

STRUCTURAL PREREQUISITES OF ELITE INTEGRATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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INTRODUCTION

In the following study we shall give some empirical evidence concerning the extent to which elite integration in the Federal Republic of Germany is structurally determined. For that purpose, we shall use data from a national elite survey carried out in 1981. Given the universal importance of elite integration for the stability of political systems the quest for the mechanisms by which it is brought about or impeded has to be considered as a central topic of elite theory and elite research.¹

In accordance with Field and Higley (1985) we define elite integration as a network of institutionalized relations within an elite, as well as the widespread existence of procedural norms guiding elite behavior which facilitate policy

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formation. This definition implies two different types of integration, namely, structural integration and ideological integration. "Structural integration" refers to the extensive formal and informal networks of personal communication, friendship, and influence among all the persons who constitute a national elite (Kadushin, 1979), while "value consensus" refers to the "unanimity with which these persons observe mainly informal rules and codes of political conduct" (Field and Higley, paper in this volume).

Ideological integration is usually measured by the degree of consensus that exists within an elite with regard to political goals or to the aforementioned rules of political conduct.² In order to measure structural integration three different subtypes can be distinguished and measured separately:

- Informal social integration, i.e., networks of friendship ties among elite members
- Professional integration, i.e., networks of contacts among position holders in the context of their regular organizational activities
- Integration of the policy formation process, i.e., networks of contacts with which elite members try to influence political decisions

While the first subtype includes, by definition, only informal relations among elites, the latter two can be based on formal as well as informal relations, and the degree of correspondence between formal and informal ties is in itself an important variable.

Most of the variables we shall be studying in this paper belong to a set of classic components of elite research, i.e., social background, career experience, and interlocking positions. These factors have often been considered as indicators of informal elite integration, and their importance has been stressed by scholars who favor the idea that all societies are dominated by small, distinctive, and cohesive elites, and that elite power is maintained primarily by two processes: cooptation and control. "Influence theories" which assume that these processes are of central importance even among modern elites in industrial societies, are widespread not only as a popular myth but also among power elite theorists (e.g., Domhoff, 1979; Miliband, 1969).³

Cooptation means that only the "right" persons are recruited into the elite and that access is denied to persons who might wish to change the existing structure of privileges in a society. This process can be studied by analyzing the elites' social background and career patterns which give insights into the rules determining which persons are selected and groomed for elite positions.

Control, on the other hand, implies that individual elite members exert a wider influence which transcends the formal power attached to their position. This can be accomplished by simultaneously holding positions in more than one organization and also through membership in informal groups where relevant information can be exchanged with persons sharing one's values and interests. The concept of

control has also often been used to define the power that one organization or societal sector exerts over other seemingly independent organizations or sectors, e.g., the economic dependence of smaller enterprises on assets and orders from bigger ones. Similarly, it has often been assumed that in capitalist societies the economic sector exerts a high degree of control over decision making in the political-administrative sectors.

In order to study informal elite integration of this kind many scholars have relied exclusively on data concerning the social and professional homogeneity of elites. This homogeneity was assumed to facilitate informal elite integration and was measured by social class background, attendance at exclusive private schools, membership in prestigious clubs, free circulation between different sectors, and multiple position holding. Several recent studies have, instead, tried to measure elite integration directly by using network data on interaction among elites (cf. Higley et al., 1979; Moore, 1979; Laumann and Pappi, 1976).⁴ The availability of such network data allows a test of the assumptions underlying the use of the indirect measures which we propose to call "structural prerequisites of elite integration" and to distinguish them from elite integration itself.

The importance attributed to these structural factors is mainly based on the assumption that social similarity, measured by homogeneity of social background and career experiences, promotes friendship ties among people.⁵ These, in turn, are assumed to facilitate cooperation among elites by creating a climate of solidarity and confidence (cf. Dahrendorf, 1965a; Domhoff, 1979). Two more implicit assumptions based on this line of reasoning should be mentioned. The first is the idea that there exist institutions of elite socialization which impart generalized leadership qualifications rather than expertise and that these qualifications enable elite members to take over many elite positions, regardless of the specific problem to be confronted. As a result, frequent elite circulation is made possible. Secondly, exclusive social backgrounds and elite socialization are thought to promote the maintenance of a homogeneous elite which is clearly distinguished from the rest of society.

The distinction between the structural prerequisites of elite integration and integration itself leads to the question of the extent to which informal elite circles, based on similarity of background and informal friendship ties originating in common attendance at elite schools or universities, form a basis for informal networks of elite decision making. Such a basis would indicate the existence of a relatively closed elite. A model of multiple elites (leadership groups) presupposes, instead, that elite recruitment primarily stresses criteria of professional achievement.

Presenting the results of our elite survey, we want to discuss the importance which must be attributed to the traditional variables in elite research in a modern industrial society in the light of some recent studies on elite integration. We are mainly interested in the extent of the social and professional homogeneity of elites. Our main assumption is that with the growing complexity of a social

system the importance of formal relations, as compared to informal ones, increases. That means that in industrial societies interpersonal elite contacts based primarily on the formal requirements of an elite position are more important than informal friendship ties based on social and professional homogeneity. In turn, increasing importance of formal relations renders the existence of a closed elite less likely and the incumbents of elite positions therefore become nothing more than a part of the upper stratum of a hierarchically differentiated society.

Nevertheless, informal relations among elites continue to play an important role, even when they are no longer exclusively determined by attributes which are independent of the elite position. In addition, they do not presuppose friendship relations: "In power circle terms there is no requirement that affects flow through the system, only power and influence on a regular basis" (Kadushin, 1979:133). Informal relations which are used to influence political decision making are mainly based on instrumental considerations, which may include the use of friendship ties but also the use of connections based on other factors.

We assume, however, that there exist considerable cultural differences with regard to the role played by informal mechanisms of elite integration. These differences indicate that traditional elite segments are capable of maintaining old power positions. This makes comparative study of the structural prerequisites of elite integration especially interesting.

In the last section of the paper, we shall analyze the relationship between social and professional similarity and the political beliefs of elites. We shall therefore limit ourselves to studying only one political factor—namely, the party preferences of the respondents. In a democratic polity with party competition, party preference can be considered the major indicator of political cleavages among elites and highly interrelated with their issue attitudes.⁶

Since all available empirical evidence shows a negligible association between structural variables of elite homogeneity and the political beliefs of elites,⁷ we assume that the structural variables have little explanatory value in clarifying actual elite behavior which is predominantly determined by positional requirements. The latter are also decisive in determining the extent to which an organization demands homogeneous political outlooks in its personnel. If these are irrelevant for the elite role, political heterogeneity can be tolerated. We cannot, however, make causal assertions concerning the relationship between the elite role and political beliefs: ideological predispositions may determine an individual's decision to enter a certain career as much as the occupation, in turn, may have an impact on the political beliefs of that person.

DATA BASE

The data on which our analyses are based were gathered from the larger project "Elites in the Federal Republic of Germany 1981" headed by Rudolf Wilden-

Table 1. Sector Composition and Response Rates in the West German Elite Study, 1981

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Positions</i>		<i>Position Holders (= Target Persons)</i>		<i>Respondents</i>		<i>Response Rate (Percentage Respondents of Position Holders in Sector)</i>
	<i>n</i>	<i>Percentage of Sample Total</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Percentage of Sample Total</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>Percentage of Sample Total</i>	
Politics	539	15.1	452	14.3	274	15.7	60.6
Civil service	479	13.4	471	14.9	296	17.0	62.8
Business	837	23.4	688	21.7	285	16.3	41.4
Business asso- ciations	394	11.0	296	9.4	174	10.0	58.8
Trade unions	155	4.3	155	4.9	87	5.0	56.1
Mass media	376	10.5	354	11.2	222	12.7	62.7
Academic	209	5.8	179	5.7	130	7.5	72.6
Military	172	4.8	172	5.4	43	2.5	25.0
Cultural	188	5.3	180	5.7	104	6.0	57.8
Other ^a	<u>231</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>59.2</u>
<i>Total</i>	3580	100.1	3165	100.1	1744	100.1	55.1

^aProfessional associations, consumers' associations, the judiciary, churches, and mayors and administrative heads of the 15 biggest cities. Additionally, a number of persons who lost their elite positions during the stage of field work but were nevertheless interviewed.

mann and Max Kaase at the University of Mannheim.⁸ We use the data of a 1981 elite survey which includes 1744 interviews with respondents in top positions in the sectors of politics, the civil service, business corporations, business associations, trade unions, mass media, the military, and the intelligencia, as well as those in some minor sectors such as the judiciary, the churches, professional associations, and local elites which were assigned to the residual sector "others."

Table 1 shows the number of respondents in the different sectors as well as the response rates. All interviews were personal interviews averaging one and a half hours in length. The interview posed questions concerning demographic variables, political beliefs, and positional activities as well as sociometric questions about regular contacts with other organizations and other personal contacts in the context of the one national issue which dominated the activities of the respondent at the time of the interview.

A part of the questionnaire, the demographic questions and the opinion questions, was also used in a general population survey at the beginning of 1982. We are therefore able to compare the answers of the elites to those of the population sample. Analyses of these population data have here been limited, however, to a group comparable to the elite survey in age and gender, namely the male population over 40 years of age.

Moreover, we can also refer to the results of two previous elite surveys which used a similar approach and allowed a comparison of German elites over a period of time. The first survey was done in 1968 and included 808 interviews; the second one with 1825 interviews was carried out in 1972.⁹ The comparisons have mostly been limited, however, to the results of analyses reported in Enke (1974) for the 1968 survey and in Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980; see also their paper in this volume) for the 1972 survey. A secondary analysis of the two older data-sets was not undertaken because it would have required detailed examination of all elite positions included in the three studies as well as extensive data transformations. The gain in information thereby attained would, in our opinion, not have justified the necessary amount of work. Due to differences in the samples, the wording of questions, and the categories used for analysis, the comparison is limited to relatively crude assertions about changes over a long time period.

In the future, we intend to complete the analyses presented here by relating them to the sociometric data of the 1981 survey. That will allow us to test some assumptions about relations between demographic variables and political beliefs, on the one hand, and the more direct indicators of elite integration, on the other. We nevertheless believe that the results presented here are valuable in giving a full picture of important demographic characteristics of both elites and the population in West Germany and of their relationship to party preference.

SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY OF ELITES

In this section, we discuss a number of the measures of social homogeneity of elites and their validity as indicators of informal social elite integration. Aside from family background, these are: education, membership in voluntary associations, and the regional proximity of elites. Each of these factors influences the opportunities for informal social relations among elites. Since it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly the existence of informal social circles among national elites—in contrast to the relatively small elites of minor or medium-sized communities—these variables must still be considered as the best available indicators of the social cohesion of elites. The desirability of informal elite integration is, however, controversial. While Dahrendorf considers the existence of an “established” elite as an important prerequisite of “representative government within a liberal constitution” (Dahrendorf, 1965a:302), power elite theorists have stressed the problem of the nonresponsiveness of a socially homogeneous and cohesive ruling class (e.g., Domhoff, 1979).

Social Class Background and Education

Whereas the actual degree of elite integration gives clues concerning the character of elites, analysis of social and professional recruitment shows the degree to which access to elite positions is open to all members of a society. “Open” means that access to the elites is not restricted to persons with ascribed characteristics such as exclusive social class background or to members of other delimitable social categories (religion, race), but occurs according to criteria of achievement. Openness in this sense does not mean total equality of opportunity for everyone at all times because we assume that successful incumbency in an elite role requires special abilities. Openness has, therefore, to be operationalized as equality of opportunity for those persons capable of fulfilling the role requirements of elite positions. As an indicator of qualifications, we have used educational degrees. This ensures that a certain level of knowledge has been acquired in educational institutions. In many elite sectors, a higher educational degree is a formal precondition for entry.

As a beginning, a comparison of the profiles of social class origins of members of the elite with a cross section of the adult male population (age: above 40 years) provides some information on the extent to which persons from lower social backgrounds have succeeded in achieving elite positions. Social background was measured as the occupational status of the respondent’s father at the time when the respondent was about 15 years old. Social background may influence access to elite positions directly and indirectly. Indirectly, the father’s occupational status influences the opportunity for a child to obtain a higher educational de-

gree, which in turn is a precondition for an elite career. But there are other advantages provided by a privileged family background, e.g., good connections, money, and self-assurance, which may also facilitate access to the elite. The more important the direct advantages of background, the more it is justified to speak of lack of openness among elites.

Before analyzing the data on social background, a decision had to be made about whether the many categories which had been used to measure the occupational status of a respondent's father should be recoded using a status or a class concept. We decided to use the latter because the status concept is mainly based on the prestige of occupations and therefore is not independent of the educational level of a person. Since the educational level of the father, in turn, is highly intercorrelated with that of the respondent, a status concept would not provide an independent measure of social background. In addition, it neglects the control potential of an occupation which power elite theories regard as important for securing access to elite positions.

The class scheme developed by E. O. Wright seemed most useful for our purpose.¹⁰ It takes into account four dimensions of occupations: (1) control of one's own work process, (2) control of the work of others, (3) control of strategic decisions in an organization, and (4) control of the means of production (Wright et al., 1982:712ff.).¹¹ Wright et al. (1982:722ff.) and Mjøset and Petersen (1983) show that this classification of the father's occupation is suitable for the determination of occupational chances, for example, of women and minorities. It should therefore allow us to determine whether the occupational status of the respondent's father was important for attaining elite status.

Tables 2 and 3 present the percentage breakdown (i.e., *marginals*) for the social class background of elites and the general population and the relationship between social class background and education. The small numbers made it necessary to condense the categories of both variables into two broad categories. While within the elites there were almost no respondents in the lower background and educational categories, the same was true within the population sample for the higher categories. Within the elites as within the population, respondents coming from a working-class background differ most from other respondents.

In looking at the marginals for social class background (Table 2), we see that only a minority of elites (38.4 percent) is recruited from the lowest two class categories whereas the overwhelming majority of the population (74 percent) comes from these classes. On the other hand, the fathers of the elite were disproportionately self-employed (28.1 percent) or belonged to upper or middle management (33.4 percent). But it is noteworthy that only 15.4 percent of the elites were recruited from the upper class (*bourgeoisie* or upper management) while the elite respondents without exception currently belong to this class.

This means that the degree of inheritance of elite status in the Federal Republic is rather low. One might, however, argue that our elite sample is much too large

Table 2. Social Class Origin and Education by Sector
(percentages based on number of valid answers)

	Occupational Status of Respondent's Father												Respondent's Education					
	Bourgeoisie (Employers with at least 10 Employees)		Small Employers (2-9 Employees)		Petty Bourgeoisie (Self- Employed 0-1 Employee)		Managers		Supervisors		Semi- autonomous Employees		Workers		High School Graduation (Abitur) After 13 Years of Schooling		University Degree	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
<i>Elite Sector</i>																		
Social Democratic politicians (SPD)	0	0.0	6	5.6	6	5.6	5	4.6	22	20.4	24	22.2	45	41.7	78	64.5	67	55.4
Christian Demo- cratic politicians (CDU/CSU)	8	7.2	24	21.6	11	9.9	3	2.7	16	14.4	28	25.2	21	18.9	101	80.8	92	73.6
Liberal politicians (FDP)	4	16.7	4	16.7	1	4.2	5	20.8	6	25.0	3	12.5	1	4.2	21	84.0	17	68.0
Civil service	9	3.3	37	13.7	19	7.0	12	4.4	84	31.1	86	31.9	23	8.5	286	97.3	276	93.9
Business	44	16.9	21	8.0	20	7.7	26	10.0	60	23.0	60	23.0	30	11.5	250	87.7	214	75.1
Business associa- tions	34	20.7	30	18.3	11	6.7	19	11.6	39	23.8	26	15.9	5	3.0	150	86.2	118	67.8
Trade unions	0	0.0	6	7.8	4	5.2	1	1.3	5	6.5	14	18.2	47	61.0	17	19.5	7	8.0
Mass media	15	7.4	12	5.9	24	11.9	15	7.4	65	32.2	50	24.8	21	10.4	208	93.7	105	47.3
Academic	6	5.2	13	11.3	12	10.4	6	5.2	40	34.8	24	20.9	14	12.2	130	100.0	125	96.2
Military	2	4.9	1	2.4	2	4.9	3	7.3	20	48.8	12	29.3	1	2.4	40	93.0	14	32.6
Cultural	8	8.4	11	11.6	10	10.5	10	10.5	28	29.5	19	20.0	9	9.5	92	88.5	64	61.5
Other	6	5.0	11	9.2	15	12.5	3	2.5	38	31.7	30	25.0	17	14.2	107	82.9	92	71.3
<i>Total</i>	136	8.6	176	11.1	135	8.5	108	6.8	423	26.6	376	23.7	234	14.7	1480	85.1	1191	68.5
<i>Population</i>			40	9.0	58	13.1			18	4.1	61	13.7	267	60.1	60	11.7	33	6.4

*Because of small numbers, persons belonging to the category *Bourgeoisie* were assigned to the category *Small Employers*, and those of the category *Managers* to the category *Supervisors*.

Table 3. Social Class Origin and Education of Elites and Nonelites (percentages based on number of valid answers)

<i>Occupational Status of Respondent's Father</i>	<i>Elites</i>			<i>Nonelites</i>		
	<i>Less than High School Graduation (Abitur) (%)</i>	<i>High School Graduation (Abitur) (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Less than High School Graduation (Abitur) (%)</i>	<i>High School Graduation (Abitur) (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Workers	48.9	51.1	(n = 233) 100.0	96.6	3.4	(n = 265) 100.0
Other occupations	8.9	91.1	(n = 1353) 100.0	76.7	23.3	(n = 176) 100.0

to constitute a real ruling class and that the results would be quite different if it were concentrated on a smaller and more exclusive elite circle. The empirical evidence presented by Moore and Alba (1982:54ff.) and Moore (1979:687) does, however, argue against this because these authors did not find any significant association between social class background and sociometric data on elite integration.

Although we have no empirical measure for the membership of respondents in elite circles, we did test for a relationship between social class background and seniority of position. Dividing the positionally defined sample into two categories of incumbents of more important (28.3 percent) and less important (71.1 percent) positions, we found no significant relation between the level of position and social class background of a respondent ($p = .16$). Although this result does not preclude the existence of informal circles of exclusive class background within the elites, it does indicate that these circles may not be used to dominate the political decision-making process since they do not partake of the entire range of relevant positions.

Our results can, however, be interpreted as a clear confirmation of the "law of increasing disproportion" described by Putnam, i.e., a general tendency towards the agglutination of social and political status factors (1976:33ff.).¹² This tendency also exists for education: while only 11.7 percent of our population sample graduated from high school, this is also true for 85.1% of the elite respondents (Table 2).¹³

Table 4 contains the associations between the three variables of social class background, education, and elite status. All zero-order relationships between these variables are significant but vary in strength. From the multitude of possible measures of association we started by computing Phi which is based on χ^2 and, for fourfold tables, is identical to Pearson's r . In comparing the magnitudes of Phi between tables, this measure has the disadvantage that its empirically

Table 4. Associations Between Variables

	χ^2	<i>P</i>	<i>Phi</i>	<i>Phi/Phi_{max}</i>
<i>1. Simple associations</i>				
Social origin by elite status	383.8	0.00	.44	.47
Social origin by education	583.0	0.00	.54	.63
Education by elite status	881.5	0.00	.66	.84
<i>2. Social origin by education, controlled for elite status—Model I</i>				
Nonelites	41.7	0.00	.31	.70
Elites	251.8	0.00	.40	.40
<i>3. Social origin by elite status, controlled for education—Model II</i>				
Less than high school graduation (<i>Abitur</i>)	17.5	0.00	.17	.18
High school graduation (<i>Abitur</i>)	4.9	0.02	.06	.10
<i>4. Education by elite status, controlled for social origin—Model III</i>				
Workers	147.6	0.00	.54	.87
Other occupations	513.0	0.00	.58	.72

attainable upper limit depends on the distributions of the marginals and that it attains its theoretical upper value of 1 only under an equal distribution of the marginals of the two variables. Therefore, a comparison presupposes a standardization of *Phi* for the upper value it can attain under the given marginals, i.e., the computation of $\text{Phi}/\text{Phi}_{\max}$.¹⁴

Among the zero-order associations the one between education and elite status is the highest ($\text{Phi}/\text{Phi}_{\max} = .84$). Elite status here means even more than membership in the two highest class categories. When we compare the education of the elites to that of the members of these two class categories within the general population, we see that the percentage difference between persons with high school graduation (*Abitur*) amounts to 40.7 percent (Table 5).

Asking for the causes for the agglutination process in elite composition is equivalent to asking about the degree of openness of the elites. To answer this question, it is necessary to determine the relative importance of social class background and education for elite status. Both independent variables are closely interrelated with elite status and can, taken separately, be considered as evidence for contradictory assumptions: the disproportionate recruitment of elites from the upper classes as evidence for the continuing importance of inheritance of wealth and the processes of deliberate cooptation, and the higher educational level of the elites as evidence for the importance of achievement criteria. Only a multivariate analysis of the interrelations of all three variables can give conclusive evidence concerning the explanatory value of each of these hypotheses, because it is the

Table 5. Educational Level of Elites and Members of the Upper Classes Within the Population at Large

	<i>Elites</i>		<i>Population: Occupational Status Bourgeoisie or Managers^a</i>	
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Less than high school graduation	259	14.9	15	55.6
High school graduation	1480	85.1	12	44.4
University degree	1191	68.5	6	22.2
Total	1739	100.0	27	100.0

^aBecause of the small size of this group, all respondents of these occupational status categories were included in the table, not only the male adults of 40 years and more (of which only 16 respondents were in the sample). The number is still extremely small: respondents in these two occupational categories make up only 1.6% of the total sample of the working population.

precondition for causal inferences. Putnam discusses four conceivable causal models (Figure 1) for the relationship between social class background, education and elite status (1976:29ff.).

Model I is not compatible with our data because the association between social class background and education does not disappear when we control for elite status, i.e., look at elites and nonelites separately. We can also refute Model III which assumes that there is no relationship between elite status and education when we control for class background because education and elite status are both determined by class. Independent of background, the proportion of persons with




Figure 1

a high school degree is much higher within the elites. Models II and IV remain to be interpreted. Whereas Model IV assumes that social class background has an indirect—via better education—as well as a direct effect on the attainment of elite status, Model II postulates that there is no direct effect at all. The crucial test of the relative validity of the two models occurs when we control for education. Model II assumes that the relationship between social class background and elite status is entirely due to the fact that persons from higher classes have more opportunity for a better education. If so, the relationship between class and elite status should disappear as soon as we control for education. This is not entirely the case. Table 4 shows that there remains a significant direct effect of class even if we control for education. In relation to the indirect effect it seems, however, too small to support Model IV. Recruitment for the elites thus proceeds mainly through the channel of educational institutions. Even among the elites with working-class background 51.1 percent have a high school degree compared to only 3.4 percent of the population coming from that class. This can be interpreted as an indication that elites—independent of their father's occupation—come from families with high educational aspirations. This assumption is also supported by the fact that the association between social class background and education is weaker among the elites.

We have so far looked at the elites in a global manner and compared them to the population at large in order to show the importance of education for elite recruitment. In doing this, we have neglected the differences in the social class recruitment of the different sectors. The figures in Table 2 show that among SPD politicians and among trade union leaders, higher education is obviously less important. These two groups are also recruited to a considerable degree from working class and lower white-collar employee families: 32.4 percent of the Social Democratic politicians, 45.5 percent of the trade union leaders but also 15.3 percent of the Christian Democratic politicians had fathers of blue-collar status, while the blue-collar stratum plays a negligible role in elite recruitment (Only 11.2 percent of all elites come from blue-collar families in contrast to 57.4 percent of the population at large).

From these data we conclude that even today within the elite segments representing the tradition of the working-class movement there exist recruitment paths into the elite where political activity can compensate for lack of educational credentials. The Christian working-class movement within the Christian Democratic Party (*Sozialausschüsse*) also belongs to this tradition. Thus, about 6.5 percent of the elites come from a population stratum with two disadvantages: a working-class background and a low level of education. Compared to the elite surveys of 1968 and 1972, no significant changes in the social recruitment basis of the different sectors could be detected (Table 6). Even though the occupational categories and the sampling criteria are not exactly comparable across the studies, business associations, the military, business, and academic elites are the sectors with the highest percentage of upper-class recruitment. The elites in the

Table 6. Recruitment of Elite Sectors from Upper Social Class Background^a

	<i>Percent Bourgeoisie, Small Employers, Upper Management ("Managers"), Middle Management ("Supervisors"):</i>	<i>Percent Bourgeoisie and Management:</i>	<i>Percent Upper- Class Background</i>	
	1981	1981	1972 ^b	1968 ^b
Liberal politicians	79.2	37.5	—	—
Business associations	74.4	32.3	48.9	33.8
Military	63.4	12.2	48.6	—
Cultural	60.0	18.9	—	—
Business	57.6	26.9	33.6	45.2
Academic	56.5	10.4	46.2	50.0
Mass media	52.9	14.8	30.9	29.6
Civil service	52.5	7.7	33.3	33.0
Christian Democratic politicians	45.9	9.9	—	—
Social Democratic politicians	30.6	4.6	—	—
Trade unions	15.6	1.3	3.7	13.6

^aIn 1968 and 1972 a different classification was used: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, lower class.

^bFigures were taken from the tables of Enke (1974:76) and Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980:24). These studies do, however, not report comparable figures for the political elites. Enke at least compares figures for the parliamentary elites of the "bourgeois" parties and the Social Democrats (31.3% vs. 11.2% upper-class background).

Federal Republic do not differ in their upper social class background from American and Australian elites (Pakulski, 1982:51; Moore and Alba, 1982:44ff.). But while the proportion of elites with self-employed fathers is 40 percent in Australia and 48.6 percent in the United States, it is much lower in West Germany, namely 28.2 percent.

Given the rather small to moderate proportions of respondents of upper-class origins or of those having attended prestigious private schools, Moore and Alba argue that privileged background per se is quite obviously not a sufficient explanation for the attainment of elite status. Instead, they put forward an alternative explanation partly based on the extraordinarily high proportion of American elites with self-employed fathers. They argue that cultural values engendered by family background might account for the motivation toward upward mobility among future elites. Concerning the content of these values they offer an explanation which in our opinion is typically "American," stressing the commitment to "career" and to control of one's own work and of the lives of others (1982:68). We favor, instead, an explanation more in line with the European tradition and would argue that the educational aspirations of the parents are the

dominant factor leading to career orientation.¹⁵ Both factors are, of course, intimately related and our data do not allow us to decide definitely between them.

Membership in Voluntary Associations

Societies are normally more united at the top than at the bottom (Galtung, 1966:162). We can therefore expect elites more frequently to be members of voluntary associations than nonelites. This is true at least for American elites: "Elites are 'joiners'," as Dye states poignantly (1982:213).

In this section, we wish to discuss the function of such membership for elite behavior and elite integration. Therefore, we have limited our analysis to membership in politically relevant organizations. Membership in associations with an exclusively private character, i.e., local research or cultural foundations, as well as leisure time associations such as sports clubs, are not considered. The impact of such membership for elite integration is more indirect than direct. Since most of these associations are organized on the basis of regional units, only activities on the level of the state or federal organization can contribute directly to elite integration. These were, however, so infrequent that we decided to analyze formal membership regardless of whether a person actively participated in meetings or not. They have to be interpreted as an expression of interests or values shared by members of a certain association rather than a basis for development of elite circles.

In studying membership, we are not only interested in comparing different elite sectors but also in comparing elites and nonelites. These comparisons will not only be quantitative but also qualitative. This means that in addition to comparing the number of persons holding certain kinds of memberships, we also want to investigate whether elites prefer the same types of associations as non-elites do.

Religion

Religious denomination is a traditionally important variable which before 1945 constituted a major line of social and political cleavage and is still today an important determinant of voting behavior. Its meaning has, however, changed since the foundation of the Federal Republic. The lessening of the numerical dominance of the Protestants who lived predominantly in the northern and the lost eastern parts of the former German Reich (1871: 62 percent)¹⁶ made it possible to found the interdenominational Christian Democratic Party as successor of the former party of the Catholic minority, the *Zentrum*. This development reflected a shift from the denominational cleavage to the new cleavage: Christian vs. laical (cf. Baker et al., 1981:180ff.).

Regardless of the numerical shift of the two denominations, the old preponderance of Protestants continues within the elites. This is particularly true for the

*Table 7. Development of the Proportions
of Religious Denominations Over Time*

	<i>Percent Protestants</i>	<i>Percent Catholics</i>	<i>Ratio of Catholics to Protestants</i>	<i>Percent Without Religious Denomination</i>
Elites, 1968	56.6	27.3	48.2	14.7
Elites, 1972	56.6	30.4	53.6	12.5
Elites, 1981	52.1	29.8	57.1	17.6
General population, 1980	42.3	43.3	102.4	14.0

civil service, business, academic and military sectors. The reason for this lies mainly in the average lower education of the Catholic part of the population. This, in turn, has been explained by the continuing effect of the "Protestant ethic" as well as the fact that Catholics live mainly in rural areas with fewer high school graduates (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:33). The Catholics, therefore, belong even today to those segments of the population disadvantaged by the educational system and underrepresented in the higher social strata: "The Catholics are confronted with the same basic barriers which all economically and socially disadvantaged groups are facing when they want their children to achieve a higher educational level" (Claessens et al., 1974:380). In this respect, our figures are a revealing illustration of the fact that the "law of increasing disproportion" may affect the social composition of elite groups long after the causes of the disadvantage have been eliminated. Compared to 1972, our data show no basic changes: the number of Catholics has grown in relation to the number of Protestants. This was, however, less the result of an increase in the number of Catholics than of the increase of respondents without any religious affiliation (Table 7). This increase of persons without religious denomination is, however, not a phenomenon limited to the elites. Among the population at large, church membership has also dropped from 94 percent in 1970 to less than 86 percent in 1980.¹⁷ Here, too, the decrease was primarily among Protestants. The proportion of Catholics and Protestants changed from 91.0 to 102.4 percent in favor of the Catholics.

Within both the elites and the population, the rising proportion of persons without religious denomination is mainly a consequence of people deliberately leaving the church. Thus, religious denomination, which used to be an ascriptive characteristic, becomes increasingly an indicator of individual value orientation. This becomes quite clear if we also consider the frequency of church attendance as a measure of religious ties.

The figure in Tables 16 and 17 (presented later) show that today a combination of these two variables has an impact on party preference which is reflected in the high proportion of regular church attenders favoring the Christian Democrats.

In interpreting the figures, one has to bear in mind that even among church members, only minorities attend church regularly—namely, 29.1 percent of the elites and 32.4 percent of the population. Religious ties are therefore of central importance only for a minority, and they have also lost their relevance to social proximity among elites and population alike.

Party Membership

In 1979 4.3 percent of the West German population were members of a political party.¹⁸ For the elites, the percentage is 10 times higher. It has increased slightly from 40.0 to 43.4 percent since 1972. The figures for the different sectors have also remained rather stable. Among the elites of the civil service, the trade unions, and the broadcasting media, more than half of the respondents are party members (Table 8). The figures within the civil service¹⁹ and mass media²⁰ sectors were broken down by subgroups primarily to show that party membership in these sectors is not only an expression of individual political orientation but is also influenced by the type of position and organization.

Some 41.9 percent of party members belong to the CDU/CSU, 47.7 percent to the SPD, and 10.3 percent to the FDP. These overall figures conceal, however, large differences between groups.²¹ Within the trade unions, for instance, 86.0 percent of party members belong to the SPD. Among the civil service elites it is again necessary to differentiate according to position. Nearly 90 percent of the top state civil servants belong to government parties and more than 50 percent of the party members among the top federal civil servants are Social Democrats. Among the mass media elites, members of the SPD constitute only a minority of

Table 8. Party Membership Among Civil Service, Mass Media, and Trade Union Elites

	<i>Percentage of Party Members</i>	
	<i>1972</i>	<i>1981</i>
<i>Civil service</i>		
Federal political civil servants	57.3	64.6
Federal nonpolitical civil servants	32.8	44.7 ^a
State political civil servants	83.6	87.9
<i>Mass media</i>		
Press	20.8	14.0
Broadcasting media	51.1	53.7
<i>Trade unions</i>	95.8	98.9

^aSee note 19.

the party members (39.2 percent) with little variation throughout the different media. These figures, too, show that membership in a certain party depends on the type of position held by a respondent.

Trade Unions and Professional Associations

Elites and nonelites differ considerably in their membership in occupational associations (Table 9). Among elites (disregarding the business and trade union sectors) the organization ratio in trade unions is lower than among the working population in general (26.5 percent as compared to 36.7 percent).²² We assume, however, that among the elites it is higher today than it was formerly, even though we have no figures from earlier elite studies. The general rise in organization membership among white-collar employees, as well as the decline in hostile attitudes against trade unions among the new middle class, support this assumption. This trend is particularly strong among civil servants and journalists, who constitute two important groups of our elite sample.²³

On the other hand, membership in professional associations is significantly higher among elites than among the working population at large (30.2 percent as compared to about 9 percent).²⁴ This is a logical consequence of the fact that, in contrast to the elites, only a small fraction of the population has professional training.

If we combine the figures for both types of associations, however, elites do not differ from the working population: 50.5 percent of the elites and about 45 percent of the working population are members of occupational associations.²⁵

Social Clubs and Student Fraternities

In contrast to the associations discussed thus far, which were mass organizations where anyone can become a member, membership in social clubs and student fraternities is subject to certain preconditions. To enter student fraternities one must at least have been enrolled as a university student, and some fraternities even require references from one or more members.

The number of social clubs in Germany is much smaller than in Anglo-Saxon countries and mostly limited to three major international associations: the Rotary, the Lions, and the Freemasons. Admission to these associations is only possible after nomination by senior members and approval by the managing committee. The figures in Table 9 confirm the expectation that these clubs are, in fact, exclusive upper-class associations (cf. also *Der Spiegel*, 1983:63,66). While Social Democratic politicians and trade union leaders are rarely admitted, business leaders, academics, and the military establishment are overrepresented in these clubs. The association between social class background and membership is significant, though not very strong ($\Phi/\Phi_{\max} = .18$). We can therefore conclude that membership is more closely tied to the present position of the respondents than to their family background.

Table 9. Membership in Voluntary Associations by Sector
(percentages based on number of valid answers)

Sector	Religion ^a															
	Catholics		Protestants		No Religious Affiliation		Political Parties		Trade Unions		Professional Associations		Social Clubs		Student Fraternities	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Social Democratic politicians (SPD)	16	13.1	75	61.5	30	24.6	— ^b		106	85.5	25	20.2	9	7.3	3	2.4
Christian Democratic politicians (CDU/CSU)	69	55.2	56	44.8	0	0.0	— ^b		22	17.6	54	43.2	38	30.4	28	22.4
Liberal politicians (FDP)	4	16.0	19	76.0	2	8.0	— ^b		2	8.0	4	16.0	4	16.0	5	20.0
Civil service	83	28.1	177	60.0	34	11.5	199	67.7	66	22.3	74	25.0	51	17.2	61	20.6
Business	98	34.6	134	47.3	50	17.7	81	28.6	35	12.3	56	19.6	114	40.0	55	19.3
Business associations	54	31.2	103	59.5	14	8.1	64	37.0	4	2.3	39	22.4	66	37.9	45	25.9
Trade unions	23	26.4	25	28.7	39	44.8	86	98.9	— ^b		11	12.6	3	3.4	1	1.1
Mass media	76	34.5	92	41.8	51	23.2	74	33.5	46	20.7	78	35.1	54	24.3	16	7.2
Academic	36	27.9	74	57.4	18	14.0	24	18.6	10	7.7	58	44.6	41	31.5	19	14.6
Military	9	20.9	30	69.8	3	7.0	6	14.6	1	2.3	29	67.4	21	48.8	7	16.3
Cultural	15	14.6	40	38.8	47	45.6	22	21.4	29	27.9	33	31.7	10	9.6	0	0.0
Other	33	25.6	78	60.5	18	14.0	77	60.2	35	27.1	66	51.2	31	24.0	16	12.4
Total	516	29.8	903	52.1	306	17.6	633	43.4	356	21.6	527	30.2	442	25.3	256	14.7

^aBecause of small numbers, membership in other religious denominations is not reported.

^bImplied by position.

Altogether the size of the membership figures does not confirm the idea of an "elite within the elites." We agree with Dye's conclusion that such associations "provide an opportunity for informal interaction among elites in different segments of society" (1983:214) and that membership in them is more a consequence than a precondition of a leadership position.²⁶

The assumption that many key decisions of an industrial nation are made in such clubs is misleading since the political sector is underrepresented among their members. This is true for the Federal Republic as well as for the United States, even though a much higher proportion of American elites are club members. "The fact that a majority of top governmental and military elites are *not* club members undercuts the importance attributed to club membership by many 'power elite' writers" (Dye, 1983:216).²⁷ One has also to bear in mind that Rotary and Lions Clubs, for example, are competitive organizations as far as membership is concerned.

The function of social clubs is, therefore, more of a private than of an instrumental nature. Membership in such clubs, similar to possessing an upper-class background, may be helpful in furthering one's own interests by providing personal connections. Members of these clubs do not, however, constitute a "ruling class." "Personal interaction, consensus building, and friendship networks all develop in the club milieu, but the clubs help facilitate processes that occur anyway" (Dye, 1983:216).

Since there are no prestige universities in Germany where future elites can meet at an early stage of their careers, student fraternities used to play that sort of role. This is, however, no longer the case because at the end of World War II the fraternities were discredited as a result of their collaboration with the Nazi regime. Since then, the membership of the traditional duelling fraternities has decreased and given way to the joining of more modern clubs devoted primarily to social life: 14.7 percent of all elites and 21.5 percent of the respondents who studied at a university reported membership in a fraternity. The arguments made for social clubs also apply to student fraternities: they may be of instrumental value to the individual member, yet the total membership numbers are too small to contribute much to elite integration or to the bolstering of an elite culture.

To summarize, the analysis of membership in voluntary associations revealed no evidence of such organizations contributing to elite integration. Compared to the population at large, elites are more frequently Protestants and members of political parties, professional associations, and social clubs. This, however, does not lead to the development of a common interest, particularly since membership is split between competing organizations. We contend that the memberships analyzed can be more accurately understood as indicators of social value orientations, as was the case for membership in religious denominations. Trade union members and persons without religious denomination are presumably more favorable to reform, while members of professional organizations, social clubs, and student fraternities have a more conservative outlook. Later, we will analyze how these basic orientations correspond to party lines.

Regional Concentration, Informal Elite Integration, and Elite Culture

Regional concentration provides opportunities for coordination among elites of different sectors by enabling regular informal contacts reaching beyond the immediate occupational environment. Empirical evidence indicates the importance of informal social relations for integration among local elites.²⁸ In a similar fashion, the existence of a national capital could provide a center for the development of an informal national elite circle. It has frequently been argued that in England and France, for instance, elite members of different sectors meet regularly at social occasions and thus foster the development of a specific "elite culture." In order to discuss this argument properly, we have first to distinguish this concept of elite culture from informal influence on political decisions. The latter takes place primarily within a circle of persons tied by a common interest or ideology. In an era of telephones and airplanes, it no longer depends on regular physical contact.

An elite culture, instead, requires occupational and political-ideological heterogeneity and regional concentration at the same time. In a recently published article with the revealing title "The Unsociable Crème," the journalist Hans Otto Eglau, deploring the lack of informal social relations among West German elites, outlines the function of such contacts: "Social relations on a high intellectual level by themselves . . . do not solve problems nor do they enable a balance of interests. Nevertheless, they foster a milieu which, regardless of separate interests, facilitates an understanding of common goals and tasks and sharpens the sense for what is feasible" (1983:35).

The absence of a real national capital in the Federal Republic, however, impedes the development of informal elite circles in the above sense. Bonn and its environs, including Cologne, one of the biggest German cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, could not take over the function of a capital primarily because a considerable number of the relevant organizations do not have a place of residence there. Hamburg has become a center for the media sector, and Frankfurt a business center. The headquarters of the trade unions are dispersed among a number of larger cities such as Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Stuttgart—and only liaison offices are maintained in Bonn. Thus, aside from the federal political institutions, only the business associations have their headquarters in the Bonn area.

An informal elite circle in Bonn would therefore be limited from the beginning to the sectors of politics, the civil service, and business associations. This limitation becomes even more pronounced if we also take into consideration that many members of these sectors do not have their homes in the Bonn area. Many of them keep their private residences in other places even when they take a position in a federal organization located in Bonn or Cologne. "German top managers are glad if they can catch the last plane after a talk to the minister or an official reception," Eglau complains, noting that none of the multinationally active

German corporations maintains a guest house in Bonn where informal social gatherings of political and business leaders might take place (1983:32).

A similar argument applies to federal politicians. Even those who have been engaged in federal politics for a long time usually maintain their private residences far from Bonn and commute on weekends (Eglau, 1983:32). This is a rational strategy since they normally depend on local support for reelection. Thus, among the nearly 30 percent of the elite respondents whose organizations are based in or near Bonn, only two-thirds also have their private residence in this area. Those who do so usually have permanent positions; mostly as civil servants in the ministerial bureaucracy: 81.9 percent of these civil servants, in contrast to only 3.3 percent of the federal politicians and 28.2 percent of the top business association leaders, reported a private residence in the Bonn area. This does not preclude, however, informal contacts on weekdays, but these are presumably restricted to persons sharing the immediate occupational environment. The short periods of presence lead to a steady pressure to attend to business appointments and preclude the openness to questions not of immediate concern, which, in turn, is a precondition for informal contacts with persons in other sectors.

Given the absence of a real federal capital, one could ask if the state capitals fulfill a comparable function for the individual states. Here, again, a similar picture of regional decentralization emerges. Only in the small states are private residences concentrated near the state capitals, which is, however, a trivial finding. The more important larger states, i.e., North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria, however, have several subcenters where the private residences of the elites are scattered across the whole state.

In short, elites in the Federal Republic are decentralized. We could not detect a single national center where something like an "establishment" (in the American sense) could develop. There are some regional centers aside from Bonn—the Rhein-Main region, the Ruhr area, and Hamburg—but they are limited to members of regional elites or to specific sectors and thus cannot contribute to a national and truly intersectoral elite integration. According to Eglau, only in the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg and Bremen is there something like an elite culture which encompasses not only members of different sectors but also representatives of different parties (1983:35).

Given the technical complexity of the decisions elites are facing today, it is, however, open to debate whether an elite culture of this sort would be likely to fulfill the function often ascribed to it. Shils, who concedes that it might promote "wisdom and good judgment," nevertheless doubts that such a culture could impart the technical and scientific knowledge modern elites need (1982:26).

Moreover, the concept of an elite culture implies that leadership qualifications and good judgment can only be acquired by talking to other elites. It thus assumes that nonelites differ qualitatively from elites with regard to their level of information and their qualifications for judging current events. Given the average

high educational level and the universal spread of mass media information, this is, however, no longer true. Thus, the decline of elite culture may in part be caused by the fact that the elites themselves no longer attach great value to it, which means that it has lost its function for elite integration.

PROFESSIONAL RECRUITMENT AND POSITION INTERLOCKS: EXPERTISE VS. AMATEUR POWER

In this section, we shall analyze specialization as well as position interlocks between sectors. Interlocks may be synchronous or diachronous [concurrent vs. revolving interlocks (cf. Salzmann and Domhoff, 1980:251)].²⁹ Both kinds of interlocks are widely assumed to contribute to the exchange of information and thereby the coordination among elites. Following the life cycle of the respondents, we will start with an analysis of career patterns.

Professional Training

Up to now, we have commented rather briefly on the level of formal schooling our respondents have received. We found that the overwhelming majority of the elites completed a high school degree (*Abitur*). Nearly 70 percent have a university degree. This means that a college degree is a nearly universal precondition for recruitment to elite positions. We will now analyze the level, as well as the content of, the elites' education in somewhat more detail.

It has already been said that Social Democratic politicians and trade union leaders have, on average, less formal education than other elite respondents. A long-term analysis shows, however, that the average level of education has risen among Social Democratic politicians whereas it has remained fairly constant among trade union leaders.³⁰ The proportion of respondents with a university degree rose in the first group from 46.2 to 55.4 percent from 1972 to 1981. In the trade unions, instead, it remained as low as 8 percent in 1981.

Due to the different educational systems, comparisons among countries are always somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, the results of Dye (1983:196), Barton (1974), and Pakulski (1982:56) allow the rough conclusion that elites in the United States and Australia possess similar advanced educational backgrounds.

In contrast to a college degree, the *Abitur* in Germany has never been a self-contained educational degree but only an entrance ticket to the university. Most high school graduates continue their education at a university. Only a small proportion proceeds directly to on-the-job training.³¹ Among elites, however, two groups can be found in which most respondents completed high school but a much smaller proportion went on to acquire a university degree. These are the

mass media and the military sectors. But whereas the military offers its applicants professional on-the-job training, this is not true for the mass media, where less than half of the respondents (47.3 percent) have a university degree. Another 31.7 percent enrolled at a university but did not finish their studies and reported no other formal professional training; 7.7 percent finally completed high school and the follow-up on-the-job training which is offered by most daily newspapers.³² This peculiar educational pattern of mass media elites was also found in the previous elite surveys of 1968 and 1972 and is known to be typical for West German journalists in general (cf. Enke, 1974:91; Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:27ff.; Zimmer, 1982:30ff.).

While high schools offer a rather broad and unspecialized curriculum and the large number of respondents with a high school degree means that nearly all members of the elites have received such a general intellectual training, university studies usually provide more specialized knowledge. The choice of a specific field of university studies, therefore, sets the course for the future career of a person. Comparing the faculties at which the respondents of the different sectors most often studied, we can see that law studies lead most often to political or civil service careers: 49.5 percent of the politicians and 70.0 percent of the civil service elites with a university education have studied law.

Among the business elites, instead, the number of lawyers and economists (each with 33.2 percent) are nearly balanced. The natural sciences and engineering constitute a third field mentioned rather frequently by business elites (19.5 percent). It seems plausible that each of these three faculties provides the knowledge needed in business enterprises or business associations.

On the other hand, a plurality of respondents in the mass media and in the cultural sector mentioned social sciences and the humanities as the fields of their university studies (42.0 percent in the mass media and 57.3 percent in the cultural sector). In the academic sector representatives of the natural sciences and engineering are predominant (41.7 percent). This reflects the fact that research funding priorities of the West German government favor technological research.

The differences found between sectors indicate that specific knowledge is not only important for entrance into a certain sector but that it continues to be important during the later stages of a career. One has to bear in mind, however, that no single field dominates any sector. Even in the civil service, which is most homogeneous in this respect, only two-thirds of the respondents have completed a law degree.

Several authors have pointed out the importance of law studies for elite recruitment in Germany (Dahrendorf, 1965a:260ff.; von Beyme, 1971:55f; Wildenmann, 1982:9). The majority of elites are indeed lawyers: 39.2 percent of all respondents who studied at a university and 29.7 percent of elite respondents studied law.³³ The proportion has decreased, however, since 1972 by a margin of nearly 10 percent.

Dahrendorf assumed that the high proportion of lawyers among German elites

is of considerable importance for elite integration. The law faculties, in his opinion, are the only institutions where a significant section of the German political class spend part of their lives together (1965a:275). Wildenmann stresses the fact that "about two percent of the university teachers educate one-third of the future positional elite" (1982:9).

According to Dahrendorf, the integrative effect of law studies is brought about by two mechanisms: selection and socialization. Our data confirm that respondents who have studied law do indeed differ from other university graduates in their family backgrounds (Table 10): a disproportionate number had fathers who were either self-employed or civil servants (cf. Dahrendorf, 1965a:260, 270). However, the association is not very strong.

The socializing effect of law studies consists, according to Dahrendorf, in a specific approach to problem solving taught at the law faculties. Since this is independent of the subject itself, he characterized lawyers as "specialists for the general" (1965a:264). He adds the assumption that the study of law imparts general leadership qualifications (1965a:265). One should therefore expect to find relatively more lawyers in the highest positions of a society. Within the elite sample we could, however, not find support for this assumption. Respondents in the very top positions did not differ from those in other elite positions in the number of former law students. Our data do not allow us to determine whether this is due to the fact that specialized knowledge is more important today, even for elites, or rather that all elite positions included in our sample are located at such a high level that the two parts of our sample do not differ with regard to the amount of leadership qualification required. The decreasing number of lawyers within the elite supports the first assumption without invalidating the second.

We could also not confirm a second socializing effect postulated by Dahrendorf, namely, a conservative orientation among lawyers. At least we could find no significant difference between respondents from law faculties and those grad-

Table 10. Association Between Father's Occupational Status and Law Studies^a

<i>Father's Occupational Status</i>	<i>Law Studies</i>		<i>Other Faculties</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>
Employer/self-employed	128	38.9	201	61.1	329
<i>Civil Service:</i>					
Lower civil service	112	44.4	140	55.6	252
Higher civil service	127	50.4	125	49.6	252
White-collar employees	87	30.1	202	69.9	289
Blue-collar workers	17	23.9	54	76.1	71
<i>Total</i>	471	39.5	722	60.5	1193

^ap = 0.00; Cramer's V = .17.

uated from other faculties concerning party preferences ($p = .99$). It even transpired that among university graduates the number of respondents with a preference for the Social Democrats is above average among lawyers (24.7 percent). Only respondents who studied the social sciences and the humanities express a higher rate of sympathy for the Social Democratic Party. This is, of course, no direct disconfirmation of Dahrendorf's contention, but it does show that this thesis does not apply to one of the most politically relevant attitudes. A recent survey among young lawyers who were compared to a control group of other students also showed that the former were not more conservative than the latter with reference to a wide range of political attitudes (cf. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 8, 1982). Thus, Dahrendorf's assumptions about the role of lawyers in German society need to be qualified in the light of more recent research results. This is particularly true for the assumed numerical dominance of lawyers among West German elites. In all elite sectors, except for the political-administrative ones, less than one-third of the respondents are lawyers. This is also true for the business elites where lawyers used to play a prominent role (Dahrendorf, 1965a:263, Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:30).

On the other hand, 33.6 percent of the politicians and 66.7 percent of the civil servants in the sample have studied law. Since legal knowledge is important in the legislative process, this seems justified for technical reasons. Because of the increasing complexity of the legislative process one could claim that law studies qualify a person as a law maker. We can even draw the speculative conclusion that the law has lost its function as a general intellectual training and (re)gained the status of a specialized training in legal matters. If this is true, legal education will continue to lose its importance for elite integration and will instead contribute to a differentiation between elite sectors. But, independent of this development, the differences in social background and party preferences between lawyers and other university graduates were too small to support the contention that lawyers form a homogeneous elite circle in West Germany.

Career Patterns

The careers of elites are important for two reasons. First, many authors have discussed the fact that the different elite sectors are characterized by an increasing differentiation in careers, which, in turn, leads to an increasing demand for coordination (e.g., Keller, Dahrendorf, Scheuch). On the other hand, the question arises whether career experiences have an impact on elite attitudes. We shall investigate this question in a later section.

With regard to elite integration, the intersectoral differentiation of career patterns is of special importance. Internal homogeneity of careers in combination with differences between sectors indicate that specialized knowledge is more important than generalist leadership qualifications. While this has always been true for the civil service and academic elites, recent studies have shown that even

the political sector which had long been the province of the "lay politician" displays a growing tendency to "careerization and professionalization".³⁴ Given the heterogeneity of the elite sample studied, it was impossible to get detailed information on the careers of the respondents in the context of a structured interview. To do this, it would have been necessary to obtain not only precise information concerning their main occupational activities but also about many relevant honorary offices held during their careers. In order to study differences in career patterns it was, however, enough to ask for the number of years the respondents had spent full time in different sectors. For reasons of standardization, respondents were asked to use a given list of sectors.

The figures in Table 11 were computed on the basis of this information. It was, however, necessary to exclude the respondents of a number of subgroups whose careers deviated systematically from the other respondents in a given sector:

- Business associations sector—officials of agricultural associations ($n = 37$)
- Academic sector—respondents working in research branches of large industrial companies ($n = 19$)
- Cultural sector—publishers ($n = 49$)³⁵

In addition, respondents of the residual group "others" ($n = 129$) were not analyzed because of their heterogeneity. Respondents were also excluded who displayed individual differences between our sector classification of the main position of the respondent and the one used by the respondent himself for his present sector. These inconsistencies mainly pertained to persons who simultaneously held positions in several sectors and differed in their subjective classification of which of these positions was the main one. Such inconsistencies were especially frequent among members of business associations who claimed the sector business corporations as their present sector. Since many positions in business associations are, in fact, held by managers of business corporations or by entrepreneurs, we could not classify this sort of deviation as individual inconsistency. At the same time the corporate positions of these persons were, according to our criteria, of minor importance and did not belong to the sector category which comprised only the top position holders in the biggest corporations. We decided, therefore, to keep these respondents as a separate group; this also enabled us to look for possible differences between these two groups of managers.

Due to the exclusions mentioned, the analyses of career patterns are based on the answers of 1426 respondents. Altogether, 234 respondents were excluded because of their group membership and another 83 because of individual inconsistencies in sector classification.³⁶ Respondents in the political sector were

Table 11. Careers

Sector	Mean Age	Mean Age at Time of Entry into Occupational Career	Mean Years in Present Position	Mean Years in Present Sector	Percentage of Whole Career Spent in Present Sector	Mean Number of Sectors	Number and Percentage First Sector Identical with Present Sector		Number and Percentage Whole Career in Present Sector	
							n	%	n	%
Politics (n = 237)	49.6	24.8	3.9	12.2	51.6	2.3	15	6.3	10	4.2
Civil service (n = 293)	53.1	28.0	5.1	22.4	90.2	1.7	128	43.7	113	38.6
Business (n = 261)	54.2	24.8	7.1	26.3	90.7	1.4	196	75.1	176	66.7
Business associations, but main position in business (n = 63)	58.1	25.8	5.7	31.4	97.9	1.3	55	87.3	46	73.0
Business associations (n = 70)	53.0	26.7	8.0	18.6	72.7	2.0	18 ^a	25.7	17	24.3
Trade unions (n = 82)	54.3	18.9	8.7	25.8	73.2	2.1	3	3.7	2	2.4
Mass media (n = 108)	51.8	25.0	8.0	26.5	99.1	1.4	164	75.2	151	69.3
Academic (n = 108)	51.0	27.1	5.7	21.7	90.5	1.5	77	71.3	60	55.6
Military (n = 42)	54.8	22.0	2.0	28.1	88.0	2.0	27	64.3	8	19.0
Cultural (mass media) (n = 52)	47.5	24.7	7.6	21.5	96.5	1.5	33	63.5	29	55.8
Total	52.5	25.4	6.1	22.6	83.9	1.7	716	50.2	610	42.8

^aAnother 23 (32.9%) respondents of this group named business as their first sector. Thus, altogether, 58.6% of this group started their careers in the economic sector.

analyzed together since we were primarily interested in the differences between politicians and respondents in other sectors for which party membership is only of secondary importance.

Typically, an elite position in the Federal Republic is reached after a rather long career. The respondents were, on average, nearly 47 years old and had pursued a career of nearly 21 years when they entered their present position. Since the data did not allow us to decide whether the present position was the first elite position of a respondent, we used the panel information in our data in order to determine the age at which persons in the Federal Republic normally first enter elite positions. This was done by excluding those respondents from the analysis who had already been registered as elite position holders in the 1972 elite survey as well as all respondents in the cultural sector who had not been included in that previous study. We can assume that for most of the other respondents their present position, which they had generally occupied for six years, was their first elite position.

The figures were not changed very much by these exclusions. The remaining respondents, too, had first entered their elite position at a mean age of 46 years. Table 11 shows only minor intersectoral differences in the duration of elite careers except for the military elites, who obviously needed longer to reach the top and were usually about 52 years old when they entered their present position.

The results concerning the sectors in which the respondents had been active during their careers support the assumption of a trend toward a differentiation of careers between sectors. This trend is less obvious if we look only at the number of respondents with an exclusively intrasectoral career. Instead, these figures allow identification of those sectors which do not yet offer full-time career opportunities because they are usually entered as a full-time occupation only after a respondent has spent time in honorary offices in that sector. These are business associations, trade unions, and politics.

In our opinion, two further measurements are suitable as evidence of the career autonomy of sectors: the number of years a respondent has spent without interruption in his present sector, and the percentage of his whole career spent in the present sector. The figures show that only the political sector differs from others in this respect. Politicians have generally spent only somewhat more than half of their careers as full-time politicians, which is equivalent to a mean of 12 years. They most often mentioned the civil service (40.5 percent), business enterprises (27.4 percent), science, and higher education (30.4 percent) as former sectors.³⁷

This picture of the relatively high career autonomy of the individual sectors becomes even clearer if one looks at the percentages instead of the means: 82.7 percent of the respondents have been in their present sector for more than 10 years and only 7 percent for less than 6 years. Even in the political sector, somewhat less than 19 percent of the respondents have been professional politicians for less than 6 years.

Our data also give evidence that intersectoral elite circulation is rather low in

the Federal Republic.³⁸ Even if nearly 60 percent of the elites can look back on occupational experience in at least one other sector, this usually dates to a rather early period in their careers and can therefore not be regarded as a contribution to elite integration. In our opinion, change from one sector to another, in order to have an integrative effect, must occur at a relatively late stage of a career because it then presupposes insight into the decision-making structures and personal acquaintance with important persons in that sector. Therefore, we cannot assume that the former employment in business enterprises which was mentioned by 76 percent of the trade union leaders contributes to elite integration since it normally means only that these persons performed subordinate functions at the beginning of their careers.

Our data, however, do not allow us to conclude that interchangeability of positions is always low. Patterns of elite circulation, instead, seem to be strongly influenced by cultural norms. In the United States and Canada, for instance, in spite of a rather similar socioeconomic structure, elite circulation is quite common, particularly between politics and economics, while intrasectoral careers prevail in Europe (Pakulski, 1982:188ff.). This difference in patterns might be an explanation of the much higher emphasis placed by American authors on the importance of elite circulation for elite integration (e.g., Salzman and Domhoff, 1980).

Position Interlocks

The study of position interlocks, particularly research on interlocking directorates is a frequent way of studying elite integration. Interlocks between organizations have been interpreted either as means of coordination or of control (Palmer, 1983:41). Advocates of the power elite theory have tended to stress the control aspect which, however, assumes that it is possible to determine the direction of the control relationship, i.e., the unequivocal determination of the main position of a certain respondent.

We started by analyzing interlocks among the different elite positions in our gross sample of elite positions. Altogether, 3580 positions were identified as elite positions. Of these, 3531 had an incumbent at the time of the survey and were held by 3165 different persons. Of these 3165 incumbents of elite positions, 91.3 percent held only one elite position; 18.2 percent of the positions were interlocked with other positions. The proportion of persons holding more than one position at the same time was 8.7 percent, but no more than 2 percent held more than two or up to six elite positions (Table 12). The proportion of interlocking positions is considerably smaller than in the United States, where (according to Dye's results) 68.1 percent of the positions are interlocked and 15.0 percent of the incumbents of these positions hold more than one position at the same time (Dye, 1983:171). However, the difference is partially a consequence of the

Table 12. Interlocking Elite Positions

	<i>Positions</i>		<i>Position Holders</i>	
	n	%	n	%
<i>Total</i>	3531	100.0	3165	100.0
One position	2889	81.8	2889	91.3
Two positions	426	12.1	213	6.7
More than two positions	216	6.1	63	2.0

criteria Dye used to select elite positions. In the academic sector, for example, Dye included not only academics but members of the boards of trustees of universities (which are normally made up of persons having their main position in other sectors).

The 642 position interlocks in our sample resulted in 497 combinations of two interlocking positions. More than half of these (53.1 percent) were combinations within the economic sector (business and business associations), 14.3 percent occurred within the political sector and another 8.9 percent were other intrasectoral combinations. Thus only 23.7 percent of the combinations were intersectoral. The first two columns of Table 13 show the corresponding figures for the elite persons in the different sectors. Only 2.9 percent of the elite persons had an additional elite position in another sector.

Salzman and Domhoff have, however, objected that his kind of reasoning underestimates the real number of interlocks for two reasons. In the first instance, they criticize its use of a micro-perspective. Their reanalysis of Dye's data for the business sector in the aggregate showed that the number of corporations with ties to at least one other corporation in the sample was much higher: 190 of 201 corporations in the sample were interlocked (1980:233). Since the number of corporations is much smaller than the number of positions, an analogous computation for our data also led to a higher density of interlocks within the business sector: 132 positional interlocks among 229 corporations. Even though this is a somewhat lower density than that which Salzman and Domhoff found, it suggests a rather high overall rate of interlocks since nearly 60 percent of the corporations are involved.

If this number is, however, not related to the number of corporations but to the maximum possible number of links between these corporations, the proportion of links is only half a percent. That means that it is possible to change the relational numbers dramatically by changing the point of reference. But the latter figure does, in turn, underestimate the actual extent of intercorporate links since our sample is limited to the holders of top positions in these corporations. A study of interlocking directorates among the 259 biggest independent German business

Table 13. (Continued)

	Member of Control Board of Broad- casting Networks				Position in Political Parties		Member of a Legis- lature ^c		Position in Trade Unions		Position in Profes- sional Associa- tions		Position in Business Associa- tions		Total
Mass media	9	4.1	5	2.3	3	1.4	6	2.7	10	4.5	6	2.7	222		
Academic	4	3.1	2	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	17	13.1	6	4.6	130		
Military	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	9.3	0	0.0	43		
Cultural	3	2.9	1	1.0	1	1.0	6	5.8	11	10.6	9	8.7	104		
Other	<u>7</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>42*</u>	<u>32.6</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>129</u>		
Total	93	5.3	332	19.0	175	10.0	37	2.2	175	10.0	197	12.5	1744		

^aAll holders of elite positions.

^bIncluding membership in all kinds of advisory committees to federal ministries.

^cIncluding membership in the Bundestag, State Legislatures, the European Parliament, or a local legislature.

^dImplied by position.

^eThirty-five of these respondents have been interviewed because they hold elite positions in professional associations.

^fFourteen persons have interlocking positions in the same and in other sectors. Therefore, the total number of persons with interlocking positions ($n = 276$) is less than the sum of the column totals.

corporations showed that, altogether, 4 percent of all possible pairs of corporations were linked by personal ties and one-half percent by assets (Biehler, 1982:86).

In the context of our analysis, however, intersectoral links are of greater importance than intrasectoral ones. These are, as the figures in Table 13 show, much less frequent. The trade union leaders, in this respect, contribute most to intersectoral elite integration: 8.4 percent of them have at least one other elite position in a different sector, compared to 6.6 percent of the politicians and 4.2 percent of the business managers. The position interlocks of the latter can, however, hardly be qualified as truly intersectoral because most of them concern additional positions in business associations.

The second objection of Salzman and Domhoff against Dye's analysis and in general against the study of interlocking elite positions is that such an approach ignores relationships on lower organizational levels (1980:240ff.). Here again, we can provide some information from our study. We have systematically included information on the membership of the respondents in a number of pre-defined bodies such as legislatures, state or federal party committees, control boards of the broadcasting networks, and advisory committees to federal ministries. This information was gathered by looking up the positions in directories. They are thus complete where these bodies are concerned. In addition, in the course of the interviews respondents were asked about additional positions they

held in trade unions as well as professional and business associations at the state or federal level. In analyzing these positions, naturally we have not collected information on *all* positions of the respondents but, at least, on those which might be of greatest importance for intersectoral elite coordination. The control boards of the broadcasting networks and the advisory committees are, indeed, exclusively made up of persons from other sectors.

Looking at Table 13, one can again see that trade union leaders and politicians are most active intersectorally, while business leaders limit their scope to business and professional associations. The figures, however, underestimate the actual extent of intersectoral position interlocks since only membership in a number of predefined bodies has been considered. An open-ended question included in the 1972 elite survey elicited a much higher amount of multiple position holding: 54.2 percent of the politicians and 45 percent of the top civil servants named at least one position in another sector (Neumann, 1979:101, 108). These were board memberships in business enterprises and positions in religious and charitable associations, in educational institutions, and on the boards of local research foundations (cf. also Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:73).³⁹ Higley et al. report an even higher amount of interlocking positions: 62 percent of the Australian elite respondents held additional positions in another sector (1979:72).

How do we interpret these results? Obviously, this depends primarily on the choice of a point of reference. Relating the number of position interlocks to the number of organizations involved indicates extensive intersectoral relations; relating them to the number of possible links makes them appear rather modest. If we choose the perspective of network literature which stresses the integrative importance of indirect ties (e.g., Kadushin, 1968), we may conclude that the number of intersectoral positional links found in the data are sufficient to ensure institutionalized intersectoral coordination. This is particularly true since it is supplemented by other role-related contacts.

The concept of social circles which interprets indirect ties as promoting elite integration is, however, not suitable for measuring power in the sense of control. Thus, according to Kadushin, the function of social circles does not consist in the exertion of control but rather in the promotion of common interests. A social circle has no leaders and no clearly defined goals (1968:692). Control, rather, can only be exerted by a direct relationship between two organizations. If corporation A has a member on the board of corporation B and B, in turn, has a link to C, this does not mean that A controls C. Palmer even concludes, on the basis of his data on interlocking directorates, that not even the direction of interlocks allows determination of the direction in which power is exerted (1983:53). This means that the intersectoral links provided by multiple position holding serve the purpose of diffusion of information but link only a small portion of the organizations in the sense of control relationships. Such control relationships are most frequently intrasectoral, i.e., within the political and economic sectors. This is mainly a

result of the fact that in these sectors there are institutionalized relationships between organizations. Considering that this pattern is peculiar to these two sectors, it is therefore questionable whether one can interpret the number of intrasectoral positions as an indication of the power of a person (cf. Dye, 1983: 175ff.).

STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND PARTY PREFERENCE

Up to now we have discussed how the amount of professional homogeneity among elites may contribute to elite integration. Next, we wish to examine the influence this has on the political attitudes and thus on the behavior of the elites. Political attitudes are never completely determined by social structural variables. Hence, attitude cleavages must be regarded as an independent dimension of political conflict (Lehmbruch, 1969:285). This dimension can coincide in varying degrees with the structural cleavages in a society. Scholars of the conflict theory have often pointed to the fact that a superimposition of several cleavage lines normally leads to a reduction of the number of conflicts with different opponents and to an intensification of the remaining conflicts. Conversely, cross-cutting cleavage lines contribute to an attenuation of conflicts since differing coalitions develop (cf. Dahrendorf, 1965b:224ff.).

Therefore, in the following we shall analyze the degree of association between the structural variables discussed thus far and the political attitudes of elites. The association between social structure and political cleavages is often assumed to be a measure of the degree of subcultural segmentation in a society. If it turns out to be high, that can be considered an indication of the fact that structural characteristics are transformed into political positions.

Edinger and Searing (1967) have shown in their classic article that at least in industrial societies, social background variables do not influence the attitudes of elites. This result has been replicated in numerous other elite studies, including those of West German elites (cf. Schleth, 1971; Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:69). This has been brought about by the blurring of traditional subcultural cleavages which, in turn, lead to a decline in the association between social origin and present social status on the one hand and political attitudes and voting behavior on the other.⁴⁰

Our analyses are not meant as another replication of these findings. Therefore, we did not analyze the relationship between social characteristics and the issue attitudes of the respondents. Instead, we have limited ourselves to an analysis of the association between the party preference of the respondents and the other variables. This is done for two reasons. First, party preference and issue attitudes are so closely related, particularly among elites, that the former can be considered as a relatively valid sign of a broad range of individual attitudes. Secondly, party preference is a measure of structural processes among elites. This is so

because parties compete less for elite votes than for power positions. Therefore, they try to gain influence over the recruitment of elite personnel in other sectors in order to tie the clientele of those sectors to their organization electorally, as well as to strengthen the chances of achieving their goals in the policy formation process in which these other elites play a major role. The analysis of the distribution of party preferences in the different elite sectors shows how far they have been successful.

The analyses in this section have been limited to nonpolitical elites since political elites are defined by party and the relationships between party and the other variables can be assumed to be different for them. Given the fact that we

Table 14. Party Affiliations of Elites and Nonelites:

(a) Percentages based on number of respondents

(b) Percentages based on number of valid answers^a

		n	SPD	CDU/CSU	FDP	Other, N.A.
Civil service	(a)	296	30.4	37.2	18.2	14.2
	(b)	254	35.4	43.3	21.3	—
Business	(a)	285	8.4	63.5	11.9	16.1
	(b)	239	10.0	75.7	14.2	—
Business associations	(a)	174	2.3	69.5	15.5	12.6
	(b)	152	2.6	79.6	17.8	—
Trade unions	(a)	87	80.5	12.6	1.1	5.7
	(b)	82	85.4	13.4	1.2	—
Mass media	(a)	222	16.7	43.2	18.5	21.6
	(b)	174	21.3	55.2	23.6	—
Academic	(a)	130	15.4	38.5	16.9	29.2
	(b)	92	21.7	54.3	23.9	—
Military	(a)	43	2.3	65.1	9.3	23.3
	(b)	33	3.0	84.8	12.1	—
Cultural	(a)	104	29.8	16.3	19.2	34.6
	(b)	68	45.6	25.0	29.4	—
Other elites	(a)	129	31.8	43.4	8.5	16.3
	(b)	108	38.0	51.9	10.2	—
All nonpolitical elites	(a)	1470	21.6	45.6	14.6	18.2
	(b)	1202	26.5	55.7	17.8	—
Population	(a)	517	25.1	44.3	6.0	24.6
	(b)	390	33.3	58.7	7.9	—
Federal elections	1980	—	42.9	44.5	10.6	1.8
	1983	—	38.2	48.8	6.9	6.1

^aOnly 31 elite respondents ranked the Green Party first in sympathy. Therefore, percentages were based on the number of respondents with a first sympathy rank for one of the three "established" parties.

are dealing only with nominal variables it is difficult to determine the relative strength of independent structural variables on dependent variable party preference. Nevertheless, we ran some dummy variable regression analyses. Since the data do not, however, meet all of the metric and distributive assumptions of regression analysis, we cannot expect the resulting coefficients to reflect the value of the "true" associations with absolute accuracy, which means that the coefficients can only be interpreted tentatively. In addition, many of the independent variables are highly intercorrelated, e.g., social class background and education. This multicollinearity makes it impossible to interpret the regression coefficients because they depend on the order in which the variables are introduced into the regression equation. Nevertheless, we assume that the relative strength of the predictors is preserved even under these conditions if we look at the zero-order correlations and that we can grasp the overall explanatory power of the model by studying the multiple correlation coefficients. Table 18, to be discussed later, contains the correlation coefficients (Pearson's r) for three groups of variables to be discussed in connection with the following: social background, present occupation, and memberships in voluntary associations.

The standards for the distribution of party preferences⁴¹ in the different elite sectors are listed in Table 14. The basic pattern has not changed since 1968 and 1972 (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:48ff.). We cannot, however, determine the causal processes which are responsible for these relationships. Theoretically, the distributions found in the different sectors can be traced back to four causes: the position itself, the deliberate personnel policy of nominators, the collective

Table 15. Party Preference for the Social Democratic Party of Various Elite Sectors and Nonelites Over Time

	<i>Percent SPD^a</i>		
	<i>1968/69</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>1981/82</i>
Civil service	37.3	36.9	35.4
Broadcasting media	34.0	57.1	34.7
Press	33.0	37.1	21.6
Academic elites	29.7	45.8	23.7
Nonelites:			
General population			
surveys	47.0	54.0	33.3
Elections for the			
Bundestag 1969,			
1972, and 1983	42.7	45.9	38.2

^aPercentages based on respondents with a clear preference for one of the three major parties. Comparative figures for cultural elites are not available. Figures for the 1969 and 1972 surveys relate to voting intention instead of party preference.

Table 16. Association Between Background Factors and Party Preference of Nonpolitical Elites
(percentages based on number of valid answers)

(a) *Social Class Origin^a*

	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Bourgeoisie	9	8.7	76	73.1	19	18.3	104	9.4
Small employers	25	21.7	71	61.7	19	16.7	115	10.4
Petty bourgeoisie	28	29.8	50	53.2	16	17.0	94	8.5
Managers	15	18.3	57	69.5	10	12.2	82	7.4
Supervisors	64	20.9	165	53.9	77	25.2	306	27.8
Semiautonomous employees	60	23.3	157	61.1	40	15.6	257	23.3
Workers	<u>86</u>	<u>60.1</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>13.0</u>
<i>Total</i>	287	26.1	617	56.0	197	17.9	1101	

^ap = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.24; $\chi^2 = 127.3$.

(b) *Education^b*

	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Less than high school graduation (<i>Abitur</i>)	97	56.4	57	33.1	18	10.5	172	14.3
High school graduation (<i>Abitur</i>)	<u>221</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>613</u>	<u>59.6</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>19.0</u>	<u>1029</u>	<u>85.7</u>
<i>Total</i>	318	26.5	670	55.8	213	17.7	1201	

^bp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.28; $\chi^2 = 92.3$.

(c) *Religion and Church Attendance^c*

<i>Religion/Church Attendance</i>	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Catholics/regular attendance	9	5.3	154	90.1	8	4.7	171	14.5
Catholics/no regular attendance	44	22.8	120	62.2	29	15.0	193	16.3
Protestants/regular attendance	21	20.6	60	58.8	21	20.6	102	8.6
Protestants/no regular attendance	131	25.9	260	51.5	114	22.6	505	42.7
No religious affiliation	<u>110</u>	<u>51.9</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>18.9</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>17.9</u>
<i>Total</i>	315	26.6	656	55.5	212	17.9	1183	

^cp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.27; $\chi^2 = 173.3$.

Table 16. (Continued)

(d) Memberships

	SPD		CDU/CSU		FDP		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Trade unions	189	76.2	38	15.3	21	8.5	248	20.6
Professional associations	71	19.6	222	61.2	70	19.3	363	30.2
Religious lay organization	34	19.9	112	65.5	25	14.6	171	14.2
Welfare organizations of the churches	8	12.3	49	75.4	8	12.3	65	5.4
Welfare organization of the workers' movement ^d	104	88.9	9	7.7	4	3.4	117	9.7
Independent welfare organizations	34	31.5	61	56.5	13	12.0	108	9.0
Student fraternities	15	7.6	150	75.8	33	16.7	198	16.5
Social clubs	40	12.2	236	71.7	53	16.1	329	27.4

^d Arbeiterwohlfahrt.

political orientations, or the individual opinion formation of the respondents. Only the first of these can be considered as an impact of the sector in a strict sense. The criteria used by nominators, instead, need not reflect autonomously defined sector interests. It seems quite conceivable that external nominators are successful in influencing the personnel recruitment, e.g., party elites who want to induce favorable judicial decisions or media coverage. By collective orientations, we mean that a consensus develops among the members of a sector which is, however, not systematically related to the functions performed by this sector.

We can assume that normally all four factors are simultaneously at work, although carrying different weights. Every attempt to determine these weights is necessarily speculative. We conjecture that in the business sector and the trade unions, the agreement of sectoral interests with the policies advocated by the different parties are responsible for the distributions found. In the civil service and the media, however, criteria of personnel recruitment can be assumed to play the most important role. The functions performed by these two sectors do not automatically imply certain policy priorities. It is, however, instrumental for the parties to influence the personnel recruitment in these sectors—which, in fact, they do. The politicalization of personnel policy in the civil service and the broadcasting media is therefore a widely discussed topic.

In the military sector, we assume that the three first-named factors are equally important. The military and defense policy of the Christian Democrats is more in line with the sector interests. Secondly, the CDU/CSU was obviously more successful than the other two parties in exerting influence on personnel recruitment. Finally, the German military traditionally has a conservative orientation.

Table 17. Association Between Occupational Status, Social Class Origin, Religion, and Party Preference in the Population
(percentages based on number of valid answers)

(a) Occupational Status of Respondents^a

	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Bourgeoisie/small employers	1	4.2	21	87.5	2	8.3	24	6.6
Petty bourgeoisie	3	12.5	17	70.8	4	16.7	24	6.6
Managers/supervisors	12	22.6	36	67.9	5	9.4	53	14.5
Semiautonomous employees	24	28.9	50	60.2	9	10.8	83	22.7
Workers	84	46.2	90	49.5	8	4.4	182	49.7
<i>Total</i>	124	33.9	214	58.5	28	7.7	366	

^ap = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.22; $\chi^2 = 34.0$.

(b) Social Class Origin^b

	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Bourgeoisie/small employers	3	10.0	26	86.7	1	3.3	30	9.0
Petty bourgeoisie	7	16.7	30	71.4	5	11.9	42	12.5
Managers/supervisors	3	20.0	10	66.7	2	13.3	15	4.5
Semiautonomous employees	9	19.6	29	63.0	8	17.4	46	13.7
Workers	91	45.0	101	50.0	10	5.0	202	60.3
<i>Total</i>	113	33.7	196	58.5	26	7.8	335	

^bp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.24; $\chi^2 = 37.8$.

(c) Religion and Church Attendance^c

	<i>SPD</i>		<i>CDU/CSU</i>		<i>FDP</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Catholics/regular attendance	8	8.7	80	87.0	4	4.3	92	23.8
Catholics/no regular attendance	24	32.0	46	61.3	5	6.7	75	19.4
Protestants/regular attendance	10	30.3	20	60.6	3	9.1	33	8.5
Protestants/no regular attendance	76	46.6	71	43.6	16	9.8	163	42.2
No religious affiliation	11	47.8	9	39.1	3	13.0	23	6.0
<i>Total</i>	129	33.4	226	58.5	31	8.0	386	

^cp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.26; $\chi^2 = 50.6$.

Table 17. (Continued)

(d) Education ^d								
	SPD		CDU/CSU		FDP		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Less than high school graduation (Abitur)	119	35.1	198	58.4	22	6.5	339	87.6
High school graduation (Abitur)	8	16.7	31	64.6	9	18.8	48	12.4
Total	127	32.8	229	59.2	31	8.0	387	

^dp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.19; $\chi^2 = 12.5$.

The functions of the academic and cultural sectors are the least political. Therefore, one can assume that the political preference of an applicant plays only a subordinate role in personnel recruitment. We expect consequently that the party preferences in these politically less exposed sectors, to which we also add the press, are less stable over long periods of time and reflect the fluctuations of individual and public opinion formation.⁴² This assumption is borne out by comparing the development of the party preferences of respondents in these sectors to those of the general public (Table 15).

For the population, the fluctuations in the survey data are much more pronounced than those in actual voting behavior. Similar fluctuations can be seen in the media and academic elites which indicate that the individual opinion formation in these sectors parallels that of the general public. Quite obviously, the recruitment policy within the broadcasting media has much less influence on that opinion formation than many observers expected. Within the civil service elite, however, the nearly constant preference status of the SPD reflects the existence of stable power blocks governing the recruitment of leadership personnel.

The figures in Tables 16 and 17 show that social origin, education, and religion all have a significant impact on the party preferences of both elites and the population at large. The coefficients of associations are, however, not very high and range between .20 and .30. They are not higher for the population than they are for the elites. This means that the impact of structural variables is not greater for the population, as previous results have suggested, a result also confirmed by the multiple correlation coefficients in Table 18. This impression is reinforced if we compare the party preferences of all nonpolitical elites to the population subgroups most comparable in occupational status, i.e., employers and managers (Table 17). Among all three groups, the Christian Democrats have a disproportionate number of supporters and the Social Democratic Party is underrepresented. This is especially true in comparison to the working class. It is only with regard to the Liberal Party that elites differ from the upper classes: to

exaggerate somewhat, one could maintain that the FDP is not only a bourgeois party but even an elite party.

Table 18 shows that the sector variable explains nearly as much difference in party preferences as do the social background variables. The zero-order correlations additionally confirm the intuitive impression one gets looking at the figures in Table 14, i.e., that it is mainly membership in the business and trade union sectors which determines party preference while in the civil service and the media there is little apparent relationship to the dependent variable. In general, sector location (*situs*) determines party preference more among the elites than social status does among the population at large (cf. also Table 17). However, more important than this finding is the fact that both variables are not linearly related to party preference: whereas the relationship is strong for trade union elites and members of the working class, on the one hand, and business elites and the classes of employers or the self-employed, on the other, the members of the new middle class (i.e., managers, supervisors, semiautonomous employees, and most other elite sectors) are structurally much less predetermined in favor of a certain political party.

The results for the membership of elites in voluntary associations (Table 16) confirm the assumption stated earlier that those memberships are primarily an expression of individual value orientations and therefore closely related to party preference. Members of the trade unions and the Social Democratic Welfare Association (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*) are mostly supporters of the Social Democratic Party; those of professional associations, religious lay associations, student fraternities, and social clubs largely support the bourgeois parties. We included in the regression analysis only those organizations whose members showed the most skewed distributions either in favor of the Social Democrats or the Christian Democrats. The welfare organizations were, however, not taken into consideration because they have too few members.

We have included frequency of church attendance among the membership variables because it is an indication of the role the ascribed religious denomination actually plays for the respondent. Unfortunately, the effects of both variables cannot be disentangled because the sizeable proportion of respondents without religious denomination, by definition, does not go to church and most Protestants are also not regular churchgoers. Therefore it seems advisable to look at the combined effect of both variables rather than at the separate effects, even if this is not greater than the effect of each of the variables taken separately. Nevertheless, the separation of both variables in the regression model shows that denomination alone continues to play a major role in determining party preference and issue attitudes of elites as well as of voters (cf. also Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:69).

Due to the obviously high multicollinearity of the predictor variables, the multiple correlation coefficient for all three groups of variables is only .48 among elites. Our structural variables thus explain less than one-quarter of the

Table 18. Correlations Between Social Background, Present Occupation, Membership in Voluntary Associations, and Preference for the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU)

	<i>Elites</i>	<i>Nonelites</i>
1. Social background		
Social class background ^a	.16	.16
Education ^b	.12	.05
Religious denomination ^c	.26	.25
Multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i>	.31	.29
Squared multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i> ²	.10	.09
2. Present occupation		
<i>(a) Elites^d</i>		
Civil service	-.09	—
Business ^e	.26	—
Trade unions	-.17	—
Mass media	-.02	—
<i>(b) Nonelites</i>		
Employer or self-employed	—	.17
Manager, supervisor, semiautonomous employee	—	.09
Worker	—	-.17
Multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i> ^f	.30	.22
Squared multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i> ²	.09	.05
3. Membership in voluntary associations^g		
Frequency of church attendance ^h	.24	.26
Trade unions	-.34	—
Social clubs	.17	—
Student fraternities	.19	—
Multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i>	.41	.26
Squared multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i> ²	.17	.07
4. Overall relationship		
Multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i>	.48	.37
Squared multiple correlation coefficient <i>r</i> ²	.23	.14

^a(1) Employer, self-employed, manager, supervisor, semiautonomous employee; (0) worker.

^b(1) High school graduation; (0) no high school graduation.

^c(1) Catholic; (0) Protestant or no religious affiliation.

^dMembership in other sectors is the implicit fifth dummy variable which had to be excluded from analysis for mathematical reasons. Since it is a heterogeneous residual variable including the smaller sectors, i.e., academic, cultural, military, and other elites, its zero-order correlation was not computed.

^eIncluding business corporations and business associations.

^fFor the population data, the third dummy variable was not included in the regression model because it is implied by its linear relationship to the other two dummy variables.

^gThe questions concerning membership in voluntary associations were not included in the questionnaire for the general population survey (discussed earlier in this paper). Frequency of church attendance is analyzed as a membership variable because it can be conceived as an expression of the current importance the respondents attribute to their church membership, which was otherwise classified as a background variable.

^h(1) Frequent; (0) seldom or never.

variance in the preference for the Christian Democratic Party. Given the rather unrefined statistics this seems acceptable even if party preference is far from being fully determined by these predictors. In order to compare the explanatory influence of the independent variables between elites and nonelites, we had to rerun the regression analysis without the membership variables which were not available for the population. The multiple correlation coefficient for the elites dropped in this run from .48 to .42. It is still higher than the coefficient for the nonelites, which means that sector is not only a more important indicator of elite attitudes than is occupational status of voter attitudes, but also that it is less associated with background variables.

Altogether, we found a rather differentiated pattern with regard to the overlap among sector and party lines. For business and trade union elites both lines overlap almost completely, whereas in the civil service, mass media, academic, and cultural elites supporters of all parties can be found. Assuming that religion has to be conceived of as a variable of value orientation rather than as a background variable, the association between social background (class origin and education) and party preference is rather weak. Therefore, the conclusion seems justified that conflict between party lines means primarily conflict between different political goals. For the definition of the goals, in turn, the sector interests of business and trade unions play a major role. As long as we are willing to interpret party competition as indicative of political conflict within the elites, this conflict is rather pronounced. Among the elites, however, the competing parties and sectors are not equally strong. The trade unions and the Social Democrats are numerically much weaker than business and the Christian Democrats.

CONCLUSION

Elite integration cannot be discussed without reference to a more general model of societal integration. One possible model is that of a social system differentiated vertically according to occupational status, education, wealth, and political influence, i.e., a class or a power elite model. In choosing such a model, the question arises how vertical integration of a society is possible, i.e., how mass loyalty to elite rule can be maintained. The horizontal integration of elites under such a model results automatically from the common interest of elites to preserve their status and is facilitated by their small numbers. "Generally, the social structure is more closely tied together at the top than at the bottom" (Galtung, 1966:162). Elite integration, in this model, serves to maintain the existing distribution of privileges. The main conflict line runs between upper and lower classes or between elites and nonelites.

Pluralist theory, as well as the theory of "consociational democracy," instead conceives of society as segmented horizontally by religious, ethnic, and occupational (situs) lines or by analytically defined functions. These theories tend

therefore to consider the problem of horizontal rather than vertical integration of a society. They have raised the question of how binding political decisions can be reached in a highly differentiated society. It presupposes the existence of an elite consensus on the rules of political decision making and a sense of responsibility for the overarching needs of the entire society among the elites, i.e., the willingness to transcend one's group interests.

In the first model, elite integration is characterized by social homogeneity and shared interests; in the second, by social heterogeneity and value consensus, as well as cooperation in political decision making across group and sector lines. In our analysis we have tried to determine which of these two models is more in line with the empirical data. For that purpose, indicators of social and occupational homogeneity were examined. Whereas social homogeneity was thought to promote informal elite integration through friendship ties based on similar backgrounds (homophily), similar recruitment patterns were assumed to further the professional integration of elites since they indicate that elite nominators value universally applicable leadership qualifications more than specialized knowledge.

What can be said now on the basis of our data about elite integration in West Germany? The main result is that the social and professional heterogeneity found among the elites does not support the assumption that a cohesive power elite exists in Germany. It offers little basis for informal elite integration. The various structural bases of informal elite integration, i.e., membership in social clubs or other associations, regional proximity, similar background or shared occupational experiences, are all limited to small segments of the elites. Thus, informal elite circles which doubtlessly exist in West Germany as they do everywhere, do not provide a sufficient basis for a more inclusive decision-making elite circle.

With regard to the representation of interests by elites, we have to state first that elites in the Federal Republic differ significantly from the population at large in their social characteristics. If, however, we differentiate the latter according to occupational status, our data indicate the validity of the "law of increasing disproportion" rather than a qualitative distinction between elites and nonelites. In this respect, one has also to consider the role of Social Democratic politicians and trade union leaders as representatives of the lower classes. They differ less in social background and education from the population than other elites do.

The analysis of career patterns, too, gave no indication that the requirements for elite positions differ qualitatively from those for other positions: the low level of intersectoral elite circulation shows that specialized knowledge and professional experience are obviously more important than general leadership qualifications. Given the fact that the social composition of the elites is not representative of that of the population at large, we have examined in the previous section the question of whether this has consequences for the goals and the behavior of elites. The associations between background variables were indeed significant but not very powerful. Putnam's question, "Agglutination: so what?"

(1976:41), can be answered again by stating that social background contributes little to the explanation of elite attitudes.

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NOTES

1. There is a vast body of literature relevant to this assumption. For further references see Higley et al. (1979), Bachrach (1964), McClosky et al. (1960), Barton (1974), and Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980).

2. The term *consensus* refers to the extent to which beliefs, values, and attitudes are shared by the members of a group. Thus, it is one type of elite integration. The term *integration*, in referring to political beliefs, is normally used to indicate the degree of consistency among several beliefs of an individual.

How far consensus concerning the "rules of the game" is accompanied by a consensus concerning political goals is an empirical question. While power elite theorists have always assumed that the members of an elite have a great many interests in common, the most important of which is the interest to preserve their present elite status, other scholars have assumed that there may be considerable conflict of interests within an elite which at the same time exhibits a high degree of procedural consensus (cf. Field and Higley, 1984; Kadushin, 1979; Lehmbuch, 1969; Bachrach, 1964).

3. See Offe (1974). These theories try to explain why, even in democratic societies, political decisions normally do not jeopardize the existing distribution of privileges. It is traced back by them to deliberate manipulation on the part of elites. Offe, instead, advocates a structural theory according to which routinized decision-making structures and democratic ideology ensure maintenance of the status quo.

4. Laumann and Pappi distinguish three types of interpersonal relations which correspond to our three subtypes of structural elite integration: (1) informal social relations, (2) business-professional relations, (3) discussions of community affairs (1976:135ff.). This distinction corresponds to the three general types of networks described by van Poucke: sentiment networks, power networks, and interest networks (1979/80:181).

5. It is, however, only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for the development of friendship ties. The latter can also be based on other factors. In a recent study, Feld (1982) demonstrates that the usually high correspondence between social similarity and friendship ties (homophily) can in part be traced to the fact that "focused sets" tend at the same time to bring socially similar people together and to promote friendship ties. The development of friendship ties among socially similar persons may thus be primarily a result of the social composition of "focused sets." Feld's results allow the speculative conclusion that friendship ties will presumably also develop among socially and professionally heterogeneous elites.

6. See Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980:60). This association is normally stronger among elites than among general populations as the empirical results of Converse (1964) and McClosky et al. (1960) have shown.

7. See Edinger and Searing (1967), Schleth (1971), and Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980:69).

8. The study is supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. We appreciate the help of the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA), Mannheim, and GETAS, Bremen during the field work and data management process. A machine-readable codebook prepared

by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne, is available at the University of Mannheim.

9. Machine-readable codebooks are also available for these studies at the Zentralarchiv in Cologne.

10. Moore and Alba have used another measure which, however, does not differentiate between the entirely subordinate and the lower professionalized occupations. Since this distinction is important for educational aspirations and political behavior, we decided to use Wright's scheme.

11. Wright et al. operationalize class according to seven different criteria (1982:714ff.).

12. The data of our population survey show clearly that the agglutination theory of Putnam is only a special case of mobility theory: higher-status groups in general tend to come from higher-status families.

13. Women are similarly underrepresented among the elites with only 2.8 percent.

14. The formula was developed by Weisberg (1968:128):

$$\text{Phi/Phi}_{\max} = \frac{ad - bc}{(c + d)(c + a)}$$

under the conditions $ad > bc$ and $b > c$. These conditions can always be realized by an adequate exchange of rows and columns.

15. The hypothesis of high educational aspirations as the main factor responsible for career achievements among the elites is supported by the fact that only 38.2 percent of the fathers of our respondents had a high school degree. In addition, our population data show that persons with high school degrees are disproportionately drawn from families with certain occupational backgrounds: employers with at least 10 employees, self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and management (managers and supervisors). Especially among the self-employed professionals and the higher civil servants control orientation should be less pronounced than for instance among small employers. The latter, in turn, show lower educational aspirations.

16. Source: Claessens et al. (1974:470).

17. Source: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 4, 1983.

18. Source: Kaack and Roth (1980:82).

19. In contrast to 1972, not all subdepartment heads in federal ministries but only those in the most important ministries were included in the 1981 study. The higher proportion of party members in this latter group in 1981 may thus be due to the fact that political affiliation plays a more important role in personnel recruitment in these ministries.

20. Paradoxically, among the cultural elites working for the press there are more party members than among the political journalists and editors. In the broadcasting media the relationship is reversed, as one would have expected.

21. Party of the party members:

	SPD	CDU/CSU	FDP
Administrative heads of state ministries—			
Social Democratic administrations	82.7	1.9	15.4
Administrative heads of state ministries—			
Christian Democratic administrations	2.9	91.4	5.7
Administrative heads and department			
heads in federal ministries	62.5	15.0	22.5
Subdepartment heads in federal ministries	54.5	21.2	24.2
Trade unions	86.0	14.0	0.0
Mass media	39.2	51.3	9.5

22. Figures from Jacobi et al., 1981:199. Members of the Association of Civil Servants (Deutscher Beamtenbund) were excluded. The 1972 study included only a general question concerning membership in trade unions and professional associations whereas in 1981 the respondents were asked to include the name of the association. The combined numbers are therefore smaller in the 1981 study (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:78).

In some cases it was rather difficult to decide whether an association should be considered as a trade union or a professional association since the latter are also often involved in negotiations concerning working conditions. We finally decided to restrict the trade union category to the member unions of the West German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and the Union of White-Collar Employees (Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, DAG). The Association of Civil Servants was instead considered as a professional association.

23. The number of civil servants in the DGB has risen by a margin of 146 percent from 1950 to 1979. The organization ratio of white-collar employees rose from 19.0 percent in 1960 to 22.1 percent in 1975 (cf. Streeck, 1981:474). The number of those who approve of a statement that the trade unions do not behave correctly declined among white-collar employees from 48 percent in 1953 to 38 percent in 1973 (cf. Pappi, 1977:221).

The organizational figures for journalists is unknown, but the DGB claims that 12,000 journalists belong to one of its member unions (internal source).

24. Some 3.5 percent of these are members of the Civil Servants Association (cf. Jacobi et al., 1981:199) and 5.4 percent are members of other professional associations. We had to rely on the data of the National Social Survey 1980 (ALLBUS; cf. Lepsius et al., 1982:258) for these figures. Because of the small number of members of such associations in a general population survey with only 3000 respondents these figures must be considered somewhat unreliable, providing only a rough estimate of the real percentage.

25. The latter figure is presumably somewhat inflated since double memberships could not be excluded.

26. See Dye (1983:216). *Der Spiegel* (1983:60,63) uses a similar argument. It even claims that it is the main function of these clubs to give their less prominent members the feeling of belonging to the elites.

27. In the Federal Republic, military elites are, rather, overrepresented in the social clubs. According to *Der Spiegel* this is due to the aspirations of the German military to regain its former prestige.

28. See Pappi (1979).

29. *Synchronous* means that a respondent simultaneously holds positions in more than one sector, whereas *diachronous* indicates that he has been active in more than one sector during his career.

30. In 1981, the percentage of trade union leaders *without* a high school degree is even somewhat higher (80.5 percent compared to 77.8 percent in 1972). This may, however, be caused by the additional inclusion of some district leaders and hence a different sample composition.

31. Unfortunately, we were not able to find data to confirm this.

32. Some 83.0 percent of the respondents in the press, but also 29.0 percent of those in the broadcasting media, named the press as the first sector of their occupational career.

33. We have restricted the group to those respondents who either named only one field of university studies or have acquired a law degree. Thus, respondents for whom law studies were not the main subject were excluded.

34. The term *professionalization* is used here in a rather loose sense and does not presuppose formalized educational requirements. It means nothing more than a tendency of politics to become a full-time occupation and to institutionalized political career patterns (cf. Herzog, 1982:94; von Beyme, 1971:109ff.).

35. The analysis of career patterns among cultural elites was thus restricted to journalists, i.e., those respondents with full-time employment in the mass media. Publishers were excluded because they normally have a different occupational background.

36. These were only 5.6 percent of the respondents of the sectors included in the analysis.

37. Individual respondents may have been active in more than one other sector. The civil service, business enterprises, and science/higher education sectors were in general, the ones mentioned most frequently as former sectors.

38. For political elites cf. Herzog (1975:150ff.) and von Beyme (1971:155ff.).
39. These board memberships were usually on boards of public enterprises, mostly public utility enterprises.
40. For the thesis of decreasing class and religious vote cf. Baker et al. (1981:165ff.) and Pappi (1977:214).
41. Party preference was defined as the first sympathy rating on the familiar party thermometer.
42. Party lines play a less prominent role in the West German press because most newspapers stress their political independence. They normally have only a broad general political leaning toward a more conservative or more liberal outlook.

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