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Bridge or Barrier?

Religious Identification's Role in Shaping
Attitudes toward Immigrants and
Immigration in the European Context

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I. Framework

1 Introduction

How does religious identification shape individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the European context?

More and more people have immigrated to European countries since the mid-1980s (Eurostat 2019)¹. These recent developments and changes generated a renewed societal and scientific interest in the research question leading this dissertation. Although re-migrating European citizens, together with migration from one European country to another, make up over 50 percent of the immigrants (Eurostat 2020a, 6), immigration to seek asylum or for other reasons from non-European countries, especially from countries with a predominantly Muslim population (e.g., Syria and Afghanistan), has increased rapidly in the last decade (Eurostat 2020b; Pew Research Center 2017)². European countries, albeit to different degrees, have become more ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse (Casanova 2007). Muslims have since become the largest religious minority in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008).

Furthermore, the political landscape in European countries has changed. Most notable is the success of right-wing populist parties, such as the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, the Rassemblement National (former Front National) in France and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria (Jesse and Panreck 2017; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Siegers and Jedinger 2021). They frequently label ethnic and cultural minorities, especially Muslim immigrants³, as the non-native and unwanted 'others', the ones that 'disrupt' a country's homogeneity and are responsible for problems (Schwörer and Romero-Vidal 2020). To justify

¹ For example, 3.4 million people migrated permanently or for at least a year to one of the EU member-states in 2013. In 2018, the number increased to 4.5 million immigrants per year. The year 2015 marks an exception, and immigration to EU member states reached a high with over 4.6 million people (Eurostat 2019). Following EU and UN guidelines, the term 'immigrant' refers to "a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence" (UN 1998, 10). Consequently, 'immigration' refers to the related process of relocating the place of residence and the centre of one's life.

² The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (2019-2022) put a hold on the immigration to Europe (e.g., by travel restrictions and quarantine rules). The present dissertation relies on data from before the pandemic (2014-2017). Its findings are, therefore, not affected by the extraordinary circumstances of a global pandemic.

³ In the remainder of the dissertation, the term 'Muslim immigrants' refers to immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority population. The individual immigrant does not necessarily have to identify strongly with the Islamic faith. Immigrants vary in their strength of religious identification.

this narrative, they refer to the maintenance and defence of the Christian-influenced culture, traditions, and values (Forlenza 2019).

Lastly, besides the political changes, societal tensions are on the rise. Recent years recorded an increase in racism, anti-immigrant sentiments, negative attitudes and hate crimes against immigrants, especially against Muslim immigrants (Davidov et al. 2014; Semyonov, Rajjman, and Gorodzeisky 2006).

While these examples give reason to look at the role of religion in shaping attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, one might argue that religion is merely a cultural characteristic and is no different than, for example, language or ethnicity. Hence, it should be similarly relevant for individuals' formation of attitudes and opinions. However, besides not being limited by borders, which also applies to some languages, religion is more exclusive: it is impossible to be a member of more than one religious group. It is impossible to be half Christian and half Muslim, while individuals can speak more than one language or be citizens of two countries (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol in Traunmüller 2013, 441). Religions also offer clear standpoints on socio-cultural and moral questions (Traunmüller 2013). These standpoints are less negotiable and extend to numerous spheres of life (Mitchell 2006). Additionally, religions provide their members with interpretation frames for their surroundings, and guidelines on wrong and right behaviour and attitudes (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Nagel 2013; Ysseldyk, Mathenson, and Anisman 2010). These interpretation frames and guidelines also concern the evaluation of and interactions with other societal groups like immigrants.

The previous sections highlight the importance and urgency of considering religion or religious identification as determinants for attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The present dissertation is situated in this area of research. *It explores the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration at the micro-level in the European context.* Previous research on this topic did not reach a consistent conclusion. It remains unclear whether greater religious identification acts as a 'bridge' and results in positive attitudes or as a 'barrier' which results in negative attitudes⁴. A closer look revealed at least three possible reasons for the lack of consensus. First, previous research has frequently used religious individuals' threat perceptions and value-support as explanations for their attitudes⁵

⁴ The dissertation's title and this phrase are loosely inspired by Connor and Koenig (2013).

⁵ Negative attitudes were often explained by perceiving immigrants as a threat to the religious culture, values, and prerogatives as well as by the conservative values of religious individuals. Positive attitudes were often explained by the principle of brotherly love and solidarity as well as by the altruistic values of religious individuals (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Otjes 2021; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

but has not thoroughly considered the interplay between religious identification, values-support, and threat perceptions. Second, previous research has rarely considered external events or shocks that increase the salience of immigration and religion and, therefore, affect the relationship between religious identification and attitudes. Third, previous research has predominantly focused on the majority population within the host society. It has only marginally discussed religious identification and the attitudes of individuals with a migration background, although they constitute an ever-growing share of the host population.

The present dissertation addresses these shortcomings of previous research in three separate papers in detail. Each paper focuses on one shortcoming, using the question of religious identification's role in shaping individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the European context as a guiding question: *Paper A*⁶ focuses on the interplay between religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions. It analyses how these three aspects, individually and combined, relate to attitudes. *Paper B*⁷ analyses how an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack⁸ affects the relationship between religious identification and attitudes. *Paper C*⁹ focuses specifically on the attitudes of individuals with a migration background. It analyses the relationship between religious identification and their attitudes toward newly arriving immigrants' acculturation¹⁰. The corresponding empirical analyses – namely, ordinary least square, multinomial logistic, and generalised logistic regression models – are grounded on the assumptions of the Group-Threat-Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000), Social-Identity-Theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979), Uncertainty-Identity-Theory (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007), Religious Coping Literature (Fischer et al. 2006), and theoretical elaborations on individuals' value-support (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and Huismans 1995), respectively.

⁶ *Paper A* is published in the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion: Benoit, Verena. 2021. "Opposing Immigrants in Europe: The Interplay Between Religiosity, Values, and Threat." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 60 (3): 555-589. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12726>.

⁷ At the date of the dissertation's submission, *Paper B* (preliminary title: Religious Identification and Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants in the Context of a Terrorist Attack) is under review in the *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*.

⁸ Labelling a terrorist attack by members or sympathisers of an extremist Islamist group like ISIS or al-Qaeda as an 'Islamist terrorist attack' might cause some readers to have negative connotations associated with Islam. It is not the intention of the present dissertation to portray Islam negatively. Relying on the label 'Islamist terrorist attack' (or similar terms) is purely to facilitate readability by avoiding complex sentences like 'terrorists who happen to identify themselves as Muslim'.

⁹ *Paper C* is published in Ethnic and Racial Studies: Benoit, Verena. 2022. "Religious identification and Muslim immigrants' acculturation preferences for newly arriving immigrants in Germany." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (online first). <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2022.2095219>.

¹⁰ Acculturation understands the process by which long-term contact between different cultural groups results in "changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits (1936) in Berry 1997, 7).

In general terms, the present dissertation looks at the determining factors for intergroup relations (host population and immigrants). Intergroup relations ultimately influence a country's social cohesion in a significant way. *Paper A* and *B* thereby focus on attitudes toward immigration. They explore individuals' attitudes toward the number of immigrants a country should allow entry (immigration policy). *Paper C* focuses instead on attitudes toward immigrants. It looks into individuals' attitudes toward the ideal form of immigrants' acculturation. In other words, it explores how they expect immigrants to acculturate. However, acculturation preferences can be understood as general policy preferences, too. In this sense, they would also reflect attitudes toward immigration. Notwithstanding the above, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are expected to correlate closely, i.e., individuals who favour low numbers of immigrants are also, on average, more prejudiced against immigrants and hold more negative attitudes. Further general discussions in this regard, the three papers' specific contents and the linkages between them will be presented in greater detail in the upcoming sections.

The present dissertation gains three important insights into the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration by addressing the mentioned shortcomings of previous research. First, it reveals that research should simultaneously consider religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions to uncover direct and indirect effects on attitudes. Second, the relationship between religious identification and attitudes is not constant over time. It varies in the context of an external shock, like an Islamist terrorist attack, that increases the salience of immigration and religion. Third, in the interest of understanding intergroup relations and social cohesion, research should also consider the attitudes of individuals with a migration background. The latter make up a considerable share of the population in European countries and have attitudes toward immigrants who arrive in the country they are now living in. Considering religious identification as a determinant is particularly informative as it is of different importance for immigrants – notably Muslim immigrants – than for members of the Christian or atheist majority population and their respective attitude formation (van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011; Verkuyten 2007).

The insights greatly contribute to the scientific literature by providing explanations for the inconsistent findings of previous research on the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Additionally, they make a societal contribution by helping to understand whether and how religious identification relates to tensions between societal groups. These tensions, in turn, influence the social cohesion in a country. Increased immigration and diversity do not necessarily cause more tensions between societal

groups or less social cohesions (Holtug 2010; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). However, societal tensions in Europe more often concern the relationship between the host population and immigrants. It is thus necessary to be aware of what causes societal tensions to avoid or lessen them.

The remainder of the framework paper is structured as follows: The next section (2) defines the central terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious identification’ and gives a brief literature review on the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. It is intentionally left at a rough overview as each paper includes a literature review related to its specific research focus. The section includes reviews of research on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Europe as well as the United States of America (US) to illustrate the diversity of the research topic. It also includes research on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, asylum seekers, and granting religious rights in Europe. The literature review ends with a concluding section, which points out how the present dissertation contributes to the scientific literature. The following section (3) embeds the present dissertation in the concept of social cohesion. In detail, it focuses on understanding the role of religious identification in forming attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, which then define intergroup relations and, ultimately, a country’s social cohesion. Furthermore, the concept helps to clarify how an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack influences the relationship between religious identification and attitudes. The subsequent section (4) recapitulates the individual papers’ motivations, findings, contributions, and limitations. The last section (5) summarises the findings of the three papers and puts them again in the broader context of social cohesion. It explores whether religious identification is a promoting or hindering factor – a bridge or a barrier. It also discusses the implications of the present dissertation for future research and its limitations (e.g., causal inference, social desirability, country comparability).

2 Religious Identification and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration

No universal definitions for ‘religion’ and ‘religious identification’ exist. It is therefore critical to define the main terms as they are applied in the present dissertation. From here on, *religion* is understood as a set of beliefs, norms, values, and meanings which are widely shared among people who affiliate with the religion (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). *Religious identification* is understood as the “extent to which a person identifies with a religion, subscribes to its ideology or worldview, and confirms to its normative

practices” (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010, 72). The latter consists of different dimensions, like formal affiliation or membership, practises, beliefs, experiences, and subjective religiosity. These dimensions can be operationalised and quantified for social science research. Subjective religiosity, for example, covers individuals’ self-assessment of how strongly they identify with a religion. In other words, it is the answer to questions such as “how religious would you say you are?”

The following review situates the dissertation in the literature. Research on individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration often follows a similar logic. It questions which personal characteristics lead people to different evaluations and perceptions of their situation and, in turn, different attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. For example, it is well-known how educational background, age, socio-economic status, job security, realistic and symbolic threat perception or political ideology behave as relevant determinants (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmüller and Hopkins 2014; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014). Research focusing on religious identification as the personal characteristic in question reports very mixed results, as the below section will show in detail.

2.1 Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration

A closer look at previous research on the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the European context reveals a vast inconsistency regarding its findings: some research has reported greater acceptance of immigrants and immigration by religious individuals compared to non-religious individuals. Other research has concluded opposite or no statistically significant effects. Yet other studies have concluded that the relationship varies by the analysed dimension of religious identification. Furthermore, religious identification has been operationalised and measured differently from study to study¹¹ due to the non-existent universal definition. As a result, the findings also vary depending on the utilised measurement.

For example, Bohman and Hjerm (2014) have analysed the attitudes in Europe toward immigrants that are ethnically different from most of the people in a country and toward immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. Similar to the following studies, they have focused

¹¹ For example, religious identification has been operationalised and measured by individuals’ religious affiliation or group membership, self-assessed level of religiosity, frequency of church attendance, frequency of praying, extent of religious belief, strength of religion as a guiding principle, importance of God in life, strength of belief in life after death, hell, heaven, religious miracles or indices subsuming multiple of the previously mentioned measurements (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Knoll 2009; Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Hello 2002; Strabac and Listhaug 2008).

on attitudes of members of the host society. They have concluded that religious individuals, i.e., predominantly Christians, are, on average, less likely to oppose immigration than non-religious individuals. Additionally, religious individuals in predominantly Protestant and religiously heterogeneous countries are more accepting than religious individuals in predominantly Catholic and religiously homogeneous countries. In contrast, religious individuals hold more negative attitudes in countries where the government favours the majority religion.

Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello (2002) have also analysed the attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. They have put a stronger focus on prejudice and showed that Catholics and Protestants support prejudice against immigrants more than non-religious individuals. Furthermore, frequent church attendance and stronger religious particularism are related to more prejudice. On the other hand, individuals who subscribe to doctrinal beliefs or perceive religion to be important in life and as a guiding principle are less prejudiced.

The work of Gray (2016) has a different methodological approach, but it still provides valuable information. Based on a case study of the Catholic Church in Ireland, she has demonstrated that pro-migrant church initiatives increased in the past couple of decades, and the Catholic Church has become an essential provider of pro-migrant services.

Looking at research in the US-context, Knoll (2009) has studied the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigration policies. He has concluded that frequent service attenders and members of religious minorities are more likely to support liberal immigration policies. In contrast, Creighton and Jamal (2015) have studied Americans' opposition to granting citizenship to Christian and Muslim immigrants via a list experiment. They have found that religious identification – neither frequency of church attendance nor denomination – plays no role in determining opposition. In a meta-analysis with a broader focus on racism and not only on attitudes toward immigrants, Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) have analysed the relationship between religious identification and racial (in)tolerance in the US. They have found no evidence for increased racial tolerance of religious individuals after considering social desirability. Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche (2015) have extensively tested the effects of various dimensions of religious identification on attitudes toward different immigrant groups in the US, Turkey, and Israel. They have differentiated between ethnically different and ethnically similar immigrants to most of the population in the respective host country. Additionally, they have distinguished between religious belief (i.e., belief in God or life after death) and religious social identity (i.e., identification with the religious group and participation in group-specific activities). They have concluded that religious social identity negatively affects

attitudes toward immigrants. The effect is more pronounced toward ethnically different immigrants. In contrast, religious belief promotes acceptance of immigrants, but the effect is conditional on the immigrants' similarity.

The studies conducted in the US, similar to the European studies, reported different findings and utilised various measurements for religious identification. The inconsistent findings are thus not a particularity of the European setting. More importantly, in both settings, the expectations were often deduced or the findings were explained by relying on the values and threat perceptions of religious individuals (solidarity and altruism for positive attitudes; conservatism, tradition, and fear for religious prerogatives for negative attitudes; e.g., Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Davidov et al. 2008; Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010; Hamilton 2001). However, these lines of argumentation are flawed as they overlook that values are not mutually exclusive. (Religious) individuals can support both value types simultaneously (Malka et al. 2012; Saroglou, Delpierre, and Dernelle 2004).

2.2 Muslim Immigrants, Asylum Seekers, and Religious Rights in Europe

Focusing on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants in Europe, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) have found no statistically significant effect of religious identification on attitudes. One exception in their study is the frequency of church attendance with a weak positive effect on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants ($\beta = 0.03$). Focusing on attitudes toward the foundation of asylum seeker centres in the Netherlands, Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers (2006) have concluded that frequent church attenders object less to asylum seeker centres than non-attenders. Carol, Helbling, and Michalowski (2015) have focused on attitudes toward granting religious rights in Europe. Their findings also provide information on the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants: Religious natives (Christians) support outgroup rights, including Muslim rights, more than non-religious natives. Muslims are generally more in favour of religious rights than natives. The positive relationship is more pronounced when Muslims identify strongly with their religious group.

The reviewed studies did not explicitly report negative relationships between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, asylum seekers or religious rights. However, the statistically insignificant findings along with the observed positive effects do not allow for an unambiguous conclusion. Furthermore, the operationalisation and measurement of religious identification varied from study to study. Lastly, the values taught by religions were again central for deducing expectations and explaining the findings (e.g., human compassion of religious individuals for asylum seekers; Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers 2006).

2.3 The Missing Pieces

The presented review of the literature is by no means exhaustive because each of the present dissertation's papers includes a detailed review related to its specific research focus. However, these few examples already demonstrate that the findings vary considerably.

It is not surprising or new that research on religion reached different conclusions. Over 50 years ago, Gordon W. Allport (1966, 477) already stated that "there is something about religion that makes for prejudice and something that unmakes prejudice". Even today, this statement precisely summarises the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Religion embraces many dimensions like ideology, practises, experiences, belonging, etc. (Davie 1990; Glock and Stark 1965; Joseph and Diduca 2007; Scheepers, Gijssberts, and Hello 2002; Sosis and Alcorta 2003). Additionally, religion has many different functions for individuals, groups, and societies, like providing meaning, explanations, and guidelines as well as constituting a support system and community, but also a marker to distinguish groups (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Fischer et al. 2006; Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013; Jamal 2005; Nagel 2013; Ys-seldyk, Mathenson, and Anisman 2010). How well and strongly religion can fulfil these functions inevitably depends on the strength of religious identification.

The multidimensionality of religious identification and its numerous functions, together with the heterogeneity of immigrants and the effects of different samples and methodological approaches, provide reasonable explanations for diverging findings regarding the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Nevertheless, the diverging findings are not satisfactory from a scientific as well as a policy perspective, especially since religion is a reoccurring topic of recent developments, namely: the success of right-wing populist parties and their references to the maintenance and defence of Christian-influenced values, the increasing number of immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority population to Europe, and the rise of negative attitudes and hate crimes against immigrants, especially against Muslim immigrants.

The present dissertation picks up here. Besides consciously considering the multidimensionality of religious identification and immigrants' heterogeneity, it deliberately addresses a problem: previous research has often used similarly constructed explanations for opposite findings (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Otjes 2021; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Negative attitudes were explained by perceiving immigrants as a threat to the religious culture, values, and prerogatives as well as by the conservative values of religious

individuals. In contrast, positive attitudes were explained by the principle of brotherly love and solidarity as well as by the altruistic values of religious individuals. While previous research frequently used threat perceptions and value-support as explanations, it did not consider the interplay between religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions in greater detail. Some studies included value-support or threat perceptions (or both) as covariates in their analyses. Other studies focused merely on two factors, like Hillenbrand (2020), who has analysed religion and migration-related threat perceptions. The present dissertation fills this void. *It analyses how religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions, individually and combined (direct and indirect effects), relate to attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.* The focus on threat perceptions and value-support also addresses two topics of the recent (above-mentioned) developments in European countries: Discussions about immigrants posing a threat to the host population and the fear of changing society's values.

Furthermore, previous research has rarely considered external shocks that increase the salience of immigration and religion. The present dissertation closes this gap by *analysing how the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration is affected by an Islamist terrorist attack.* In doing so, it combines two, up until now, separate research areas that both benefit from the findings. The first area of research focuses on how terrorist attacks affect attitudes toward immigrants. The overwhelming conclusion is that terrorist attacks, even abroad, negatively affect the attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the short-term (e.g., Böhmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020; Galea et al. 2002; Legewie 2013). The second area of research investigates religion's varying degrees of importance and functions depending on external factors and specific situations. For example, religion gains relevance for individuals in times of insecurity and uncertainty (Healy and Breen 2014; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013; Lechner and Leopold 2015; Storm 2017).

Lastly, almost all research on the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration has focused on members of the majority population within the host countries. In the broader context of intergroup relations, which ultimately influence a country's overall social cohesion (see: 1 Introduction), it is imperative to also look into the attitudes of people with a migration background as they make up a considerable share of the population in European countries. The present dissertation, therefore, focuses on the attitudes of Muslim immigrants. *It analyses the relationship between Muslim immigrants' religious identification and the acculturation dimension they perceive as ideal for other newly coming immigrants (acculturation preferences).* Muslim immigrants constitute an immigrant group that

has grown steadily in recent years while also being the focus of numerous societal discussions that often surround their religious affiliation. Furthermore, they are, on average, more religious than other immigrant groups or members of the majority population within European host countries (Guveli 2015; Lewis and Kashyap 2013; Pfündel, Stichs, and Tanis 2021). Against this background, expecting certain acculturation behaviours from other immigrants is also a way for ‘existing’ Muslim immigrants to, albeit indirectly, avoid negative stereotypes if there is the possibility that the behaviour of newly arriving immigrants might negatively impact on immigrants as a whole.

Aside from exploring the three postulated issues, the present dissertation consciously considers the multidimensionality of religious identification and immigrants’ heterogeneity, as mentioned above. These demands are met by comparing the attitudes toward different immigrant groups and measuring religious identification in numerous ways.

3 Theoretical Framework

The focus on the role of religious identification in shaping attitudes toward immigrants and immigration situates the present dissertation in the broader field of social cohesion.

“Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations.”

(Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290)

The quote defines a term most people have “at least a rough idea of what it means” (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 281). However, research on social cohesion is highly interdisciplinary. As a result, numerous theories and definitions of social cohesion exist (Friedkin 2004). Against this background, the above definition does not claim universality but highlights crucial components of the social cohesion concept. In general, social cohesion is an attribute of social groups, societies or sovereign states, not individuals (Chan, To, and Chan 2006, 290). It focuses on “[...] vertical and horizontal interactions among members of society [...]” and thereby concerns relationships among different levels of society: individuals, groups, organisations, and the state (Dickes and Valentova 2013, 829). Lastly, it entails “[...] trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations”, which is why

social cohesion illustrates a feeling of social connectedness as well as attitudes and behaviour (Dickes and Valentova 2013, 829; Stanley 2003). On the one hand, social cohesion is a societal attribute (macro-level) which materialises itself due to individuals' behaviours and attitudes. On the other hand, social cohesion influences how individuals behave and feel (micro-level).

In general, social cohesion has a positive connotation. Its attributes (interconnectedness, trust, participation, feelings of belonging, commitment, solidarity, reciprocity) are desirable for communities, groups, and nation-states (Stanley 2003; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

At the state level, social cohesion can be understood as a public good (Putnam 1994; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). For states, a high level of social cohesion is desirable because it goes hand in hand with fewer societal tensions, less political dissatisfaction and instability, hatred, conflicts or, in extreme cases, riots and civil wars (Aall and Crocker 2019; Diman and Miodownik 2022; Friedkin 2004; Holtug 2010). States are not homogeneous but inevitably made up of various societal groups. To achieve a high level of social cohesion at the state-level, it is necessary that the attributes of social cohesion are not only present within the respective social groups but also across groups. In other words, to achieve or maintain a high level of social cohesion, it is necessary to have positive intergroup relations, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Link d).




Figure 1: General Theoretical Framework (own compilation)

Intergroup relations concern relationships between ethnic and religious groups, status groups and classes, age, and gender groups (Stangor 2016; Stephan and Stephan 2000). They also

concern relationships between immigrants and the host population, which are of high societal and political relevance. This is the focus of the present dissertation. Additionally, the increase in racism, anti-immigrant sentiments, and hate crimes against immigrants are examples of a lack of social cohesion.

Intergroup relations are characterised by a systematic aggregation of individual relationships between members of different societal groups (Coleman 1990). Individuals are thus the starting point of intergroup relations; when a critical mass of individuals systematically behaves in a certain way, it manifests itself in the relationships between societal groups. Aggregated attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are one societal component that shapes and accentuates intergroup relations (Figure 1, Link c). The present dissertation focuses on the determining characteristics of individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (micro-level; Figure 1, Link a). It primarily investigates the role of religious identification. In addition to the importance mentioned in the introduction, religions' core elements like solidarity, support, and trust are also considered as characteristics of social cohesion. Again, this underpins the chosen research focus. The micro-level focus further allows considering individuals as members of more than one societal group who identify with each group to various degrees (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

In detail, this dissertation explores the link between individual characteristics and intergroup relations by analysing the role of religious identification in shaping attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (acculturation preferences), respectively (Figure 2, Link a).




Figure 2: Overview Dissertation Project (own compilation)

In both cases, it covers the host population's attitudes. While the former focuses on the attitudes of members of the majority population in the host country (Paper A), the latter looks at the attitudes of minority group members within the host country (Paper C). Lastly, the dissertation focuses on the role of an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack by analysing

how it affects the relationship between religious identification and attitudes (Figure 2, Link b). It thus complements the first two analyses by exploring whether the link between religious identification and attitudes is stable over time or varies in case of external shocks. Jointly the analysis of both links contributes to a better understanding of intergroup relations, which ultimately determine social cohesion (Figure 1).

3.1 Individual Characteristics and Attitudes *(Figure 2, Link a)*

Current societal and political developments provide good reasons for exploring religious identification as a determinant of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. It is, however, only one of many individual characteristics that shape attitudes. Consequently, research must not analyse religious identification as an isolated individual characteristic but rather focus on its interplay with other characteristics.

The previous literature review has revealed that research has often used similarly constructed explanations for opposite findings: religious individuals' value-support (altruistic, conservative) and threat perceptions as explanations for either negative or positive attitudes. Looking at the individual aspects of these explanations can provide greater clarity. However, research on religious individuals' value-support and threat perceptions has also reported mixed results. Some research linked greater religious identification to conservative values and higher levels of threat perception; others linked it to altruistic values and lower levels of threat perception (e.g., Hillenbrand 2020; Saroglou, Delpierre, and Darnelle 2004). In contrast, research on value-support, threat perceptions, and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration came to consistent findings. Conservative values and greater threat perceptions correlate with negative attitudes (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2014; Gorodzeisky 2013). Against this background, analysing religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions simultaneously and exploring their interplay proves crucial to understanding the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, which, in turn, affect intergroup relations and social cohesion.

The value framework by Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995) constitutes a theoretical starting point to deduce expectations for the mentioned interplay between these three factors. It helps to deduce expectations for the direct effects of religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions as well as their indirect effects via the respective other factors.

Values are stable guiding principles that surpass specific situations by relating to all areas of life and thus influence individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration

(Hitlin and Pinkston 2013; Schwartz 1992; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015). Similarly, religions provide individuals with guiding principles for all areas of life and are relatively stable due to early age religious socialisation (Cairns et al. 2006; Mitchell 2006). As such, religions influence individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, too. This consistency result in relatively stable direct effects of values and religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration over an individual's lifetime. However, the value framework suggests that religious identification is not at the same level as values. It argues that there is no consensus on religious guiding principles, that such principles vary within and between religious groups, and that religious teachings are often of a philosophical and theological nature, which makes them too complex to fall back on in day-to-day life (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and Huismans 1995). Consequently, values are superior and thus should have a stronger direct effect than religious identification.

Threat perceptions, however, are less stable and comprehensive – they are more reactive (Semyonov et al. 2004; Stephan and Stephan 2000). The level of threat perception is conditional on changes in external circumstances. How strongly someone perceives immigrants as a threat depends, for example, on how many immigrants from which countries arrive. Furthermore, perceived threats due to immigrants and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration concern the same subject matter. In contrast, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are only one of many subject areas covered by values and religious identification. Due to the dependency on changes in external circumstances and the coverage of the same subject matter, threat perceptions should have stronger direct effects than values and religious identification. Threat perceptions should also mediate the effects of values and religious identification because they are not entirely exogenous (indirect effects). Individuals' religious identification and values shape their perceptions on which issues are important and the degree to which they are being threatened by immigrants and immigration.

Lastly, there are numerous threats and each type influences individuals' lives and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration differently. Most notable is the differentiation between realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan and Stephan 2000). In the context of immigration, realistic threat addresses the fear of increased competition over scarce resources like jobs or social benefits, whereas symbolic threat addresses the fear of loss of symbolic establishments, ethnic, and cultural cohesiveness (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Quillian 1995; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999). The monetary assets reflected in the realistic threat concept are of utmost importance for an individual's identity and status in developed societies (e.g., jobs and

related income). Overcoming the loss of these scarce resources depends to a large extent on external factors like labour market conditions or the welfare system. The loss of components reflected in the symbolic threat concept also has negative consequences for an individual (e.g., loss of belonging; Berry 1997), but it is easier to overcome them through personal effort and adapting. The dependency on external factors makes overcoming the loss of components reflected in the realistic threat concept unpredictable. Consequently, realistic threat perceptions should induce greater fear than symbolic threat perceptions, which should then result in stronger direct effects of realistic threat perceptions on attitudes than symbolic threat perceptions.

In sum, the value framework and related works (Berry 1997; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz and Huismans 1995; Semyonov et al. 2004; Stephan and Stephan 2000) provide three expectations for religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions as intertwined individual characteristics that shape attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Figure 2, Link a):

- *The perception of realistic threat has a stronger direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration than the perception of symbolic threat.*
- *Threat perceptions have a stronger direct effect than value-support; value-support has a stronger direct effect than religious identification.*
- *Value-support and religious identification indirectly affect the attitudes toward immigrants and immigration via threat perceptions (mediating effect of threat perceptions).*

Apart from the interplay between various individual characteristics, previous research also falls short in analysing the relationship between the religious identification of individuals with a migration background and the acculturation dimension they perceive as ideal for other immigrants to follow (acculturation preferences)¹². Individuals with a migration background make up a considerable share of the population in European countries. Their attitudes toward other immigrants are thus also relevant in the broader context of intergroup relations and social cohesion. Furthermore, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration not only cover preferences for acceptance or rejection but also how immigrants should culturally integrate into the host society.

¹² An extensive body of research focuses on the general attitudes of people with a migration background toward immigrants and immigration (e.g., acceptance or opposition; Just and Anderson 2015); a limited number focuses on the role of religious identification in that respect (e.g., Connor 2010; Vishkin and Bloom 2022). The analysis of the relationship between the religious identification of individuals with a migration background and acculturation preferences misses out.

Acculturation preferences differ by the extent to which people prefer immigrants to maintain their origin culture and the degree of contact, participation, and taking on of the host culture (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006; Berry 1997)¹³. Discrepancies in acculturation preferences between societal groups can result in intergroup tensions, conflicts, and discrimination as they shape motivations to adapt to various spheres of life and to interact with other groups (Berry 2005; Bourhis et al. 1997; Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2012; Sam and Berry 2006; Ward and Leong 2006). Consequently, discrepancies in acculturation preferences between societal groups negatively affect intergroup relations and social cohesion.

Previous research has shown that majority group members within the host population overwhelmingly prefer immigrants' cultural assimilation or integration (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Maisonneuve and Teste 2007; Navas et al. 2007; Phillips 2010; Piontkowski et al. 2000; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015; Zick et al. 2001). Turning to minority group members within the host population and focusing on immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority population due to the salience of religion in the context of immigration, previous research has found no clear pattern. Some reported preferences for assimilation or integration, others for separation (Gattino et al. 2016; Kunst et al. 2016; Pfafferott and Brown 2006; Piontkowski et al. 2000; Zagefka and Brown 2002). Varying preferences between the host population's majority and minority group members indicate attitudinal discrepancies, which might strain intergroup relations and, ultimately, affect social cohesion negatively. As already mentioned, preferences for the acculturation behaviour of other immigrants are also a way for individuals with a migration background to, albeit indirectly, avoid negative stereotypes if there is the possibility that the behaviour of newly arriving immigrants might negatively impact immigrants as a whole. In highly simplified terms, preferences are indirect preventive means of avoiding strained intergroup relations. However, the literature on Muslim immigrants' acculturation preferences has predominantly focused on their individual acculturation processes. Furthermore, it has only superficially considered religious identification, although Muslim immigrants are, on average, more religious than other immigrant groups and the majority population (Guveli 2015; Lewis and Kashyap 2013; Pfündel, Stichs, and Tanis 2021). Against this background, Muslim

¹³ Most prominent is Berry's (1997) differentiation between four acculturation dimensions: *Integration* applies when immigrants maintain their origin culture and simultaneously adopt aspects from the host culture. *Separation* applies when immigrants maintain their origin culture and simultaneously avoid the host society's culture. *Assimilation* applies when immigrants adopt the host society's culture and simultaneously give up their origin culture. Lastly, *marginalisation* applies when immigrants neither adopt the host society's culture nor maintain their origin culture. Since its development, Berry's (1997) differentiation has repeatedly been the subject of modifications and extensions. One enhancement is the concept of 'combined culture' - understood as merging the immigrants' and the host population's culture into a new culture (Phalet and Baysu 2020).

immigrants in Europe should vary systematically in their preferences for the acculturation of other immigrants, depending on their religious identification.

Religious identification is part of an individual's social identity. It can be understood as the individual's knowledge of being a member of a societal group and the emotional attachment to it (Tajfel 1974, 69). Individuals are members of various societal groups, but in the present case, religious identification represents the knowledge of being a member of a religious group and the emotional attachment to it. The Social-Identity-Theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979) relies on this concept of social identity to explain individuals' intergroup behaviour. It argues that how strongly someone identifies with their group(s) shapes how they evaluate other groups and their members. Applied to the present case, the level of identification with a religious group (religious identification) shapes the evaluation of other groups and their members (attitudes toward immigrants and immigration).

In detail, greater identification with a societal group shapes the evaluation of others because it results in "favourable ingroup comparison" (Verkuyten 2007, 341), implying that individuals aim to positively differentiate their group from groups to which they do not belong (Cairns et al. 2006, 703; Tajfel 1974, 68). Furthermore, perceived threats toward the own group result in increased identification with the group (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Lastly, strong identification with a societal group leads to a higher readiness to use the respective group to describe themselves (Verkuyten 2007, 343).

Religious identification additionally constitutes an important cultural dimension for Muslim immigrants in Europe. The religious group is a way to experience belonging, familiarity, and solidarity while maintaining a connection to the origin country (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Foner and Alba 2008; Nagel 2013; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). In addition, religious teachings, values, and beliefs can function as coping tools to deal with the insecurities arising throughout the immigration process and being a minority in a new country (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Lastly, religious identification serves as a social marker to differentiate between groups (Nagel 2013).

Combining the specifics of religious identification for Muslim immigrants in Europe with the general implications of a strong social identity, Muslim immigrants with a strong religious identification should be more inclined to positively differentiate their group from groups to which they do not belong. They should also have a higher readiness to use their religious group to describe themselves. In turn, the inclination to differentiate from other groups and the emphasis on one's group membership should also translate to varying preferences for

acculturation dimensions. Muslim immigrants with a strong religious identification should, therefore, be more likely to prefer separation, followed by combined culture, over assimilation. The latter is least preferred because it promotes a one-sided sacrificing of cultural components on the immigrants' side, while the former suggests a differentiation from other groups.

The presented mechanisms, so far, merely explain preferences regarding immigrants' personal acculturation processes. They also apply to immigrants' preferences for the acculturation of following immigrants by understanding acculturation preferences as policy preferences for a general narrative in the context of immigration and integration, which could advance, limit or restrict the exercise of the own culture as well. Against this background, Muslim immigrants with a strong religious identification should be more likely to prefer an acculturation dimension that supports the maintenance of the origin culture (separation; to a lower extent, combined culture) instead of one that promotes sacrificing cultural components (assimilation).

In addition, Muslim immigrants in European are a heterogeneous group. The most obvious difference arises from the various religious groups within Islam. In most European countries, Sunnis constitute the majority within Islam while, for example, Shiites, Alevi and Ahmadiyya constitute minority groups. These differences should also translate into varying acculturation preferences, depending on whether the immigrants identify with a minority or majority within Islam. In general terms, Banfi, Gianni, and Giugni (2016) have already confirmed that minority and majority status within Islam affects attitudes differently.

More specifically, minority and majority group membership results in distinct perceptions of threat, which in turn lead to different extents of increased identification with the own group – as assumed by the Social-Identity-Theory (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Greater identification should lead to a higher likelihood of preferring an acculturation dimension which promotes the maintenance of the immigrants' culture – as discussed above. Minority group members within Islam hold a double-minority status, i.e., they have to deal with the challenges (threats) of being immigrants and belonging to a minority within the immigrant group. They are exposed to more identity threats as they are, for example, in a disadvantaged position when competing with the Muslim majority for state recognition in the host country. In line with the solidarity-of-the-minorities effect (Fetzer 1998), members of the minority within Islam should also be more aware of the importance of cultural identity for immigrants. Lastly, in preferring an acculturation dimension that promotes sacrificing the immigrants' culture, minority group members would indirectly jeopardise their support system and religiously influenced culture (implicit link between acculturation and policy preferences).

In sum, the Social-Identity-Theory and related theoretical approaches (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Fetzner 1998; Foner and Alba 2008; Nagel 2013; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Verkuyten 2007; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010) provide two expectations for the relationship between Muslim immigrants' religious identification and their preferences for the acculturation of other immigrants (Figure 2, Link a).

- *Stronger religious identification results in preferring acculturation dimensions, which promote the maintenance of the immigrants' culture.*
- *Minority group members within Islam are more likely to prefer separation over combined culture and assimilation than majority group members.*

3.2 The Role of External Shocks (Figure 2, Link b)

The relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration might not be constant. External shocks can influence the perception of immigrants and the importance individuals ascribe to their religious beliefs. Brought forward mainly by the economics literature, an external or exogenous shock can be understood as an “[...] unexpected event not initiated by a given market, community or country that carries a significant negative impact upon that market, community or country” (Miklian and Hoelscher 2022, 180).

Terrorist attacks are one of these external shocks and are particularly powerful in changing public opinion and attitudes, including attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007). A broad consensus in previous research exists that Islamist terrorist attacks cause more negative attitudes in the short-term (Böhmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Hitlan et al. 2007; Legewie 2013; Silva 2018; Solheim 2021). On the other hand, terrorist attacks affect the emotions and (psychological) well-being of religious and non-religious individuals differently – even if an attack is not experienced directly. Religious individuals have, on average, more positive emotions and better well-being after an attack than non-religious individuals because they can rely on a religious support system and coping tools (Fischer et al. 2006; Greenfield and Marks 2007). It remains unclear how these two separate findings are related. In other words, it is unclear how an external shock in the form of a terrorist attack affects the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. It is particularly informative to look at the effect of an Islamist terrorist attack in Europe because it involuntarily connects the attack to a religious group and the media coverage frequently emphasises the perpetrators' migration background (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2018). Against this background, it is first necessary to

understand the initial mechanisms as to why terrorist attacks, on average, cause more negative attitudes. In a second step, it can be explored how an Islamist terrorist attack relates to the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.

Negative feelings play a key role in an attack's negative effect on attitudes. Everyone could be theoretically affected by a terrorist attack, and they always include strategic and symbolic aspects; therefore, they increase mortality salience, awareness of one's vulnerability, feelings of threat and uncertainty (Ben-Ezra, Leshem, and Goodwin 2015; Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Galea et al. 2002). These feelings are uncomfortable for individuals, they attempt to counter them by trying "to maintain or restore a positive and distinct collective identity, for example by increasing in-group favoritism" (Verkuyten 2007, 345). Group-Threat-Theory and Integrated-Threat-Theory suggest similar developments: Perceived threats toward one's group, such as a nation in the context of a terrorist attack, increase individuals' negative attitudes toward outgroups like immigrants (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995; Stephan and Stephan 2000). Greatly simplified, terrorist attacks result in more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration because they trigger negative feelings (threat, mortality salience, uncertainty, vulnerability). In turn, these negative feelings make individuals prefer their group over outgroups (immigrants) and evaluate them negatively.

However, depending on individual characteristics, some people experience more negative feelings than others which then translate into various degrees of in-group favouritism and negative attitudes toward outgroups (immigrants). Religious identification constitutes such an individual characteristic. It can help to deal with the uncertainties and the negative feelings or emotions triggered by an attack and thus weaken its negative effect on attitudes.

Specifically, religious identification can help to deal with the uncertainties of an attack by connecting individuals to a religious group or community. The latter constitute highly coherent groups, defined as groups that provide individuals with belief systems and narratives for everyday life (Campbell 1958). Uncertainty-Identity-Theory suggests that identifying with highly coherent groups is an effective way to reduce uncertainties because they provide behavioural guidelines. Additionally, their narratives and belief systems are familiar and trusted in times of uncertainty (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007). Lower levels of uncertainty should then translate into less in-group favouritism and more positive attitudes toward outgroups. In particular, if religious identification helps to reduce uncertainties and highly religious individuals thus exhibit lower levels, they should hold fewer negative attitudes toward outgroups like immigrants. Religious groups are unique compared to other highly coherent groups (e.g.,

nationalist groups). They additionally address questions of life's meaning and human existence (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010, 73). Religious groups also provide individuals with rules on handling, interpreting, and evaluating dangers and problems (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013, 359). In times of uncertainties related to death and increased mortality salience, like after a terrorist attack, all these aspects are especially appealing. Together, religions' abilities to deal with uncertainties imply that the negative effect on attitudes differs by individuals' religious identification.

Furthermore, religious identification can help to absorb negative emotions resulting from a terrorist attack by providing coping tools. The Religious Coping Literature differentiates between internal and external coping (Fischer et al. 2006, 366): Internal coping occurs if individuals process negative events by themselves. They find comfort or make sense of the event based on personal knowledge, experiences, and behavioural patterns. External coping, on the other hand, occurs if individuals process negative events with the help of a community. The latter functions as a support system and provides its members with resources to process the event (e.g., money, accommodation, distraction, explanation). Both forms of coping absorb negative emotions, cause positive emotions and overall contribute to individuals' well-being (Fischer et al. 2006, 367). They can distract people from negative thoughts and worries, put their minds at ease, and alter their modes of thinking about the negative event. They can also help to process self-relevant information (thinking more clearly and structured), enhance how individuals find meaning in the negative event and set long-term goals afterwards. As a result, fewer negative emotions should translate into less ingroup-favouritism and, in turn, fewer negative attitudes toward outgroups like immigrants. Again, numerous identity sources and communities can provide coping tools, but religions and religious communities are especially effective in doing so. They are internal as well as external coping sources. On the one hand, religious teachings provide meaning, explanations, and guidelines (internal coping). In their respective ways, all religions have ideas about life after death, the meaning behind pain or suffering and propositions on managing them. Individuals can rely on these teachings during their increased awareness of vulnerability and mortality in the context of a terrorist attack. On the other hand, religions constitute social support systems through membership in the religious community (external coping). Consequently, if religious identification helps to cope with a terrorist attack and highly religious individuals thus exhibit higher levels of positive emotions afterwards than individuals with lower levels of religious identification, they should have fewer negative attitudes toward outgroups like immigrants.

So far, the above elaborations suggest that the negative effect of a terrorist attack on attitudes is less pronounced for religious individuals because religious identification helps to deal with uncertainties and can absorb negative emotions. However, the coping mechanisms need time to unfold. For example, it takes time to contact the religious community or process the event with the help of religious teachings. The more positive attitudes of religious individuals toward immigrants should thus not occur immediately but rather with temporal distance to the event. Immediately after a terrorist attack, before coping mechanisms can unfold, religious individuals should be more prone to the immediate effects of a terrorist attack, namely increased uncertainty and feelings of threat. An Islamist terrorist attack highlights religious group differences and inevitably links the perpetrators to a specific religious group. Furthermore, if religious teachings include beliefs in the inherently good in people, religious individuals might be more aghast at the terrorist attack and thus perceive greater insecurity and threats. Therefore, religious members of the majority population should experience greater threat (especially from Muslim immigrants) immediately after the attack than non-religious individuals, which translates into more negative attitudes.

Lastly, to fully understand the role of an Islamist terrorist attack, it must be considered that threats and uncertainties which translate into negative attitudes are not only influenced by an attack but can also result from a general increase in immigration. Similar to the expectations in the previous section (Section 3.1, Link a), the threat perceptions due to increased immigration should mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes before the attack. After the attack, at a time with two threats (increased immigration; terrorist attack), threat perceptions due to increased immigration should no longer mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants. The threat triggered by a severe and unexpected external shock (terrorist attack) overshadows them. However, the threat triggered by an attack should weaken over time, for example, due to unfolding coping mechanisms, while threat perceptions due to increased immigration remain. Consequently, threat perceptions due to increased immigration do not mediate the effect of religious identification immediately after an attack, but they mediate the effect with temporal distance to the attack.

In sum, the Uncertainty-Identity-Theory and the Religious Coping Literature (Fischer et al. 2006; Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007; Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010) provide four expectations for the role of an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack in shaping the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Figure 2, Link b).

- *Immediately after the terrorist attack, religious individuals have more negative attitudes toward immigrants than non-religious individuals.*
- *With temporal distance to the attack, religious individuals have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than non-religious individuals.*
- *Perceived threat due to increased immigration does not mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants immediately after the terrorist attack.*
- *Perceived threat due to increased immigration mediates the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants immediately before and with temporal distance to the terrorist attack.*

4 Summaries of the Individual Papers

The first three sections have focused on the general framework of the present dissertation. This section concentrates on the individual papers. It introduces the differences and similarities between the papers' data and samples at the beginning. Afterwards, it summarises each paper by briefly recapping its motivation and central theoretical expectations, which have been discussed in detail above. Each summary also includes a description of the respective methodological approach, the central findings, and possible limitations.

4.1 Data and Sample Descriptions

All three papers utilise existing and publicly available datasets to test the theoretical expectations. *Paper A* and *B* rely on data from Round 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS) program. *Paper A* utilises data from 20 European countries¹⁴ and covers a survey period of over one year (August 2014 - September 2015; N= 33344). Due to methodological considerations, *Paper B* only utilises data from six European countries¹⁵ from September 2014 until February 2015 (N= 9728). Instead of other datasets that also meet scientific standards like the European Value Study (EVS), the ESS data includes all variables of interest for both articles, which allows a certain degree of comparability. Furthermore, its survey period coincides with the Islamist terrorist attack in Paris on January 7, 2015, which is important for *Paper B*. Both papers analyse the attitudes of majority group members within the host population (Christians, non-affiliates).

Paper C focuses on the attitudes of minority group members within the host population and relies on data from the 'Religionsmonitor', issued by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017). The data collection took place in Germany from July 2016 until March 2017. Even though large-scale survey studies often include relevant questions and variables to analyse the proposed

¹⁴ Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.

¹⁵ Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland.

relationships, they usually try to mirror the national population, resulting in relatively small numbers of Muslim respondents or underrepresentation due to limited reachability (e.g., language barrier). Therefore, utilising the Religionsmonitor, which purposefully includes a sample of the Muslim population in Germany (N= 1066), allows more informative analyses with greater external validity.

4.2 Paper A

Opposing Immigrants in Europe: The Interplay Between Religiosity, Values, and Threat

Paper A lies the foundation for the more specific research questions in Paper B and C. It tests the first three expectations related to *Link a* (Figure 2 and Section 3.1) and analyses the interplay between religiosity¹⁶, value-support, and threat perceptions for the attitudes toward immigrants.

The diverging findings regarding the link between the host population's religious identification and attitudes serve as the starting point. A comparison of previous research reveals that positive attitudes of religious individuals have been frequently explained by arguing that devoted individuals follow the altruistic values and pro-social teachings of their religion. In comparison, the negative attitudes of religious individuals have been frequently explained by referring to the conservative values of religious individuals and the perception of immigrants as a threat to the identity of religious individuals.

The paper argues that the three factors (religiosity, value-support, threat perceptions) are not independent. It suggests considering them simultaneously to make reliable claims about the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants. The expectations about the interplay between religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions are deduced based on the value framework by Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995), mirroring the above-presented theoretical elaborations (Section 3.1). The expectations about the interplay outline the following order: The perception of realistic threat has a stronger direct effect on the attitudes toward immigrants than the perception of symbolic threat. Threat perceptions have stronger direct effects than value-support, and value-support has a stronger effect than religiosity. Additionally, value-support and religiosity indirectly affect the attitudes toward immigrants via threat perceptions.

¹⁶ The main analyses rely on religiosity, understood as the self-reported level of religiosity (0-10 scale; not at all - very religious), as the measurement for individuals' religious identification. Robustness checks with the frequency of service attendance and praying consider the multidimensionality of religious identification. In this sense, the paper fits the theoretical framework, which relies on the more general concept of religious identification.

To test the expectations, the paper analyses European Social Survey (Round 7) data with multivariate statistics, namely ordinary least squares and multinomial logistic regression analyses. It relies on data from 20 European countries, covers a survey period from August 2014 to September 2015, and focuses on the majority population in Europe, i.e., individuals who identify as Christians or do not affiliate with a religious group (N= 33344).

The empirical analyses largely meet the expectations. In detail, how strongly someone perceives immigrants as a threat – especially a realistic threat – has the strongest direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants, followed by how strongly someone supports altruistic and conservative values. Higher levels of threat perceptions and more conservative attitudes correspond with more restrictive attitudes. Religiosity has no statistically significant direct effect ($p>0.1$). The described order holds regardless of whether the analyses focus on attitudes toward ethnically similar, ethnically different or Muslim immigrants. Except in the case of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, where both types of threat perception are almost identical, realistic threat perceptions have stronger direct effects than symbolic threat perceptions. While religiosity has no statistically significant direct effect, it indirectly affects attitudes via threat perceptions. For example, at low levels of perceived threat, religious, compared to non-religious, individuals, are more likely to have moderate (allow some or a few immigrants into the country) than very liberal attitudes (allow many immigrants into the country). The observed indirect effect of religiosity holds for attitudes toward ethnically similar, ethnically different, and Muslim immigrants. In the case of Muslim immigrants, value-support also indirectly affects the attitudes via threat perception. The described links are largely robust across various dimensions of religious identification and different country samples.

Nevertheless, the paper has some limitations that can serve as starting points for future research. It is not able to uncover causal relationships or between-country differences, as commented extensively in the paper. Furthermore, the arguments' universality across time cannot be tested by repeating the analyse with ESS data from other periods. The latter is especially relevant since the data collection took place between August 2014 and September 2015. Some major terrorist attacks occurred during this time in Europe, and the so-called 'refugee crisis' reached its peak in the summer of 2015. Even though robustness checks support the findings, these events might affect how immigrants are (wrongfully) perceived. Previous rounds of the ESS include most of the variables used in this paper, but crucial ones are missing (e.g., symbolic threat, quantity/quality of contact). Hence, it is not possible to repeat the analyses with different rounds. The possible role of a terrorist attack will be addressed in detail in Paper B.

Despite the limitations, *Paper A* reveals the importance of considering the interplay (direct and indirect effects) between religiosity (or other dimensions of religious identification), value-support, and threat perceptions for attitudes toward immigrants. The indirect effect of religiosity remains, otherwise, hidden.

4.3 Paper B

Religious Identification and Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants in the Context of a Terrorist Attack.

Paper B complements the findings of Paper A by focusing on one specific situation: An Islamist terrorist attack in Europe. It tests the expectations related to *Link b* (Section 3.2) and analyses how an attack affects the relationship between religious identification and attitudes. In this sense, it not only looks at individual characteristics that affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (Figure 1 and 2, *Link a*) but considers the role of an external shock (Figure 1 and 2, *Link b*).

Previous studies concluded that terrorist attacks affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration negatively, even if people are not directly exposed (Böhmelt, Bove, and Nussio, 2020; Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2017; Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Hitlan et al. 2007; Legewie 2013; Silva 2018; Solheim 2021). Depending on individual characteristics, some people feel more threatened by a terrorist attack than others, which, in turn, translates into different degrees of negative attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., immigrants). Besides the reasons already mentioned in the introduction, this paper focuses on religious identification as one of these individual characteristics because religion inevitably becomes a topic of discussion in the context of Islamist terrorist attacks. Against this background, the paper tests the expectations of Section 3.2 for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

It applies the assumptions of the Uncertainty-Identity-Theory (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007) and the Religious Coping Literature (Fischer et al. 2006) to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. As a result, the present paper hypothesises that religious individuals have more negative attitudes than non-religious individuals toward Muslim immigrants immediately after the terrorist attack. In contrast, it hypothesises that religious individuals have more positive attitudes than non-religious individuals toward Muslim immigrants with temporal distance to the terrorist attack. Furthermore, it hypothesises that perceived threat due to increased immigration mediates the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants

before and with temporal distance to the terrorist attack. It does not mediate the effect immediately after the terrorist attack.

European Social Survey (ESS; Round 7) data is again used to test the expectation empirically. The dataset provides a unique opportunity to compare the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after a terrorist attack. On the downside, the data collection took place in different countries at different times. Hence, some restrictions to the dataset are inevitable to obtain reliable analyses. Ultimately, the present paper analyses religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after (September 2014 - February 2015) the terrorist attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (January 7, 2015) in six European countries. It focuses on the majority population in Europe, i.e., individuals without a migration background who identify as Christians or do not affiliate with a religious group (N= 9728).

Results from generalised logistic regression models with country fixed-effects reveal that the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants, in this specific case, Muslim immigrants, is indeed not constant over time but affected by an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack. In detail, religious identification alone does not predict the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants *before* the terrorist attack. However, at high levels of threat perception, religious individuals are more accepting than non-religious individuals of Muslim immigrants. Based on data from fewer countries and only four months, these findings corroborate the ones from Paper A: religious identification has the smallest direct effect. At the same time, it indirectly affects the attitudes via the threat perceptions considerably (see 4.1 Paper A). The reported findings are robust across various measurements of religious identification and for different immigrant groups besides Muslim immigrants.

Immediately after the terrorist attack (in January 2015), religious individuals are less likely to have liberal attitudes than non-religious individuals toward Muslim immigrants – they are less accepting, which is in line with the expectations. The level of religious identification does not affect the likelihood of having moderate or restrictive attitudes in a statistically significant way. This relationship only applies to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, not toward ethnically different or ethnically similar immigrants. Furthermore, it only becomes visible when individuals are asked to self-assess their level of religiosity, not when other identification measurements are utilised. These findings indicate that the increased threat perception, which translates to increased ingroup-favouritism and more negative attitudes immediately after a terrorist attack, only applies when two aspects concur. First, individuals must be willing to ascribe

personal importance to religion and use their religiosity to define themselves (subjective religiosity). Second, the (supposed) religious affiliation of the terrorist attack's perpetrators must evoke some association with the immigrant group in question (Muslim immigrants) – even if it is a wrongful association. Lastly, general threat perceptions due to increased immigration have no mediating effect immediately after the terrorist attack, which supports the expectations anew.

With *temporal distance to the terrorist attack* (in February 2015), religious individuals have a higher likelihood than non-religious individuals to have moderate or liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and a lower likelihood to have restrictive attitudes, which again endorses the expectations. The relationship between religious identification and attitudes is independent of the level of perceived threat due to increased immigration. The findings are robust for various measurements of religious identification and across immigrant groups that are noticeably different from the European majority population (Muslim immigrants and ethnically different immigrants).

In sum, the results of Paper B clearly meet the expectations concerning attitudes toward Muslim and ethnically different immigrants. They cannot be convincingly confirmed for attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants. The latter highlights the importance of cultural differences between immigrants and members of the majority population.

The paper again has a few limitations that serve as starting points for future research. The dataset is cross-sectional and different individuals participated in the survey before and after the attack. Furthermore, the number of observations in the pre-and post-attack samples varies considerably between the countries. Similar to Paper A, informative claims about causality are thus impossible and in-depth analyses of country differences would be necessary for further understanding the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants in the context of an Islamist terrorist attack. Additionally, the paper builds on the assumption of increased perceptions of threats and uncertainties due to a terrorist attack. While the descriptive analyses indicate, on average, more negative attitudes after the attack, the dataset does not include specific information on the individuals' perceived threat due to terrorism. Lastly, the analyses conclude with data from February 2015. It remains unclear how the relationship between religious identification and attitudes develops with an even greater temporal distance to the terrorist attack.

Despite the limitations, *Paper B* highlights that the relationship between individuals' religious identification and attitudes is not constant over time but varies in the context of external shock, especially the ones that increase the salience of religion or immigration.

4.4 Paper C

Religious Identification and Muslim Immigrants' Acculturation Preferences for Newly Arriving Immigrants in Germany

Paper A and Paper B focus on the majority population within the host society. They consider the interplay between religious identification, value-support, and threat perceptions (Figure 2, Link a) as well as the specific context of an Islamist terrorist attack for attitudes (Figure 2, Link b). *Paper C* now shifts the focus from the majority population to a minority group within the host society. It focuses on the attitudes of first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants in Germany toward newly arriving immigrants. It explores how these immigrants' level of religious identification affects the acculturation dimensions they prefer other immigrants to follow (acculturation preferences). Doing so tests the remaining two expectations related to *Link a* (Section 3.1).

Previous research has observed that people with and without migration backgrounds differ substantially in their acculturation preferences (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006; Rohmann, Piontkowski, and van Randenborgh 2008). For immigrants who intend to stay longer, members of the majority population without migration background prefer cultural assimilation and integration while rejecting cultural separation. For immigrants who intend to stay temporarily, they prefer cultural separation (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Maisonneuve and Teste 2007; Navas et al. 2007; Phillips 2010; Piontkowski et al. 2000; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015; Zick et al. 2001). (Muslim) immigrants' acculturation preferences are less straightforward. Some studies have reported that immigrants prefer cultural assimilation; others have reported preferences for segregation or integration (e.g., Navas et al. 2007; Pfafferott and Brown 2006; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Zick et al. 2001). Apart from the inconsistent findings, studies on immigrants' acculturation preferences have commonly focused on their acculturation process, not on attitudes toward newly arriving immigrants' acculturation.

Immigrants' heterogeneity in individual characteristics, origin country, and experiences with the host country might explain the mentioned inconsistent findings. Muslim immigrants, which characterise recent immigration to Europe, further differ in their denomination within Islam, religious practises, and the importance they ascribe to the Islamic faith. To make reliable claims about the acculturation preferences of Muslim immigrants in Europe, it is thus necessary to thoroughly consider these differences in religious identification.

Based on the Social-Identity-Theory and incorporating the particularities of religious identification, the present paper argues that Muslim immigrants with a strong religious

identification prefer an acculturation dimension that favours the maintenance of the immigrants' culture (separation > combined culture > assimilation). It further argues that minority group members within Islam are more likely to prefer acculturation dimensions that favour maintaining the immigrants' culture (separation, combined culture) than majority group members within Islam.

The empirical analyses to test the expectations rely on the 'Religionsmonitor', an existing dataset issued by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2017; infas 2016). It includes a sample of the Muslim population (first- and second-generation immigrants) in Germany but intentionally excludes refugees (N= 1066).

The findings of multinomial logistical regression analyses are in line with the argumentation. Muslim immigrants in Germany with a strong religious identification are more likely to prefer an acculturation dimension that favours the maintenance of the immigrants' culture (combined culture, separation). On the other hand, they reject an acculturation dimension that implies a one-sided giving up of cultural components on the immigrants' part (assimilation). Additionally, members of the majority within Islam in Germany (Sunnis) are more likely to prefer combined culture, while members of the minority (Shiites) are more likely to favour separation. Complementary analyses by migration generation and with different measurements for religious identification corroborate the above findings.

The paper is limited insofar as it lacks detailed specifications of the newly arriving immigrants in question. The surveyed Muslim immigrants should merely state which acculturation dimensions they prefer if immigrants with a different culture than most of the population in Germany come to live there. Furthermore, little information on the participants' acculturation strategy is available, only proxies via their language use or duration of stay in Germany. Future research might balance out these deficits. It might also repeat the analyses in other countries with similar Muslim populations or entirely different experiences with Muslim immigrants to test the arguments' generalisability.

In sum, this paper highlights that Muslim immigrants' acculturation preferences depend on the extent of religious identification and whether they belong to a minority or majority within Islam in Germany. It thereby contributes to a better understanding of intergroup relations, which ultimately affect a country's overall social cohesion.

5 Summary and Conclusion

Coming back to the overarching research question of the present dissertation: *how does religious identification shape individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the European context?*

The review of previous research to answer this question has revealed that the findings are inconclusive. Some research reported a positive relationship between greater religious identification and attitudes, others a negative association. It has also revealed at least three shortcomings and thus possible starting points for research to help clarifying the relationship.

First, previous research has not thoroughly considered the interplay between religious identification, values-support, and threat perceptions, even though religious individuals' threat perceptions and value-support are often used as explanation for positive and negative attitudes, respectively.

Second, previous research has rarely considered external events or shocks that increase the salience of immigration and religion and, therefore, affect (moderate, mediate) the relationship between religious identification and attitudes.

Third, previous research predominantly focused on the majority population within the host society, while only marginally discussing the religious identification and attitudes of individuals with a migration background.

It is self-evident that other approaches are also conceivable to clarify previous inconclusive findings, but the present dissertation focuses on the above-mentioned shortcomings. Three individual papers address them one by one for the European context.

The first paper (*Paper A*) explores how individuals' religious identification, realistic- and symbolic threat perceptions, and value-support individually and combined (direct and indirect effects) affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The empirical analyses uncover a clear 'effect-size-order' for the direct effects: Threat perceptions, especially realistic threat perceptions, are most decisive, followed by individuals' value-support. Higher levels of threat perceptions and more conservative attitudes correspond with more restrictive attitudes. Religious identification has no statistically significant direct effect – it neither acts as a 'bridge' nor a 'barrier'. Even though it has no statistically significant direct effect, religious identification indirectly affects attitudes via threat perceptions. For example, at low levels of perceived threat, religious, compared to non-religious, individuals, are more likely to have moderate than liberal attitudes. Value-support only indirectly affects the attitudes via threat perceptions if individuals are questioned on their attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

The findings provide some reasons for the inconclusiveness of previous research: Religious identification, especially compared to threat perceptions and value-support, has a small or even statistically insignificant direct effect, which makes it more reactive to methodological specifications and sample selections. They can easily alter the coefficient's sign and report positive as well as negative associations. The findings highlight the importance of simultaneously considering religious identification, threat perceptions, and value-support when analysing the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Above all, it is essential to take a closer look at the indirect effect of religious identification; otherwise, its role in shaping attitudes is misjudged or overlooked.

The second paper (*Paper B*) analyses how an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack affects the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Its empirical findings complement the first paper's. In line with the first paper, religious identification has no statistically significant direct effect on attitudes before the terrorist attack. However, it indirectly affects the attitudes via threat perceptions. For example, at high levels of threat perception, religious individuals are more accepting than non-religious individuals of immigrants. Immediately after the attack, religious identification directly affects attitudes, and threat perceptions have no mediating effect. Religious individuals are less likely to have liberal attitudes than non-religious individuals toward immigrants, toward Muslim immigrants in particular – they are less accepting. Religious identification does not affect the likelihood of having moderate or restrictive attitudes in a statistically significant way. In contrast, with temporal distance to the terrorist attack, religious individuals have a higher likelihood than non-religious individuals to have moderate or liberal attitudes toward immigrants and a lower likelihood to have restrictive attitudes – they are more accepting and religious identification acts as a 'bridge'. The relationship between religious identification and attitudes is again independent of the perceived threat level.

The paper provides further reasons for the inconclusive findings of previous research. It reveals that the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants, Muslim immigrants, in particular, is not constant over time but affected by an external shock in the form of an Islamist terrorist attack. How religious identification shapes attitudes toward immigrants and immigration thus depends on how close to the survey an external shock that increased the salience of religion and immigration has occurred.

The last paper (*Paper C*), concentrates on individuals with a migration background within the host population. It explores Muslim immigrants' attitudes toward the acculturation

of immigrants who arrive in the country they now reside. The empirical analyses reveal that Muslim immigrants in Germany with a strong religious identification are more likely to prefer an acculturation dimension that favours the maintenance of the immigrants' culture. On the other hand, they reject an acculturation dimension that implies a one-sided giving up of cultural components on the immigrants' part (assimilation). Additionally, members of the majority within Islam in Germany (Sunnis) are more likely to prefer combined culture, while members of the minority (Shiites) are more likely to favour separation.

The paper demonstrates that religious identification not only affects the majority group members' attitudes toward immigrants and immigration conditional on threat perceptions and the occurrence of external shocks. Religious identification also affects the attitudes of minority group members.

Aside from the limitations specific to each paper, which have been discussed in detail in the above sections (4.2 - 4.4) and the attached papers (Sections: II. - IV.), the present dissertation has some general limitations. As commented extensively in the papers, making informed causal claims is not feasible with the utilised datasets. Future research might analyse these relationships with longitudinal or panel data, which are better suited for causal analyses.

Furthermore, in the case of *Paper A and B*, individual country samples are used to demonstrate how robust the argued relationships are. As such samples often lack substantial case numbers, one needs to treat them with caution when interpreting between-country differences. These need to be analysed in more extensive research with higher case numbers for the respective countries. In the case of *Paper C*, the analyses might also be repeated in countries with similar or very different experiences with Muslim immigrants (e.g., most similar/most different approach) to gain information on the findings' generalisability and validity.

The present dissertation solely concentrates on the micro-level – individuals' religious identification and their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The respective aggregation processes, as illustrated in Figure 1 (group- and macro-level; Link c, Link d), remain open to future analyses. These include, for example, analysing how aggregated individual attitudes toward immigrants shape the intergroup relations in a country or how exactly these intergroup relations contribute to a country's social cohesion. The micro-level also neglects to consider the respective countries' existing policy context and experiences with Islamist terrorist attacks, immigration in general, and immigration from countries with a Muslim majority population in particular. For example, the papers' methodological approaches are adjusted accordingly by utilising country-fixed effects models to acknowledge country differences. Future research

might, nevertheless, intentionally focus on the macro-level context to gain further insights into country-specifics (e.g., by extensive case studies).

Lastly, due to the currency of the topic, it focuses on one specific attitudinal determinant (religious identification) and addresses three associated shortcomings. In doing so, it neglects other determinants and alternative explanations for the inconclusive findings of previous research. Additionally, the empirical analyses depend on the queried information in the utilised datasets. Therefore, the topic's political sensitivity and social desirability in the individuals' response behaviour cannot be taken into account. The same applies to minority group members' attitudes within Christian denominations (e.g., Orthodox Christians) or comparisons with Christian immigrants' attitudes toward other immigrants (*Paper C*).

In sum, the present dissertation illustrates that to accurately assess how the religious identification of members of the host populations shapes attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the European context, at least three aspects need to be considered. An accurate assessment depends on: 1) the values religious individuals support and how threatened they generally feel by immigrants, not only on how strongly they identify with their religious group; 2) external shocks that highlight the salience of religion and immigration. Contingent on the timing, external shocks can, on the one hand, result in greater threat perceptions for religious individuals. On the other hand, religious individuals can fall back on their religion to cope with external shocks. An accurate assessment also requires to recognise that 3) religious identification does not only shape the attitudes of majority group members within the host population but also of minority group members, especially Muslim immigrants. These groups of the host population should not be neglected to get a comprehensive picture of how religious identification shapes attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in a country.

Concluding with the dissertation's implications for the broader context of social cohesion. Religious identification is one of the various individual characteristics that shape attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. In turn, these attitudes, in a systematic and aggregated form, define the prevailing intergroup relations in a society or country. Intergroup relations ultimately constitute a country's social cohesion, notwithstanding other factors. The findings thus indicate that religious identification's role in shaping attitudes, which influence intergroup relations and social cohesion, varies in the context of external shocks and the manifestation of other individual characteristics (value-support, threat perceptions). Furthermore, one must take the role of minority group members' religious identification within the host population into account. Minorities also contribute to a country's social cohesion, and Muslim immigrants, in

particular, make up an ever-growing share of the population in European countries. Consequently, their attitudes toward other immigrants gain importance for the social cohesion of a country.

6 References

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II. Paper A

This is the accepted manuscript version* of the single-authored article published in the
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Opposing Immigrants in Europe: The Interplay Between Religiosity, Values, and Threat

Abstract

Previous research located two opposite findings and frequently used threat perceptions and value-support to explain the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants: Religious individuals have negative attitudes toward immigrants because they support conservative values and feel threatened by unfamiliar groups. Second, they are open toward immigrants because they integrate prosocial and altruistic teachings of religion into their daily lives. Both lines have been confirmed repeatedly, which is puzzling. I argue that we need to consider all three factors (religiosity, value-support, threat perceptions) simultaneously and explore their mutual interactions. In this study, I test this line of argumentation empirically with data from the European Social Survey (Round 7). The analyses reveal that religiosity has the weakest direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants. Threat perceptions, on the other hand, have the strongest direct effects, followed by value-support. However, religiosity affects the attitudes toward immigrants indirectly via threat perceptions. These findings highlight that religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions are closely linked and need simultaneous consideration to make reliable claims about their effects.

Introduction

The number of immigrants living in Europe increased steadily from the mid-1980s onward (Eurostat 2019a). Hence, a central concern of the social sciences is the analysis of determinants that drive attitudes toward immigrants. Scholars largely agree on how sociodemographic and socioeconomic determinants affect the attitudes, but there is still disagreement over the role of religiosity (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; McLaren 2003; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014)¹.

* Layout and citation style are according to the journal's guidelines. It can thus deviate from the formatting in the framework chapter and in the other papers.

¹ I understand *religiosity* as the "extent to which a person identifies with a religion, subscribes to its ideology or worldview, and confirms to its normative practices" (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010: 72). This covers different dimensions (e.g. affiliation with a religious group, practicing religious customs and traditions, believing in religious teachings and doctrines). I

Despite the disagreement, the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants is of high actuality. Religiosity increasingly comes to the fore of discussions about immigrant integration and immigration policies because immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority characterize the recent influx of immigration to Europe (Pew Research Center 2017).

Allport (1966: 447) famously summarized the unclear role of religiosity as: “[...] there is something about religion that makes for prejudice, and something about it that unmakes prejudice.” Some research discovered that religious people have more negative attitudes toward immigrants than non-religious people. Others concluded that religious people are more accepting of immigrants. The varying attitudes were primarily explained by referring to varying value-support and threat perceptions.

This study seeks to disentangle the opposite findings and their explanations. It focuses on the link between the majority population’s religiosity and the attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. The majority population is hereby understood as individuals who are either affiliated with one of the majority denominations (Roman Catholic, Protestant) or do not belong to a religious group (non-affiliates). Approximately 85–90 percent of the European population belong to these groups (Pew Research Center 2015).

I propose that we must consider all three factors (religiosity, value-support, threat perceptions) simultaneously and explore their mutual interactions to draw reliable conclusions about their relations with attitudes toward immigrants. Research that found no consistent relationship between religiosity and one single value type or threat perceptions supports this proposition (Gorodzeisky 2013; Malka et al. 2012; Saroglou, Delpierre, and Darnelle 2004). In contrast, close and consistent relationships between value-support, threat perceptions, and attitudes toward immigrants have been observed (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2014).

By the simultaneous consideration of the three factors and the exploration of their interactions, this study sheds light on two things. First, it clarifies whether the inconsistent findings are due to a relatively small absolute effect size of religiosity, compared to values-support and threat perceptions. This would make religiosity more prone to, for example, methodological changes, which can easily turn the effects from negative to positive (and vice versa). Second, it reveals to which degree religiosity affects the attitudes directly and indirectly via value-support

understand *religion* as a set and system of beliefs, norms, values, and meanings that are shared among its members (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010).

or threat perceptions. The indirect effects would remain undetected and ultimately bias the findings without the simultaneous consideration of all three factors.

I use data from the European Social Survey (ESS, Round 7) to test my argumentation empirically. This study primarily focuses on the interplay. It does not aim to demonstrate that support for certain values and stronger threat perceptions relate to specific attitudes. These connections are already very well-researched: Conservative values correlate with negative, altruistic values with positive attitudes² toward immigrants (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov et al. 2014; Davidov et al. 2008; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995). Stronger threat perceptions correlate with negative attitudes (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Hjerm 2009).

Religiosity and Acceptance of Immigrants

Sacred texts frequently include parables of solidarity and altruism like “love your neighbor as yourself,” “the Good Samaritan,” and the Golden Rule (Donahue and Nielsen 2005: 275). Furthermore, Western religions, especially Christianity, contributed substantially to modern philanthropy (Wuthnow 2001). These aspects hint at positive attitudes of religious individuals toward immigrants.

Indeed, the number of pro-migrant church initiatives in Europe has increased over the past decades (Gray 2016). Additionally, Bohman and Hjerm (2014) conclude that religious individuals in Europe are more accepting of immigrants than non-religious individuals. Focusing specifically on Muslim immigrants, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) further support this conclusion. They observe that frequent church attendees hold more positive attitudes than people who do not attend religious services regularly. Furthermore, in the case of asylum seekers, Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers (2006) conclude for the Netherlands that frequent church attendees show more human compassion with asylum seekers.

These positive attitudes are primarily explained by prosocial teachings of religions – by the support for altruistic values. Following the widely accepted definition by Schwartz (1992: 1), values are the “criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events.” They are relative stable guiding principles that shape the evaluation of entities and influence individuals’ actions regularly (Hitlin and Pinkston 2013). Values

² Compared to values, attitudes are directed at concrete entities; they are not as consistent and abstract (Schwartz 1992; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015). Attitudes express an (un)favorable evaluation of an entity (Eagly and Chaiken 2007). Values are superior to attitudes (Esses, Haddock, and Zanna 1993; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995).

are general and abstract concepts, which means that they are not limited to one specific situation or entity but used comprehensively (Schwartz 1992: 4). At the same time, they mirror certain desirable goals. Their supporters perceive these goals as crucial for human existence to survive (Schwartz 1992: 4). Supporters of altruistic values perceive the welfare and well-being of others as desirable (Schwartz 1992). Prosocial religious teachings are in line with these goals (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). Hence, the explanation is based on the argument that devoted individuals are more prone to follow and act upon them, which results in positive attitudes toward immigrants.

Religiosity and Aversion of Immigrants

Sacred texts and the history of religions also point to negative attitudes toward unfamiliar groups like immigrants. Empirically, Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello (2002), for example, conclude that frequent church attendance is related to more prejudice. Additionally, adherents of the Catholic and Protestant Church in Europe, compared to non-affiliates, hold more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002).

Two closely intertwined explanations for these negative attitudes stand out: Religious individuals embody conservative values. Religious individuals perceive immigrants as a threat to their identity. The former explanation reasons that religious individuals have negative attitudes because they support conservative values. Supporters of conservative values perceive it as desirable to maintain security and tradition, to ensure conformity with established rules, orders, and expectations (Schwartz 1992: 9-10). Religions thrive on maintaining and regularly practicing traditions and customs. People with unfamiliar traditions and customs – like immigrants – are then an obstacle to these desirable goals, which results in negative attitudes toward them. The latter explanation is based on theories of group stratification, group threat, and social identity (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999; Tajfel 1974). Thereby, it is argued that religious individuals perceive immigrants as an unfamiliar group. This unfamiliarity is accompanied by perceiving them as a threat to the position of the own group, to the established (religiously influenced) societal and cultural order, and the cohesiveness of the own group identity. Thus, negative attitudes are defense mechanisms to secure what is familiar.

Two Opposite Findings, Values and Threat Perceptions as Explanations

The above sections focus on studies conducted in Europe as the U.S. context, for example, differs crucially in the importance, status, and role of religion. They leave us with two opposite findings, whereby different value preferences and threat perceptions function as explanations for the link between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants. On their own, each one provides valuable information. Nevertheless, their opposite implications do not contribute to a better understanding of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. They lack the simultaneous consideration of the mentioned explanations and the systematic exploration of their interplay. This study provides this missing piece. At least two aspects are worthy of discussion and justify a simultaneous consideration of religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions.

First, the links between religiosity and the explanatory values (altruistic/conservative) are presented as exclusive; the respective other value is largely neglected. This is problematic as it is not an “either/or” situation. Studies on the value-support of religious individuals demonstrate that they embody both value types, albeit to various degrees (Malka et al. 2012; Saroglou, Delpierre, and Dernelle 2004): Religious individuals support conservative values (tradition, conformity) but dislike values that represent change and autonomy. They also support altruistic values like benevolence. These associations are robust across different religious groups and countries (Saroglou, Delpierre, and Darnelle 2004).

Second, we need to consider different types of threat. Commonly, we can differentiate between realistic and symbolic threat (Quillian 1995; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999). Realistic threat expresses that the majority population feels threatened because minorities may endanger their prerogatives. The majority population and the immigrants compete for scarce resources (e.g., welfare benefits, political/economic power, material well-being, natural resources; Quillian 1995; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999). There is no reason to believe that realistic threat is systematically related to religiosity. In contrast, symbolic threat is understood as the majority population’s “fear of risking the positive status of the country’s symbolic establishments as well as its ethnic and cultural cohesiveness” (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015: 1762). The majority population and the immigrants compete for traditions, customs, morals, beliefs, norms, and so on (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; McLaren 2003; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999). Accordingly, immigrants’ presence triggers fear in religious individuals for their familiar and religiously influenced traditions and customs, which results in

negative attitudes. In both cases, the perceived and not the actual threat is relevant. Although we have no reason to believe that the perception of realistic threat is systematically related to religiosity, we can observe a strong positive relationship between realistic and symbolic threat (Gorodzeisky 2013). Therefore, using one type of threat, without the other, to explain the negative attitudes of religious individuals is not sufficient and leads to wrongful conclusions.

Theoretical Connections

To overcome these shortcomings, I deduce the expectations for the interplay by a two-step approach. First, to determine whether we can expect direct or indirect effects on attitudes toward immigrants, I propose that we contrast the consistency and stability of threat perceptions with the consistency and stability of value-support and religiosity. Second, to further determine the links between religiosity, value-support, and attitudes, I propose that we deduce whether religiosity constitutes a value itself. If it constitutes a value, then it must be treated like any other value type. Otherwise, values might overshadow the influence of religiosity.

Threat Perceptions, Value-Support, and Religiosity

Values are stable guiding principles that influence the individuals' actions regularly (Hitlin and Pinkston 2013). They do not concern specific situations/entities – they embrace all areas of an individual's life (Schwartz 1992; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015). Due to this stability and range, values are relatively static concepts. They are less reactive to (temporary) external changes or events. It takes an accumulation of changes in numerous areas of an individual's life to have consequences for their value-system (Esses, Haddock, and Zanna 1993; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995).

The same applies to individuals' religiosity. Due to usually early age religious socialization in the parental home, religious beliefs and practices are deeply rooted in an individual's personality (Cairns et al. 2006). Furthermore, religiosity shapes numerous areas of an individual's life (e.g., culinary preferences, ways of interacting, clothing style) and is not limited to specific situations (Mitchell 2006). Thus, changes in an individual's religiosity also proceed slowly and gradually.

We can consider the described connections as the direct effects of values and religiosity on attitudes toward immigrants. These direct effects are relatively stable. However, they are not the only factors that shape attitudes. More reactive factors also play a role. They mediate how strongly the effects of values and religiosity on attitudes toward immigrants ultimately are.

Threat perceptions are one of these reactive factors. They are less stable and comprehensive. They are not always (to the same extent) operative (Stephan and Stephan 2000: 39). They depend on the awareness and evaluation of external events. Hence, the level of perceived threat is a reaction to an event/change (Semyonov et al. 2004). For example, a sharp influx of immigrants and negative reporting can cause an increased perception of threat. This reaction concerns the subject of the event/change and areas related to the subject. It does not comprehensively concern most areas of an individual's life like values and religiosity do. The attitudes toward immigrants relate directly to the perception of immigrants as a threat. Threat perceptions and attitudes cover the same subject matter, whereas attitudes toward immigrants are one of many areas of the individual's life that values and religiosity cover. Due to its immediate relationship with attitudes toward immigrants, the perception of immigrants as a threat has a stronger direct effect than value-support and religiosity. Additionally, value-support and religiosity indirectly affect the attitudes via threat perceptions. These indirect effects appear likely because threat perceptions are not entirely exogenous. Religiosity and values inspire which (symbolic) aspects are relevant for an individual and are likely to be perceived as being threatened by immigrants.

H1: *Religiosity and value-support affect the attitudes toward immigrants indirectly via threat perceptions. Threat perceptions have mediating effects.*

Each type of threat has different consequences for the individuals' lives and their attitudes toward immigrants. Realistic threat focuses on scarce resources, while symbolic threat focuses on symbolic establishments, ethnic and cultural cohesiveness (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Quillian 1995; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999).

In developed societies, it is almost impossible to survive and participate without the monetary assets and the possessions reflected in the concept of realistic threat (e.g., jobs and social benefits). In addition, they are also necessary to realize (some of) the cultural components reflected in the concept of symbolic threat. To sacrifice components reflected in the concept of symbolic threat is also challenging and has (psychological) consequences (e.g., loss of identity and belonging, insecurities; Berry 1997). However, when it comes down to it, the loss of scarce resources has (in the long run) severer consequences for an individual's life than the loss of symbolic establishments. Furthermore, the loss of scarce resources and the subsequent overcoming of this loss predominantly depend on factors that are out of the individual's hands. The loss of symbolic establishment is also not self-imposed, but overcoming the related difficulties

is possible with personal efforts and adapting. Based on these differences, realistic threat perceptions induce greater fear than symbolic threat perceptions, which results in severer consequences for attitudes.

H2: *The extent to which individuals perceive immigrants as a realistic threat has a stronger effect on attitudes toward immigrants than the perception of immigrants as a symbolic threat.*

However, we need to address one exception: When cultural differences of a certain immigrant group are highlighted and framed as a threat to the predominant culture and values (symbolic threat) – like it is repeatedly the case with Muslim immigrants in Europe – we can expect that the gap between the effect of realistic threat and symbolic threat perceptions decreases.

Religion and the Value Framework

The works of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995) on value contents and structures³ provide information on the link between religiosity and value-support.

Religions supply answers to the question of life's meaning, provide stability, and reduce uncertainty (Schwartz 1992: 11-12; Schwartz and Huismans 1995: 92). In doing so, they provide guidelines, structure, and modes of behavior. Furthermore, religious leaders promote support for some desirable goals, whereas they neglect others (Schwartz and Huismans 1995: 88). They also use them to reinforce religious teachings (Schwartz 1992: 11). Deducing from these aspects, one might see religiosity as a value and stable guiding principle that affects attitudes.

Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995) elaborate further and uncover three limitations that contradict seeing religiosity as a value. First, the offerings of religion can be satisfied with other values like universalism or security (Schwartz 1992: 6-7). Second, even though religious leaders promote, neglect, and use certain desirable goals, there is no consensus. Different religious leaders promote different goals (Schwartz 1992: 11). Even within the same religious group, devotees and religious leaders differ on the goals they perceive as desirable (Schwartz and Huismans 1995: 88). Schwartz (1992) tested the existence of a single and universal spirituality value empirically. He concluded that there is no universal value, but rather “a number of distinct types of spirituality values, each consisting of a different subset of specific values” (Schwartz 1992: 38). In other words, other value types also express the goals of

³ Schwartz (1992) distinguishes 10 human values: conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, and security. He bases this distinction on their respective desirable goals. See Schwartz (1992: 28-29) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995: 89) for detailed descriptions of the value types, their goals, and empirical confirmations.

religiosity/spirituality. These types are also not universal and vary between groups. Third, the desirable goals are of a theological and philosophical nature. Dealing with complex questions like the meaning of life requires deep knowledge of the topic and great intellectual capabilities (Schwartz 1992: 11). A lot of people are not able or do not want to make this effort. The desirable goals are too abstract to serve as everyday guiding principles for many people. People fall back on other, easily accessible values as guiding principles. Consequently, values are superior to religiosity and have stronger direct effects on attitudes because religiosity constitutes no value itself. Together with the above elaborations on the reactivity of threat perceptions, we can form the following hypothesis:

H3: *The extent to which individuals perceive immigrants as a threat has a stronger direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants than how religious they are and which values they support. However, individuals' value-support has a stronger direct effect than their religiosity.*

The hypothesis does not imply that religiosity is irrelevant. It merely implies that religiosity is less relevant than value-support when it comes to direct effects. The hypothesis also does not imply that religiosity and value-support are always unrelated. Value-support could also mediate the effect of religiosity. I will test this empirically later on. In this case, we have to deal with a lack of clarity regarding the causal relationship (Schwartz and Huismans 1995: 88): Do religious people favor certain values because they are promoted by their religion or do people identify with a religion because it promotes values they perceive as favorable? We can disregard this discussion for this study as it does not focus on how the individuals' value-support, religiosity, threat perceptions, and attitudes came about.

In sum, the hypotheses outline that value-support and religiosity indirectly affect attitudes toward immigrants via threat perceptions (H1). Additionally, they suggest an “effect size order” for the direct effects: *Realistic threat perception* > *symbolic threat perception* > *value-support* > *religiosity*. Realistic threat perceptions have stronger direct effects on attitudes toward immigrants than symbolic threat perceptions (H2). Threat perceptions have stronger direct effects than value-support, and value-support has stronger effects than religiosity (H3).

Data and Methods

Data

Round 7 of the ESS is very fitting to test the hypotheses (ESS 2018; Edition 2.1). The biennial multi-country survey contains questions about attitudes toward immigrants, religiosity, threat perceptions, and a shortened version of Schwartz's human value scale. The data set stems from face-to-face interviews, conducted between August 2014 and September 2015 with persons older than 14 years in private households (ESS 2014a). It includes samples from 20 European countries and Israel (ESS 2014a). This study solely focuses on European countries.

Methodical Approach

First, I perform a factor analysis with principal-component factoring to pinpoint which items of the human value scale represent conservative and altruistic values. Afterward, I perform a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to double-check how well the observed variables (items) measure the latent variables (conservative/altruistic values).

Second, I examine the links between the three factors and attitudes descriptively to identify first particularities (means, distributions, correlations).

Third, I analyze the relationships stepwise with multivariate statistics – namely, OLS-regression models and multinomial logistic regression models. It is opted for OLS-regression models because the dependent variable can be treated as a quasi-metrical variable and is normally distributed. Nevertheless, it only consists of four response categories, which is not ideal for quasi-metrical treatment. To anticipate this point of criticism, I additionally adopt multinomial logistical regression models to illustrate the mediating effects. Their estimates are sometimes hard to interpret. Therefore, I calculate the corresponding predictive marginal effects and display them graphically to allow more intuitive interpretations. Due to the present data set's cross-sectional structure, it is impossible to analyze multistage causal claims with structural equation models or path analyses that utilize longitudinal data. Nevertheless, analyses of interaction effects can at least provide information on the dependencies between the variables – independently of their causal relationships. All models are country fixed-effects models with robust standard errors. I apply listwise deletion to missing data. A supplementary analysis revealed that imputing missing values (imputations: 20; observations: +2,904) leads to similar findings. Throughout the analyses, I refrain from weighting the data because they are based on a non-randomly selected subsample of the data set (N= 33,344). It only includes members of the majority population with valid responses for all relevant value items. This helps to reduce

biases due to (systematic) non-response. The available weights only account for subsamples that are based on age, gender, education or region (ESS 2020).

Finally, I check the findings' robustness by utilizing different measurements of religiosity and individual country samples.

Measurements

To measure attitudes toward immigrants, it is necessary to specify the types of immigrants. Immigrants are a heterogeneous group. It would cause ambiguities if we generally ask respondents about their attitudes. It would remain unclear which types of immigrants they have in mind when expressing their attitudes. The main analyses, therefore, consider three different dependent variables: *Attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants*, *attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants*, and *attitudes toward Muslim immigrants*. For each variable, the survey's question was phrased similarly and had identical response categories. The respondents were asked to what extent they think [country] should allow [people of the same race or ethnic group from most of [country]'s people/people of a different race or ethnic group from most of [country]'s people/Muslims from other countries] to come and live here. They should choose the category they agree with most: allow many to come and live here, allow some, allow a few, allow none (ESS 2014b: 12, 27). I collapse the two middle categories for the predictive marginal effects because a meaningful distinction between "some" and "a few" is challenging. However, I refrain from further collapsing the variable (e.g., dummy variable) to maintain as many information as possible.

Religiosity is measured by the self-reported *level of religiosity* (0–10 scale; not at all–very religious). The participants were asked to indicate how religious they are, regardless of them belonging to a particular religion (ESS 2014b: 17). The religious affiliation (nonaffiliate, Catholic, Protestant) is not considered explicitly as it is not necessary to be a formal member to be religious and vice versa (Davie 1990). Analyses with the religious affiliation as a covariate support this and reveal that it is no relevant explanatory factor (Table 1, Models 2/9/16). It is also impossible to explore the effect of minority group membership (e.g., Jews, Eastern Orthodox) on attitudes toward immigrants due to low case numbers.

I use the *frequency of service attendance* and the *frequency of praying* as robustness checks. The response categories were recoded. Higher values display higher frequencies (0–6 scale; never–every day; ESS 2014b: 17–18).

Individuals support various types of values simultaneously; each one is of different importance. This relative importance must be understood as a continuum rather than discrete

categories one either completely supports or completely neglects (Schwartz 1992: 44-46). Based on a factor analysis, I generate a variable that illustrates both: The mutual appearance of conservative and altruistic values (simultaneous endorsement) and their different levels of importance (continuum). The left-hand column of Table A1 displays all value items and their wordings in the questionnaire. The endorsement of each item was measured by asking the participants how much the described person is like them (6-point scale; not like me at all-very much like me; ESS 2014b). The factor analysis reveals that we can summarize the value items into three factors. The factors largely comply with the theoretical suggestions of Schwartz (2003). He proposes that each of the 10 basic human values can be illustrated by combining two to three value items. The right-hand column of Table A1 displays the value each item indexes, according to Schwartz (2003). These values can, in turn, be summarized into higher order values (Schwartz 1992: 45). Factor 1 is not our focus and neglected from here on. Factor 2 combines items that index the values universalism and benevolence. They can be subsumed to the higher order value “Self-Transcendence.” I refer to these items as altruistic value items. The CFA supports this. The corresponding R^2 -values range from .27 to .43, and the factor loadings from .52 to .66 ($p < .001$). Factor 3 combines items that index the values conformity, security, tradition, and power. Besides the latter, these values can be subsumed to the higher order value “Conservation.” I refer to these items as conservative value items. Again, the CFA supports this. The R^2 -values range from .25 to .38, and the factor loadings from .50 to .62 ($p < .001$).

Subsuming two or three items to one value is one point of criticism the ESS’s human value scale receives (Beierlein et al., 2012; Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008; Knoppen and Saris 2009). I avoid this discussion by combining all relevant items and analyzing them collectively. Hence, I do not differentiate the higher order values’ subcategories. It is also not necessary to make corrections that account for individual differences in the use of the response scale, as proposed by Schwartz (2003: 2), because my attention is on the differences in support. It is not on the individual ratings of each item or the comparison of different items.

Finally, I compute the *value-support* by subtracting the overall score of all five altruistic value items from the overall score of all five conservative value items. In the data set, no observations at the edges are available. This results in a -23 to 16 scale. I set the scale’s starting point to 0 to facilitate the interpretation (0-39 scale): The support for altruistic values outweighs the support for conservative values when the score is < 23 . The support for altruistic and conservative values is equally strong at a score of 23. The support for conservative values outweighs the support for altruistic values when the score is > 23 . This variable displays the mutual

appearance of conservative and altruistic values as well their different levels of importance, which avoids an either-or situation for the individuals' value-support.

Some research concluded that individuals with a left-leaning political ideology support altruistic values to a greater extent, while right-leaning individuals support conservative values (Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009). Other research concluded that value-support and political ideology do not necessarily overlap (Hanel, Zarzeczna, and Haddock 2019). The question then arises whether individuals' political ideology might be an easier to operationalize measurement that could replace the generated value-support variable. Based on Pearson correlation coefficient, these two variables have a low correlation ($r = .174$), which indicates that they cannot fully replace each other. The value-support is a more universal measurement and focuses on a broader set of application areas. The political ideology – based on a left-right scale – strongly focuses on the political sphere.

The analyses also include the *realistic threat perception* and the *symbolic threat perception* to consider different types of threat. A three-item index illustrates realistic threat perceptions. A two-item index illustrates symbolic threat perceptions. The indices subsume the respondents' answers to questions like “Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?” (realistic threat) or “Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” (symbolic threat). The items' wordings and the methodical approach can be found in the questionnaire's guidelines (ESS 2015: 20-23). The indices are coded on an 11-point scale (very low-very high perception of realistic/symbolic threat).

The models also include individual characteristics that turned out to have relevant associations with attitudes toward immigrants (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; McLaren 2003; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014). Included are the respondents' *migration background* (none, at least one parent, own), *sex* (male/female), *age*, *level of education* (completed ISCE-level at the time of the interview), *feeling about household's income* (4-point scale; very difficult-living comfortably), and their *quantity and quality of contact with immigrants of a different race or ethnic group* (nine categories: rarely/occasionally/frequently \times bad/medium/good). The latter picks up previous experiences with immigrants that shape future attitudes and willingness to interact with immigrants. The variable “feeling about household's income” additionally considers the potential effects of insecure living situations on the perception of immigrants as a realistic threat (e.g., fear of increased job competition). Including

these covariates enables us to avoid biased results due to correlations at the individual level that are not this study's focus (e.g., higher threat perceptions among people of a certain age).

Results

Descriptive Results

The descriptive analyses provide an overall picture of the average prominence of religiosity, value-support, threat perceptions, and attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. We see that most respondents are open to allow at least a limited number of ethnically different immigrants⁴ into the country (allow a few/some: 74.11 percent; allow many: 14.34 percent; allow none: 11.55 percent). The average level of religiosity is low to moderate (mean: 4.17; Figure A1). The difference between the support for altruistic and conservative values is minimal (mean: 20.23; median: 21; Figure A2): Few people are situated toward the scale's extreme ends, whereas 74.2 percent are either situated at the score 23 (equally strong support for both value types) or in a ± 5 -unit range around it. Most respondents neither perceive immigrants as totally threatening nor as totally beneficial or enriching (Figure A3). Nevertheless, the perception of immigrants as a realistic threat (mean: 5.26) is more pronounced than as a symbolic threat (mean: 4.72).

Irrespective of whether we treat the dependent variable as quasi-metrical or ordinal, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients report similar correlations (Table A2). The coefficients are negative throughout. Higher threat perceptions and stronger support for conservative values are associated with more negative attitudes. The correlations support the hypothesized "effect size order" (H2/H3): Realistic threat perception ($r = -.550$) > symbolic threat perception ($r = -.500$) > value-support ($r = -.346$) > religiosity ($r = -.028$). The "effect size order" can also be confirmed for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and ethnically similar immigrants. In the case of Muslim immigrants, the correlation between attitudes and threat perceptions is almost identical for both types of threat (Table A2), which is in line with the exception noted after H2.

The correlations between the explanatory variables further support this study's argument to consider them simultaneously and explore their interactions and mediating effects. The association between value-support and the perception of immigrants as a realistic ($r = .285$) or symbolic ($r = .335$) threat is stronger than between value-support and religiosity ($r = .167$). The

⁴ Most respondents are also open to allow at least a limited number of Muslim or ethnically similar immigrants into the country (allow a few/some: >70 percent; allow many: >12 percent). Furthermore, all mean values vary between 1.4 and 1.9, with the lowest value for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and the highest for ethnically similar immigrants.

respondents' religiosity correlates negligibly with their threat perceptions ($r = -.025/-0.018$). People who perceive immigrants as a realistic threat likely perceive them as a symbolic threat – and vice versa ($r = .627$).

Multivariate Results

Table 1 displays the estimates of the linear regression analyses for each immigrant group. The first two models (1/2, 8/9, 15/16) test the direct effects (H2 and H3). The following models (3-7, 10-14, 17-21) focus on the interaction effects (H1).

Starting with the direct effects. The findings confirm the hypotheses entirely for the attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants. The perception of immigrants as a realistic threat has the strongest effect on attitudes, followed by the symbolic threat perception and the value-support, while religiosity has no significant effect (standardized β -coefficients in Models 1b/8b). Stronger threat perceptions as well as more conservative values are associated with the tendency to allow fewer immigrants into the country (Models 1a/8a). The attitudes toward Muslim immigrants deviate only in one case from the other immigrant groups: Both threat perceptions affect the attitudes to a similar degree, which again supports the exception noted after H2 (Models 15a/15b). Adding the religious affiliation to the models causes no changes, although Protestants are slightly more open than non-affiliates to allow more ethnically similar immigrants into the country (Models 2/9/16). Nevertheless, the overwhelmingly insignificant coefficients and the very small positive coefficient of Protestants toward ethnically similar immigrants let me to neglect the religious affiliation from here on. Different standardized β -coefficients do not automatically imply that they are also statistically different. t-Tests after the regression analyses help to clarify whether the differences between the coefficients are significant. Except for the differences between realistic and symbolic threat in the case of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, all differences are significant with $p < .001$.

Table 1: Linear Regression Analyses for Attitudes Toward Immigrants
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants								
	(1a)	(1b) ¹	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.00329)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.017** (0.00579)
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.132	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)	-0.028*** (0.002)
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.306	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.155*** (0.004)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.149*** (0.010)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.141*** (0.003)
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.229	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.108*** (0.004)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.112*** (0.009)	-0.097*** (0.003)
Religious Affiliation (Ref. No Affiliation)								
Roman-Catholic			-0.016 (0.013)					
Protestant			-0.009 (0.013)					
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception				0.004*** (0.001)				
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception					0.003*** (0.001)			
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception						0.000 (0.000)		
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception							0.001 (0.000)	
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support								0.001** (0.000)
Constant	3.298*** (0.038)		3.299*** (0.038)	3.367*** (0.040)	3.344*** (0.039)	3.336*** (0.055)	3.360*** (0.049)	3.354*** (0.043)
Observations					24577			
Adjusted R ²					0.43			

Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants								
	(8a)	(8b) ¹	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	0.002 (0.002)	0.008	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.013* (0.006)
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.097	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.002)
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.134*** (0.003)	-0.309	-0.134*** (0.003)	-0.150*** (0.004)	-0.134*** (0.003)	-0.127*** (0.010)	-0.134*** (0.003)	-0.134*** (0.003)
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.162	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.080*** (0.004)	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.078*** (0.009)	-0.065*** (0.003)
Religious Affiliation (Ref. No Affiliation)								
Roman-Catholic			0.021 (0.013)					
Protestant			0.038** (0.013)					
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception				0.004*** (0.001)				
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception					0.004*** (0.001)			
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception						-0.000 (0.000)		
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception							0.001 (0.000)	
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support								0.001** (0.000)
Constant	3.066*** (0.039)		3.071*** (0.039)	3.141*** (0.041)	3.128*** (0.040)	3.033*** (0.055)	3.122*** (0.049)	3.121*** (0.043)
Observations					24568			
Adjusted R ²					0.34			

Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants								
	(15a)	(15b) ¹	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.008	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.006)
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.137	-0.029*** (0.002)	-0.029*** (0.002)	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.038*** (0.003)	-0.035*** (0.002)	-0.029*** (0.002)
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.231	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.137*** (0.005)	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.159*** (0.011)	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.119*** (0.004)
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.256	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.129*** (0.004)	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.149*** (0.009)	-0.121*** (0.003)
Religious Affiliation (Ref. No Affiliation)								
Roman-Catholic			-0.017 (0.014)					
Protestant			-0.003 (0.014)					
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception				0.004*** (0.001)				
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception					0.002** (0.001)			
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception						0.002*** (0.0001)		
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception							0.001** (0.000)	
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support								0.000 (0.000)
Constant	3.252*** (0.042)		3.255*** (0.042)	3.337*** (0.044)	3.284*** (0.043)	3.439*** (0.061)	3.365*** (0.053)	3.247*** (0.048)
Observations					24411			
Adjusted R ²					0.44			

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ¹ = Standardized β -Coefficients

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Country-Dummies not displayed. In all models, it is controlled for the respondents' age, sex, level of education, migration background, feeling about household's income, and quality/quantity of contact with immigrants. The attitudes toward immigrants are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 'allow none', 1 'allow a few', 2 'allow some', and 3 'allow many'.


Turning to the interaction effects in Table 1. For attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants, the observations partly support H1: Religiosity indirectly affects the attitudes via threat perceptions, while we cannot observe the same for value-support. The interaction terms between religiosity and realistic as well as symbolic threat have significant and positive effects on attitudes ($p < .001$; Models 3/4, 10/11). The interaction terms between value-support and the two types of perceived threat are statistically irrelevant ($p > .1$; Models 5/6, 12/13). In contrast, we can observe an interaction effect between religiosity and value-support, which provides further support for H3. The interaction term also has a significant and positive effect ($p < .01$; Models 7/14). For attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the observations fully support H1: Religiosity and value-support indirectly affect the attitudes via threat perceptions ($p < .01$; Models 17/18, 19/20). The interaction terms have significant and positive effects. Threat perceptions are mediating factors for the effects of religiosity and value-support on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. In contrast, the interaction term between religiosity and value-support has no significant effect ($p > .1$; Model 21).

Collectively, the multivariate analyses so far provide us with five conclusions. First, threat perceptions have the strongest direct effects on attitudes toward all immigrant groups, followed by value-support. Religiosity has the weakest effect. Second, both threat perceptions play a similar role for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, while realistic threat perceptions have a greater impact than symbolic threat perceptions on attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants. Third, religiosity and value-support indirectly affect the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants via threat perceptions. Fourth, religiosity indirectly affects the attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants via threat perceptions, but value-support does not. Fifth, religiosity and value-support interact and collectively affect the attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants.

Figure 1 graphically illustrates the interaction effects. Specifically, it displays the average marginal effects of value-support and religiosity on attitudes toward immigrants at different levels of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. Additionally, it displays the average marginal effect of religiosity on attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants at different levels of value-support to graphically illustrate the significant interaction term in Table 1 (Model 7). To compute the average marginal effects, I fall back on multinomial logistical regression models and display the effects for each response category separately. Figure 1 only includes the interaction effects on attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants and Muslim immigrants. The interaction effects on attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants are nearly identical with the attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants (Table 1, Models 3-7/10-14).

In Figure 1, we can observe similar trends for the effect of religiosity on attitudes toward both immigrant groups at different levels of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. However, the effects are slightly more pronounced for realistic threat than symbolic threat, and slightly more pronounced for Muslim immigrants than ethnically different immigrants. This supports the hypotheses anew.

Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects (Interaction Terms by Response Categories)



Specifically, we see that the effect of religiosity on attitudes toward all immigrant groups varies by the level of threat perceptions. Stronger religiosity increases the probability to favor the category “allow a few/some” and decreases the probability to favor the category “allow many” at low levels of perceived threats. Stronger religiosity also increases the probability to favor the

category “allow a few/some” and decreases the probability to favor the category “allow none” at high levels of perceived threats.

In the case of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the effect of value-support also varies by the level of threat perceptions. Stronger support for conservative values increases the probability to favor the most restrictive response category (allow none). Considering the confidence intervals, the effect size remains almost identical throughout all levels of perceived threats. Furthermore, stronger support for conservative values increases the probability to favor the category “allow a few/some” at low levels of perceived threats. This effect weakens with increasing threat perceptions. It ultimately turns into a negative effect and stronger support for conservative values decreases the probability to favor this response category at high levels of perceived threats. Finally, the weaker the perceived threats, the stronger the negative effect of value-support on the probability to favor the most accepting response category (allow many).

In the case of attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants, Table 1 also indicated an interaction between religiosity and value-support. As long as altruistic values outweigh conservative values (left of the vertical line), stronger religiosity has a positive effect on the probability to favor the category “allow a few/some” and a negative effect on the probability to favor the category “allow many.” In short, the role religiosity plays for the attitudes is stronger the more individuals support altruistic values. As soon as conservative values outweigh altruistic values (right of the vertical line), the effect of religiosity vanishes. Although we can observe a tendency toward a negative effect at strong support for conservative values, the effect of religiosity on the probability to favor the most restrictive category (allow none) remains rather small and insignificant at all levels of value-support.

It is necessary to note that all discussed effects on the probability are $< \pm .03$. In other words, mediating effects exist but are comparatively small, which supports H3 on the direct effects and the “effect size order.”

Robustness Checks

The descriptive findings and the first part of the multivariate analyses confirmed that the direct effects of threat perceptions on attitudes toward immigrants are the strongest, followed by the value-support. Religiosity has the weakest effects. Furthermore, realistic threat perceptions have a stronger effect than symbolic threat perceptions on attitudes toward ethnically similar or different immigrants. Both types of threat have similar effects on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The second part of the multivariate analyses confirmed that threat perceptions mediate the effect of religiosity on attitudes toward all immigrant groups. Threat perceptions

additionally mediate the effect of value-support on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. However, we have to keep the small sizes of the interaction effects in mind.

Now the question arises whether these findings occur independently of the way we measure religiosity. To test the robustness of the above findings, I repeat the analyses and replace the level of religiosity once with the frequency of service attendance and once with the frequency of praying. Finally, I add all three dimensions simultaneously (Table A3). These robustness checks consider the multidimensionality of religiosity (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002). They capture intrinsic and behavioral dimensions, even though the measurements are closely related (Table A2). The data set does not allow for distinctions beyond that, for example, between spirituality, religiosity, and “fuzzy-fidelity” as Voas (2009) calls it. To ensure the comparability of the different measurements, the robustness checks focus on the standardized β -coefficients and the interaction terms.

The estimates with the frequency of service attendance and the frequency of praying largely comply with the initial ones (Table A3). They reinforce the hypothesized “effect size order” (threat perceptions > values-support > religiosity dimension), the deviating findings for the effect of symbolic threat on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, and the interactions. However, compared to the initial analyses, we can no longer observe a significant interaction effect of value-support and the respective religiosity dimension on attitudes toward ethnically similar or different immigrants. This is the only case in which the robustness checks deviate from the initial analyses. In the last step, I include all three dimensions of religiosity simultaneously. In these models, we can no longer observe significant individual and interactions effects of the religiosity dimensions. The direct effects of value-support and threat perceptions, on the other hand, remain in the hypothesized order.

Furthermore, there might be some country differences that cannot be fully picked up by the fixed-effects models. These differences could, for example, be contingent on country-specific experiences with immigrants or religion’s significance in a country. I exemplarily repeat the analyses for individual countries to rule out these effects (Table A5). Based on the share of immigrants and the average level of religiosity in a country, I use a most-different approach to select the countries (Table A4): Portugal (high religiosity, low share), Czech Republic (low religiosity, low share), Sweden (low religiosity, high share), and Ireland (high religiosity, high share).

The findings for the individual countries support H2 and H3 anew (standardized β -coefficients in Table A5): They show that threat perceptions have the strongest direct effects on

attitudes toward immigrants, followed by value-support, while religiosity has the weakest direct effect. The analyses also confirm the exception noted after H2. In the case of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, symbolic threat perceptions are of particular importance. Their effects are nearly as strong as the effects of realistic threat perceptions. Turning to the mediating effects of threat perceptions. The country analyses do not uniformly support H1. In other words, religiosity does not affect the attitudes toward immigrants indirectly via threat perceptions in all countries. Considering the effect sizes, this is not unexpected. Compared to the other explanatory factors, religiosity continuously has the weakest effect. Consequently, model specifications like restrictions to individual country samples can easily change the direction of the effect and its statistical significance. Taken together, the robustness checks are further proof for the proposed “effect size order” in H3 - religiosity is the least decisive factor for attitudes toward immigrants.

In detail, we see that in countries with a low average level of religiosity (Czech Republic and Sweden), religiosity has no statistically significant direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants ($p > .1$). Even after adding interaction terms to the models, the coefficients remain small and statistically insignificant, which reflects religion’s low significance in these countries. The suggested “effect size order” and the particular effect of symbolic threat perceptions on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are in line with the initial findings. Furthermore, we see that in the Czech Republic, a country with a comparatively low share of immigrants, religiosity indirectly affects the attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants via realistic threat perceptions ($p < .05$). In Sweden, a country with a high share of immigrants, this is not the case ($p > .1$). This might suggest an effect of low overall experience and contact with immigrants (McLaren 2003). However, this aspect needs separate consideration in future research. In both countries with low levels of religiosity, we see that symbolic threat perceptions mediate the effect of value-support: In the Czech Republic with respect to attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants ($p < .05$), in Sweden with respect to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants ($p < .05$).

In countries with a high average level of religiosity (Portugal and Ireland), three aspects stand out. First, in both countries, all interactions effects with respect to attitudes toward ethnically similar and ethnically different immigrants play no statistically significant role ($p > .1$). In Portugal, we can also observe this with respect to attitudes toward Muslim immigrants ($p > .1$). Second, in Portugal with a low share of immigrants, even after adding the interaction terms to the models, religiosity has a small negative direct effect on attitudes toward all immigrant groups ($p < .01$): Religious individuals are less accepting of immigrants. This might again

suggest an effect of low overall experience and contact with immigrants. Third, in Ireland, a country with high average levels of religiosity and immigrants, the effects on attitudes toward Muslim deviate from the previous findings. In this case, especially the proposed “effect size order” cannot be confirmed. Religiosity still has the weakest and realistic threat perception the strongest effect. However, value-support plays a more prominent role than symbolic threat perception. This might indicate that restrictive attitudes are not primarily the result of concerns over cultural prerogative, but rather of increased aversion of people who support conservative values to an immigrant group that differs from the majority population specifically with regard to their religious affiliation. This possibility needs detailed exploration in future research as well.

Conclusion and Discussion

The contradictory findings and relying on value-support and threat perceptions to explain the link between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants in Europe were the starting point of this study. I argued that we must consider religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions simultaneously and explore their interplay to draw reliable conclusions.

We can conclude a clear “effect size order”: How strongly someone perceives immigrants as a threat - especially as a realistic threat - has the strongest direct effect on attitudes toward immigrants, followed by how strongly someone supports altruistic and conservative values. Religiosity has the weakest direct effect. Except for two cases, this finding is robust across different dimensions of religiosity, various immigrant groups, and different country samples. First, symbolic threat perceptions play an important role for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. In this case, the effects are almost identical with realistic threat perceptions. Second, in a country with a high average level of religiosity and immigrants (Ireland), the effect of symbolic threat perception on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants loses importance, while value-support gains importance. Due to its high shares of immigrants, Ireland is to some degree used to immigrants, including culturally different immigrants. At the same time, its population is on average highly religious and predominantly Christian. Muslim immigrants are, therefore, not only culturally different from the majority population, but also distinctively different from the Christian majority population in terms of their religious affiliation. The latter could be an explanation for the stronger effect of value-support compared to symbolic threat perceptions in Ireland, but it needs further exploration in future research.

The analyses also reveal a tendency that religiosity indirectly affects the attitudes toward immigrants via threat perceptions. However, the interaction effects reflect the weak direct effect of religiosity and need to be interpreted with caution. The importance of the interactions cannot only be evaluated by their statistical significance. Even though they often reach significance with at least $p < .05$, the actual size of the effect is comparatively small and easily loses significance when additional factors or individual country samples are considered (robustness checks). This ultimately provides further support for H3.

Taken together, this study reveals that it is important to consider religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions simultaneously for the analyses of attitudes toward immigrants. The simultaneous consideration helps to receive more precise estimators for the individual effects of religiosity, value-support, and threat perceptions on attitudes toward immigrants.

Nevertheless, at least four remarks are necessary: First, the continuous use and application of Schwartz's shortened version of the human value scale should not imply that other established scales for personality traits and values (e.g., "Big Five" personality factors, HEXACO model of personality structure) are less valid or useful. If the applied constructs or scales map a prosocial/altruistic as well as a conservative (maintaining the status quo, reluctance to change) type – no matter how they are operationalized – similar results should occur. I relied on Schwartz's scale because it is included with all other relevant measurements in the ESS. Second, it was not the aim of this study to uncover causal relationships. As commented before, making informed causal claims is not feasible with the cross-sectional structure of the dataset at hand. The observed interaction effects are a starting point for future research, which explores these relationships with longitudinal data that are better suited for causal analyses. Third, I used the individual country samples to demonstrate how robust the argued relationships are. As they often lack substantial case numbers, we need to treat them with caution when interpreting between-country differences. These need to be analyzed in more extensive research with higher case numbers for the respective countries. Fourth, the same goes for repeating the analyses with datasets from other periods to test how universal the argument is across time. This is especially relevant since the interviews were conducted between August 2014 and September 2015. Some major terrorist attacks took place during this time in Europe, and the so-called "refugee crisis" reached its peak in summer 2015. Even though this study distinguished between three immigrant groups, these events might affect how immigrants are perceived and which types of threats are associated with them. Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav (2015), for example, demonstrate that the type of immigrants matters greatly. Round 1 of the ESS includes most of the variables used in

this study, but crucial ones are missing (e.g., symbolic threat, quantity/quality of contact). Hence, it is not possible to repeat the analyses with different rounds.

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Appendix

Table A1: Items and Wording of Human Value Scale and Rotated Factor Loadings

Wording (ESS 2014c, 4-5)	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	CFA	Uniqueness	Value	
It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	0.6078				0.4849	Power	Factor 1
It's important to her to show her abilities. She wants people to admire what she does.	0.6532				0.4974	Achievement	
She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.	0.6038				0.4979	Stimulation	
Having a good time is important to her. She likes to "spoil" herself.	0.6024				0.5663	Hedonism	
Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognise her achievements.	0.6888				0.4266	Achievement	
She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an exciting life.	0.7034				0.4501	Stimulation	
She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give her pleasure.	0.6090				0.5604	Hedonism	
She thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.		0.6095		0.5289	0.6229	Universalism	Factor 2 (Altruistic Value Items)
It is important to her to listen to people who are different from her. Even when she disagrees with them, she still wants to understand them.		0.6907		0.6089	0.5134	Universalism	
It's very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well-being.		0.6662		0.6594	0.5024	Benevolence	
It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself to people close to her.		0.6337		0.6295	0.5413	Benevolence	
She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to her.		0.5600		0.5244	0.6089	Universalism	
It is important to her to live in secure surroundings. She avoids anything that might endanger her safety.			0.6579	0.6036	0.5466	Security	Factor 3 (Conservative Value Items)
She believes that people should do what they're told. She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.			0.6034	0.5032	0.6333	Conformity	
It is important to her that the government ensures her safety against all threats. She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.			0.5936	0.5884	0.5927	Security	
It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.			0.6790	0.6203	0.4987	Conformity	
It is important to her to get respect from others. She wants people to do what she says.			0.5229		0.5209	Power	
Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down by her religion or her family.			0.5927	0.5115	0.6326	Tradition	

Note: The questions were asked in a female and a male version, for reasons of space only the female version is displayed. Principal-component factoring, only loadings >0.5 are presented. The CFA column displays the factor loadings (p<0.001) that stem from the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).

Table A2: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients

	Level of Religiosity (0-10)	Frequency of Service Attendance (0-6)	Frequency of Praying (0-6)	Value- Support (0-39)	Realistic Threat Perception (0-10)	Attitudes Toward Immigrants	
						Pear- son's r	Spear- man's ρ
Level of Religiosity						-0.028 -0.057 <i>-0.012</i>	-0.027
Frequency of Service Attendance	0.628					-0.040 -0.094 <i>-0.029</i>	-0.040
Frequency of Praying	0.681	0.650				-0.055 -0.090 <i>-0.044</i>	-0.060
Value-Support	0.167	0.212	0.156			-0.346 -0.398 <i>-0.288</i>	-0.335
Realistic Threat Perception	-0.025	-0.011	0.017	0.285		-0.550 -0.506 <i>-0.502</i>	-0.537
Symbolic Threat Perception (0-10)	-0.018	0.008	0.015	0.335	0.627	-0.500 -0.498 <i>-0.438</i>	-0.500

Note: In parentheses, the variables' scales are displayed. For the dimensions of religiosity, higher values display stronger devotion (higher frequency). The attitudes toward immigrants are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 'allow none', 1 'allow a few', 2 'allow some', and 3 'allow many'. Pearson's correlation coefficient is displayed for ethnically different immigrants, Muslim immigrants (in **bold**), and ethnically similar immigrants (in *italics*). Spearman's correlation coefficient is only displayed for ethnically different immigrants.

Table A3: Linear Regression Analyses for Attitudes Toward Immigrants with Different Dimensions of Religiosity (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Dimension of Religiosity: Frequency of Service Attendance						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Service Attendance (never-every day)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001	0.008* (0.003)	0.013	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.012
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.133	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.099	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.137
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.306	-0.135*** (0.003)	-0.309	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.237
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.229	-0.064*** (0.003)	-0.161	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.256
Service Attendance x Realistic Threat Perception		p<0.001		p<0.001		p<0.001
Service Attendance x Symbolic Threat Perception		p<0.001		p<0.001		p<0.001
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.001
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.01
Service Attendance x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		24596		24586		24428
Adjusted R ²		0.43		0.34		0.44
Dimension of Religiosity: Frequency of Praying						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Praying (never-every day)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003	0.003 (0.002)	0.009	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.132	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.097	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.138
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.306	-0.135*** (0.003)	-0.309	-0.119*** (0.004)	-0.231
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.229	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.162	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.255
Praying x Realistic Threat Perception		p<0.01		p<0.05		p<0.001
Praying x Symbolic Threat Perception		p<0.01		p<0.001		p<0.001
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.001
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.01
Praying x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		24484		24472		24321
Adjusted R ²		0.43		0.34		0.44

(continued)

Dimension of Religiosity: All Dimensions Simultaneously						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003
Service Attendance (never-every day)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003	0.006 (0.004)	0.011	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012
Praying (never-every day)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002	0.001 (0.003)	0.003	0.002 (0.003)	0.004
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.131	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.098	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.136
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.141*** (0.003)	-0.306	-0.135*** (0.003)	-0.309	-0.120*** (0.004)	-0.232
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.097*** (0.003)	-0.229	-0.065*** (0.003)	-0.162	-0.121*** (0.003)	-0.255
Observations	24409		24249		24398	
Adjusted R ²	0.43		0.44		0.34	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Country-Dummies not displayed. In all models, it is controlled for the respondents' age, sex, level of education, migration background, feeling about household's income, and quality/quantity of contact with immigrants. The attitudes toward immigrants are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 'allow none', 1 'allow a few', 2 'allow some', and 3 'allow many'. Each interaction term was computed in a separate model, but for reasons of space, one is displayed below the other.

Table A4: Number of Immigrants and Mean Level of Religiosity by Countries

Country	Number of Immigrants	Mean Level of Religiosity	Standard Deviation	Number of Observations
(abbreviation according to ISO-31166 Alpha 2)	(per 1000 inhabitants, Eurostat 2019b)	(own calculations based on ESS dataset)		(in restricted sample)
AT	12.7	4.4717	2.8823	1645
BE	11.1	4.1496	3.0520	1605
CH	17.0	4.8069	2.9456	1346
CZ	4.9	2.0960	2.6672	1745
DE	11.1	3.7952	2.9820	2785
DK	11.9	3.7793	2.6576	1376
EE	13.4	2.8274	2.7654	1409
ES	11.4	4.0006	2.8745	1691
FI	5.8	4.6963	2.7921	1939
FR	5.5	4.3859	3.3368	1702
GB	9.8	3.6178	2.9772	2015
HU	7.0	3.5746	2.8616	1431
IE	16.3	5.1806	2.7029	2230
LT	7.2	5.4423	2.7446	2029
NL	11.1	4.0247	3.0831	1659
NO	10.1	3.4900	2.7083	1353
PL	5.5	6.3271	2.5731	1520
PT	3.6	5.3555	2.7742	1147
SE	14.4	2.9981	2.7165	1625
SI	9.1	4.3195	2.9891	1092

Table A5: Linear Regression Analyses for Attitudes Toward Immigrants by Countries (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Portugal						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.083	-0.028** (0.009)	-0.101	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.092
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.130	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.115	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.184
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.142*** (0.017)	-0.331	-0.147*** (0.018)	-0.359	-0.109*** (0.019)	-0.225
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.083*** (0.016)	-0.200	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.168	-0.104*** (0.018)	-0.224
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		825		826		821
Adjusted R ²		0.32		0.29		0.33
Czech Republic						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	0.006 (0.008)	0.021	0.011 (0.009)	0.035	0.005 (0.008)	0.018
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.138	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.089	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.114
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.168*** (0.016)	-0.369	-0.146*** (0.018)	-0.310	-0.116*** (0.016)	-0.254
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.080*** (0.016)	-0.179	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.182	-0.106 *** (0.015)	-0.237
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception		p<0.05		p<0.05		p>0.1
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p<0.05		p>0.1
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		1088		1091		1094
Adjusted R ²		0.30		0.25		0.23

(continued)

Sweden						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	0.001 (0.005)	0.003	0.001 (0.005)	0.003	0.003 (0.006)	0.009
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.109	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.094	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.104
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.121*** (0.012)	-0.341	-0.109*** (0.012)	-0.321	-0.138*** (0.014)	-0.303
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.067*** (0.012)	-0.195	-0.067*** (0.011)	-0.203	-0.124*** (0.014)	-0.280
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.05
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		1384		1380		1377
Adjusted R ²		0.34		0.29		0.43
Ireland						
	Attitudes Toward Ethnically Different Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Ethnically Similar Immigrants		Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants	
	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.	Coef.	Standardised β-Coef.
Level of Religiosity (not at all-very)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.013	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.006	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.046
Difference in Value-Support (altruistic-conservative)	-0.033*** (0.005)	-0.149	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.109	-0.040*** (0.006)	-0.165
Realistic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.103*** (0.012)	-0.243	-0.095*** (0.013)	-0.226	-0.092*** (0.014)	-0.199
Symbolic Threat Perception (very low-very high)	-0.088*** (0.014)	-0.192	-0.072*** (0.014)	-0.159	-0.061***	-0.122
Level of Religiosity x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.05
Level of Religiosity x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Difference in Value-Support x Realistic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.05
Difference in Value-Support x Symbolic Threat Perception		p>0.1		p>0.1		p<0.01
Level of Religiosity x Difference in Value-Support		p>0.1		p>0.1		p>0.1
Observations		1581		1587		1563
Adjusted R ²		0.31		0.26		0.24

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. In all models, it is controlled for the respondents' age, sex, level of education, migration background, feeling about household's income, and quality/quantity of contact with immigrants. The attitudes toward immigrants are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 'allow none', 1 'allow a few', 2 'allow some', and 3 'allow many'. Each interaction term was computed in a separate model, but for reasons of space, one is displayed below the other.

Figure A1: Distribution - Dimensions of Religiosity






Figure A2: Distribution - Value-Support



Note: The vertical line is situated at 23 - the score that represents equal support for conservative and altruistic values. To the left of the line, the support for altruistic values is greater than for conservative values. To the right of the line, the support for conservative values is greater than for altruistic values.

Figure A3: Distribution - Threat Perceptions



III. Paper B

This is the manuscript version* of the single-authored article submitted to the International Journal of Intercultural Relations. At the time of the dissertation's submission, the article is under review.

Religious Identification and Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants in the Context of a Terrorist Attack

Abstract

Research showed that terrorist attacks lead to anti-immigrant attitudes, but it remains unclear how religious identification mediates this effect: Do religious individuals feel more threatened or does religion help to cope with the negative feelings triggered by an attack? While research on religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants is inconclusive, we can assume that religion plays an important role in the context of an attack by an extremist religious group like ISIS. The present study, therefore, analyses the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after the 'Charlie Hebdo Attack'. It builds on the Uncertainty-Identity-Theory and the Religious Coping Literature. Analyses of European Social Survey (ESS) data reveal that the relationship varies over time: Religious identification does not predict the attitudes before the attack. Immediately after the attack, religious individuals are less accepting than non-religious. Lastly, with temporal distance, stronger religious identification makes liberal attitudes more likely.

Introduction

The number of terrorist attacks executed by members or sympathisers of extremist Islamist organisations (e.g., al-Qaeda, ISIS) has increased in Europe since the 2000s (Europol 2018; GTD 2019). Compared to nationalist, left- or right-wing terrorist attacks, terrorist attacks by (self-identified) Muslims receive above-average media attention (Kearns, Betus, and Lemieux 2018). The combination of strategically and purposefully targeting cultural and national symbols as well as hurting civilians makes Islamist terrorist attacks¹ unique (Fritzsche and Fischer 2009; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009).

The attacks are powerful enough to change public opinions and attitudes (Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007). The extent of attitudinal change depends on many factors and varies

* Layout and citation style are according to the journal's guidelines. It can thus deviate from the formatting in the framework chapter and in the other papers.

¹ From here on and to facilitate readability, the term 'Islamist terrorist attack' is used to refer to terrorist attacks by members or sympathisers of extremist Islamist organisations like ISIS or al-Qaeda. The term should not portray Islam negatively or lead to negative connotations of Islam.

between attacks (e.g., number of casualties, symbolic significance). Due to their strategic and symbolic components, they highlight group differences in particular. As a result, terrorist attacks also affect attitudes toward immigrants.

Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2007, 355, emphasis in original) summarised the relationship between terrorist attacks and attitudes toward immigrants: “Terrorist attacks manifest themselves in the minds of people as a *threat* to personal and national security [...] [and they contribute] to the development of prejudice, increase ethnocentrism and xenophobia [...] and promote intolerance and reliance on stereotypes”. Even when a terrorist attack is not experienced directly, it affects attitudes toward immigrants (Böhmelt et al. 2020; Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Galea et al. 2002).

Legewie (2013) observed more negative attitudes in Europe toward immigrants after the attack in Bali in 2012, Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede (2006) after the attack in Madrid in 2004, and Hitlan et al. (2007) after the attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. Concerning more recent terrorist attacks in Europe: Solheim (2021) concluded that the demand for more restrictions on immigration increased after the attack in Paris in January 2015. Ferrín et al. (2020) demonstrated that the attitudes toward immigrants after the attacks in Paris in November 2015 were more negative than before. Böhmelt et al. (2020) also support these findings. Focusing specifically on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, Silva (2018) concluded that people who have opposed Muslim immigrants before the attack oppose them even stronger after the attack in Paris in January 2015. Studies utilising student samples often contradict the above findings or find no attitudinal changes (e.g., Jungkunz et al. 2018; van Assche and Dierckx 2021). However, student samples limit the studies’ broader implications and external validity. Another string of the literature focuses on attitudes toward refugees in the context of terrorist attacks (e.g., Jäckle and König 2008; Nägel and Lutter 2020). This article neglects further discussions in that regard as refugees constitute a special immigrant group. See Helbling and Meierrieks (2020) and Godefroidt (2022) for comprehensive overviews of research on terrorism and migration as well as terrorism and political attitudes.

The above findings have shown that terrorist attacks affect attitudes toward immigrants. The changes overwhelmingly tend toward more negative attitudes, even when an attack is not experienced directly. However, the attitudinal changes are generally short-lived (e.g., Legewie 2013). These works considered country-specific and numerous individual factors to explain varying reactions to terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if the determining factors are identical before and after an attack.

The present study explores the latter by focusing on individuals' religious identification. It singles out religious identification because religion inevitably becomes a topic of discussion in the context of Islamist terrorist attacks. Additionally, religions have a moral capacity; they have clear ideas about right and wrong behaviours and attitudes (Hogg et al. 2010; Schwartz and Huismans 1995). They are also valuable coping tools in times of uncertainty and threats as they contain a social component (religious communities) and serve psychological needs like stability, certainty, and belonging (Fischer et al. 2006; Hogg et al. 2010; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). Despite an increasing pluralisation of the religious landscape, religious identification remains a crucial determinant for attitudes.

Concerning attitudes toward immigrants, empirical findings are inconclusive. Some research revealed that religious, compared to non-religious individuals, are more accepting of immigrants and more approving of immigrant rights (Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Carol, Helbling, and Michalowski 2015; Knoll 2009). Some research revealed that greater religious identification is related to racism, negative attitudes toward foreigners, and prejudice toward immigrants (Bloom et al. 2015; Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Some research observed no effect (Creighton and Jamal 2015).

In sum, for a short period, terrorist attacks generally induce more negative attitudes toward immigrants. Religion affects attitudes, but there is no universal relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants². Furthermore, it remains unclear if (and how) religious identification and a terrorist attack interact and combinedly affect individuals' attitudes toward immigrants. Two opposite effects are plausible: First, religious identification acts as a coping tool and mitigates the attack's negative effect on attitudes. Second, a terrorist attack, especially an Islamist attack, poses an additional threat for religious individuals and reinforces already negative attitudes.

The present study dedicates itself to this question. It explores *the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after an Islamist terrorist attack in Europe on the individual level*. In doing so, it combines two, until now,

² Allport (1966) broached the issue of the inconsistent relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants in his work on religion and prejudice. He deduced that attitudes differ by religious context (theological, sociocultural, or personal-psychological context). The present study treats religious identification as a possible determinant for varying pre- and post-attack attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. In this sense, it focuses on all three contexts. In recent years, state-church relationships found contextual consideration as well. The present article neglects this since previous research demonstrated that state-church relationships do not influence the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants on the individual level, whereas they are relevant in the context of public policies and the implementation of Muslim religious rights (Carol, Helbling, and Michalowski 2015; Fetzer and Soper 2005).

separate research areas. It contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between religion and attitudes toward immigrants by considering the role of external shocks. It might be that previous research did not come to one single conclusion because the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants is not constant over time. It might be contingent on contextual situations (e.g., external shocks) which highlight religious differences and make people aware of the importance they ascribe to a religion. In addition, the pre-and post-attack comparison of attitudes allows us to explicitly measure the role of threat induced by a terrorist attack as the perceived threat due to immigration itself is relatively stable over a short period. The present study focuses on Islamist terrorist attacks and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants because of the currency in societal and political discussions.

It builds on the Uncertainty-Identity-Theory (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007) and the Religious Coping Literature (Fischer et al. 2006). Empirically, it relies on data from the European Social Survey (Round 7) and utilises generalised ordered logistical regression analyses to test the theoretical expectations in six European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland).

Religion as a Tool to Cope with Terrorist Attacks

Terrorist attacks increase mortality salience, and feelings of threat and uncertainty, even if people are not directly exposed (Ben-Ezra, Leshem, and Goodwin 2015; Boomgaarden and de Vreese 2007; Galea et al. 2002). They raise awareness for one's vulnerability because, in theory, everyone could be affected. To counter these feelings, people try "to maintain or restore a positive and distinct collective identity, for example by increasing in-group favoritism" (Verkuyten 2007, 345). Furthermore, according to Group-Threat-Theory and Integrated-Threat-Theory, people's negative attitudes toward outgroups increase when they perceive a threat toward their group (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995; Stephan and Stephan 2000).

Depending on individual characteristics, some people feel more threatened by a terrorist attack than others. In turn, this translates into different degrees of in-group favouritism and negative attitudes toward outgroups. The role of characteristics like the educational level, employment status, and age is already intensively researched (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Creighton, Jamal, and Malancu 2015; Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016; Rustenbach 2010). The role of religious identification remains ambiguous. The present study picks up here and explores the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after an

Islamist terrorist attack. The following sections demonstrate how religious identification might influence the perception of threats and uncertainties triggered by a terrorist attack, which, in turn, affects attitudes toward immigrants.

Uncertainty-Identity-Theory

Uncertainty-Identity-Theory proposes that people are highly motivated to reduce uncertainty because it is uncomfortable (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007). Its line of argumentation builds on assumptions of the Social-Identity-Theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979). The best way to reduce uncomfortable feelings is to identify with highly coherent groups - groups that provide individuals with belief systems and narratives for everyday life (Campbell 1958; Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010). In times of uncertainty, their narratives and belief systems are familiar and trusted. They provide behavioural guidelines. These factors create a framework to make sense of uncertainties, and ultimately, they reduce uncomfortable feelings (coping). Nationalist (or similar) groups can also be highly coherent. However, religious groups are unique. Besides providing a belief system and narratives for everyday life, they address questions of life's meaning and human existence (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010, 73). They provide individuals with rules on how to handle, interpret, and evaluate dangers and problems (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013, 359). In times of uncertainty, especially related to death and increased mortality salience, these components are particularly appealing.

The theory assumes that identification and not mere belonging is decisive. Identifying with a group means that individuals have an emotional attachment to the group and feel a part of it (Tajfel 1974). Consequently, just belonging to a religious group is not helpful to reduce uncomfortable feelings caused by uncertainties. Consciously identifying with it is very helpful. In this case, it is secondary how religious groups formulate their narratives and address existential questions. It is primarily relevant that they do have answers and can provide guidelines. When identifying with a religious group reduces uncertainties, it should also reduce the uncertainty triggered by terrorist attacks. If religious individuals exhibit lower levels of uncertainty after an attack than non-religious individuals, this should lead to less negative attitudes toward outgroups.

Religious Coping Literature

Looking at general coping mechanisms is useful to understand how exactly religious identification helps to cope with the uncertainties triggered by a terrorist attack. The central aspect of this literature is the differentiation between internal and external coping (Fischer et al. 2006,

366). We are talking about internal coping when someone processes negative events by oneself. For example, people find comfort and make sense of the event based on their knowledge, experiences, and behavioural patterns. We are talking about external coping when someone processes negative events with the help of others, especially with the help of a community. Communities function as support systems and provide their members with material as well as immaterial resources to process the event (e.g., money, accommodation, distraction, explanation). Both coping types improve an individual's well-being because they cause positive emotions. Fischer et al. (2006, 367) spell out how positive emotions contribute to well-being in the context of negative events. First, they distract from negative thoughts and worries. Second, they put people's minds at ease. Third, they can alter people's modes of thinking about the negative event. Fourth, they help processing self-relevant information, i.e., let people think more clearly and structured. Lastly, they enhance how individuals find meaning in the negative event and how they set long-term goals afterwards. In this sense, positive emotions achieved by internal and external coping processes can also contribute to the well-being after a terrorist attack. They can alleviate the uncomfortable feelings and uncertainties caused by the attack.

Religion is a source of internal and external coping. It is, therefore, particularly effective to elicit positive emotions and process negative events. On the one hand, religious teachings provide meaning, explanations, and guidelines (internal coping). While each religion has specific teachings, all have ideas of life after death, the meaning behind pain and suffering as well as propositions on managing it. Individuals can rely on these teaching in the context of a terrorist attack and increased awareness of vulnerability and mortality. On the other hand, religion constitutes a social support system through membership in the religious community (external coping). Fischer et al. (2006) have shown that the emotions of religious individuals, relative to non-religious, are indeed more positive immediately after a terrorist attack. Generally, religious individuals' (psychological) well-being is better than non-religious individuals' (Greenfield and Marks 2007).

These findings, combined with the fact that religious identification contributes to internal and external coping, suggest that religious individuals have fewer negative emotions and perceive lower levels of uncertainties after a terrorist attack. The lower levels, in turn, raise fewer concerns for increasing in-group favouritism and negative attitudes toward outgroups. Hence, religious individuals should have more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants after a terrorist attack than non-religious individuals.

The Relevance of Religious Identification Before and After a Terrorist Attack

Previous research showed that terrorist attacks cause more negative attitudes toward (Muslim) immigrants because they trigger feelings of uncertainty and threat, which translate into increased in-group favouritism. Religions are especially equipped to deal with uncertainties (Uncertainty-Identity-Theory) and can absorb negative emotions (Religious Coping Literature). It can operate as a buffer and weaken the attack's negative effects for individuals who strongly identify with a religion. However, the religious coping mechanism is not immediate. It needs time to unfold. It takes time, for example, to get into contact with the religious community or process the event with the help of religion. Consequently, we can expect different effects of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants immediately after the attack, compared to the attitudes that occur with increased temporal distance to the attack.

Hypothesis 1: With temporal distance to the terrorist attack, religious individuals have more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals.

In contrast, as previously described, terrorist attacks initially increase uncertainty and trigger feelings of threat, which result in negative attitudes. Before coping mechanisms can unfold, religious individuals should be more prone to this immediate reaction: Due to its cultural and symbolic significance, an Islamist terrorist attack highlights religious group differences. In addition, if religious teachings include beliefs in the inherently good in people, religious individuals might be more aghast at the terrorist attack and thus perceive greater insecurity and threats. Muslim immigrants are, therefore, perceived by religious members of the majority population (Christians) as a greater threat.

Hypothesis 2: Immediately after the terrorist attack, religious individuals have more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals.

Lastly, threats that translate into negative attitudes cannot only arise from a terrorist attack. They can also arise from immigrants' arrival. Focusing on migration-related threat perceptions, Hillenbrand (2020) concluded that stronger religious identification is associated with lower symbolic and realistic threat perceptions. Furthermore, Benoit (2021) analysed the interplay between threat perceptions and religious identification in connection with attitudes toward immigrants. She concluded that realistic and symbolic threat perceptions mediate the effect of religious identification. Based on these findings, the question arises of how threat perceptions, due to increased immigration, mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward

Muslim immigrants before and after a terrorist attack. Before the attack, we can expect mediating effects similar to those concluded by previous research as we observe a time with one threat (increased immigration). After the attack, at a time with two threats (increased immigration; terrorist attack), we can expect that threat perceptions due to increased immigration no longer mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. For a short period, the threat triggered by a severe and unexpected external shock (terrorist attack) overshadows them. However, the threat triggered by an attack weakens over time, e.g., due to unfolding coping mechanisms, while threat perceptions due to increased immigration remain.

Hypothesis 3a: Perceived threat due to increased immigration does not mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants immediately after the terrorist attack.

Hypothesis 3b: Perceived threat due to increased immigration mediates the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and with temporal distance to the terrorist attack.

Data and Method

The present study relies on data from the European Social Survey (ESS; Round 7 - Edition 2.1) to test the hypotheses. The dataset is publicly accessible online (ESS 2018). The data collection took place via face-to-face interviews with individuals in private households. They were conducted in 20 European countries and Israel from August 2014 to December 2015 (ESS 2015a). Two terrorist attacks occurred in Europe during this period: The writers and staff of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo were attacked in their office in Paris on January 7, 2015. The capital of France was hit again by a series of attacks throughout the city on November 13, 2015.

The ‘Charlie Hebdo Attack’

Based on three considerations, the focus is solely on the ‘Charlie Hebdo Attack’: First, the number of radical Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe has increased since then (Europol 2018; GTD 2019). Attacks are closer together, which makes it harder to disentangle individual effects. Second, less than 30 valid observations are available after the attacks in November 2015. A comparison between the three periods is not feasible due to the sample size. Third, other developments relevant to the formation of attitudes toward immigrants occurred in Europe during the survey period (e.g., increase in refugees/asylum seekers). Expanding the period would cause ambiguities whether the terrorist attack is the cause of attitudinal changes.

Timeframe and Country Selection

The dataset provides a unique opportunity to compare the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after a terrorist attack. On the downside, the data collection took place in different countries at varying times.

Hence, some restrictions to the dataset are inevitable to obtain reliable analyses: 1) In some countries, the data collection took place only before or only after the attack. In other countries, the data collection took place before and after the attack but was very unequally distributed. Countries with less than 10% of the observations after the attack are, therefore, dismissed to minimise biases due to unbalanced numbers of pre- and post-attack observations. 2) The study focuses on the attitudes of the majority population in Europe (Eurostat 2019). Data from Israel is neglected and the sample is restricted to people without a migration background (respondents and their parents are born in the country), who identify as Christians or do not affiliate with a religious group. 3) After these restrictions, data for August 2014 are only available for Germany. Therefore, August 2014 is excluded from the analyses. 4) Despite the implemented restrictions, the number of observations after the attack is still unequally distributed between the countries. Hence, it is reasonable to focus on data from September 2014 to February 2015. It is an additional advantage that this restriction reduces the impact of other political and social developments that occurred during the survey period, which might affect the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. 5) The day of the attack is excluded from the analyses. Table A1 displays the monthly number of observations in each remaining country.

Sample

The final sample consists of 9728 observations from six European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland). 70.62% are from before (September 2014 - January 6, 2015), 29.38% from after the attack (January 8, 2015 - February 2015). I refrain from weighting the data since the analyses focus on a non-randomly selected subsample³.

A shortcoming of the survey is its cross-sectional structure. We have no information from the same participants before and after the terrorist attack. To ensure that the attitudinal changes are a function of the attack and not of different participants, I compare various demographics before and after the attack (Table A2). In the pre-attack sample, the respondents are, on average, more religious and slightly older than in the post-attack sample. The share of women, level of education, and political orientation are almost identical. Hence, the samples

³ Applying design, sampling, or population size weights would cause additional bias (Levy and Lemeshow 2008, 148-150).

are similar in relevant demographics. The different levels of religious identification and age structures do not hinder the comparability. On the contrary, they reinforce the findings if we can confirm the hypotheses, despite a post-attack sample with younger and less religious participants. Tests for the equality of the coefficients revealed that the coefficients, except for the central explanatory variable, do not significantly differ between the pre- and post-attack sample ($p < 0.01$).

Measures

The dependent variable, *attitudes toward Muslim immigrants*, was originally assessed by asking the survey's participants how many Muslims from other countries should their country allow to come and live in their country (0-3 scale: allow none, allow a few, allow some, allow many; ESS 2014, 27). I collapse the two middle categories to differentiate between *restrictive* (allow none), *moderate* (allow a few or some), and *liberal attitudes* (allow many). The question's wording implies attitudes toward immigration policies. Nevertheless, we can assume a close relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. The dataset contains no further items that inquire about attitudes toward Muslims or Muslim immigrants, which could cause doubts about the dependent variable's reliability and validity. However, in the context of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, relying on a single item has repeatedly been proven to be an adequate approach (e.g.; Silva 2018).

The central explanatory variable (*religious identification*) was conceptualised by asking the participants to indicate on a 0-10 scale (not at all-very religious) how religious they are, regardless of whether they belong to a particular religion (subjective religiosity; ESS 2014, 17). In additional analyses to test the robustness of the findings, the explanatory variable is substituted by an additive and standardised *religiosity-index* (0-10 scale; not at all-very religious). The index includes subjective religiosity, frequency of service attendance, and frequency of praying. The three items load on one factor (standardised scores; $\alpha = 0.865$) and are highly correlated ($r = 0.7-0.9$). The analyses are also run separately for *frequency of service attendance* and *frequency of praying* (0-6 scale; never-every day). The initial analyses deliberately rely on the respondents' subjective religiosity as the identification measure, because the Uncertainty-Identity-Theory suggests that the emotional attachment to a religious group is the decisive factor, which can most adequately be reflected by the subjective religiosity. All identification measures are worded denomination-unspecific, but due to the sample's restrictions, they are inevitably linked to the majority population (Christians and non-affiliates without migration background; Section: Timeframe and Country Selection).

Individual characteristics affect religion's importance in one's life and the perception of (Muslim) immigrants (Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016; Rustenbach 2010). Hence, the participants' *sex* (male/female), *age*, *level of education* (completed ISCED level), and *political orientation* (0-10 scale; left-right) are considered as covariates. There is no need to include the denomination⁴. It merely reflects the formal belonging, but according to Uncertainty-Identity-Theory, the identification is the relevant factor. Religious identification automatically implies a connection with a religious group, independently of the formal membership. Lastly, *realistic and symbolic threat perceptions* are considered (0-10 scale; very low-very high threat perception)⁵. Previous research showed that they mediate the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward immigrants and that stronger religious identification is associated with lower levels of migration-related threat perceptions (Benoit 2021; Hillenbrand 2020).

Analyses

The analyses consist of five parts: First, describing the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before the attack to set the reference point.

Second, determining whether the attitudes are statistically significantly different before and after the terrorist attack with the help of summary statistics and two-sample t-tests with unequal variance (σ^2 -before: 0.333; σ^2 -after: 0.388). This part is necessary as the study assumes that increased perceptions of threat and uncertainties due to a terrorist attack result in more negative attitudes. The dataset does not include information on the perceived threat due to terrorism to analyse this intermediate step more thoroughly. To adequately perform the t-tests and compare the mean attitudes between the two samples, the dependent variable is thereby treated as a quasi-metrical variable and the tests are carried out by only considering two timepoints (before/after) without further differentiating the period after the attack.

Third, exploring how the terrorist attack affected the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants with multivariate analyses (generalised logistical regression models with country fixed-effects). The dependent variable's three response categories inevitably raise questions about the appropriate scaling. The variable is not an ideal metrical variable. It can be treated as a quasi-metrical or ordinal variable because of its

⁴ Complementary analyses support this decision (not displayed). Denominational differences (non-affiliates, Catholics, Protestants) do not significantly affect the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants ($p > 0.1$). The same applies to interaction terms (denomination x timing).

⁵ Realistic threat perception is illustrated by a three-item index (impact on jobs, welfare services, economy; $\alpha = 0.793$). Symbolic threat perception is illustrated by a two-item index (impact on cultural life, religious beliefs and practices; $\alpha = 0.691$). The methodical approach for the index construction as well as the individual items' wordings can be found in the survey guidelines (ESS 2015b, 20-23).

hierarchical order. In the present case, linear models are not ideal because the findings lack informative value due to the small number of response categories. Ordered logistical regression models are more suitable. However, Brant-tests revealed that the proportional odds (parallel lines) assumption is violated. Generalised ordered logistical regressions with fitted partial proportional odds models (modification of ordered logistical regression models) are a possible solution. These models have at least three advantages (Williams 2016): They fit the models to the variables that do not meet the proportional odds assumption. They, nevertheless, consider that the response categories are ordered. They are easier to interpret than, for example, multinomial models. As with any other logistical model, direct comparisons across models and subsamples are impossible due to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (Breen, Bernt, and Holm 2018; Mood 2010). Utilising Average Marginal Effects (AME) and their graphical display solves this problem and allows for reliable comparisons (Mood 2010). Because the analyses are limited to six countries, which makes hierarchical models inappropriate, country fixed-effects models are applied. Furthermore, models with interactions terms (timing x country x religious identification) would lead to a great number of dummy-variables that ultimately bias the estimations. Country fixed-effects models consider that the effects of terrorist attacks vary by the geographical distance to the attack and country-specific contextual variables (Legewie 2013, 1229-1230). Additionally, the robust standard errors are clustered at the regional level to account for the nesting of the respondents in regions and avoid underestimating the standard errors. Throughout the analyses, missing values are omitted through listwise deletion. In less than 0.56% (N= 55) of all observations, data for the central explanatory variable (religious identification) are missing. From the 6870 respondents of the pre-attack sample, 2.85% (N= 195) did not answer the item that constitutes the dependent variable. In the post-attack sample, 2.45% (N= 70) did not answer⁶.

Fourth, analysing the role of threat perceptions in detail. To consider the potential mediating effect of threat perceptions and test hypotheses 3a/3b, I repeat the multivariate analyses and include a three-way interaction term (religious identification x threat perception x interview time) instead of a two-way interaction term (religious identification x interview time). The analyses are run separately for symbolic and realistic threat perception.

Fifth, robustness checks are necessary to reflect on the multidimensionality of religious identification and the heterogeneity of immigrants. Regarding the former, the analyses are

⁶ Imputing missing values increases the number of observations (+128). Analyses with listwise deletion (Table 1) and with imputed data (not displayed) reach comparable estimations and show similar developments.

repeated with different identification measurements (religiosity-index, frequency of praying, frequency of service attendance). Regarding the latter, the analyses are repeated with different dependent variables (attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants, attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants).

Results

Attitudes Before the Attack as the Reference Point

Pearson's correlation coefficient indicates a weak positive association between religious identification and attitudes ($r = 0.073$) before the attack. Religious individuals have a slightly greater tendency for liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals.

However, multivariate analyses show that, when considering additional characteristics, religious identification has no statistically significant effect ($p > 0.05$; Table A3). The strength of religious identification cannot predict attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before the terrorist attack. Age, sex, level of education, political orientation, and threat perceptions, on the other hand, can explain varying attitudes. Furthermore, the AME indicate that respondents' realistic and symbolic threat perceptions are especially meaningful predictors of attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Increased threat perceptions make it more likely to have restrictive or moderate attitudes⁷. The latter finding highlights again the importance to explore the role of threat perceptions in-depth.

Comparing the Attitudes Before and After the Attack

Comparing the attitudes before and after the attack, lends support to the central part of the theoretical argumentation, which cannot be measured directly with the dataset at hand. T-tests confirm that the difference in attitudes between the pre- and post-attack sample is statistically significant (t-value: 12.353, $p < 0.001$). The attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are, on average, more negative after the attack (means; January: 0.758, February: 0.702; Table A2) than before (mean: 0.913). With the exception of Germany and France, the share of respondents who hold restrictive attitudes is higher in January and/or February after the attack than before (Table A2). However, these country differences highlight anew the necessity to rely on country fixed-effects models.

⁷ Odds ratios are displayed in all outputs. They can be interpreted as follows: Coefficients > 1 indicate that an increase in the respective variable makes it more likely that the respondents will be in a higher category of the dependent variable than the current one. Coefficients < 1 indicate a greater likelihood that respondents will be in the current category or a lower one.

Religious Identification, Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants, and a Terrorist Attack

The third and central part of the analyses explores the interplay between religious identification, interview time, and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Two different generalised ordered logistical regression models are computed. The first model includes religious identification, interview time (pre-/post-attack), and covariates (Table 1, Models 2a/3a). The second model additionally includes an interaction term (interview time x religious identification; Table 1, Models 2b/3b). Table 1 also includes the respective AME for each model.

[Table 1 here]

Looking at the central explanatory variables' individual effects, religious identification has no statistically significant effect on attitudes (Models 2a/3a/4a). Looking at the interview time, it seems that in January, individuals are, on average, more likely to have liberal than moderate attitudes toward Muslim immigrants (OR: 1.347, $p < 0.05$; Model 3a). The AME support this (moderate: -0.047, $p < 0.01$; liberal: 0.025, $p < 0.05$). This is a tentative indication that the interview time matters for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. However, the findings are still too ambiguous to draw clear conclusions.

Models with interaction terms provide further clarification (Table 1, Models 2b/3b/4b). The effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants is contingent on the interview time. It matters specifically for the likelihood of liberal attitudes (Model 4b; AME). Figure 1 illustrates the interaction terms graphically to facilitate the interpretation.

[Figure 1 here]

Before the terrorist attack, religious identification is neither a determinant for liberal nor moderate or restrictive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. In other words, how religious someone is, makes no difference for their attitudes before the attack. Other factors like the individuals' age, level of education or threat perceptions are decisive, as the coefficients in Table 1 show.

In *January* immediately after the attack, religious identification makes a difference: More religious individuals are less likely to have liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. They are less accepting than non-religious individuals, which confirms hypothesis 2. It also supports the argument that an Islamist terrorist attack highlights religious group differences. In turn, religious members of the majority population (Christians) perceive Muslim immigrants as a greater threat.

The negative effect of religious identification on liberal attitudes vanishes in *February* after the attack. It is short-lived. Now, stronger religious identification makes it less likely to

have restrictive and more likely to have moderate or liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. This supports hypothesis 1: Religious individuals are more accepting than non-religious individuals. No such effects were visible in January. The finding indicates delayed reactions to the attack and supports the argument that religious coping mechanisms need time to unfold.

In sum, the above findings leave us with two conclusions. First, while religious identification made no difference for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before the attack, religious individuals had more accepting attitudes in February after the attack, which supports hypothesis 1. Second, in January immediately after the attack, more religious individuals were less likely to have liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. They were less accepting, which supports hypothesis 2. This effect was short-lived and no longer observable in February.

The covariates behave as expected (Table 1): Less educated, older respondents, and respondents with a right-leaning political ideology are less accepting of Muslim immigrants. They are more likely to have restrictive attitudes. Respondents with higher symbolic or realistic threat perceptions are also less accepting. Threat perceptions are continuously the strongest determinants. Concerns mirrored in the concept of symbolic threat⁸ often overlap with aspects that are of value for religious individuals (e.g., religiously influenced culture or traditions). Consequently, threat perceptions and religious identification should not be analysed independently. The following section explores the role of threat perceptions and tests hypotheses 3a/b.

The Role of Threat Perceptions

Table A4 displays the computed estimates to test the mediating effects of threat perceptions. Based on the coefficients, we can only observe a statistically significant interaction effect of realistic threat perception in February ($p < 0.05$). Coefficients of three-way interaction terms are not always intuitive to interpret. They are averaged and do not allow for detailed analyses at specific levels of threat perception.

[Figure 2 here]

Figure 2 thus illustrates them graphically to allow detailed analyses. Starting with the role of symbolic threat perception *before* the terrorist attack, when only one type of threat (immigrants' arrival) is present. Linked to the findings of Hillenbrand (2020) and Benoit (2021), symbolic threat perception mediates the effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Specifically, at high levels of symbolic threat perception, religious individuals are

⁸ Symbolic threat perception is a person's fear of losing a country's symbolic establishments due to increased immigration and fear of increased competition with immigrants over traditions, customs, beliefs, norms, etc. (Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999).

more likely than non-religious individuals to have moderate, relative to restrictive, attitudes. It does not affect liberal attitudes. The distinction between moderate and liberal attitudes could be one contributing factor to the inconclusive findings of previous research: More religious individuals are somewhat more open and accepting of immigrants but still not fully or unconditionally accepting.

In *January*, when the threat triggered by a terrorist attack joins, symbolic threat perception no longer mediates the effect of religious identification. The effect of religious identification on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants does not vary by the level of symbolic threat perception due to increased immigration. This lends support to hypothesis 3a.

In *February*, the effect of religious identification again varies by the level of symbolic threat perception, which supports hypothesis 3b: At the same levels of threat perception, religious are more likely than non-religious individuals to have moderate, relative to restrictive, attitudes. The attitudinal differences increase with higher levels of symbolic threat perception and are more pronounced than before the attack. However, the mediating effect weakens at extremely high levels of threat perception. Compared to before the attack, religious individuals are not only more likely to have moderate attitudes. They are also more likely to have liberal attitudes. Although this relationship is least affected by symbolic threat perceptions, we see that the stronger the symbolic threat perception, the smaller the positive effect of religious identification on the likelihood to have liberal attitudes.

The mediating effects of realistic threat perceptions are similar to symbolic threat perception. However, the effect of religious identification as a function of realistic threat perception is less pronounced. In other words, at the same level of symbolic threat perception, religious and non-religious individuals differ to a greater extent in their attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than at the same level of realistic threat perception.

Robustness Checks

The Multidimensionality of Religious Identification

This section explores the multidimensionality of religious identification. The analyses consider the religiosity-index, frequency of praying, and frequency of service attendance as measurements for individuals' religious identification. The frequency of praying and service attendance are especially interesting as they reflect different coping strategies. Praying as a way of drawing

strength from religious beliefs reflects internal coping. Service attendance as a source of social support reflects external coping.

The empirical approach is identical to Table 1. Merely the central explanatory variable is replaced. To allow more intuitive interpretations and easier comparisons, the different dimensions' pre- and post-attack effects are displayed graphically (Figure A1). The findings are identical, independently of the respective other dimensions included as covariates (not displayed).

In sum, the findings are robust before and in February after the attack. The initially observed negative effect of religious identification on the probability to have liberal attitudes in January vanishes when other measurements are utilised.

Specifically, independently of the utilised identification measurement, it makes no difference for the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants *before* the terrorist attack, how religious someone is. In *January*, we can no longer observe a negative effect of religious identification on the probability to have liberal attitudes. The effect vanishes as soon as other measurements are utilised or several measurements are combined (index). The initial analysis relies on the individuals' self-assessment of religious identification. Compared to explicit frequency measurements of religious practices, whether in private (praying) or as a religious community (service attendance), this subjective measurement is more prone to bias and exaggeration. It is possible that respondents intentionally emphasise their religious identification to highlight their group membership. In turn, this tendency results in negative attitudes toward outgroups. In the present case, toward Muslim immigrants.

In *February*, the findings are robust across different dimensions: Stronger religious identification makes it less likely to have restrictive attitudes and more likely to have moderate or liberal attitudes. Two exceptions are, nevertheless, noteworthy. First, when utilising the frequency of praying, the findings only correspond to the initial findings regarding the restrictive and moderate attitudes. We cannot observe a positive relationship between a higher frequency and a greater likelihood to have liberal attitudes. Second, when utilising the frequency of service attendance, the findings merely correspond to the initial findings with $p < 0.1$. Although service attendance reflects a source of external coping and is a way for individuals to practice their faith. It might not necessarily be the reason why they attend. Individuals might have extrinsic motivations to attend religious services (Allport 1966; Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010). Service attendance can be instrumentalised and used to serve non-religious ends (e.g., social contacts,

reputation). If extrinsic motivations are behind frequent service attendance, it reflects a weaker religious identity and is less useful as a coping tool.

Ethnically Similar and Ethnically Different Immigrants

The study uses religious identification as a predictor of attitudes toward immigrants with one specific religious affiliation to which also the perpetrators of the terrorist attack belonged. To anticipate this point of criticism, I rerun the analyses with '*attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants*' and '*attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants*' as the dependent variables (ESS 2014, 11-12). The empirical approach is identical to Table/Figure 1.

In sum, the effect of religious identification on attitudes is similar before and in February after the attack, irrespective of whether we look at attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, ethnically similar or ethnically different immigrants (Figure A2): *Before* the attack, religious identification is neither a determinant for liberal nor moderate or restrictive attitudes toward all immigrant groups. In *February* after the attack, stronger religious identification makes it less likely to have restrictive and more likely to have moderate attitudes toward all immigrant groups. Furthermore, stronger religious identification makes it more likely to have liberal attitudes toward ethnically different immigrants. These findings correspond to the initial ones. In contrast, religious identification does not make it more likely to have liberal attitudes toward ethnically similar immigrants in February ($p > 0.05$). It seems that religious identification only determines the most accepting attitudes (liberal) in February if the immigrant group is distinctively different from the majority population (ethnically different or Muslim immigrants). Lastly, in *January*, contrasting the findings for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, religious identification is no statistically significant determinant ($p > 0.05$) for attitudes toward ethnically similar or ethnically different immigrants.

The varying findings for attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and ethnically similar/different immigrants in January support the hypothesis that the attack highlights religious differences and, thus, religious individuals feel more threatened by an Islamist terrorist attack as the perpetrators identify with a different religious group. However, from the previous section, we need to remember that this is only true if we rely on the respondents' subjective assessment of their religiosity as the identification measurement.

Conclusion and Discussion

The present study aimed to uncover the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants before and after a terrorist attack. For this, attitudes in six European countries before and after the ‘Charlie Hebdo Attack’ (January 7, 2015) were analysed with European Social Survey data (Round 7).

I hypothesised that, first, religious individuals have more positive attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals with temporal distance to the attack. Second, religious individuals have more negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals immediately after the attack. Lastly, threat perceptions due to increased immigration do not mediate the effect of religious identification immediately after the attack, while they have mediating effects before and with temporal distance to the attack.

The empirical analyses revealed that the relationship between religious identification and attitudes toward immigrants varies over time, which serves as one possible explanation for the inconclusive findings of previous research:

Before the terrorist attack (since September 2014), religious identification did not predict attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. This finding is robust across different measurements of religious identification and applies to other immigrant groups as well. However, religious identification made a difference when respondents perceived high levels of realistic or symbolic threat: At high threat perception, religious individuals were more accepting of Muslim immigrants than non-religious individuals.

In *January* after the terrorist attack, greater religious identification made it less likely to have liberal attitudes, while it made no statistically significant difference for the likelihood to have moderate or restrictive attitudes. Religious individuals were less accepting of Muslim immigrants. This relationship is independent of perceived realistic or symbolic threats due to increased immigration. Threat perceptions have no mediating effect. However, the negative effect of religious identification on liberal attitudes was only observable toward Muslim immigrants, not toward ethnically different or ethnically similar immigrants. The negative effect was also only observable if the respondents’ self-assessment was utilised as the identification measurement.

In *February* after the attack, religious individuals were less likely than non-religious individuals to have restrictive attitudes and more likely to have moderate or liberal attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. In short, religious individuals were, on average, more accepting. This finding is robust across different measurements of religious identification and, with one

exception, also across different immigrant groups: The greater likelihood of religious individuals to have liberal attitudes only applied to Muslim immigrants and ethnically different immigrants. It did not apply to ethnically similar immigrants.

The study comes with a few limitations. First, it is impossible to make claims about causality. We can observe changes, but panel data would be necessary to determine whether the attitudes are conditional on the religious identification or the other way around. Furthermore, personal strokes of fate (e.g., sudden illness, unemployment) can influence how strongly someone leans on religion. These experiences are not perceived by a large part of the public as threatening and do not affect the attitudes like a far-reaching external shock. The same applies to individual experiences with Muslim immigrants. They influence people's attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, but these experiences do not vary systematically between religious and non-religious individuals (e.g., contact hypothesis: positive contact with unfamiliar groups can reduce prejudice; Allport 1954; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). The survey's random variation allows neglecting these specific individual differences.

Second, the present study does not aim for country comparisons and employs country fixed-effects models. Nevertheless, the countries' unequal data collections before and after the attack, their varying distances to the attack, and their different experiences with religion as well as Muslims give reasons to discuss this issue. The descriptive analysis shows that the average attitudes toward Muslim immigrants and the level of religious identification vary between countries (Table A2). Future research might take these superficial findings as a starting point and analyse the country differences in-depth.

Third, the theoretical elaborations build on the assumption of increased perceptions of threat and uncertainties due to a terrorist attack. While the descriptive analyses indicate that the attitudes are generally more negative after the attack, the dataset does not include specific information on the perceived threat due to terrorism. Hence, an in-depth analysis of this intermediate step, e.g., with structural equation models, is not possible with the available data.

Fourth, the dependent variable's wording implies attitudes toward immigration policies. On the one hand, we can assume close relationships between attitudes toward immigrants and preferences for immigration policies, which becomes most noticeable from previous research that frequently framed immigration policy preferences as attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Ferrín, Mancosu, and Cappiali 2020; Legewie 2013). On the other hand, they are nevertheless two distinct concepts. Future research might explicitly focus on the differences between these two distinct yet related concepts.

Generally, researchers need to be aware of a possible desirability bias in the context of research on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, especially in combination with Islamist terrorist attacks. Furthermore, they need to be aware of the different dimensions of religious identification, the heterogeneity of immigrants, and the mediating role of threat perceptions. While the present study showed that the effect of religious identification is not constant over time and varies in the context of an external shock, which is one explanation for the inconclusive findings of previous research, future research should also consider analyses on the persistence of the observed relationships. One starting point is to analyse how long the effects observed in February remain.

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Appendix


Table 1: Generalized Ordered Logit Regression on the Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants and Average Marginal Effects (AME) (Odds Ratios Displayed)

	Restrictive Attitudes				Moderate Attitudes				Liberal Attitudes			
	Model 2a	AME-2a	Model 2b	AME-2b	Model 3a	AME-3a	Model 3b	AME-3b	Model 4a	AME-4a	Model 4b	AME-4b
Religious Identification	1.018 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.001)	1.022 (0.013)	-0.003* (0.002)	1.018 (0.012)	0.001 (0.000)	1.022 (0.013)	0.003* (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Interview Time (Ref. Before)												
January (after)	0.833 (0.107)	0.022 (0.015)	0.829 (0.151)	0.021 (0.015)	1.347* (0.157)	-0.047** (0.017)	2.069*** (0.347)	-0.044** (0.017)		0.025* (0.010)		0.023* (0.010)
February (after)	0.881 (0.117)	0.015 (0.65)	0.742 (0.139)	0.010 (0.006)	0.881 (0.117)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.742 (0.139)	-0.006 (0.006)		-0.010 (0.010)		-0.004 (0.010)
Sex (Ref. Female)												
Male	1.125* (0.065)	-0.014* (0.007)	1.131* (0.066)	-0.014* (0.007)	1.125* (0.065)	0.004* (0.002)	1.131* (0.066)	0.004* (0.002)		0.009 (0.005)		0.010* (0.005)
Age	0.985*** (0.002)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.985*** (0.002)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.985*** (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.985*** (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.001)	<i>Reference Category for Mod- els 2/3a</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	<i>Reference Category for Mod- els 2/3b</i>	-0.001*** (0.001)
Level of Education	1.164*** (0.024)	-0.018*** (0.002)	1.164*** (0.024)	-0.018*** (0.002)	1.164*** (0.024)	0.005*** (0.001)	1.164*** (0.024)	0.005*** (0.001)		0.012*** (0.002)		0.012*** (0.002)
Political Orientation (left-right)	0.980 (0.021)	0.002 (0.003)	0.979 (0.021)	0.002 (0.003)	0.834*** (0.019)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.838*** (0.019)	0.012*** (0.003)		-0.015*** (0.002)		-0.014*** (0.002)
Symbolic Threat Perception	0.695*** (0.021)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.694*** (0.021)	0.042*** (0.003)	0.695*** (0.021)	-0.013*** (0.002)	0.694*** (0.021)	-0.013*** (0.002)		-0.029*** (0.003)		-0.029*** (0.003)
Realistic Threat Perception	0.708*** (0.021)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.710*** (0.021)	0.040*** (0.003)	0.630*** (0.023)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.626*** (0.023)	-0.002 (0.003)		-0.037 (0.003)		-0.037*** (0.003)
Interview Time x Religious Identification (Ref. Before x Religious Identification)				-0.002 (0.001)				0.001 (0.001)				0.002 (0.001)
January (after) x Religious Identification			1.002 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.005)			0.891** (0.034)	0.001 (0.005)				-0.007** (0.002)
February (after) x Religious Identification			1.062* (0.029)	-0.012** (0.004)			1.062* (0.029)	0.008** (0.003)				0.004** (0.001)
N	7806											
Pseudo R ²	0.30											

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001


Note: Odds ratios displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed-effects models (country-dummies not displayed). Religious identification is measured on a 0-10 scale (not at all-very religious).

Figure 1: **Average Marginal Effects of Religious Identification on Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants Before and After the Terrorist Attack (CI: 95%)**



Note: The AME are based on the estimates of the interaction term (religious identification x interview time) displayed in Table 1.

Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of Religious Identification on Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants Before and After the Terrorist Attack by Symbolic and Realistic Threat Perceptions (CI: 95%)



Note: The AME are based on the estimates of the interaction term (Interview Time x Religious Identification x Threat Perception) displayed in Table A4.

Table A1: Number of Observations (by Country and Month)

	AT	CZ	DE	FR	GB	IE	Total
2014-September	0	0	509	0	436	436	1 381
2014-October	54	0	433	0	654	400	1 541
2014-November	129	28	658	595	158	366	1 934
2014-December/2015-Januar (before)	47	692	362	586	18	309	2 014
Number (%) of Observations before the Attack	230 (16.48)	720 (38.98)	1 962 (82.26)	1 181 (85.46)	1 266 (74.51)	1 511 (77.93)	6 870 (64.52)
2015-January (after)	144	881	393	153	129	428	2 128
2015-February	364	246	30	48	42	0	730
2015-March	413	0	0	0	0	0	413
2015-April	245	0	0	0	0	0	245
2015-October	0	0	0	0	203	0	203
2015-November	0	0	0	0	59	0	59
Number (%) of Observations after the Attack	1 166 (83.52)	1 127 (61.02)	423 (17.74)	201 (14.54)	433 (25.49)	428 (22.07)	3 778 (35.48)
N	1 396	1 847	2 385	1 382	1 699	1 939	10 648

Note: The sample is restricted to the majority population. Not listed countries have less than 10% of their observations after the attack.

Table A2: Sample Description

	AT	CZ	DE	FR	GB	IE	Total
Dependent Variable: Mean Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants Before/January after/February after	0.857/ 1.014/ 0.765	0.458/ 0.404/ 0.443	1.124/ 1.272/ 1.207	0.985/ 1.055/ 1.043	0.880/ 0.938/ 0.952	0.832/ 0.765/ na	0.913/ 0.758/ 0.702
Dependent Variable: Share of Restrictive Attitudes in % Before/January after/February after	25.35/ 18.31/ 28.37	55.33/ 61.00/ 57.79	9.29/ 4.11/ 3.45	14.32/ 8.28/ 10.64	20.78/ 20.93/ 19.05	26.53/ 31.37/ na	21.35/ 35.44/ 35.72
Dependent Variable: Share of Moderate Attitudes in % Before/January after/February after	63.59/ 61.97/ 66.76	43.52/ 37.62/ 40.16	69.02/ 64.52/ 72.41	72.84/ 77.93/ 74.47	70.49/ 64.34/ 66.67	63.71/ 60.78/ na	65.96/ 53.35/ 58.37
Dependent Variable: Share of Liberal Attitudes in % Before/January after/February after	11.06/ 19.72/ 4.87	1.15/ 1.39/ 2.05	21.69/ 31.36/ 24.14	12.84/ 13.79/ 14.89	8.73/ 14.73/ 14.29	9.76/ 7.84/ na	12.69/ 11.22/ 5.93
Dependent Variable: Number (%) of Observations before the Attack	217 (30.65)	694 (38.51)	1 927 (82.17)	1 145 (85.64)	1 237 (87.86)	1 455 (78.10)	6 675 (70.54)
Dependent Variable: Number (%) of Observations after the Attack	491 (69.35)	1 108 (61.49)	418 (17.83)	192 (14.36)	171 (12.14)	408 (21.90)	2 788 (29.46)
Mean: Subjective Religiosity Before (After)	5.017 (4.308)	2.087 (1.997)	3.814 (3.298)	4.201 (4.395)	3.613 (2.807)	5.196 (5.745)	4.013 (3.389)
<i>t-value</i>	3.197**	0.701	3.329***	-0.753	3.451***	-4.125***	9.040***
Mean: Age Before (After)	47.009 (50.533)	45.515 (47.103)	51.227 (48.170)	50.689 (48.050)	54.734 (48.200)	51.649 (50.385)	51.135 (48.495)
<i>t-value</i>	-2.333*	-1.935	3.271**	1.785	4.704***	1.313	6.646***
Mean: Level of Education Before (After)	3.070 (3.028)	3.287 (3.274)	3.693 (3.768)	3.263 (3.527)	3.163 (3.142)	2.934 (3.226)	3.292 (3.307)
<i>t-value</i>	0.474	0.295	-1.264	-2.495*	1.155	-3.589***	-0.526
Mean: Political Orientation Before (After)	4.986 (4.869)	5.083 (4.917)	4.560 (4.394)	5.060 (5.429)	5.028 (4.815)	5.147 (5.279)	4.921 (4.904)
<i>t-value</i>	0.837	1.463	1.707	-1.994*	1.408	-1.287	0.361
Mean: Realistic Threat Perception Before (After)	5.938 (6.098)	6.468 (6.519)	4.721 (4.410)	5.553 (5.190)	5.683 (5.623)	5.714 (5.654)	5.481 (5.836)
<i>t-value</i>	-0.957	-0.607	3.105**	2.503*	0.334	0.546	-7.714***
Mean: Symbolic Threat Perception Before (After)	5.738 (5.907)	5.926 (6.170)	4.377 (4.236)	5.231 (4.995)	5.701 (5.584)	4.989 (4.964)	5.102 (5.530)
<i>t-value</i>	-0.923	-2.801**	1.301	1.435	0.626	0.237	-8.883***
% of Women Before (After)	49.19 (53.15)	52.25 (54.07)	48.42 (46.34)	51.41 (46.77)	56.40 (53.22)	54.27 (55.14)	52.07 (52.35)
<i>t-value</i>	1.010	0.763	-0.779	-1.147	-0.781	0.320	0.254

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: The sample is restricted to the majority population. Before the attack includes data from September, 2014 to January 6, 2015. After the attack includes data from January 8 to February 2015. The subjective religiosity is measured on a 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious) scale. The attitudes toward Muslim immigrants are measured on a 0 (restrictive) to 2 (liberal) scale.

Table A3: Generalized Ordered Logit Regression on the Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants and Average Marginal Effects (AME) before the Terrorist Attack (Odds Ratios Displayed)

	Restrictive Attitudes		Moderate Attitudes		Liberal Attitudes
	<i>Model 1a</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>Model 1b</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>AME</i>
Religious Identification	1.020 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.001)	1.020 (0.014)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Sex (Ref. Female)					
Male	1.158* (0.075)	-0.016* (0.007)	1.158* (0.075)	0.003 (0.002)	0.013* (0.006)
Age	0.985*** (0.002)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.985*** (0.002)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Level of Education	1.178*** (0.028)	-0.018*** (0.003)	1.178*** (0.028)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.002)
Political Orientation (left-right)	0.966 (0.025)	0.004 (0.003)	0.850*** (0.021)	0.010** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Symbolic Threat	0.722***	0.035***	0.652***	0.002	-0.037***
Perception	(0.024)	(0.003)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Realistic Threat	0.679***	0.041***	0.679***	-0.008***	-0.034***
Perception	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.002)	(0.003)
N	5572				
Pseudo R ²	0.27				

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: Odds ratios displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed-effects models (country-dummies not displayed). Religious identification is measured on a 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious) scale.


Table A4: Generalized Ordered Logit Regression on the Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants with Three-Way Interaction Terms (Odds Ratios Displayed)

	Restrictive Attitudes		Moderate Attitudes		Liberal Attitudes
	Model 5a	Model 6a	Model 5b	Model 6b	
Religious Identification	0.999 (0.039)	0.992 (0.036)	0.999 (0.039)	0.992 (0.036)	Reference Category for the Generalized Ordered Logit Regression Analysis
Interview Time (Ref. Before)					
January (after)	0.809 (0.140)	0.800 (0.142)	1.841*** (0.275)	1.917*** (0.287)	
February (after)	0.809 (0.135)	0.777 (0.141)	0.809 (0.135)	0.777 (0.141)	
Sex (Ref. Female)					
Male	1.130* (0.066)	1.129* (0.066)	1.130* (0.066)	1.129* (0.066)	
Age	0.985*** (0.002)	0.985*** (0.002)	0.985*** (0.002)	0.985*** (0.002)	
Level of Education	1.164*** (0.024)	1.163*** (0.024)	1.164*** (0.024)	1.163*** (0.024)	
Political Orientation (left-right)	0.978 (0.021)	0.979 (0.021)	0.841*** (0.020)	0.838*** (0.020)	
Symbolic Threat Perception	0.686*** (0.017)	0.695*** (0.021)	0.686*** (0.017)	0.695*** (0.021)	
Realistic Threat Perception	0.708*** (0.021)	0.696*** (0.023)	0.631*** (0.025)	0.619*** (0.031)	
Interview Time x Religious Identification x Symbolic Threat Perception					
Before x Religious Identification x Sym- bolic Threat Perception	1.005 (0.006)		1.004 (0.009)		
January (after) x Religious Identification x Sym- bolic Threat Perception	1.006 (0.007)		0.980 (0.011)		
February (after) x Religious Identification x Sym- bolic Threat Perception	1.010 (0.006)		1.010 (0.006)		
Interview Time x Religious Identification x Re- alistic Threat Perception					
Before x Religious Identification x Real- istic Threat Perception		1.004 (0.005)		1.007 (0.008)	
January (after) x Religious Identification x Real- istic Threat Perception		1.006 (0.007)		0.983 (0.010)	
February (after) x Religious Identification x Real- istic Threat Perception		1.013* (0.006)		1.013* (0.006)	
N	7806				
Pseudo R ²	0.30				

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001


Note: Odds ratios displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed-effects models (country-dummies not displayed). Religious identification is measured on a 0 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious) scale.

Figure A1: Average Marginal Effects of Different Dimensions of Religious Identification on Attitudes toward Muslim Immigrants Before and After the Terrorist Attack (CI: 95%)



Note: The average marginal effects are based on the estimates of the interaction term between the interview time and the respective dimension of religious identification.

Figure A2: Average Marginal Effects of Religious Identification on Attitudes toward Ethnically Similar and Ethnically Different Immigrants Before and After the Terrorist Attack (CI: 95%)



Note: The average marginal effects are based on the estimates of the interaction term (religious identification x interview time).

IV. Paper C

This is the accepted manuscript version* of the single-authored article published in
Ethnic and Racial Studies:

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Religious identification and Muslim immigrants' acculturation preferences for newly arriving immigrants in Germany

Abstract

Acculturation preferences of immigrants and the host population differ substantially. Research on the former predominantly focused on immigrants' preferences for their acculturation process. It remains unclear what they prefer for other immigrants. Therefore, the present study analyses how Muslim immigrants' religious identification shapes their preferences for the acculturation of other immigrants. It focuses on religious identification as the central determinant because Muslim immigrants' faith differentiates them from a Christian or secular host population. Furthermore, it is a source of self-identification that affects attitudes and preferences. The study relies on the Social Identity Theory and utilizes a sample of Muslim immigrants in Germany. The analyses reveal that stronger identification makes it more likely to prefer combined culture and (to a lesser extent) separation, while it makes it less likely to prefer assimilation. Additionally, members of the minority within Islam in Germany are more likely to prefer separation than the majority.

Introduction

The number of immigrants living in European countries has increased steadily. Besides immigrants from neighbouring non-EU countries, recent developments are characterized by immigrants from the Middle East (Czaika and Di Lillo 2018; Pew Research Center 2017). Consequently, cultural and religious diversity is on the rise (Casanova 2007). This phenomenon leads to discussions about accommodating immigrants' cultural practices in the host societies. One area of research concentrates on acculturation and acculturation preferences.

Acculturation is an inevitable process of cultural change when people with different cultures come into contact for a prolonged period (Berry 1997; Pfafferott and Brown 2006). In other words, long-term contact of groups with different cultures results in "changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits (1936) in Berry

* Layout and citation style are according to the journal's guidelines. It can thus deviate from the formatting in the framework chapter and in the other papers.

1997, 7). Berry (1997) distinguishes four acculturation dimensions. Each dimension varies in the degree of maintaining the origin culture and taking on the host society's culture (Berry 1997, 8). The first dimension is integration, which occurs when immigrants maintain their origin culture but simultaneously adopt aspects from the host culture. The second dimension is separation, which occurs when immigrants maintain their origin culture while simultaneously avoiding the host society's culture. The third dimension is assimilation, which occurs when immigrants adopt the host society's culture and simultaneously give up their origin culture. The last dimension is marginalization, which occurs when immigrants neither adopt the host society's culture nor maintain their origin culture. Berry's concept and dimensions have been repeatedly modified to consider the host context and psychological factors (Bourhis et al. 1997). The concept of "combined culture" – understood as merging the immigrants' and the host population's culture into a new culture – also does not perfectly match Berry's (1997) dimensions.

Acculturation preferences thus refer to the preferences given to each acculturation dimension (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006). In the words of Berry et al. (1989, 186): "[...] individuals are likely to hold attitudes toward the way in which they wish to become involved with, and relate to, other people and groups they encounter in their acculturation arena". Acculturation preferences can either reflect the dimension someone wishes to follow in their acculturation process or the dimension someone prefers others to follow. It is challenging to deduce actual acculturation processes solely from preferences due to additional mediating and external factors (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). However, analysing acculturation preferences someone has for others is still relevant because they shape beliefs about other groups and the motivation to interact with them (Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2012, 556). Furthermore, acculturation preferences, in a broader sense, reflect policy preferences.

Discrepancies in acculturation preferences between societal groups can result in social tension, conflicts, and discrimination (Arends-Tóth and van de Vijver 2006; Bourhis et al. 1997; Rohmann, Piontkowski, and van Randenborgh 2008; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Ward and Leong 2006). Numerous scholars reasoned that integration causes the least tensions between immigrants and the host population (Pfafferott and Brown 2006; Zagefka and Brown 2002).

Research on the host population's preferences points in this direction: They favour immigrants' cultural assimilation or integration (Kunst et al. 2016; Maisonneuve and Teste 2007; Navas et al. 2007; Phillips 2010; Piontkowski et al. 2000). Immigrants' acculturation preferences are less clear. Some studies concluded that they prefer cultural assimilation, while others

suggested that they prefer separation or integration. Immigrants' heterogeneity might explain these inconsistencies. They differ, for example, in their origin country, socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics, and experiences with the host country. These differences also apply to the recently increasing number of Muslim immigrants. Furthermore, they differ in their denomination within Islam, the importance they ascribe to the Islamic faith, and the extent of religious practices.

As already mentioned, differences in acculturation preferences between immigrants and the host population can have negative consequences. However, with immigrants increasingly accounting for a considerable proportion of the host population, it remains unclear what they prefer for other (newly arriving) immigrants' acculturation. Therefore, the present study *analyses the preferences of Muslim immigrants in Germany concerning the acculturation of other (newly arriving) immigrants*. There are 5.3-5.6 million Muslims living in Germany ($\approx 6.5\%$ of the total population); around five million have a migration background (Pfündel, Sticks, and Tanis 2021). Germany is an exemplary case for European countries which had similar experiences with increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants in recent years (Pew Research Center 2017). The study focuses specifically on the role of religious identification in shaping immigrants' preferences. In this context, "Muslim immigrants" refers to first- or second-generation immigrants who affiliate with Islam. The term "(newly arriving) immigrants" indicates that the present study is interested in expectations regarding future immigrants with different cultures and traditions than the majority population.

This study complements existing research in at least four ways: First, it focuses on a steadily growing proportion of the host society, whose attitudes and preferences become increasingly important for a society's cohesion and the peaceful coexistence of people with different cultures. Second, instead of exploring Muslim immigrants' acculturation processes, this study focuses on their preferences concerning other immigrants' acculturation. Third, the study implicitly enquires about general immigration and integration policy preferences that might potentially limit or restrict the exercise and realization of their culture. Fourth, previous discussions focused on the accommodation of Muslim religious and cultural practices in a predominantly Christian/atheist/secular host population. The present study explores the role that Muslims' religious identification plays in shaping their preferences concerning the acculturation of other immigrants. Muslim immigrants, on average, ascribe greater importance to their Islamic influenced cultural practices and are more religious than other immigrant groups, which reinforces this point (Guveli 2015).

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section presents previous findings on the host population's and immigrants' acculturation preferences. The following section hypothesizes how Muslim immigrants' religious identification affects acculturation preferences by relying on theoretical assumptions of the Social Identity Theory. The third section introduces the dataset (Religionsmonitor; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017) and methods (multinomial logistical regression models) to test the hypotheses with a sample of first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants in Germany (N = 1066). After presenting the empirical findings, the article concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings.

Host Population's and Muslim Immigrants' Preferences

Most studies have analysed the host population's acculturation preferences or the preferences of minorities in general. Studies on the preferences of Muslim immigrants differ in their findings. Furthermore, they almost exclusively explore immigrants' preferences for the personal acculturation process. The following section provides a short overview of this rich research that is by no means exhaustive.

Research on the preferences of members of the host population in European countries suggests that they prefer cultural assimilation or integration. Cultural separation is only preferred if immigrants intend to stay temporarily (Fetzer and Soper 2005), while it is rejected and seen as problematic if immigrants intend to stay longer (Maisonneuve and Teste 2007; Phillips 2010).

Assimilation and integration are the preferred dimensions, independent of whether the immigrants in question originated from predominantly Muslim or Christian countries. This is true for the preferences of the German host population toward immigrants from Turkey and (former) Yugoslavia (Piontkowski et al. 2000); the French host population toward immigrants from Morocco and the Congo Republic (Maisonneuve and Teste 2007), and the Spanish host population toward immigrants from the Maghreb region and sub-Saharan Africa (Navas et al. 2007), to name a few.

It is not always possible to clearly distinguish between assimilation and integration. In connection with assimilation, individuals might think about cultural aspects of the public domain, which become apparent in everyday interactions (e.g., language), rather than aspects of the private domain, which hardly affect others (e.g., diet). For example, it is unlikely for someone to expect immigrants to start eating pork if it is uncommon in their origin culture, whereas

it is likely that someone expects immigrants to start learning the language. In this sense, assimilation matches integration. It illustrates maintaining the origin culture in some respects and simultaneously adopting some elements from the host culture. The differences between assimilation and integration become apparent when scholars relate acculturation preferences to pre-existing prejudices: Kunst et al. (2016) concluded that members of the host population in Norway who generally hold negative prejudices toward Muslims are more likely to expect Muslim immigrants to assimilate than integrate. Zick et al. (2001) as well as van der Noll and Saroglou (2015) also observed that pre-existing prejudices toward Muslims are important determinants for the acculturation preferences of members of the host population in Germany. Furthermore, preferences for assimilation and integration – giving up the origin culture – are primarily driven by older age, high levels of national pride, low levels of education and low levels of perceived cultural similarity (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Piontkowski et al. 2000). In sum, assimilation and integration are the dominant acculturation preferences of members of the host population.

Next, I discuss Muslim immigrants' preferences for their own acculturation processes. Muslim immigrants in the Spanish province of Almería, for example, see separation as the ideal acculturation dimension (Navas et al. 2007). The findings for Turks in Germany depend on the strength of identification with the ethnic group: Separation or marginalization are the preferred dimensions if immigrants identify strongly with their ethnic group. In case of weak identification, assimilation is preferred (Piontkowski et al. 2000). Another string of the literature focuses on second-generation immigrants by analysing adolescents' preferences. Zagefka and Brown (2002) as well as Pfafferott and Brown (2006), for example, found integration to be the preferred dimension of adolescents with a Turkish migration background. The generational differences are not the focus of the present study. Besides focusing on the preferences for the personal acculturation process, previous studies did not consider the role of religious identification, which is a key aspect of this study.

Kunst et al. (2016) considered the religious identification of Muslim immigrants in Norway, but again for the personal acculturation process. They concluded that religious identification is only relevant for acculturation preferences if immigrants have experienced discrimination based on their religion. In this case, stronger identification relates to preferring the maintenance of the origin culture. Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders (2012) have a different research focus, but their work includes religious attendance as a covariate. They concluded that Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, who frequently visit Mosques, have more favourable attitudes toward acculturation dimensions that include maintaining the origin culture;

they are less in favour of assimilation. Both studies utilize just one variable to illustrate religious identification, hence it remains unclear if the findings are robust across different measurements.

Gattino et al. (2016) considered the multidimensionality of religion. However, they again focused on actual acculturation processes. They found that among Muslim immigrants in Northern Italy, greater religious identification contributes to maintaining the Muslim culture. It does not affect whether immigrants take on the Italian culture. In contrast, religious beliefs and practices reduce the probability to take on the Italian culture, while they do not affect whether immigrants maintain their Muslim culture.

In sum, besides almost exclusively focusing on preferences for the own acculturation process, previous research did not consider the heterogeneity of Muslim immigrants in detail. Among the 5.3-5.6 million Muslims in Germany and independent of the migration background, Sunnis constitute the majority with over 70%, followed by Alevi (13%) and Shiites (7%) (BMI 2021; Pfündel, Sticks, and Tanis 2021). Around five million Muslims are first- and second-generation immigrants (Pfündel, Sticks, and Tanis 2021): Approximately 45% are of Turkish origin, followed by the Middle East (ca. 28%), South-eastern European countries (ca. 19%), and Northern Africa (ca. 8%). Furthermore, 60-70% of Muslims with a migration background are first-generation immigrants (+16 years old; Pfündel, Sticks, and Halle 2020). The present study picks up here and explores the role of Muslim immigrants' heterogeneity in-depth.

Religious Identification and Acculturation Preferences

Social Identity Theory

Brought forward by Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), Social Identity Theory (SIT) aims to explain intergroup behaviour and attitudes toward outgroups. It is fitting to develop expectations for acculturation preferences as they also express intergroup behaviour. They reflect how different groups of society prefer to live together in one country, what they expect from each other, and how they organize their cultural (co)existence. In this sense, acculturation preferences reflect policy preferences – not attitudes toward one specific policy, but preferences for a general narrative in the context of immigration and integration policies. Acculturation preferences reflect which acculturation dimension is seen as best for society at large. This implicit policy context plays an important role in the development of the hypotheses later.

Tajfel (1974, 69) defines social identity as the individual's knowledge of being a member of a social group and the emotional attachment to the group. This social identity then affects

intergroup behaviour: How strongly someone identifies with their group shapes how they evaluate other groups and their members. It serves as a reference frame.

According to SIT, the reference frame implies that individuals aim to positively differentiate their group from groups they do not identify with (Cairns et al. 2006, 703; Tajfel 1974, 68). Scholars call this “favourable ingroup comparison” (Verkuyten 2007, 341). Second, perceived threats to the social identity cause increased identification with the group (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Third, stronger identification leads to a higher readiness to use the group to describe oneself (Verkuyten 2007, 343). Generally, a positive social identity promotes individuals’ well-being, offers support, and a sense of belonging (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010).

Religious Identification

Individuals identify with numerous social groups. Each group is of varying importance for them and for shaping their attitudes (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Greenfield and Marks 2007). Identification with societal groups can even lead to ambivalent or conflicting attitudes¹. Religious groups are also societal groups (Huddy 2003). They constitute an identity source and are an important cultural dimension, which makes religious identification especially worth considering for acculturation preferences.

Compared to languages or ethnicities, religious groups are more exclusive and draw clear boundaries between groups. The example by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (in: Trauttmüller 2013, 441) illustrates this: Individuals can speak more than one language, can be citizens of two countries, can be half European and half African. However, it is impossible to be a member of more than one religious group. An individual cannot be half Christian and half Muslim. Whereas other cultural dimensions (e.g., language) are acquired over time, individuals are traditionally born into a religious group (Cairns et al. 2006). The awareness of the membership is purposefully reinforced through customs/rites throughout one’s lifetime (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015). Affective moments and moral authority, which can be experienced through religious practices and participation, further contribute to establishing religion as an identity source and powerful cultural dimension (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Furthermore, religious groups are characterized by shared beliefs and values (Jamal 2005).

¹ Individuals often hold ambivalent or conflicting attitudes. Social psychologists call this ‘attitudinal ambivalence’ (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995). Attitudinal ambivalence has positive and negative consequences for individuals’ behaviour as discussed by van Harreveld, Nohlen, and Schneider (2015). I refrain from further discussing this matter as the present study does not focus on whether the respondents’ attitudes toward acculturation contain positive and negative elements or how attitudes translate into behaviour. Meeusen, Abts, and Meuleman (2019), for example, already studied the ambivalence of anti-immigrant attitudes among immigrants.

Their validity often stems from century-old teachings and conventions, which makes them less negotiable or open to compromise (Traunmüller 2013). Shared beliefs and values are also the basis for common interpretations of the members' surroundings (Jamal 2005). The surroundings include relationships with immigrants. Following this, religious groups make interpretation frames available to make sense of the environment, and they give narratives for cooperation and conflicts by highlighting group differences (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015; Nagel 2013; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). In doing so, religious groups again define relationships with immigrants.

In line with Greenfield and Marks (2007), we can reason that religious individuals ascribe greater importance to their religious group. They have a strong religious social identity which consists of the knowledge of being a member of a religious group and the emotional attachment to it. In turn, if someone is aware of the group membership but perceives it as irrelevant (no emotional attachment), it does not serve as an identity source (Tajfel 1974). As religious groups are also an important cultural dimension, we can furthermore reason that the strength of religious identification shapes how someone perceives and evaluates immigrants, and ultimately, which acculturation dimension the person prefers immigrants to follow.

Religious identification is thereby a multidimensional concept (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002). Its dimensions range from membership, emotional attachment, specific beliefs and convictions to different practices (Joseph and Diduca 2007; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002). Not every dimension is equally important for a positive religious identification and, hence, for shaping preferences. Each dimension reflects different underlying extrinsic and intrinsic motivations (e.g., avoiding bad reputations, maintaining friendships/status, belonging, stress relief). Generally, more visible activities and symbols (e.g., dress code) signal stronger identification as they are harder to fake and interfere more with daily life (Aarøe 2012, 589).

Muslim Immigrants' Religious Identification

Besides the links between religious identification and acculturation preferences, religion has at least three functions specifically for immigrants. These functions additionally highlight why we should explore how immigrants' religious identification shapes the acculturation dimension they prefer other immigrants to follow.

First, religion conveys a sense of belonging and familiarity (Foner and Alba 2008). Religious groups play an important role to stay connected to the origin country and maintain the ethnic origin (Cadge and Ecklund 2007, 364). Immigrants can experience solidarity among members of their religious group (Nagel 2013; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010).

Second, religious teachings, values, and beliefs help to cope with insecurities experienced due to immigration or being a minority (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Third, religion has a representative function and is a marker to distinguish groups (Nagel 2013). These functions often depend on the duration of stay in the host country. We need to remember this for the empirical analyses.

The present study focuses on Muslim immigrants. They are, on average, more religious than Christian members of the host population or other immigrant groups (Diehl and Koenig 2009; Guveli 2015; Lewis and Kashyap 2013; van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011). In Germany, the share of very religious Muslims with migration background is over 15 percentage points higher (29%) than the share of very religious Christians without migration background (Pfündel, Stichs, and Tanis 2021). Reversely, the share of (rather) not religious people is considerably lower among Muslims with a migration background (19%) than among Christians without a migration background (45%). Research from Germany and the Netherlands also suggests that Muslim immigrants' religiosity is characterized by a strong intergenerational stability (Beek and Fleischmann 2020; Diehl and Koenig 2009; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Guveli and Platt 2011). While the importance of religion remains high, the forms of religious expressions and practices become more diverse among second-generation immigrants (Beek and Fleischmann 2020; Guveli 2015). Diehl and Koenig (2009) argue that the intergenerational stability is due to a general value stability in immigrant families. For an in-depth comparison between first- and second-generation immigrants' and natives' religiosity in Europe over time see Guveli and Platt (2020).

Overall, stronger religious identification results in a greater influence of the Islamic faith on the way Muslims live their life (Verkuyten 2007). It ultimately also influences how they evaluate other immigrants and which acculturation dimension they prefer them to follow.

Religious Identification and Acculturation Preferences of Muslim Immigrants

Combining the SIT with the particularities of religious identification allows us to deduce which acculturation dimension Muslim immigrants prefer other immigrants to follow. The expected relationship between religious identification and acculturation preferences becomes especially recognizable when we remember the implicit policy context of acculturation preferences.

Individuals aim to positively differentiate their group from others. Furthermore, stronger identification increases the readiness to use the group for self-description. Combined with the fact that religious values and beliefs are less negotiable, we can expect that stronger religious identification results in favouring an acculturation dimension that promotes maintaining the

immigrants' culture. Muslim immigrants with a strong religious identification should prefer separation, to a lesser extent also combined culture, over assimilation (separation > combined culture > assimilation). The latter is not desirable because it promotes a one-sided sacrifice of cultural components on the immigrants' part. However, this line of argumentation only provides us with expectations for Muslim immigrants' acculturation processes. Understanding acculturation preferences as general policy preferences helps to deduce what Muslim immigrants prefer other immigrants to follow: Individuals who identify strongly with their religion are less in favour of assimilation because it reflects a policy preference that potentially limits or restricts the exercise and realization of their own culture as well.

H1: *Stronger religious identification results in preferring acculturation dimensions which promote the maintenance of the immigrants' origin culture.*

Focusing on threat perceptions and social identity helps to make sense of differences between minority and majority group members within Islam. Perceived threats toward one's identity increase the identification with the own group. The group becomes more important for the personality and wellbeing (support system). Muslim immigrants who additionally belong to a minority within Islam have to cope with challenges (threats) of not only being immigrants, but also being a minority within the immigrant group. They hold a double-minority-status. For example, Muslim minority group members suffer disadvantages when competing with the majority for the "right" religious beliefs and state recognition. Due to their double-minority status and related experiences, Muslim minority group members ought to be more aware of the importance the cultural identity has for immigrants. This supports the solidarity-of-the-minorities effect (Fetzer 1998). It also considers the work of Banfi, Gianni, and Giugni (2016), who suggest that minority and majority status within Islam affect attitudes differently. Together with the implicit link between acculturation and policy preferences, the increased awareness makes it less likely for Muslim minority group members to prefer acculturation dimensions that indicate abandoning cultural aspects. In doing so, they would jeopardize their support system and religiously influenced culture. Minority group members within Islam should be more likely than majority group members to prefer maintaining the immigrants' culture.

H2: *Minority group members within Islam in Germany are more likely to prefer separation over combined culture and assimilation than majority group members (Sunnis).*

Data and Method

I utilize an existing dataset (Religionsmonitor; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017) which includes a sample of the Muslim population in Germany ($N = 1114$; first- and second-generation immigrants: $N = 1066$). The sample consists of respondents who affiliate with Islam, independent of how frequently they practise their faith. The affiliation was enquired by preceding filtering questions to ensure the correct assignment (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017; infas 2016)². Data collection took place from July 2016 to March 2017 via telephone interviews. The sample intentionally leaves out refugees as they exhibit characteristics which differ substantially from other immigrant groups. Furthermore, the dataset includes weights to account for unequal distributions within the sample compared to the total population of Muslims in Germany (iterative proportional fitting algorithm). The commissioned survey institute did not provide further information on the weighting.

Variable Selection, Coding, and Methodological Approach

The dependent variable (*acculturation preferences*) was collected by asking the respondents' opinion on how coexistence can be successful if, through immigration, people with different cultures and traditions come to live together in one country. The respondents were asked to choose their preferred option³: 1) Immigrants and host population each maintain their own culture; 2) immigrants assimilate to the host population's majority culture; 3) the host population assimilates to the immigrants' culture; and 4) the immigrants' culture and the host population's culture merge into a new culture. The first category corresponds with Berry's (1997) definition of separation, the following two represent assimilation – assimilation on the immigrants' and the host population's part. The last category does not perfectly match Berry's (1997) definitions, but reflects the concept of "combined culture". The question does not specify the immigrants further. It is also worded generally and does not clarify whether it solely enquires about preferences for other (newly) arriving immigrants or general preferences that concern the

² The sampling is based on Humpert and Schneiderheinze's onomastic procedure, a name-based sampling procedure which, in this case, used typical names from countries with a Muslim majority as a reference to identify Muslim immigrants in Germany. The sampling procedure has a 90% accuracy for immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries (Liebau, Humpert, and Schneiderheinze 2018).

³ The questionnaire is in German. Relevant questions and response categories were translated into English. The original wording was (infas 2016, 10): Was meinen Sie: Wie kann das Zusammenleben aus Ihrer Sicht am besten gelingen, wenn durch Einwanderung Menschen verschiedener Kulturen und Traditionen in einem Land zusammenleben?

- Einwanderer und Mehrheitsbevölkerung bewahren ihre eigene Kultur.
- Die Einwanderer passen sich an die Kultur der Mehrheitsbevölkerung an.
- Die Mehrheitsgesellschaft passt sich an die Kultur der Einwanderer an.
- Die Kulturen der Einwanderer und Mehrheitsbevölkerung verschmelzen zu einer neuen Kultur.

respondents' acculturation. However, the wording and response categories underline the cultural difference from the majority population in the host country.

In the dataset ($N = 1066$), 38.65% prefer combined culture as the ideal acculturation dimension, followed by immigrants' assimilation to the host population's culture (36.77%). 16.14% prefer cultural separation. Few respondents perceive the host population's assimilation to the immigrants' culture as ideal (1.69%). The low number leads me to neglect it from here on. The preferred dimension of 72 respondents is not reported. These cases are noted as missing values, which results in 976 valid observations and three response categories (separation, assimilation, combined culture) for the bi- and multivariate analyses.

Religious identification is a latent construct and not directly measurable. Consequently, we need observable variables to illustrate it. Second, we need to consider religious identification as a multidimensional concept. The dataset is fitting as it focuses specifically on religion and includes numerous variables that illustrate different dimensions.

To structure the analyses, I follow a four-step approach. First, I perform an exploratory factor analysis to pinpoint the variables that best illustrate the latent construct. The dataset includes 19 religion-related variables (standardized beforehand to ensure comparability; 0-1 scale). The factor analysis revealed that it is best to retain one factor. Hence, I generate an additive *Religious-Social-Identity-Index (RSI-Index)* that includes all items with a rotated factor loading >0.7 (subjective religiosity, abidance of religious rules, frequencies of Mosque visits, frequency of obligatory and personal prayers). In sum, the index illustrates religious identification on a 0-5 scale (very low-very high). Table A1 displays the summary statistics of the index and its five constituting items. In their original form, the five items were coded as follows: The respondents were asked to indicate how religious they see themselves to determine the *subjective religiosity* (0-4 scale; not at all-very religious). The abidance of religious rules was gathered by asking how strongly they follow *religious rules* and live their life accordingly (0-4 scale; not at all-very). To determine the frequency of *mosque visits*, respondents were asked how often they visit a mosque besides the Friday prayer (0-6 scale; never-daily). Information on the frequency of *obligatory prayers* (Salah; five times a day would be mandatory) and additional *personal prayers* throughout the day (Du'a) were gathered by asking how often the respondents pray each prayer (0-7 scale; never-several times a day).

Second, I explore the bivariate relationship between religious identification and acculturation preferences.

Third, I focus on multivariate analyses (multinomial logistical regression models). The models consider the dependent variable's non-linear and non-hierarchical scaling, for which linear or ordered logistical regression analyses are not suitable (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018: violation of proportional odds assumption, three normatively ordered categories). Generally, (multinomial) logistical models come with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity⁴. One solution is to rely on Average Marginal Effects (AME) and the graphical display of their respective Predictive Margins, which allow for comparisons between models and subsamples (Mood 2010). Applied to the present study, an AME of 0.1 means that a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable increases the probability of preferring the respective acculturation dimension by ten percentage points on average. AMEs of one variable are conditional on holding other covariates at their means (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018, 48). The multivariate analyses focus on the RSI-Index. Religion is one of many cultural dimensions affected by acculturation processes. Thus, religiously influenced cultural aspects must be important for an individual to affect their acculturation preferences. Regularly exercising several religious customs and practices, which concern different areas of an individual's life, is a strong indicator of the importance. It can be mirrored best by an index. Throughout the multivariate analyses, I apply list-wise deletion to missing values and utilize sampling weights⁵ in line with the dataset's specification. List-wise deletion leads to ~800 observations in the models.

Lastly, I utilize the individual items and a different index for religious identification to ensure the findings' robustness. The *Religious-Centrality-Index* is included in the dataset by default and distinguishes between low, moderate, and high religiosity (Huber 2003). Independent of the measurement, I expect similar findings. However, dimensions that interfere more with everyday life signal stronger identification (e.g., faithfully following religious rules; Aarøe 2012). Therefore, I expect their effects to be more pronounced than the effects of privately expressed dimensions (e.g., personal prayer).

Group Membership and Religious Upbringing

Two additional variables are utilized to ensure informative analyses. The first variable is the *denomination within Islam*. It provides information on minority and majority group

⁴ Unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased estimates and makes direct comparisons between nested models and across models or subsamples impossible (Mood 2010). The effects' directions and statistical significance remain unaffected (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018).

⁵ Complementary analyses with unweighted data revealed similar relationships (not displayed). While the respective coefficients vary slightly between the weighted and unweighted analyses, the general directions remain identical. Corresponding marginsplots support this.

membership. Sunnis represent the majority within Islam in Germany (53.4%; BMI 2021). Shiites, Alevi, Ahmadiyya, and members of other Muslim groups represent minorities (Shiites: 18.8%, Others: 24.4%; BMI 2021). We have no information on the denomination of 37 respondents. The sample's distribution does not represent the overall Muslim population (BMI 2021). Applying weights corrects this. The second variable considers the *religious upbringing* (response categories: no, in parts, yes). It acknowledges that individuals are usually born into a religious group. Religious upbringing lays the foundation for personal religious identification (religious socialization). Among the respondents, 21.9% reported no religious upbringing, 34.9% reported a partial religious upbringing, and 43.1% reported that they were brought up religiously (missings: 2).

Covariates

The analyses include various sociodemographic and immigrant-specific covariates to assess whether religious identification is independently relevant for acculturation preferences. Again, the distributions do not match the overall Muslim population in Germany and weights are applied throughout the analyses to balance the initially uneven distributions of the covariates. The respondents' *age* considers their period of socialization, experiences with their religious group, other immigrants and the host population (Güngör, Bornstein, and Phalet 2012). Zagefka and Brown (2002) as well as Pfafferott and Brown (2006) already observed that acculturation preferences differ between adults and adolescents. The respondents are 38 years old on average. Another covariate is *sex* (female/male) because, on the one hand, previous research concluded that women are less in favour of cultural assimilation than men (Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2012). On the other hand, research often argues that Islam promotes gender roles and authoritarian family relations that differ from that of the European majority (Joppke 2013; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015). The sample includes 41.7% women and 58.3% men. The analyses also include the respondents' *level of education* (response categories: low, medium, high level of education; more details: infas 2016). Previous research repeatedly concluded that it is an important determinant for attitudes toward immigrants (Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014). In the unweighted sample, 49.3% have a high, 24.7% a medium, and 17.9% a low level of education (missings: 86). Lastly, the analyses include the immigrants' current *job situation* (response categories: full-time, part-time, unemployment, education, retired/housewife/housemen) to consider their integration into the host society and possible economic threat perceptions due to newly arriving immigrants. Over 50% of the respondents are full- or part-time employed (missings: 5).

Immigrant-specific characteristics include the experienced discrimination, migration background, share of years spent in Germany, frequency of interreligious contact, and origin country. These variables indicate the respondents' level of assimilation and experiences with the host country, other immigrant groups, and the integration process (Berry 1997). The *experienced discrimination* was assessed by asking the respondents how often they have experienced discrimination in the past 12 months (0-4 scale; never-very often). It considers that acculturation preferences might emerge due to discrimination or exclusion. Previous research has already uncovered mediating effects of experienced discrimination (e.g., Kunst et al. 2016). The respondents have experienced rather low levels of discrimination on average (mean: 0.7, sd: 1.07). The variable that illustrates the *migration background* differentiates between first- and second-generation immigrants. Around 63% have immigrated themselves (first-generation), while 37% are second-generation immigrants. Among the latter, over 85% have parents who both immigrated. Due to the small number of cases, I refrain from further distinguishing the migration background. In the acculturation context, how long first-generation immigrants have been in the host country matters. Therefore, the *share of years* is included as well. It is not part of the initial questionnaire. The years the respondents' have spent in Germany are available. The variable correlates highly with the respondents' age ($r = 0.704$; $p < 0.001$). Therefore, I generate a variable that indicates how many years out of their life the respondents have spent in Germany. I divide the years spent in Germany by age and standardize it on a 0-100 scale. It is "0" when they have spent less than a year of their life in Germany. It is "100" when they were born in Germany, but at least one parent immigrated. Muslim immigrants in Germany have spent, on average, over three-quarters of their life there (Table A1). This share includes second-generation immigrants, who by default have spent all their life in the host country (share = 100). Focusing on first-generation immigrants, they have spent, on average, a little more than half their lives in Germany (share = 56). The frequency of *interreligious contact* was assessed by asking the respondents how often they have contact with people of a different religion (0-4 scale; not at all-very frequently). This variable follows research which concluded that primary contact with the own group increases preferences for maintaining the own culture (Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2012; Piontkowski, Rohmann, and Florack 2002). Additionally, it tests the contact-hypothesis, which states that frequent positive contact to unfamiliar groups decreases prejudice and leads to more positive attitudes (McLaren 2003). Including the *country of origin* considers the heterogeneity of Muslim immigrants. It also considers cultural similarities and immigration traditions between host and origin countries. I distinguish six

origins: Turkey, South-East Europe, Northern Africa, Iran, South Asia, and the Middle East. A seventh category subsumes respondents from countries not mentioned above or with ancestors from more than one country.

To rule out multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, I checked the variance inflation factor (VIF). All VIF-values are <5.9 with a mean VIF-value of 2.3. These values indicate no problem of multicollinearity in the models. See infas (2016) for the original wording.

Table A1 displays summary statistics for (quasi-)metrical variables. Over 90% of the interviews were in German, which requires a certain level of language proficiency that simultaneously reflects the respondents' level of acculturation. Due to low numbers of non-German interviews, comparisons by language proficiency are not possible.

Results

To facilitate the reading, I refrain from repeating that in the present study, acculturation preferences reflect what Muslim immigrants in Germany perceive as best for society at large when people with different cultures live together in one country.

Bivariate Analyses

Table A2 presents the bivariate findings. It shows that stronger religious identification corresponds with favouring the maintenance of the immigrants' origin culture (combined culture, separation; C-D; $p < 0.01$) and with decreasing tendencies for assimilation (B; $p < 0.001$). These tendencies remain identical whether we look at indices or individual items. They also remain identical whether we utilize dummy-variables (B-D) or treat the dependent variable as a quasi-metrical (A), ordinal or nominal variable (not displayed). Furthermore, religious identification and preferring separation correlate weakly (D; $r = 0.097$; $p < 0.01$), although in the expected direction. Focusing on the most frequently selected dimensions: Stronger religious identification corresponds with greater tendencies to select combined culture over assimilation (E; $r = 0.221$; $p < 0.001$), i.e., not a one-sided cultural change (immigrants' assimilation) is preferred, but both (host population and immigrants) should adjust parts of their culture. Out of the individual items, how strictly someone follows religious rules correlates strongest with acculturation preferences. Lastly, the denomination within Islam correlates only weakly with acculturation preferences (Cramer's $V = < 0.12$).

The above findings support Hypothesis 1. However, the correlations are weak to moderate ($r = \pm 0.22$; Cramer's $V = < 0.12$). This might be because acculturation preferences and religious identification are not independent of sociodemographic/immigrant-specific characteristics. The following analyses consider this.

Multivariate Analyses

Table 1 displays the estimates of the multinomial logistical regression analyses to explore the relationship between religious identification (RSI-index) and acculturation preferences⁶. The estimates are displayed as Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) and complemented by the respective Average Marginal Effect (AME) to allow comparisons and intuitive interpretations.

⁶ Imputing missing values for the explanatory variables and covariates leads to similar findings (chained iterations; imputations: 20; Table 1: +130 observations).

Table 1: Multinomial Logistical Regression Models for Acculturation Preferences of Muslim Immigrants in Germany (Relative Risk Ratios and Average Margin-al Effects Displayed, Standard Errors in Parentheses)


<i>Assimilation</i>			<i>Combined Culture</i>		<i>Separation</i>	
	RRR	AME	RRR	AME	RRR	AME
Religious-Social-Identity-Index	0.663** (0.096)	-0.080*** (0.021)	0.949 (0.124)	0.049* (0.021)	Ref.	0.030 (0.016)
Religious Upbringing (Reference: No)						
In Parts	1.459 (0.628)	0.167** (0.060)	0.554 (0.236)	-0.188** (0.067)	Ref.	0.022 (0.049)
Yes	1.023 (0.485)	0.083 (0.067)	0.582 (0.258)	-0.126 (0.072)	Ref.	0.043 (0.054)
Denomination within Islam (Reference: Shiites)						
Sunnis	2.313 (1.031)	0.014 (0.069)	3.385** (1.670)	0.153* (0.076)	Ref.	-0.167* (0.080)
Others	1.472 (0.691)	0.009 (0.075)	1.825 (0.942)	0.081 (0.082)	Ref.	-0.090 (0.084)
Interreligious Contact	1.130 (0.142)	-0.008 (0.022)	1.255 (0.153)	0.033 (0.023)	Ref.	-0.025 (0.015)
Experienced Discrimination	0.810 (0.121)	-0.037 (0.024)	0.951 (0.123)	0.020 (0.023)	Ref.	0.017 (0.017)
Age	0.990 (0.014)	0.001 (0.001)	0.985 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.002)	Ref.	-0.002 (0.002)
Share of Years in Germany	1.014 (0.007)	0.001 (0.001)	1.015 (0.008)	0.001 (0.001)	Ref.	-0.002* (0.001)
Migration Background (Ref. First-Generation)						
Second-Generation	0.307** (0.133)	-0.104 (0.074)	0.364* (0.166)	-0.052 (0.080)	Ref.	0.156** (0.058)
Sex (Reference: Male)						
Female	0.617 (0.202)	-0.057 (0.053)	0.736 (0.234)	0.003 (0.054)	Ref.	0.054 (0.041)
Level of Education (Ref. Low)						
Medium	0.966 (0.379)	-0.048 (0.067)	1.318 (0.528)	0.066 (0.069)	Ref.	-0.018 (0.051)
High	0.990 (0.376)	-0.066 (0.062)	1.540 (0.575)	0.097 (0.063)	Ref.	-0.031 (0.048)
Job Situation (Ref. Unemployed)						
Full-Time	0.671 (0.371)	-0.008 (0.099)	0.600 (0.333)	-0.055 (0.104)	Ref.	0.063 (0.063)
Part-Time	0.557 (0.353)	-0.080 (0.116)	0.761 (0.467)	0.026 (0.123)	Ref.	0.055 (0.072)
Education	0.749 (0.468)	-0.063 (0.112)	1.012 (0.592)	0.048 (0.114)	Ref.	0.014 (0.065)
Retired/Housewife/-men	2.076 (1.372)	0.158 (0.118)	1.026 (0.718)	-0.117 (0.123)	Ref.	-0.041 (0.065)
Country of Origin (Reference: Turkey)						
South-East Europe	1.006 (0.403)	0.066 (0.064)	0.632 (0.258)	-0.101 (0.064)	Ref.	0.035 (0.057)
Northern Africa	1.014 (0.383)	0.010 (0.059)	0.952 (0.336)	-0.013 (0.059)	Ref.	0.003 (0.048)
Iran	2.415 (1.575)	0.039 (0.094)	2.452 (1.660)	0.058 (0.101)	Ref.	-0.097 (0.056)
South Asia	1.702 (0.732)	0.032 (0.064)	1.664 (0.660)	0.031 (0.063)	Ref.	-0.063 (0.044)
Middle East	0.991 (0.426)	0.020 (0.064)	0.863 (0.362)	-0.032 (0.066)	Ref.	0.012 (0.058)
Other	2.082 (1.037)	0.072 (0.072)	1.699 (0.867)	0.001 (0.076)	Ref.	-0.074 (0.050)
N	795					
Pseudo R ²	0.09					

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Note: In the multinomial logistical regression analyses, separation constitutes the reference category. Weighted Data.

We see that stronger religious identification, on average, increases the probability of preferring combined culture (AME: 0.049; $p < 0.05$) and decreases the probability for assimilation (AME: -0.080 ; $p < 0.001$). There is no statistically significant difference for the probability to favour separation ($p > 0.1$). AMEs are useful to detect general trends, but they are averaged and overlook non-linear or (reversed) U-shaped relationships. They illustrate the average effect changes across all values of the explanatory variable. The related predictive margins, on the other hand, illustrate the individual predictions at each value. The graphical display of the predictive margins at each level of religious identification contradicts the latter finding (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Predictive Margins for the Effect of Religious Identification on Acculturation Preferences (with 95%CI)



Note: All predictive margins are statistically significant with $p < 0.001$.

Figure 1 illustrates that Muslim immigrants in Germany, who identify strongly with their religion, are more likely to prefer acculturation dimensions that promote maintaining the immigrants' culture (combined culture, to a lesser extent separation). They do not prefer a one-sided sacrificing of cultural components on the immigrants' part (assimilation). This supports Hypothesis 1.

Comparing the most frequently preferred dimensions, we can deduce from Figure 1 that individuals with a strong religious identification prefer an acculturation dimension which implies that both parties – immigrants and host population – compromise and sacrifice cultural

components (combined culture). They are less likely to prefer an acculturation dimension that implies only immigrants give up cultural components and culturally assimilate to the host population (assimilation). A post-estimation test reinforces this finding. It reveals that the effect of religious identification on the probability of preferring assimilation is statistically different from combined culture ($p < 0.002$). These findings further support Hypothesis 1.

I focus on AMEs (Table 1), because predictive margins offer no additional benefits for categorical variables. Majority group members within Islam in Germany (Sunnis) have a lower probability of preferring separation (AME: -0.167 ; $p < 0.05$) and a higher probability for combined culture (AME: 0.153 ; $p < 0.05$) than members of the minority (Shiites). Conversely, Sunnis are more in favour of combined culture, while minority group members (Shiites) show greater tendencies for separation. This supports Hypothesis 2. Sunnis and Shiites do not differ in their probabilities of preferring assimilation. Post-estimation tests reinforce the finding: Sunnis and Shiites are statistically different in their probabilities regarding combined culture and separation ($p < 0.01$), while they do not statistically differ concerning assimilation. Complementary analyses revealed no interaction effects between religious identification and the denomination within Islam, religious upbringing, interreligious contact or experienced discrimination (not displayed).

Furthermore, in comparison to individuals with no religious upbringing, individuals with a partial religious upbringing have a lower probability of preferring combined culture (AME: -0.188 ; $p < 0.01$) and a higher probability for assimilation (AME: 0.167 ; $p < 0.01$). The religious upbringing has no statistically significant effect on preferring separation. Complementary analyses revealed that neither the religious upbringing nor the age mediates the effect of religious identification (not displayed). The sample itself might explain the effect of religious upbringing. It also includes respondents who have no religious upbringing or never practised their faith but have answered that they affiliate with Islam. They would not have been included in the sample otherwise. We know from theoretical elaborations that stronger group identification leads to a higher readiness to use this group for self-description (Verkuyten 2007). Being Muslim must consequently be of some importance to self-identify as such.

Lastly, sociodemographic characteristics and the origin country do not systematically influence Muslim immigrants' acculturation preferences. In contrast, immigrant-specific characteristics (share of years, migration background) seem to influence the probability to prefer separation. It is hard to draw meaningful conclusions from Table 1 alone as the share of years

is by default set at the maximum for second-generation immigrants. Therefore, Table A3 and Figure A1 display separate estimations by the migration background.


The findings for first-generation immigrants, with one exception, comply with the initial analysis, which is not surprising as first-generation immigrants make up the sample's majority. The separate analysis reveals that the frequency of interreligious contact matters for first-generation immigrants' preferences: More contact increases the probability of preferring combined culture and decreases the probability for separation, which complies with previous research (Huijnk, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2012; McLaren 2003). Three findings stand out for second-generation immigrants. First, second-generation immigrants with a strong religious identification are more inclined to prefer separation than first-generation immigrants (Figure A1). Second, religious upbringing, denomination within Islam, interreligious contact as well as socio-demographic characteristics do not systematically affect acculturation preferences. Third, remembering the low number of observations, we can observe a greater variance in acculturation preferences subject to their parents' origin country.

Robustness Checks

I rerun the previous analysis (Table 1) with different measurements for the central explanatory variable (religious identification), i.e., substituting the RSI-Index by its constituting items and the Religious-Centrality-Index. Figure 2 displays the predictive margins from the respective multinomial logistical regression model to allow intuitive interpretations and comparability.

The robustness checks corroborate previous findings. Independent of the measurement, we see that stronger identification increases the probability of preferring combined culture and separation, while it decreases the probability for assimilation. As expected, the effects are more pronounced for dimensions that interfere more with everyday life (mosque visits, religious rules) and less pronounced for privately practiced dimensions (personal prayer). The effects of the group membership within Islam remain unaffected by the measurement of religious identification (not displayed).

Figure 2: Predictive Margins for the Effect of Religious Identification on Acculturation Preferences utilising Different Measurements (with 95%CI)



Note: All predictive margins are statistically significant with $p < 0.001$.

Conclusion and Discussion

The present study analysed the preferences of Muslim immigrants in Germany concerning the acculturation of other (newly arriving) immigrants. It focused on the role of religious identification and built on the Social Identity Theory. It hypothesized that Muslim immigrants with

stronger religious identification have greater tendencies to favour acculturation dimensions that indicate the maintenance of the immigrants' culture. Furthermore, it hypothesized that minority group members within Islam have a higher probability to favour separation than majority group members.

The findings support the hypotheses and highlight three aspects. First, Muslim immigrants' religious identification is relevant to their acculturation preferences. Respondents with a strong religious identification are more likely to prefer an acculturation dimension which implies that both parties – immigrants and host population – compromise and sacrifices cultural components (combined culture, separation). They are less likely to prefer an acculturation dimension that implies only immigrants give up cultural components and culturally assimilate into the host population (assimilation).

Second, it matters whether Muslim immigrants belong to the minority or majority within Islam in Germany. Majority group members (Sunnis) are more likely to favour combined culture and less likely to favour separation than minority group members.

Lastly, the findings are robust across different identification measurements. However, the effects are more pronounced for dimensions of religious identification that interfere more with everyday life.

One limitation of this study is the lack of information on the immigrants in question. Their description is limited to having a different culture than most of the population in Germany. Furthermore, little information on the respondents' acculturation process is available, only proxies via their language use or duration of stay. Additionally, the study focused on Muslim immigrants and their religious identification. We cannot conclude how their acculturation preferences differ from (religious) Christians' or Christian immigrants' preferences. Lastly, the present study could only consider some characteristics. Future research can focus on immigrants' language skills, regional environment, the endogeneity and causality of experienced discrimination, and interreligious contact. Another starting point might be the in-depth analysis of religious upbringing by utilizing panel-data.

Overall, this study contributed to a better understanding of inter-group conflicts or (mutual) discrimination against new immigrants by existing immigrants. The attitudes of Muslim immigrants in Germany toward other immigrants are analysed. Furthermore, the implicit link to policy preferences can reveal discrepancies between Muslim immigrants' preferences and acculturation policies. These discrepancies can lead to dissatisfaction with policy outputs and policymakers.

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Appendix

Table A1: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Central Explanatory Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min/Max	N
Acculturation Preference	1.23	0.72	0/2	976
Religious-Social-Identity-Index (RSI-Index)	2.30	1.38	0/5	995
Items: Subjective Religiosity	2.10	1.13	0/4	1051
Religious Rules	1.79	1.28	0/4	1040
Mosque Visit	1.65	1.69	0/6	1058
Obligatory Prayer	3.11	3.07	0/7	1034
Personal Prayer	4.30	2.80	0/7	1039
Religious-Centrality-Index (0-2)	1.29	0.65	0/2	1028
Religious Upbringing	1.22	0.76	0/2	1064
Interreligious Contact	3.11	1.07	0/4	1039
Experienced Discrimination	0.70	1.07	0/4	1048
Age	37.78	14.61	16/81	1064
Share of Years	79.02	26.36	0/100	1063

Note: The variable for acculturation preferences is coded on a 3-point scale ('0' Separation, '1' Combined Culture, '2' Assimilation). Higher scores on the religiosity items/indices indicate stronger identification or frequency. The statistics for the items that constitute the RSI-Index are displayed with their original coding (before standardising on a 0-1 scale). Weighted data.

Table A2: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients

	A Acculturation Preferences (quasi-metrical)	B Assimilation vs. Combined Culture and Separation (Dummy-Variable)	C Combined Culture vs. Assimilation and Separation (Dummy-Variable)	D Separation vs. Assimilation and Combined Culture (Dummy-Variable)	E Combined Culture vs. Assimilation (Dummy-Variable)
Religious-Social-Identity-Index	-0.201***	-0.222***	0.145***	0.097**	0.221***
Subjective Religiosity	-0.175***	-0.182***	0.106***	0.098**	0.174***
Religious Rules	-0.210***	-0.222***	0.132***	0.113***	0.212***
Mosque Visit	-0.159***	-0.181***	0.126***	0.069*	0.184***
Obligatory Prayer	-0.146***	-0.163***	0.111***	0.066*	0.165***
Personal Prayer	-0.137***	-0.141***	0.079*	0.079*	0.131***
Religious-Centrality-Index	-0.145***	-0.168***	0.119***	0.061 ⁺	0.172***
Denomination within Islam	Cramer's V: 0.074*	Cramer's V: 0.100**	Cramer's V: 0.092*	Cramer's V: 0.011 ⁺	Cramer's V: 0.115**

⁺p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Note: The quasi-metrical variable for acculturation preferences (A) is coded on a 3-point scale ('0' Separation, '1' Combined Culture, '2' Assimilation). The dummy-variables (B-D) illustrate the preference for the respective acculturation dimension versus the remaining two. In the right-hand column (E), the preference for combined culture (1) and assimilation (0) is contrasted. Weighted data, except for the calculation of Cramer's V.

Table A3: Multinomial Logistical Regression Models for Acculturation Preferences of Muslim Immigrants in Germany by Migration Background (Relative Risk Ratios and Average Marginal Effects Displayed, Standard Errors in Parentheses)


	First-Generation Immigrants						Second-Generation Immigrants					
	<i>Assimilation</i>		<i>Combined Culture</i>		<i>Separation</i>		<i>Assimilation</i>		<i>Combined Culture</i>		<i>Separation</i>	
	RRR	AME	RRR	AME	RRR	AME	RRR	AME	RRR	AME	RRR	AME
Religious-Social-Identity-Index Religious Upbringing (Reference: No)	0.789 (0.130)	-0.072** (0.027)	1.131 (0.183)	0.062* (0.026)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.009 (0.017)	0.574* (0.147)	-0.068* (0.034)	0.786 (0.157)	0.015 (0.035)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.537 (0.029)
In Parts	1.025 (0.547)	0.129 (0.080)	0.415 (0.244)	-0.171* (0.079)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.041 (0.005)	1.728 (1.321)	0.150 (0.095)	0.658 (0.470)	-0.161 (0.117)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.011 (0.094)
Yes	0.984 (0.569)	0.084 (0.089)	0.575 (0.336)	-0.116 (0.089)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.032 (0.059)	0.914 (0.786)	0.038 (0.112)	0.634 (0.449)	-0.090 (0.128)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.053 (0.099)
Denomination within Islam (Reference: Shiites)												
Sunnis	2.538 (1.451)	-0.014 (0.093)	5.518** (3.201)	0.200** (0.065)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.184* (0.095)	2.295 (1.720)	0.061 (0.097)	1.913 (1.387)	0.053 (0.140)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.114 (0.118)
Others	1.691 (1.011)	-0.047 (0.101)	3.848* (2.351)	0.187* (0.077)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.140 (0.099)	1.733 (1.380)	0.128 (0.112)	0.721 (0.577)	-0.128 (0.154)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.001 (0.132)
Interreligious Contact	1.195 (0.186)	-0.021 (0.028)	1.477* (0.234)	0.054* (0.027)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.033* (0.016)	1.164 (0.288)	0.017 (0.038)	1.085 (0.229)	-0.001 (0.041)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.016 (0.030)
Experienced Discrimination	0.789 (0.166)	-0.054 (0.032)	1.009 (0.203)	0.039 (0.029)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.016 (0.024)	0.878 (0.196)	-0.011 (0.035)	0.906 (0.157)	-0.006 (0.034)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.017 (0.025)
Age	0.984 (0.017)	0.002 (0.003)	0.967 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.003)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.003 (0.002)	0.981 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.006)	1.023 (0.030)	0.007 (0.006)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.001 (0.004)
Share of Years in Germany	1.012 (0.008)	0.001 (0.001)	1.014 (0.009)	0.001 (0.001)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.002 (0.001)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sex (Reference: Male)												
Female	0.508 (0.220)	-0.032 (0.072)	0.454 (0.207)	-0.061 (0.069)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.093 (0.054)	0.501 (0.265)	-0.125 (0.074)	1.029 (0.479)	0.090 (0.081)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.035 (0.065)
Level of Education (Ref. Low)												
Medium	0.926 (0.526)	-0.069 (0.090)	1.402 (0.830)	0.080 (0.085)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.012 (0.066)	1.170 (0.792)	-0.004 (0.101)	1.300 (0.823)	0.039 (0.115)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.035 (0.091)
High	0.910 (0.422)	-0.093 (0.080)	1.600 (0.778)	0.111 (0.076)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.018 (0.053)	1.079 (0.737)	-0.022 (0.094)	1.342 (0.858)	0.056 (0.110)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.034 (0.094)
Job Situation (Ref. Unemployed)												

Full-Time	1.759 (1.165)	0.184 (0.108)	0.649 (0.425)	-0.174 (0.115)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.009 (0.082)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Part-Time	1.251 (0.889)	0.066 (0.128)	0.860 (0.609)	-0.064 (0.139)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.002 (0.086)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Education	2.215 (1.769)	0.147 (0.147)	1.144 (0.795)	-0.091 (0.142)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.056 (0.083)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Retired/Housewife/-men	6.366* (4.645)	0.290* (0.126)	1.971 (1.567)	-0.163 (0.140)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.127 (0.074)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Country of Origin (Reference: Turkey)												
South-East Europe	0.669 (0.363)	0.001 (0.084)	0.538 (0.297)	-0.069 (0.079)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.068 (0.070)	1.894 (1.189)	0.195* (0.095)	0.569 (0.385)	-0.198* (0.99)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.002 (0.093)
Northern Africa	0.783 (0.405)	0.053 (0.085)	0.474 (0.254)	-0.114 (0.078)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.061 (0.065)	0.710 (0.518)	-0.120 (0.079)	1.864 (0.927)	0.174* (0.087)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.054 (0.069)
Iran	2.630 (2.196)	-0.035 (0.110)	4.017 (3.434)	0.130 (0.110)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.095 (0.056)	6.078 (8.465)	0.154 (0.186)	3.578 (4.875)	0.003 (0.192)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.157 (0.087)
South Asia	1.068 (0.609)	0.020 (0.086)	0.964 (0.545)	-0.018 (0.081)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.002 (0.062)	3.145 (2.387)	0.044 (0.101)	3.170 (1.961)	0.091 (0.101)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.135* (0.059)
Middle East	0.861 (0.491)	0.030 (0.088)	0.655 (0.377)	-0.065 (0.081)	<i>Ref.</i>	0.034 (0.070)	0.859 (0.669)	-0.043 (0.101)	1.168 (0.703)	0.053 (0.109)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.009 (0.092)
Other	1.898 (1.244)	0.050 (0.094)	1.732 (1.175)	0.009 (0.093)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.059 (0.058)	2.446 (2.109)	0.131 (0.130)	1.343 (1.216)	-0.057 (0.147)	<i>Ref.</i>	-0.074 (0.100)
N	505						290					
Pseudo R ²	0.10						0.12					

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Note: In the multinomial logistical regression analyses, separation constitutes the reference category. Weighted Data.

Figure A1: Predictive Margins for the Effect of Religious Identification on Acculturation Preferences by Migration Background (with 95%CI)



Note: All predictive margins are statistically significant with $p < 0.001$.

Erklärungen

Erklärung über das selbstständige Anfertigen der Dissertationsschrift

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation und ihre Bestandteile selbstständig angefertigt habe, dabei keine anderen Hilfsmittel als die im Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis genannten benutzt, sowie alle aus Quellen und Literatur wörtlich oder sinngemäß entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht und korrekt angegeben habe.

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Bei der vorliegenden Dissertation handelt es sich um eine kumulative Dissertation. Zwei der drei Artikel sind bereits veröffentlicht, der dritte Artikel wurde im Rahmen des Begutachtungsverfahrens von einer internationalen, SSCI gelisteten Zeitschrift an Reviewer gesendet.

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