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“The Climate Will Change Again and Ye’cüc and Me’cüc Will Leave Their Places”: Gog and Magog in Two Late Ottoman Texts  
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“‘Climate Will Change Again, the Ice Will Melt, and Gog and Magog Will Leave Their Places:’ Ye’cüc and Me’cüc in two late Ottoman texts,” *Gog and Magog: The World History of an Apocalyptic Motif*, Lutz Greisiger, Andrew Mein, Georges Tamer, Julia Wannenmacher (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter (2023), 669–700. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720235>

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According to David Cook, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Arabic-writing authors refrained from writing apocalyptic texts. Cook argues that Muslim authors were generally reluctant to make a connection between apocalyptic traditions (about which they were writing) and the actual political situation they were living in. He explains this reluctance, which came to an end with the Six Day War of 1967, with their conservatism and their awareness of the “politically and religiously explosive nature of apocalyptic.”<sup>1</sup> I think that this observation needs to be specified: what Cook has studied are texts written by the higher ‘*ulemā*’, who, as members of the elite, arguably had much to lose and nothing to gain with a disruption of the social order, which is what apocalyptic propaganda might have brought about. Members of the lower classes, on the other hand, might have longed for such a disruption without leaving written evidence of it. Moreover, apocalypticism is often a matter of practice rather than intellectual debate. We know that mahdism was present in several anti-colonial movements of the nineteenth century, not only in Sudan, but also on Java, in northern India, and in Algeria.<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman Empire, to be sure, was not a European colony, but it also went through a period of political turmoil. In this essay, I present two late Ottoman texts from the early twentieth century that discuss “signs of the Hour,” analyzing them for their perception of doomsday

1 David Cook, “Ḥadīth, Authority and the End of the World: Traditions in Modern Muslim Apocalyptic Literature,” *Oriente Moderno* 21 (82), no. 1 (2002): 21–53, here 35.

2 See the contributions to a special issue of *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la méditerranée*, focusing on mahdism and millenarism in the Muslim world: Julia Clancy-Smith, “La Révolte De Bû Ziyân En Algérie, 1849,” *REMMM* 91–94 (2000): 181–208; Marc Gaborieau, “Le Mahdi oublié de L’Inde britannique: Sayyid Ahmad Barelwî (1786–1831), Ses Disciples, Ses Adversaires,” *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 91–94 (2000): 257–74. On north Africa in general see Julia Clancy-Smith, “Saints, Mahdis, and Arms: Religion and Resistance in Nineteenth-Century North Africa,” in *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*, eds. Edmund Burke and Ervand Abrahamian, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press., 1988): 60–80. On mahdism on Java: Ethan L. Menchinger, “Intellectual Creativity in a Time of Turmoil and Transition,” in *The Wiley Blackwell History of Islam*, eds. Armando Salvatore, Babak Rahimi and Roberto Tottoli, Wiley Blackwell Histories of Religion (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018): 459–78, here 471; for a comprehensive study, see Peter Carey, *The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785–1855* (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

(*kıyāmet*, literally: the rising [of the dead]) and their depiction of Gog and Magog.<sup>3</sup> While the first, *Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc* by Hüseyin al-Cisr/Husayn al-Jisr (first published ca. 1900), is a fairly conservative religious treatise, Hāşim Velî's *Efşāhu l-maḳāl fî-l-mesîḥi-d-deccāl, yaḥūd: eşrātu s-sā'a* (Clear Sermon Concerning the Messiah and the Dajjal, or: The Signs of the Hour, hereafter: *eşrātu s-sā'a*) qualifies as an historical apocalypse: Its author argues that the signs of the Hour have already appeared and that *kıyāmet* has already started. Significantly, the text appears to have been written in 1913 or 1914, after the Balkan Wars and prior to the Ottoman entry into World War I in November 1914. I argue that it offers important insights into popular perceptions of war and politics, and into popular eschatology during those critical few months. Moreover, I suggest that Hāşim Velî's booklet should be considered as rare written evidence of messianic thought in the Ottoman "little tradition" during those years. With "Little tradition," Şerif Mardin refers to the popular culture of ordinary Muslim folk, which he describes as linked to the "Great tradition" of the Ottoman Muslim elite by the idea and practice of redistribution of economic resources (from the rich to the poor).<sup>4</sup> The concept is similar to E.P. Thompson's "moral economy," but differs from it insofar as Mardin coined the term for a specific religious community. He has also argued elsewhere "that religion not only functioned as an *institution* (i.e. the corps of ulamas, *medreses* [seminaries], *vakıfs* [pious foundations], and sufi orders) but also established noninstitutional links as discourse between *devlet* and the common folk."<sup>5</sup> Stories from the Qur'ān, popular *aḥādīth* and biblical stories about earlier prophets (*qişaş al-anbiyā'*) were widely known across all segments of Muslim society, so we can safely assume that virtually every Muslim was familiar with the characters and elements of Islamic eschatology – without necessarily having messianic expectations for the immediate future. What I argue here is that lower-class Muslims and their little tradition were prone to having such beliefs. In societies with high rates of illiteracy, popular beliefs and values are usually transmitted orally, and are therefore hard to trace for the historian. We can, however, assume that messianic movements – which sometimes appear in state records – formed against the background of such beliefs. The following discussion therefore gathers the little evidence we have for cases of mahdism in the nineteenth-century Ottoman world. It also reviews elements of the "little tradition," and more particularly, the idea of popular revolt against unjust rule, in late

3 It should be pointed out that mention of "doomsday" (*kıyāmet*) alone doesn't qualify a text as apocalyptic. The phrase "*kıyamet koptu*," ("the dead have risen/doomsday has started") is frequently used in modern Turkish, much in the same way as "all hell broke loose" in American English.

4 See Şerif Mardin, "Super-Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century," (1974) in *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey*, ed. Şerif Mardin (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006): 135–63.

5 Italics and square brackets in the quotation according to the original. Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. eds. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997): 64–80, here 72.

Ottoman oppositional movements.<sup>6</sup> But before doing that, I outline the socio-economic changes that led to an increase in social and economic inequality, and hence, discontent, among ordinary Ottomans. In doing so, I follow Hamit Bozarslan by considering millenarian and messianic movements as social phenomena that can only be understood as the result of both religious and socio-economic factors.<sup>7</sup>

## 1. The Little Tradition and Messianic Thought

Mardin has argued that a difference between the “great” tradition of the Ottoman elite, including the higher *‘ulemā’*, and that of the “little” folk tradition already existed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In earlier times, however, forms of social solidarity – such as the custom of elite households to support large numbers of clients – bridged the gap between the two cultures.<sup>8</sup> The Ottoman age of modernization, rather than closing this rift, further deepened it.<sup>9</sup> The reasons for this were socio-economic: despite creating a large bureaucracy, the *tanẓimāt* reforms limited, rather than promoted, social mobility. Small bureaucrats, lower-level *‘ulemā’* and officers found themselves unable to climb the ladder, while highest-level bureaucrats were able to “amass considerable wealth.”<sup>10</sup> This was a new development because, until the early nineteenth century, the property of high-ranking bureaucrats had been seized upon their death and reverted to the treasury (*müşādere*).<sup>11</sup> Mardin is right in pointing out the new wealth of the highest-ranking bureaucrat families. However, he fails to mention that higher-level *‘ulemā’*, especially those controlling large *evkāf*, (pious foundations) had been enjoying such security of wealth already in earlier times.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, it is important to point out that, when private property in land was established in the mid-nineteenth century, rich Muslim families, just like their Christian counterparts, were able to invest their fortunes into land, thus becoming an important part of the new landowning class in the

6 The notion of “unjust rule” was based on the ancient concept of the “Circle of Justice,” an ideal model for harmonious, and hence, legitimate governance according to which rulers raise taxes to equip armies to protect the land, in return for which the population pays taxes etc. From the eighteenth century onwards, the Circle of Justice was mostly used to critique actual government practice, which groups like the Young Ottomans felt was violating this ancient principle. See Linda T. Darling, “Circle of Justice,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE*, eds. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_COM\\_24405](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_24405) first published online 2012 (last accessed July 24, 2020).

7 See Hamit Bozarslan, “Le mahdisme en Turquie: L’‘incident de Menemen’ en 1930,” *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 91–94 (2000): 297–320.

8 See Bozarslan, “Le mahdisme en Turquie.”

9 Şerif Mardin, “Türk Siyasetini Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri,” in *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset*, ed. Şerif Mardin (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 35–78, here 55.

10 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 122.

11 See Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 122.

12 See Rifa‘at Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*. SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1991), 64.

nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> It was land used for commercial agriculture, rather than factories or commerce, that formed the backbone of Ottoman capitalism. It is therefore misleading to assume, as many historians have done and continue to do, that the Ottoman bourgeoisie was more or less exclusively non-Muslim.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, conflicts between rich and poor Christians also tend to be overlooked.<sup>15</sup> It may, in other words, make sense to look into an inter-religious dimension of both the great and the little tradition. That, however, will have to be done elsewhere. Those who were disgruntled by the emergence of new wealth were mainly people dependent on salaries, which, as the nineteenth century progressed and the financial situation of the Ottoman state deteriorated, tended to be paid more and more irregularly: lower-level bureaucrats, officers and lower-level ‘ulemā’. We know that the latter groups’ alienation from the top-down modernization project of the Tanzimat (1839–1876) and later the Hamidian era (1876–1909) was an important contributing factor for their participation in the constitutional movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: these movements are known as the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and 1870s, and the Young Turks in the 1890s–1900s.<sup>16</sup> When the army in Ottoman Macedonia rose up to enforce a return to constitutional government in June and July 1908, ‘ulemā’ support was critical for turning the affair into a popular movement.<sup>17</sup> Probably the best-studied representative of this group, which Mardin calls “Lumpen-ulema,” was ‘Alī Suavi (1839–1878).<sup>18</sup> Unlike the other Young Ottomans, who tended to be disaffected members of the former Ottoman elite, he came from a modest social background and didn’t study with private tutors, but at a state middle school and attended lessons at mosques before landing his first government job. He didn’t graduate from a *medrese*, so technically speaking he wasn’t part of the ‘ulemā’ class. Interestingly, a position as teacher and administrator in Filibe/Plovdiv (in present-day Bulgaria) ended when his superior accused him of having incited the people to revolt during his weekly sermons at a local mosque.<sup>19</sup>

13 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Ottoman Parliament of 1877 and its Social Significance,” in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 75–89.

14 The belief is probably rooted in the widespread conceptual confusion of capitalism with industrialization. The list of authors who gloss over rich, land-owning Muslim families is endless. A particularly noteworthy example is Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

15 For a good criticism of this tendency in the historiography of Ottoman Armenian life, see Varak Ketsemanian, “The Hunchakian Revolutionary Party and the Assassination Attempts Against Patriarch Khoren Ashegian and Maksudzade Simon Bey in 1894,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50, no. 4 (2018): 735–55.

16 İsmail Kara, “Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition,” in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*. ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, SOAS / Routledge Curzon studies on the Middle East 3 (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005): 162–200.

17 Ottoman History Podcast, “Ottoman Ulema and the Second Constitutional Revolution, with Yakoob Ahmed”, hosted by Taylan Güngör (March 4, 2016): <http://www.ottomanhistorypodcast.com/2016/03/ulema-1908-revolution.html>. Also see Amit Bein, *Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2011).

18 Mardin, “Türk Siyasetini Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri,” 54.

19 Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 361.

Later he became famous for his sermons at the Şehzadebaşı mosque in Fatih/Istanbul and joined the Young Ottomans. Escaping a government-*cum*-exile posting to Kastamonu, he went to Paris and started to publish the Young Ottoman paper *Muḥbir*, but soon fell out with the other Young Ottomans when his writings became more and more radical, culminating in a text calling for the assassination of grand vizier ‘Alī Paşa.<sup>20</sup> Şerif Mardin points out that Suavi’s “essential force consisted in being in touch with that large, inchoate mass of dissatisfaction which modern political manipulators usually equate with ‘the people.’”<sup>21</sup> Nazan Çiçek, who has studied his thought more seriously, points to his connection with the Scottish politician David Urquhart (1805–1877), the founder of a pro-Ottoman, anti-Russian free-trade movement in the United Kingdom.<sup>22</sup> ‘Alī Suavi died at the young age of 38 in May 1878, when he, together with several hundred Caucasian refugees, tried to storm Çırağan palace in a desperate attempt to reinstate sultan Murat V. to the Ottoman throne.<sup>23</sup> In March 1878, the latest Russo-Ottoman war had ended with the humiliating treaty of San Stefano, which surrendered large swathes of the Ottoman Balkans to a new Bulgarian nation-state (the treaty was soon replaced with the treaty of Berlin, which was slightly less disastrous for the Ottoman state). Mardin observes that “the apocalyptic figure for which ‘Alī Suavi yearned did not appear in this instance,” but only forty years later, in the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.<sup>24</sup> He thus suggests that Suavi, disappointed with Abdülhamid II.’s failure to act as *mehdi* of the Ottoman state, had decided to take matters into his own hands by bringing Murat V. back to the throne. Back in 1867, when still in Istanbul, he had written in the daily *Muḥbir* (the eponymist of the Paris paper he would soon edit there) about a *ḥadith* that, he argued, established the right to revolt against unjust rulers. Mardin cites from three different articles:

O people. How long are you still going to believe that a Mehdi shall appear and save you? (...) Do you think that the emirs who are in charge and who are free of question and responsibility will abandon what profits they draw out of you and begin to favor you? (...) This matter of resistance to oppression which our religion enjoins (“farz kılıyor”) is a

20 Ironically, the activities of the Young Ottomans in London and Paris were financed by a member of the Ottoman Great Tradition, former Egyptian crown prince Mustafa Fazıl Paşa.

21 Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 360.

22 Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century*, Library of Ottoman Studies 20 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

23 For a study of the police investigation into this incident, see Florian Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire: Conspiracies and Political Cultures*, SOAS / Routledge studies on the Middle East 15 (London, New York: Routledge, 2011), 58–70.

24 Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 364–65. As far as I know, this hint at the possible importance of messianic thought in the emergence of the Turkish War of Independence has not been taken up.

fundamental political principle which Europeans have only recently discovered after several thousand years of experience.<sup>25</sup>

In this text, ‘Alī Suavi criticizes his contemporaries for putting their hopes into a messianic figure, the *mehdi*, instead of rising up against unjust rule themselves. He thus references a popular belief in and expectation of such a redeemer. Implicitly, he also points to the old Ottoman tradition of uprisings, during which the population of Istanbul, together with the Janissary corps, often replaced unpopular sultans with younger members of the Ottoman dynasty. Such uprisings were not directed against Ottoman rule per se, and the Young Ottomans nostalgically regarded them as a kind of safety valve that had been lost with the destruction of the Janissary corps under Mahmut II in 1826.<sup>26</sup> While ‘Alī Suavi merely informs us that messianic beliefs were present among ordinary Ottomans, several people of his time actually thought they *were* the *mehdi*. They may or may not have been inspired by the approaching year 1300 *Hicri*, for which many Muslims anticipated the emergence of a *mahdi/mehdi*. These expectations were one factor contributing to the mahdist uprising in Sudan, which started in 1881 or 1298/99 according to the *Hicri* calendar.<sup>27</sup> Its leader was Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Mahdī, a sufi teacher of the Sammaniyya order.<sup>28</sup> He fought first against Ottoman-Egyptian and then against British rule and succeeded at establishing a state for almost two decades.<sup>29</sup> The Ottoman authorities followed the events in Sudan anxiously, believing the uprising had been instigated by various European powers. In Ottoman state correspondence, Muḥammad Aḥmad was at first referred to as a “false mehdī” (*mütemehdī*) and later as a “bandit,” (*şāķī*).<sup>30</sup> While Muḥammad Aḥmad attracted many followers and temporarily established a state, most other *mehdis* were much less successful. The Ottoman authorities were nevertheless concerned about such cases, swiftly arresting or exiling the aspiring *mehdis*, most of whom failed to gather any followers. According to Ömer Koçyiğit, in 1883, a *medrese* student in Istanbul, who had previously

25 ‘Alī Suavi, “İstanbuldan fī 17 Teşrin-i Sani,” *Muhbir* (November 28, 1867): 3; ‘Alī Suavi, “İstanbuldan Tahrirat fī 15 Ramazan,” *Muhbir* (January 27, 1868): 3; ‘Alī Suavi, “Paristen bir Müslüman Mektubu,” *Muhbir* (December 25, 1867): 3. Cited in Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 378.

26 Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 133.

27 See Seri-Hersch, Iris, “The Mahdiyya Movement in Sudan,” in *Encyclopedia of World History. Era 7: The Age of Revolutions 1750–1914*, ed. James H. Overfield (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011).

28 See John O. Voll, “From Saints and Renewers to Mahdis and Proto-Nationalists,” in *The Wiley Blackwell History of Islam*, eds. Armando Salvatore, Babak Rahimi and Roberto Tottoli, Wiley Blackwell Histories of Religion (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018): 499–518.

29 On the mahdist state, see Erhard Oeser, *Das Reich des Mahdi: Aufstieg und Untergang des ersten islamischen Gottesstaates 1885–1897*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2012); Aharon Layish, *Sharī‘a and the Islamic State in 19th-Century Sudan: The Mahdī’s Legal Methodology and Doctrine*, Islam in Africa Series 19 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 6–25.

30 See Ömer Koçyiğit, “The Ottoman State’s Perception About the Sudanese Mahdi Uprising,” *Turcologia* 9, no. 18 (2014): 101–37.

killed a preacher, declared himself *mehdi*. He was arrested but subsequently pardoned, probably because he was considered to be mentally ill. In 1889, a certain Hasan Baba (indicating a Bektashi *baba*?) was arrested in Aydın for charges of false mahdism (*mehdilik*). A case in Aleppo in 1884 was more delicate: here, the man in question was the son of a local Naqshibendi sheikh. The Ottoman government called in several hundred soldiers to bring him under control. Another case happened in Diyarbakır, also in 1884, and the aspiring *mehdi* was arrested and sent to Urfa. In the Hejaz, the issue had a transnational dimension: At least two cases are documented for Mecca (both in 1886, a man from Ethiopia and one from another, unspecified country) and one for Medina.<sup>31</sup> In Medina, a *medrese* student from Bosnia and his friend became convinced that one of them was a prophet in 1892. The Hamidian authorities, however, filed the case under “*mehdilik*.”<sup>32</sup> Though closer scrutiny would be necessary, these cases certainly indicate that messianic ideas were both a part of the popular culture at that time and a concept that the authorities conveniently used in order to describe religious troublemakers. The political upheaval of the late 1870s and early 1880s, combined with the beginning of a new century in the *Hicri* calendar in 1882/1300, may have “activated” slumbering messianic perceptions among the population: A brief constitutional intermezzo (1876–1878) had lasted less than two years, and hopes for an improvement of the general situation had been dashed. The 1877–1878 war with Russia had forced great numbers of Muslims from the North Caucasus and the Balkans into Anatolia and the Levante, where their settlement aggravated pre-existing conflicts between nomadic and sedentary communities. Tsarist Russia had annexed Batum, Kars, and Ardahan in northeastern Anatolia, Austria-Hungary had occupied Bosnia Herzegovina, and the British Cyprus in 1878. The French had occupied Tunis in 1881, and the British Egypt in 1882. Ottoman Muslims were certainly shocked by these news, and they may also have heard of the *mehdi* in Sudan. For modern Turkey, we have one well-documented case of messianism that took place in December 1930, in the midst of the World Economic Crisis.<sup>33</sup> Named after the small town in which it took place, it is known in Turkish as the “Menemen incident” (*Menemen olayı*). In late 1930, seven young Naqshibendis made their way from the town of Manisa to a village in the vicinity of Menemen in the İzmir region. There, they smoked hashish, performed *zikr/dhikr*, the sufi mystical prayer, and obtained weapons. After about two weeks, their leader, a seventeen-year old known as Giritli Derviş Mehmet (the nickname indicating Cretan refugee descent), declared himself to be the *mehdi*, his companions the seven

31 Ömer Koçyiğit, “The Ottoman State’s Perception About the Sudanese Mahdi Uprising,” 101–37.

32 See Eyüp Öztürk, “Osmanlı’nın Son Döneminde Bir Mehdilik (Peygamberlik) İddiası: Bosnalı Hafız Abdullah Efendi Olayı,” *Toplum Bilimleri* 6, no. 11 (2012): 117–28.

33 Hamit Bozarslan speaks of a messianist and millenarianist movement. See Hamit Bozarslan, “Messianisme et Mouvement Social: L’événement de Menemen en Turquie (Décembre 1930),” *Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien* 11 (1991): 73–88; “Le Mahdisme En Turquie: L’incident De Menemen’ en 1930,” *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, 91–84 (2000): 297–320.

sleepers (*eşhāb el-kehf*) and named his dog Kıtırmır, the name associated in Islamic folklore with the dog mentioned in the sūra *al-Kahf*.<sup>34</sup> The villagers, who were familiar with this cast of characters, didn't object. On 23 December, six of the young men entered Manisa. The group performed *zikr*, in the public square together with about a hundred townspeople. Derviş Mehmet announced a rebellion with which he intended to restore the *şerī'at* and re-open the dervish lodges (*tekkes*), which had been officially abolished in 1925.<sup>35</sup> He claimed that a large army was on its way to help him. When a local gendarmerie officer tried to stop him, Mehmet killed him and cut off his head.<sup>36</sup> The rebellion was crushed the very same day, but nevertheless sent shock-waves through the young republican regime, which had been unaware of the real extent of popular discontent in the country. As Umut Azak points out, (limited) popular support for the youthful rebels should be explained by at least two factors. The first is the deep unpopularity of the republican regime, which was aggravated by the ongoing economic crisis. The second is the ordinary people's Islamist worldview: "if some villagers helped – if not recognized – Derviş Mehmed as the *Mehdi*, it is possible that they at least believed in the need to restore Islam for bettering their situation."<sup>37</sup> Summing up, we may say that eschatological narratives were well-known both in the Ottoman "great" and the "little" traditions. Messianic expectations for the immediate future, however, were more common in the "little" tradition. There was also a long tradition of popular uprisings against unjust rule. In the 1860s, 'Alī Suavi argued that, rather than wait for the *mehdi* to save them, people should rise up against the government, and he died trying to do exactly that in 1878. In the 1880s and 1890s and at least once in the republican era, there were people who announced themselves to be the *mehdi* in times of political and economic crisis. The Menemen incident can be called a millenarian movement insofar as the leader used mahdist rhetoric to explain his actions. That vocabulary in itself was nothing special: the eschatological "cast of characters" in Qur'ān and *aḥādīth* was certainly well-known in all segments of Muslim society. What made the difference, however, was the question whether or not people had messianic expectations for the immediate future.

34 Whether or not he also spoke of Zülkarneyn and Ye'cüc and Me'cüc – which seems likely since they are mentioned in the same sūra – is unfortunately not mentioned in the literature dealing with the Menemen incident.

35 In 1924, the Turkish republic officially abolished the institution of the caliphate, sending all members of the Ottoman dynasty into exile. In 1925, sufi orders (*tarikātlar*) and dervish lodges (*tekkeler*) were officially disbanded. In 1926, the introduction of a civil code that was largely adapted from the Swiss one had officially ended the application of the Islamic holy law *şerī'at* in Turkish courts. All three steps were part of the secularizing reforms of the republican period, and, constituting major attacks on ordinary Muslims' everyday lives, were deeply unpopular. We know today that the sufi orders and polygamy (which was outlawed by the 1926 code) persisted despite their illegality, especially in remote parts of the country. See Mustafa Tuna, "The Missing Turkish Revolution: Comparing Village-Level Change and Continuity in Republican Turkey and Soviet Central Asia, 1920–50," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 50, no. 1 (2018): 23–43.

36 See Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*, International Library of Twentieth Century History 27 (London: I.B. Tauris 2010): 25–31.

37 Italics and spelling as in the original, Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey*, 27.

## 2. The Cast of Characters

Muslim apocalyptic literature is vast and developed as a result of contact with various pre-Islamic cultures and religions. It features a “principal cast of characters,”<sup>38</sup> which is interpreted in curious ways by al-Cisr and Hāšim Velī, and therefore calls for a brief introduction. The Qur’ān merely contains a tiny part of those characters, most notably the mythical people of Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj (Ye’cüc and Me’cüc in Ottoman Turkish, Gog and Magog in English). According to the Qur’ān, they are people who live on the margins of the known world, behind a barrier erected by Dhū l-Qarnayn (“the two-horned”) to fend them off. This is probably a reference to “Alexander’s Gate,” (or wall) which, together with Gog and Magog, first appears in a Syriac apocalyptic text dating from ca. 630 AD, the Alexander Legend. In it, Alexander is depicted as building – with divine assistance – a wall that shuts the Huns (who are ruled by Gog and Magog) off from the civilized world.<sup>39</sup> The story as it appears in the Qur’ān is clearly inspired by an (orally transmitted) variety of the Alexander Legend.<sup>40</sup> Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj appear twice in the Qur’ān, once in the story about Dhū l-Qarnayn in Surah 18 (al-Kahf – “the Cave”), and once in Surah 21 (al-Anbiyā’ – “the Prophets”), 96–102, where their appearance marks the beginning of Judgment Day. Surah 18:82–98 tells the story of Dhū l-Qarnayn, who travels the West, the East, and a third region of the world, where he finds people who ask him to build a wall against Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj, who are bringing destruction upon them. Dhū l-Qarnayn does so, and erects a wall made from iron and copper which Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj cannot overcome. Dhū l-Qarnayn tells the people that the wall will disintegrate and turn into dust on the day “when the Lord’s promise is fulfilled,” i.e., when the day of the Last Judgment starts. The question of Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj’s precise location runs through the history of European and Middle Eastern geography and cartography. Pre-modern cartographers (Christians, Jews and Muslims alike) often marked the location of “Alexander’s Gate” (and Gog and Magog behind it) on their maps. This tradition faded around 1500, “[w]hen, as the full light of modern day came on, the Alexander Romance ceased to be regarded as history, and with it Alexander’s gate passed into the realm of fairyland.”<sup>41</sup> Muslim apocalyptic texts written since late antiquity contain, often detailed, descriptions of the devastation that Ya’jūj and Ma’jūj (and many other mythical creatures) will lay

38 David Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam 21 (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 2002), 17.

39 See Lutz Greisiger, “Opening the Gates of the North in 627: War, Anti-Byzantine Sentiment and Apocalyptic Expectancy in the Near East Prior to the Arab Invasion,” in *Peoples of the Apocalypse: Eschatological Beliefs and Political Scenarios*, eds. Rebekka Voss, Wolfram Brandes, Felicitas Schmieder (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016): 63–79; Faustina Doufikar-Aerts, “Dogfaces, Snake-tongues, and the Wall against Gog and Magog,” in *Embodiments of Evil: Gog and Magog. Interdisciplinary Studies of the ‘Other’ in Literature & Internet Texts*, eds. A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, Faustina Doufikar-Aerts and S. McGlinn (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011): 37–52.

40 See Israel Friedländer, *Die Chahirlegende und der Alexanderroman: Eine sagengeschichtliche und literaturhistorische Untersuchung* (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner, 1913), 278–80.

41 Andrew R. Anderson, *Alexander’s Gate, Gog and Magog, and the Inclosed Nations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Medieval Academy of America, 1932), 104.

on the civilized world. Many prophetic traditions feature the false messiah Dajjāl, who fights a final battle with ʿĪsā (Jesus).<sup>42</sup> The Dajjāl is usually described as one-eyed.<sup>43</sup> There is also the *Mahdī*, a messianic figure who will rule the Muslims at the end of the world. His identity and exact relation to Isā are topics that generate much controversy throughout the *ḥadīth* literature.<sup>44</sup> A third character is a beast called *Dābba* or *dābbat al-ard*, “beast of the earth,” known in the bible as Behemoth. It is not necessarily evil, but has a rather monstrous appearance, with its huge body being composed of various body parts from different animals. Its main job is to distinguish between believers and non-believers and to mark them accordingly.<sup>45</sup> Many apocalyptic texts also mention as a sign of the approaching last hour that the sun will rise from the West.<sup>46</sup> Another element is a people called *bānū l-aşfar* (Sons of the Yellow One), who, prior to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, were usually identified with the Byzantines, with whom the Muslims would fight the final battle.<sup>47</sup> When that conquest started to be a realistic expectation, and finally, reality, such eschatological beliefs had to be modified.<sup>48</sup> It is probably in this context that the meaning of *banū l-aşfar* (*beni’-l-eşfar*) shifted from “Byzantines” to “fair-skinned people in the west.” Meḥmed Yazıcızāde’s *Muḥammediye*,<sup>49</sup> a “voluminous religious poem” dating from 1449, already uses the term in this new way.<sup>50</sup> The poem, which discusses all aspects of Islamic belief including the arrival of Judgment day, was very popular throughout the Ottoman world and beyond.<sup>51</sup> It continued to be read widely in modern times, and Hāşim Velī cites it several times in his *Eşrāṭu s-sā’a*.

### 3. Hüseyin al-Cisr: Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc (1900s/1912)

*Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc* is a small booklet that contains a mere eight pages of text, including seven rather lengthy annotations, which was published in Istanbul in 1327/1912. A copy of it is part of the Ottoman and Turkish literature collection at Duke University library, digital copies of which are

42 See Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, 93.

43 Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, 96.

44 See W[ilferd] Madelung, “al-Mahdī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, eds. P. Bearman et al.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_COM\\_0618](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0618) (last accessed May 23, 2020).

45 On the Dābba, see Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, 120–22.

46 See Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, 14.

47 See I[gnaz] Goldziher, “Aşfar,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition*, eds. P. Bearman et al.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_SIM\\_0766](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0766) (last accessed July 6, 2017). Maribel Fierro, “Al-Aşfar,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam, THREE*, eds. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_ei3\\_SIM\\_0080](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_SIM_0080) first published online 2007 (last accessed July 6, 2017).

48 See Feridun M. Emecen, “Lânetli Şehir Düştü: İstanbul’un Fethi ve Kıyâmet Senaryolari,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 12 (2003): 191–205.

49 On Yazıcızāde and his *Muḥammediye*, see Edith G. Ambros, “Yazıcızāde,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, eds. P. Bearman et al.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_SIM\\_8008](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_8008) (last accessed May 7, 2020).

50 See Emecen, “Lânetli Şehir Düştü: İstanbul’un Fethi ve Kıyâmet Senaryolari,” 197.

51 See Tobias Heinzmann, *Populäre religiöse Literatur und Buchkultur im Osmanischen Reich: Eine Studie zur Nutzung der Werke der Brüder Yazıcıoğlu*, vol. 32 of *Istanbul Texte und Studien* (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2015).

freely available through the internet archive.<sup>52</sup> The booklet was probably sold cheaply to a broader audience, possibly even in a “take-away” setting for immediate consumption at ferry docks or train-stations. It may have offered some edutainment to white-collar commuters on their way to or from work. At the beginning of the booklet, we are informed that it is a slightly shortened and annotated translation from the Arabic, of a piece that Hüseyin al-Cisr at-Ṭarābulūsi once (*vaḳṭıyle*) published in the Tripoli newspaper *Ṭarābulus aş-Şam*. The date of the original publication is not given, but we know that *Ṭarābulus aş-Şam* was published from 1892 to 1902.<sup>53</sup> The Ottoman translation was published in 1327 R., i.e. 1911/12 in Istanbul, by Jirayir-Keteon, and by a certain Meḥmet Tevfik, who is further specified as “former district governor (*ḳā’immaḳām*) of Molva [a village on Midilli/Lesbos] and general history teacher at the Mercan highschool (*İd’ādisi*).”<sup>54</sup> This information fits a Meḥmet Tevfik who was born in 1875 in Turgutlu (formerly known as Kasaba, a town near Manisa in western Turkey), graduated from the *Mülkiye* school for public servants in 1891, and served as principal of the Tripoli *İdadi* highschool between 1899–1902. M. Tevfik appears to have supported Young Turk ideas, because he fled to Egypt (in 1902?), but later returned, only to be arrested and exiled to Rhodos. In 1908, he returned to Istanbul and served as *ḳā’immaḳām* of Molva (1912), İmroz (1913), and Köprü (present-day Gedegra, 1916).<sup>55</sup> Since Mehmet Tevfik worked in Tripoli between 1899 and 1902, he might have read the original article during those three years.

### 3.1 The author

52 Hüseyin al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc, Jirayir Kete’on Matbaası: Istanbul 1327*, transl. Mehmed Tevfik (1912): <https://archive.org/details/yecucvemecuc0001me/mode/2up>. The online collection contains 216 books that were written for a popular audience, such as novels (including several translations from the French), religious and political treatises and cookbooks that were published during the very last years of the Ottoman Empire.

53 For information on the paper, see: <https://archiv.zmo.de/jaraid/index.html> (last accessed October 3, 2022). According to Mahmoud Haddad, *Ṭarābulus aş-Şam* was founded and edited by Muḥammad Kāmil al-Buḥeirī: Mahmoud Haddad, “Ottoman Economic Nationalism in the Press of Beirut and Tripoli (Syria) at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Economy as an Issue in the Middle Eastern Press*, eds. Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Martin Strohmeier, Neue Beihefte der Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 2 (Wien, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008): 75–84, here 75. This paper seems to be identical with *Caridat Tarabulus*, a paper that Hüseyin al-Cisr, according to Ebert, edited himself (see below). Several volumes of this paper were later published by Muḥammad Kāmil al-Buḥeirī and were, by the late 1980s, available for research in Damascus. See Johannes Ebert, *Religion und Reform in der arabischen Provinz. Husayn al-Ğisr at-Ṭarābulusī (1845–1909) – ein islamischer Gelehrter zwischen Tradition und Reform* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), 173. According to jaraid, the American University of Beirut library holds a collection.

54 This prestigious high-school was first established as the preparatory school for the *Mülkiye* school for public servants (which was established in 1859). By 1900, the preparatory branch was reduced to being a regular high school, which (due to its location in a neighborhood of Fatih) became known as “Mercan İd’ādisi.” See: <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/mekteb-i-mulkiyye> (last accessed October 3, 2022).

55 Mücellitoğlu Ali Çankaya, *Mülkiye Tarihi Ve Mülkiyeliler: 2. 1860–1949 M.M. Ve S.B.O. Mezunları* (Ankara: 1954), 242. No information on later postings is given, and we are informed that he “reportedly died” at an unknown point in time (*ölmüş*). The postings as kaymakam after 1912 clearly mark him as someone who was at least sympathetic to the Young Turk movement, and possibly also a member of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Hüseyin al-Cisr (Ḥusayn al-Jisr at-Ṭarābulusi, 1845–1909) was a conservative reform theologian, teacher and sufi (Khalvatiyya) sheikh from Tripoli/Trablusşam in present-day Lebanon.<sup>56</sup> He was educated at al-Azhar in Cairo, but, upon the death of his father, returned to Tripoli without having completed his studies. He spent most of his life in Tripoli, where he was active as a sheikh, teacher and journalist, but also traveled to Beirut and Cairo, spent a year at the Yıldız palace (i.e., at the court of Abdülhamid II.) in Istanbul, and performed the Hajj towards the end of his life.<sup>57</sup> His education and biography clearly make him a member of the provincial elite and the Ottoman “great” tradition. In 1879, al-Cisr was the founder of the *Madrassa al-Waṭaniyya*, a religious reform school that taught a modernized curriculum which included not only religious learning, but also some Western-style education in natural sciences (all in Arabic) and thus offered an alternative both to the Ottoman state’s provision and to Christian missionary schools. In 1882, the school had to be closed down when its students, unlike “real” *medrese* students, and probably upon the insistence of conservative-religious circles in the city, were made subject to military service.<sup>58</sup> Al-Cisr was very interested in the latest European-style scientific knowledge, whose development he closely followed through popular Arabic magazines published in Cairo and Beirut. He enjoyed some protection from Sultan Abdülhamid II., and, like many better-known religious reformers of his time – most notably Cemaleddin al-Afġānī (Jamāl ad-Din al-Afġānī), whom he met in 1894 in Istanbul, and Reşit Rızā (Rashīd Riḍā), who was his student at the Madrasa al-Waṭaniyya in Tripoli – taught an understanding of Islam that strove to protect the religious tradition while being open to modern technology and scientific exploration of the God-created world – at least those parts of it that were in harmony with the traditions. His most famous work is the *Risāle-yi Ḥamīdiye*, a learned refutation of Darwinism.<sup>59</sup> Johannes Ebert, to this day the only scholar to have written a (slim) monography about al-Cisr, describes the basic approach of his work as “using Islamic criteria to check [the findings of] modern science.”<sup>60</sup> Between 1893 and 1903, al-Cisr edited a newspaper that Johannes Ebert calls *Caridat al-Tarabulus*, which, according to him, was the only newspaper published in Tripoli in those years. It is probably identical with the above-mentioned paper *Ṭarābulus aş-Şām*.<sup>61</sup> According to Ebert, al-Cisr didn’t publish his pieces under his own name

56 For a discussion of his teachings and his social environment in Tripoli, see Dorothe Sommer, *Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Fraternity and Its Influence in Syria and the Levant*, Library of Ottoman Studies 37 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 50–51. According to Sommer, al-Cisr, unlike many other upper-class sufis in greater Syria, was not a freemason.

57 For a detailed account of his life and writings, see İlyas Çelebi, Hüseyin al-Cisr, in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 18, 537–40: <http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/pdf/c18/c180324.pdf> (last accessed February 22, 2017).

58 See Ebert, *Religion und Reform in der arabischen Provinz*, 79–82.

59 See Ebert, *Religion und Reform in der arabischen Provinz*, 138–51.

60 Ebert, *Religion und Reform in der arabischen Provinz*, 157.

61 Mahmoud Haddad also mentions a paper called *Trablus al-Sham*: Mahmoud Haddad, “Ottoman Economic Nationalism in the Press of Beirut and Tripoli (Syria) at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Economy as an Issue in the Middle Eastern Press*, eds. Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Martin Strohmeier, Neue Beihefte der Wiener

because journalism was not considered a proper activity for a religious scholar like him. Instead, he used the name of his friend Al-Buḥayrī, who owned the paper. Among the subjects al-Cisr wrote about were the destructive effects of free trade policies on trades and crafts in his hometown Tripoli and possible remedies to that situation.

### 3.2 The text

The booklet's title is *Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc*, but the actual text is headed by a question: "In which part of the world is the nation of Yecüc and Mecüc [located]?"<sup>62</sup> Mehmed Tevfik informs us that a certain Seyyid Hüseyin İbn Mehmed 'Ali bin Şehhab Bi-'Alevi, an *'ālim* from Calcutta, had asked this question, and that the Ottoman text is a translation of Hüseyin al-Cisr at-Ṭarabulusi's answer.<sup>63</sup> The first footnote (I assume that the footnotes were added by Mehmed Tevfik) follows right after this question, before the text has even started, presenting several etymologies for the names of Gog and Magog.<sup>64</sup> In his answer to the initial question, the author (being unable to verify, I simply assume that it was indeed al-Cisr) states that the question of Gog and Magog's location has occupied people's minds since ancient times, and that their existence is established by tradition.<sup>65</sup> He explains that, according to an Arabic tradition, the Abbasids sent reliable people to look for them, but could not find them, instead finding the Chinese Wall.<sup>66</sup> Later, the Europeans, too, travelled the earth "over and over" (*da'iren madar*), found the Eskimos on Greenland, and the Patagonians in South America, but never Gog and Magog. So, the author reasons, if the Europeans have traveled all corners of the earth, but have not found Gog and Magog, where could they be? Al-Cisr's answer is that the Europeans have actually not discovered all of the world. He first points out that the Europeans may well have discovered all continents, but nevertheless did not succeed at exploring all of their parts. They never penetrated the north and south poles, and prior to the

*Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 2 (Wien/Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008): 75–84, here 75.

62 "Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc ta'ifesi dünyânın ne tarafındadır?": see Hüseyin al-Cisr, *Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc, Jirayir Kete'on Matbaası: İstanbul 1327*, transl. Mehmed Tevfik (1912), 5 = <https://archive.org/details/yecucvemecuc0001me/mode/2up>.

63 I have been unable to identify this *'ālim*.

64 These appear to be based on an encyclopedia, but not the *Kamus* by Şemseddin Sami, in which I couldn't find an entry on Ye'cüc and Me'cüc.

65 "Mevcūdiyeti naş ile sābit olan tā'ife-yi Ye'cüc ve Me'cücün ne taraflarda bulunduđu minelkadīm ezhān-i 'umūmiyeyi işğāl itmekde olduğundan, murhūn-i 'arabdan ba'zılarının rivayātına nazaran mulūk-i 'Abbasiyeden al-Vāsik billah bile ta'ife-yi mezbūreniñ taḥrīsi için Çine iki mu'temed zāt göndermiş ve sedd-i Çiniñ müsāḥası ve evsāfı hakkında ma'lūmāt idinebildikleri hâlde 'Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc' tā'ifesine muşādif olamamışlardı." Al-Cisr, *Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc*, 6.

66 This probably is a reference to the journey of Sallam the Interpreter, who traveled to Central Asia in order to find Alexander's gate in the time of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Wāthiq (r. 842–47). Upon his return to Samarra, Sallam claimed to have found the wall and provided a detailed description of it. (This description closely resembles those in Syriac sources that must have been known to Sallam). See Emeri van Donzel and Andrea Schmidt, *Gog and Magog in Early Eastern Christian and Islamic Sources: Sallam's Quest for Alexander's Wall* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 170–73. Al-Cisr apparently was aware of the story, but interpreted it in the light of later explorations, which found the Chinese Wall. In this, he comes to the same conclusion as van Donzel and Schmidt, who argue that Sallam indeed traveled as far as the salt lake Lop Nor (in contemporary Xinchiang), where the western extension of the Great Wall is located. See *ibid.*, 234.

discoveries of Christopher Columbus, the areas to the north of Asia and the west of Europe used to be known as “the sea of darkness”.<sup>67</sup> He concludes this argument by stating “that God must have decided to postpone the discovery of that place [where they live] and make it impossible [for us to discover it] until the limits of time are reached.”<sup>68</sup> We may summarize his argument as “Human knowledge is limited by God, and all knowledge is a result of His will.” But apart from this (the limited nature of human knowledge), there is a second possibility: Ye’cüc and Me’cüc might live at one of the poles.<sup>69</sup> Al-Cisr clearly speaks of *two* poles here, and specifically mentions the south pole.<sup>70</sup> He explains that the poles, where a kind of perpetual twilight reigns, remain devoid of exploration.<sup>71</sup> Then he tries to fit this fact in with the Islamic tradition about Gog and Magog, and thus, with the story of *Zü’l-ḳarneyn*, the “two-horned.” He explains that, according to the *Ḳur’ān*, *Zü’l-ḳarneyn* went to a place called the “place of darkness” (*arż-ı zülümāt*), which clearly is meant to indicate one of the poles, “together with his minister *Ḥızr*, peace be upon him”.<sup>72</sup> “*Zü’l-ḳarneyn* went to the pole at those times, discovered Ye’cüc and Me’cüc, and prevented their assault [on the civilized parts of the world] by building the wall we all know about.”<sup>73</sup> The translator and annotator adds two footnotes at this point. The first deals with *Zü’l-ḳarneyn*, the second with *Ḥızr*. Only the first concerns us here. The *sūrat* that al-Cisr refers to is the one known as “the cave,” which contains bits and pieces that are quite clearly influenced by pagan, Jewish and Christian traditions, including the above-mentioned story of the seven sleepers and the Alexander Legend. He mentions some elements (such as the identification of *Zü’l-ḳarneyn*’s servant with the prophet *Ḥızr*) that are not part of the actual Quranic text, but have been commonly known and widely accepted throughout the history of Islam.<sup>74</sup> Concerning *Zü’l-ḳarneyn*, M. Tevfik disagrees with al-Cisr in referring to him as *İskender Zü’l-ḳarneyn*, only to then explain that he was “one of the follower-kings who once

67 “Amerikanın keşfinden muḳaddem Avrupa’nın ğarb ve Asya’nın şark cihetlerine o ‘aşrın ‘üleması “baḥr-i zülümāt” derlerdi.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 7.

68 “Ta’ife-i mezbûrenin min taraf-ı Allah zaman hurûclarına kadar keşf edilememek hükûmetine müste’nid olması lâzım geleceği şübhesizdir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 8.

69 “Ḳutubeynden birinde bulunması müste’ad değildir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 9.

70 Al-Cisr was probably unaware of the continent of Antarctica, but he must have (correctly) guessed that the south pole would also be covered with ice.

71 At this point, the translator inserts a footnote explaining the phenomenon of the northern lights, informing us that they have to do with magnetism, and therefore cause compass needles to get disoriented.

72 “Ḥattâ mevd-ı mebhûseyi teb’îd iden bir keyfiyet dahî Zülkarneynin vezîri bulunan ‘Ḥızr’ ‘aleyhesselam ile birlikde arz-ı zülümâta seyahat ettikleri fıkрасıdır ki burada arz-ı zülümâtdan maḳsad ḳutubeynden biridir.” Tevfik, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 9–10. In surah 18:59–82, it is Mūsā (Moses), not Dhū’l-Qarnayn, who is accompanied by an (unnamed) servant. The “land of darkness,” too, is not mentioned there, but in several Arabic *Ḳhiḍr*-legends. See Friedländer, *Chadhirlegende*, 123–24. For a recent study, see Patrick Franke, *Begegnung mit Khidr: Quellenstudien zum Imaginären im traditionellen Islam*, Beirut Texts and Studies 79 (Halle, Saale/Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000).

73 “Zü’lḳarneyn işte olvaḳitler ḳutuba gitmiş ve Ye’cüc ve Me’cücü keşfle anların şavlet ve hücumlarını sedd-i ma’lûmın inşasıyla mâni’ olmuştur.” Franke, *Begegnung mit Khidr*, 11.

74 The different strata and trans-religious influences informing this story form a distinct and rather well-researched area of research that I will not attempt to trespass into. The only point that interests us here is the question whether *Zü’l-ḳarneyn* is identical with the historical *İskender*, i.e., Alexander the Great. Author and translator disagree on this point, and as I shall argue that this difference is important.

ruled the Yemen.” (*vaktiyle Yemen’de hükmeden mulûk-u teb’adandır.*) He goes on to explain that there was also a second İskender, namely, Alexander the Great, “İskender Rûmî,” “who was once the ruler of Macedonia.” Zü’l-ķarneyn, in other words, is *not* identical with Alexander the Great. With this annotation, Mehmet Tevfik refers to a problem that is not mentioned in the actual text, but was probably well-known to its readers. From the earliest days of Islam, Islamic scholars debated the possibility that Alexander the Great and the Zü’l-ķarneyn mentioned in the Qur’ān may be identical, and several indeed argued that they were.<sup>75</sup> Those who argued against this idea thought that there were two İskenders, and some located the first one (the one mentioned in the Qur’ān) in Yemen.<sup>76</sup> While he disagrees about the identity of Zü’l-ķarneyn, concerning the question of Yecüc and Mecüc’s location, Mehmet Tevfik agrees with al-Cisr, who argues that the “place of darkness” must be one of the poles, for two reasons: First, the holy Qur’ān mentions that Zü’l-ķarneyn roamed the three ends of the world. The first two clearly are the east and the west, which leaves either the north or the south as the third end.<sup>77</sup> Second, “place of darkness” must refer to the vicinity of one of the poles because the sun very rarely shines there, and sometimes doesn’t appear at all.<sup>78</sup> The poles, however, have not been explored because they are surrounded by icebergs.<sup>79</sup> This, the author acknowledges, poses a problem, because the inhibitive coldness of that place, “which hinders the birds from flying,” would obviously keep not only all known people, but also Ye’cüc and Me’cüc from living there. It would also have hindered Zü’l-ķarneyn and his soldiers from reaching that place.<sup>80</sup> Al-Cisr therefore speculates that the poles must have been warmer in Zü’l-ķarneyn’s time. He argues that this assertion is proved by the fact that bones of elephants were found in Siberia (a reference to Mammoth bones?). Therefore, Zü’l-ķarneyn probably went to one of the poles when they were still much warmer and less covered with ice, built the wall that keeps Ye’cüc and Me’cüc from descending on the earth, and left again. Then, the weather got much colder and stayed that way. But how could humans (i.e., Ye’cüc and Me’cüc) live in such a cold environment? That, al-Cisr asserts, is “indeed strange.” He speculates that there must be places that are warmer than the

75 Friedländer, *Chadhirlegende*, 287. Friedländer explains that early Islamic scholars (unlike the prophet Muḥammad) were familiar with the Alexander Legend, which tells the story of *Alexander* building a wall against Gog and Magog.

76 On theories concerning the Yemenite connection, see Friedländer, *Chadhirlegende*, 286.

77 “Çünkü, Zülķarneyniñ seyāḥatı ḥaḳķındaki āyet-i kerīme kendisiniñ arziñ üç tarafını dolaşdığını nāṭıkdır ki bunlardan biri şark, diğeri ğarb ve üçüncüsü daḥī cihet-i şeliğedir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 9.

78 “Zirā şemsiñ ekseriyetle ve ḥattā ba’zen hiç rû yet olunamadığı maḥaller ḥavālī-yi kütubiyedir.” Tevfik, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 10. This argument very much resembles the one cited by Friedländer from Al-Ṭabarī (d. 923), who wrote in an Alexander biography that “he (Alexander) went with four hundred men into the darkness towards the north pole, while the sun was south of him, to look for the spring of life.” Friedländer, *Chadhirlegende*, 232.

79 The translator adds: “Quite some time ago, many travelers went to explore the pole, but they had to return with their [mission] unfinished. Now, it is well-known that two Americans named ‘Cook’ and ‘Perry’ have succeeded at exploring the North Pole.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 10.

80 “Kütublarda şimdiye kadar iktisāfât icrāsının ‘adem-i imkāni ḥavālī-yi kütubiyeniñ buzdağlarından ‘ibaret olmuş olmasından münbahişdir. Pekālā. O ḥâlde şiddet-i bürüdeti kuşlarıñ ṭayyaratını bile māni’ bir derecede olduğu ḥâlde Zülķarneyniñ ‘askeriyle naşıl olubda oralara gittiği ve öyle yerlerde tā’ife-yi ‘Yecüc ve Mecüc’üñ naşıl yaşayabildikleri ve bilāḥara naşıl olubda ḥurûc idecekleri sū’āl olunur (...).” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 10.

rest of the poles, much like the valleys that can be found below snow-covered mountaintops, which allow people to live there: “It is entirely possible that the all-powerful God created green fields and places where human life is possible on those other sides of the obstacles [composed of] masses of ice.”<sup>81</sup> This explanation raises the question how Ye’cüc and Me’cüc should ever manage to leave the poles. Al-Cisr’s answer is interesting because it contains a phenomenon we are quite familiar with today – climate change and global warming:

We know that the climate at the poles has been warmer before, and only changed with time to being so cold. It can therefore change into a warm climate again, and, with the will of God, the ice will melt, and when the eternal orders of the Almighty in the holy Ẓur’ān are fulfilled, that is, when the assigned time is completed, Ye’cüc and Me’cüc will naturally leave their places.<sup>82</sup>

The translator adds one last footnote here: “The ‘yellow peril’ that occupied the whole European press during the recent Russo-Japanese war must be a misreading of the peoples of Ye’cüc and Me’cüc, in whom we believe.”<sup>83</sup> With this last sentence, he makes it clear that he, too, believes in the existence of Gog and Magog, but does not believe that they should be identified with the Japanese. As we shall see, this is an important difference to Hāşim Velī’s perspective.

### 3.3 Discussion of *Yecüc ve Mecüc*

The question that al-Cisr and his translator/commentator M. Tevfik deal with is almost as old as monotheism, and their answer is in line with a tradition just as old: Gog and Magog must live at the margins of the known world. Al-Cisr’s text is based on two sources of knowledge: the latest geographic and cartographic information and Islamic tradition. He seeks to show that modern geography is in harmony with the teachings of Islam, while also making it clear that the limits of human knowledge are set by God: As long as God does not want humankind to find Gog and Magog, they will not be found. His article can be read as a pamphlet against the idea of

81 “Ḳuṭublarda daḥī mürur ve ‘ubūrī mānī’ bunca buz kitlelerinden müteşekkil ṭağlarıñ öte cihetlerinde insān ve ḥayvanātın yaşamasına müsa’id arāzī ve vadilerin bulunması daḥī müsteb’at değıldir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 11–2.

82 “Muḳaddema mevākī’-yi ḥāreden olduğı añlaşılan ḳuṭubeyniñ ba’zı cihetleri naşıl mürür-ı zamānla mevākī’-i bārideye ṭahavvül itmiş ise ileride ṭahavvülāt ve tebeddülāt-i ceviye(?) ile yine aḳālim-i ḥāreye tebeddül ve inkilāb iderek buz kitlelerinin erimesiyle cenāb-ı ḥaḳḳıñ Kur’ān-ı ‘azīm eş-Şāndaki irādāt-ı ezeliyesi yerini bulduğı zaman ya’nī mu’ayyen olan vaḳtın hulūlunda ‘Yecüc ve Mecüc’ tā’ifesiniñ ḥurūcları ṭabī’idir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 12.

83 “Geçen Rus ve Japon muḥārebesinde ‘tehlike-yi ‘ırḳ-ı aşfār’ nāmıyla bütün Avrupa maṭbu’atını işgāl iden mesele bizim mu’taḳid olduğumuz ‘Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc’ ṭā’ifesinden ḡalaṭ olsa gerekdir.” Al-Cisr, *Ye’cüc ve Me’cüc*, 12.

“unstoppable progress” that was widespread among late Ottoman intellectuals.<sup>84</sup> These very same intellectuals usually argued that Islam was in harmony with modern science. They did, however, differ from al-Cisr in one important aspect, namely the question of the relationship between both: Al-Cisr would probably have agreed with the physician and microbiologist Hüseyin Hulki (1861–1894), for whom the authority of Islam was clearly superior to that of science.<sup>85</sup> When al-Cisr wrote this text, there were only two areas of the earth left that had not yet been explored: the north pole and the south pole. When M. Tevfik published his translation, these areas, too, had been explored – and nobody had found Gog and Magog.<sup>86</sup> Unfortunately, Mehmet Tevfik does not discuss the significance of this fact for the validity of al-Cisr’s argument. His very last sentence “Ye’cüc and Me’cüc, in whom we believe,” however, indicates that he, too believed in the ultimate limitation of scientific knowledge by divine will. Moreover, his last comment makes it clear that he believed they would *eventually* be found somewhere on earth. His interest in the subject, much like that of his potential readers, was probably grounded in familiarity with the story of *Ye’cüc* and *Me’cüc*, and a desire to understand the world better – with the combined help of science and Islamic tradition. Neither he nor al-Cisr show any interest in a millenarian reading of the story of *Ye’cüc* and *Me’cüc*. Author and translator differ in only one major point, which is the identity of *Zü’l-ḳarneyn* and Alexander the Great. Al-Cisr must have been aware of the extensive literature that identified *Zü’l-ḳarneyn* with İskender, and he apparently was not troubled by the idea at all. In this, he may have been part of a trend among late nineteenth-century Arab authors (many of them living in Egypt) who used Alexander the Great (sometimes with Muhammad ‘Alī of Egypt, who was also from Macedonia, depicted as his modern incarnation) as a trope to refute European Orientalism by fitting themselves into a post-Hellenic tradition.<sup>87</sup> The annotator, however, appears to have been rather unhappy about the Alexander connection. As an Ottoman Muslim of his time, he was probably deeply concerned about the emergence of Christian nation-states on formerly Ottoman territory in the Balkans and the continuing irredentism of the Balkan nation-states, which claimed parts of Ottoman Macedonia for themselves. For this reason, he may have been intensely uncomfortable with the idea of a *Macedonian* king featuring in the holy Qur’ān.

#### 4. Hāşim Velī: the author and his time

84 M. Alper Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots. Debating Science, State, and Society in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2015), 182.

85 M. Alper Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*, 187.

86 *Servet-i Fünûn*, a popular scientific and literary magazine, reported on the expedition in no. 958, 1 Teşrinievvel 1325 (14 October 1909): <https://dspace.ankara.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12575/21479>.

87 See Michael Kreutz, “A Staged Return: Alexander the Great in the Modern Political Discourse of the Balkans in the Middle East,” *Historische Anthropologie* 18, no. 2 (2010).

A completely different approach to the matter is taken in a little booklet written in Ottoman Turkish, and published under the Arabic title *Efṣāḥu l-maḳāl fī-l-mesīḥi-d-deccāl, eṣrāṭu s-sā‘a* (Clear Sermon Concerning the Messiah and the Dajjal, or: [and] The Signs of the Hour) by Hāṣim Velī in R. 1332, i.e., 1916 or early 1917.<sup>88</sup> The text was clearly written after the Ottoman defeat in the first Balkan war and prior to the Ottoman state’s entry into World War I.<sup>89</sup> The text runs to 28 pages, and the price is given as 100 *para*, which in 1914 corresponded to between 20 and 25 percent of an unskilled laborer’s daily wage in Istanbul.<sup>90</sup> Its author, Hāṣim Velī, was certainly of much lesser importance than al-Cisr. We know very little about him. From 1905 onwards, and possibly until the Ottoman entry into the war, he served for many years as second *imām* at the Ottoman Embassy in Rome, which means that he, like Hüseyin al-Cisr, had a *medrese* education.<sup>91</sup> According to the official website of the Turkish freemasons, he was one of relatively few Ottoman ‘*ulemā*’ who were members of that organization.<sup>92</sup> His posting in Rome may have been a form of exile: it was common for government critics and other troublemakers to be posted to far-away embassies, and also for Ottoman diplomats to be friends with exiled people in those places – the lines between the two categories often blurred.<sup>93</sup> The idea that his stay in Rome may have been an involuntary one (like that of Mehmet Tevfik in Egypt) is supported by the booklet’s content, which shows that Hāṣim Velī (at least by the time he was writing the treatise) was an ardent enemy of sultan Abdülhamit II. (r. 1876–1909) and a supporter of the Young Turk movement. Apart from the

88 Hāṣim Velī, *Efṣāḥu l-maḳāl fī-l-mesīḥi-d-deccāl eṣrāṭu s-sā‘a* (Istanbul: Hikmet Matbaası, 1332 [1916/17]). The title is Arabic, but since the booklet was written in Ottoman Turkish, I transcribe the title, too, according to its pronunciation in that language. I have worked with a photocopy made by Leiden University Library, which unfortunately lacks the title page. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences also owns an original copy, and two more copies are held by Ankara University.

89 In the library catalogs of Leiden and Ankara universities, the year 1332 is interpreted as a *Hicrī* date (1913), whereas the Hungarian Academy of Sciences gives 1916 as the year of publication, reading it as a *Rumī* year. Since this is a religious treatise, use of the *Hicrī* calendar would make sense. However, the latest historical event mentioned in the text dates to the spring of 1914, therefore a *Hicrī* dating (in which 1332 would correspond to April 1912 – March 1913) cannot be intended.

90 100 *para* equalled 2,5 *kuruş*. On the eve of WWI, 2 *kuruş* would buy a loaf of bread weighing 1,28 kg, and unskilled laborers made between 10 and 12 *kuruş* per day. See Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), 208.

91 See Ilaria Falconi and Sinan Kuneralp, *Palazzo Gamberini: Türkiye’nin Roma büyükelçiliği Palazzo Gamberini Ambasciata di Turchia in Roma* (İstanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfı, 2013), 32: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/Yayinlar/roma.pdf> (last accessed May 8, 2020). Another work of his, a paraphrase (*şerh*) of the *mevlūd*, identifies him as “second imam at the Ottoman embassy in Rome”: Orhan Kaplan, “Son Dönem Osmanlı Müelliflerinden Roma Sefareti İmamı Haşim Velî’nin Mevlid Şerhi: ‘Esrar-ı Mevlidü’n-Nebi,’” *Divan Edebiyatı Araştırmaları Dergisi* 9 (2012): 111–38 (116) = [http://devdergisi.com/Makaleler/97670113\\_4.pdf](http://devdergisi.com/Makaleler/97670113_4.pdf) (last accessed May 8, 2020).

92 The Turkish freemasons’ website lists forty politicians, ten officers, twenty-nine scientists (including engineers), sixteen poets and writers, fifteen artists (including musicians), seven “educators” and five men of religious learning as members. Apart from “embassy imam Haşim Velî,” these are Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım Efendi, Şeyhülislam Hayri Efendi, Berlin embassy imam Mustafa Hafız Şükrü, and Mahmut Esat Efendi: <https://www.mason.org.tr/tuerkiye-de-uenlue-masonlar> (last accessed August 3, 2020).

93 A famous example is Hoca Taḥsîn Efendi, who served as *imām* at the Ottoman embassy in Paris and was close friends with Namık Kemāl and his fellow exiles. See Mardin, *Young Ottoman Thought*, 222.

*Eşrātu s-sā‘a*, he authored at least nine other books and booklets, including several about the Mevlevi order (which might suggest that he was a Mevlevi himself)<sup>94</sup> and a list of Islamic works held by the library of the Vatican. He also translated a treatise about marriage in Islam into Ottoman Turkish and Italian. This booklet was published in Rome in 1914, suggesting that he may still have lived there at that point.<sup>95</sup> His last publication, a dictionary of Turkish proverbs, was published in 1926.<sup>96</sup> Given that so little is known about him, it seems likely that he, much like ‘Alī Suavi, came from a modest social background and could therefore be labeled a member of the lower ‘*ulemā*’, and thus of the little tradition. Apart from the original Ottoman text of his *Eşrāt us-Sā‘a*, which seems to have survived in only three library collections worldwide, there is an abbreviated and annotated translation into modern Turkish, which also provides the (mostly authoritative) *aḥādīth* sources used by Velī.<sup>97</sup>

#### 4.1. The text

Unusually, Hāşim Velī’s tractate starts not with the *besmele* (*bismillah*) formula, but with a prayer asking for divine protection against Satan. The prayer is followed by an annotation explaining why the text is not headed by the traditional *besmele*: “With the appearance of the signs of the Hour, the noble *besmele* has become an unsheathed sword [against] the wicked nations, therefore it will no longer provide those with comfort who are not true believers.”<sup>98</sup> In the preface (*muḳaddeme*), Velī proceeds to explain that the prophetic traditions describe the signs preceding *ḳiyāmet* in ways that only the initiated can correctly understand. Others before him (including Mevlānā Celāleddin Rūmī and several more recent *şeyhs*) were familiar with these meanings, but refrained from revealing them. However, he states that, now that these signs have actually appeared, it has become necessary to uncover their previously hidden meanings.<sup>99</sup> He makes it very clear that the Hour has already arrived: “In a nutshell: What happened has happened. The End has arrived.”<sup>100</sup> With this prologue, he places his text very clearly in the realm of apocalyptic writing. On the following twenty-three pages, Velī lists the classic signs of *ḳiyāmet* as described in the *aḥādīth* (and, occasionally, in the

94 It is well-known and uncontroversial that many prominent Young Turks were freemasons, and it has been argued that freemasonry and sufism in the area influenced each other. See Thierry Zarcone, *Mystiques, philosophes et Francs-Maçons en Islam: Rıza Tevfik, penseur ottoman (1868–1949), du soufisme à la confrérie*, Bibliothèque de l’Institut Français d’Études Anatoliennes d’Istanbul 37 (Paris: Libr. D’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, 1993).

95 Walī-allāh ad-Dihlawī; Hāşim Velī, *Huḡḡat allāh al-bāliḡa fī asrār aš-şarī‘a tarḡumasi, islāmījatde izdiwāḡ = Il fidanzamento e le nozze nell’Islam*, Roma Casa ed. 1914.

96 Hāşim Velī, *Mevlānā Tarikatı* (Bekir Efendi Matbaası, 1327 [1911]); Hāşim Velī, *Atalar Sözü* (Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1342 [1926]).

97 Kamil Çakın, “Kıyamet Alametleri,” *Dini Araştırmalar* 6, 16 (2003): 183–198 = [http://isamveri.org/pdfdrg/D01949/2003\\_16/2003\\_16\\_CAKINK.pdf](http://isamveri.org/pdfdrg/D01949/2003_16/2003_16_CAKINK.pdf).

98 “Besmele-yi şerīfe risālemizden ṭayy idilmiştir. Çünkü eşrāt-ü sâ‘aniñ zuhūru ḳavm-ı şirāra seyf-i meslūl maḳāmında olduğundan ḥaḳīḳī ehl-i imān olmayanlara fī ma‘abed besmele-yi şerīfeniñ taẓmīn ettiḡi merḥamet yokdur.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 3.

99 “Aḡır zamān ‘alāmeti olarak irā‘e idilen elfāzdeki remz ü işāretleri oldukça izāḥ itmiş.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 5.

100 “Hūlāşa olan oldu. Kıyāmet ḳopdu.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 5.

Qur'ān) explaining the meanings of certain words and terms in the “language of truth” (*lisān-i ḥakīkat*), and then proceeding to match them to the actual events and people to which they correspond. Expecting his readers to be familiar with the relevant traditions, he never gives any explicit references to *aḥādīth*. There are, however, occasional short citations from the *Qur'ān* (in Arabic), as well as much longer ones from Yazıcıoğlu's *Muḥammediye*. Moreover, there are some citations from Celāleddin Rūmī's works. Only one book, a *tefsīr* by a certain Şeyḫ Cemaleddin al-Ḳermānī titled *Keşfü'l-esrār ve hetkü'l-estār*, is referenced in a footnote. Velī starts his discussion with the *Deccāl* (*Dajjāl*), whom he describes as having already appeared numerous times throughout history (*nice Deccāl zuhūr itmiş*).<sup>101</sup> He also points out that the *Deccāl* already appears as the wicked “antéchrist” (French in the original) in other holy books, centuries before the descent (*nuzūl*) of the Ḳur'ān.<sup>102</sup> His last, and by far most devastating personification, however, took place during the reign of sultan Abdülhamit II: “The appearance of the cursed *Deccāl*, as everybody knows, is the regency of Abdülhamit II., which brought about boundless discord, evil, and disorder.”<sup>103</sup> Velī explains that the description of the *Deccāl* as blind in one eye has to be taken metaphorically: it is not a real eye, but rather an inability to see certain things: “The *Deccāl*'s eye for perceiving the true nature of Islam is blind.”<sup>104</sup> It is also said in the language of truth that the *Deccāl* shall “advocate the Jewish religion. This is a reference to the hypocritical importance that the Jewish religion attaches to outer appearance, [which hinders Jews from] coming into touch with the real meaning and truth [of the divine revelation, i.e., Islam].”<sup>105</sup> Velī devotes almost a page to several etymological explanations for the meaning of the name “*Deccāl*,” all of which are related to wickedness, deceitfulness, etc. Summing up, he states that “all these meanings fit the character of the Hamidian government.”<sup>106</sup> The second sign of the Hour is the emergence of a yellow race, the “Sons of the Yellow One” (*beni'l-eşfār*). Velī starts his discussion of their identity with a citation from Yazıcızade's *Muḥammediye*: “the *hadiş* narrators have asked: who are the Sons of Yellow One? [and they have answered:] the Franks.”<sup>107</sup> He adapts this answer to his time: they are “the sons of Moscow, a purely yellow race,” and their renegades, the Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin and

101 Velī, *Efşāh*, 6. For a discussion of *Deccāl* in Islamic tradition, see A. Abel, “al-Daḍḍjāl,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, eds. P. Bearman et al.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_SIM\\_1654](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_1654) (last accessed May 30, 2020).

102 “(A)ntéchrist” in the original: ḥattā nuzūl-i Ḳur'āndan ‘aşırlarla sene muḳaddem “antéchrist” nāmiyle kütüb-i muḳadessede Deccāl-i la'īn yād idilmekde ve şerrinden isti'āza olunmaḳda idi.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 6.

103 Deccāl-i la'īnīn ḥurūcu ki ḥükümet-i Hamīdiyenīn devam ittiği müddetten ‘ibāret olup fitn ü şurūr ü fesād-i nā-maḥşūruñ vūḳu'udur ki herkesiñ ma'lūmudur.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 7.

104 “Deccāl-i la'īnīn ma'rifet-i Allah taḥşīl idecek ve māhiyet-i İslāmiyeyi görecek gözü kördür.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 7.

105 “Yahūdī mezhebinı tervīc ideceği de lisān-i ḥaḳīkatıñ ifādesidir. Ya'nī yalnız mezhebiñ zāhirine riyākārāne bağlanüb ma'ānā ve ḥaḳīkata aşlā temās etmeyeceği de içündür.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 7.

106 “Şimdi te'mil idelim: bu ma'ānā-yı kāffesi ‘Abdülhamidiñ hükümetine biḥaḳḳ muşaddık idi.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 8.

107 “Muḥaddisler dediler kim beni-l-eşfārdır Efrenç.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 10.

Greek governments, who invaded all of Rumelia (in the Balkan Wars).<sup>108</sup> Another manifestation of the “Sons of the Yellow One” is Germany, which was created out of many small states, and whose emergence (as a nation state) marks the Germans’ gaining control over the world economy.<sup>109</sup> The third sign of the approaching of the Hour is the descent (*nuzūl*) of ‘*Īsā*.<sup>110</sup> Here, Velī makes a small detour into the realm of Christology. Dwelling on the meaning of *nuzūl*, he argues that it is a reference to ‘*Īsā* being born by Meryem (Mary), and thus to the physical manifestation of his spiritual presence.<sup>111</sup> The name *Īsa* actually means “true *mehdī*” in the language of truth – and therefore is not a reference to the return of the historical Jesus.<sup>112</sup> Like the Deccāl, ‘*Īsā* has already appeared several times, in the form of different righteous people, but his last and most important appearance is that taking place at the present time. Another name for him is *Ruḥullah*. According to one tradition, ‘*Īsā* will kill the pigs and revoke the *cizye* (*jizya*, the head tax paid by non-Muslims living under Muslim rule). “Swine,” Velī explains, means impurity and filth.<sup>113</sup> The lifting of the *cizye* represents the passing of laws by the freedom-lovers (the Young Turks) that have mitigated previous grievances.<sup>114</sup> Citing a *ḥadiṣ* (*ḥadīth*) in Arabic, Velī reiterates that ‘*Īsā*’s appearance is one of the signs of the Hour: He will descend onto the holy earth/place called “*Afīk*” (*al-arḥ al-muḥaddesāt ismuhā Afīk*) and hold a lance in his hand, with which he will kill the *Deccāl* (*biyaduhī ḥarbatun yaḳtulu bihā ad-deccāla*).<sup>115</sup> He will break the cross, put fire to the churches and synagogues, and enter the Dome of the Rock at the time of the morning prayer. Velī explains that “holy earth” actually refers to a woman here.<sup>116</sup> The breaking of the cross, the burning of churches and places of worship must be understood in the sense that all other religions will be revoked (*edyān-ı muḥtelifeyi ref’ ideceğine*).<sup>117</sup> As for the arrival of a *mehdī* from among the descendants of the prophets (another sign of the Hour), Hāşim Velī argues that this, too, has to be taken metaphorically: All true ‘*ülemā*, regardless of their race, are, according to another *ḥadiṣ*, heirs of the

108 “Hālis şarı cins olan Moskofuñ oğulları ve iḥyā girdesi olan Bulğar, Şırp, Karadağ, Yunan hükümetlerinin ḥurūc ve bütün Rūm ilı kazāsını istilālarıdır.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 11.

109 “Almanya devletiniñ keyfiyet-i teşekkülü de müte’addid küçük hükümetlerin ittiḥādı olduğı cihetle beni’l-aşfār ‘unvānına lāyiktir. Bu hālde onların ḥurūcu, cihānı iktisāden ḳabza-yı teşḥirine aldıklarına işārettir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 11.

110 On ‘*Īsā* in the Islamic tradition, which Velī clearly assumes to be well-known to his readers, see Georges C. Anawati, “‘*Īsā*,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, eds. P. Bearman et al.: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912\\_islam\\_COM\\_0378](http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0378) (last accessed May 30, 2020).

111 “‘*Īsa* bin Meryem ‘aleyhesselāmın ruḥāniyetten cismāniyete nuzūlu ve zuḥuru dimektir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 12.

112 “Ḥazret-i ‘*Īsa* aleyhesselām lisān-ı ḥaḳīḳatta mahdi-yi ḥaḳikat ma’ānāsındadır.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 12.

113 “(D)omuzları ḳatıl ve cizyeyi ḳaldırması. Ḥinzir demek pislik, mürdārlik ma’nāsındadır. Velī, *Efşāh*, 13.

114 “Cizyenin ref’i ḥürriyet perverāndan taḥfif-i muşākī-yi mu’eddī ḳavāniniñ vaḳ’idir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 13.

115 Velī, *Efşāh*, 13.

116 “Ḥazret-i ‘*Īsā*niñ teşekkül ve tenezzül ideceğı maḥall olarak irā’e idilen arz-ı muḳaddese ḳadıdır.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 14.

117 “(V)e ma’bedleri taḥrīb eylemesi edyān-ı muḥtelifeyi ref’ ideceğine işārettir.” The phrase is ambiguous. “Ref’ etmek would usually be translated as “lifting” or “removing.” I understand it to mean the opposite of *nuzūl* (descend) – i.e., the “lifting back up” (in German: *Aufhebung*) of divine revelation. “Edyān-i muḥtelife” translates as “various religions” and might include Islam, too. However, judging from the context, I think that it only refers to the other book religions, not Islam. Velī, *Efşāh*, 14.

prophet by virtue of their true faith.<sup>118</sup> It is said that the *mehdi* will use his sword to split the *Deccāl* in two. Another name for him (the *mehdi*) is young fellow (*fetā*), which means “jeune” (French in the original).<sup>119</sup> This clearly indicates those true words of the bill that the freedom lovers with the strength resembling that of a young man, printed, published, and gave to Yıldız [palace].<sup>120</sup> Velī probably means the 1908 ultimatum with which the rebellious army in Ottoman Macedonia (the Young Turks) forced Abdülhamit II. to reinstate the constitution of 1876. Velī thus insinuates that the *mehdi* is not a person, but the Young Turk movement and its actions. At this point, Velī jumps back from twentieth-century politics to the *Muhammediye*, citing a passage about peaceful times when the wolf will dwell with the sheep – only to add that there is plenty of time left until that day.<sup>121</sup> Several last evil actors that (falsely) claim to represent true Islam, but are actually manifestations of the *Deccāl*, stand in the way. As examples, Velī lists “uprisings and reactionary [incidents]” (*ihtilāl ve irticā*) such as the *Kör ‘Ali vaḳ‘ası*, the 13 (sic) *Mart ḥadişesi* (31 March 1325/13 April 1909), and the Bitlis *aḥvāl* (of 1914?).<sup>122</sup> The next sign of the Hour is the sun rising from the West. For this, Hāşim Velī offers a rather interesting explanation: The sun has to be taken metaphorically, as meaning “light,” i.e., the arrival of knowledge and education.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, “sun” is another word for the soul, while the west is the human body. This means that knowledge is spread by people.<sup>124</sup> Starting from the times of Ibn Ruşd and al-‘Arabi, knowledge came to the East from the West [i.e., from *al-Andalus*].<sup>125</sup> European knowledge was built on Islamic foundations that were first transported from the East to the West much like ingots of metal that now “return as finest golden jewelry.”<sup>126</sup> As for the *Dabbat ül-Arz*, which is described by Yazıcızāde (and several *aḥādīth*) as having an ox-like head, pig-like eyes, ears like an elephant, the breast of a lion, and two wings:<sup>127</sup> The description, according to Hāşim Velī, perfectly fits the Jesuit order

118 ‘Arab olmak lâzım değildir. (...) herhangi ‘ırkıdan olursa olsun ma‘ānan ‘akrabā-yi Muḥammedī ve sādāt-i Ḥassanīndirler. Velī, *Efşāh*, 15–16.

119 Velī, *Efşāh*, 16.

120 “‘jeune’ tesmiye idilen zāt, o vaḳit ḥürriyetperver olarak te’sis iden ve ḥaḳıḳat-i beyyin bulunan zevātın fetā gibi ‘azm-i kuvvā ile ḥürriyetperverāne ṭab‘ ve neşridilen ve lâyiḥa ṭarzında Yıldız virilen ṭoḡru sözlerinden ‘ibaretdir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 16.

121 “Muḥammediye: Helāk olsa kaçan Deccāl deveyle yavruya arslān/koyun kurd ile yavruya hiç itmeye ḥiyānātı/yılanla oynaya oḡlan cihān emin ve imān ola (...) Bu yolda şulḥ-i ‘umūmī ve sa‘ādet-i beşeriyeye ḥayli zamān daha lâzımdır.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 17.

122 Velī, *Efşāh*, 18. The *Kör Ali* incident was a small protest against the Young Turk regime that took place in Istanbul in October 1908. With “Bitlis ahvalı,” Hāşim Velī may have referenced a rather mysterious Kurdish uprising in that province that took place in the spring of 1914. For an account of the uprising, see, Yektan Türkyılmaz, *Rethinking Victimhood: Violence and Victimhood in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1915* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Cultural Anthropology Duke University: 2011), 73–77.

123 “Ma‘lūm olsun ki ‘ulūm ve ma‘ārifin ḥarfı ve kelimesi güneşdir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 18.

124 “Maḡreb el-şems beden-i insāndır (...) bu gibi teraḳḳi ve ḥaḳāiḳin insāndan zuḥūruna işāretidir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 18.

125 Velī, *Efşāh*, 18.

126 “Esās-i islāmīyet güyā külce ḥālinde Avrupa’ya naḳl olundu da şoñradan müfassalan [detailed] ve müṭarran [fresh] altun olarak yine şarkā ‘avdet itmekdedir.” Velī, *Efşāh*, 18.

127 Çakın reads “kandili” here, but it clearly is “kanadları.” Ibid., 20; Çakın, “Kıyamet Alametleri,” 194.

(*Cizvit cemiyet-i ruḥānisi*). The lion's breast is an allegory to the society's strength, the two wings signify the railway and the steam ship, which both allow the Jesuits to spread to the last corners of the world.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, it is known that the beast speaks all languages, and especially pure Arabic. The Jesuits print and distribute books in many languages, and often in Arabic, and take away the money and property of many people. The beast is based in the place that is also the real base of the Great Powers: the Vatican in Rome.<sup>129</sup> The Jesuits protect the poor and punish those who inflict suffering on others, two characteristics that have been ascribed before to the beast of the earth. Besides Mecca and Medina, there is no place left that the Jesuits have not set foot in. They have roamed all of Asia, China, Japan, America, and Africa, and will continue to do so as long as God wishes.<sup>130</sup> Having explained all of this, Hāşim Velī points out that there is, actually, nothing to fear, because the arrival of doomsday (*ḳiyāmet*) will only bring harm to the wicked.<sup>131</sup> The appearance of signs of the Hour is no reason to be alarmed, at least not for those who support freedom and for those who truly believe. What God has planned to happen will happen. The great signs of the Hour have appeared, and the devastating events taking place in Rumelia and other Muslim countries are already a part of *ḳiyāmet*.<sup>132</sup> As a final sign of the Hour, Hāşim Velī discusses the appearance of Ye'cüc and Me'cüc. He states that the collapsing of "Ye'cüc's wall" is presented in the *Şaḥiḥ ahādīs* (the collection of aḥādīth *al-Jāmi' al-şahīh*) compiled by Buḥārī (Muḥammad al-Bukhārī) as an imminent event, and that, in the "language of truth," the "nations of Ye'cüc" signifies all those nations whose culture and progeny are in the process of corruption, while "Zü'lkarneyn" is a reference to all those laws whose laying down helps to fight corruption and sedition.<sup>133</sup> As with the other signs, he states that they, too, have already appeared several times, for instance, in the form of Hülagü (Hülegü Khan) and Cingiz (Genghis Khan), devastating the face of the earth. The Chinese wall is but one of many historical walls constructed to keep them at bay – in fact, all important cities, including Peking, Istanbul, and Rome, are surrounded by walls for this reason.<sup>134</sup> Zü'lkarneyn, who walled Ye'cüc and Me'cüc off from the civilized world, too, is only a name for several just rulers who appeared several times in the course of history. Seen from Arabia, Ye'cüc

128 "İki kanadlı olması şimendüfer, vapur gibi sür'at-i seyr şāḥibi olan alāt-ı serī'e ile dünyānıñ her tarafına seyr ve hulül itmelerine işaretdir." Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 20.

129 Dābbet ül-arzıñ her lisānda ve 'alā el-ḥuşūş 'arabca fasīḥ-i tekellüm ideceğide lisān-i ḥaḳīkatıñ cümle-yi ifādātındandır. Cemiyet-i mezkûre müte'addid lisānda ve bi-lḥaşşa 'arab lisānında birçok kitāblar ṭab' ve neşr iderek ḥalkıñ emvāl ü nüḳüdunu celb-i vaşid itmeleri (...) Dābbetülarzıñ istinādğāḥı düvel-i mu'azzama-i kuvvā el-erkān maḳām-ı aşılları Roma'da Vatiḳandır. Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 21.

130 Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 22.

131 "(e)şrāt-ı sâ'atdan her hangisi olursa olsun ehli imāna göre fā'idalı, eşirräya nisbetle zararlıdır." Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 23.

132 "Rûm ili'de ve sâ'ir memālik-i islāmiye'de vukû'ûbular fecār' ile ḳiyāmet vukû' bulmuşdur." Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 24.

133 Şaḥiḥ Müslim ve Buḥārī'niñ ityān ittiği aḥādīs-i şerīfede sedd-i Yecüc'ün inhidāmını pek yakın olarak göstermişlerdir. Aḳvām-ı Ye'cücüye lisān-i ḥaḳīkatda ḥars ve nesli ifsād iden her cem'iyete itlāk olunduğu gibi sedd de fesād-i fitneye māni' olan ḳavānīn-i 'āliyeden ve Zülkarneyn de ānıñ vaz'ından ibārettdir. Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 25.

134 Velī, *Efşāḥ*, 25.

and Me'cüc are those peoples that live to the east and the north-east, and they have broken the wall several times before. Their biggest and last invasion, however, is ongoing.<sup>135</sup> This is the invasion of Asia by China and Japan (in the 1890s), the Japanese conquest of Korea and Manchuria, and the discussion of the idea to migrate to Asia Minor and Anatolia in the Tokyo newspapers. That the idea "Asia for the Asians" is gaining popularity in China is yet another sign that Ye'cüc and Me'cüc have appeared.<sup>136</sup> Their confrontation with the Mehdi will, according to several aḥādīth, take place in Damascus. Since the role of the Mehdi is played by the freedom-lovers, it is them that will, together with 'Īsā ("Ruhullah"), have to confront Ye'cüc and Me'cüc there. The wall constructed against them, according to the dictionary of 'Asim Efendi the translator (d. 1819), is a spiritual one constructed by the prophet 'Alī.<sup>137</sup> As a result of their appearance, the truth will become more apparent, and Islam will gain even more glory.<sup>138</sup> The treatise ends with an epilogue in which Velī presents sufism as the path through which the relationship between people, animals and inanimate objects on the one hand and the letters and words given to them in the Qur'ān can be better understood.

#### 4.2. Contextualization and Interpretation

Hāşim Velī's *Eşrātu s-sā'a* was clearly written under the impression of the Balkan Wars and the huge territorial losses they brought about, which formed a collective trauma for Ottoman Muslims (and especially for those members of the elite who hailed from those territories). It is therefore hardly surprising that he recognizes the "Sons of the Yellow One" in the member states of the Balkan League and in Tsarist Russia. As he states towards the end of the treatise, the "catastrophes" in Rumelia (probably a reference to anti-Muslim atrocities and the resulting forced migrations, as well as the collective humiliation of military defeat, territorial losses, and European colonial expansion in North Africa), are not only a sign of the Hour, but actually form part of *kıyāmet*.

A much more far-fetched idea is that pertaining to the Dabbat ül-Arz representing the Jesuit Order. While the Jesuits were also present in the Ottoman Empire, they were, at least by the early twentieth

135 "Ye'cüc ve Me'cüc'ün iklimi 'Arabistana nisbetle şark ve şark şimali aqvāmından 'ibāretidir. Bu kavim-i seddleri hedm iderek mā sabıḳda beyān olunduḡu vechle müte'addid ḡurūcları vukū' bulmuş, ayak başdıḡları yeri ḡarābezāre çevirmişlerdir. Faḡaḡ şoñ ve 'aẓīm ḡurūcları ḡāl-i ḡazırda ve henüz zamānımızda vukū' bulmaḡdadır." Velī, *Efşāḡ*, 26.

136 "Ya'nī Çin ve Japon aqvāmı camī' 'aẓimetiyle Asya'yı taẓyīḡ ve iḡāta itmekde oldukları ya'nī Japonya'nın Kore ve Manḡurya istilası ve ḡattā Japonların Asya-yı şaḡırā ve Anaḡoluya muḡāceret fikrinin mevzū'-ı baḡş olması ve Tokyo maḡallī gazetelerinin bu bābda teşvikāti, ve Çin'de aşār-i intibāḡ ve tayḡaz görölerek 'Asya Asyalılarının' dır fikri kesbi ta'ammüm itmesi [...] Ye'cüc ve Me'cücün meydān-i 'alāniyete geldiḡini ve ḡurūclarını irā'e ider." Velī, *Efşāḡ*, 26.

137 Hāşim Velī probably refers to Fairūzābādī's (1329–1414 AD) *Al-Qāmūs al-Muḡīḡ*, which is known simply as "the dictionary" ("al-Qāmūs"). 'Asim Efendi published a famous Turkish translation in 1814. See Mustafa S. Kaçalın, "Mütercim Āsim Efendi," (first published 2006) *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*: <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/mutercim-asim-efendi> (last accessed August 3, 2020).

138 "Aqvām-i Ye'cücüyenin ḡurūcu ḡaḡa'ikün daha ziyāde zuḡūruna sebeb olacaḡı cihetle İslāmiyet daha parlayacaktır." Velī, *Efşāḡ*, 27.

century, certainly much less important than the various Protestant missions. Velī's focus on the catholic Jesuits is probably due to his prolonged stay in Rome, where he certainly came in contact with Catholicism. His anti-Catholic position may also have been a result of his freemasonry.

Hāşim Velī is remarkably oblivious to geographical references to Palestine. He mentions the Dome of the Rock (which İsa will enter at the time of the morning prayer) and Syria (where the final battle will take place, probably a reference to Dābiq in present-day Syria) only in passing, and is not interested in the hill 'Aḫḫ, to which İsa is bound to descend, preferring to interpret it as "a woman." This is remarkable since that hill, according to many *aḫādīth*, is supposed to be located in Palestine, which was still part of the Ottoman Empire in 1914.<sup>139</sup> Hāşim Velī, however, appears to care a great deal more for the territories lost in the Balkan Wars as well as for Anatolia, which he believes to be claimed by the Japanese, whom he – rather far-fetchedly – identifies as the Gog and Magog of his time. While this reference to the Japanese may have been inspired by European fears of the "yellow peril" following the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 (which Mehmet Tefvīk also discusses, but dismisses in his booklet), Velī's focus on Anatolia suggests that he, like many Young Turks such as Mustafa Kemal, had already given up on the Arab provinces and instead started to consider Anatolia as the future homeland of the Ottoman Turks. Like Kemal, he may well have hailed from Macedonia.

## 5. Conclusion

Hüseyin al-Cisr and Hāşim Velī were worlds apart. While the first wrote in Tripolis (Trablusşam), in the relative tranquility of the 1890s, and from the position of a well-respected, established scholar who was loyal to the Hamidian regime, the latter was an obscure, lower-level *‘ālim* who supported the Young Turk government. Both practiced sufism: Al-Cisr was a Ḥalvatiyya şeyḫ, and it seems reasonable to think that Velī may have been a member of the Mevlevi order- and a freemason. This, however, is not surprising given that almost every Muslim in the Empire was linked to one sufi order or another. Moreover, the freemasons welcomed Muslims as members, and their mystical practices may have been particularly attractive for sufis. And indeed, both authors appear to have written for a mainstream audience, i.e., for people who were familiar with the apocalyptic stories in Qur'ān and *aḫādīth* – which were transmitted both orally and through popular works such as the *Muḥammediye* by Yazıcızade.

One might be tempted to think that al-Cisr, who observed the destructive effects of cheap imports and certainly also the arrival of destitute refugees of the 1877–78 war with Russia, would have had reason to describe his time as one very close to the arrival of the last Hour. However, he did not do

139 See Georges C. Anawati, "'İsā."

so. His text is a serious attempt by a late Ottoman *‘ālim* at locating Alexander’s gate and Gog and Magog that uses the latest European scientific knowledge in order to interpret the information given in the Qur’ān. It forms an interesting engagement of a well-informed, conservative religious scholar with the problem of ever-expanding human knowledge. We may say that this text deals not so much with doomsday (which, as its author argues, will *eventually* come) – but rather insists on the divine limitation of human science and knowledge. What he argues is that human scientific knowledge proves and re-affirms the divine revelation recorded in the Qur’ān. Al-Cisr, much unlike Hāşim Velī, doesn’t try to reveal any hidden meanings in the holy traditions. His approach to the Qur’ān, to *aḥādīth* and Islamic tradition in general is a literal one – Gog and Magog must be real people, and they really must live behind a barrier that has not yet been found. Al-Cisr wrote as a member of the great tradition; he didn’t anticipate *kıyāmet* for the near future. His argument that Gog and Magog will be released by a warming of the poles was certainly not intended to be read as a prophecy – yet, in light of ongoing global warming, it appears as one today.

Hāşim Velī’s perception is similar to al-Cisr’s insofar as he, too, looks for “real” phenomena and people that match the descriptions in the Qur’ān and in Islamic tradition. Yet, he takes things much less literally than al-Cisr, instead reading the texts as allegories on actual political events of his time. His frequent mention of previous invasions and of impersonations of Zü’lkarneyn suggests a somewhat secularized reading of the idea of doomsday, which is no longer presented as a singular event. On the other hand, he makes it very clear that the ongoing signs of the Hour really are the very last in history.

Velī does not look for a real, monstrous creature (the *Dābba*), but instead matches its description with certain features of the Jesuits. Likewise, he does not believe that the sun might one day shine from the West – instead taking this to mean that the light of knowledge is shining from the West. His approach is completely different from al-Cisr’s insofar as he does not look, but has already found: the end of times has already arrived. Indeed, he probably started out from an eschatological *Lebensgefühl* and then started to match his favorite enemies (Abdülhamid, the Jesuits, the Balkan League, domestic political opposition to the Young Turks) with the cast of characters that can be found in the Islamic tradition. In this sense, his sermon appears as a rare written example of eschatological thought in the Ottoman little tradition.

While al-Cisr is not interested in matching any real events with those described in the holy texts, Hāşim Velī does exactly that. The political, economic and social situation in 1913–14 was already more than dire and further deteriorated throughout the war years. We know that there was a widespread sense of an upcoming catastrophe among many educated (i.e., literate) Ottoman

Muslims at that time, and Velī's booklet may have addressed exactly this audience.<sup>140</sup> It may also be the written version of one or several sermons addressed to illiterate Muslims. In the face of the devastating and humiliating defeat in the Balkan Wars, ordinary Muslims could have been attracted to Velī's message, which, after all, told them that things would get worse only for a while – to eventually culminate in Judgment Day. According to Velī's account, the Ottomans (and especially the Young Turks) were already fighting a spectacular, final battle between Good and Evil, which the evil side would eventually lose. His treatise suggests a sense of uncompromising mercilessness towards the Muslim opposition that one can only too easily imagine to be turned against other groups. Last but not least, Velī's reasoning behind the omission of the *besmele* suggests more than a little measure of antinomism. Written in 1914 (most probably prior to the outbreak of World War I), this treatise suggests that eschatological expectations, among them that of Ye'cüc and Me'cüc may have been a part of the deadly cocktail that would soon lead to disaster in Anatolia.

140 "The post Balkan Wars era was a period when rumors and conspiracy theories related to past atrocities and future danger had begun to brew in everyday talk and popular culture; a noticeable anxiety and the expectation of imminent victimization is clear in the correspondence and writings of politicians and military men." Türkyılmaz, Yektan, *Rethinking Victimhood: Violence and Victimhood in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1915* (Department of Cultural Anthropology Duke University, 2011), 65.

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