswertungen der Immigrant German Election Study zu Deutschtürken und Russlanddeutschen* [Germans with migration background during the 2017 German Bundestag Election: First results of the immigrant German election study on Germans of Turkish descent and Germans from the former Soviet Union] (Working paper 1). Retrieved from https://

www.researchgate.net/publication/323534980_Deutsche_mit_Migrationshintergrund_bei_der_Bundestagswahl_2017_Erste_Auswertungen_der_Immigrant_German_Election_Study_zu_Deutschturken_und_Russlanddeutschen

Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., & Iskra-Golec, I. (2013). Collective narcissism moderates the effect of ingroup image threat on intergroup hostility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104,* 1019–1039. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032215

Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. *Annual Review of Psychology, 53,* 575–604. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135109

Hindriks, P., Verkuyten, M., & Coenders, M. (2014). Interminority attitudes: The roles of ethnic and national identification, contact, and multiculturalism. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 77,* 54–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272513511469

Hogg, M. A. (2016). Social identity theory. In S. McKeown, R. Haji, & N. Ferguson (Eds.), *Understanding peace and conflict through Social Identity Theory: Contemporary global perspectives* (pp. 3–17). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29869-6_1

Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement. *American Journal of Political Science, 51,* 63–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00237.x

Joppke, C. (2005). *Selecting by origin: Ethnic migration in the liberal state*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kivisto, P., & Nefzger, B. (1993). Symbolic ethnicity and American Jews: The relationship of ethnic identity to behavior and group affiliation. *The Social Science Journal, 30,* 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/0362-3319(93)90002-D

Kosic, M., & Caudek, C. (2005). Ethnic identification and outgroup attitudes in minority and majority groups. *Review of Psychology, 12,* 103–113.

Kranendonk, M., Vermeulen, F., & van Heelsum, A. (2018). "Unpacking" the identity-to-politics link: The effects of social identification on voting among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. *Political Psychology, 39,* 43–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12397

Lauglo, J. (2017). Does ethnic identification promote integration into the larger society? A study of youth in Oslo. *Ethnicities, 17,* 392–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796815595819

Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95,* 144–165. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144

Lee, S. (2019). Determinants of identity: The influence of generational status, religiosity, and school context on immigrant identity in Europe. *International Review of Sociology, 29,* 446–463. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2019.1643655

Livingstone, A., & Haslam, S. A. (2008). The importance of social identity content in a setting of chronic social conflict: Understanding intergroup relations in Northern Ireland. *The British Journal of Social Psychology, 47,* 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466607X200419

Martinovic, B., van Tubergen, F., & Maas, I. (2009). Changes in immigrants' social integration during the stay in the host country: The case of non-western immigrants in the Netherlands. *Social Science Research, 38,* 870–882. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.06.001

Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Nationalism and patriotism: National identification and outgroup rejection. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 40,* 159–172. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466601164740

Munniksma, A., Verkuyten, M., Flache, A., Stark, T. H., & Veenstra, R. (2015). Friendships and outgroup attitudes among ethnic minority youth: The mediating role of ethnic and host society identification. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 44,* 88–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.12.002

Nandi, A., & Platt, L. (2020). The relationship between political and ethnic identity among UK ethnic minority and majority populations. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46,* 957–979. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1539286

Negy, C., Shreve, T. L., Jensen, B. J., & Uddin, N. (2003). Ethnic identity, self-esteem, and ethnocentrism: A study of social identity versus multicultural theory of development. *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology, 9,* 333–344. https://doi.org/10.1037/1099-9809.9.4.333

Noor, M., Brown, R. J., & Prentice, G. (2008). Precursors and mediators of intergroup reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A new model. *The British Journal of Social Psychology, 47,* 481–495. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466607X238751

Paulhus, D. L., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Tracy, J. L. (2004). Two replicable suppressor situations in personality research. *Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39,* 303–328. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_7

Phinney, J. S., Jacoby, B., & Silva, C. (2007). Positive intergroup attitudes: The role of ethnic identity. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31,* 478–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025407081466

Politi, E., Roblain, A., Gale, J., Licata, L., & Staerklé, C. (2020). If you want to be one of us, then become like us: The evaluation of naturalization applicants by host nationals. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 50*(4), 839–856. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2663

Postmes, T., Haslam, S. A., & Jans, L. (2013). A single-item measure of social identification: Reliability, validity, and utility. *The British Journal of Social Psychology, 52,* 597–617. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12006

Reimer, N. K., Becker, J. C., Benz, A., Christ, O., Dhont, K., Klocke, U., & Hewstone, M. (2017). Intergroup contact and social change: Implications of negative and positive contact for collective action in advantaged and disadvantaged groups. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 43,* 121–136. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216676478

Reimer, N. K., Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., & Al Ramiah, A. (2020). Self-categorization and social identification: Making sense of us and them. In D. Chadee (Ed.), *Theories in social psychology* (2nd ed.). Chichester, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell. Retrieved from https://nilsreimer.com/pdf/chapter-9.pdf

Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6,* 88–106. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602_01

Rodriguez, L., Schwartz, S. J., & Krauss Whitbourne, S. (2010). American identity revisited: The relation between national, ethnic, and personal identity in a multiethnic sample of emerging adults. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 25,* 324–349. https://doi.org/10.1177/0743558409359055

Roßteutscher, S., Schmitt-Beck, R., Schoen, H., Weßels, B., Wolf, C., Wagner, A., … Giebler, H. (2018). *Nachwahl-Querschnitt (GLES 2017): GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln: ZA6801 Datenfile, Version 4.0.1*. [Data file and code book]. Retrieved from https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/SDesc2.asp?DB=D&no=6801

Shelton, J. N., & Richeson, J. A. (2006). Ethnic minorities' racial attitudes and contact experiences with White people. *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology, 12,* 149–164. https://doi.org/10.1037/1099-9809.12.1.149

Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist, 56,* 319–331. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.4.319

Simon, B., Reichert, F., Schaefer, C. D., Bachmann, A., & Renger, D. (2015). Dual identification and the (de-)politicization of migrants: Longitudinal and comparative evidence. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 25,* 193–203. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2206

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tillie, J. (2004). Social capital of organisations and their members: Explaining the political integration of immigrants in Amsterdam. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30,* 529–541. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183041000168207O

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.

Van Dommelen, A., Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., Gonsalkorale, K., & Brewer, M. (2015). Construing multiple ingroups: Assessing social identity inclusiveness and structure in ethnic and religious minority group members. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 45,* 386–399. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2095

Verkuyten, M. (2005). Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among minority and majority groups: Testing the multiculturalism hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88,* 121–138. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.1.121

Verkuyten, M. (2018). The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Second edition). European monographs in social psychology. Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2012). Immigrants' national identification: Meanings, determinants, and consequences. *Social Issues and Policy Review, 6,* 82–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2011.01036.x

Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2016). Dual identity, in-group projection, and outgroup feelings among ethnic minority groups. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 46,* 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2131

Von Alemann, U., Erbentraut, P., & Walther, J. (2018). *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Einführung* [The party system of the Federal Republic of Germany: An introduction] (5th ed.). Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS.

de Vroome, T., Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). The integration paradox: Level of education and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and the host society. *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology, 20,* 166–175. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034946

Wagner, U., van Dick, R., & Zick, A. (2001). Sozialpsychologische Analysen und Erklärungen von Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland [Social psychological analyses and explanations of xenophobia in Germany]. *Zeitschrift Für Sozialpsychologie, 32,* 59–79. https://doi.org/10.1024//0044-3514.32.2.59

Worbs, S., Bund, E., Kohls, M., & Babka von Gostomski, C. (2013). *(Spät-)Aussiedler in Deutschland: Eine Analyse aktueller Daten und Forschungsergebnisse* [(Late-) resettlers in Germany: An analysis of current data and research results]. Nürnberg, Germany: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Appendix S1. Sample Characteristics

Table S1.1. Distribution of all Variables, Means or Percentages

Appendix S2. Robustness Checks

Table S2.1. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities, Full Models without Weights; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S2.2. Ordinary Logistic Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities; Unstandardised Log Odd Coefficients

Table S2.3. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities Including Russian Identity; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S2.4. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities without Religiosity; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S2.5. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities without Religious Identity; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S2.6. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities without Worship Attendance; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S2.7. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities Including Language Skills; Unstandardised Coefficients

Appendix S3. Tables with Additional Information

Table S3.1. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities, Baseline Models with 95% CI, Turkish group; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S3.2. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities, Baseline Models with 95% CI, Russian German group; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S3.3. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities, Full Models with 95% CI, Turkish group; Unstandardised Coefficients

Table S3.4. Linear Regression Models on Out-Group Hostilities, Full Models with 95% CI, Russian German group; Unstandardised Coefficients