Urban Society, Nomadic Rule and Islamic Iran
Tabriz from the late sixth/twelfth through the early tenth/sixteenth centuries

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## Contents

Preface, Acknowledgements and Note on Transliteration 5

1 Introduction 7

1.1 Research Questions and Thesis 7

1.2 Structure of the Framework Paper 8

2 Previous Research and Novel Perspectives 11

2.1 Islamic Iran and Nomadic Rule: Arabs, Turks, Mongols 12

2.2 Nomadic Rule and Urban Society: Mobility, Government, Local Elites 19

2.3 Urban Society and Islamic Iran: City, Kingship, Religion 25

2.4 Late Medieval Tabriz: Sources, Approaches, Issues 33

3 A Special Significance in the Making 49

3.1 Iran as Royal Realm: Name, Territory, Succession of Dynasties 50

3.2 Azerbaijan as Central Region: Camps, Courts, Kingly Monuments 61

3.3 Tabriz as Special Site: Social Space, Political Actors, Local Awareness 68

4 Conclusion: Royal City of Islamic Iran 81

5 Bibliography 85

6 Articles 95


6.2 “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession: Tabriz prior to, under and following Mongol rule (Sixth/Twelfth to Ninth/Fifteenth Centuries”, *Eurasian Studies* 16/1-2 (2018), pp. 352-94 (DOI 10.1163/24685623-12340057) 110

When I began working on this research project long ago, my intention was certainly to produce a dissertation thesis to be published as a monograph study. Nonetheless, I am happy to submit this cumulative dissertation consisting of substantial elements of that intended monograph study which have been published in the form of articles and of a framework paper. As required, the framework paper situates these articles within a broader research context and demonstrates their interrelatedness with regards to the subject of the dissertation. Furthermore, it discusses some new or previously neglected evidence on a few questions of detail. More than that, however, it attempts to outline promising traits of a theoretical-methodological framework for the study of late medieval Iranian history with a focus on royal tradition and the local elites of a specific city.

There are many people not only among my family and friends to whom I owe immense gratitude on the completion of this research project even if the result may not fully meet their expectations. First, I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Christoph Werner and Prof. Dr. Jürgen Paul who have accompanied this research for a long time and have continued to do so even after I turned away from working in academia. Then, I would thank the many brilliant colleagues whom I met during the years that I earned a modest living through my academic work, not least in projects directed by Prof. Paul and Prof. Werner. The Collaborative Research Center Difference and Integration (SFB 586) at the universities of Halle and Leipzig deserves a special mention, especially the project Nomadic Rule in a Sedentary Context. So does the ERC project Mobility, Empire and Cross Cultural Contacts in Mongol Eurasia directed by Prof. Michal Biran at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Not to be left unmentioned, of course, is the German-French DFG-ANR funded project Dynamics of Transmission: Families, Authority and Knowledge in the Early Modern Middle East which I was able to join through a previous affiliation with Marburg University. In addition to the colleagues with whom I collaborated in the framework of these projects, there are numerous other scholars to whom I am grateful for their support. I had the opportunity to meet a few at conferences or workshops, but to several others I merely sent emails often asking questions of considerable detail and most were so kind to answer even without ever having met in person. Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Lorenz Korn and Prof. Dr. Klaus van Eickels for their willingness to join my disputation committee as examiner and chair, respectively.

For the transliteration of Arabic and Persian words, the framework paper adopts a simplified and slightly modified variant of the scheme proposed by the International Journal of Middle
East Studies (IJMES). This means that basically all words are transliterated as if they were Arabic except for the letter “ج” in Persian words where “ו” is used instead of “و”. This also applies to Arabic titles of Persian books. Dynastic names and regnal titles, such as Sultan, are generally given in a regular spelling without transliteration diacritics. Well-known toponyms are dealt with accordingly and only some lesser-known place names are transliterated according to the simplified and slightly modified IJMES-scheme just outlined.
1 Introduction

The subject of the present dissertation is the history of Tabriz from the late sixth/twelfth to the early tenth/sixteenth century. This means, first and foremost, the history of the city and its inhabitants with a special focus on the local elites of Tabriz. However, investigating the history of Tabriz during the era under study is also very much about the significance which the city acquired in and for Iranian royal tradition from ancient through modern times. The aims of the present dissertation are to clarify that significance and to specify what role the local elites of Tabriz played in the process of its emergence and perpetuation. It is these two aims that the articles of the cumulative dissertation have been pursuing.

1.1 Research Questions and Thesis

Both aims can be translated into several research questions and into a two-fold main thesis. The first part of this thesis is that following the Mongol conquests in the seventh/thirteenth century, Tabriz came to stand for the idea of a territorial-political entity named Iran and conceived as an Islamic kingdom. The second part is that the local elites of Tabriz actively participated in the process of emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of their city.

As will be shown, the local elites played important roles, most notably helping enable a specific sequence of dynastic succession and connect it to that process. By the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century, the special significance of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran was firmly established. However, while the Mongol conquests mark the beginning of the process under study, the focus of the dissertation on the local elites of Tabriz requires the inclusion of the decades preceding these events in the analysis. This is the reason why the late sixth/twelfth century marks the starting point of the era under consideration.

Research questions into which the aims of the dissertation can be translated, pertain to various areas of historical inquiry. On a macro-level of analysis, this includes weighing consequences of the Mongol invasions and Mongol rule which lasted until the middle of eighth/fourteenth century, for the subsequent history of Iran. Another area is the relation between kingship and religion through the ages. On a micro-level, relevant areas of historical inquiry include assessing the extent of political agency of Iranian Muslim and mostly civilian populations as opposed to that of Turkish, Mongol and Turko-Mongol rulers and their predominantly military
entourage. Identifying axes of social change within a major urban center throughout several centuries of nomadic and temporary non-Muslim domination is another micro-level area.

As for the macro-level of analysis, examples of specific research questions which the dissertation asks are: In what respects did the Mongol invasions and rule contribute to reconfigurations in Iranian royal tradition as an element of political culture? Could these contributions perhaps outweigh death and destruction that are often seen as primary consequences of the conquests of Chinggis Khan (d. 624/1227) and his descendants? What long-term effects have relevant reconfigurations had, especially with regards to the relative importance of religion, first and foremost Islam, for the Iranian tradition of kingship and political culture more broadly?

Examples of specific research questions on the micro-level are: Who were the local elites of Tabriz and which resources did they have at their disposal in political interaction with rulers and dynasties succeeding each other in control of the city between the late sixth/twelfth and the early tenth/sixteenth century? How did the composition of the local elites of Tabriz as a social group change during the era under study? What were likely causes driving such change and in what ways did it possibly affect the political priorities of the local elites as their city acquired and preserved its special significance in and for Iranian royal tradition?

1.2 Structure of the Framework Paper

Chapter 2 of the framework paper will review previous research on issues related to questions and the main thesis of the dissertation as stated above. It concentrates on the macro-level of analysis, outlining where novel perspectives taken in the dissertation may lead to new insights into the history of Tabriz in late medieval times and its importance for Iranian royal tradition. The review and the outline explore three key concepts – Islamic Iran, nomadic rule and urban society – in their interrelatedness, thereby addressing questions of periodization and of conceptualizations of continuity and change in Iranian history. The chapter closes with a presentation of relevant sources, an overview of theoretical and methodological approaches and an introduction to specific issues related to the history of late medieval Tabriz.

Chapter 3 turns to the micro-level of analysis, tracing the process of making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran from three different angles. The first angle is the revival and reformulation of the idea of Iran as a royal realm bearing that name and extending over a relatively distinct territory. This revival and reformulation proceeded
primarily under and with reference to the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty. The dynasty emerged while Chinggis Khan’s grandson Hülegü (r. 654/1256-663/1265) campaigned in the Middle East, sacking Baghdad in 656/1258 and effectively eliminating the Abbasid caliphate. A core aspect of the relevant idea is that highly diverse kings and dynasties have succeeded each other in control of the territorially distinct royal realm named Iran since the beginning of history.

The regional setting of Azerbaijan and adjacent areas in Anatolia and the Caucasus forms the second angle from which the chapter traces the process under study. Under the conditions of nomadic rule as they prevailed in much of the Iranian lands and neighboring regions since the fifth/eleventh century, Azerbaijan was politically central. Especially from the late sixth/twelfth century onward, successive kings and dynasties based their mobile courts in that extended region and several left physical marks of their royal presence in Tabriz which could also bear tremendous symbolic significance.

The most important of these royal monuments is the pious endowment (vaqf) complex of Hülegü’s great-grandson Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 694/1295-703/1304). This ruler adopted Islam just prior to mounting the throne and secured the eventual conversion of the Mongol dynasty in Iran. His vaqf-complex was located right outside Tabriz and included Ghaza’s mausoleum, in addition to various religious, educational and charitable structures. In tracing the process of making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran, the city itself is the third angle on the micro-level of analysis.

Tabriz as a city means an urban agglomeration with its rural hinterland where relatively discreet segments of social space intersected. The primary distinction is that between a courtly and a local setting, the latter implying either a more pronounced urban or rural background. Yet, representatives of the local elites of Tabriz did, of course, interact with the royal dynasties succeeding each other in control of the city. They fulfilled political functions at their courts, served as artists there but sometimes also actively opposed a specific ruler or ruling house. Moreover, while the local elites contributed to making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran, some among them also began to cultivate the awareness that their city had indeed acquired such a special significance.

Chapter 4 is the conclusion of the framework paper and brings the macro- and micro-levels of analysis back together. It will summarize how Tabriz developed into the royal city of Islamic Iran between the late sixth/twelfth and the early tenth/sixteenth centuries with the focus on roles

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1 The concept of ‘urban agglomeration’ for the study of medieval Iranian cities has been introduced by Jean Aubin whose classic article was recently published in an English translation and contextualized by Jürgen Paul, see “Jean Aubin’s Article “Elements for the Study of Urban Agglomerations in Medieval Iran” in Context”, Eurasian Studies 16 (2018), pp. 21-38.
played by the local elites in that process. This summary also features suggestions for answers to the specific research questions outlined above and wraps up how the individual articles of the cumulative dissertation – as interrelated contributions – have helped formulating them. All in all, the framework paper is mainly intended as an attempt to delineate a broader theoretical, methodological and conceptual framework for the concrete details discussed in the submitted dissertation articles.
2 Previous Research and Novel Perspectives

This chapter reviews previous research on issues related to the subject of the dissertation and outlines novel perspectives for tackling relevant questions. Among the studies that have inspired it, articles by Dorothea Krawulsky and Bert Fragner deserve special mention. Based on the observation that the term “Īrān” resurged as a territorial-political designation for the dominions of the Mongol Ilkhans, Fragner has developed an argument a key aspect of which is that Tabriz acquired a special significance. One of the principal objectives of the dissertation is to refine Fragner’s argument with regards to the emergence, perpetuation and precise nature of that significance as well as a few other points.

The chapter concentrates on the macro-level of analysis and proceeds along combinations of two of the three key concepts of the study as mentioned in the title. These concepts and the combinations in which they are arranged will be discussed with regards to the aims of the dissertation: clarifying the special significance which Tabriz acquired and preserved between the late sixth/twelfth and the early tenth/sixteenth centuries and specifying what roles the local elites played in the process of emergence and perpetuation of that special significance.

The first combination is that of Islamic Iran and nomadic rule. The respective section raises questions of periodization while discussing the dominant narrative of national Iranian history, focusing on differences in views of the Arabs, the Turks and the Mongols as foreign conquerors. The second section combines the key concepts of nomadic rule and urban society. It reviews scholarship on the modalities of political domination by Turkic, Mongol and Turko-Mongol groups with a mobile pastoralist background and a focus on their ties to cities and urban populations. Special attention is devoted to practical aspects of the organization of government at and through camp-based mobile royal courts and to ways in which local leaders of major urban centers were related to broader networks of political power and social prestige.

Reviewing previous research on nomadic rule and urban society also serves as a gateway to introducing basic contours of the theoretical-methodological framework of the dissertation. Its fundamental element is a consistent analytical focus on Tabriz and its local elites which ultimately frames the novel perspectives taken in this inquiry. Another cornerstone of that

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framework is a specific understanding of ‘political culture’ as an analytical tool to investigate continuity and change in the phenomenon of political culture which I have already briefly outlined in an article not included in the cumulative dissertation.\(^3\)

The third combination of key concepts is that of urban society and Islamic Iran. The respective section continues with a more thorough-going introduction of the theoretical-methodological framework of the study. Following the focus on practical aspects of political culture in the previous section, this one brings ideological aspects into the discussion, most notably kingship, religion and cities as special symbolic sites in the traditions of both. Thus, it includes a review of scholarship on matters of royal dignity and sovereignty in the medieval history of predominantly Muslim societies and on religion in Iran from the period just preceding the Mongol invasions to the early tenth/sixteenth century.

The fourth and final section of this chapter presents the most important sources for the late medieval history of Tabriz and summarizes issues arising in studying it as well as approaches to tackle these issues. With ‘political culture’ introduced as the basic theoretical-methodological tool to explore intersecting dynamics of continuity and change in the phenomenon of political culture, this section brings practical and ideological aspects together. In doing so, it also outlines how terminological analysis of honorary designations serves as the concrete methodological approach to clarify the special significance which Tabriz acquired and preserved and to specify which roles the local elites played in the process of its emergence and perpetuation.

2.1 Islamic Iran and Nomadic Rule: Arabs, Turks, Mongols

According to the grand narrative of national Iranian history, the country faced recurring waves of conquest and domination by foreign invaders, but each time succeeded in reasserting its essentially Persian identity. Notable foreign invaders included the ancient Greeks, the Muslim Arabs and, of course, the Mongols. The image of Iran underlying its grand national history narrative is that of “[…] an eternal, homogenous cultural entity shaped by the Persian language and its literature, as well as a certain understanding of just, central rule.”\(^4\) Anja Pistor-Hatam found that this is the image shown by numerous contemporary authors in Iran who participated in a conference on the Mongols the proceedings of which were published about 20 years ago.


In her analysis of these proceedings, Pistor-Hatam generally asks, “[…] what is the significance of the Mongol invasions concerning a modern Iranian identity and self-awareness?”

Specifically, she aims at looking “[…] into the way Iranian authors relate to the Mongol invasion and their rule, the way they construct meaning and fictions of coherence to incorporate the Mongol legacy into the Iranian past and present.”

Pistor-Hatam suggests convincingly that the Mongol invasions are significant with regards to modern Iranian identity and self-awareness because they ultimately validate the meaning of the national history of the country. Moreover, the Mongol invasions and the way they came to be remembered helped forge the myth which lies at the very heart of the grand narrative of national Iranian history. Pistor-Hatam points out that this myth, understood as a consolidated and internalized past which expresses itself in the form of a narrative and must be repeated and remembered constantly, claims “[…] that ‘Iran’ cannot be destroyed, but will always rise from the ashes […].”

Furthermore, she rightly sees this historical narrative and its underlying assumptions as signs that “[…] Iranian nationalism as the Pahlavi shahs fortified it seems to be still powerful in the Islamic Republic.”

In her recent anthropological study focused on state film production, Narges Bajoghli suggests that Iranian nationalism may have grown even more powerful as the Islamic Republic matured.

Pistor-Hatam also draws attention to another assumption underlying the grand national history narrative, in addition to the image of Iran as an eternal, homogenous cultural entity shaped by the Persian language and its literature. It is connected to the understanding of just, central rule in that the authors of the conference proceedings she analyzed, also view Iran as an ancient urban civilization whereas the Mongols appear as barbaric, bloodthirsty and ignorant nomads.

In this connection, Pistor-Hatam further notes similarities between the descriptions of the Mongol and the Arab invasions: “Iran, as it is collectively imagined in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, is understood as a homogenous entity in opposition to non-Persian nomadic invaders, whether Muslims or ‘unbelievers’.” She remarks that between the Arabs and the Mongols, some authors separately mention the Seljuk Turks as foreign invaders but stresses that the large contingents of nomadic populations living in Iran at least since their arrival in the fifth/eleventh century are generally ignored.

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5 Ibid., p. 149.
6 Ibid., p. 150.
7 Ibid., p. 157.
8 Ibid., p. 148.
11 Ibid., p. 157.
12 Ibid., p. 156.
The grand national history narrative and its underlying assumptions about Iran’s essentially Persian culture and urban civilizational foundation do not only inform the views of scholars in the country such as those analyzed by Pistor-Hatam. They have also remained highly influential in historical research on Iran produced in the west. Four relatively recent overviews of Iranian history from ancient through modern times, by Gene Garthwaite, Michael Axworthy, Homa Katouzian and Peter Avery may exemplify that. All authors do state that Iran has always been ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse internally and exposed to various external influences throughout the ages. Nonetheless, they also follow the narrative scheme of the nation preserving its essentially Persian identity despite waves of foreign conquest and rule.

However, while the conference proceedings analyzed by Pistor-Hatam may describe the Arab and the Mongol invasion in broadly similar terms, the four overview studies of Iranian history appear to emphasize differences between the two conquests and their consequences. In turn, the status and role of the Turks as foreign invaders seem to be somewhat awkward and certainly less clear than those of the Arabs and the Mongols in all these works. As the four overview studies show, the different assessment of the Arab and the Mongol invasion as well as the question whether and how to include the Turks in the succession of foreign conquerors and rulers affect the periodization of Iranian history. Garthwaite and Axworthy discuss the era from the invasion of the Muslim Arabs in the first/seventh to the establishment of the Shiite Safavid dynasty in the early tenth/sixteenth century in a single chapter. Katouzian covers that era in two separate chapters suggesting two distinct periods. Avery adopts a more subtle and altogether a bit different structure for his narrative than the other three authors.

The chapter headings under which Garthwaite and Axworthy deal with the history of Islamic Iran throughout nearly its entire first millennium feature an enumeration of Arabs, Turks and Mongols as foreign invaders and rulers. Katouzian chose Turks and Mongols as heading for his chapter on the final period of that era and Arabs, Islam and Persians as heading for the one on the initial period. Consistent with the narrative structure of a single era of foreign domination from the advent of Islam to the beginning transformation of Iran into a Shiite country through royal initiative, Garthwaite remarks that it was under the Safavids “[…] when earlier elements of Iranian rulership and political culture re-emerged […] in the hands of a Persian dynasty.”

Although Katouzian splits the era in two periods, he also views the early tenth/sixteenth century as a return to a state of affairs resembling pre-Islamic times. Under the heading Persian Empire

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Again, his chapter after the one on Turks and Mongols as foreign rulers of Iran opens saying, “[t]he ancient Persian Empire was restored by the Safavids as a Shia Muslim state.”

Thus, while Garthwaite’s structure posits a single era of foreign domination by Arabs, Turks and Mongols and Katouzian’s narrative splits that era in two separate periods, both authors make a similar point here. It seems that in their eyes, the coming to power of the Safavids as a Shiite dynasty brought back a level of political and religious distinction which Iran had lost when the Arab Muslim invaders destroyed the kingdom of the Zoroastrian Sassanians. At the beginning of the chapter on the Safavids, Katouzian may well admit that they spoke Turkish at their courts. But its above-cited heading and opening sentence suggest that he ultimately sees their coming to power very much in the same way as Garthwaite.

A passage in the introduction to Katouzian’s study which lays out an analytic framework for the historical narrative, further strengthens that impression. He presents Shiite Islam as the third of three factors which “[…] bound the peoples [of Iran] together and determined their shared identity of Iranian-ness […]”, especially since medieval times. Moreover, Katouzian adds that it “[…] is unique to Iran as a state, is followed by the great majority of Iranians and has aspects and implications that are deeply ingrained in Iranian culture since pre-Islamic times.”

As is well known, Shiite Islam only began to turn into a feature distinguishing Iran politically and into the religious creed of most Iranians thanks to Safavid royal initiative in the tenth/sixteenth century. Hence, the claim that it was a factor binding the peoples of the country together and determining their alleged shared identity since medieval times appears extremely far-fetched. But Katouzian’s argument that the Safavids somehow restored the ancient Persian Empire by imposing Shiism as official religion of Iran also points to an important criterion for periodization in the country’s grand national history narrative: the existence or lack of a distinct religious identity upheld by royal power.

In general, the Arabs figure much more as Muslim rather than nomadic invaders and their conquest is mainly seen as having drawn Iran into Islamic civilization. Moreover, the grand national history narrative emphasizes that medieval Islamic civilization then drew heavily on Iran’s essentially Persian culture. The Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad who are sometimes referred to as “Muslim Sassanians” usually serve as prime examples for that. Katouzian does not use that phrase in his above-mentioned chapter on Arabs, Islam and Persians. But he heads in a similar direction, stressing the Persian connection of the Abbasids and speaking of “Persianism”

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15 Katouzian: The Persians, p. 112.
16 Ibid., p. 13.
17 Nasr, Taghi: The Eternity of Iran. From the Viewpoint of Western Orientalists, Ministry of Culture and Arts, Tehran 1974, p. 225. This expanded English version of a study previously published in Persian accompanied the infamous celebrations of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy in Persepolis and is a good example of how western scholars had contributed to formulating the grand national history narrative.
to describe what underlay and drove their political, religious and cultural impact.\textsuperscript{18} Although the structure of Katouzian’s study obviously sets the Turkish conquest in the fifth/eleventh century as the beginning of a new period, the author also states that, “[t]he Turkish invasion of the Seljuks [had] comparatively little effect on the civilian population; the Seljuks’ religious culture was already the same as the Iranians’.”\textsuperscript{19} And although the structure of his study situates the Mongol invasions under Chinggis Khan and Hülegü in the same period as Turkish domination, Katouzian rather seems to consider them as a serious historical rupture. Moreover, he reproduces the classic view of the grand national history narrative on these events in an unambiguous manner:

“There were Mongol incursions into Persian lands both between these invasions and after them. But the greatest disaster that befell Iran, greater by far than any other single event in Iranian history, was those two major invasions, and especially the first, which had no other motive than death, destruction and plunder.”\textsuperscript{20}

Katouzian’s choice of the phrase ‘Persian lands’ may seem surprising given that he introduces 	extit{territoriality} as the first factor supposedly binding the peoples of Iran together since medieval times and determining their alleged shared identity. However, he also makes clear that he is not concerned with the history of Iran as a territorial-political entity and that he sees the country in medieval times primarily as a cultural region.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, the Persian language which Katouzian proposes as the second of these factors, only knows the term ‘Īrān’ as historical and contemporary name to designate the entire country; specialists merely disagree as to how ancient it is.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, he puts it on par with the Greek-derived designation ‘Persia’ and, like Axworthy, explains that these are just to different names.\textsuperscript{23} Garthwaite likewise uses both but at least points out that, “Iran was the term commonly used in Iran and by Iranians except from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries.”\textsuperscript{24} However, he does also not make a connection between the resurgence of the name and Mongol rule at precisely that time.

The view that the Mongol invasions were especially disastrous which is so central to the grand narrative of national Iranian history and which Katouzian expresses so clearly, has been increasingly challenged by specialists over the past years. Scholars, such as Thomas Allsen, George Lane and Michal Biran do, of course, not deny that the conquests also brought death

\textsuperscript{18} Katouzian: \textit{The Persians}, pp. 74-6.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 100.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{24} Garthwaite: \textit{The Persians}, p. 1.
and destruction. However, they have shown that Islamic civilization and Persian culture continued to flourish despite temporary non-Muslim rule over Iran and the extinction of the Abbasid caliphate, stressing that the Mongols actively promoted cultural production and complex processes of exchange across their vast empire. Katouzian’s view on the invasion of the Seljuk Turks and the reasoning behind it have also long dominated scholarship on Iranian history. Although his structure suggests that this invasion marked the beginning of a new period which lasted through the time of Mongol rule until the coming to power of the Safavids, he does not seem to see it as a historical disruption of any sort. That only some of the authors analyzed by Pistor-Hatam appear to include the Seljuks among the foreign conquerors of Iran at all, may indicate how this view likewise informs the grand national history narrative. It has been formulated most forcefully by Ann Lambton in her classic study on *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* which basically compares the Seljuk with the Mongol invasion. Lambton argues that, “[w]hereas the Saljuqs were heirs to the civilization of the lands of the Eastern Caliphate and continued and adapted the political institutions of the past, Mongol domination involved a break with the past: the nomads were the state and political rule was in the hands of their leaders who formed a kind of military aristocracy.” According to her, the fact that the Seljuks were Sunni Muslims somehow ensured that they also were familiar with urban life from early on, that they had settled capitals and soon distanced themselves from their Turkmen nomadic followers after becoming lords of a vast empire. Lambton is certainly right to emphasize that by extinguishing the Abbasid caliphate, the Mongols initiated significant change with tremendous religious and political implications. This is indeed highly relevant with regards to the subject of the dissertation. As will be discussed in the next chapter in connection with Fragner’s argument, the demise of the Abbasids was a precondition for the revival and reformulation of the idea of a distinct territorial-political entity named Iran. However, it is probably much less justified to assume historical continuity to the extent that Lambton does in her assessment of the Seljuk invasion just because the conquerors were Muslims and left the Abbasid caliphate intact. The reasoning behind this assessment seems to be that adherence to Islam somehow neutralized the nomadism of the Seljuks as a factor of historical relevance. Given the importance of religion, most notably the religious orientation of

27 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
28 Ibid., p. 15.
ruling dynasties in the grand narrative of national Iranian history, the Turkish invaders sometimes even hardly appear as foreign. This contrasts sharply with the Mongols. In their case, being nomads and non-Muslims obviously reinforce each other as markers of foreignness in the framework of that narrative.

Be that as it may, the view that the invasion of the Seljuk Turks was overall a matter of smooth historical continuity due to their adherence to Sunni Islam has also been increasingly challenged in recent years. Scholars such as David Durand-Guédy, Anrdrew Peacock and Jürgen Paul have shown that the Seljuks retained much of their nomadic heritage as lords of Iran and other lands of the Middle East. For instance, they generally stayed outside of cities and members of the ruling dynasty did also not simply distance themselves from the Turkmen but, instead, addressed the concerns of their nomadic followers and often sought their support, especially as military manpower. Hence, the Seljuk invasion in the fifth/eleventh century did indeed mark a major historical break or change: Islamic Iran fell under nomadic rule which persisted through the time of Mongol, temporary non-Muslim domination, until the early tenth/sixteenth century when the Safavids consolidated their power as a Shiite dynasty.

Said Amir Arjomand, for his part, does not only acknowledge that the Seljuk invasion brought such change but also conceives a historical period extending up to early Safavid rule. Yet, he seems to see nomadic domination over Iran in a way that is not uncommon in the framework of the grand national history narrative. Arjomand stresses a supposed lack of fit between what appears as inherently settled or urban ideals of kingship – thus, the certain understanding of just, central rule mentioned by Pistor-Hatam – and the nomadic practice of itinerant government during that era. With regards to Islamic history, this era largely coincides with what Marshall Hodgson called the Early Middle Period and the Later Middle Period. This periodization – with the Mongol invasions marking the split between the two sub-periods – is well established in the study of the medieval Middle East and also reflected in some of the research presented so far. Furthermore, numerous scholars have adopted Hodgson’s terminology, but his view of Islamic history has also been criticized, notably from an Iranian history perspective. Shahzad


Bashir’s criticism of Hodgson and a couple of other scholars is especially relevant for the purposes of this dissertation and will be discussed in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{32} At this point, it may suffice to note two things. First, this dissertation refrains from using Hodgson’s terminology because it rather misses its intended goal of providing an alternative independent from western historical concepts and because there seems to be little gain in replacing the \textit{Middle Ages} with the \textit{Middle Period}. The terms \textit{medieval} and \textit{late medieval} will be employed in this study partly for convenience and partly due to the lack of better options but generally in line with standard usage in the historiography of Latin Europe. Second, while the era under study largely corresponds to the European \textit{Late Middle Ages} or the \textit{Later Middle Period} as defined by Hodgson, it spans over and cuts across generally established periods of Islamic and Iranian history. This is due to the consistent analytical focus on Tabriz and its local elites as a novel perspective to trace the emergence and perpetuation of a specific notion of Islamic Iran with the conditions of nomadic rule as a crucial factor in the process.

2.2 Nomadic Rule and Urban Society: Mobility, Government, Local Elites

As noted in the previous section, the main characteristics of nomadic rule were the mobility of the dominant political elites and the fact that they generally stayed outside of cities. In the case of the Mongols and some of their successors in the eighth/fortteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries, this has long been acknowledged and studied but with regards to the Seljuks, the issue has received greater scholarly attention only recently.\textsuperscript{33} Anyway, rulers and their courts would usually migrate between summer and winter pastures and camp in extra-urban garden areas when visiting cities. However, it is also important to keep in mind that such migrations may not always correspond exactly to the seasons and that rulers were mobile for a variety of reasons. Military campaigns within and beyond their dominions were among the principal motives for rulers to move around while individual journeys mostly combined several purposes.

In any case, the center of political decision making was in general not a fixed palace built in a specific place but the mobile royal encampment. Furthermore, political power was organized

\textsuperscript{32} Bashir, Shahzad: “On Islamic Time: Rethinking Chronology in the Historiography of Muslim Societies”, \textit{History and Theory} 53 (2014), pp. 519-44.

and exercised in a decentralized manner. In the Turko-Mongol context, princes of the ruling dynasty were usually appointed to govern specific parts of the royal realm as appanages but also required to appear at court when summoned by the ruler, especially for military campaigns which they had to support by providing warriors, horses and other relevant resources. Refusing or failing to do so, would be considered an act of rebellion. However, the decentralized mode of government could also help members of royal families and their supporters get hold of the means to challenge the ruler. Another important point is that in principle, all male descendants of a dynastic founder were entitled to head the polity. This partly explains why the succession to a deceased ruler was often disputed and accompanied by violent internal conflict.

These issues have been comparatively well studied in general and more specialized scholarship from a dynastic history perspective. Some of the relevant research also addresses the roles which representatives of the Iranian elites played in government, especially as administrative personnel at imperial or central courts. In this connection, it is important to note that as far as practical politics is concerned, alliances and factions did generally not form along ethno-linguistic or religious lines even under temporary non-Muslim Mongol rule. However, there was, of course, a difference between the period when the Abbasid court was still there with the caliph enjoying a special status and the time since the emergence of the Ilkhanate.

As just noted, some researchers have addressed Iranian elites at imperial or central courts of nomadic Turko-Mongol rulers in their work. The local backgrounds of those persons, including some from Tabriz, are occasionally mentioned but they are rarely analyzed as local elites in dynastic history research. Besides, the concrete benefits of such research for the dissertation vary greatly because not all these dynasties were ultimately relevant for the history of Tabriz. Few scholarly works take a closer look at local elites and their involvement in the structures and mechanisms of government. Jürgen Paul has analyzed numerous aspects of urban history under the conditions of nomadic rule as they characterized the medieval Iranian lands. It is to the notables of Herat in the ninth/fifteenth century when this city served as the principal urban


center of the Timurids that Paul has also devoted special attention. His findings make clear that the urban notables played active roles in decision-making regarding surrender to royal claimants as well as in military engagements if the city offered resistance.36

Moreover, Paul has included the notables of various cities in an analysis of how different social groups across the Iranian lands reacted to the first Mongol invasion at the time of Chinggis Khan. He stresses that religious scruples had little bearing on the motivations of the notables who generally tended to seek accommodation with the conquerors and often proved unable to organize a unified defense of their cities if the populace pushed for resistance. All in all, Paul has shown that reactions varied greatly depending on local political conditions, that it is the balance of power in a certain place or area which determined, to a large extent, which social group was primarily concerned or concerned itself with responding to the threat. Insofar the first Mongol invasion represents indeed a historical moment that reveals much about Iranian society which Paul concludes was characterized, above all, by fragmentation, be it on the level of larger political entities or on the level of individual cities.37

In a recent monograph study of relations between different kinds of local elites and Seljuk imperial rule in the sixth/twelfth century, Paul does not include urban notables.38 Yet, this study deserves closer attention and I will return to some of Paul’s insights and suggestions below, especially with regards to the question if the local elites of Tabriz may be seen as representatives of an aristocratic class. There is hardly a handful of monograph studies on individual regions or cities with a strong analytical focus on the local elites. Two exist for Isfahan, one covering the time between the Seljuk conquest in the fifth/eleventh century and the initial Mongol invasions in the early seventh/thirteenth and the other the period of rule by the Timurids as well as the Turkmen Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu confederations in the ninth/fifteenth and by the Safavids in the tenth/sixteenth century.39 A third monograph study is devoted to Fars with its urban center Shiraz from the establishment of Mongol rule in the seventh/thirteenth up to the conflicts between emerging western Iranian post-Ilkhanid dynasties in the eighth/fourteenth century and a fourth one focuses on Herat during the difficult takeover of the city by the Safavids in the early tenth/sixteenth century.40 Like Paul’s research, these studies have shown that the notables actively participated in local and imperial level politics in various ways.

Durand-Guédy’s study of Isfahan is of special interest in the context of this dissertation because it covers the period when the city developed from a regional center into an imperial metropolis under the Seljuks. His findings suggest that the Seljuk court came to exert considerable dominance over the city and its local elites, for instance through the influx of bureaucrats and religious dignitaries from the western Iranian region of Khurasan. Durand-Guédy shows that by the time of the Mongol invasions, leading representatives of the local elites of Isfahan would be individuals whose ancestors had settled in the city as associates of prominent Seljuk courtiers slightly less than two centuries earlier. Since Tabriz turned from a regional center into an imperial metropolis during the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran, the question arises whether similar developments can be observed there.

Other than some of the articles published by the candidate, including those submitted for the cumulative dissertation, virtually no systematic research on the local elites of Tabriz has been done so far. In addition to general studies from a dynastic history perspective, some works on more specific issues also include a few references to individual notables or leading families of Tabriz and their relations to structures of government. The monographs by Birgitt Hoffmann on the vaqf of the famous Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318) and by Monika Gronke on the early history of the Safavids as an emerging Sufi community in the early eighth/fourteenth century are two cases in point.

Judith Pfeiffer recently edited a collective volume entitled Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz which unfortunately largely leaves the local elites out of the picture. In her introduction, Pfeiffer explicitly challenges Fragner’s argument that Tabriz acquired a special significance under Mongol rule, but this disagreement may be due to the different frame of reference to which she relates that significance. As explained above, this dissertation builds on Fragner’s argument and attempts to refine it. I will return to Pfeiffer’s challenge in the next section. Suffice it to note at this point that the issues she has raised in her challenge to Fragner’s argument do not seem entirely convincing and may ultimately even prove beneficial to the attempted refinement.

Two contributions to the collective volume edited by Pfeiffer deal with royal monuments of Tabriz. One of them is focused on buildings from the ninth/fifteenth century and the other one

admits a more long-term perspective whereas the volume in general strongly concentrates on the period of Ilkhanid rule in the second half of the seventh/thirteenth and the first half of the eight/fourteenth century. As noted above, royal monuments built in and around Tabriz are of utmost importance for the purposes of this dissertation. Although most of these buildings are only poorly preserved or have vanished completely, several scholars have studied them from various angles. Haneda Masashi has analyzed two of the relevant monuments, including the vaqf-complex of Ilkhan Ghazan, as well as another site used by the Mongol rulers of Iran. He argues that they are examples of a new form of urbanism introduced by the nomadic conquerors from the Inner Asian steppes. Haneda’s argument will also be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

What is important to note here is that cities and their local elites were important for a variety of reasons in the context of nomadic rule although the royal court was highly mobile and generally stayed outside of urban settings. Not only were monuments often built in the environs of cities where rulers and their entourage camped in extra-urban garden areas. As noted, the notables of major cities were also actively involved in local and imperial or central government structures. For the purposes of the dissertation, these matters are considered elements of practical-level political culture. The analytical distinction between a practical level of political culture (politische Handlungskultur) and an interpretative level of political culture (politische Deutungskultur) is borrowed from political scientist Karl Rohe. Although Rohe distinguishes the two levels analytically, he also stresses that it is their interrelatedness which eventually provides for both, continuity and change in the phenomenon of political culture.

On the practical level, political culture generally refers to culturally based attitudes and preferences that guide the actual political behaviour of the members of a given regime. This includes, for example, the forms of interaction between various power holders and institutions according to written and unwritten rules. In the context of this dissertation, the mobility of the Turko-Mongol ruling elites and their inclination to have royal monuments erected in the

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The environs of cities shall be understood as parts of such culturally based attitudes and preferences. The ways in which the local elites were integrated into structures and mechanisms of government would also belong to the practical level of political culture and will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter.

At this point, it is important to stress one point about the mobility of Turko-Mongol courts and the rulers’ inclination to have royal monuments built in the environs of cities. Understanding these matters as elements of practical-level political culture permits to analytically relate them to the dynamics of continuity and change in a political culture that was primarily defined by Iranian literate elites as far as the interpretative level is concerned. Hodgson has coined the term ‘Persianate’ to denote the extended Iranian plateau area as a cultural sphere within the lands of Islam that was shaped, first and foremost, by the Persian language and its literature.\(^49\) In this dissertation, the term will mainly be used to denote the specific political culture under inquiry. However, including culturally based attitudes and preferences of Turks and Mongols among the factors shaping the phenomenon of Persianate political culture, partly reverses Hodgson’s definition of the concept.

The main reason why this partial reversion seems necessary for the purposes of this dissertation is that Turks and Mongols as non-Persian nomads were not only on the receiving end when it comes to developments in late medieval Persianate political culture. Instead, the conditions and modalities of nomadic rule greatly contributed to the emergence and preservation of the special significance of Tabriz. Rulers and their courts frequently camped in the environs of the city during the era under study and numerous prestigious royal monuments were built there. These monuments may be understood as links between Tabriz as a physical place of practical importance and as a symbolic site endowed with a special significance.

Interpreting that significance with reference to the notion of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran was presumably rather driven by the Iranian elites. After all, they viewed outcomes of Turko-Mongol nomadic rule through the prism of their own literary tradition and integrated them into this tradition accordingly. Yet, as Thomas Allsen has shown, in the Turko-Mongol nomadic tradition, it was also not uncommon to associate notions of legitimacy and sovereignty with specific localities.\(^50\) The presence of living and dead rulers in such localities was certainly a critical factor for their endowment with a special significance in both traditions. However, all this belongs rather to the interpretative level of political culture which may also be called the ideological level and will be discussed in the next section.

\(^49\) Hodgson: *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 2, pp. 293-4.
2.3 Urban Society and Islamic Iran: City, Kingship, Religion

Some aspects of urban society during the era under study have already been addressed in connection with the practical level of Persianate political culture. This section will in fact deal not so much with cities as social spaces but rather with the significance they may have had in Iranian royal or Islamic religious tradition. One ideological feature of the Iranian tradition that may be worth noting is the strong link between cities and kingship. Thus, major feats attributed to legendary and historical kings of Iran in writings before and after the advent of Islam often included the founding of cities often coupled with the erection of monuments.\textsuperscript{51} A couple of places allegedly founded by ancient and legendary kings of Iran turned into longtime royal residences, into other kinds of special royal sites and in some cases they had enormous religious importance as well. One such place – known as Takht-i Sulaymān – was situated in Azerbaijan, gained tremendous significance for the Iranian tradition of kingship under the Sassanians, became practically insignificant with the advent of Islam and was only revived as a royal site under the Mongol Ilkhans.\textsuperscript{52} Besides, a strong direct link between religion and kingship was forged early on in Iranian royal tradition and eventually became a characteristic feature of ideological level Persianate political culture. Yet, as explained in connection with the grand national history narrative, the religious orientations of successive ruling dynasties should not be taken as the decisive criterion for historical periodization.

With regards to ‘Persianate’ as an attribute for political culture, it has been noted that the present study adopts an understanding of the concept that partly reverses Hodgson’s definition. This partial reversal shall render the concept sufficiently open to accommodate both, practices and ideals of the Turkish and Mongol ruling elites as critical factors shaping Persianate political culture. Accommodating their practices and ideals in that way will hopefully permit a more precise analysis of the interdependency of practical and ideological level political culture in the Iranian lands during the era under study. Ultimately, the partial reversion of Hodgson’s definition of the concept shall lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of continuity and change in late medieval Persianate political culture.

As much as the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz were based on developments in political practice, the major change this dissertation is concerned with occurred


on the ideological level of Persianate political culture: the city came to stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. The core of that process was an Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy for the creation and upholding of which practices and ideals of the Turko-Mongol ruling elites may be considered instrumental. However, these practices and ideals are in large part primarily accessible through the medium of Persian writings and as noted above, interpreting the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy in such a way that Tabriz would embody that specific idea was presumably rather driven by the Iranian literate elites. Consequently, ‘Persianate’ also acknowledges that the Persian language and its literary tradition played a predominant role in assigning that special significance to Tabriz and in solidifying it. They provided a historical and cultural framework in which interpretations of political practices and ideals of the Turko-Mongol nomadic elites and outcomes of their rule could be embedded and they served as the key medium for formulating relevant interpretations.

When it comes to ideological aspects of Persianate political culture, that framework appears to have had two principal cornerstones and taken shape along two main axes. Memories of the pre-Islamic Iranian past, especially models of efficient and just government exemplified by Persian kings, notably the Sassanians and legendary monarchs from historical lore, formed one of those cornerstones. Broadly speaking, models of efficient and just government can be said to include the founding of cities and the erection of monuments, especially religious buildings. The second cornerstone was of course Islam and the imperial polity that evolved in conjunction with the Arabic religious tradition based on the Quranic revelation. The history of the Muslim imperial polity, first and foremost as represented by the Abbasid caliphate, was also one of the two main axes along which that framework had taken shape. Leaving aside simplifications such as ‘Muslim Sassanians’, there may have been more than Hodgson’s observation of just a certain respect that the Persian literary tradition enjoyed in an Arabized form under the caliphs of Baghdad. Yet, its impact on political culture under the Abbasids was perhaps indeed rather indirect. Extensive research has been done on the ways in which pre-Islamic Iranian concepts and symbols had affected the development of the Muslim imperial polity. For the purposes of the present study, Aziz al-Azmeh’s study of Muslim Kingship with its focus on the Abbasid caliphate, is of particular interest.

Al-Azmeh offers an intriguing analysis of the ways in which Muslim authors received, adapted, reformulated and reconfigured discursive and enunciative elements pertaining to royal power,

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especially in its relation to the sacred. He stresses that these elements formed part of a common Middle Eastern patrimony and regarding the differences in status ascribed to Alexander the Great in places as diverse as Macedonia, Greece, Egypt and Iran, he adds that, “[…] norms of kingship and modalities and modules of culture are diffused, by superimposition, adaptation and renaming […]”.\(^{55}\)

He further notes that many Muslim authors generally considered the caliphate as a form of absolutist kingship in a rather technical sense, an institution deploying the tools of government to ensure the maintenance of social order and public life.\(^{56}\) Moreover, he rightly cautions not to care too much about the origins of specific elements of royal tradition. But in connection with the so called ‘circle of justice’, a concept that was common in pre-Islamic Iran and to which I will return, al-Azmeh also remarks that, “[t]he caliphate, moreover, was equivalent in many ways with the rational polities of the Persians, except that it derived most of its working principles from divine inspiration mediated by the Prophet.”\(^{57}\) But he also makes very clear that the religious dimension of the caliphate was a matter of enormous complexity.

“Writing on kingship was not religious writing, and the ceremonial of the caliphate and its imitation in sultanic courts was not religious, though it contained religious elements and languages. Neither king nor caliph was the object of a cult, nor were their palaces sacred enclosures according to the criteria and lineaments of sacredness as defined by the vast majority of Muslim divines, which required the radical transcendence of divinity and its immediate attributes.”\(^{58}\)

Yet, al-Azmeh also adds that all major strands of Islamic thought, “[…] have in common not only a shared stock of sublime epithets, metaphors, attributes of power, notions of divine ratifications and investment, but also idolatrous and sacralising practices and attitudes towards the person of the caliph.”\(^{59}\) Thus, the caliph enjoyed a special status even if there were other kings in the lands of Islam. However, things must have appeared way more difficult if there were rivals claiming to be caliphs, such as the Ismāʿīlī Shiites Fatimids in North Africa and Egypt in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. Al-Azmeh discusses this issue but also highlights “[…] the analogy continually drawn by Muslim authors of all persuasion, between the unicity of God and that of the king […].”\(^{60}\) He deals with rival caliphal dynasties explicitly only in brief and does likewise with a couple of dynasties based in the Iranian lands that


\(^{56}\) Ibid., pp. 100-7.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 130.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 156.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 121.
overpowered the Abbasids, first and foremost, the Imāmī Shiite Buyids in the fourth/tenth century and Sunni Seljuks after them.\textsuperscript{61}

The history of Sunni dynasties based in eastern Iran and Central Asia prior to the Seljuks was the second axis along which the framework of ideological level Persianate political culture had taken shape that would later accommodate the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. Most notable among these dynasties were the Samanids and the Ghaznavids who recognized Abbasid suzerainty without exerting control over the caliphs as the Buyids and the Seljuks did. What makes the history of those dynasties so important is that they actively promoted the emergence of a Muslim Persian literary tradition, especially in historiography and poetry. Julie Meisami and Andrew Peacock are among the scholars who have made extremely valuable contributions to the study of that process. Notably, their research pays close attention to the ways in which it affected notions of sovereignty and legitimacy and visions of history in the Iranian lands after the advent of Islam.\textsuperscript{62}

Both cornerstones and axes of the historical and cultural framework into which the polity of the Mongol Ilkhans would be interpretatively embedded, are essential for the purposes of the present study. This will become clearer in the next chapter, but two points may be worth making here and now to illustrate the critical importance of the second axis. First, the notion of a territorially distinct royal realm named Iran may have been largely stripped of connotations of political sovereignty up to the time of the Mongol Ilkhans but it had already gained some popularity among writers and rulers in the Iranian lands even prior to the Seljuks.\textsuperscript{63} Second, the emergence of a Muslim Persian literary tradition brought forth the single most important work for Iranian royal tradition in Islamic times, namely the famous Shāhnāma of Firdawsī (d. 416/1025) which was based on a Sassanian narrative of history and legend.

There are several reasons why the Shāhnāma is also of considerable importance in the context of this dissertation. Most notably, the work offers a historical account of the pre-Islamic kingdom named Iran which would, in its broad outlines and more or less aligned with biblical historical accounts, become the authoritative narrative of Iranian history from creation to the advent of Islam. This narrative along with the characters and literary topoi it features and the overall historical vision it conveys would crystallize into a critical element of ideological level late medieval Persianate political culture. As a complex form of imperial expression drawing

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp. 142-50.


on and shaping the Iranian tradition of kingship, Firdawsī’s epic poem directly touches upon notions of legitimacy and sovereignty.

Karin Rührdanz, Asadullah Melikian-Chirvani, Eleanor Sims, Abolala Soudavar and Charles Melville are among the scholars who have noted an enormous upsurge in Shāhnāma-related activities from the Mongol conquests onwards and who have studied them in detail. These activities included the production of precious illuminated manuscript copies of the Shāhnāma and the composition of versified histories in Persian modeled on Firdawsī’s epic poem. That upsurge in Shāhnāma-related activities under the Mongols and their successors was certainly more than a coincidence. Indeed, the present study argues that quite to the contrary, it indicates significant changes on the ideological level of Persianate political culture after the end of the Abbasid caliphate.

As the institution effectively ceased to exist, the Persian literate elites were faced with the necessity and presented with an opportunity to redefine the relation between their history and tradition, on the one hand, and criteria for legitimate rule over them and their lands, on the other. Just like the resurgence of the name ‘Iran’ as designation for the dominions of the house of Hülegü, the upsurge in Shāhnāma-related activities under the Mongol Ilkhans and their successors appear to reflect key aspects of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. Regardless of Tabriz and its special significance, these developments appear to signal the rising importance of the territory, its name and its history as reference points for notions of sovereignty and legitimacy within Persianate political culture.

Beyond these two interrelated points indicating the importance of the second axis along which the historical and cultural framework took shape, connections between the eastern Iranian lands and Abbasid Baghdad were no less crucial for developments in ideological level Persianate political culture. These connections intensified under Seljuk rule. As noted above, eminent individuals in the domains of administration and religious sciences followed the Turkish conquerors from Khurasan to the new principal city Isfahan. But such people also accompanied the Seljuk court to Baghdad, helping spread certain trends in Islamic learning and corresponding religious institutions across the wider Middle East. No doubt that cities were important in that process, but this dissertation is not concerned with odd questions such as whether Islam is an urban religion or what supposedly constitutes an alleged Islamic city.

One of the major trends in Sunni Islam was the rising prominence of scholarly Sufism which was heavily influenced by Shāfī’īte legal and Ash’arī theological discourses. The religious college (madrasa) and the Sufi lodge (khānaqāh), often patronized by influential courtiers or rulers, including the caliphs in Baghdad, were probably the most notable institutions underpinning that trend. Moreover, in the late sixth/twelfth and early seventh/thirteenth centuries, it was accompanied by a reassertion of Abbasid political power and of caliphal religious authority involving a relative openness towards Shiites.\(^{65}\)

That period corresponds to the beginning of the era under study which saw the weakening of Seljuk rule and the end of the dynasty in Iran in 590/1194. For the decades following the demise of the Abbasid caliphate in 656/1258, questions that have long been in the focus of historical research are how and why the Mongol conquerors eventually converted to Islam and what issues of legitimacy and sovereignty affected this process.\(^{66}\) The broad consensus on the wider picture still seems to be that temporary non-Muslim domination and the vicissitudes of Mongol rule entailed a decline of scholarly Sunni Islam and an upsurge in popular Sufi movements some of which turned to messianic doctrines in a Shiite guise and even to military action. In a simplistic form, such a view often aligns well with the grand narrative of national Iranian history as explained above. It would see the Safavids who started out as a Sunni Sufi community not far from Tabriz and underwent such a trajectory before becoming a royal dynasty of Iran, as a prime example for that development. As noted in connection with the studies of Garthwaite and Katouzian, the Safavids are extremely important in the grand national history narrative. Arjomand, in turn, seems to see the Mongol conquests and temporary non-Muslim rule as a precondition for the *transition of Shiism from sectarian to national religion in Iran* which the Safavids eventually spearheaded.\(^{67}\)

Be that as it may, while most studies of dynastic or political history do stress and discuss the growing importance of Sufism under the Mongols and their successors, the body of specific research on the subject, often also looking beyond Iran, has also grown substantially over the past years. This has evidently greatly enhanced our understanding of religious, literary, social and political aspects of Sufism during the era under inquiry. Numerous studies touch on developments in Tabriz, but many valuable ones still rather concentrate on a specific person or


Sufi community and tradition, usually called ‘brotherhoods’ or ‘orders’. Recently, several scholars have placed great emphasis on Sufi, Shiite or broadly messianic, millenarian or occultist currents in late medieval Islam, stressing that they formed one source from which notions of sacral kingship were derived alongside Chinggisid, Mongol or steppe traditions as another one. The present dissertation does not dispute that such notions of sacral kingship became indeed important elements of ideological level Persianate political culture during the era under study. However, the focus on religious and mostly genealogical or dynastic factors as basis for claims to legitimacy and sovereignity may sometimes leave the Iranian tradition out of sight. In her study of kingship and ideology, Anne Broadbridge, for instance, seems to distinguish an Islamic World, that is mainly Mamluk Egypt and Syria, from a Mongol World, that is first and foremost the Iranian lands under the Chinggisids and subsequent dynasties, in this case especially the Timurids. Matthew Melvin-Koushki, for his part, has a more direct interest in Persianate political culture and as one of the historians with a strong focus on Sufism, occultism and Shiite-inspired ‘Alidism, on the one hand, and Chinggisid prestige through descent or intermarriage, on the other, also notes that, “[...] absolutist Persian royal ideas were powerfully revived”. But even his discussion of the transition to Safavid rule pays comparatively little attention to this thread of Persianate political culture as basis for claims to legitimacy and sovereignity. Something combining Iranian royal tradition and an association with the Mongols aside from Chinggisid descent does not seem to interest Melvin-Koushki; not even once he refers to ideological elements immediately related to the specific Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy.

As explained above, this dissertation argues that the idea of a territorially distinct political entity named Iran, conceived as an Islamic kingdom and epitomized by the Ilkhan Ghazan developed

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into a critical element of ideological level Persianate political culture. Moreover, Tabriz came to stand for that idea as royal city. It is generally acknowledged that the Safavids turned from leaders of a militaristic, messianic Sufi movement into a royal dynasty of Iran when they conquered Tabriz in 907/1501. Some accounts of their coming to power may well add a vague reference to the prestige the city had gained under the Mongols. But most scholars seem reluctant to consider that the territory and the name of the realm as well as the special significance of the city may have mattered for late medieval Iranian royal tradition at all. The Safavids certainly had much in common with other early modern dynasties drawing on post-Mongol Persianate political culture, such as the Ottomans and the Mughals. But being able to mobilize the idea of a territorially distinct kingdom named Iran with all its historical depth also set the new Shiite kings apart even though they already lost Tabriz to the Ottomans a few times in the tenth/sixteenth century. As noted above, this dissertation argues that the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy with the special significance of the city and the notion of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran had been firmly established as core elements of ideological level Persianate political culture by that time.

While acknowledging the importance of religious aspects of Persianate political culture and Iranian royal tradition, they are not in the focus of the present study. Instead, it adopts a basic definition of the idea of an Islamic kingdom which was named Iran, corresponded to the territorial dominions of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty and had Ghazan as its epitome. It is understood as a kingdom situated within the historical and cultural framework of Islam and the pre-Islamic Iranian past and having a Muslim ruler who is generally thought to uphold the fundamental obligations of Islam.

Fragner is certainly the scholar who has taken the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy most seriously as an element of ideological level Persianate political culture. Although he does not use the phrase ‘Islamic kingdom’, Ghazan’s conversion is central to his argument. Surprisingly, he does not mention the vaqf-complex of the celebrated convert Ilkhan nor any of the royal monuments erected in and around Tabriz by subsequent rulers. Yet, Fragner clearly made the point that control of Tabriz became a major source for claims to legitimacy and sovereignty for post-Ilkhanid dynasties up to the Safavids:

“[…] whenever any 15th century Türkmen (Qara-Qoyunlu and Aq-Qoyunlu) rulers […] succeeded in the conquest of Tabriz they immediately used to proclaim themselves as pādšāh-i Īrān or kisrā-yi Īrān without any regard to the real extent of “Iranian” territory
being actually under their rule. [...] Šāh Ismā‘īl, the founder of the Safavid ruling dynasty, happened to do quite the same in the year 1501.”

Hence, if control of Tabriz was more relevant for claims to the throne of Iran than the power to rule the whole territory of the royal realm bearing that name, it is no exaggeration to say that the city as a symbolic site came to stand for the idea of the kingdom. Besides, the quote makes clear that Fragner relates the special significance which Tabriz acquired under the Mongol Ilkhans to the idea of a kingdom named Iran. However, he also insists that this Chinggisid dynasty strove to appear as successors to the Abbasid caliphs and to turn Tabriz into the new metropolis succeeding Baghdad. In Fragner’s argument, Ghazan’s conversion seems to signal the success of that endeavor. This part of his argument is obviously the one that prompted much of Pfeiffer’s challenge. She is right to stress that the significance of Baghdad was related to the idea of the Muslim community as a whole and that part of Fragner’s argument does indeed open the way to misunderstand his frame of reference. The question which dynasty may be considered as predecessors of the Ilkhans will be addressed in the next chapter. In contrast, what seems to have led Fragner to emphasize that Tabriz acquired a special significance for the kingdom named Iran does not only pertain to the ideological level of Persianate political culture but also directly to the analysis of sources and is one issue to be discussed in the following section.

2.4 Late Medieval Tabriz: Sources, Approaches, Issues

Fragner seeks to back his assertion that the Ilkhans portrayed themselves as successors of the Abbasids and Tabriz as successor of Baghdad by drawing attention to the practice of using honorific epithets to signal a special significance ascribed to individual cities. Baghdad was the abode of the caliphate (dār al-khilāfa) or the abode of peace (dār al-salām), other cities associated with major royal courts, such as Isfahan and later Hamadan under the Seljuks, were usually designated as an abode of kingship (dār al-mulk).

According to Fragner, the Ilkhans created a similar honorific epithet for Tabriz in connection with Ghazan’s conversion when the significance of the city had surpassed that of Baghdad as there was no abode of the caliphate anymore. “Eventually, Tabriz became officially Dār al-saltana, the seat of unconditional rulership. Just as Baghdad had been absolutely unique as Dār

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72 Fragner: “Iran under Ilkhanid rule”, p. 128.
73 Idem: “Ilkhanid rule and its contributions to Iranian political culture”, pp. 73-4.
74 Pfeiffer: “Introduction. From Baghdad to Marāgha, Tabriz, and Beyond”, pp. 4-5.
al-khilāfa, Tabriz should also be uniquely recognized as Dār al-salṭana, clearly of a higher value than the former Dār al-mulks [...].” This is an interesting suggestion although Fragner does not explicitly argue that the honorific epithet supposedly created by the Ilkans for Tabriz referred to the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom epitomized by Ghazan.

Fragner’s assertion that the Mongol rulers of Iran intentionally created the honorary epithet dār al-salṭana as part of some distinct political program seems questionable. The Persian elites probably played a more important role in associating Tabriz with honorary epithets, including dār al-salṭana, and in inscribing such associations into their literary tradition. Moreover, in the longer term this specific epithet was not uniquely applied to Tabriz. By the ninth/fifteenth century, historians working at Timurid courts routinely designated Herat, the principal city of that dynasty, as dār al-salṭana. Without regard to the misunderstanding between Fragner and Pfeiffer about the frame of reference, one question appears to lie at the heart their disagreement: was the significance which Tabriz acquired under Mongol Ilkhanid rule somehow unique, like the status of Abbasid Baghdad as the abode of the caliphate had been? On this question, the present study sides with Fragner and, as already explained, argues that there was no other city that came to stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran.

The analysis of honorary epithets applied to Tabriz in different kinds of sources is one lane of an approach focused on terminologies of distinction. It has already been done in detail in the most recent article submitted for the cumulative dissertation. The article also includes several other honorary epithets in the analysis and covers the entire era under study, focusing on instances where they were coupled with the term ‘Īrān’ or ‘Īrān-zamīn’ as territorial-political designation for an ancient or virtually eternal kingdom. One honorary epithet, ‘the dome of Islam (qubbat al-Islām)’, has turned out particularly notable in view of the research questions which the dissertation pursues because it obviously refers specifically to Tabriz as the site of Ghazan’s mausoleum. The second lane of the approach focused on terminologies of distinction concerns various designations applied to individuals, especially among the local elites of Tabriz, which shall help assess their social status and political agency. It will be further discussed at the end of this section.

As regards sources where distinguishing Tabriz by means of honorary epithets was common, Fragner underlines the importance of coins and documents, such as royal decrees and correspondence, and Pfeiffer likewise speaks of “[...] the lofty epithets that the city assumed

75 Fragner: “Ilkhanid rule and its contributions to Iranian political culture”, p. 75.
on coinage and in official titulature under Mongol rule”.77 These kinds of sources are presumably the most likely to convey an official stance on whether Tabriz acquired a special significance. But the issue of what exactly ‘official’ is supposed to mean and to imply in the context of late medieval Iranian history is tricky and will be taken up again below in connection with court historiography.

At this point, it seems useful to stress that a cursory survey of coins struck at Tabriz in different periods of the era under study, based on descriptions and analyses in numismatic scholarship, suggests that they did not feature any verbal indication that the city had a special significance.78 In contrast, diplomatic scholarship which has resulted in editions and commentaries of royal documents and correspondence, shows that there may at times indeed have been some sort of official policy to employ honorary epithets signaling that Tabriz enjoyed a distinguished status.79 However, if such a policy did exist it was never carried out in a way anywhere close to consistent. Even under the Muslim Ilkhans of the early eighth/fourteenth century, court decrees do rather not designate Tabriz as dār al-saltana but tend to use dār al-mulk. Moreover, this honorary epithet is not exclusively reserved for Tabriz and in many cases, Ilkhanid court decrees in Persian mention the city without any special designation.80

Honorary epithets, such as dār al-saltana and dār al-mulk, are usually translated as ‘capital’ by the great majority of scholars, Fragner included. In view of the conditions of nomadic rule as described above in connection with practical level Persianate political culture during the era under study, this dissertation discards that term. I have addressed the issue in another one of the submitted articles which focuses on the local elites and dynastic succession at Tabriz.81 As I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, identifying that supposedly eternal kingdom named Iran with the territorial dominions of the house of Hülegü and expressing the special significance of Tabriz by means of honorary epithets were separate, but related operations on the interpretative or ideological level of Persianate political culture. As such, these operations were bound to practical politics resonating far beyond the local setting. Yet, as noted above, the dissertation attempts to show not only how the city came to stand for the idea of a territorially

81 Zakrzewski, Daniel: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession: Tabriz prior to, under and following Mongol Rule (sixth/twelfth to Ninth/Fifteenth Centuries)”, Eurasian Studies 16/1-2 (2018), pp. 352-94 [here, pp. 366-7].
distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran also but how the local elites of Tabriz contributed to the emergence and perpetuation of that special significance, both on the practical and ideological level of political culture. In fact, three of the articles which have been submitted for the cumulative dissertation have focused on the local elites and their contributions, especially as regards practical politics. Representatives of the local elites can only be properly identified by using a broad range of sources which can be categorized according to different criteria. As just noted, the set of terminological distinction used to approach the issue of assessing their agency will be introduced at the end of this section. It seems useful to first proceed with the presentation of sources and then with some more general theoretical and methodological remarks. Most sources are literary texts from various genres, mainly in Persian and to a lesser extent in Arabic or other languages, but there are also some documents, in addition to the above-mentioned royal decrees. These are mainly endowment deeds, such as the one for the complex established at Tabriz by the Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rashid al-Din which has already been noted.

One endowment deed from the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century pertains to the vaqf-complex of a man known as Khvāja Shaykh Kujujī. Research efforts of the candidate played a non-negligable role in the publication, directed by Christoph Werner, of an edition and German translation of that Arabic document, the Kujujī-vaqfiyya, including a thorough commentary and substantial appended material. Khvāja Shaykh Kujujī, played an important role in local and dynastic politics at Tabriz in the aftermath of Ilkhanid rule. But he also composed poetry which has been studied by Werner and he compiled a collection of prophetic traditions (hadīth) which appears to be virtually unknown and is still unpublished. In two of the submitted articles, I have also analyzed members of the Kujujī family as influential courtiers up to the coming to power of the Safavids.

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84 Werner, Christoph: “The Kujuji Poets. Families, Poetry and Forms of Patronage in Azerbaijan and beyond (Fourthteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)”, Eurasian Studies 15 (2017), pp. 250-79. Khwāja Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shaykh Muhammad Kujujānī (Tabrīzī), mashhūr ba-Khwāja Shaykh (sada-yī haftum-i hijrī: Divān-i Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kujuji, ed. Mas'ūd Rāstīpūr, Tehran 1395sh) (2016). The hadīth-collection compiled by Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī is entitled Jawāmī‘ al-akhbār al-nabawīyya wa Jawāmī‘ al-anwār al-mustafa‘wiyyya and consists of about 350 folios. One manuscript copy which is held at the National Library of Israel was made in the late eighth/fourteenth century, thus almost certainly when the author was still alive. I am grateful to Or Amir from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for bringing this work to my attention. Unfortunately, I have not been able to study it in depth but will return to some details below. Wust, Efraim: Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish Manuscripts of the Tahuda Collection of the National Library of Israel, Raquel Ukeles et al. (ed.), Brill, Leiden 2017, pp. 595-6 (ms. no. 371).

The Kujujī-vaqfiyya, the poems of Khvāja Shaykh Kujujī and his hadīth-collection can be categorized as local sources. In addition to these three, there are a couple of other important local sources which have been discovered or made accessible only recently. A manuscript collection which is known as Safīna-yi Tabrīz and contains mainly religious and literary works, is another one.86 Most of the Safīna was compiled during the heyday of Ilkhanid rule in the 720s/1320s by a member of the eminent Malikān family from Tabriz. Another important local source which has been discovered only recently, is likewise related to the Malikān as I have demonstrated in two of the submitted articles which also discuss the roles which several family members played in local and imperial politics prior to and under Mongol rule.87 The source in question is a versified universal history modeled on the Shāhnāma and entitled Humāyūnnāma.88 This work was composed in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century, thus when Ilkhanid rule had not yet fully consolidated, by a poet in Tabriz who was known as Zajjājī. The patron of the author was known as Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, most probably the reference for the family name Malikān and the person who commissioned the Humāyūnnāma.

Local sources like the ones just presented have evidently been consulted with particular attention for this study of local history. Yet, like most of the written material used in this dissertation, they basically serve two main purposes. First, they are pools of genealogical and other prosopographical data on the local elites of Tabriz. Second, many sources provide indications not only to possible political preferences among them but also the ways in which the local elites related to religious, intellectual, literary or artistic trends in the late medieval Iranian lands and the wider Middle East. Local sources may be expected to provide somewhat more valuable indications to tackle these issues. Such indications are especially important when they shed light on the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz for Iranian royal tradition and Persianate political culture. One reason why the Humāyūnnāma is so important in the context of this inquiry is that the work gives hints to how the local elites themselves may have viewed the early stages of that process in the seventh/thirteenth century. The issue will, of course, be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Another local source has been known for a long time, but it is perhaps the single most important one for this dissertation. The work in question is the Sufi pilgrimage guide to the cemeteries of Tabriz and surrounding villages written by Ibn Karbalāʾī, himself a representative of the local

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elites who then emigrated to Ottoman Damascus around 988/1580. In his *Rauḍāt al-jinān va jannāt al-janān*, Ibn Karbalāʾī compiled by far the largest pool of genealogical and other prosopographical data on the notables of Tabriz. Moreover, the work also contains lots of information on non-elite individuals from the local setting and on numerous people from elsewhere who were buried in Tabriz or visited the city. Fortunately, Ibn Karbalāʾī generally names his sources which included material now lost or apparently unretrievable, such as tomb inscriptions, local manuscript codices and oral traditions. But he also quotes extensively from well-known works of historiography, Sufi hagiography and poetry as well as from various sorts of biographical dictionaries in a fairly accurate manner.

In addition to serving as the main pool of prosopographical data, the *Rauḍāt al-jinān* of Ibn Karbalāʾī is also the only source which offers a local view on the entire process of the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz. Yet, local sources are evidently not sufficient to achieve the broad range from which information on the local elites needs to be collated. Written sources consulted for this dissertation belong very much to the same literary genres from which Ibn Karbalāʾī also quoted. This includes collections of poetry, hagiographical accounts of individual Sufi masters, biographical dictionaries of religious scholars, Sufis or poets as well as works of universal and dynastic history. One biographical dictionary which deserves special mention is the one of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī. The author was a native of Abbasid Baghdad and taken captive by the Mongols before ultimately becoming an intimate of Ilkhanid court circles. He met numerous notables of Tabriz personally, but also provides valuable information on the pre-Mongol history of Azerbaijan while offering an interesting perspective on early stages of the process under study.

Although works from all literary genres which have just been enumerated are relevant for reconstructing visions of history during the era under study, historiography is perhaps the most important one. As noted above, historical literature was mainly produced in courtly settings. It was also written for rulers and princes, in the first place. Hence, it does often have some sort of official or semi-official character. Yet, Persian court historians unquestionably belonged to the Iranian elites who have been noted above as presumably driving the revival of the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran and interpreting the special significance of Tabriz with reference to it. Thus, Persian historiography has been much more helpful than the above-mentioned royal decrees and correspondence when it comes to tracing the emergence

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and perpetuation of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. The relevant set of terminological distinction which will be in the focus of the analysis for that purpose has been introduced above.

Persian historiography during the era under inquiry has been studied quite intensively and many of the source texts from the other literary genres have as well. Thus, most have been published in printed editions and several are even available in translations into Western languages. Hence, a lot of fundamental research has already been done without which this study would not be possible. However, they have hardly been analyzed with a focus on Tabriz and even less with an interest in the emergence and perpetuation of its special significance. Another theoretical element which the dissertation uses to approach the issue is a concept of ‘places’ as explained by Tilmann Trausch in his study of Persian courtly historiography of the early tenth/sixteenth century, thus, the end of the era under consideration here. Trausch explains that these ‘places’ are primarily understood not as concrete physical localities but as specific cultural preconditions determining the communication practice of historical actors. The concept is most beneficial for the analysis of local sources offering visions of history, such as the Humāyūnīnāma of Zajjājī and the Raudāt al-jīnān of Ibn Karbalāʾī. Nonetheless, it will of course also benefit the evaluation of historical writing that did not come out of the local setting of Tabriz. The whole issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

At this point, it may be helpful to recall that, in contrast to the concept of ‘places’ as explained by Trausch, the present study focuses very much on Tabriz as a concrete physical locality and as a space of social and political interaction. Katouzian makes a few more basic suggestions touching upon some central issues of this study, apart from the three factors which he considers paramount in determining a supposed shared identity of ‘Iranian-ness’ and which have been addressed in connection with the grand national history narrative. These suggestions pertain primarily to the agency of the local elites and to questions of continuity and change over a long-term period of Iranian history, such as the roughly four centuries investigated here.

According to Katouzian, a characteristic feature of Iranian history is a perpetual conflict between society and ‘the state’. I would rather refrain from projecting the modern concept of ‘the state’ on the pre-modern polities associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran. Katouzian’s description of that alleged perpetual conflict even increases the reservations. Katouzian does not make clear if ‘the state’ is supposed to mean anything more than the generally idealized absolute and arbitrary as

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92 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
93 Katouzian: The Persians, pp. 5-8.
well as divinely sanctioned or inspired power of the king which he claims could transform into weak and arbitrary power. If there is more to it than royal power Katouzian does not give the slightest indication where the line was that separated ‘the state’ from society with which it allegedly was in perpetual conflict. The most precise delineation Katouzian makes is a classical image from Iranian royal tradition, but he just inserts ‘the state’ instead of the king noting that, “[i]n Iran, the state stood over and above the social pyramid and looked upon the whole of society, both high and low, as its servants or flocks.”  

Katouzian obviously takes this model of order as an adequate depiction of the relations between rulers and different groups in society that characterized the practice of politics in the medieval Iranian lands. This model is indeed a key element on the ideological level of Persianate political culture but this does not make it a viable foundation for analyzing practical aspects related to the constitution of society at a given historical moment or over a period of time. Yet it is largely from that ideological feature of Persianate political culture that Katouzian derives what he calls realistic descriptions of Iranian society which supposedly apply irrespective of specific historical conditions. The most relevant descriptions in the context of the present study are the ‘arbitrary society’ and the ‘short-term society’.

Thus, in Katouzian’s view, Iranian society was generally subject to the arbitrary power of the king against whom it would occasionally rise in revolt leading to chaos from which a new king would arise. Lambton has at least identified certain social groups as elements of change and others as elements of continuity, namely successive ruling houses in the first and Persian bureaucrats as well as religious dignitaries in the second case. Given the analytical focus on Tabriz, this dissertation suggests that the city could be conceived as an element of continuity as it acquired and preserved its special significance. However, Katouzian goes so far as to state that, “[…] Iranian history has lacked long-term continuity. It has consisted of a series of connected short terms.” Katouzian repeatedly stresses that he considers one factor as critical to explain both of the described characteristics of Iranian society stating, for instance, that “[t]he short-term nature of society was also both a cause and an effect of the absence of a long-term aristocratic class.” In another instance, the near equation of ‘the state’ with the king seems striking again. “The arbitrary power of the state in Iran – that is, a power not constrained by any
Independent laws and social classes – would also become absolute in the hands of a strong ruler [...] (original emphasis)."

Much of Katouzian’s discussion revolves around the question whether Iranian history warrants the classification of the society as feudal, the question of differences from and similarities with medieval Europe. He makes the point himself as he brings the allegedly critical factor into the discussion. “Independent long-standing social classes – feudal or other – did not exist as they did in Europe. Instead, the state exercised arbitrary power over all.” In his above-mentioned study focused on Khurasan and adjacent areas in the eastern Iranian lands in the sixth/twelfth century, Jürgen Paul carefully weighed the arguments for and against the case that Iran can be described as a feudal society. Paul found that many arguments usually adduced against that case, for example in Lambton’s research, do not withstand thorough historical analysis. But he concludes nevertheless that it is not reasonable and helpful to use the term ‘feudal’ to characterize society in eastern Iran in the period just prior to the Mongol invasions.

The present study does not take up the debate regarding differences and similarities between Iran and Europe in medieval times and the extent to which the former possibly was a feudal society. The important point about Paul’s findings is that they clearly show the existence of an aristocratic class which included various kinds of local lords who often stemmed from ancient families and served more powerful, sometimes imperial overlords but whose local elite status and power or agency did not depend necessarily or primarily on royal appointment. Such local lords appear very much like belonging to the long-standing aristocratic social class whose existence Katouzian denies assuming that by independent, he does not mean unrelated to the king and the affairs of government.

As noted above, Paul largely leaves out major cities and urban notables in his recent monograph study. He briefly touches on this complex explaining that he considers the urban notables, especially in cities that served as centers of larger political entities, members of the aristocratic class making up the social and political elites alongside successive rulers and their households. The Turko-Mongol elites who are often called the ‘military aristocracy’ in view of their principal field of activity may be slightly distinguished from the rest of that class. One of the questions this study pursues in view of the special significance which Tabriz acquired and preserved is whether the local elites of the era under inquiry also formed a distinct component of that aristocratic class. It would be rather not suitable to use ‘nobility’ as a

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99 Ibid., p. 6.
100 Ibid., p. 4.
102 Ibid., pp. 211-229.
103 Ibid., pp. 213-5, 456-475.
synonym for ‘aristocracy’ in the context of late medieval Iranian history. Yet, there is research on the aristocratic class in late medieval and early modern Europe which does use both terms synonymously, but nonetheless offers a basic definition that may well be adopted for the purposes of the dissertation. Thus, what characterizes the aristocratic class is that its members fulfill leadership functions in society and politics with complex relations to the royal court, a pronounced awareness of moral-religious superiority and strong local and regional encroachment.  

The above-mentioned local leading families, the Malikān and the Kujujīs, are examples that appear to perfectly fit this definition. One thing that might justify viewing them as representatives of a distinct component of that aristocratic class is that the local elites of Tabriz helped enable the specific sequence of dynastic succession which came to be associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of the city. Taking the distinction Katouzian makes for Iranian history, this leads to the question whether by doing so, the local elites participated in driving a process of long-term continuity or if they only contributed to a series of connected short-terms. These questions address core issues of the present study that have already been outlined in some of the research questions above. Thus, even if the Mongol invasions did lead to change in the composition of the local elites of Tabriz as a social group or if the experience and legacy of Ilkhanid imperial rule did alter criteria according to which its representatives would accept and support a certain sovereign. Were the political interests and efforts of the local elites and the social roles they played in enabling the specific sequence of dynastic succession associated with making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran matters of aristocratic long-term continuity?

Another remark on the theoretical and methodological framework for the inquiry into medieval Persianate political culture undertaken here pertains to relations between the ruler and different social groups, thus, to the practical level. As noted above, the idealized model of the king as unrestrained power acting on society adopted by Katouzian seems unhelpful for an analysis of political practice in the medieval Iranian lands. Roy Mottahedeh has brilliantly demonstrated, in his classic analysis of loyalty and leadership in western Iran under Buyid domination in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, that rulers were embedded in a network of relations compelling them to provide benefit (niʿma) to their subjects. The latter owed gratitude for that benefit and according to Mottahedeh, acquired loyalties forged through these relations would

tie members of the political and social elites to each other, the network connecting rulers primarily to leading soldiers and bureaucrats ‘men of the regime’.  

Paul has developed Mottahedeh’s insights further suggesting in his monograph on local and imperial authority in sixth/twelfth century eastern Iran to conceive this network of relations as ties of mutual rights and obligations. Paul proposes the concept of khidma stressing that the gratitude owed for the benefit provided by a lord, most notably an imperial ruler, would translate into service (khidma) which was due to him. Service and benefit implied a variety of concrete actions expected of both parties while the relation between them was generally hierarchical. The loyalty forged through these ties would sometimes span over more than one generation and the network usually reach beyond the immediate entourage of a ruler well into society. But the relation could also break down, for instance when the lord failed to fulfill his obligation to provide adequate benefit possible reasons being death, weakness or negligence. In such cases, local lords and other members of the aristocratic class would often withdraw their loyalty from a ruler and offer their service to a more promising claimant in pursuit of their own interests. Paul concludes very convincingly that the concept of khidma may help understand and explain the rapid succession of imperial or regional regimes in eastern Iran just prior to the Mongol invasions.

Assuming the local elites of Tabriz belonged to that aristocratic class, the relations they had to successive rulers, their households and courts from the late sixth/twelfth through the early tenth/sixteenth centuries must have resembled those ties of service and benefit very much. Hence, by offering or withdrawing their loyalty according to circumstances, notables of Tabriz could contribute to the stabilization or collapse of political entities, some of which represented an imperial authority, as well as to the transfer of rule from one dynastic formation to the next. In doing so, they would ultimately enable the specific sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran while pursuing their own, often locally defined interests.

Yet another important theoretical and methodological remark pertains to discerning the interests of the local elites of Tabriz. To achieve this, the present study tries to look at the network in which they were embedded from their perspective as much as possible. The successive rulers and courts, especially those of imperial reach based in the environs of the city, were essential

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106 Paul: Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft, pp. 233-235. He also explained the concept in an article, see Idem.: “Khidma in the Social History of Pre-Mongol Iran”, JESHO 57 (2014), pp. 392-422.  
107 Paul: Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft, pp. 283-300.  
108 Ibid., pp. 507-508.
elements of that network. Furthermore, this network has a synchronic and diachronic dimension and could perhaps be said to consist of numerous overlapping sub-networks. But the local elites of Tabriz, their relations to each other, to individual rulers and dynastic regimes and to broader religious, literary or artistic trends in the Middle East, especially the Iranian lands, will be in the focus of attention.

The basic question will consequently be who the local elites of Tabriz were if well-known bureaucrats, religious dignitaries or men of letters mainly affiliated with a ruler or court based there are not the primarily intended group of people. In the most general terms, the answer would be that they were notables whose attachment to the local setting did not result from their affiliation with a dynastic court but who engaged in similar activities. These activities included participating in government and administration, sometimes even in military matters, practicing traditional Islamic learning, Sufi spirituality or natural sciences as well as composing Persian poetry or writing calligraphy. Additional questions are what motivated the local elites of Tabriz to be loyal to or withdraw their loyalty from a specific ruler or dynasty and what means and resources they had at their disposal to support a ruler or dynasty they served as men of the regime. Finally, it seems worthwhile to ask how relevant activities of the local elites of Tabriz helped enable the sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of the city. This also implies the how they possibly contributed to other developments in Persianate political culture related to inscribing that special significance into Iranian royal tradition.

The rough definition of the local elites and the enumeration of activities they engaged in leads back to key elements of the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu which may help tackle these questions supplementing the theoretical and methodological framework as outlined so far on a more abstract level of analysis.\textsuperscript{109} The foundation is a relational model of social space in which actors occupy positions in distinct but interpenetrating fields of activity, such as politics, religion or culture. Their positions in any of these fields, their relations to other social actors and their agency in specific contexts of interaction depend on the amount of adequate resources at their disposal, called ‘capital’ by Bourdieu. Family standing, material wealth, religious piety, educational achievements, administrative or artistic skills would be examples of such resources in the context of this dissertation. As far as acquired loyalties, such as the ties of service and benefit explained by Paul, are concerned, these resources may often imply government

\textsuperscript{109} Bourdieu developed various aspects of his sociological theory in numerous different works. The most relevant points for the purposes of this study have been summarized in a series of lectures. Bourdieu, Pierre: \textit{Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action}, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1998, pp. 1-20, 24-34, 64-74.
postings, court attendance and a certain proximity to rulers which would, in turn, usually reinforce the kind of social, economic or cultural capital just mentioned.

Thus, the local elites of Tabriz and the successive rulers of the Iranian lands with their courtly entourage of mainly Turkic, Mongol or Turco-Mongol military aristocrats and predominantly Iranian bureaucrats and religious dignitaries shared of course one social space. Yet not all of it was accessible to everybody in the same measure which is why I consider the local and the courtly setting as two interrelated but distinct segments of that social space. For the network in which the local elites were embedded, royal courts, especially those successively based at Tabriz, may be said to have delineated much of the somewhat ill-defined ‘field of power’ in Bourdieu’s theory. But the assumption is that such a delineation mainly affected imperial level intra- and inter-dynastic politics and that positions of local authority entailed privileges like proximity to rulers and court attendance rather than the other way around.

As already noted above, representatives of the local elites of Tabriz were often government officials, Islamic scholars (‘ulamā’), Sufis, poets or calligraphers at the same time switching between various domains of social activity. Thus, it may be difficult to clearly detect mental and behavioral dispositions that actors develop through their social practice and often cultivate as marks of social distinction, called ‘habitus’ by Bourdieu and complementing the concepts of ‘capital’ and ‘fields’. Mediated through ‘habitus’, positions actors occupy in social space would in theory translate into positions they may be expected to take towards political, religious or cultural phenomena or developments they face. However, even if it is difficult to spell out precisely for different social groups, there may well be mental and behavioral dispositions distinguishing the local elites of Tabriz from other members of the aristocratic class in the late medieval Iranian lands. A stronger inclination to promote the special significance which the city was acquiring as part of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy would be an example to examine in connection with the above-mentioned concept of ‘places’.

But differences between social groups with regards to professional practice or similar activities, sometimes corresponding to differences in ethos or ideological outlook, have also often been noted in historical research. Mottahedeh, focusing on soldiers, bureaucrats and Islamic scholars (‘ulamā’) as professional categories, has shown that membership in certain categories of people, moreover, involved loyalties and made clear that such ‘loyalties of category’ could also apply to the inhabitants of a city. According to Mottahedeh, this second form of loyalty, forged through “[…] less personal, less formal and usually inherited ties of category […]”, was closely related to the acquired loyalties between individuals as the ties underlaying the latter, “[…] were not made at random, but they were repeatedly engaged upon by similar groups of men,
generation after generation.”¹¹⁰ Mottahedeh further remarks about loyalties of category that, “[m]en of a common interest will, on some occasions, make common cause, whether their interest is the protection of their profession, their city, or their family. But such interests need to be self-conscious in order to produce self-conscious loyalties [...]”¹¹¹

A pronounced inclination among the local elites to promote the notion that Tabriz was standing for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran would be a good indication for self-conscious interests producing a self-conscious loyalty to the city. Furthermore, it could indicate that the local elites of Tabriz formed indeed a distinct component of the aristocratic class in the Iranian lands. This, in turn, may imply that a long-term local aristocratic awareness was a factor bearing on their political interests and efforts as well as on the roles they played in enabling the specific sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of their city.

Assuming the city of Tabriz was one of the categories constituting an object of loyalty for its notables, another major question is how this was related to other loyalties, both within the local setting and beyond. This includes ties of loyalty to other categories of people representatives of the local elites of Tabriz were members in and acquired loyalties, especially to any of the rulers or dynasties succeeding each other in control of the city. Under what circumstances would the loyalty to Tabriz, for example, reinforce other loyalties or conflict with and run counter to them? Was that loyalty a factor in the formation of factions within the city and if so, would it override other factors possibly driving local factionalism, such as religious differences? Finally, could self-conscious common interests as notables of Tabriz and the self-conscious loyalty it would produce at times outweigh the fragmentation that Paul, in his above-mentioned study of reactions to the first Mongol invasion, has concluded was characteristic for medieval Iranian society generally and for specific local settings such as individual cities?

In any case, the ties forging loyalties between representatives of the local elites of Tabriz as well as between them and other actors in social space seem to belong largely to the domain of micro-politics as defined by Wolfgang Reinhard. According to Reinhard, ‘micro-politics’ denotes the more or less premeditated use of a network of personal connections for political ends, nepotism and patronage being examples of “immortal micro-political practices”.¹¹² The khidma-niʿma-ties which aristocrats in the medieval Iranian lands built and maintained,

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¹¹⁰ Mottahedeh: Loyalty and Leadership, p. 96.
¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 97.
amounted to a network of personal connections that would be mobilized for political ends and Paul has suggested that they were a specific form of patron-client-ties. Further important points with regards to the present study arise from Reinhard’s extension of the basic definition of micro-politics and from his persuasive assumption that it often has profound effects on large-scale historical developments associated with what could be called the presumably objective ‘macro-politics’ of political entities or regimes. According to the extended definition, micro-politics pursues particular interests rather than organizational goals, is interlinked with networks and takes place on a sub-institutional level. Since no institutional body of municipal decision-making assembling representatives of the local elites of Tabriz in that capacity is known, all their political practice was interlinked with networks. And while notables of Tabriz, even as men of a regime, certainly pursued particular interests rather than organizational goals, like say the integrity of Iranian royal territory, political decisions they made between the late sixth/twelfth and the early tenth/sixteenth centuries had profound effects on large-scale historical developments.

Identifying the local elites of Tabriz, specifying the relations among themselves and to other social actors as well as their interests leads back to the second set of terminological distinction to be used in the analysis which will be introduced now. The same applies to assessing the agency of representatives of the notables of Tabriz in specific contexts of interaction, the political loyalties, religious tendencies and cultural trends that predominated among them and how their choices in relevant fields, in turn, affected Persianate political culture in such a way that the special significance of their city came to be inscribed into Iranian royal tradition. Mottahedeh has reviewed some general concepts referring to social elite status in connection with the ‘loyalties of category’ and also discussed a few slightly more specific terms denoting leadership within certain categories, such as court bureaucrats, the ‘ʿulamāʾ’ and a town or region. This review may still serve as a useful analytical basis and guideline.

General concepts referring to social elite status include the ‘distinguished (khawāṣṣ)’, ‘notables (ʿaʾyān)’ or ‘grandees (akābir/buzurgān)’ and would usually be employed in relation to a certain category of people, such as the inhabitants of Tabriz, the ‘ulamāʾ’ or a religious school. Terms for positions of leadership, for example raʾīs or imām, may be rather vague or relatively specific depending on the context and range from governmental or administrative posts to various sorts of professional designations and honorific address or titles. Other terms that have been taken into consideration denote offices, like judge (qāḍī) and court secretary (kātib),

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113 Paul: Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft, p. 235.
professions or activities, like that of a poet (shāʿir) or calligrapher (khaṭṭāṭ/khūshnīvīs), honorifics, like khwāja, mawlānā or shaykh that became common among Sufis, and other concepts related to that domain, such as ‘wanderer on the Sufi path (sālik)’ or ‘friend of God (valī)’.

Such terms would often be coupled with personal names or components of names, especially in the case of honorifics, and sometimes with general concepts referring to elite status, especially in the case of professions and activities, relating relevant individuals to one or more categories of people. Sources from the broad range of genres outlined above have indeed helped elucidate to which rulers and dynasties notables of Tabriz were related through ties of service and benefit and how individual local leaders were positioned in far-flung networks of religious or literary discourse and activity. By intensively collating relevant genealogical and other prosopographical data, it has also been possible to properly identify representatives of the local elites of Tabriz and to establish how they were related to each other as a social group, to some extent. Two eminent local leading families whose members played important roles in the process of Tabriz coming to stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran, have already been introduced. The process and the contributions of the local elites will be further discussed in the next chapter.
3 A Special Significance in the Making

This chapter moves the analysis to the micro-level by turning to the actual tracing of the process of making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. As noted above, it will attempt to trace the process from three different angles and to specify how the local elites of Tabriz contributed to it. It may be added at this point that the analysis from each of these angles will address issues of continuity and change on the practical and ideological level of Persianate political culture. Furthermore, this chapter will increasingly bring insights from the four articles which have been submitted for the cumulative dissertation into the discussion, as numerous important questions have already been examined there.

The first section of the chapter approaches the process from the angle of the broader political history of the late medieval Iranian lands. It focuses on the revival and reformulation of the idea of Iran as a royal realm bearing that name and extending over a relatively distinct territory as well as on visions of history adopted and promoted especially by contemporary Persian authors. As noted above, that revival and reformulation proceeded primarily under and with reference to the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty and eventually in relation to Tabriz. The section involves a more thorough review of Fragner’s argument, of criticism and disagreement it has faced and of other relevant counterarguments to carry on with the attempted refinement of some of its basic aspects. The above-mentioned most recent article submitted for the cumulative dissertation has already explicitly embarked on that refinement and, in consequence, also discussed several issues to be addressed here, notably visions of history as succession of ruling dynasties, the use of the term ‘Iran’ as a territorial-political name, the application of honorary epithets to Tabriz and royal monuments in and around the city.116

As noted above, the second section approaches the process under study from the angle of regional history with a focus on Azerbaijan and adjoining areas as politically central under the conditions of nomadic rule. Thus, the second section includes a review of important royal campsites in the region and in the immediate environs of Tabriz where successive rulers erected their monuments mostly as extra-urban complexes. It has already been explained that the vaqf-complex of the celebrated convert Ilkhan Ghazan assumed a sort of foundational significance for making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. While the review of Fragner’s argument continues into the second section, the focus shifts to the one advanced by Haneda that two of the royal vaqf-complexes just outside Tabriz, including

that of Ghazan, represent a new form of urbanism introduced by the Mongols. So far, this issue and the question of royal campsites in Azerbaijan and adjacent areas have only been addressed briefly in two of the submitted articles.\textsuperscript{117}

Finally, the third section moves the analysis further to the micro-level by approaching the process under study from the angle of the city itself, that is, first and foremost, its inhabitants. This section will specify connections and disconnections between the courtly setting and the local setting as well as within the local setting of Tabriz. As noted above, it concentrates on the local elites with a special focus on the roles they played in instances of dynastic change or succession and possible other contributions they made to the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz. I have already discussed this issue in great detail in three of the submitted articles two of which take a long-term view spanning almost over the entire era under study whereas the other one looks specifically at the establishment of Mongol rule.\textsuperscript{118} Some of the insights from these articles seem even more valuable seen in the light of the results presented in the more recent one on the name and territory of Iran, its history as a succession of ruling dynasties and the royal monuments of Tabriz. In general, with their focus on the local elites as social and political actors, those articles supplement the fourth one refining Fragner’s argument.

\textbf{3.1 Iran as Royal Realm: Name, Territory, Succession of Dynasties}

Fragner rightly situates the revival of the name and territorial-political concept of Iran in the dual historical context of the post-Abbasid Middle East and the dissolution of the Mongol Empire into relatively distinct polities under different Chinggisid dynasties. For a better understanding of his argument, it may be helpful to first give some background on the history of the Mongol Empire and of the territorial-political name ‘Iran’.

After the death of Chinggis Khan in 624/1227, supreme leadership of the dynasty passed to his third son Ögedei who died in 639/1241. His reign boosted the integration of the Iranian lands into the nascent imperial structures of the Chinggisid realm but was also marked by growing tensions within the ruling dynasty. The importance of Tabriz, especially as a center of financial administration grew steadily during this period. But Ögedei’s line was eventually marginalized and Möngke, a son of Chinggis Khan’s fourth and youngest son Tolui, enthroned as Great Khan in 650/1252. In this capacity, he dispatched his brothers Qubilai and Hülegü to resume the

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., pp. 54-5, 58-9, 63-4. Idem.: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, pp. 366-7.

\textsuperscript{118} Idem.: “Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī and the Establishment of Mongol Rule in Iran”. Idem. “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”. Idem.: “Lords of Tabriz”.

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campaigns of conquest. The former eventually succeeded as Great Khan after Möngke’s death in 657/1259 and founded the Yuan dynasty of China while the latter established himself as a subordinate ruler in West Asia.

Hülegü and subsequent Ilkhans recognized the supremacy of their Toluid brethren in East Asia although the mutual ties had weakened by the end of the seventh/thirteenth century. Meanwhile, the dominions of different branches of the Chinggisid dynasty had been developing into relatively distinct polities. Perhaps the sheer size of the Mongol Empire guaranteed that it could not stay a functioning unified structure for long. Anyway, the Ilkhans had generally hostile relations to the descendants of Chinggis Khan’s second son Chaghadai and to those of his eldest son Jochi both of whom were neighbors of the house of Hülegü. The Chaghadaids were based in Central Asia and repeatedly challenged Ilkhanid rule over the region of Khurasan while the Jochids were based north of the Caucasus but also laid claim to the Ilkhanid heartland of Azerbaijan and made several campaigns to conquer it.

The lands which Hülegü brought under his sway corresponded roughly to the core territory of the Sassanians. According to some scholars, Fragner included, the Sassanians were the royal dynasty that created or invented the idea of a territorially distinct political entity named Iran whereas others have maintained that this idea was more ancient. Details of this debate are not relevant here, although they may sometimes illustrate the confusion around the name of the land in an unfortunately ironic manner. In any case, suffice it to repeat at this point that the Sassanians shaped Iranian royal tradition in significant ways and to stress that they remained its primary point of reference for more than a millennium after the advent of Islam.

As regards the exact delineation of Iranian territory under the Sassanians as well as under the Mongols, this is an issue which Fragner does not address. It seems that there were basically two conceptions. According to the first, Iran stretched from the Oxus in the east to the Euphrates in the west and according to the second, it extended even further to the Nile. One question arising in view of the latter definition is whether all the lands over which the Sassanians or later the Mongols claimed or exercised suzerainty at least temporarily were considered to be part of the territory of Iran. Be that as it may, the realm of the Ilkhans was generally restricted to the lands between the Oxus and the Euphrates including large parts of Anatolia and Iraq. This area had also been central under several pre-Islamic royal dynasties of Iran. Occasional Ilkhanid

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120 Daryaee, Touraj: Sassanian Persia. The Rise and Fall of an Empire, I.B. Tauris, London 2009. In contrast to the title of the book, the author put the name and the territorial-political concept of ‘Iran’ in three out of five chapter headings and rightly stresses their importance.
campaigns against their Chinggisid neighbors and repeated invasions of Syria confronting the rising Mamluk Sultans of Egypt who were allied with the Jochids had no lasting success. Fragner argues that the revival of the idea of a distinct territorial-political entity named Iran was part of a deliberate policy pursued by the Ilkhanids against the background of disintegrating tendencies in the Mongol Empire. He further explains that the rulers from the house of Hülegü strove to become a regional power, that is to integrate themselves in the political and cultural area of the Middle East, so their alleged policy culminated in Ghazan’s conversion to Islam. Finally, Fragner claims that all modern and contemporary political concepts of ‘Iran’ were directly derived from the Mongol notion which the supposed policy of reviving the name brought forth and which implied a special significance of Tabriz.¹²² These aspects of Fragner’s argument have been discussed in greater detail in my above-mentioned article on the connections between the name and territorial idea of Iran, the vision of Iranian history as a succession of dynasties and royal buildings of Tabriz.¹²³ Based on Melville’s research on the short, but highly influential universal history of the famous Quran commentator Nāṣir al-Dīn Bayḍāvī,¹²⁴ the article has revised Fragner’s argument in two important respects. First, the revival of the name ‘Iran’ as designation for a distinct territorial-political entity was indeed rather driven by the indigenous elites writing in Persian and not so much a deliberate policy pursued by the Mongol Ilkhanid rulers. Second, that revival was underway well before Ghazan and identifying this territorial-political entity with the Ilkhanid dominions remained separate from ascribing a special significance to Tabriz even though a relation between these two operations on the ideological level of Persianate political culture also evolved gradually.¹²⁵ Both points have already been noted above and not been made sufficiently clear by Fragner. Originally written in 674/1275, Bayḍāvī’s work explicitly delineates the territorial boundaries of Iran, calls the land by its name and expounds its history as a succession of ruling dynasties of which the Mongol Ilkhans were the last. Only a few years before Bayḍāvī wrote the first recension of his short universal history, the Ilkhans had secured control of Khurasan against their Chaghadaid cousins. Biran called the battle of Herat in 668/1270 a “full-scale and decisive combat”, stressing that it involved all four Chinggisid dynasties and that it was influential in shaping the borders of their realms.¹²⁶ As far as the territory of the house of Hülegū is

¹²⁴ Dates given for Bayḍāvī’s death range from 685/1286 to 716/1316 most scholars, including Melville favoring the later options, see Kohlberg, Etan: “Bayzāwī, Nāṣir-al-Dīn”, Encyclopedia Iranica, online edition, 1989. Since this note, no more certainty could be gained regarding this matter which cannot be discussed further here. I might just add that I think a date around 710/1310 or 711/1311 to be most likely.
concerned, David Morgan has, unlike Biran, explicitly addressed Fragner’s argument and objected that the delineation of Iran’s modern borders has more to do with military successes and failures of the early Safavids than with the Mongol Ilkhans.\footnote{Morgan, David: “The Mongols in Iran: A Reappraisal”, \textit{Iran} 42 (2004), pp. 131-6 [here: p.135].} Morgan’s objection is not entirely unjustified but also seems to miss the point a bit. As noted, Fragner’s argument is about modern and contemporary political concepts of ‘Iran’, thus the notion of a distinct entity which bears that name and has relatively clearly delineated territorial borders. Military successes of the Mongols in Iran, for example in the battle of Herat, were a necessary precondition on the practical level of political culture for the renewed foundational association of that notion with the Ilkhanid dynasty on the ideological level.

Bayḍāvī’s short universal history identifies the Ilkhanid dominions with the territory of a quasi-eternal kingdom named Iran in a very self-confident manner. Another major characteristic of the work is an innovative fourfold division of history – Biblical prophets, pre-Islamic Iranian royal dynasties, the prophet Muḥammad followed by the Rightly Guided, the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs and, finally, rulers of the Iranian lands in Islamic times. This division implies and betrays a strong focus on Iran so that the past of that kingdom apparently accounted for much of universal history. The basic structure of the fourfold division was adopted by many later Persian authors, but also by at least two contemporaries of Bayḍāvī. One of them was working outside the Mongol dominions but, nonetheless, identified the land which Hülegü conquered as Iran and named it accordingly. The third Persian universal history from the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century adopting that fourfold division as basic structure is Zajjājī’s \textit{Humāyūnnāma}. Based on my research of this local source, the article on the connections between the name and territorial-political concept of Iran, the vision of its history as a succession of dynasties and royal buildings of Tabriz has not only begun to refine Fragner’s argument, but also to supplement Melville’s findings on Bayḍāvī’s work.

While all three of these Persian universal histories adopt the same basic structure, there are significant differences with regards to the dynasties that each author includes among the Muslim ruling houses of Iran that preceded the Mongols. Those shared by all three are the Samanids, the Ghaznavids, the Buyids and the Seljuks. Which and how many others the authors included seems to depend in part on their place of origin and work and a corresponding view of universal history very much through a local lens as well. Zajjājī is notably the only one to include the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan among the pre-Mongol ruling houses of Iran. Moreover, his \textit{Humāyūnnāma} even associates the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom bearing that name with Tabriz. The connection is made through the Atabeg Abū Bakr (d.
607/1210), the first Eldigüzid ruler after the end of the Seljuk dynasty in Iran and the first to be based at Tabriz. In two of the submitted articles, I have stressed that Zajjājī changes the structure of his work from the time of Abū Bakr onwards, leaving the dynastic pattern behind and switching to successive rulers of the city whom he obviously regards as kings of Iran.\footnote{Zakrzewski: “An Idea of Iran on Mongol Foundations”, p. 52. Idem.: “Local Elites and Dynamic Succession”, pp. 360-1.}

As has likewise been noted in the article, the change of the structuring pattern which Zajjājī makes for the period from the reign of the Atabeg Abū Bakr onwards implies that the \textit{Humāyūnnāma} includes the Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn,\footnote{Paul, Jürgen: “Jalāl al-Dīn Mangburnū”, \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam – Three}, 2018-1, pp. 142-6.} the famous warrior against the Mongols, only in his capacity as temporary lord of Tabriz. The Khwarazmshah dynasty as a ruling house of Iran is lacking in Zajjājī’s universal history whereas his two contemporary authors do devote a chapter to it. Melville has found that some manuscript copies of Bayḍāvī’s work even feature the Ismāʿīlī lords of Alamut as predecessors of the Mongol Ilkhans in the fourth section. Moreover, he has argued convincingly that a second recension was probably made by Bayḍāvī himself when Ghazan ascended to the throne as Muslim king of Iran in 694/1295.\footnote{Melville, Charles: “FromAdam to Abaqa: Qāḍī Bayḍāvī’s rearrangement of history (Part II)”, \textit{Studia Iranica} 36 (2007), pp. 7-64 [here: pp. 8-9, 15-26, 31-2].} The Ismāʿīlīs were usually regarded as heretics, but their inclusion as a royal dynasty of Iran appears to be consistent with the stated goal of the author and with the way his history is structured. To take over the land, Hülegū had to defeat the lords of Alamut so it would be the Ismāʿīlīs, first and foremost, and not so much the Abbasids whom the Ilkhans followed in a proper and uninterrupted sequence of rulers and kings of Iran.

Be that as it may, seen from Tabriz and Azerbaijan, it certainly made sense to consider the Eldigüzids a more important ruling house than the Khwarazmshahs. While Zajjājī speaks respectfully about the Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn, his universal history presents him merely as a successor to the house of Eldigüz. For a few years, he ruled the royal city of still Islamic Iran, but was killed trying to escape the Mongol armies dispatched westward by Great Khan Ögedei that took control of Azerbaijan and adjacent lands beyond the Iranian plateau in 628/1231. The Ilkhans are not even that prominent in the \textit{Humāyūnnāma} perhaps because the dynasty was still very much embattled and its realm far from secure while Zajjājī composed his work. However, in addition to associating the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran with the Eldigüzids and Tabriz in a foundational manner, the local poet-historian also posits a special relation between the city and Mongol rule since the first invasion at the time of Chinggis Khan.\footnote{Zakrzewski: “An Idea of Iran on Mongol Foundations”, pp. 52-3. Idem.: “Local Elites and Dynamic Succession”, pp. 360-1, 368-9.} As the last section of this chapter will further discuss, Tabriz never offered resistance to the Mongols and peaceful interaction was mutually beneficial.
The concept of ‘places’ as explained by Trausch seems to be a suitable tool to analyze such specific perspectives within broader trends in Persian historical writing and to explain them as variations in political culture, especially on the ideological level. As noted above, these ‘places’ are primarily understood not as concrete physical localities but as specific cultural preconditions determining the communication practice of historical actors. But Trausch remarks that such ‘places’ can also be actual ‘places of power’, citing as examples royal courts and the cities of Herat and Qazvin from which most tenth/sixteenth century Persian historians hailed.132 Herat has been mentioned as an imperial center rivalling Tabriz for much of the ninth/fifteenth century when it was the principal city of the Timurid dynasty, Qazvin became the principal city of the Safavids when Tabriz was stripped of that status in the middle of the tenth/sixteenth. When Zajjājī wrote the *Humāyūnnāma*, he was living in the urban center which had already been associated most closely with Mongol rule for several decades and been shaped mainly by the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan in the preceding period. This may well be expected to provide a fair amount specific cultural preconditions determining his communication practice as it can be observed in the *Humāyūnnāma*.

I will return to Trausch’s findings on similarities and differences between historical works written under the early Safavids in Herat and Qazvin toward the end of this section. Yet, it may be noted now that among the differences, one is the way they incorporate the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy into Iranian history and royal tradition while designing broadly similar fictions of coherence, to bring back the term already borrowed from Pistor-Hatam above. The territory of Iran is a critical point of reference for these fictions of coherence and the succession of royal dynasties is a basic characteristic of its history. As noted above and shown in the most recent of the submitted articles, the territory and the name of Iran as well as the notion that kingship of that land had been transmitted from one ruler or ruling house to the next since the creation of mankind were already common for Bayḍāvī and his contemporaries.

It has likewise been noted that identifying the Ilkhanid dominions with a territorially distinct, quasi-eternal kingdom named Iran and ascribing a special significance to Tabriz remained separate operations on the ideological level of Persianate political culture. While Zajjājī’s *Humāyūnnāma* shows that from a local point of view, Tabriz may have been seen as royal city of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran during the transition from Eldigüzid to Mongol rule, the relation between these two operations for Persianate political culture more broadly was primarily forged through Ghazan by later historians writing for the Ilkhans.

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In my most recent article, I have discussed in somewhat greater detail how well-known authors, such as Rashīd al-Dīn, Qāshānī and Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī contributed to the gradual evolution of the relation between those two operations. Mustawfī has been singled out as especially noteworthy not only due to his role in the production of the ‘Great Mongol Shāhnāma’ but also because he explicitly designates Tabriz as ‘the dome of Islam of Iran (qubbat al-Islām i Īrān)’. As explained above, the designation is an obvious reference to the city as the site of Ghazan’s mausoleum. It may be added that in contrast to Zajjājī whose communication practice was rooted in the local setting of Tabriz, Mustawfī’s main ‘places’ in the sense proposed by Trausch were probably his native city of Qazvin and the Ilkhanid court to which he was closely attached. Given the lack of a local background, it seems even more significant that Mustawfī binds the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran and the notion that Tabriz was its royal city together in such an outspoken manner.

When Ilkhanid rule collapsed in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, the link between these two ideological level features of Persianate political culture was also recognized by Arabic writers in the Mamluk dominions of Egypt and Syria. The example in the article shows that like in many Persian writings, the special status of Tabriz usually extended to sites in the immediate environs and the rural hinterland of the city that were intimately related to it. These localities, notably the site of Ghazan’s mausoleum, had a strong connection to the celebrated convert Ilkhan as well, but the issue will only be further discussed in the next section. At this point, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that variations in ideological level Persianate political culture became more clearly visible after the end of the Ilkhanid dynasty as there was no single political entity centered on the Iranian plateau anymore.

Major variations pertain to the relevance of the specific Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. One way to observe them is by comparing historical writings produced at Timurid courts, mainly in eastern Iran and Central Asia, with works written in western Iran under the dynasties who succeeded the house of Hülegü as actual lords of Tabriz, Azerbaijan and adjacent lands in Caucasia and Anatolia. Thanks to the tremendous output not only of historical literature but of works in various artistic and scientific domains under their watch, the Timurids have received great scholarly attention since long time whereas their rivals, notably the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu are often dealt with rather cursorily. But as my most recent article has shown, these dynasties, in addition to the Chupanids for whom no history was written, should be counted as the actual successors to the house of Hülegü.

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134 Ibid., p. 57.
135 Ibid., pp. 57-64.
Historians affiliated with Timurid courts did, of course, recognize elements of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy, but it appears to have been less relevant to them than to their counterparts working for the Jalayirids and the Turkmen. The notable exception seems to be Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī who was a native of the place where Ghazan’s mausoleum was built and uses the specific honorary epithet qubbat al-Islām for Tabriz at least twice.\textsuperscript{136} However, like his colleagues, he was far removed from the practical politics driving the process of perpetuating the notion that Tabriz stood for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran.

Histories of the Iranian lands since the time of Mongol rule which were produced at Timurid courts tend ascribe greater relevance to ideological alternatives to the specific Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. Authors were often ambiguous regarding the status of Tabriz and its uniqueness, perhaps because the fact remained that Timur first had to invade Iran and conquer it and that his realm retained its center in Transoxiana. Besides, they transformed Timur more and more into a dynastic founder in his own right while also increasingly emphasizing his connection to the Chinggisids through the house of Chaghadai. Finally, unlike their above-mentioned western rivals, the Timurids hardly ever exercised effective control over the Ilkhanid heartland of Azerbaijan.

In general, notions of sovereignty and legitimacy which prevailed under the Chupanids, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu certainly belonged to a similar frame of reference as those prevailing under the Timurids. There were genealogical or dynastic factors, for many ruling houses especially the connection to the Chinggisids and of course also the Islamic and Iranian traditions with their mutual links and their shared elements. For western dynasties, possessing Tabriz seems to have been an important additional factor and distinguishing it as principal urban center of the realm or specifically as royal city of Islamic Iran appears to have been more focused and consistent among their historians. They frequently equal control of Tabriz and its hinterland sites with the most rightful claim to Iranian kingship or even Iranian kingship itself and understandably use a variety of honorary epithets to designate the city. A local eye-witness account of a sack of Tabriz by a Jochid army in 787/1385 is the only other text I could find that uses qubbat al-Islām but does so repeatedly.

However, there are also more general histories that have been much lesser studied than works from Timurid courts but that put considerably greater stress on the perpetuation of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy and the special significance of Tabriz it implied. Some major examples have been analyzed in my most recent article. They include the universal history which Quṭb al-Dīn Aharī wrote for the Jalayirid sultan Uways (d. 776/1374), the history of the Turkmen dynasties

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., pp. 60-1.
which Abū Bakr Ṭihrānī began for Jahānshāh Qara Qoyunlu (d. 872/1467) and eventually dedicated to the latter’s great enemy Uzun Ḥasan Aq Qoyunlu (d. 882/1478) as well as Faḍl Allāh Khunjī Īṣfahānī’s history of the reign of Ya’qūb Aq Qoyunlu (d. 896/1490).

In an article which has already been mentioned but not been submitted for the cumulative dissertation, I have compared Ṭihrānī’s work of a well-known ninth/fifteenth century historian from Transoxiana and affiliated with the Timurid court at Herat. The article argues that certain differences between the two histories seem to reflect variations within the broader framework of Persianate political culture, especially on the ideological level. Differences pertain to basic characteristics like form, structure and style but also to more specific matters, such as the use of terminology and imagery related to pastoral nomadism. The analytical focus of the article has been on this issue but among the variations, the relevance that each author could and did ascribe to the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy has also been noted. Ṭihrānī highlights the importance of Tabriz for the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu rulers and its special significance as royal city of Islamic Iran much more than his eastern Iranian colleague serving the Timurids.

Different dynastic loyalties may help explain such ideological variations in political culture as expressed in ninth/fifteenth century Persian historiography. However, as with the seventh/thirteenth century universal histories discussed above, different cultural preconditions bound to long-term structures and shaping communication practice, that is ‘places’ in the abstract sense explained by Trausch, may even further enhance our understanding of relevant variations, especially with regards to the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. Moreover, Trausch remarks that much of the political and cultural heritage represented by the Turkmen dynasties lived on at Qazvin as an actual place of historical writing after the coming to power of the Safavids and that the same applies to the heritage represented by the Timurids at Herat. Hence, some degree of ideological variation in Persianate political culture with regards to the relevance ascribed to the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy or to some of its elements, at least, may also be expected to persist in tenth/sixteenth courtly historiography attributable to either city.

Trausch is certainly right to note that all tenth/sixteenth century courtly historians told the same story, roughly the consolidation of Safavid rule as conclusion of the history of humankind. Yet, given certain variations in their works, they also seem to emphasize different aspects of that story, depending on the ‘place’ and notably with regards to the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. Trausch has focused on four works, notably that of Khwāndamīr which can be attributed to

139 Ibid., p. 38.
Herat, and those of Yahyā Sayfī Qazvīnī, ʿAlīmd Ghaffārī Qazvīnī and ʿHasan Beg Rūmlū which can be attributed to Qazvin. He has identified structure as a key difference between works attributable to either city demonstrated this by summarizing the basic organization of each. But his subject was, of course, neither the use of the territorial-political concept ‘Iran’ nor the significance of Tabriz in the histories of those four chroniclers of early Safavid rule and also not how they structure the past out of which the family rose to the throne. Among sources analyzed by Trausch, the universal histories of Sayfī and Ghaffārī as well as that of Khwāndamīr have been the most fruitful to address questions raised in this dissertation. There are a couple of differences between the latter work and the other two which indicate that the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy did indeed not have the same relevance in the courtly histories attributable to either Qazvin or Herat. While all three authors do apply honorary epithets to Tabriz, none of them couples these epithets to the territorial-political concept ‘Iran’. A major difference is that Khwāndamīr does not even seem to use the term once in his account of the early Safavids whereas both historians from Qazvin specifically point out that the new rulers had become kings of Iran. Another thing all three authors have in common is that they generally refer to the Ottomans as lords of Rum. In my most recent article, I have analyzed a letter from the Aq Qoyunlu chancery to Sultan Mehmet, the conqueror of Constantinople in 857/1453, which the Persian scribes who drafted it, used to invoke all the historical depth of relations between the realms of Rum and Iran. Thus, the juxtaposition of these two territorial-political designation was not without recent precedent under the early Safavids, but it seems indeed to indicate a variation in relevance of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy whether the kingdom of Iran is explicitly named or not. Khwāndamīr’s universal history is one of the sources on which Bashir bases his above-mentioned criticism of Hodgson and others for their understanding of Islamic history as a single, unified timeline from the prophet Muḥammad onwards. It is also one of the examples that serve him to demonstrate alternative conceptualizations of time in Islamic literature itself, in fact the one which brings together the same variety of traditions and histories as the process of making Tabriz stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. Bashir defines these different strands of times as “[…] the religious view of time which was anchored in the Quranic version of the biblical account of creation; the time represented in

140 Ibid., 50-52, 80-100.
Persian mythology, concerned with ancient kings who had ruled until the Islamic conquest of Iran; and Mongol time as present in the history of Chingiz Khan and his descendants.144

The universal histories written by Sayfī Qazvīnī and Ghaffārī Qazvīnī bring together the very same strands of time. This also means that early tenth/sixteenth century Persian historians generally saw the Mongol conquests as having ushered in a historical era they were still living through, to some extent. As helpful it has been for the purposes of this study to look at which dynasties mid seventh/thirteenth century historians included as predecessors of the Mongols as useful it seems to look at least at the dynasties included as predecessors of the Safavids in the early tenth/sixteenth century histories.

Comparing how Khwāndamīr, on the one hand, and Sayfī and Ghaffārī, on the other, structured their narratives up to Safavid rule, one thing is striking although it may seem obvious to many. While both historians from Qazvin devote a proper chapter to the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu as royal dynasties of Iran, the author from Herat only includes them as marginal figures in his account of the Timurids. The only exception in Khwāndamīr’s history is Uzun Hasan Aq Qoyunlu who was a maternal uncle of the first Safavid ruler Shah Ismāʿīl and whose dynasty gets a summary entry as he came to power. Viewing the Turkmen as marginal political formations has long dominated historical scholarship as well but is misleading. As I have noted in my most recent article with regards to Hans Robert Roemer’s assessment of the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu, their rule was highly influential in perpetuating the idea that Tabriz stands for a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran as it had emerged under the Mongols. Thus, more than the Timurids, the Turkmen, as rulers of Tabriz in succession to Ghazan, strengthened the very foundation on which a central element of the Safavid claim to royal dignity rested.145

Taking Khwāndamīr’s work as example, histories attributable to Herat as a ‘place’ in the sense explained by Trausch seem to not only avoid the term ‘Iran’ to designate the kingdom which the Safavids inherited when they took over Tabriz and then expanded so that it largely aligned with the territorial notion. They tend to obscure the sequence of dynastic succession which was associated with the perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz and whose members had left corresponding marks in Iranian royal tradition and Persianate political culture. While the Eldigüzids were the most important pre-Mongol dynasty associated with the emergence of the special significance of Tabriz, the Chupanids, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu were the ruling houses most closely associated with the perpetuation of the Ilkhanid-

Ghazanid legacy after the end of the Chinggisids in Iran. It is that specific sequence to which the Safavids succeeded as a new royal dynasty, in the first place.

As a local source also attributable to Tabriz as a ‘place’ in the sense defined by Trausch and covering the entire era under study, the Raudāt al-jinān of Ibn Karbalāʾī makes that historical vision quite clear. The work features summaries of the histories of all the above-mentioned dynasties and of the Khwarazmshahs but not of the Timurids although members of this house briefly ruled or temporarily occupied Tabriz as well and even claimed suzerainty over it. In some instances, the author even identifies rulers as kings of Iran who did not control Tabriz at the indicated point in time but who would be considered its rightful lords as members of a dynasty from that sequence. The specific sequence of dynastic succession running from the Eldigüzids through the Mongols, specifically the house of Hülegü, the Chupanids, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu to the Safavids – with brief interludes of Khwarazmian rule and Timurid conquest – will also emerge as decisive in the next two sections.

3.2 Azerbaijan as Central Region: Camps, Courts, Kingly Monuments

As noted above, the vaqf-complexes erected by Ghazan and subsequent rulers could justify considering Tabriz as royal city literally coming to stand for the idea of an Islamic kingdom named Iran. Together with other royal buildings in and around the city, such kingly monuments may appear as marking intersections between the practical and the ideological level of Persianate political culture. Moreover, they may appear as combining aspects of Tabriz standing for that idea as both, a physical place and a symbolic site.

On the practical level of political culture proper, the preferences which guided the celebrated convert Ilkhan and his successors to placing their royal monuments in and around Tabriz, seem to result mainly from the modalities of nomadic rule. As has likewise been noted, nomadic rulers generally stayed outside of cities. Instead, their courts usually moved between summer and winter pastures as mobile military encampments, often with large flocks. Yet, nomadic rulers would in many cases also favor a particular city, spending comparatively much time in its environs, providing for their burial there or both.

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146 Ibn Karbalāʾī: Raudāt al-jinān va jannāt al-jannān, vol. 1, pp. 85, 386, vol. 2, p. 111. When giving the date of death of a person whose tomb the author describes, he often indicates in which ruler’s reign it occurred. For instance, he notes that the important local Sufi Bihb Faraj Tabrizī died in 568/1172-3, during the reign of Atabeg Eldigür, that an ancestor of his own Sufi master whose family became known as the Sayyids of Llala died in 793/1391, during the reign of Sultan Ahmad Jalayir and that the calligrapher Khwāja ʿAbd al-Ḥayy died in 825/1422, at the beginning of the reign of Iskandar Qara Qoyunlu. The latter did indeed come to power at the time but repeatedly fled Tabriz before Timurid invasions, Sultan Ahmad Jalayir did not exercise stable control of Tabriz in the indicated year and the Atabeg Eldigūz was in fact never lord of Tabriz because it was only his son and successor who took over the city for the dynasty.
Although the documentation in the sources is comparatively scarce, it seems safe to assume that Tabriz was a focal point of royal migration routes for most of the era under study. Furthermore, preferred royal campsites were located either in the immediate vicinity of the city or farther off in Azerbaijan and adjacent lands in Caucasus and Anatolia. Fragner mentions only briefly that the natural conditions of the region were highly suitable for pastoral nomadism and generally adopts the more traditional view that it was only following the Mongol invasions that the phenomenon became a “[...] basic socio-economic, structural feature of the late medieval and premodern Iranian society [which] produced some strong effects and impacts on what might be called the political culture of Iran during these periods.”

Despite this, he does not seem to factor the modalities of nomadic rule and the effects and impacts it had on Persianate political culture into his argument about how Tabriz acquired and preserved its special significance as royal city of Islamic Iran. Fragner sees the geographical location of Tabriz on the north-western fringes of the Iranian plateau as peripheral which has been shown to be inaccurate for the era under inquiry due to the prevailing conditions of nomadic rule. A couple of scholars have argued convincingly that the extended region of Azerbaijan and neighboring areas gained in political importance and centrality after the Seljuk invasion, especially since the middle of the sixth/twelfth century, and then again in the wake of the Mongol conquests.

Peacock has stressed the importance of Azerbaijan and adjacent lands for the Seljuks as nomadic rulers and Durand-Guédy that the geopolitical centrality of that extended region became more and more obvious in the second half of the sixth/twelfth century when the Eldigüzids increasingly overpowered the Seljuk sultans. Sara Nur Yıldız has focused on developments following the Mongol invasions and shown that, “[...] the political, ecological and economic regional system extending [from eastern Anatolia] into the Azerbaijani and Armenian highlands and the western Iranian plateau, as well the lowlands in the Jazira and in the vicinity of Baghdad”, became even more central under the Ilkhans and their successors. She explains that an axis between the new principal city Tabriz and the former caliphal seat Baghdad constituted the center of those nomadic dynasties and that controlling the principal urban center required a measure of control over the peripheral areas along that axis.

Building on that research, the attempted refinement of Fragner’s argument undertaken here presumes that the Ilkhanid heartland of Azerbaijan and adjacent lands was a geopolitically

147 Fragner: “Iran under Ilkhanid rule”, p. 127.
149 Yıldız: “Post-Mongol Pastoral Polities in Eastern Anatolia during the Late Middle Ages”, p. 28.
150 Ibid., pp. 30-3.
central extended region and well suited to serve as base for nomadic rulers of a realm stretching over the Iranian plateau. But while the Mongol conquests, especially the emergence of the Ilkhanid realm, certainly fueled the integration of that extended region, the modalities of nomadic rule were not only a major practical level factor for perpetuating the interpretation that Tabriz stood for the idea of a kingdom epitomized by Ghazan but also for attracting the Mongols to Azerbaijan in the first place.

Kingly monuments in and around the city and, to some extent, also the principal royal campsites in the rural hinterland of Tabriz have been addressed in three of the articles submitted for the cumulative dissertation.151 Yet, it seems helpful to provide an overview here, especially of important royal grazing grounds farther off in Azerbaijan and beyond the extended region. As noted above, the usually seasonal migrations characterizing a nomadic pastoralist lifestyle often combined several purposes for rulers during the era under inquiry. With regards to royal campsites, this needs to be stressed, too, regardless of their proximity or distance to Tabriz. The same localities would serve as grazing and hunting grounds, as areas for official receptions or festivities, such as the enthronement of a ruler or the circumcision of a prince, and as offensive or defensive positions in military conflicts.

One of the royal summer campsites (yaylaq) in the extended region of Azerbaijan was known as Alaṭāq and located on the high plateaus east of Lake Van. It is best attested as such during the time of the Mongol Ilkhans, Hülegü having, for instance, once received an influential notable of Tabriz there, but at least one Qara Qoyunlu ruler is also reported to have made camp at Alaṭāq.152 Some of the preferred winter pastures (qishlaq) were situated in the region of Arrān, just north of the river Aras bordering on Azerbaijan, the two regions being often mentioned jointly. The areas of Qarabāgh and Nakhjavān belonged to the major royal winter campsites during the entire era under study. The Eldigüzids up to Atabeg Abū Bakr, for example, mainly moved between Hamadan which was then the principal city of the Seljuks, and Nakhjavān which was their original base.153 Yet, both areas in Arrān are well documented as destinations of courtly seasonal migrations up to the time of early Safavid rule.154

153 Zakrzewski: “Lords of Tabriz”, p. 120. Idem.: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, p. 360.
To the south and west of Azerbaijan, there were rich summer grazing grounds in the areas known as Sughurluq or Surluq and as Sharūyāz or Qonqor Öleng from where rulers could also easily head off for winter in Baghdad. Sughurluq or Surluq is the area where the above-mentioned Sassanian site of Takh-i Sulaymān is located which the Mongols revived as a place of royal presence. Ilkhanid and Safavid rulers, in particular, are reported to have spent summers in that area.\textsuperscript{155} The meadow of Sharūyāz, north-west of Zanjān, in turn, is well attested as a royal campsite since the time of the Seljuks and was used as such throughout the entire era under study, but often called Qonqor Öleng after the Mongol conquests.\textsuperscript{156} This is the area where Ghazan’s brother and successor Öljjeitū (d. 716/1316) developed the site of Sulṭāniyya to erect his own mausoleum as part of a royal \textit{vaqf}-complex.

Haneda has analyzed Sulṭāniyya as an example of ‘the pastoral and the mausoleum city’ in his article which argues that the Mongols introduced that new form of urbanism in the Iranian lands. While he notes that the area was called Sharūyāz in pre-Mongol times, his temporal horizon does not exceed Öljjeitū’s and Ghazan’s father, the Ilkhan Arghun (d. 690/1291).\textsuperscript{157} However, it seems unlikely that the area was completely undeveloped before the Ilkhans turned their attention to it given that the Seljuks had already taken their royal encampments there. This example of continuity on the practical level of Persianate political culture has not been given in the context of the brief discussion of Haneda’s argument in my most recent article.\textsuperscript{158}

As noted above, Haneda presents Ghazan’s \textit{vaqf}-complex, called ‘Ghazaniyya’, and another royal \textit{vaqf}-complex of Tabriz, the Naṣriyya which was named after Uzun Hasan Aq Qoyunlu, as the other two examples of a ‘pastoral and mausoleum city’ and stresses the similarities with Sulṭāniyya. I will return to the Ghazaniyya and the Naṣriyya shortly and have already noted in that brief discussion that Haneda’s argument seems to underestimate a significant difference between these two sites, on the one hand, and Sulṭāniyya, on the other. The latter was situated in a relatively remote rural area whereas the \textit{vaqf}-complexes of Ghazan and Uzun Hasan stood in the immediate vicinity of the principal city, the first to the west and the second to the north. Other rulers and courtiers built similar complexes and at this point, it seems useful to underline once more that even during the reigns of Öljjeitū and his successor, the last Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd (d. 735/1336), when Sulṭāniyya enjoyed special favors, it could not eclipse the political centrality of Tabriz.\textsuperscript{159}

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\item[159] Ibid., p. 56.
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All three examples presented by Haneda raise the question if these sites which included a royal mausoleum and were basically nomad camps can indeed be categorized as cities. For the Ghazaniyya and the Naṣriyya, the question is obvious as they essentially belonged to an established city even though Shām or Shanb-i Ghāzān is sometimes mentioned as a place distinct from Tabriz. Haneda’s insistence that these sites did indeed constitute cities seems especially surprising because he explicitly bases his proposition on the research of Aubin.

Yet, Aubin pointed out in his seminal article that a city, an urban agglomeration, needs to have a hinterland by stating unequivocally that, “the agglomeration cannot be dissociated from its territory.” It is not clear how Ghazaniyya or Naṣriyya as proper cities could have had a hinterland separate from that of Tabriz as this was evidently the agglomeration to which these sites and more territory belonged.

The hinterland of Tabriz encompassed the slopes of Mount Sahand and the site of Ujān as places where the nomadic rulers of the era frequently camped in summer. Mount Sahand is attested throughout most of the era under inquiry, but it is extremely difficult to determine the exact locations where royal courts made camp. The compiler of the Safīna, a member of the eminent Malikān family, as has been noted above, gives at least the name a specific site. He notes in three colophons that he copied the respective works on three consecutive days in late Jumādā II 721/late July 1321 at a site in the Sahand area which was called Āb-i Rūdān Sar in Persian (bi-maqām Sahand yudā bi-l-fārsiyya Āb-i Rūdān Sar). It is highly likely that the compiler of the Safīna stayed at this place in a courtly retinue and that he would have had no reason to go there were it not for direct or indirect ties to the nomadic ruling elites.

As for Ujān, the site was a city which could be said to have been Ghazan’s capital for a time, according to Haneda. Leaving aside the issue of ‘capital’ which has been addressed briefly above, it seems unlikely that there were permanent urban structures at Ujān although a major pre-Mongol author stated that the armies of Chinggis Khan destroyed the town of the area (wa qad kharraba al-Tātār madīnat).

Whether or not there was an urban settlement at the site of Ujān prior to the Mongol invasions, the nomadic rulers of that period definitely already made

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165 Haneda: “The Pastoral City and the Mausoleum City”, p. 151.
camp in the area for various reasons which were usually related to Tabriz. Two such stays have been mentioned in a footnote in one of the submitted articles focusing on the local elites, but a few more could be cited for the period of Eldigüizid rule.

The most recent among the submitted articles which focuses on visions of history as a sequence of dynastic succession and the kingly monuments of Tabriz emphasized two different points about Ujān. One is the long-term importance of the site which can be seen in the fact that the above-mentioned Aq Qoyunlu ruler Sultan Ya’qūb reportedly renovated a palace which Ghazan had built there but which had allegedly fallen into decay by the end of the ninth/fifteenth century. The second point emphasized in the article is that Ujān was considered intimately connected to Tabriz, notably during the reign of the celebrated convert Ilkhan. Research results of the dissertation pertaining to an issue related to the practical level of Persianate political culture confirm this connection also for the pre-Mongol and the post-Ilkhanid period. Several important instances of political interaction between representatives of the local elites of Tabriz, on the one hand, and rulers or aspiring rulers of the city, on the other, took place at Ujān. Some will be discussed in the next section based on two of the submitted articles focusing on the local elites where the site has unfortunately not been named.

If Ujān which is located about 50 km south-east of Tabriz was so closely connected to the city, vaqf-complexes, such as the Ghazaniyya and the Naṣriyya, may perhaps best be understood as suburbs. The question to what extent and at which time Sultāniyya possibly constituted a proper city with regular urban life apart from courtly presence needs to be left open here. Comparing the two suburbs discussed by Haneda, one thing to note is that the Aq Qoyunlu complex was built much closer to the walls of old Tabriz which most probably dated from the fifth/eleventh century when the city was still comparatively small even for a regional center. There is no precise information on buildings erected under the Eldigüizids, especially since the time of Abū Bakr, and it seems unlikely that the Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn added noteworthy kingly monuments during his short reign which he mostly spent on campaign.

As I have stressed in the most recent of the submitted articles, Haneda argues convincingly that the vaqf was of utmost importance for the continued existence of sites such as Sultāniyya, Ghazaniyya and Naṣriyya. Hence, it also holds true for another royal mosque-mausoleum-complex of Tabriz, the Qara Qoyunlu Muẓaffariyya to the east of the city which was named after Jahānshāh but founded by his wife with her female descendants as beneficiaries of the

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169 Ibid., p. 54.
vaqf. The Muẓaffariyya has been addressed in two of the submitted articles focusing on the local elites and in the one focusing on the royal buildings of Tabriz.\textsuperscript{172} One point stressed in the latter article, especially with regards to the famous ‘Blue Mosque’ which forms the heart of the Muẓaffariyya complex, is the possibility that relevant artistic techniques had transmitted locally since the time of the Ilkhans. Another one is the inscription while the calligrapher who made it has remained without mention in the article.

This man may be seen as an example of locally transmitted artistic techniques and I have discussed him and a couple of calligrapher families of Tabriz during the era under study in a project working paper published online.\textsuperscript{173} As the issue pertains more to the local elites, it will be taken up again in the next section. For now, it may suffice to add that the Chupanid mosque-mausoleum-complex in the eastern part of the city which became known as Ustād-Shāgird after the two renowned calligraphers who decorated it, must also be counted among the kingly monuments of Tabriz. That complex and another Chupanid royal building justify the inclusion of this dynasty in the sequence of succession which provided for the perpetuation of the special significance of the city. While the Chupanids were indeed short-lived as a ruling house only a few other dynasties in that sequence also controlled Tabriz for much longer. The other royal building the exact location of which is unknown dates from the time when the Chupanids were still a family of leading military aristocrats under the Ilkhans, several Jalayirid rulers were eventually buried there.\textsuperscript{174}

Besides royal mosque-mausoleum-complexes which were usually sustained by a pious endowment (\textit{vaqf}), there were other kingly monuments in Tabriz as well. The most important of these were palace-like structures likewise mostly located outside the walls of the old city with garden areas around. One such building, known as \textit{dawlat-khāna}, was attributed to the Jalayirid Sultan Shaykh-Uvays (d. 776/1374) but probably an older structure.\textsuperscript{175} It was probably located to the north of Tabriz not far from where Jahānshāh Qara Qoyunlu later had a new \textit{dawlat-khāna} built. The Naṣriyya complex and a palace which was also erected under the Aq Qoyunlu and later used by the Safavids as well stood in the same area, known as Ṣāḥib-Ābād.\textsuperscript{176} As I have noted in the most recent submitted article, scholars may sometimes mention that the name derives from the famous Ilkhanid vizier Shams al-Dīn Juvaynī (ex. 684/1283) but often convey the false impression that the Ṣāḥib-Ābād area was devoid of buildings before the

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., pp. 63-4.
Turkmen dynasties. Currently, there is no information on what may have been destroyed or added between the middle of the seventh/thirteenth and the second half of the ninth/fifteenth century. However, it is even possible that already the Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn and the Eldigūzids before him stayed in that area when they were at Tabriz.

Although no royal buildings are known, the Eldigūzids may be said to mark the beginning of the specific sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence of the special significance of the city and the Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn should be included. The Ilkhans were primary reference point in that sequence and Ghazan’s vaqf-complex stood as a foundational pillar of the idea that Tabriz is the royal city of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. As noted, the Chupanids must be included among the dynasties providing for the perpetuation of that idea although the Jalayirids and the Qara Qoyunlu were certainly the more important ruling houses in this sequence of succession. The Aq Qoyunlu amplified the tremendous impact which their Qara Qoyunlu rivals and predecessors had on the process and served as major reference point in that sequence for the early Safavids afterwards. When the Shiite kings of Iran came to power the special significance of Tabriz had developed as a core element of Persianate political culture. But with the rising Ottoman threat the broader geopolitical landscape also began to change making it impossible that the city remained the principal urban center of the Safavid realm for long.

The Qara Qoyunlu Muẓaffariyya and the Chupanid Ustād-Shāgird have been noted as royal mosque-mausoleum-complexes that will also be discussed in the next section on the local elites. While there were certainly connections between the local elites of Tabriz and other kingly monuments built in and around the city, including Ghazan’s complex, they are best documented for these two. Moreover, there is good evidence that representatives of the local elites played important roles in the establishment of vaqf-complexes by major courtiers, such as that of Ghazan’s vizier and historian Rashīd-Dīn to the north-east of Tabriz. Finally, representatives of the local elites sometimes established similar complexes themselves, especially if they were also influential courtiers, such as the above-mentioned Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī.

3.3 Tabriz as Special Site: Social Space, Political Actors, Local Awareness

As noted above, the ruling houses making up the sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz were also the most important ones from the perspective of the local elites. Political support from among this social
group seems to have been strongest for the Eldigüzids, the Mongols, especially the Ilkhans, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Safavids. The Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn, the Chupanids and the Aq Qoyunlu did have supporters among the local elites, but they appear to figure less prominently in the sources and may have been somewhat less influential. The Timurids who do not belong to the sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of Tabriz, nonetheless, attracted representatives of the local elites, some joining their courts forcibly and others voluntarily.

In the most recent article submitted for the cumulative dissertation, the analytical focus has not been on the local elites, but representatives of that social group have also not been completely left out of the picture. The other three submitted articles have concentrated on the local elites of Tabriz, discussed their political interests and resources during the period under study, their relations to the successive rulers and ruling houses of the city, possible reasons they may have had to support one and oppose another as well as consequences of their political choices and actions. The first of these articles has analyzed the career of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, the quasi-eponym of the Malikān family, and the transition from Eldigüzid to Mongol and eventually specifically Ilkhanid rule. The second has focused on continuity and change in the composition of the local elites of Tabriz over time but also discussed their interaction with rulers and other representatives of various dynasties. Finally, the third has concentrated a bit more on individual instances of dynastic succession at Tabriz, both within one ruling house and from one to the next and on the roles played by the local elites in these events. As Zajjājī’s Humāyūnnāma shows, representatives of the local elites appear to have cultivated the awareness that Tabriz had a special significance even before Ghazan, both with regards to the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran and with regards to Mongol rule. Moreover, Zajjājī highlights the roles which the local elites played in key events during the making of that special significance. Yet, for unknown reasons, he omits some very important details in his account of the process in question.

Thus, the poet-historian does not explicitly state that two major local aristocrats most actively involved belonged to the same family. One is his original patron Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn who was probably the most powerful and influential notable of Tabriz during the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran and the emergence of the Ilkhanid dynasty. The other, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s grand-uncle Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrāʾī, is the person who ensured peaceful interaction with the

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179 Zakrzewski: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, pp. 360-84.
Mongols during the first encounters of the city with the armies of Chinggis Khan. Furthermore, this man was not only closely attached to the Eldigüzids, but he led the resistance to the Khawarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn together with two family members although later, Ṭughrāʾī may have been reconciled with the conqueror and short-time lord of Tabriz.181 While Zajjājī’s 
*Humâyûn nāma* sheds light on the emergence of the special significance of the city in its early stages as well as on the ways in which representatives of the local elites conceived that special significance, the impact of the work is difficult to determine. It seems that the *Humâyûn nāma* was not extensively copied and little known compared with other works of Persian epic poetry, especially adaptations of the *Shâhnâma*. Yet, as noted above, Zajjājī’s versified universal history and biography of the prophet Muḥammad may serve as a good example of a specific variation in ideological level political culture documented in seventh/thirteenth-century Persian historical writing. It has also been noted that this variation can be attributed to Tabriz as a ‘place’ in the sense explained by Trausch. At this point, it may be worthwhile to recall that attributing the *Humâyûn nāma* to cultural preconditions more conducive to conceiving and communicating the notion that Tabriz stood for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran is perhaps done best when taking the city where it was composed also into account as a physical place and social setting.

At the time when Zajjājī wrote the *Humâyûn nāma*, the Mongol Ilkhanid rulers were still non-Muslims and Tabriz was becoming a focal point of their migration routes. While religious life appears to have largely continued in its established forms with no clearly discernable effects of non-Muslim domination on Islamic learning, teaching and scholarship in the city, drastic change occurred in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century, as well. Tabriz developed from a regional urban center associated with comparatively minor courts into an imperial metropolis associated with a major court. However, it is important to distinguish the local setting with its urban, suburban and rural hinterland spaces from a courtly setting even if rulers and their retinues may have temporarily shared some of these spaces with the inhabitants of Tabriz. This, in turn, does not mean that people attached to the court of the Ilkhans or to those of subsequent dynasties ruling the city did not take up residence at Tabriz and gained influence there.

Zajjājī’s original patron, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, and his second patron, the above-mentioned Shams al-Dīn Juvaynī, may serve as good examples to illustrate the difference between powerful courtiers who exerted great influence in Tabriz and representatives of the local elites who became influential courtiers. As regards the patronage of Zajjājī, it seems useful to add that

Juvaynī supported him only for one part of the *Humāyūnnāma*, the biography of the prophet Muḥammad but not for the universal history part. In two of the submitted articles, I have argued that Juvaynī did probably not appreciate Zajjājī’s historical vision with its focus on the Eldigüzids and Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran and as special place connected to Mongol rule. This vision had certainly been also espoused and endorsed by Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn as an eminent local aristocrat, but it had no appeal to Juvaynī as a notable of Khurasan and a newcomer to Azerbaijan. The latter derived his influence in Tabriz from his preeminent position at the Ilkhanid court. In contrast, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s ties to the Ilkhanid court appear to derive from his longstanding involvement in Mongol administration and politics as a leading representative of the local elites of Tabriz. Despite his above-mentioned vaqf-complex in a north-eastern suburb of Tabriz, the famous Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rashīd al-Dīn did likewise not belong to the local elites. Like Juvaynī, he did, however, have different kinds of connections to representatives of this social group. For instance, members of aristocratic families of Tabriz, including the Malikān, were involved in the legalization of Rashīd al-Dīn’s pious endowment. Another local leading family connected to Rashīd al-Dīn in this way were the ‘Ubaydīs to whom I will return below. They were Shāfi‘ī jurists, first and foremost, but one family member also authored an astronomical treatise of which Abū al-Majd Malikānī preserved a copy in the *Safīna*. As noted in the submitted articles focusing on the local elites, the *Safīna* provides evidence that the Malikān, unlike the Juvaynīs, outlived the Ilkhanid dynasty. The ‘Ubaydīs and at least one other leading family of pre-Mongol and Mongol Tabriz that I could identify and to which I will likewise return below even thrived as local elites with good connections to royal courts long after the house of Hülegü had vanished. In contrast, Rashīd al-Dīn’s vaqf-complex was still functioning in the late eighth/forteenth century, but his descendants appear as major political actors based in Tabriz only in the years immediately following the demise of the Ilkhans. However, as noted above, Rashīd al-Dīn has certainly contributed a great deal to popularizing the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy and inscribing its elements into Persianate political culture. After Ghazan, it was not just the local elites of Tabriz anymore who conceived and communicated

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183 Hoffmann: *Waqf im mongolischen Iran*, pp. 49-51. One of the local aristocratic families whose involvement in legalization of Rashīd al-Dīn’s vaqf-complex Hoffmann has demonstrated, bore the nisba Ḥaddādī or Haddādī-Shaybānī. This family was related to the Malikān and it is probably this relation which made the Friday preacher (khāṭīb) Shihāb al-Dīn Ḥaddādī claim that his ancestors had guarded the keys to the Ka’ba in Mecca. Hoffmann follows Ibn al-Fuwatī in questioning that claim, but the claim of the Malikān to be descendants of the family among the Quraysh that fulfilled that function before and after the advent of Islam, appears to have been generally accepted. Zakrzewski: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, pp. 358-9, 362-4, 369-70.
185 Zakrzewski: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, pp. 370-1.
the idea that the city stood for a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. Still, as shown in the first section of this chapter, writers with a local background or attached to a court based at Tabriz seem to have been more inclined to do so than those without such connections. Ḩamd-Allāh Mustawfī has been noted as a similar case as Rashīd al-Dīn in that he greatly helped inscribing the special significance of Tabriz into Persianate political culture while his work can likewise not be attributed to the city as a ‘place’ in the sense explained by Trausch. One important person who worked on the production team of the ‘Great Mongol Shāhnāma’ alongside Mustawfī can, in contrast, perhaps be counted among the local elites although he may originally have had a more modest background. This person is the renowned calligrapher ʿAbd Allāh Ṣayrafī who appears to have become attached to Ilkhanid court circles thanks to his special skills but, nonetheless, as a native of Tabriz. Ṣayrafī is the master referenced in the common name of the above-mentioned Chupanid Ustād-Shāgird (master-disciple) mosque-mausoleum complex and considered one of the key figures in the development of calligraphy in the Iranian lands in the crucial centuries between the end of the Abbasid caliphate and early Safavid rule.186 Soudavar has stressed that Ṣayrafī’s participation in the production of the ‘Great Mongol Shāhnāma’ constituted a novelty in that a calligrapher who had built a reputation on copying Qurans lent his skills to a courtly project glorifying Iranian royal tradition.187 Numerous subsequent calligraphers of Tabriz, like many others elsewhere in the Iranian lands, traced their writing style back to Ṣayrafī and participated in courtly manuscript projects and decorated royal monuments built in and around the city as well. Moreover, several of those in Tabriz were also bound by family ties in addition to their connections through master-disciple-relationships. These amounted to a distinct local sequence extending to the late tenth/sixteenth century when the Safavid court moved its main base from Qazvin to Isfahan.188 Thus, Muḥammad Bandgīr, the man referenced as the disciple in the name of Chupanid Ustād-Shāgird mosque-mausoleum complex, for instance, did not only learn calligraphy from Ṣayrafī and completed the decoration of that building but was also a relative of the master. A notable student of Bandgīr in the first or second generation who was named Shams al-Dīn Qaṭṭābī Mashriqī Tabrīzī (d. 812/1410) instructed both of his sons in the art of writing. One of them acted as master of Niʿmat-Allāh b. Muḥammad Bavvāb, the calligrapher who signed an inscription on the Qara Qoyunlu Muẓaffariyya complex in 870/1465. Niʿmat-Allāh, in turn,

187 Soudavar: “The Saga of Abu-Saʿīd Bahādor Khān. The Abu-Saʿīd-nāmeh”, pp. 159-63. It is possible that the Quran manuscript which Soudavar has used to identify one of the calligraphers contributing to the ‘Great Mongol Shāhnāma’ as Ṣayrafī was falsely attributed to the master from Tabriz. Ben Azzouna: “Pratique et théorie en calligraphie d’après l’œuvre de ʿAbdallāh al-Ṣayrafī”, pp. 152-3.
188 Zakrzewski: “Calligrapher families of Tabriz (8th/14th–10th/16th centuries)”, gives detailed references for relevant individuals.
taught calligraphy to a certain Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥaḍīyya (d. 930/1524) whose grandson 'Alī Beg Tabrīzī (d. 957/1550) likewise kept the local sequence of calligraphers within the family. 'Alī Beg’s nephew and major student was known for having decorated several buildings in Tabriz, but two notable local disciples of his followed the Safavid court to the new principal cities of Qazvin and Isfahan while 'Alī Beg himself was also claimed by Ibn Karbalāʾī as a master he took some calligraphy lessons with.

Ibn Karbalāʾī’s Sufi pilgrimage guide has been noted above as the single most important source for reconstructing the networks of social relations and diachronic cultural ties into which the local elites were embedded. Understandably, the author is most interested in matters of Sufism and adopts a corresponding outlook, but he covers the entire era under study with a strong focus on the local setting of Tabriz and its rural hinterland. Furthermore, his special interest in matters of Sufis does not imply that Ibn Karbalāʾī omits other domains in which representatives of the local elites were also active. Their activities often spanned over more than one field as relevant individuals could be involved in politics or government and administration, in religious affairs which includes Sufism but also traditional Islamic learning and scholarship, as well culture with domains such as poetry and calligraphy. As just noted, Ibn Karbalāʾī himself claims to have taken lessons with an eminent master of calligraphy. So, it should not come as a surprise that a few of the above-mentioned calligraphers were also closely connected with local Sufi milieus, that prominent Sufis of Tabriz were also renowned for their traditional Islamic learning, their poetry and standing with rulers or that representatives of the local elites generally could combine any variety of such characteristics.

The submitted article focusing on continuity and change in the composition of the local elites as a social group and their interaction with rulers and dynasties has discussed these issues in some detail. As regards the obvious question if the often-mentioned decline of traditional Sunni Islam and a rise of Sufi and Shiite tendencies in the wake of the Mongol invasions can be observed among the local elites of Tabriz, the findings have been mixed. Individuals and families with a Sufi background did indeed increasingly gain influence in society and politics since the time of Mongol rule. However, most prominent Sufis of Tabriz were strongly connected to local cults that originated in pre-Mongol or early Mongol times and they cultivated corresponding chains of initiation (silsila) alongside their ties to broader traditions in Islamic mysticism. Moreover, as has already been noted, religious life in the city apparently continued very much as before under temporary non-Muslim Mongol domination.

Thus, the ‘Ubaydīs still flourished as a family of traditional Shāfiʿī jurists even after the collapse of the Ilkhanid dynasty. A member of the family penned the Kujū ṭī-vaqʿīyya in the late
eighth/fourteenth century and two of his sons testified to the legality of the endowment. One of them died in 787/1385 while fighting Jochid troops that sacked Tabriz in the context of a conflict between this Chinggisid dynasty and Timur who first came to the city a year later. The other local aristocratic family which has been mentioned above as having outlived the house of Hülegü can even be traced back to pre-Mongol times with sufficient certainty. Before the Chinggisid conquests, the ḌAfqūs were closely connected to the Abbasid caliphs and the local dynasty of the town of Ahar in Azerbaijan, but already had a second base in Tabriz, as well, and a member who appears in the Safavid silsila. Under the Mongols, the ḌAfqūs continued as Islamic scholars, preachers and Sufis, one of them being a principal teacher of Abū al-Majd Malikānī, the compiler of the Safīna. But at that time, family members became primarily known as poets at Ilkhanid courts. In the late eighth/fourteenth century, a member of the ḌAfqī family testified to the legality of the Kūjūji-vaqf in Tabriz and another family member was supposed to get a position in the Qara Qoyunlu Muṭaffariyya complex. The position was reserved for an adherent of Sunnism which remained dominant in Tabriz in its Shāfīʿī-Ashʿarite strand, perhaps with stronger Sufi inclinations than prior to the Mongol invasions. Ibn Karbalāʾī himself did also not only report about Sufism focused on Tabriz but was intimately related to an important local cult which had already begun to flourish in pre-Mongol times. The cult was that of Bābā Faraj Tabrīzī (d. 568/1172-73) which members of the Aq Qoyunlu royal family and major courtiers of the dynasty took care to honor in the late ninth/fifteenth century. Bābā Faraj played an important role in the spiritual biography of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221) whose name came to be associated with a major Sufi-silsila in the broader Junaydī-tradition that had been dominant in Azerbaijan for some time when he visited Tabriz. Ibn Karbalāʾī was affiliated with a Kubrāvī-silsila through his Sufi master and the latter’s family that became known as the Sayyids of Lāla, after the village some five kilometers south of Tabriz where they finally settled at about the time of the dynastic change from the Qara Qoyunlu to the Aq Qoyunlu. Historians of Sufism tend to see the Sayyids of Lāla as a sort of Sunni branch of an increasingly Shiite Kubrāvī ‘order’ or ‘brotherhood’.

Besides the fact that there is virtually no evidence for the existence of Sufi communities in Tabriz that would qualify as ‘orders’ or ‘brotherhoods’ organized under banner of a famous eponym, such as the Kubrāvīyya, the Naqshbandiyya or even the Şafaviyya before Safavid kingship, there is more to the Sayyids of Lāla. The family emigrated from Azerbaijan in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century when the Chupanid ruler Malik Ashraf (ex. 758/1357) drove several notables of Tabriz and the region into exile. Ibn Karbalāʾī puts great emphasis on

the continuing connections of the Sayyids of Lāla to the Sufi milieu of Tabriz and after their eventual return especially on the connection to Bābā Faraj.\textsuperscript{190} His own family held the custodianship of the tomb of Bābā Faraj at least since the time of Uzun Ḥasan Aq Qoyunlu. However, as Sunni representatives of a major Sufi-\textit{silsilā} and a \textit{sayyid}-family immersed in a powerful local cult at Tabriz, the Sayyids of Lāla came under increasing pressure as Safavid rule consolidated. As for Ibn Karbalāʾī, the author of the Sufi pilgrimage guide to the cemeteries of Tabriz and surrounding villages which is, just to recall, the single most important source for this dissertation, eventually emigrated to Ottoman Damascus around 988/1580.\textsuperscript{191}

When Najm al-Dīn Kubrā visited Tabriz and encountered Bābā Faraj, he had come to study an influential \textit{hadīth}-collection compiled by renowned traditionist from Khurasan who was known as Imām Ḥafda (d. 571/1175), had settled in the city and was buried there. Imām Ḥafda also brought what appears to be a high-quality copy of the most important \textit{hadīth}-collection, the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī}, to Tabriz. In any case, the work kept on being transmitted among Islamic scholars in the city who belonged, of course, to the local elites. High-quality copies of the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī} transmitted from the one brought to Tabriz by Imām Ḥafda were still locally available in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century but probably not anymore by the late ninth/fifteenth. Nonetheless, study of the work continued among eminent Sufis of Tabriz, notably the Sayyids of Lāla, in the later period while influential local Sufis sought to study it elsewhere already in the earlier one, as well.\textsuperscript{192}

Newly found evidence suggests that the above-mentioned Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī studied the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī} and two other important \textit{hadīth}-collections with two renowned scholars in Damascus when he must still have been a young man at best. It was certainly on this basis that Khwāja Shaykh later compiled his own \textit{hadīth}-collection which has been briefly introduced above as a source not yet known to me at the time when the submitted articles were written and published.\textsuperscript{193} But, the article focusing on continuity and change in the composition of the local elites of Tabriz as a social group has noted that the father of Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī had most likely already founded a Sufi lodge (\textit{zawiya}) in Damascus based on the evidence given in the commentary and in the appendix to the edition of the Kujujī-\textit{vaqfiyya}. The family remained present in the Syrian metropolis at least until the end of the eighth/fourteenth century, but

\textsuperscript{190} Ibn Karbalāʾī: \textit{Raudūt al-jīnān wa jamāḥat al-jamān}, vol. 2, pp. 109-1, 146-52, 167-8


\textsuperscript{192} Zakrzewski: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, pp. 369, 373, 383-4.

\textsuperscript{193} Wust: \textit{Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish Manuscripts of the Yahuda Collection of the National Library of Israel}, pp. 595-6 (ms. no. 371). In addition to the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī}, Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī also studied the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim} and the collection of Tirmidhī, likewise one of the six so called canonical collections of prophetic traditions. The scholar with whom Khwāja Shaykh studied the \textit{Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī} had a couple of famous teachers and students in Damascus where he died in 752/1351. The scholar with whom he studied the two other \textit{hadīth}-collections also had notable teachers and students but lived in Damascus only temporarily and died in Cairo in 766/1365. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAṣqālānī: \textit{al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-māʾiʿa al-bāḥima}, 4 vols., ed. Muhammad Ṭābīʿu Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Iṣṭafān, [Hyderabad]: Muʿīd al-iṣlah wa maʿārif al-Dāʾira al-ʿāṣima, 1349/1930, vol. 1, pp. 86-94, vol. 2, pp. 95-106, vol. 3, p. 295 (nos. 1677, 787).
always kept the main base in Tabriz and its rural hinterland.\textsuperscript{194} It is still highly probably that Khwāja Shaykh did not personally instruct Sufis in the educational and religious institutions attached to the Kujuji-vaqf-complex in Tabriz.\textsuperscript{195} However, as he compiled a hadīth-collection there is good reason to believe that this work formed part of the teaching material there. The Kujujis were one of several Sufi families that were based in villages around Tabriz and began to rise to prominence at the time of Mongol rule. Their spiritual ancestor, Khwāja Muḥammad Kujujānī (d. 677/1279) also belonged to sort of group of eminent local Sufi masters in the seventh/thirteenth century who had either a more pronounced rural or urban background. In both cases, the Sufism of these men whom Ibn Karbalā’ī introduces as the 70 Bābās of Tabriz, generally had strong roots in the local Sufi milieu. There were, of course, connections between the urban and the rural milieu, but such connections appear to have been more intensive and comprehensive within each of them.

As noted, several bābā-families flourished in the hinterland of Tabriz alongside the Kujujis. In the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth century, a complex web of master-disciple-relationships and matrimonial ties bound numerous members of these families together. The Kujujis, for instance, intermarried with two other notable village bābā-families. Despite these connections and all the characteristics which the Kujujis share with those other families, they still stand out as the most prominent and the most influential, especially in politics. Just like the Malikān helped enable the sequence of dynastic succession associated with the emergence of the special significance of Tabriz, the Kujujis greatly contributed to enabling the sequence associated with the perpetuation of that special significance. As noted above, the Eldigüzids and the Mongol Ilkhans were the outstanding royal houses associated with the emergence while the Jalayirids and the Qara Qoyunlu were those most consequentially associated with the perpetuation up to early Safavid rule. I will return to the role of the Kujujis shortly.

What is noteworthy at this point is that the change which occurred in the composition of the local elites of Tabriz as a social group in the wake of the Mongol invasions was markedly different from the change observed in the composition of the local elites of Isfahan under the Seljuks. One conclusion drawn in the submitted article concentrating on this issue – with a special focus on the Malikān and the Kujujis – is that the notables of Tabriz who had an urban background often retained elite status in Ilkhanid and post-Ilkhanid times. Yet, those with a rural background and a base in the hinterland possibly enjoyed an advantage of access to the nomadic ruling elites. This conclusion implies that the nomadic mode of domination which the

\textsuperscript{194} Zakrzewski: “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, p. 375.
\textsuperscript{195} Werner et al.: Die Kujuji-Stiftungen in Tabriz, pp. 38-9.
Seljuks brought to the Iranian lands not only endured but perhaps intensified under the Mongols and their successors.

Bearing in mind their roles as men of politics and religion, especially Sunni-minded Sufism, Werner has also analyzed poetry by members of the Kujujī family focusing on questions of local aristocratic family awareness and perception. In addition to poems from the recently published dīvān of Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī, he included in his analysis poetry composed by a relative of Khwāja Shaykh who served at the Safavid court in the tenth/sixteenth century and was known as Amīr Beg Muhrdār (d. 983/1575-76). Werner has shown that the Kujujīs formed and were viewed as a wider family network or descent group extending over several centuries and consciously tied to the local setting of Tabriz. He has also stressed the relations between these two members of the Kujujī family and representatives of two royal dynasties of Iran, the Jalayirid Sultan Shaykh Uveys in the case of Khwāja Shaykh and the Safavid Shāh Ṭahmāsp (d. 984/1576) in the case of Amīr Beg Muhrdār. The connection between Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī and Shaykh Uveys was certainly stronger than the one between Amīr Beg Muhrdār and Shāh Ṭahmāsp. Moreover, Khwāja Shaykh’s poetry contains and conveys a much more pronounced mystical touch to his connection with the Jalayirid Sultan Shaykh Uveys. While Khwāja Shaykh could probably still claim some Sufi credentials in the eighth/fourteenth century, Amīr Beg Muhrdār appears to have been linked to this tradition mainly through his family name and its reference to the local setting of Tabriz. It is highly likely that he never even set foot there once and like all known members of the Kujujī family in the tenth/sixteenth century, Amīr Beg Muhrdār seems to have been more restricted to the role of a courtly administrator than his famous relative.

Still, as men of politics and of religion, the Kujujīs composed poetry, perhaps not least because it was an important element of courtly life and a key medium of spiritual expression, notably in Sufism. However, as Werner has stressed, it is important to note that the Kujujīs were not professional poets, and he argues convincingly that “[...] poetry has been consciously employed to create and re-enforce linkages between extended family units and to shape family identities over a longer period of time.” As poetry, especially in Persian, was a preferred pastime among the educated elites of the Iranian lands, two main questions arise for this dissertation from Werner’s findings on the Kujujīs. The first is whether members of other local aristocratic families, notably the Malikān and the ʿAtīqīs, who gained at least some reputation for their

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198 Ibid., p. 251.
verses, may be considered professional poets. Despite the fact, that some members of these families came to be remembered primarily as poets, this does not seem to be the case and it may be worth studying if their poetry conveys a similar sense of local aristocratic family awareness. The second question is how and to what extent people whose fame rested mainly on their poetry, such as Humām Tabrīzī (d. 714/1314), Muḥammad ʿAṣṣār Tabrīzī (d. 778/1377) or Muḥammad Shīrīn, known as Maghribī Tabrīzī (d. 810/1407), were identified and identified themselves specifically as poets of Tabriz.

This seems to have been the case with Humām, although he started his career as a client of the Juvaynīs and his ties to the Ilkhanid courtly setting were apparently always at least as close as those to the local setting of the city and its hinterland. Muḥammad ʿAṣṣār’s poetry remains largely unpublished and hardly studied, but while citing several of his verses, Ibn Karbalāʾī also makes clear that he belonged to the same local Sufi milieu as the Kujujīs in the eighth/fourteenth century. The same applies to Maghribī one of whose Sufi masters had also instructed Muḥammad ʿAṣṣār and numerous other renowned local mystics of the period. This man was named Majd al-Dīn Ismāʿīl Sīsī (d. 785/1383), came from a village near Tabriz, had close ties to the Kujujīs and apparently received a position as a Sufi in the lodge (khānaqāh) attached to Ghazan’s royal vaqf-complex at some point in his life.

Maghribī’s Sufism as it shows in his poetry is strongly influenced by the ideas of the famous, but controversial Andalusian mystic Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) who was buried in Damascus. A few decades before Maghribī, another famous Sufi poet from a village near Tabriz, Maḥmūd Shabistarī, had already made an enormous contribution to the spread of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas into Persian literate culture and mystical spirituality in the Iranian lands. Shabistarī’s relations to the local Sufi milieus of Tabriz and its rural hinterland are difficult to assess, but Ibn Karbalāʾī used verses from one of his works as a main source for some of the 70 Bābās and, like Sīsī, he appears to have been closely associated with Khwāja Shaykh Kujuji’s father.

As regards Maghribī, he did not only receive basic Sufi instruction from Sīsī as one of the locally most influential Sufi masters, he also had disciples among the notables of Tabriz, for example the above-mentioned calligrapher Qaṭṭābī Mashriqī and one of his sons. Interestingly, Maghribī Tabrīzī even appears as the link to a silsila leading to Ibn ʿArabī in the tradition of a

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199 Ingenito, Domenico: “‘Tabrizis in Shiraz are worth less than a dog:’ Saʿdi and Humām, a lyrical encounter”, Judith Pfeiffer (ed.): Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th–15th Century Tabriz, pp. 77-127 [here: pp. 77, 81-4, 95-9]. Ingenito focuses more on Saʿdi’s identification and self-identification as a poet of Shiraz but not so much on the question to what extent Humām was identified and identified himself as a poet of Tabriz.


202 Lewisohn: Beyond Faith and Infidelity, pp. 120-35. The Shaykh Ibrāhīm to whom Shabistarī dedicated a work which is no longer extant may indeed be Ibrāhīm Kujuji, the father of Khwāja Shaykh.
locally well-established Sufi community in Damascus.\textsuperscript{203} For this community, the link to Ibn 'Arabī was probably more a matter of prestige and had little to do with his ideas which were rather viewed with reservation. Beyond, Magribī and Shabistārī, the influence of Ibn 'Arabī’s ideas among the Sufis of Tabriz is difficult to determine precisely, but further research might even permit an assessment of whether the connection of the Kujujiš to Damascus possibly played any role in the spread of these ideas into the Iranian lands and Persian poetry.\textsuperscript{204}

For the local elites and for the rulers of Tabriz, not only connections to the Caucasus, Anatolia and Iraq but also to the Arabic speaking lands farther west were perhaps more important than those to the Persianate areas across the Iranian plateau. None other than Ghazan briefly occupied Damascus and the celebrated convert Ilkhan must have commissioned major royal construction works at Ujān right before embarking on the campaign which entailed this occupation.\textsuperscript{205} Khurasan on the north-eastern edge of the Iranian plateau was probably also more closely connected to neighboring Transoxiana and Central Asia more broadly than to Azerbaijan on the north-western edge. In any case, the local elites of Tabriz tended to support rulers and dynasties that were not only able to provide a minimum of security and stability but also willing to distinguish the city as principal urban center of the realm and base their courts in the region. This is a conclusion to which both submitted articles focusing on the local elites have come with the Malikān and the Kujujiš as most notable examples.\textsuperscript{206} Hence, primary criteria according to which the local elites of Tabriz would accept a ruler as legitimate were not fundamentally altered by the experience of Mongol rule and the development of the city into a major imperial center, but possibly reinforced.

The article that concentrates more on individual instances of dynastic change at Tabriz, both within one ruling house and from one to another, has spelled out in greater detail how the local elites, often represented by members of these two aristocratic families, interacted with lords of the city and with pretenders trying to take it over. Thus, they would generally surrender to invaders who disposed of exceptional military power, such as the Mongols or Timur, obviously with the basic interest of keeping the city intact. They would offer resistance only to less powerful assailants deemed unfit to rule Tabriz and be king of Iran and they would do so only if subsequent accommodation on reasonable terms could be expected or if previous negotiations

\begin{footnotes}
\item[203] Amir, Or: “From Saint to Eponymous Founder: Abū Bakr al-Mawṣili (d. 797/1394) and his Ṭarīqa Mawṣiliyya”, unpublished draft (courtesy of the author), p. 27.
\item[204] Zakrzewski, Daniel: “Tabrizer Windungen auf Ibn ʿArabīs poetischem Pfad in die Persophonie. Sāfīs und Dichter vor Ort und die Kuǧūǧīs in Damaskus (13. und 14. Jahrhundert)”, unpublished conference presentation at Deutscher Orientalistentag, Iranian Studies section, Münster 2013. This presentation came to the conclusion that there are no clear indications for a role of the Kujujiš and their connection to Damascus in the spread of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas into the Iranian lands, especially by means of Persian poetry. The conclusion may still be valid but I have unfortunately not been able to pursue the question further in the years following the presentation.
\end{footnotes}
had proven futile. Even if the local elites did not fully agree among themselves in all cases of those kinds and if other loyalties may have prevailed for some individuals in some instances, a sense of loyalty to the city of Tabriz is often discernable in such situations.

As noted above, the Malikān were particularly close to the Eldigüzids, appeased the armies of Chinggis Khan, initially resisted the Khwarazmian conquest and played a major role in establishing Mongol rule in Iran until the time of the early Ilkhans. By then, Tabriz was unquestionably unchallenged as principal urban center and royal city. The Kujujīs were first especially close to the Jalayirids, then to the Qara Qoyunlu and eventually to the Safavids. Members of the family helped Shaykh Uvays establish himself as lord of the city and king of Iran and in a similarly active manner invited Qara Yūsuf and Shāh Ismāʿīl to take over Tabriz, thus the throne of Islamic Iran, taking on the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. They also served at the courts of these dynasties but would nonetheless prioritize their own interests as representatives of the local elites of Tabriz. Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī, for instance, even went so far as to engineer the murder of Shaykh Uvays’ successor Sultan Ḥusayn in 782/1384 who had shown himself unable to protect the city and provide a minimum of stability. Sultan Āḥmad whom Khwāja Shaykh then helped mount the throne and served faithfully although he likewise proved unable to protect Tabriz eventually had him killed in Baghdad in 795/1393.

The article which focuses more on the roles played by the local elites in individual instances of dynastic change has stressed that Patrick Wing’s characterization of Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī as “a largely independent ruler in Tabriz” goes perhaps a bit too far.\footnote{Zakrzewski: “Lords of Tabriz”, p. 127.} However, Khwāja Shaykh and other members of the Kujujī family as well as members of the Malikan, the ‘Afiqī and the ‘Ubaydī families can certainly be categorized as local lords in the sense proposed by Paul. They stemmed from ancient families and served more powerful, sometimes imperial overlords but their local elite status and power or agency did not depend necessarily or primarily on royal appointment. Whether the local elites of Tabriz formed a distinct component of the aristocratic class in the late medieval Iranian lands, presumably thanks to the special significance which their city acquired and preserved, is difficult to assess. In any case, the question cannot be answered in a satisfactory manner based on the evidence reviewed in this dissertation. Besides, an adequate answer also seems to require further inquiries into terminological and conceptual, as well as broader theoretical and methodological issues.
4 Conclusion: Royal City of Islamic Iran

The dissertation has aimed at clarifying the special significance which Tabriz acquired and preserved between the late sixth/twelfth and the early tenth/sixteenth century and at specifying what role the local elites played in the process of the emergence and perpetuation of that special significance. This double aim has implied a refinement of Bert Fragner’s argument which has yielded the following key results in support of the two-fold main thesis of the dissertation: the special significance of Tabriz consisted in the city coming to stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran and the local elites contributed to this process by helping enable a specific sequence of dynastic succession and, to a lesser extent, by giving expression to the idea itself.

However, the process as it has been traced in the present study would most probably not have been possible were it not for the Mongol invasions and the rule of the Ilkhanid dynasty over a territory that could be identified as a quasi-eternal kingdom named Iran. In that sense, Chinggis Khan and his descendants, most notably the house of Hūlegū, were instrumental in a long-term reconfiguration of Iranian royal tradition as an element of Persianate political culture. On the practical level, Ilkhanid political and military control of the extended Iranian plateau area were a precondition for identifying the dominions of the dynasty with that quasi-eternal kingdom named Iran. On this basis, members of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty were recognized as kings of that land in a sequence of dynastic succession which effectively extended back to the beginning of history and humanity. However, these ideological level operations were much more the domain of the literate Iranian elites, thus the larger social group within the aristocratic class to which the local elites of Tabriz belonged.

Whether the reconfigurations of Iranian royal tradition associated with the Mongols, most notably the Ilkhanid dynasty, outweighed death and destruction wrought by the armies of Chinggis Khan and his descendants, is an odd question. In any case, these reconfigurations had tremendous effects as the territory and the name of Iran were eventually reestablished as interlinked core elements of Persianate political culture. The local elites of Tabriz already linked them to their city and the notion of an Islamic kingdom before the Ilkhan Ghazan, but through him all of these elements came to be inextricably connected on a much larger scale. Ghazan’s vaqf-complex, including the mausoleum of the celebrated convert Ilkhan, made Tabriz literally stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran.

In the period following the demise of the Ilkhanid dynasty, the city of Tabriz was more decisive than the territory when it came to the question who succeeded the house of Hūlegū as kings of
Iran. Royal *vaqf*-complexes and monuments generally which subsequent rulers of Tabriz had built in and around the city greatly helped perpetuate its special significance. All these rulers were Muslims, so the kingdom of Iran remained an Islamic kingdom. The local elites of Tabriz actively contributed to their *vaqf*-complexes, for instance as calligraphers. What specific strand of Islam the kings of Iran should follow or would impose on the population seems to have been of minor importance until the Safavid conquest of Tabriz. As the erstwhile Sunni Sufis consolidated their rule as Shiite kings of Iran, the special significance of the city could not and would not be constantly upheld in practical terms. By then, however, the special significance of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran had already been ineffaceably inscribed into the ideological registers of Iranian royal tradition and Persianate political culture.

Nomadic rule and its modalities as they prevailed in the Iranian lands since the Seljuk invasions in the fifth/eleventh century, were a critical factor for the emergence and perpetuation of that special significance. Azerbaijan was a politically central region at least since the rise of the Eldigüzids in the middle of the sixth/twelfth. Among the local elites of Tabriz before Ghazan, the Eldigüzids were also the dynasty linking the city to the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. The modalities of nomadic rule kept rulers who were based in Azerbaijan physically close to Tabriz and the city was generally thought to be intimately connected to major royal campsites in its rural hinterland. Continuous proximity to Tabriz did undoubtedly facilitate the construction of royal monuments by successive rulers in and around the city. With Ghazan’s *vaqf*-complex as foundational pillar, these royal monuments also mark the sequence of dynastic succession which was associated with the perpetuation of the special significance of the city from the Ilkhans through the Chupanids, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu up to the coming to power of the Safavids.

The principal axis of social change in Tabriz as a major urban center under the conditions of several centuries of nomadic rule has already been noted. Old urban aristocratic families did not disappear during the Mongol invasions, and some remained influential after the collapse of the house of Hülegü. But families with a rural background increasingly rose to positions of prominence and power and the modalities of nomadic rule must be counted as a main driver of that process. In contrast, the political priorities of the local elites of Tabriz appear to have been quite constant: a minimum of security and stability and the distinction of their city as principal urban center of the realm. These fundamental priorities may have gained greater weight after Ghazan and the end of the Ilkhans. Rulers and dynasties that were willing and able to adequately address these priorities were the closest to the local elites of Tabriz and ultimately form the sequence of succession of kings of Islamic Iran up to the Safavids.
As regards the agency of the local elites as opposed to that of Turkish, Mongol and Turko-Mongol nomadic rulers and their predominantly military entourage, it was certainly limited in situations of violent confrontation. However, it has been shown that the local elites of Tabriz generally sought to avoid such situations and that they were largely successful in that endeavor. One of the reasons which enabled them to negotiate a peaceful surrender of the city must have been that Tabriz was comparatively wealthy. Hence, the local elites did not only have a lot to lose when they found themselves in situations of violent conflict or faced hostile assailants. They also had something to offer. Unfortunately, the evidence to assess the economic resources of the local elites of Tabriz is too scarce. The Kujuji-vaqfiyya does, however, provide some valuable indications and it seems likely that other local aristocratic families likewise owned agricultural estates in the rural hinterland of Tabriz, fields and gardens in suburbs and urban structures, such as shops in the city markets.

In addition to material wealth, the local elites of Tabriz could also mobilize a couple of other resources in their interactions with rulers of the city or dynastic pretenders. These resources can perhaps best be described as skills relevant individuals had in various fields of activity or as other forms of capital into which such skills could be converted, for example, a reputation for piety. Noteworthy skills included accounting and chancery writing or management and governance skills more broadly but also artistic abilities, not least in poetry and calligraphy. Most of these skills could be capitalized upon in court service, but also in other domains and contexts of social interaction, notably among the local elites themselves and in their relations to representatives of the aristocratic class beyond Tabriz and occasionally beyond the Iranian lands. Moreover, relevant skills were often transmitted from one generation to the next within extended kinship networks. Hence, there were families whose members were primarily known as Islamic jurists, as calligraphers or as Sufis even if they combined several of such characteristics and were active in more than one domain.

As has been noted, the specific sequence of dynastic succession which the local elites of Tabriz helped enable and which came to be associated with the emergence and perpetuation of the special significance of the city, proceeded from the Eldigüzids through the Mongols, the Chupanids, the Jalayirids, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu to the Safavids with brief interludes of Khwarazmian and Timurid rule. The Mongols, the Ilkhans first and foremost, turned out to be the critical reference for the construction and expression of that special significance and Ghazan eventually became its epitome. Henceforth, Tabriz would stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. The local elites probably welcomed this process and sometimes actively participated in driving it. Their most valuable resource in
political interactions with successive rulers and dynasties seems to have been their encroachment in the local setting of Tabriz and surrounding villages. Being local aristocrats, they were accustomed to seeing royal houses come and go. But the evidence surveyed in this dissertation is insufficient to assess the extent to which the local elites of Tabriz also participated in driving that process by consciously affirming the special significance of their city as an ideological fact of late medieval Persianate political culture. The only exception so far is the pre-Ghazan *Humāyūnnāma* which has been intensively discussed in this dissertation and which does, all the local focus and awareness notwithstanding, still affirm the special significance of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran in relation to a dynasty. Studying poetry by well-known poets of Tabriz but also by members of local aristocratic families, such as the Malikān, the ʿAtīqīs and the Kujujīs, and concentrating on such issues might be a promising avenue for further research in that direction. Further research may also help understand a major difference between families like these whose members remained local aristocrats sometimes cultivating far-reaching connections, from the Safavids who eventually formulated a claim to Iranian kingship in the framework of the Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy on their own. All four of the submitted articles as well as my previous research which has been cited have analyzed varying combinations of aspects of the dissertation or questions of detail related to its subject. The framework paper has attempted to add a few new insights and hopefully succeeded in putting the interrelated contributions of the submitted articles to the study of late medieval Iranian history in a wider research perspective.
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Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī and the Establishment of Mongol Rule in Iran

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Abstract: Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī (d. 668/1269–70) was one of the most important individuals to the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran. His biography illustrates like few others not only themes of mobility and cross-cultural contacts across Eurasia but also the importance of local elites to the formation of the empire of Chinggis Khan and his descendants. Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn belonged to a notable family of Tabriz and served as governor of his native city soon after the definitive Mongol conquest of 628/1231. He traveled to Mongolia in 649/1251 and was put in charge of implementing a revised imperial taxation system in northwestern Iran by Great Khan Möngke. Then Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn remained a key player in the financial administration of the emerging Ilkhanate as Möngke’s brother Hülegü asserted his claims to the northwestern core area of Mongol Iran against his enemies from the house of Jochi. Despite connections of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s family to the Jochids, he continued as governor of Tabriz where he also acted as a patron of Persian literature until his death. So far Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn has gone almost unnoticed in historical scholarship.

Keywords: Tabriz local elites, Mongol Empire, Ilkhanate, administration, literary patronage

1 Introduction

Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn belonged to a notable family of Tabriz and was one of the most influential individuals during the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran. He served as governor of his native city as it developed into the principal urban center of Mongol Iran in the middle decades of the seventh/thirteenth century. In this capacity, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn traveled to Mongolia at least twice and must have continuously mediated between the new ruling elites and the population of his northwestern Iranian homeland, the extended region of Azerbaijan and Arran. Throughout his career, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn fulfilled military as well as administrative functions and also acted as a patron of Persian literature in

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Tabriz until his death in 668/1269–70. Nonetheless, Malik Şadr al-Dīn Tabrizī has passed almost unnoticed by historians of Iran and the Mongols alike.

The biography of Malik Şadr al-Dīn sheds new light on the period when the Eurasian empire founded by Chinggis Khan (d. 624/1227) dissolved into relatively distinct polities under his descendants. As one of these polities, the Ilkhanate (654/1256–735/1336) ultimately centered in Azerbaijan and Arran, areas where Chinggisid rule was already firmly in place when this polity began to take shape. Malik Şadr al-Dīn exemplifies the political importance of the indigenous Muslim elites, especially of the notables of Tabriz in this decisive transitional phase. To contextualize Malik Şadr al-Dīn’s career, it is helpful to briefly present his family in the local setting of Tabriz and review some of the relevant sources and scholarly works. I will then proceed in two steps, concentrating first on his involvement in politics during the westward expansion of the Mongol Empire and then during the emergence of the Ilkhanate.

2 Scholarship, sources and the Malikān family

Most of the available information about Malik Şadr al-Dīn was gathered by Jean Aubin in his groundbreaking but unreferenced study of early Mongol rule in Iran.1 However Aubin paid little attention to him and the local elites of Tabriz focusing instead on the notables of the city of Qazvin and of the eastern Iranian region of Khurasan, in particular the Juwaynī family.2 Bertold Spuler merely listed Malik Şadr al-Dīn as governor of Tabriz in 665/1263 and may have been unaware of his local origin.3 More recently, Judith Kolbas noted that he played a quite important role in the financial administration of early Ilkhanid and pre-Ilkhanid Mongol Iran. However she made the unfounded claim that the Mongols sent Malik Şadr al-Dīn from Khurasan to Tabriz to take up office there.4

The biographical dictionary of Ibn al-Fuwāṭī (d. 723/1323) is perhaps the only source to make clear that Malik Şadr al-Dīn was as a native of Tabriz and to indicate the year of his death. It features an entry on his son, who is introduced as ʿImād al-Dīn Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. al-Malik Şadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Muḥammad al-Tabrizi and likewise further designated as al-malik.5 In one of its standard meanings, this term denoted indigenous local or regional governors

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2 Aubin 1995: 21–38. Also see Lane 2015, for a discussion of the same families from Khurasan and Qazvin.
3 Spuler 1955: 347.
under the Mongols. In Malik Şadr al-Din’s case, the Persian plural *malikān* turned into a family name either during his lifetime or shortly afterwards.

The Malikān family has aroused interest among specialists on Persian literature in connection with the precious manuscript collection known as *Safinah-i Tabriz* – a sort of portable private library compiled by Abū al-Majd Malikānī Tabrizī in the final decades of the Ilkhanate. Despite conclusive evidence in the genealogies of Abū al-Majd and of his father, Malik Şadr al-Din’s relationship to the family has not been recognized. He has also not been

7 See Seyed-Gohrab 2003; for an English introduction to the *Safinah*, its compiler and the Malikān. The most advanced but still incomplete and not wholly accurate survey of the family is
properly identified as the original patron of a poet in early Mongol Tabriz who was nicknamed Zajjājī and composed a versified universal history in emulation of the *Shāhnāmah*. The work, entitled *Humayūnāmah*, consists of two parts; the first is a biography of the prophet Muḥammad and the second the actual universal history. After Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s death in 668/1269–70, Zajjājī obtained the patronage of the celebrated vizier Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī (ex. 683/1284), brother to the famous historian, for the first, but not for the second part of his work.\(^8\) I will come back to this point at the end of the paper.

Zajjājī reports surprisingly little about his original patron. Yet the *Humayūnāmah* provides genealogical details that match those of Abū al-Majd Malikānī and his father and permit to identify a leading notable of pre-Mongol Tabriz as Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s granduncle.\(^9\) This man, known as Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrāʾī, was closely attached to the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan, who had dominated the declining Saljuq Sultanate in the second half of the sixth/twelfth century. Focusing on notables of Tabriz, the history of pre-Mongol and early Mongol Iran appears in a slightly different light than it does with a focus on notables of Qazvin or Khurasan. Thus it seems worthwhile to say a few words about Ṭughrāʾī and the Eldigüzids to better understand Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s family background and the local history context which provided the basis for his subsequent career.

The Eldigüzids took over Tabriz in 572/1176 and lost it to the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn in 622/1225.\(^10\) Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrāʾī was a high-ranking courtier under the two Eldigüzids, who ruled the city after the end of the Saljuq dynasty in Iran in 590/1194. On at least one occasion he negotiated the surrender of Tabriz to the Mongols at the time of the first invasion in 617–18/1220–21. During this first invasion Chinggis Khan’s generals came to the city repeatedly and all encounters remained peaceful.\(^11\) Assisted by two relatives, Ṭughrāʾī then led resistance to the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn, who had to besiege Tabriz for about a week. The new ruler quickly alienated even his initial supporters such

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\(^8\) Zajjājī 2004–2011: 1:19 (Intr.), 351, 854, 2:18–27 (Intr.), 461–463, 857–858. The editor mistook Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn for the later Ilkhanid vizier Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī (ex. 696/1297). He found that the first part was copied on Juwaynī’s order but passed over the fact that Zajjājī deplores the death of his original patron in both parts.


\(^10\) See Luther 1987, for a summary of Eldigüzid dynastic history.

as a rival of Ṭughhrāʾī; this man intrigued against the Malikān to become qadi of the city but then provoked his swift dismissal for disrespectful statements about the Khwārazmians.  

When the Mongols returned in 628/1231 to finish with the Khwārazmshāh, they reportedly remembered Shams al-Dīn Ṭughhrāʾī as their interlocutor from ten years before. The notables of Tabriz immediately surrendered once more having obviously no reason to lament the imminent demise of their Muslim ruler. Even Shams al-Dīn’s principal opponent and Jalāl al-Dīn’s most fervent supporter at the Khwārazmian conquest was qadi of the city again by 630/1233. It is uncertain whether Ṭughhrāʾī was still alive when the Mongols eventually established themselves as lords of Tabriz but like his erstwhile rival his grandnephew must have entered their service very soon.

The well-known Ilkhanid court historians, ‘Aṭā-Malik Juwaynī (d. 681/1283) and Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318) do not elucidate the local background of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s career. They do, however, cover his political activities under the Mongols sufficiently well to serve as main sources. I am not aware of any additional evidence on Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī in other sources usually consulted for the history of Iran and neighboring lands under early Mongol rule. The most thorough scholarly analysis of the period spanned by his career is still Peter Jackson’s classic article on the dissolution of the Mongol Empire. As will be seen, the rising tensions within the Chinggisid dynasty which characterized Mongol westward expansion and the emergence of the Ilkhanate directly affected Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn and his family.

3 Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī and the westward expansion of the Mongol Empire

The conflict that produced the greatest tensions during the first phase of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s career pitted the houses of Chinggis Khan’s eldest and third sons, Jochi and Ögödei, against each other. Ögödei sent the general Chormaghun

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14 Gronke 1982: 414–445. Ṭughhrāʾī’s opponent was a renowned Islamic jurist and qadi named ‘Izz al-Dīn Qazwīnī (d. 648/1250). I plan to discuss ‘Izz al-Dīn’s family in pre-Mongol and Mongol Tabriz in greater detail expanding on Gronke’s findings in future publications.
15 Jackson 1978.
westward after his enthronement as the second Great Khan. It was to Chormaghun’s armies that Tabriz tendered its peaceful submission in 628/1231 and they remained based in Azerbaijan and Arran. Around the time of Ögödei’s death in 639/1241, Jochi’s son Batu established his main base north of the Caucasus. Thereby this branch of the imperial dynasty became the only one within easy reach of the region and its principal city. Soon after, Batu advanced to a position of seniority among the Chinggisid princes and also emerged as the most powerful. His opposition was the primary factor that initially prevented a successor ascending the throne in Mongolia, where Ögödei’s widow Töregene acted as regent.

Jackson argued convincingly that the general Bayju, who replaced Chormaghun as chief commander of the regional armies was a representative of Batu. As new regional commander, Bayju led the 641/1243 campaign against the Rûm Saljûqs of Anatolia. This campaign entailed the Mongol conquest of that region and is the earliest event in connection with which Malik Šadr al-Dîn appears in person. Zajjâji mentions his dispatch to the city of Sivas, most likely as commander of auxiliary troops enlisted by the Mongol masters of adjacent Azerbaijan and Arran. Malik Šadr al-Dîn had probably already served as local governor and, given their spatial proximity, the notables of Tabriz necessarily maintained the most intimate contacts with the Jochids. It is, however, important to note that Azerbaijan and Arran were integral parts of the expanding empire, unlike Anatolia, nearby Georgia or Mosul, where pre-Mongol dynasties remained in place under Chinggisid suzerainty.

In the years just prior to the campaign, Persian officials based in Khurasan had begun the integration of Azerbaijan and Arran into the nascent civilian administration of the Mongol far west. Their leader likewise represented Batu, as did another major tax administrator who made his headquarters in Tabriz in 642/1244. Juwaynî’s history which depicts the latter as an arch-villain, features verses composed by Zajjâji on the occasion of his death in Khurasan the next year. There is no concrete information on relations between that tax administrator and the poet’s original patron but numismatic evidence might suggest that

18 Kolbas 2006: 84, 87, 102, wrongly claims that the Mongols reinstated the Eldigûzids after the demise of the Khwârazmshâh.
20 Juwaynî 1958 [1997]: 545. Also see Manz 2013, on Juwaynî’s hostility towards Sharaf al-Dîn Khwârazmî.
they were on good terms with each other.\footnote{Kolbas 2006: 128–134, 154, stresses similarities between two relevant series of coinage. But she remained unaware that Malik Şadr al-Din was a native of Tabriz and does not discuss the possibility that he collaborated with Sharaf al-Din Khwārazmi there.} Malik Şadr al-Din also forged ties to the new Mongol imperial governor of the Iranian lands, Arghun Aqa (d. 673/1275) who first came to Tabriz in those years following his appointment by Töregene.\footnote{On Arghun Aqa, also see Lane 1999.} In any case, the enormous significance of the city as center of the financial administration of Mongol Iran has its roots in this period.

In 644/1246 Ögödei’s son Güyüg was finally enthroned as Great Khan but it is unclear whether Malik Şadr al-Din accompanied Arghun Aqa to Mongolia to attend the assembly (quriltai). Juwaynī does not name the notables of Azerbaijan who went with the imperial governor. He stresses, instead, that his own father Bahā’ al-Dīn (d. 652/1254) deputized in the region, under the supervision of a Mongol official.\footnote{Juwaynī 1958 [1997]: 249–250, 507–508.} During the return journey in 645/1247, Arghun Aqa learnt that a Mongol named Mengü-Bolad and a grandson of the last reigning Eldigüzid Atabeg were challenging his (as much as Malik Şadr al-Din’s) authority in Tabriz.\footnote{Juwaynī 1958 [1997]: 511.} In-depth discussion of the matter would require a terminological analysis beyond the scope of this paper. Space permits only some basic remarks and a suggestion for a slight revision of Boyle’s translation of the relevant passage in Juwaynī.

Mengü-Bolad had been supervisor of the city artisans (bar sar-i muḥtarifa bism-i bāsqāqi) since the time of Chormaghun. Through a court connection, he was then confirmed in a military governorship (bāsqāqi va imārat), apparently with wider powers. As regards his Eldigüzid ally, Mengü-Bolad’s supporter at court, “[...] procured for the atabeg [...] who [...] had in that period just come out of Anatolia and reappeared after having been hiding, a decree with imperial red seal appointing him as military governor (amīr) of the district (tümen) of Tabriz and Azerbaijan in opposition to Malik Şadr al-Din.”\footnote{Juwaynī 1912–1937: 2:248, “atābak [...] rā kah [...] va ham dar ān muddat az Rūm birūn āmadah va ba’d az ikhtifā rūy namūdah bi-żiddiyyat-i Malik Şadr al-Din bi-amīr-i tūmān-i Tabriz va Azarbayjān fārmānī bi-āl-tamghā girift.”} Boyle obviously understood tümen as a military term translating that the Eldigüzid was appointed as commander of a Mongol army unit of nominally ten thousand troops which is highly improbable. In this passage, Juwaynī seems not to speak about army commanders at all but rather uses tümen to refer to the administrative unit of Tabriz and Azerbaijan. It is unclear how the atabeg’s position as military governor may have differed from Mengü Bolad’s except in that he would not...
exercise authority over Mongols. The reasons for the antagonism between Malik Şadr al-Dīn and this scion of the last regional dynasty are also obscure but it appears that his consent to such an appointment was expected, at least in the local context.

Malik Şadr al-Dīn reacted by requesting permission from Arghun Aqa to accompany him to court; this was granted and he set out from Tabriz in winter 645/1247–1248. Developments farther east, including Güyük’s death in 646/1248, prevented them from reaching Mongolia then. According to Juwaynī, none of Mengü-Bolad’s orders was obeyed in Tabriz and he had to join Arghun Aqa when the imperial governor actually went to court once more in 647/1249. 26 His ally is not heard of again and his own later whereabouts are likewise unknown. Malik Şadr al-Dīn is not mentioned as having gone with Arghun Aqa on this occasion but definitely traveled to court in Mongolia two years later. By then dramatic changes in the constitution of the empire were already underway and would continue to redefine the framework of Malik Şadr al-Dīn’s political activities.

The throne again remained vacant after the death of Güyük, whose widow Oghul Qaimish acted as regent. Eventually Batu managed to transfer supreme leadership from the house of Ögödei to that of Chinggis Khan’s youngest son Tolui. The latter’s son Möngke was enthroned as Great Khan thanks to the backing of the powerful Jochid 27 and Malik Şadr al-Dīn joined a host of dignitaries arriving at the quriltai in spring 650/1252, shortly after Arghun Aqa. 28 Seen in the light of Batu’s conflict with the Ögödeids, Malik Şadr al-Dīn’s success against Mengü-Bolad and the Eldigüzid scion in Tabriz indicates Jochid protection and support. An even clearer hint to such ties exists for a relative of his. This matter shall be discussed in connection with the emergence of the Ilkhanate as a new phase of Mongol westward expansion inaugurated by Möngke’s enthronement.

4 Malik Şadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī and the Emergence of the Ilkhanate

Malik Şadr al-Dīn stayed in Mongolia for about a year, being confirmed as governor of Azerbaijan and Arran at the quriltai. Juwaynī singles him out as

27 Jackson 1978: 186.
one of four indigenous regional governors in Iran who received a tiger-headed tablet of authority (paiza), just like their Mongol superior Arghun Aqa.\textsuperscript{29} The latter directed the implementation of the newly ordered empire-wide reform and centralization policies in the Iranian lands after the return of senior officials in 652/1254. Thomas Allsen showed that the primary aim of Möngke’s policies was an increase of monetization of the economy to be achieved mainly through the imposition of a poll tax understandably preceded by the taking of a census.\textsuperscript{30} Malik Şadr al-Din carried this out in Azerbaijan and Arran under the supervision of two high-ranking Mongols. But Juwayni does not make explicit that the governor as well as a colleague of his from Tabriz were in charge of their home region and Allsen omitted them from his discussion.\textsuperscript{31}

With the help of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s biographical dictionary and the above-mentioned genealogies of later family members, Malik Şadr al-Din’s colleague can be identified as his nephew Malik Majd al-Dīn.\textsuperscript{32} Zajjāji notes that Malik Şadr al-Din then went to Mongolia once more, probably to report on the census and the imposition of the poll tax and with Arghun Aqa; the latter set out to court again in spring 654/1256.\textsuperscript{33} At this time, Möngke had already sent his brother Hülegū off to resume the westward expansion of the empire. Zajjāji claims that Malik Şadr al-Din and Malik Majd al-Dīn together prepared a welcome meal (tuzghū) for the first Ilkhan on the way but dating is one of his weak points. Time and place the poet-historian from Tabriz specifies for this incident, 9 Muharram 654/7 February 1256 at Qum, do not match Hülegū’s schedule and itinerary as reconstructed from other sources.\textsuperscript{34} Be that as it may, both members of the Malikān family fulfilled various tasks serving the founder of the Ilkhanid dynasty.

\textsuperscript{29} Juwayni (1958) [1997]: 518–519.
\textsuperscript{30} Allsen 1987: 116–171.
\textsuperscript{31} Juwayni (1958) [1997]: 521; Allsen 1987: 131–132, does mention their Mongol supervisors Turumtai and Naimatai.
\textsuperscript{34} Zajjāji 2004–2011: 2:1100–1101, “Malik Şadr-ī Din raft turghū (tuzghū) bi-burd, [...] bi-shud Majd-ī Din Khwājah bā ū bih Qum, dar ān māh būd az Muḥarram nūhum; z hijrat guzar kard panjāh va char, z shīsh-ṣad fuzūn būd rāz shumār.” See Masson Smith, Jr. 2006, for a reconstruction of Hülegū’s westward advance.
As outstanding notables of Tabriz, they were also drawn into one of the fiercest conflicts that accompanied the emergence of the realm of Hülegü and his house. The choice of Azerbaijan and Arran as the center of Hülegü’s own emerging dynasty necessarily threatened Jochid interests in this core area of Mongol Iran. Batu had died in 653/1255 and after a succession struggle his brother Berke eventually imposed himself as ruler. Jackson’s analysis of Jochid claims to northwestern Iran suggests that they were primarily based on a grant from Chinggis Khan himself. He attached secondary importance to another dimension of the Jochid-Ilkhanid conflict, namely that Berke, as the first Chinggisid Muslim ruler, strongly disapproved of Hülegü’s order to kill the last Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad in 656/1258.35 On the whole, this assessment is not unjustified from a Mongol perspective. But regardless of whether Chinggis Khan had indeed formally assigned Azerbaijan and Arran to the Jochids, their claim had a firm foundation in pre-Ilkhanid administrative practice.

Hülegü came to Tabriz a few times, before and after the sack of Abbasid Baghdad.36 He charged Malik Majd al-Dīn with the construction of a fortified building in Azerbaijan to store booty taken from the caliphal seat and elsewhere; the money was supposed to be melted into gold bars.37 In the context of the first Mongol invasion of Syria, the ruler of Mosul defected to the rising Mamluk Sultans in Egypt. Rashīd al-Dīn reports that Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn commanded an army of auxiliary troops assisting in the siege of the city in 659/1261 and that he was injured in battle. Thereupon he received permission to return to Tabriz, passing by the royal summer camp to meet Hülegü and inform him about the situation in Mosul.38

Both Malikān as well as several other officials were then subjected to a Mongol legal trial (yarghu) in the buildup to a war between Hülegü and Berke in 660/1262. While Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn got away with lashes, Malik Majd al-Dīn was among those sentenced to death.39 Jackson makes a valid argument that the first Ilkhanid-Jochid war “may be said to signify the dissolution of the Mongol Empire”.40 After Möngke’s death in 657/1259 all branches of the Chinggisid dynasty were involved in the ensuing succession struggle. That war was of particular importance, however. The anti-Ilkhanid alliance between Berke and the Mamluks would have a profound and lasting influence on inter-dynastic

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40 Jackson 1978: 238.
politics in the Middle East. And never before had a Mongol ruler allied with a non-Mongol power against a fellow descendant of Chinggis Khan. Berke defeated Hülegü but the Jochid Khans of the Golden Horde could reassert their claim to the core area of Mongol Iran with any measure of success only after the collapse of the Ilkhanate in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century.

Ibn al-Fuwaṭī gives a valuable clue to explaining the different fates of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn and Malik Majd al-Dīn in the context of that conflict. He remarks that the latter was considered a scribe or secretary (kātib) of Berke (d. 665/1267) and as such, Malik Majd al-Dīn may well have been an official accountable to the Jochids. Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn was perhaps less intimately attached to Hülegü’s enemy or simply too important to be killed. In any case, the first Ilkhan reconfirmed his governorship of Tabriz and when Hülegü died in 663/1265 his son and successor Abaqa (d. 680/1282) again assigned the city to him. It is noteworthy that Rashīd al-Dīn does not name a Mongol who would have been Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s direct superior and actually in charge as governor in these instances.

This deviation from the practice considered characteristic of Mongol government in Iran might result from the personal standing of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, from the special significance of the city as center of the financial administration or from a combination of both. Kolbas credited Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn with having devised what she terms the imperial hexagon coinage that appears to signal the progressing centralization of finances with Tabriz as sole imperial mint; she notes that this money was issued there from the time of Möngke’s enthronement to AH 668/1269–70. Unfortunately Kolbas not only remained unaware of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s local origin but also of the year he died which obviously coincided precisely with the last issue of this series. If he introduced the imperial hexagon coinage its end and his death might be more than a coincidence and officials from Azerbaijan were perhaps rather more influential in administration and government than generally thought. Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn probably played a greater role in the development of that coinage than many individuals who figure more prominently in Kolbas’ discussion, such as successive anonymous mint masters at Tabriz.

Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s son ‘Imād al-Dīn took over his father’s post but the Malikān were gradually pushed out of the top levels of politics. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī

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43 Kolbas 2006: 151–154, 196–197. Her explanations of the significance Tabriz gained for Mongol financial administration are partly based on erroneous assumptions, for example that the city had lost its local leaders during the few years of Khwārazmian rule.
reports that ‘Imād al-Dīn died young a few years later and was buried in an Islamic college (madrasa) Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn had built in their native city. The author further states that in reality the governor in Tabriz and elsewhere was Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī; Aubin concluded from the biographical note that Juwaynī had married Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s daughter but this is not evident from Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s wording that ‘Imād al-Dīn’s sister was with him.44 Juwaynī became indeed the most influential migrant to Tabriz in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century, but his influence in the city resulted from his position at the Ilkhanid court.

Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī was appointed as Hülegū’s vizier after his predecessor had been executed along with Malik Majd al-Dīn in the opening stages of the first Ilkhanid-Jochid war.45 He appeared more or less out of nowhere at this time but scholars tend not to address the war as part of the context of Juwaynī’s appointment.46 This may impede full appreciation of the circumstances and it is not only with regard to Shams al-Dīn’s appointment and Malik Majd al-Dīn’s execution that a study of relations between the Juwaynīs and the Malikān and a comparison of both families would be worthwhile. The patronage which Zajjājī obtained from Shams al-Dīn at some point after Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s death is another thread such a study could pursue.

It has been mentioned above that Juwaynī supported the first part of Zajjājī’s Humayūn māmah, a biography of the prophet composed in the same meter as the Shāhnāmah. He was famed as a patron of Persian literature and a pious Muslim so this is not surprising. But why would the celebrated vizier not patronize the universal history part of Zajjājī’s work? A plausible answer can be found in the historical vision Zajjājī expounds in the second part of the Humayūn māmah. This vision had no appeal to a notable from Khurasan recently transplanted to Azerbaijan through an attachment to the emerging Ilkhanid dynasty. An important aspect of this vision is that the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan appear as the undisputed dynastic heroes of the second part of the Humayūn māmah. It provides systematic treatment of post-Saljuq history only for the Abbasid Caliphs and the rulers of Tabriz beginning with the Eldigüzids. Moreover, Zajjājī does not cover the period after Hülegū’s sack of Baghdad except for praise of the Juwaynīs.

46 Lane 2003: 74–6, 195–6; Biran: 2009. Hülegū’s first vizier was named Sayf al-Dīn Bitikchī and had served since the Ilkhan’s westward advance.
The local poet-historian certainly died before Shams al-Dīn’s execution in 683/1284 after which the Juwaynī family was virtually extinguished. As newcomers to Tabriz they derived their influence in the city from their prominence at the Ilkhanid court but the future of the dynasty was still uncertain when Zajjājī composed the Humayūnnāmah. Zajjājī does acknowledge, however, that Chinggisid rule was a fact positing a link between Tabriz and the Mongols that stretched back to the time of the first invasion. He records the generals of Chinggis Khan who negotiated with Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s granduncle Shams al-Dīn Ṭūghrāʾī as saying, “[...] that this pleasant city has peacefully surrendered to us, supporting our army and cavalry; this golden city here forms private property of the khan, for no [city] is more amiable than it in the world.”

Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn had undoubtedly endorsed this vision with its distinctly local focus and most likely commissioned the Humayūnnāmah as a whole. Zajjājī’s work inscribes itself into the Persian tradition by adopting the Shāhnāmah as literary model and affirms the superiority of Islamic standards over the Mongol order. Nonetheless the Humayūnnāmah also testifies to the cross-cultural contacts that the Chinggisid conquests inevitably entailed as evinced by a chapter on dating systems which the author included. In this chapter he compares the hijrī with the Chinese-Uighur animal calendar, declares that the former is the best and the latter false and yet explains it to his Persian audience.

The Safinah shows that the Malikān after Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn were still involved in government and administration but more active in the field of culture, for instance composing Persian poetry. Furthermore the collection provides evidence that as notables of Tabriz, they outlived both, the Juwaynīs and the house of Hülegū. The Malikān are just one example for the persistence of the local elites of the city throughout Mongol rule as it can be observed elsewhere too. Aubin noted that the leading families of Qazvin were very much the same before Chinggis Khan and at the end of the Ilkhanate. In the case of Tabriz this may be more surprising given the political, economic and cultural significance the city acquired under Mongol rule. It may also not be so surprising given that Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn himself had helped turn Tabriz into the principal urban center of Mongol Iran.

47 Zajjājī 2004–2011: 2:22 (Intr.). The editor remarked that the author makes no reference whatsoever to Juwaynī’s execution but did not take into consideration the likelihood of his death before this happened.
5 Conclusion

This outline of Malik Şadr al-Dîn’s career exemplifies the political importance of the local elites of Tabriz during the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran. As a highly influential man of both the pen and the sword, he successfully maneuvered through the conflicts that accompanied imperial westward expansion and culminated in the emergence of the Ilkhanate. Relatives of Malik Şadr al-Dîn had already forged a connection to the Mongols at the time of Chinggis Khan mainly by ensuring the peaceful surrender of their native city to the conquerors from the outset. The first encounter between the people of Tabriz and the Mongol armies is an important point of reference for the author of the Humayûnnâmah. This versified universal history was probably commissioned by Malik Şadr al-Dîn who patronized the author until his death. It places the history of early Mongol Tabriz in a distinctly local and regional context in which the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan and the Malikân themselves figure prominently. The Ilkhans turned out to be the Mongol dynasty of Iran and Tabriz their principal city but these outcomes were by no means pre-determined. For an adequate understanding of the initial stages of this process it is crucial to take into account the pre-Mongol and pre-Ilkhanid Mongol history of Tabriz and to give due consideration to its local elites.

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Bibliography


Local Elites and Dynastic Succession: Tabriz prior to, under and following Mongol Rule (Sixth/Twelfth to Ninth/Fifteenth Centuries)

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Abstract

This article analyses the history of Tabriz from the late sixth/twelfth to the end of the ninth/fifteenth century. It develops the thesis that the local elites played an active and important role in determining a specific sequence of dynasties passing through the Mongols to the Safavids. Through a focus on two leading families, the analysis elucidates how Mongol rule transformed local society. Urban elites generally retained their status throughout the period, while rural elites gained new influence beginning with the time of Mongol rule.

Keywords

Tabriz – Leading Families – Mongols – Social Change – Sufism

1 Introduction

Mongol impact on the cities of medieval Iran has long been intensely debated. Specialists in Iranian history emphasise that many centres were destroyed during the first invasion of 617-8/1220-1 and that urban life continued to decline during the decades of non-Muslim rule following soon after.¹ Specialists

Local Elites and Dynastic Succession

in Mongol history recognise the destruction of cities and exploitation of the settled population, but now tend to place greater stress on the positive aspects of economic, cultural and scientific exchanges triggered by Iran's incorporation into the empire of Chinggis Khan (d. 624/1227) and his descendants.²

A point of accord is that Tabriz first developed as a major city under Mongol rule in Iran. Tabriz is well known as the principal urban centre of the Ilkhanid dynasty (654/1256-736/1335). Chinggis Khan's grandson Hülegü (d. 663/1265) founded this ruling house at the time of the middle-eastern campaign that led to the Mongol conquest of Baghdad (656/1258) and the elimination of the Abbasid Caliphate. The Ilkhan most closely associated with Tabriz was the conqueror's great-grandson Gāzān (d. 703/1304), who embraced Islam shortly before ascending to the throne in 694/1295, and ultimately secured the conversion of the dynasty. Gāzān had a massive pious endowment (waqf) complex erected outside the city, including the mausoleum of the ruler and a number of other structures. After the collapse of the house of Hülegü in the mid-eighth/fourteenth century, several successor dynasties of the Ilkhans likewise accorded Tabriz the distinction of being the principal urban centre of their realms. Finally the Safavids became one of these successor dynasties, by taking possession of the city in 907/1501.

This article concentrates on the local elites or 'notables' of Tabriz from the late sixth/twelfth century to the end of the ninth/fifteenth, and in particular on two leading families. The intention is to shed new light on the history of the city prior to, under and following Mongol rule, and thereby also on more general issues, such as the history of Sufism. The article advances the specific thesis that the choices made by the local elites to achieve their political interests were crucial in determining the sequence of dynastic succession passing through the Mongols to the Safavids.

At this point, it is necessary to introduce the two leading families of Tabriz who will be in the focus of the discussion. One, which came to bear the name of Malikān in the course of the seventh/thirteenth century, produced some of

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the city’s most eminent notables, prior to and under Mongol rule. The other, which became known as the Kujujis, rose to prominence under the Mongols and remained highly influential through the subsequent centuries. The discussion traces the overall chronology of events, paying particular attention to the involvement of members of the Malikān and the Kujuji families in politics. The next section sets out the scholarly framework for the study.

2 Guiding Questions, Scholarship, Sources

Historical studies of Iran, including those regarding the periods before and after Mongol rule, have shown that the notables of major urban centres purposefully interceded in politics at both the local and imperial levels. They would render loyal service to established rulers and dynasties, but also selectively support or oppose rival claimants in times of conflict and disputed succession. The Mongol conquests occurred in just such a period, when intra and inter-dynastic struggles were taking place throughout the Iranian plateau and adjacent lands. Jürgen Paul has demonstrated that during the first invasion, in the time of Chinggis Khan, reactions to the non-Muslim armies varied according to local conditions. The case of Tabriz could be very instructive in this respect. Yet with few exceptions, Tabriz, and its connections with the Mongols in Iran, have received serious scholarly attention only as concerns the period after Hülegü. Among recent works is the collective volume reputedly devoted to Tabriz from the seventh/thirteenth to the ninth/fifteenth century, edited by Judith Pfeiffer, but this again chooses the end of the Abbasid Caliphate as the


point of departure. In addition, the volume offers scarce consideration of the post-I lkhanid period and leaves the local elites almost completely out of the picture.

Non-Muslim domination and the demise of the Abbasids mark a watershed in Islamic and Iranian history. A key question of the present study is therefore: what immediate effects and long-term consequences did Mongol rule have among the notables of Tabriz? In particular, what were the resulting transformations in local society regarding its religious makeup, and otherwise?

An important factor for the history of the city during the long period under study is the availability of excellent grazing grounds in the hinterland of Tabriz, as well as in the broader region of Azarbaijan. The pastures of Azarbaijan and the adjoining lands in southern Caucasia and eastern Anatolia attracted the nomadic Chinggisids, as well as many nomadic Turkic and Turco-Mongol rulers before and after them. Some recent scholarship has stressed the increasing geopolitical centrality of this region from the Seljuq period onward. David Durand-Guédy has further stressed that the nomadic Seljuqs tended to reside outside of cities and to rule from suburban and rural spaces. The Mongols have long been viewed as even more nomadic than the Seljuqs. Putting aside the religious aspect of the question above one may then ask: did Mongol rule increase the effects of such a nomadic mode of domination and, if so, how did this affect the local balance of power between urban and rural populations? Given that the rulers of the period under study tended not to use cities as places from which they exercised power, another question that arises is whether Tabriz itself, especially under the Ilkhans and their successors, could be called a ’capital’ in any meaningful sense.


In considering the Mongol period, most scholars tend to dwell on the general religious change intensified by temporary non-Muslim rule and the end of the caliphate. They stress that from the conquests onwards, traditional Sunni Islam declined, while Sufism and Shiʿism (often coupled with messianic expectations) rose to dominance in society and politics. The Safavids, who emerged

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as Sunni Sufis not far from Tabriz in the early eighth/fourteenth century, and adopted some form of messianic Shi‘ism in the ninth/fifteenth, are often cited as an example. Interesting research questions then arise concerning the similarities and differences between the historical trajectory of the Safavids and that of the Kujuji family. Indeed, several scholars have noted roles of the Kujujis as both Sufis and court officials.9 Christoph Werner has recently directed the publication of the Kujuji-waqfiyya, accompanied by a German translation of the document and a thorough study of the family.10 The waqfiyya is the deed endowing a pious foundation, established in Tabriz by an outstanding family member in 782/1380, and is one of a few relatively new sources for the history of Tabriz and its leading families over the centuries.

Other sources have been known for some time but have not been systematically analysed in regards to the specific research questions raised here. Among these are many works of dynastic and universal historiography written within and beyond Iran, offering scattered references to notables of Tabriz in politics and providing important details about members of the Kujuji and Malikân families. Two other quite well-known, fundamental sources pertain to different genres. One is the Sufi pilgrimage guide of Ibn Karbalâ‘i (d. 997/1589) and the other is the biographical dictionary of Ibn al-Fuwaṭî (d. 723/1323). Both offer extensive information on family ties among the local elites of Tabriz and allow at least partial reconstruction of the web of social relations encompassing the actions of the relevant individuals.

Another recently discovered source has brought the Malikân family to scholarly attention. A family member compiled the precious manuscript collection known as Safîna-yi Tabrîz in the early eighth/fourteenth century.11

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The *Safīna* contains some copies of official documents, but mainly works in science, religion and literature, in particular Persian poetry. Some of these works were authored by either the compiler or other family relatives. Finally, there is a versified universal history written in emulation of the *Šāh-nāma*, by a poet of mid-seventh/thirteenth century Tabriz known as Zajjājī. This work is also related to the Malikān family and entitled *Humāyūn-nāma*. Although it is a universal history, the author adopts a fundamentally local and regional perspective. His work thus offers unique insights into the historical consciousness of notables of Tabriz at the moment when the first two Ilkhans were consolidating their power in Iran. The poet Zajjājī’s original patron was Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Tabrīzī (d. 668/1269-70), and it was from this individual that the later Malikān probably took their family name. However the editor of the *Humāyūn-nāma* did not identify Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn as Zajjājī’s original patron, and the scholars studying the *Safīna* remained unaware that the former belonged to the Malikān family. It is the combination of genealogical information preserved in these two sources with other details, given by Ibn Karbalā’ī and Ibn al-Fuwāṭī, that makes it possible to identify Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn and other local political leaders in pre and early Mongol Tabriz as members of the family.

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As the authority of the Seljuq sultans waned in the sixth/twelfth century, two powerful atabeg dynasties vied for supremacy in northwestern Iran. The Aḥmadilis were based in Marāḡa, on the southern side of Mount Sahand, but also controlled Tabriz on the northern side. The Eldigūzids were based still

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further north, in Nahjawan, and took control of the Seljuq Sultanate and its dār al-mulk Hamadan in the middle of the century. In 572/1176, shortly after the death of the dynastic eponym, Jahān-Pahlawān b. Eldigüz then wrested Tabriz from the Aḥmadilis. His brother Qīzīl Arslan set up a subordinate court at the city, where he ruled as deputy of Jahān-Pahlawān and tutor of the latter’s eldest son Abū Bakr.14

In this period, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s great-grandfather, ‘Īzz al-Dīn Abu’l-Muẓaffar, appears to have been raʾīs of Tabriz. This was a personage analogous to a mayor,15 representing the local community and mediating between the population and the ruler. It is not clear either how long the Malikān had been based in Tabriz, or how they had risen to prominence in the city. However, around 579/1183, ‘Īzz al-Dīn led a delegation of notables (buzurgān-i Tabriz), including his son Šams al-Dīn Ṭuḡrāʾī, to Nahjawan. Jahān-Pahlawān also travelled from Hamadan to Nahjawan, making only a brief stop at Tabriz.16

The decades following Jahān-Pahlawān’s death, in 582/1186, were marked by endemic fighting, with effects on Tabriz. The poet-historian Zajjājī mentions Šams al-Dīn Ṭuḡrāʾī, together with the last Seljuq Sultan Ṭoḡrīl, in the entourage of Qīzīl Arslan, who imposed himself as leader of the Eldigūzid dynasty.17 Conflict soon erupted between the sultan and this new atabeg, and after battles involving various internal and external forces, Qīzīl Arslan imprisoned Sultan Ṭoḡrīl in a castle in Azerbaijan, in 585/1189. Two years later Qīzīl Arslan himself mounted the Seljuq throne at Hamadan, but was almost immediately found dead. Released from prison, Ṭoḡrīl first went to Tabriz but was denied entry to the city.18 Obviously, the notables did not recognise the Seljuq sultan and opponent of the Eldigūzid atabeg as their lord.

Yet Šams al-Dīn Ṭuḡrāʾī accompanied Ṭoḡrīl in 590/1194 when the sultan was killed in battle against Khwarazmshah Tekeš (d. 596/1200) near Rayy.19 At this point Seljuq rule in Iran ended, and Ṭuḡrāʾī must then have returned to Tabriz to join the court of Abū Bakr b. Jahān-Pahlawān. Immediately upon Qīzīl Arslān’s death, Abū Bakr had hurried to seize the Eldigūzid core territories in

17 Ibid.: p. 1334.
18 Ḥusaynī, Aḥbār: p. 182.
Azarbaijan and the northern region of Arrān, facing opposition from two of his half-brothers. Sources disagree as to whether these half-brothers of Abū Bakr’s entered Tabriz. They had weak ties to the city at best, and in fact Abū Bakr defeated both rivals, who died soon after. Zajjājī summarises the result:

Finally, he was victorious against the bold ones, through manliness he gained kingship, the kingdom of Iran. In Tabriz was Abū Bakr Šāh, he established the royal court in that place.

The author does not conceal that Eldigüzid power diminished on all fronts under Abū Bakr but the affirmative nature of this cited statement illustrates the local focus of his work. Indeed, covering post-Seljuq history in his *Humāyūn-nāma*, Zajjājī adheres to a dynastic structure only for the Abbasid caliphs and otherwise switches to writing chapters recounting the successive rulers of Tabriz. He indicates that Šams al-Dīn Ṭuğrā’ī served as vizier of Abū Bakr around the turn of the century but was dismissed in the context of intensifying court rivalries, after having spent some time in Georgian captivity. Abū Bakr was able to repel an Aḥmadīlī attack in 603/1207 and to add Marāğa to the dynastic realm, thanks to the help of Aytoqmiš, who was one of the former Eldigüzid slave commanders based in central Iran together with Abū Bakr’s brother Özbeg. Georgian incursions reached a peak in the following years, and so Aytoqmiš brought Özbeg to Tabriz as Abū Bakr’s successor. However the inhabitants fought them, in opposition to this development. By 607/1210, Abū Bakr was dead and his vizier, a former ra’īs of the city, then convinced unnamed notables to accept the succession of Özbeg. The precise mechanisms used by Ṭuğrā’ī and his relatives to adapt to this change remain obscure, however it is clear that the Malikān were able to continue their prominence among the local elites.

At Tabriz, Özbeg installed a harsher regime than that of his brother. This caused unrest in the city, to which he reacted with arrests and confiscations. Beyond Azarbaijan, the Eldigüzid forged alliances against Khwarazmshah Muhammad, but the latter marched westwards in 614/1217, forcing Özbeg to acknowledge him as overlord. The Khwarazmshah returned to Khurasan to face the Mongols shortly afterwards, and in 617/1220 he was hunted to death by two generals dispatched by Chinggis Khan. The armies of these generals reached Azarbaijan towards the end of this year, then remained in the area until the following spring. During this time they repeatedly came to the gates of Tabriz. Although Özbeg may have been absent, all the encounters were peaceful and on at least one occasion, Šams al-Dīn Tuğrā'i negotiated the withdrawal of the Mongols. In this way he avoided a military confrontation with the powerful Mongols which would have resulted in large scale destruction, although according to Ibn al-Atîr and several later authors, the inhabitants of Tabriz were ready to fight the infidels under his leadership.

Šams al-Dīn Tuğrā'i again played a key role when Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn conquered Tabriz in the summer of 622/1225. Özbeg (who would die shortly after the Khwarazmian conquest) had abandoned the city. Unlike the Mongols, the Khwarazmshah was forced to launch a siege lasting about a week. This time Tuğrā'i led the resistance, assisted by the ra'iš and the qadi, both of whom were his nephews. Meanwhile, a renowned jurist named 'Izz al-Dīn Qazwīni led the pro-Khwarazmian faction inside the city. Šams al-Dīn's father had settled in Tabriz but his family was also prominent in Marāğa, where the Eldigüzids, to whom the Malikān were so closely linked, enjoyed little support. An in-depth discussion of the complexities of the situation would be too

lengthy for current purposes, but both ʿIzz al-Dīn’s hope for a mighty Muslim ruler and his own personal ambition appear to have determined his stance toward the Khwarazmshah. In any case, the leaders of both factions attempted to protect the city populace.

After Jalāl al-Dīn conquered Tabriz, the Malikān at first retained their positions. Šams al-Dīn Ṭuğrāʾī seems to have been appointed as a local or regional vizier, without authority to administer matters of royal finance, as may have been possible for him as vizier under the atabegs.30 However, ʿIzz al-Dīn, who taught as a professor in a madrasa founded by his rival, conspired against the Malikān to replace Ṭuğrāʾī’s maternal nephew as qadi of Tabriz. The Qazwīnī family most likely adhered to the Šāfiʿī school of law (maḏhab), and there is evidence that this was also the case for the Malikān.31 Their qadi relatives may have been Ḥanafīs, but the Šāfiʿīs were dominant in Tabriz and Azarbaijan in this period and remained so later.32 If maḏhab antagonism played any role in the rivalry, this was probably less important than matters of local attachment and loyalty to the house of Eldigüz.

In any case, ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazwīnī achieved his goal in autumn 622/1225, and even managed to have Šams al-Dīn Ṭuğrāʾī’s paternal nephew, the raʾīs, executed, while driving Ṭuğrāʾī himself into exile. But within a year, this formerly fervent advocate of dynastic change was in turn dismissed for insults against the Khwarazmians. After Jalāl al-Dīn had conquered Tabriz the new ruler continued to spend most of his time campaigning and concerned himself very little with his principal city.

Ṭuğrāʾī was back in Tabriz by summer 626/1229, and may even have joined Jalāl al-Dīn’s court. Meanwhile the local economy had begun to decline, and the opposition had grown stronger.33 It is uncertain whether Ṭuğrāʾī was still alive two years later when the notables peacefully surrendered to the Mongols once again, having little reason to lament the imminent demise of

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30 Nasawī, Sīrat: pp. 134, 253 does not mention any specific position in his description of the immediate post-conquest arrangements. In a later passage, the author refers indirectly to Ṭuğrāʾī as being vizier at this time. On the appointment of local or regional viziers under the Khwarazmshahs in western Iran, also see Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites: p. 290.

31 Ibn al-Fuwatī, Majmaʿ al-ʿadāb: 1, pp. 278-9 mentions that ʿIzz al-Dīn studied with the celebrated Imām al-Rāfiʿī in Qazvin, but generally lacks explicit references to the maḏhab affiliation of family members. The Šafīna contains several works of standard Šafīʿī literature in fiqh and related disciplines; see Seyed-Gohrab, “Casing the Treasury”: pp. 35–7.


33 Nasawī, Sīrat: pp. 178, 197, 253.
The armies sent west by Chinggis Khan’s son and successor Ögödei established their main bases in Azarbaijan and Arrān, and the Malikān were only one among the local leading families who entered willingly into Mongol service.

4 The Malikān and the Continuity of Urban Elites under Mongol Rule

ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazwīnī was again qadi of Tabriz in 630/1233, when he dealt with a case that Ṭuḡrāʾī’s brother-in-law had already adjudicated at the time of Eldigüzid rule. ʿIzz al-Dīn probably remained in office until his death in 648/1250. During the initial stages of Mongol rule in Iran he must have collaborated closely with Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, a grandnephew of his erstwhile rival, Šams al-Dīn Ṭuḡrāʾī. One of the established meanings of the term malik was as a designation of indigenous local or regional governors under the Mongols. Their formal competencies and duties are difficult to assess; however, it is obvious that Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn fulfilled administrative and military functions, both before and after the arrival of Hülegü.

Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s career coincided with a time of heightening tensions within the Chinggisid dynasty, from which the house of Hülegü emerged. Peter Jackson has analyzed these tensions, with attention to regional contexts, and has generally highlighted the role of Batu (d. 653/1255),37 a son of Chinggis Khan’s eldest son Jochi. Batu established his base north of the Caucasus, around the time of Ögödei’s death in 639/1241, and thus led the only branch of the imperial dynasty based in relatively close proximity to Tabriz. Batu very soon became the senior and most powerful Chinggisid prince, while his relations with the house of Ögödei deteriorated. The Jochid therefore offered decisive support to the claim of Möngke, a son of Chinggis Khan’s youngest son Tolui, who ascended the imperial throne in 650/1252. Möngke dispatched his

36 Aigle, Denise, Le Fârs sous la domination mongole. Politique et fiscalité (XIIIe-XIVe s.) (Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études Iraniennes, 2005): p. 90. A discussion of Arabic-Persian and Turko-Mongolian terminology concerning governmental and administrative personnel could be helpful here and more generally but is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.
brother Hülegü to the west, but by selecting Azarbaijan and Arrān as the base for his own house, the first Ilkhan threatened Jochid interests in the region.

The case of Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn's nephew, Malik Majd al-Dīn, offers an example of the ties between the notables of Tabriz and the Jochids at the time of early Mongol rule. In describing a meeting with Malik Majd al-Dīn in Tabriz in 659/1261, Ibn al-Fuwaṭī mentions him as a clerk (kātib) of Berke, Batu's eventual successor.38 The uncle, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn, certainly had connections to Mongol amirs and Persian administrators acting on behalf of Batu, and active in Azarbaijan and Arrān prior to the arrival of Hülegü. Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn thus took part in the Mongol campaign against the Rum Seljuqs of Anatolia, in 641/1243.39 And Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn's client, the above-mentioned poet-historian Zajjājī, commemorated the death of an important tax official who had set up his headquarters at Tabriz as a representative of Batu in 642/1244, and who died in Khurasan in the following year.40

During the brief reign of Ögödei's son Güyüg (644/1246-646/1248), a Mongol official who had served as supervisor of the artisans of Tabriz, and an Eldigüzid scion who had been hiding in Anatolia, challenged Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn's authority.41 In spite of enjoying court backing, both soon disappeared from the political scene, while Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn continued to increase his influence. Indeed, in 649/1251 he joined a host of dignitaries travelling to Mongolia, where the newly enthroned Great Qa'an Möngke confirmed him as governor of Azarbaijan and Arrān. He was also charged with conducting a census and introducing a poll tax in the region.42 Soon after returning from court in 651/1253, he completed this under supervision of two high-ranking Mongols, and assisted by his nephew Malik Majd al-Dīn.


40 Juwaynī, Tārīḫ-i Jahān-gušāy: II, pp. 244-5, 274-81.


Subsequently, the Malikān performed various tasks in Hülegū’s service. For storage of booty, including from Baghdad, Malik Majd al-Dīn erected a fortified building on a mountain rising over Lake Urmia.\(^{43}\) Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn commanded auxiliary troops in the 659/1261 siege of Mosul, where the ruler had defected to the rising Mamluk sultans of Egypt.\(^{44}\) In the following year, in the run-up to war between Hülegū and Berke, both Malikān and a number of other notables were subjected to a Mongol legal trial (yarjū). Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn escaped with a lashing but Malik Majd al-Dīn was among those sentenced to death, presumably having been found too close to the Jochids.\(^{45}\) As Jackson correctly asserts, the war between Berke and Hülegū “may be said to signify the dissolution of the Mongol Empire”.\(^{46}\) Following the death of Mōngke in 657/1259, a struggle for succession raged through Central and East Asia, in which the Ilkhan and Jochid supported rival candidates. Berke (d. 665/1267), as the first Muslim Mongol ruler, also disapproved of Hülegū’s order to kill the last Abbasid caliph, and allied with the Mamluks against his Chinggisid cousin. Hülegū suffered a humiliating defeat, but it was only after the collapse of the Ilkhanid house that the Jochids of the Golden Horde could reassert their claim over the core area of Mongol Iran with any measure of success.

Hülegū reconfirmed Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn as governor of Tabriz, and the city was again assigned to him in 663/1265 when the conqueror’s son Abaqa (d. 680/1282) rose to the Ilkhanid throne.\(^{47}\) Although many scholars stress the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongol rulers, it is also generally believed that following the enthronement of Abaqa, Tabriz became the ‘capital’ of the Ilkhans. Birgitt Hoffmann addressed the issue with caution, and yet her discussion illustrates the confusion in speaking of a particular city as ‘capital’ of nomadic rulers. Hoffmann rightfully remarks that the mobile royal encampment (ordu) was the effective capital (wirkliche Kapitale) of the Ilkhan Empire, while also stating that under Abaqa, Tabriz obtained the rank of a capital (Hauptstadt), and adding the epithet dār al-mulk to clarify this German term.\(^{48}\)

David Durand-Guédy has stressed that the understanding of epithets such as dār al-mulk requires careful analysis on several levels, and that simple English

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\(^{46}\) Jackson, “Dissolution”: p. 238.


translations such as ‘capital’ should possibly be abandoned. This assertion is supported by a brief statement of the famous Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rašīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318), concerning Tabriz under Abaqa. Contrary to general understanding, his Persian text literally says of the second Ilkhan that “he made the dār al-mulk Tabriz the seat of the royal throne”. From this wording, Tabriz was clearly already a dār al-mulk at the time of Abaqa’s enthronement. Moreover, this historian uses the same epithet in passages on the pre-Mongol history of the city, in particular under the Eldigüzids. One could therefore express doubts that the status of Tabriz underwent any ‘official’ change at all with the coming of the Ilkhans, doubts that would be strengthened by Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s continuing administrative record.

As noted, Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn had been charged under Möngke with conduct of a census and introduction of a poll tax in northwestern Iran, and so it seems that governorship of Tabriz implied some responsibilities concerning imperial finances. It is noteworthy that it was only after Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn’s death in 668/1269-70 that there was a substantial change in the coinage of the city. The local monetary standards were eventually imposed as imperial standards throughout the Ilkhanid realm, in the reign of Ġāzān. However, the political landscape had already undergone a decisive change with the arrival of Hülegü in Azarbaijan. It was at this time that Tabriz became associated with a major court, based in the region. The village of Šam, west of Tabriz, later the site of Ġāzān’s mausoleum, had been a preferred royal campsite in the immediate city environs going back to at least the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century. There were other major royal campsites in the hinterland, such as at Ujān, clearly used since the time of pre-Mongol rulers, but under the early Ilkhans, an unprecedented courtly entourage was attracted to Tabriz. With

the death of Sadr al-Dīn, the Malikān soon lost political pre-eminence. This is made clear by a note from Ibn al-Fuwaṭī on the son, Malik ʿImād al-Dīn:

He took up the position of his father Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn in the year 668 [1269-70]. But in reality, the governor in Tabriz and elsewhere was the master Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Juwaynī, ʿImād al-Dīn's sister being with the master. He died young in the year 676 [1277-8] and was buried next to his father in the madrasa Ṣadriyya.54

This Šams al-Dīn Juwaynī, from a notable family of Khurasan, was the most influential immigrant to early Ilkhanid Tabriz. His predecessor as Hūlegū's vizier had been executed along with Malik Majd al-Dīn.55 After Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn's death, Juwaynī patronised the poet-historian Zajjājī, but only for the first part of the *Humāyūn-nāma*, consisting of the biography of the prophet Muhammad, and not for the second, the actual universal history.56 This could be explained by the historical vision of Zajjājī, set forth in this second part. Here, we have seen that he celebrates the Atabeg Abū Bakr as "king of Iran" and the Eldigūzids as undisputed heroes. Juwaynī was a newcomer from Khurasan, with no connection to the last Muslim regional dynasty of Azarbaijan, and Zajjājī's vision would have lacked appeal. On the other hand Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn had certainly endorsed this vision, and may indeed have commissioned the work in entirety.

Juwaynī's influence in Tabriz was dependent on his position at the Ilkhanid court. When he fell from grace in 684/1283, his family was virtually extinguished.57 Apart from praise of the Juwaynīs, Zajjājī makes no reference to the events following Hūlegū's sack of Baghdad, and it would appear that the

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author died before the demise of his second patron’s family. The fate of the house of Hülegü was all but certain at the time when Zajjājī was composing the *Humāyūn-nāma*. Given the local focus of his work, the author must have considered it more important that the principal city of the Ilkhans had been under Mongol rule well before this dynasty even began to take shape. So Zajjājī posited a special relation between Tabriz and the conquerors, beginning in the time of Chinggis Khan himself. He discusses the generals of Chinggis, who supposedly negotiated with Šams al-Dīn Ṭuğrāʾī:

They said that this pleasant city has peacefully surrendered to us, supporting our army and cavalry; this golden city here forms private property of the khan, for no [city] is more amiable than it in the world.

With Tabriz under Mongol rule, the urban elites continued traditions of Sunni Islamic learning in the city. The *Safīna*, most of which was compiled between 721/1321 and 723/1323 by a descendant of Malik Majd al-Dīn, includes selections from the *Maṣābīḥ al-sunna*, a highly influential hadith collection compiled by the Khurasani transmitter Rukn al-Dīn Baḡawī (d. 516/1122). A renowned student of Baḡawī, known as Imām Ḥafda, left his native Khurasan and settled in Tabriz, where he died in 571/1175. He probably brought the *Maṣābīḥ* with him. Local transmissions of another major hadith collection compiled by Baḡawī himself, the *Šarḥ al-sunna*, definitely derived from a copy by Imām Ḥafda. The most famous local Mongol-era transmitter of the *Šarḥ al-sunna* was Muḥyī al-Dīn Qazwīnī, a son of the aforementioned ʿIzz al-Dīn, who had succeeded his father as qadi of Tabriz prior to the arrival of Hülegü. Muḥyī al-Dīn taught the *Šarḥ al-sunna* to the celebrated polymath Quṭb al-Dīn Šīrāzī (d. 711/1311), and to Ṣadr al-Dīn Ḥamuwayi (d. 722/1322), who presided over Ilkhan Ġāzān’s conversion to Islam shortly before the latter rose to the throne in 694/1295.
For some time prior to 674/1275 Muḥyī al-Dīn shared the post of qadi with the same relative of the Malikān who, at the time of the Khwarazmian conquest, had been temporarily replaced by Muḥyī al-Dīn’s own father. He then held the position alone, until his death in 697/1298.63 Muḥyī al-Dīn is usually referred to as chief qadi (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Tabriz, but in fact we know very little about the organization of the city’s judiciary. His son was one of four individuals who, as qadi of Tabriz, signed a laudatory statement (taqrīz) concerning the theological works of Rašīd al-Dīn.64 Such a taqrīz is generally issued on request, but not one of the four signed as chief qadi. They may thus have been equal in rank, probably representing not more than two schools of law, and may even have all been Šāfiʿīs. It is quite certain that all four belonged to families based in Tabriz for at least one generation.

Other members of the Qazwīnī family served in various functions under the Ilkhan Ġāzān, and under Öljeitū, his brother and successor (d. 716/1316).65 Although Öljeitū briefly adopted Shiʿi Islam, a distant cousin of Muḥyī al-Dīn’s, who was leader of the Sunni-Šāfiʿī party in his court, remained chief qadi of the Ilkhanid dominions (qāḍī quḍāt al-mamālik).66 Following this last period there is no longer any detailed information on the Qazwīnīs, but it is clear the Malikān were still flourishing in 735/1336, at the time of the death of Öljeitū’s son Abū Saʿīd, and the subsequent collapse of the Mongol dynasty. Indeed the Safīna contains a letter dealing with the problem of succession to Abū Saʿīd,

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63 Ibn al-Fuwāṭī, Majmaʿ al-ādāb: 111, p. 530; v, p. 54.
Local Elites and Dynastic Succession

and a teacher of the compiler, named Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAtīqī (d. 744/1343), likewise outlived the house of Hülegū.67

Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAtīqī pertained to another old leading family of Tabriz. Like his father he was best known as a poet at the courts of Öljeitü and Abū Saʿīd, by the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century.68 But in fact the ʿAtīqīs were first of all Islamic scholars, preachers and Sufis, who had close ties to the Abbasids in the first half of the seventh/thirteenth century.69 It is possible that these ʿAtīqīs had contracted a matrimonial relationship with the famous Suhrawardi family, whose members lent crucial support to the efforts for promotion of scholarly Sufism under the last caliphs in pre-Mongol Baghdad.70 This does not necessarily imply that the ʿAtīqīs belonged to a distinct Suhrawardiyya ‘brotherhood’ or ‘order’. However they continued to author commentaries on the Quran and transmit hadith, even in the times when the rulers of Tabriz were not Muslim. This was one of several long-standing urban families still giving rise to notable individuals in the post-Ilkhanid period. However, under Mongol rule, families from the hinterland villages of Tabriz also began rising to prominence.

5 The Kujjūjis and the Rise of Rural Elites under Mongol Rule

The Kujjūjis, originally from the village Kujujān (about ten kilometres south of Tabriz), developed as the most prominent of these rural families. The spiritual ancestor, Ḥwāja Muḥammad Kujujānī, died in 677/1279.71 This individual


70 Ibn Karbalāʾī, Rawżāt al-jīnān: I, p. 565, wrote down a genealogy of the ʿAtīqīs (nasab-nāma-yi ʿAtīqīyān), positing a matrimonial relationship with the Suhrawardīs. The editor Jaʿfar Sulṭān al-Qurrāʾī included this genealogy, which has some flaws, in the appendix to his edition of the main work. The scope of the current article does not permit discussion of other hints to the matrimonial relationship between the two families. See Ohlander, Erik S., Sufism in an Age of Transition. ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī and the Rise of the Islamic Mystical Brotherhoods (Leiden: Brill, 2006): pp. 57-106, on Šihāb al-Dīn ʿUmar Suhrawardī, his family, and their links to the Abbasid court.

and his tomb in Kujūjān are recorded in the two major early eighth/fourteenth
century works by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī. But the basic source is a hagiographical
account by a disciple, in Arabic and later translated into Persian.
(I will return to this translation below.) Ḥwāja Muḥammad’s disciple had studied
an esteemed commentary of the Quran with its author in Mosul. He then
came to Tabriz and Kujūjān to visit the master on a number of occasions,
including during Ramaḍān 675/February-March 1277.73 The fact that such a
learned man would seek the mystical guidance of Ḥwāja Muḥammad is an-
other example disproving the existence of any rift between traditional scholars
and Sufis.

Ḥwāja Muḥammad belonged to a loose group of local Sufi šayḥs, which Ibn
Karbalāʾī introduces as the “70 Bābās of Tabriz”.74 Most remain obscure, how-
ever some tentative remarks are possible. First, it is unclear when and how the
individuals listed by Ibn Karbalāʾī came to be considered as a group. Second,
these local Sufis did not constitute a community of any kind. Yet several bābās
were connected in a complex web of master-disciple relationships, in subse-
quent generations often intersecting with matrimonial ties. Particularly im-
portant with regard to the generally accepted history of Sufism is that some
of the bābās, as well as later members of their families and other local Sufis,
were direct or indirect disciples of representatives of widespread traditions
(usually called ‘brotherhoods’ or ‘orders’) or were at least acquainted with
these representatives. Among these ‘brotherhoods’ or ‘orders’ there were the
aforementioned Suhrawardiyya, as well as the Kubrāwiyya, however there is no
evidence that such distinct groups existed in Tabriz between the sixth/twelfth
and ninth/fifteenth centuries. Instead, local cults and corresponding interre-
lated Sufi lineages are well attested, prior to, under and following Mongol rule.

The main distinction among the 70 Bābās of Tabriz would be between those
based in the city or its immediate suburbs and those of the villages. The urban
and the rural Sufi milieus were not neatly separated. Nevertheless, the rela-
tions within the urban milieu itself, and within the rural milieu on the other
hand, appear to have been much closer than those across the city-village divide.
The chain of initiation (sīsilā) of Ḥwāja Muḥammad Kujūjānī, for instance,

72 Mustawfī Qazwīnī, Tārīḫ-i guzīda: p. 672; Mustawfī Qazwīnī, Nuzhat al-qulūb: p. 89.
73 Ibn Karbalāʾī, Rawżāt al-jinān: 11, pp. 15, 36. On the teacher of Ḥwāja Muḥammad’s dis-
ciple, see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ al-ādāb: V, pp. 593-4.
74 Ibn Karbalāʾī, Rawżāt al-jinān: 1, pp. 49-50; Lewisohn, Leonard, Beyond Faith and Infidelity:
126-35 discussed some of the bābās based mainly on their presentation in an early eighth/
fourteenth work by the famous Sufi poet Maḥmūd Shabistārī.
was traced through the šayḥs of the neighbouring village of Šādābād. Hwāja Muḥammad is said to have gone to Tabriz once as a young boy, when he received an inspiring glance (naẓar) from Bābā Ḩasan Surḥābī, the original leader of the 70 Bābās, who had a lodge (zāwīya) in the suburb of Surḥāb. On the other hand, a preferred venue for the most noted city bābās of the mid-seventh/thirteenth century was the zāwīya of Ḥwāja Ṣāyīn al-Dīn Yahyā Tabrīzī (d. 683/1284), inherited from his father, and there are no explicit mentions of a village bābā attending a session there.

A tale about Ḥwāja Yūsuf Ḥyarān Dihhwārqānī (d. 670/1271) and his disciple Ḥwāja ‘Alī Bādāmyārī (d. 699/1299) further strengthens the argument that there was a relatively pronounced urban-rural divide. Ḥwāja Yūsuf once prompted a gathering of eminent village bābās, included Ḥwāja Muḥammad Kujujānī, at his house in Dihhwārqān, to secure their blessings for his unborn nephew. However no city bābā is named as present. One of the rural Sufis in attendance, Bābā Faqīh Aḥmad Asbustī, had migrated from Konya to Tabriz and settled in Asbust. Almost all others were natives of the villages they lived in, and were eventually buried in these same villages in what developed into family shrines. The majority probably had rather modest formal education. Aḥmad’s additional designation as faqīh identifies him as a scholar, and indeed among these 70 Bābās he passed as the expert in Islamic law.

Some among the second generation of prominent village bābā families frequented urban scholarly milieus. Hwāja Yūsuf’s nephew, known as Pīr Čūpān Walī (d. 724/1324), studied the most authoritative hadith collection, the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī, as transmitted from the copy brought to Tabriz by Imām Ḥafda. He was eventually buried in Bādāmyār, next to his mystical master Ḥwāja ‘Alī. Šihāb al-Dīn ‘Atīqī (d. ca. 663/1265) represented an important link between the urban and the rural milieus even farther into Azarbaijan, as early as the first generation. Šihāb al-Dīn’s mausoleum is located in Ahar, between Tabriz and Ardabil, where the ‘Atīqīs had maintained a second base since pre-Mongol
times. He occupies a key position in the Safavid silsila, in that of Ahmad Asbusti and of two other bābās from villages of Tabriz, most notably Bāla Ḥasan Binīsī.81  
Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardabīlī (d. 735/1334), the Safavid eponym, had forged ties to Ilkhanid court circles by the time of the reign of Abū Saʿīd, however experienced difficulties in gaining acceptance among the scholars and Sufis of Tabriz.82 These difficulties are illustrated by the fact that only one member of a village bābā family is specifically indicated as a follower of Ṣafī al-Dīn.83 Indeed in the first decades after his death, his community deemed it necessary to connect Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardabīlī, and also his master Ṣayḥ Zāhid Gīlānī, with Bāla Ḥasan Binīsī and Ḥwāja Muḥammad Kujūjī. This Bāla Ḥasan was credited with a vision predicting the future appearance of Ṣayḥ Zāhid, as well as another vision jointly with Ḥwāja Muḥammad, spiritual ancestor of the Kujūjīs, predicting the future appearance of Ṣayḥ Ṣafī.84  
Ḥwāja Muḥammad, and another outstanding village bābā of Tabriz, Bābā or Pīr Ḥāmid Sardrūdī (d. 690/1291), had clearly impressed even the learned elites of the city. Pīr Ḥāmid, as well as Muḥammad Kujūjī, had authored poems in ancient regional Iranian tongues (fahlawīyyāt) which the compiler of the Safīna included in his portable private library.85 Later members of the Kujūjī family were descended from the brother of Ḥwāja Muḥammad, named Ibrāhīm. By the ninth/fifteenth century, these had intermarried with the Ḥāmidī šayḥs of Sardrūd, and with the family of another village bābā.86 All remained firmly rooted in the Sufi milieus of Tabriz and its villages. In the eighth/fourteenth century, the Kujūjīs appear to have led a Sufi movement comparable to that of the Safavids. This certainly involved rivalries between the two families, for
instance for followers, but also common concerns, such as shielding their respective movements from persecution. Further research on the early Safavids and the Kujujis would be needed to enhance our understanding of similarities and differences between these movements.

The recent publication of the *Kujuji-waqfiyya*,87 provides new evidence, showing that the descendants of Ḥwāja Ibrāhīm and spiritual heirs of Ḥwāja Muhammad were the equal of the Safavids in terms of social status, and that they disposed of similar material resources. The large part of the portfolio consisted of agricultural estates in the rural hinterland, supplemented by suburban fields and gardens, and urban structures such as shops in city markets. The large Kujjūji waqf complex in Tabriz was established in 782/1380 by a great-grandson of Ḥwāja Ibrāhīm, named Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Muḥammad, also known as Ḥwāja Šayḫ Kujjūji.88 However some possessions had been given in endowment a generation earlier. Indeed Ḥwāja Šayḫ’s father had not only possessed a za-wāya in Tabriz, but very likely also already founded one in Damascus, where family members remained present as Sufi masters for at least several decades.89 However, among the Kujjūji family, it was Ḥwāja Šayḫ who would first rise as a major political figure in Tabriz and as a highly influential courtier beyond the local level.

6 The Kujjūjis and Dynastic Succession following Mongol Rule

After the death of the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd in 736/1335, the two principal contenders to succession pertained to the houses of the Čūpānids and the Jalāyirids, both Mongol military aristocratic families related through various ways to the Ilkhanid dynasty and to each other. For some time, their leaders raised true or pretended descendants of Hülegū to the throne, left it vacant, or recognised other Chinggisids as nominal sovereigns.90 In 738/1338, the Čūpānid Ṣayḥ Ḥasan expelled his Jalāyirid namesake from Azarbajjan, who then ruled in Baghdad until his death in 757/1356.

The Čūpānids were the first serious successors of the Ilkhans at Tabriz, but troubles increased at the time when the conqueror’s wife had him murdered, in 744/1343, Ṣayḥ Ḥasan’s brother, Malik Ašraf, then met with resistance when

88 The complex was located in the vicinity of the ‘Ališāh-Mosque; the latter is indicated in the map in fig. 4.
89 Werner et al., *Die Kuǧuǧī-Stiftungen*: pp. 24-6, 88-90.
he attempted to take the city, so two prominent Sufis ultimately led a delegation for negotiation of terms of surrender.91 Both of these had settled in Tabriz under the Mongols. Malik Ašraf was devoted to one of them, who was named Niẓām al-Dīn Ġūrī (d. 752/1351) and had become a promoter of the local cult of Bābā Mazīd Surḥābī in Tabriz. Bābā Mazīd had emerged as leader of the 70 Bābās, in succession to Bābā Hasan, even though he was not a disciple of the

In the realm of Malik Ašraf his tyranny reached extreme proportions, making the people leave their homeland. Ḥwāja Šayḫ Kujuji went to Shiraz and on to Damascus where he erected lofty buildings consisting of Sufi lodges. Ḥwāja Šadr al-Dīn [b. Ṣafī al-Dīn] Ardabīlī, mercy upon him, went to Gilan.94 Ḥwāja Šayḫ Kujuji must also have intensified his contacts with the Jalāyirids in Baghdad at the time, while another exile encouraged Jānī Beg Khan of the Golden Horde to invade Azarbaijan. The Jochid ruler was welcomed in Tabriz, and had Malik Ašraf executed in 758/1357. He then returned to his dominions, and soon died.95 The Muẓaffarids of Fars then briefly occupied the city. In 761/1360, Ḥwāja Šayḫ Kujuji secured the succession of the Jalāyirid Sultan Uways as ruler of Tabriz.96 Ḥwāja Šayḫ remained close to Uways, and, in 776/1374, he was even admitted to the ruler's deathbed to partake in deciding on his successor.97 Uways was buried in Šādābād at the shrine complex of the local family of village šayḥs.98 Their connection to the Kujujīs has already been noted.

Uways' successor, Sultan Ḥusayn Jalāyir, was subject to both internal and external attacks. Ḥwāja Šayḫ Kujuji, for his part, did not hesitate to welcome another Muẓaffarid pretender to Tabriz in 778/1376, and may even have incited him to take over the city.99 The resulting short-term occupation would not
endure. Nonetheless Ḫwāja Šayḫ’s influence at the Jalāyirid court was curtailed while Sultan Ḥusayn’s position remained precarious.100 This situation appears to have motivated the Kujuji leader to transfer a sizable part of his possessions to a pious foundation, in 782/1380. Two years later, Ḫwāja Šayḫ procured the assassination of Sultan Ḥusayn and brought Ḥusayn’s brother, Sultan Aḥmad, to the throne.101 The new ruler duly reconfirmed the Kujju-waqaaf in 784/1382, and Ḫwāja Šayḫ supported him against rival Jalāyirid claimants.102 Still, even greater troubles than these loomed for Sultan Aḥmad and the principal city of Mongol Iran.

In 787/1385, Toqtemiš Khan of the Golden Horde (d. 809/1406) attacked Tabriz during his struggle with Timur, who had raised his claim in the name of the Chaghadaid branch of the Chinggisid dynasty.103 Mongol dynastic claims were certainly of limited relevance to the local elites in such situations. Negotiations with the armies of Toqtemiš failed, and the notables decided to defend their city by military means. One of them, Qadi Quṭb al-Dīn ‘Ubaydi, died while fighting the Jochid assailants.104 Since as early as the time of the Ilkhans, the ‘Ubaydis had been known as astronomers, but primarily as Šāfiʿī jurists.105 Qadi Quṭb al-Dīn’s father had penned the Kujju-waqaifyya, and Qadi Quṭb al-Dīn himself, his brother Faḍl-Allāh and a member of the aforementioned ‘Atīqī family, had all testified to the legality of the endowment.106 Another notable, Sayyid Riḍā Naqīb Ḥasanī, was humiliated by the troops of Toqtemiš, and then in 788/1386, joined the delegation welcoming Timur to Tabriz.107 Sayyid Riḍā’s ancestors were reportedly the first Alids to settle in the city and most probably held the post of naqīb on a hereditary basis. Family

100 Werner et al., Die Kuǧuǧī-Stiftungen: p. 33.
102 Werner et al., Die Kuǧuǧī-Stiftungen: p. 33-4.
Local Elites and Dynastic Succession

members are well attested from the time of the Muslim Ilkhans to the early ninth/fifteenth century.108

Prior to the Jochid assault on Tabriz and the arrival of Timur at the city, Ḥwāja Sayḥ Kujūjī had apparently departed for Baghdad with the Jalāyirid Sultan Aḥmad. It is possible that Ḥwāja Sayḥ instigated a reported plot against Timur’s life, and indeed it is quite likely that he attempted to return Tabriz to the hands of his Jalāyirid protégé.109 Shortly afterwards, Timur returned to Samarqand. Numerous contenders, including the Qara Qoyunlu, then fought for control of Tabriz over the coming years.110 The conqueror returned in 795/1393, and installed his son Mīrān-Šāh as governor. Timur expelled Sultan Aḥmad from Baghdad, but the latter had Ḥwāja Sayḥ Kujūjī executed, prior to his escape.111 The Kujūjīs in Tabriz certainly sought accommodation with the Timurids. Their associate, who translated the above-mentioned hagiographical account of Ḥwāja Muḥammad Kujūjānī, definitely served the governor.112

Timur removed Mīrān-Šāh from the governorship of Tabriz during his last great western campaign, which began in 802/1399, when the latter attempted to assert his independence. But Timur then reassigned the region to the family of Mīrān-Šāh.113 The notables would certainly have been unhappy at having their city subordinate to distant Samarqand, and had probably endorsed Mīrān-Šāh’s attempt at independence. Yet after Timur’s death in 807/1405, Mīrān-Šāh and his sons were unable to provide sufficient security and stability, and the Kujūjīs instead initiated the succession of the Qara Qoyunlu. A year later, Ḥwāja Sayyīdī Muḥammad Kujūjī went to the camp of Qarā Yūsuf, near Nahjavān, and urged him to protect Tabriz.114 Qarā Yūsuf soon defeated the quarrelling Timurids. The Jalāyirid Sultan Aḥmad reoccupied the city in 813/1411, and was then likewise defeated. He was executed, and his corpse was

113 Manz, Tamerlane: pp. 72-3.
displayed in the madrasa of Ḥwāja Šayḥ Kujūji, demonstrating to the inhabitants that he was indeed dead.\textsuperscript{115}

Qarā Yūsuf died in 823/1420, during the approach of Timur’s successor Šāhruḥ. Without resisting, Tabriz surrendered to the huge Timurid army. Ḥwāja Sayyidī Kujūji provided for Qarā Yūsuf’s corpse, and must have been among those notables who favoured the Qara Qoyunlu, and who ensured that they regained the city as soon as the Timurid had left for his base in Khurasan.\textsuperscript{116} Šāhruḥ undertook two more major campaigns to the Ilkhanid heartland, but as Beatrice Manz convincingly argues, “real control over Azerbāijān was beyond his grasp, as it had been beyond Temür's.”\textsuperscript{117} Iskandar Qara Qoyunlu imposed himself as lord of Tabriz, against other sons of Qarā Yūsuf, and survived both these invasions. The Kujūjis preserved their pre-eminence among the local elites.

Šāhruḥ’s first major campaign against Iskandar had in part been provoked by an assassination attempt, in 830/1426-27, allegedly by an adherent of the messianic Ḥurūfī movement. A son of the founder of the movement lived in Tabriz. He was suspected of having sent the assassin, and told Timurid officials that Ḥwāja Sayyidī Kujūji would exculpate him.\textsuperscript{118} Although the Ḥurūfīs had gained a sizable following in the city, Ḥwāja Sayyidī’s acquaintance with the individual in question should not be seen as evidence of messianic orientations among the Kujūjis. In the aftermath of Šāhruḥ’s last invasion, in 835-36/1432-33, Jahān-Šāh b. Qarā Yūsuf prevailed over his brother Iskandar, and the latter was then killed by one of his sons.\textsuperscript{119} Jahān-Šāh crushed the Ḥurūfīs of Tabriz in the wake of an 845/1441 uprising.\textsuperscript{120} Qadi Najm al-Dīn Uskūʾi (d. 879/1474-75), from the village of Uskū or Uskūya, sanctioned this measure. Being a native of the rural hinterland he had at least indirect ties to some notable village bābā lineages and families.\textsuperscript{121} With their deep roots in local Sufi milieux, especially those of the villages, the Kujūjis would have had little objection to crushing the Ḥurūfī movement, which originated from eastern Iran and had only gradually established a foothold in Azerbāijān.

\textsuperscript{115} Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, 	extit{Zubdat al-tavārīḫ}: III, pp. 169-72, 222-9, 401-4; Mīrḫwānd, 	extit{Rawżat al-ṣafū}: VI, pp. 579-83.
\textsuperscript{117} Manz, “Mongol History”: p. 146.
\textsuperscript{119} Ṭihrānī, 	extit{Kitāb-i Diyarbakriyya}: pp. 138-9, 144-5.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibn Karbalāʾī, 	extit{Rawżat al-jīnān}: I, pp. 478-81.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.: I, pp. 410-1; II, pp. 49-54, 58-61, 95-9.
However in the post-Mongol era, most members of the Kujuji family were better known for involvement in court administration and government than as prominent Sufis. Another example of a Kujuji man of politics is ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀdīd, a vizier of Jahān-Šāh in the years following Šāhrūḥ’s death (850/1447), when the Qara Qoyunlu ruler expanded his dominions eastwards at the expense of the Timurids.122 ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn was dismissed and imprisoned around 860/1455-56. A certain Šams al-Dīn Ḥusayn Tabrīzī replaced both ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn and his co-vizier, but he too soon lost favour. In 863/1458, when Jahān-Šāh occupied the Timurid principal city of Herat, his son tried to seize power in Tabriz, supported by the same Šams al-Dīn as vizier. The ruler immediately returned and ordered the execution of the vizier, but pardoned his son.123 Jahān-Šāh died during a campaign against his great enemy Uzun Ḥasan Aq Qoyunlu, in 872/1467. ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀdīd Kujuji played a leading role in the Qara Qoyunlu succession struggle that erupted at Tabriz.124 However in 874/1469, Uzun Ḥasan took over the city after defeating the Timurid Abū Saʿīd, who was taken captive in Azerbaidjan and handed over to a disgruntled Timurid prince for execution.125

A relative of ‘Alāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀdīd, named Ḩwāja ʿAlī Kujuji (d. 884/1479-80), was the best-known family member still active as a Sufi. Ḩwāja ʿAlī further exemplifies the proximity of the family to the Qara Qoyunlu, having allegedly inspired Jahān-Šāh’s wife to found the royal waqf-complex around the famous Blue Mosque of Tabriz, in 870/1465.126 Qadi Najm al-Dīn Uskūʾī was the judge responsible for legalizing the endowment, and Qadi Quṭb al-Dīn, of the ‘Atīqī family introduced above, took an administrative position in the complex, which was intended as an inheritance for his descendants. The deed of endowment stipulated that officials working in the complex were to adhere to Sunni Islam.127 For his part, Ḩwāja ʿAlī was intimately associated with an eminent Sunni Sufi of the time, suggesting that the Kujujis also adhered to Sunni Islam.

The name of Ḩwāja ʿAlī’s associate, who in a way represented the broad Kubrāwi Sufi tradition, was Sayyid Badr al-Dīn Aḥmad (d. 912/1507). Many scholars of Sufism regard this individual as the founder of a local Sunni branch of the increasingly Shiʿa-leaning Kubrāwīya ‘order’,128 however this interpretation

122 Ṭihrānī, Kitāb-i Diyarbakriyya: p. 258.
123 Ibid.: pp. 359-60.
should be rejected. Ḫwāja ‘Alī helped Sayyid Badr al-Dīn settle in the village of Lāla, when the latter returned to Tabriz at the time of Jahān-Šāh’s death. Lāla is situated about five kilometres south of the city. Here, Badr al-Dīn’s Sufi lodge, named Darwīšābād, attracted mystics of various affiliations.129 As with the Safavids and the Kujujīs, family members had also emigrated from Azarbaijan under the Čūpānid Malik Ašraf. Badr al-Dīn’s ancestors had Sufi ties to the Safavids and other communities. However, decades after the Safavids had seized power as self-declared Shiʿi rulers, Badr al-Dīn’s descendants, known as the “Sayyids of Lāla”, remained the main proponents of Sunnism in Tabriz.130

Given their proximity to the Qara Qoyunlu, the Kujujīs probably lost much prominence at court when Uzun Hasan Aq Qoyunlu took control over Tabriz.


Meanwhile, Sayyid Badr al-Dīn of Lāla supported Uzun Ḥasan (d. 882/1478), gaining some favour with the conqueror, and presumably with his son and eventual successor Yaʿqūb. Recent scholarship specifically devoted to Sunni Sufis at the courts of these two rulers still adheres to the interpretative framework of distinct organised ‘orders’, and tends to overlook Sayyid Badr al-Dīn. The latter was directly connected to the broad Kubrāwī Sufi tradition through his sīlṣīla, but also had an indirect and possibly more important connection through the thriving local cult of Bābā Faraj Tabrīzī (d. 568/1172-73). The family of Ibn Karbalāʾī were the custodians of the tomb of Bābā Faraj beginning at least in the time of Uzun Ḥasan, and Ibn Karbalāʾī was himself a disciple of a son of Sayyid Badr al-Dīn. In his writing, the author of the local pilgrimage guide took great care to stress Sayyid Badr al-Dīn’s integration in the Sufi milieus of Tabriz. In particular, Ibn Karbalāʾī emphasised Sayyid Badr al-Dīn’s close association with Ḥwāja ʿAlī Kujuji and with other eminent local Sufis, only one of whom was a representative of the Safavids. Hence the Sufis of Ardabil were far from dominating the religious scene in Tabriz.

The foresaid Bābā Faraj played a key role in the spiritual biography of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221). These two individuals met in Tabriz when the latter came to study the Šarḥ al-sunna, with Imām Ḥafda. In the late ninth/fifteenth century, Uzun Ḥasan and prominent courtiers of Yaʿqūb Aq Qoyunlu are recorded as visiting the tomb of Bābā Faraj, demonstrating that the ruling elites of Tabriz still honoured his local cult. In contrast, it seems that the

132 Lingwood, Politics: pp. 81-110, summarises earlier scholarship highlighting the Ḥalwatiyya and focuses on the Naqšbandīyya. One of the supposed Naqšbandis, Darwīš Sirāj al-Dīn Qāsim who was executed in 891/1486, had married one of his daughters to Sayyid Badr al-Dīn; that Darwīš Qāsim was a Naqšbandi is in fact all but clear as no source known to me states his sīlṣīla affiliation or anything comparable.
135 Ibn Karbalāʾī, Rawżāt al-jinān: 1, pp. 377-9; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaʿ al-ādāb: 11, pp. 117, 351, 537; IV: pp. 76, 391, 477, 506. The author recorded several individuals who studied the Šarḥ al-sunna with Kubrā as transmitted from Imām Ḥafda adding in some cases parts of the details that this happened in Khwarazm in Ṣafar 615/May 1218. This should dissipate doubts among scholars of Sufism about the credibility of the one version of Kubrā’s biography that features the visit to Tabriz and the encounter with Bābā Faraj.
works of hadith brought to the city by Imām Ḥafda were no longer available in high quality transmissions based on his copies. The aforementioned Qadi Najm al-Dīn Uskūʾī, one of the most renowned local hadith teachers, transmitted the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī from a copy that had arrived in Tabriz much more recently, and which this scholar had perhaps brought in himself. One of Sayyid Badr al-Dīn’s sons studied this copy with a student of Qadi Najm al-Dīn.137

The Kujujis reappear on the political scene after the death of Yaʿqūb in 896/1490, when Aq Qoyunlu rule gradually collapsed. A certain Šayḫ Muhammad Kujuji served as vizier of Yaʿqūb’s infant son, Baysunḡur, but the latter was captured and executed by his rivals in 898/1493. A year earlier this same Šayḫ Muḥammad had already been instrumental in engineering the succession of the relatively effective Rustam, who likewise fell victim to factional fighting and was executed in 902/1497.138 Šams al-Dīn Zakariyā Kujjī (d. 918/1512) served as vizier of Alwand (d. 910/1504), the last Aq Quyunlu ruler of Tabriz. He was the first high official to switch allegiance to the future Safavid ruler, Šāh Ismā’il (d. 924/1530), a maternal grandson of Uzun Ḥasan, having changed sides prior to the decisive Safavid defeat of Alwand, meaning before Ismā’il took the city in 907/1501.139

The sources vary in explaining the motivation for Šams al-Dīn Zakariyā’s shift in allegiance, some of them citing religious convictions. This is probably the basis on which John Woods considered the Kujujis as Shiʿis.140 Jean Aubin rightfully remarked long ago that there is no adequate definition of the precise contents of the categories of Sunni and Shiʿi in the ninth/fifteenth century.141 While acknowledging this, it seems that the Kujujis were indeed not Shiʿis. Also, unlike the Safavids, they had not contracted a matrimonial alliance with a royal family, nor formulated a claim to kingship on their own. However, like all notables of Tabriz and other cities, the Kujujis faced an enormous political problem in the last years of the Aq Qonunlu, as was aptly summarised by the tenth/sixteenth century historian Budāq Munšī Qazwīnī: “In the realm of Persian Iraq (i.e. western Iran) and Azarbaijan chaos prevailed and every two days someone became king.”142

139 Ibid.: p. 117.
Summary of dynastic history concerning Tabriz

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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Ruler/Dynasty</th>
<th>Events, Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much of 6th/12th c.</td>
<td>Aḥmadīlī Atabegs of Marāğa</td>
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| 572/1176-622/1225 | Eldigüzid Atabegs (of Azarbaijan): Qızıl Arslan, Abū Bakr, Özbeg | 590/1194: end of Seljuq dynasty in Iran  
617-18/1220-21: three times peaceful surrender to Mongols |
| 622/1225-629/1231 | Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn                        | Local resistance to conquest, then peaceful surrender to Mongols again          |
| 629/1231-654/1256 | Mongol amirs and governors                        | Gradual development into center of imperial administration in Iran             |
| 654/1256-736/1335 | Mongol Ilkans                                      | Formally on behalf of alleged Hülegüid puppet sovereign                       |
| 736/1336-738/1338 | Šayḥ Ḥasan (Buzurg) Jalāyir                       | Formally on behalf of alleged Hülegüid puppet sovereigns; local resistance to Malik Ashraf; no resistance to conquest by Jānī Beg Khan of the Golden Horde |
| 738/1338-758/1357 | Čūpānids: Šayḥ Ḥasan (Kučik), Malik Ašraf         | After withdrawal of Golden Horde control disputed between Chupanid amīr, Muzaffarid ruler of Fars and Uways Jalāyir |
| 758/1357-761/1360 |                                                                                   |                                                                                  |
| 761/1360-788/1386 | Jalāyirids: Uways, Ḥusayn, Aḥmad                  | 778/1376: no resistance to conquest by Muẓaffarid ruler of Fars, perhaps invited  
787/1385: after failed negotiations local resistance to conquest by Toqtemish Khan of the Golden Horde  
788/1386: peaceful surrender to Timur |
<p>| 788/1386-795/1393 |                                                                                   | Control disputed, dynasties involved include Timurids, Jalayirids and Qara Qoyunlu |</p>
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<tr>
<td>795/1393-810/1408</td>
<td>Mirān-Šāh b. Timūr (his sons ʿUmar and Abā Bakr)</td>
<td>Governor installed by Timur, temporary claim of independent rule then reassignment of governorship to ʿUmar 807/1405: death of Timur, intensifying conflicts between Mirān-Šāh and his sons, then local appeal to Qara Qoyunlu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>875/1469-906/1501</td>
<td>Aq Qoyunlu: Uzun Ḥasan, Sulṭān-Ḥalil, Yaʾqūb, Baysunghur, Rustam, Aḥmad, Alwand</td>
<td>906/1500: major Aq Qoyunlu courtier and local notable switches allegiance to Safavids.</td>
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Conclusion

This paper has examined the Malikān and Kujujī families of Tabriz, and in so doing has revealed that the local elites participated actively in determining the sequence of dynastic succession from the sixth/twelfth to ninth/fifteenth century. In general, pretenders, rulers, and dynasties would gain support from the local notables if they fulfilled the following conditions. They needed to demonstrate themselves capable of providing a minimum of stability and were to base their courts in Azarbaijan, granting Tabriz the distinction of being the principal city. Also, the notables of Tabriz repeatedly refrained from resisting exceptionally powerful armies, and instead sought peaceful accommodation with the invaders.

The Malikān were outstanding political leaders under the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azarbaijan, and subsequently, crucial players in the establishment of Mongol rule, which would then become Ilkhanid. The case of this family demonstrates that in Tabriz, urban life remained largely intact through this period, and that traditional Sunni Islam continued to flourish despite temporary non-Muslim domination. Conditions seem to have taken a serious turn for the worse in the period between the collapse of the Ilkhanate and the consolidation of the Qara Qoyunlu. In Tabriz, it was not the Mongol conquests, but rather Khwarazmian rule and the repeated Timurid invasions that led to significant negative impacts.

The Kujujīs were prominent Sufis who became eminent political leaders in association with the most important post-Ilkhanid dynasties, specifically the Jalāyirids and the Qara Qoyunlu. Their example indicates that the influence of Sufis in society and politics did indeed increase in Mongol and post-Mongol times. However, this growth was firmly embedded in a foundation of local pre-Mongol pious traditions. The cult of Bābā Faraj, and the Sufi lineages emanating from the 70 Bābās, developed over the entire three-century period under consideration. The family component of these lineages was particularly strong in the villages of the hinterland of Tabriz. The examination concerning this city fails to confirm and indeed counters the widely held assumption that Sufism in Azarbaijan became increasingly Shiʿi, in the century prior to the coming to power of the Safavids.

The transformation of local society under Mongol rule did not have very great effects in the religious domain, nor were the old urban elites replaced by newly arrived courtiers and their associates. The local elites of post-Mongol Tabriz instead pertained to rural backgrounds, and beginning in the time of Mongol rule, even notable immigrants to the city took up residence in the hinterland villages. This change in the local balance of power may be attributed
to the endurance of a nomadic mode of domination, or perhaps its intensification beginning with Mongol rule. Of course, Ġāzān and subsequent lords of Tabriz, like their predecessors, made use of residences in the immediate suburbs of Tabriz. Yet they exercised power mainly from their mobile camps. Therefore Tabriz should not be called a ‘capital’, even when referring to the time under the Ilkhans and their successors. Finally, the tendency of the nomadic imperial elites to stay outside of the city possibly implied an advantage of access to them for those notables who had rural backgrounds.

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Biographical Note

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Aus den Tiefenschichten der Texte

Beiträge zur turko-iranischen Welt
von der Islamisierung bis zur Gegenwart

Herausgegeben von
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I. Introduction

Tabriz is well known as a city that acquired tremendous political significance after the Mongol conquests in the seventh/thirteenth century. It was the principal urban center of the Ilkhanid dynasty that Hülegü (d. 663/1265), a grandson of Chinggis Khan (d. 624/1227), founded during a campaign to the Middle East which also entailed the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad in 656/1258. After the collapse of the dynasty in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, the successors of the Mongol Ilkhans up to the early Safavids at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century likewise accorded Tabriz the distinction of being the principal city.

In spite of the significance, which Tabriz acquired, research into the history of the city during these centuries is only in its initial stages. Judith Pfeiffer recently published an edited volume devoted in title to Tabriz between the seventh/thirteenth and the ninth/fifteenth centuries but actually focusing mainly on the period of the Mongol Ilkhans. Moreover, the volume leaves the local elites or the notables of Tabriz almost completely out of the picture. This reflects a perspective from which many scholars study the political history of the Iranian lands during this era. They rather concentrate on members of ruling families and their closest associates, that is the Turco-Mongol nomadic military aristocracy and the Persian bureaucratic, cultural, and religious elites at court.

Yet some scholars, including Jürgen Paul, have also paid attention to the ways in which the elites of specific cities, especially Isfahan and Herat, interacted with the armies and the courts of the Turkic, Mongol or Turco-Mongol rulers of the time. Their

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Daniel Zakrzewski

studies have shown that the notables of these cities purposefully interceded in politics at both the local and the imperial level, rendering loyal service to established rulers and dynasties but also selectively supporting or opposing rival claimants in times of conflict and disputed succession. But it was not only in Isfahan and Herat that the notables played an active role in politics.

As I have recently shown elsewhere with a focus on the Malikān and Kujujī families, the local elites of Tabriz were crucial in determining a specific sequence of dynastic succession passing through the Mongols to the Safavids. Members of the two leading families of Tabriz will figure prominently in the present paper as well but its analysis concentrates more on individual instances of dynastic change, both within a single ruling house and from one dynasty to another.

Research questions shall be similar for each case. Which interests were at stake for Tabriz when its local elites had to deal with rulers, dynasties or pretenders that aimed at becoming or remaining lords of the city? Did these interests change over time and, if so, in what respect? Which means did the notables have at their disposal to shape situations of dynastic change and what were the limits of their political agency? On what grounds would the local elites of Tabriz accept and support an individual ruler, dynasty or pretend and on what grounds would they rather take an oppositional stance? Finally, which roles did they play in the transfer of power from one ruler or ruling house to the next?

In view of the great significance that Tabriz had for several royal dynasties of this era, its local elites need to be somewhat distinguished from prominent courtiers of individual rulers or ruling houses based there. However, the notables of Tabriz often had close ties to the courts of these rulers and dynasties although the city always constituted a distinct social and political setting. One reason why the local elites have received comparatively little scholarly attention as major political actors is that they rarely appear in the sources, the bulk of which are historiographical works deriving from courtly contexts. Moreover, in Tabriz as elsewhere, agency is usually not attributed to the local leaders and notables if such individuals do appear. Authors of Persian chronicles in particular often leave the local elites unnamed and mostly show them either as victims of military assaults or as beneficiaries of royal favors.

Nevertheless, the main sources for the present study pertain to the genre of court historiography. Numerous works of dynastic and universal history written within and beyond the Iranian lands between the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries do contain scattered references to notables of Tabriz engaging in politics. Furthermore, there are different kinds of local sources that often provide additional information allowing us to identify relevant individuals and to partly reconstruct the web of social relations in which they operated.


One of these local sources is a versified universal history composed in mid-seventh/thirteenth century Tabriz by a poet named Zajjājī in emulation of the Shāhnāma. The work is entitled Humāyūnnāma and was probably commissioned by Malik Šadr al-Dīn Tabrīzī (d. 668/1269–70), an eminent member of the Malikān family.\textsuperscript{4} Another text and, as it seems, the local source giving the most comprehensive information about notables of Tabriz, especially the Kujujī family, is the Rawzāt al-jinān, a Sufi pilgrimage guide to the cemeteries of the city and surrounding villages written by Ibn Karbalāʾī (d. 997/1589).\textsuperscript{5} An important non-narrative local source, the endowment deed to a pious foundation established in Tabriz in 782/1380 by Ghīyāṣ al-Dīn Muhammad Kujujī (known as Khwāja Shakhī), has greatly advanced the knowledge about this family that has increasingly attracted broader scholarly interest in recent years.\textsuperscript{6}

In addition to these local sources, several works written by authors who frequented Tabriz or were otherwise acquainted with its notables likewise provide valuable information helping to contextualize the brief references in court historiography. Such sources include the prosopographical dictionary of Ibn al-Fuwāṭī (d. 723/1323),\textsuperscript{7} various hagiographic accounts and other works containing biographical details about eminent individuals from Tabriz, for instance treatises on the history of calligraphy. The analysis of the various sources will concentrate on the local elites of Tabriz in situations of dynamic change trying to assess their interests and agency in each case. The discussion shall proceed chronologically, the three sections of this paper corresponding roughly to the three centuries under study. The first section is devoted to the seventh/thirteenth century with the transition from the Eldūzīd Atabegs of Azerbaijān to Mongol rule and the emergence of the Ilkhanid dynasty. The second section examines the eighth/fourteenth century with various contenders claiming succession to the Mongols in Iran and fighting for control over their principal city Tabriz. The third section discusses the ninth/fifteenth century which was dominated by the conflicts between the Turkmen Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu on the one hand and the Timurids on the other.


II. From Eldigüzid to Mongol Rule (Seventh/Thirteenth Century)

The Eldigüzids who came to be known as Atabegs of Azerbaijan are the first dynasty of considerable relevance for the history of Tabriz during the period under study. They were originally based in Nakhjavān and became the most powerful ruling house in western Iran in the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. The Eldigüzids controlled the disintegrating Seljuq Sultanate and, in 572/1176, succeeded in taking over Tabriz from a rival atabeg dynasty in Azerbaijan. The city developed as the principle urban center of the Eldigüzids under Atabeg Abū Bakr who headed the dynasty in the years prior to and following the end of Seljuq rule in Iran in 590/1194.

But Eldigüzid power declined significantly in the reign of Abū Bakr. Externally, he faced great pressure from the Khwarazmshahs and the Georgian Bagratids; internally, Abū Bakr had to rely on successive strongman emirs based in the Hamadan area together with his brother Özbeg. One of these strongman emirs eventually brought Özbeg to Tabriz as Abū Bakr’s successor in 607/1210 but they met with resistance from the local elites. Zajjājī says Özbeg seems to be the only author reporting this takeover of Tabriz by Jahanbān and later Özbeg as his successor in 614/1217 forcing Özbeg to take refuge in the city for a year and the Humayūnāma adds that the notables ultimately accepted the succession of Özbeg.

One possible explanation for the initial opposition of the local elites to the successor is Özbeg’s lack of a connection to Tabriz. Unlike Abū Bakr, he had no firm ties to the city before he came to power. It is reasonable to assume that the notables feared Özbeg would restore the primacy of Hamadan, previously the principal city of the last Seljuq Sultans, should an opportunity arise. But there was no other serious candidate of the locally established dynasty and Özbeg managed to impose himself as lord of Tabriz. In any case, cities beyond the Eldigüzid core territories in Azerbaijan and the northern region of Arrān turned out to be beyond his reach most of the time.

However, Özbeg forged an alliance with the Abbasids and the Ismāʿīlīs of Alamut in an attempt to contain Khwarazmshah expansion into central Iran. Nonetheless, Khwarazmshah Muḥammad marched westwards in 614/1217 forcing Özbeg to...

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acknowledge him as overlord before being forced to return to Khurasan to face the Mongols.\(^{13}\) Three years later, the Khwarazmshah was hunted to death by two generals Chinggis Khân dispatched in his pursuit while Özbeg remained lord of Tabriz. But when these two governors returned to the city during the first Mongol invasion of the Iranian lands in the winter of 617–18/1220–21, the Eldigüzid ruler played only a marginal role in countering the threat. The sources disagree about how many times the Mongol armies came to the gates of Tabriz that winter. But they unanimously depict a member of the Malikân family named Shams al-Dîn 'Uşmân Ťughrâ'î as the main figure in the first encounter between the city and the non-Muslim conquerors.

Zajjâ’î notes in his *Humâyûnânâma* that Shams al-Dîn’s father had already been a leading notable of Tabriz and that Ťughrâ’î served as vizier of Abû Bakr, a post he possibly regained around 616/1218 under Özbeg.\(^{14}\) According to the same author, the Mongols came to Tabriz only once in the winter of 617–18/1220–21, Shams al-Dîn Ťughrâ’î advising Özbeg to make peace and negotiating the withdrawal of the infidel armies.\(^{15}\) Ibn al-Attîr, whose contemporary universal history written in Mosul is the basic source for most later authors, reports three appearances of the Mongols before Tabriz during the first invasion. He stresses that, at the last of these, Özbeg had left the city while Ťughrâ’î prepared Tabriz and its inhabitants to fight the Mongols but then agreed to provide the invaders with what they demanded.\(^{16}\)

Shams al-Dîn Ťughrâ’î and the local elites of Tabriz certainly knew what happened to cities that offered resistance and confronted the Mongols militarily. By taking the decision to surrender and comply with their demands, Ťughrâ’î avoided a siege of Tabriz, which would have resulted in great loss of life and property and large-scale destruction. Özbeg, for his part, may also have had other reasons to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Mongols a bit later: They were the enemies of the Khwarazmshahs with whom the Eldigûzids had generally hostile relations – in spite of occasional alliances between individual representatives of both dynasties. Ibn al-Attîr reports that, when the Mongols returned to Tabriz in 621/1224, they demanded the surrender of Khwarazmian captives and that Özbeg not only complied but also executed some himself handing over their heads.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{15}\) See ibid., 2: 1218 f.


However, the following year, when Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn approached Tabriz, in summer 622/1225, the atabeg abandoned the city once more. He died soon after the Khwarazmian conquest while his wife Malika, a daughter of the last Seljuk sultan Toğhril (d. 590/1194), remained in Tabriz. Malika’s role in the dynastic change from the Elidigužids to the Khwarazmshah is not entirely clear and the local elites were divided. This time, there was military resistance to the invaders, Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrahā‘ī heading the faction that opposed the Khwarazmian takeover and a renowned jurist named ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī leading the one that supported Jalāl al-Dīn.

Zajjā‘ī notes that Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrahā‘ī went to inform Malika about Jalāl al-Dīn’s advance on Tabriz and that he summoned the urban militias (javānān-i Tabriz) because there were only few troops in the city. The ra‘īs, who was named Nizām al-Dīn Muḥammad, then led them outside to confront the Khwarazmian army together with some Eldiğüzd emirs. Nasawī who was an eyewitness of the events, largely confirms Zajjā‘ī’s account of the fighting in his biography of the Khwarazmshah, clearly depicting Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrahā‘ī as the most influential notable in Tabriz. He adds that the ra‘īs Nizām al-Dīn was a paternal nephew of Ṭughrahā‘ī.

According to Zajjā‘ī’s Humāyūnnama, after a week the local elites realized that the city could not withstand the Khwarazmian siege any longer. They approached princess Malika to discuss their options, concluding that ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī would be sent out to declare the submission of Tabriz to the Khwarazmshah. The poet-historian suggests that the jurist also argued strongly in favor of surrender at this meeting with Malika. The terms of surrender negotiated by the local elites, as it seems ultimately by ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī, included a guarantee of safe passage out of Tabriz for princess Malika and perhaps also provisions for her projected marriage to Jalāl al-Dīn.

As for the jurist ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī, he had previously made an agreement with the vizier of the Khwarazmshah that he would become qadi of Tabriz once the conqueror had taken possession of the city. But this post was held by a maternal nephew of Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrahā‘ī and, as Nasawī points out, Ṭughrahā‘ī and his paternal nephew the ra‘īs Nizām al-Dīn, also retained their positions of local leadership after the conquest. Thus, ʿIzz al-Dīn, who taught as a professor in a madrasa built by Ṭughrahā‘ī, conspired against the latter to achieve his goal. Eventually, the ra‘īs was executed, Ṭughrahā‘ī forced to pay a fine and, then, to go into temporary exile while ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī was finally appointed as qadi of Tabriz.

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18 See Zajjā‘ī, Humāyūnnama, 2: 1222–1224. – Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 12: 433, explains that the notables of Tabriz complained about Khwarazmian troops that had been admitted to the city to provision themselves and, then, about an official the Khwarazmshah sent to constrain his soldiery, stressing that Jalāl al-Dīn heavily fought the inhabitants when he came to Tabriz in person.

19 Nasawī, Sirat, 133, does not clearly indicate the involvement of the urban militias in the fighting.


21 See Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 12: 433; Nasawī, Sirat, 133. Juwaynī, Tārīkh-i Jahān gushāy, 2: 156 f., claims that Malika had been in correspondence with Jalāl al-Dīn because of an estrangement from her husband, Ata-beg ʿOzbeg, and proposed to marry the Khwarazmshah prior to his assault on Tabriz. He further asserts that Malika convened the notables during the siege and suggested surrender as the best option.

22 See Nasawī, Sirat, 134, 142.

23 See ibid., 137–139, 142 f. – Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 12: 436 f., does not say that Shams al-Dīn Ṭughrahā‘ī and the ra‘īs were falsely accused of plotting against the Khwarazmians and is far from passionately defending
One of ʿIzz al-Dīn’s first deeds in office must have been to confirm that the divorce of princess Malika from Atabeg ʿOzbek had taken legal effect so she could marry Khwarazmshah Jalāl al-Dīn.24 However, his personal ambition was certainly not the only factor accounting for Qazvīnī’s pro-Khwarazmian stance. Zajjājī suggests that he also hoped for a mighty Muslim ruler able to face the Mongols, citing a speech, which the jurist allegedly delivered to the Khwarazmshah to praise and admonish him accordingly.25 Furthermore, ʿIzz al-Dīn obviously lacked the type of attachment to the Eldīgzids, which characterized the family of Shams al-Dīn ʿUṯmānī, making it easier for him to turn his back on Atabeg ʿOzbek. Qazvīnī had settled in Tabriz in his youth together with his father and most, if not all, of his family that had also risen to prominence in nearby Marāgha where the house of Eldīgzī enjoyed little support.26

Be that as it may, ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī was dismissed from his post as qādi of Tabriz in spring 622/1226, thus within roughly half a year of his appointment, for insults against the Khwarazmians while princess Malika likewise quickly became disillusioned with the new lord.27 In contrast, Shams al-Dīn ʿUṯmānī returned to Tabriz with the permission of the Khwarazmshah, possibly joined Jalāl al-Dīn’s court in summer 622/1226 and reportedly defended Khwarazmian officials against an enraged crowd somewhat later.28 At that time, support for the new Muslim ruler of Tabriz had already greatly diminished and in 628/1231 the local elites once again submitted to the Mongols most likely before they received the news of Jalāl al-Dīn’s death.29

Shams al-Dīn ʿUṯmānī died perhaps before the final Mongol conquest whereas ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī is again attested as qādi of Tabriz two years later in 630/1233.30 He probably retained this office until his death in 648/1250.31 During that early phase of Mongol

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24 See Nasawī, Sīrat, 141. – Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʿ al-tāvārīkh, 1: 552, states that Malika fell in love with Jalāl al-Dīn while he was besieging Tabriz and dismissed qādi Qvām al-Dīn Ḥaddādī because the latter refused to legalize her projected marriage to the Khwarazmshah, appointing ʿIzz al-Dīn Qazvīnī instead. The author does not indicate that qādi Qvām al-Dīn was a relative of Ṭuḡhrāʾī and the chronology he presents seems extremely unlikely.

25 See Zajjājī, Ḥumāyūnīnāma, 2: 1225.


28 See ibid., 139 f., 223, 253.

29 Ibn al-ʿAthir, al-Kāmil, 12: 502 f., reports that the Mongols inquired about Ṭuḡhrāʾī. Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʿ al-tāvārīkh, 1: 655, remarks that the people of Tabriz deliberately gave false information to a scout of the Khwarazmshah telling him the Mongols had withdrawn.


31 See Ibn al-Fuwātīḥ, Majmaʿ al-ʿaddāb, 1: 279 (No. 327).
rule, 'Izz al-Dīn must have collaborated closely with a grandnephew of Shams al-Dīn Tuğhrāʾī, the above-mentioned Malik Şadr al-Dīn Muḥammad. The latter seems to be the origin of the family name Malīkān and advanced to the position of local or regional governor (malik) in these years, which he retained until he died in 668/1269–70.22 Thus, both families were instrumental in the establishment of Mongol rule in Iran culminating in the emergence of the Ilkhanid dynasty based in Azerbaijan.

The Malīkān were caught in a series of conflicts within the imperial dynasty of Chinggis Khān that characterized the middle decades of the seventh/thirteenth century. They had close ties to the Jochid Mongol house known as the Golden Horde and based in the Qipchak Steppe but eventually supported Hūlegū and the emerging Ilkhanid dynasty. Family members were still employed in Ilkhanid government service when the house of Hūlegū collapsed in the eighth/fourteenth century but, by that time, the Malīkān did not serve at the top levels of imperial administration anymore and were rather active as scientists and poets.33

'Izz al-Dīn Qazvīnī and his relatives remained qadīs in Tabriz and Marāgha through the emergence and consolidation of the Ilkhanid dynasty and, at some point, held the same post in Baghdad and for the whole Mongol realm in Iran. Several family members were also renowned transmitters of hadith; others served in various court functions under the Ilkhan Ghāzān (d. 703/1304) and Öljeitū (d. 716/1316).34 Concrete information about the Qazvīnīs in the final years of Ilkhanid rule or later periods is lacking, but for the transition from the Eldigūzids to the Mongols family members played almost as critical roles as the Malīkān.

III. Fights for the Ilkhanid Heartland (Eighth/Fourteenth Century)

As noted above, the Mongol Ilkhans generally accorded Tabriz the distinction of being the principal city of their realm, making it a far more important urban center than it had been under the Eldigūzids. A critical aspect of the political significance the city acquired was its association with the Ilkhan Ghāzān. This ruler, who adopted Islam shortly before ascending the throne in 694/1295 and secured the ultimate conversion of the Ilkhanid dynasty, had a massive pious endowment (vaqf) complex erected just outside Tabriz which included his mausoleum and various other structures.

After the death of Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd in 736/1335 the house of Hūlegū collapsed and the Mongol realm in Iran broke apart. Control over the Ilkhanid heartland of Azerbaijan and the principal city Tabriz was disputed between members of two Mongol military aristocratic families, the Chupanids and the Jalayerids.35 For some time the opposing rulers and claimants of both houses installed various actual or alleged descendants of Hūlegū as nominal sovereigns, recognized other Chinggisids or left the throne vacant.

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24 See ibid., 369 f.
The Chupanid contender Shaykh-Hasan drove his Jalayerid rival of the same name out of Azerbaijan in 738/1338, establishing the members of his house as the first serious successors of the Ilkhans as lords of Tabriz.36 He repelled repeated attempts to invade Azerbaijan and in 742/1341–42 Shaykh-Hasan had a mosque built in Tabriz, possibly with a mausoleum included or attached. There are reports of dissatisfaction about extra tax levies for the Chupanid royal mosque among the local elites but also signs that Shaykh-Hasan's rule was relatively well accepted. Two highly renowned artists decorated the building: 'Abd Allāh Sayrafī, a native of Tabriz and a towering figure in the history of calligraphy, and his nephew and most famous disciple Muḥammad Bandgīr.37

When Shaykh-Hasan was murdered by his wife in 744/1343, his brother Malik Ashraf tried to take over Tabriz but faced resistance from the local elites. Again, the people could not withstand the assault for long and two prominent Sufis led a delegation out of the city to negotiate terms of surrender with the new Chupanid pretender.38 Both had only settled in Tabriz under the Mongols but at least one of them, named Niẓām al-Dīn Yahyā Ghūrī, could indeed represent the local Sufi milieus. He promoted a distinctly local cult in addition to being remembered as a master of several well-known Sufis in Tabriz and beyond. Malik Ashraf himself was also said to have been a devoted follower of Niẓām al-Dīn Yahyā.39

However, Malik Ashraf's reign was marked by endemic warfare and is unanimously characterized as tyrannical in the Persian histories.40 In 751/1350 the Chupanid summoned Niẓām al-Dīn Yahyā to his encampment and asked the Sufi master to convince the people of Tabriz to accept him as their lord. But not even Niẓām al-Dīn Yahyā saw his royal Sufi follower fit to rule the city any longer at that time.41 Malik Ashraf fortified himself in a suburb of Tabriz together with his attendants, including representatives of the local elites.42

Yet, several eminent individuals from Azerbaijan went into exile during Malik Ashraf's reign and one of them encouraged the Jochid ruler Jānī Beg to invade the Ilkhānid heartland. The Jochids had challenged the claim of the house of Hūlegū to Azerbaijan


41 See Mustawfī Qazvīnī, Žayl, 51 f.; Ḥāfīz-i Ābru, Žayl, 230; Ḥāfīz-i Ābru, Zubda, 1: 222.

42 See Mustawfī Qazvīnī, Žayl, 55; Ḥāfīz-i Ābru, Žayl, 231; Ḥāfīz-i Ābru, Zubda, 1: 239; Ahārī, Tāvārīkh, 231, 235.
from the outset and when Jâni Beg came to Tabriz in 758/1357, he ordered the execution of Malik Ashraf, obviously with the approval of the local elites. It seems that they just wanted to get rid of Malik Ashraf, and Jâni Beg returned to his dominions where he died the following year.\(^43\) Azerbaijan remained outside of Jochid control.

One of the notables of Tabriz who went into exile during the reign of Malik Ashraf and whose family supported the execution of the Chupanid was the above-mentioned Khwâja Shaykh Kujjujî. The family rose to prominence under the Mongols thanks to Khwâja Shaykh’s great-granduncle Khwâja Muḥammad Kujjujâni (d. 677/1279), who belonged to a loose group of local Sufi masters in Tabriz and the hinterland. Hailing from Kujjujân about ten kilometers south of Tabriz the Kujjujîs maintained close connections to their native village and the local Sufi milieus.\(^44\) But the career of Khwâja Shaykh Kujjujî shows clearly that family members became increasingly active in politics with ties far beyond Azerbaijan by the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century.

Thus, Khwâja Shaykh Kujjujî spent parts of his exile in Damascus and must also have been in contact with the Jalayerids in Baghdad.\(^45\) After the Jalayerid Shaykh-Ḥasan had been expelled from Tabriz by his Chupanid namesake, he built a realm centered in Baghdad, expanding towards the Jazira and Anatolia.\(^46\) He died in 757/1356 and was succeeded by his son Uvays who first marched to Tabriz in the wake of the Jochid withdrawal but was forced to retreat temporarily. The Muzaffarid ruler Mubâriz al-Dîn Muḥammad who had gained control over much of southern Iran briefly occupied the principal Ilkhanid city in 760/1359. He returned to Isfahan where he was blinded, and Uvays finally took possession of Tabriz again the following year.\(^47\)

It is possible that Khwâja Shaykh Kujjujî accompanied the Jalayerid conqueror, who adopted the sovereign title sultân, on these campaigns. In any case, the main historians for this period, Zayn al-Dîn Qazvînî and, following him, Ḥâfiz-i Abrû, report that Uvays stayed at Khwâja Shaykh’s house upon arrival in Tabriz, adding that Khwâja Shaykh averted a plot against Uvays, thereby securing the succession of the Jalayerid as lord of the city.\(^48\) However, this alleged plot to assassinate Uvays indicates that there was opposition to the dynastic change.

The oppositional forces in Tabriz perhaps disliked the Jalayerid takeover, represented the preeminence of Khwâja Shaykh and the Kujjujî family among the local elites or both. Be that as it may, Uvays was able to stabilize his realm encompassing the former Ilkhanid core territories in western Iran and centered in Azerbaijan. His intimate relation to Khwâja Shaykh Kujjujî, which was most clearly expressed in Khwâja Shaykh’s poetry,

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\(^{44}\) See Zakrzewski, “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, 371–374.

\(^{45}\) See ibid., 375–377; Werner / Zakrzewski / Tilschneider, Die Kujjujî-Stiftungen, 24–26, 88–90. – Naṭanżî, Muʿīn al-Dîn: Munākhah-i tāvârîkh-i muʿînî (taʾlîf-i 816 va 817-ha), Ed. Jean Aubin. Tehran: Khubfurûshi-yi Khâyûmâst, 1356ha’ [1957], 167, claims that he was a preceptor of Uvays.


\(^{48}\) See Mustawfî Qazvînî, Žayîl, 69 f.; Ḥâfiz-i Abrû, Žayîl, 238.
certainly helped the Jalayerid to gain acceptance in Tabriz and beyond. Khwāja Shaykh remained a pillar of government under Uvays and was even admitted to the ruler’s deathbed to partake in the decision on his successor in 776/1374.50

Yet, his close ties to the Jalayerids did not prevent Khwāja Shaykh from welcoming the Muzaffarid Shāh Shujā’ī (d. 786/1384) at Tabriz when the latter briefly occupied the city in 778/1376 in the context of fighting after the death of Uvays. Once more, nothing is known about resistance to the Muzaffarid among the local elites and Khwāja Shaykh may even have invited Shāh Shujā’ī to take over.51 Although Khwāja Shaykh had a say in installing the Jalayerid Sultan Ḥusayn as successor of Uvays he probably considered him less able to ensure security and stability. In any case, the second Muzaffarid occupation also remained short-lived and Khwāja Shaykh paid for his accommodation with Shāh Shujā’ī with temporary disgrace at the Jalayerid court.52

Both the apparent weakness of Sultan Ḥusayn and his own decreasing influence at court seem to have motivated Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī to transfer a sizable part of his possessions into a pious foundation in 782/1380. Sultan Ḥusayn and two other sons of Uvays were among the witnesses testifying to the legality of the Kujujī-vaqf but Patrick Wing goes perhaps a bit too far asserting that Khwāja Shaykh “was a largely independent ruler in Tabriz” in the first monographic study of the Jalayerids.53 The following developments confirm that he would not dispense with a lord from a royal dynasty.

In view of the weakness of Sultan Ḥusayn a report in the history of the Egyptian scholar and Mamluk bureaucrat Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī is highly credible. According to Ibn Ḥajar’s report, Sultan Ḥusayn was killed in 784/1382, following instructions given by Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī who, thus, enabled the succession of Ḥusayn’s brother Sultan Ahmad.54 Immediately after the transfer of power, Khwāja Shaykh ensured that the new lord of Tabriz reconfirmed the Kujujī-vaqf and helped Sultan Ahmad to face the challenge of a leading emir named ʿĀḍil Āqā who pressed the claims of another brother.55

However, ʿĀḍil Āqā enjoyed great support among the local elites of Tabriz, as an anonymous eyewitness account of the attack of the Jochid ruler Toqtemish (d. 809/1406) in 787/1385 evinces. The account was written within about a year of the attack and highly praises ʿĀḍil Āqā although he may have been absent during the

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50 See Hāfiẓ-i Abrū, Ṣayl, 245; Hāfiẓ-i Abrū, Zubaḵ, 1: 489.
52 See Hāfiẓ-i Abrū, Ṣayl, 252.
53 Wing, The Jálayrīds, 150, falsely attributes this characterization to Werner / Zakrzewski / TILLSCHNEIDER, Die Kujiūjī-Stiftungen, 38. The commentary does note that, by means of the endowment deed, Khwāja Shaykh placed himself in a tradition of princely founders (“herrscherliche Stifter”) which should better have been curtly founders (“börsche Stifter”) to avoid such misunderstandings.
events.56 As for Sultan Ahmad, he retreated to Baghdad and Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī probably accompanied him.57 Other notables of Tabriz took the charge of negotiating with the assailants who were not welcome this time, unlike the earlier Jochid conquest. As the negotiations failed, the inhabitants defended the city for a few days and several representatives of the local elites died fighting the troops of Тоqтемиш.58

Among those who died was a qadi named Ḍuḥayn al-Dīn ‘Ubaydī. This man as well as his father and brother were all involved in the legalization of the Kujujī-vaqf.59 Other members of families that belonged to the local elites at least since the time of Mongol rule, such as the representative of the sayyids (naqīb) and the above-mentioned calligrapher Muḥammad Bandgīr, then joined the welcome committee for the conqueror Timūr who came to Tabriz for the first time in 788/1386 in the context of his conflict with Тоqтемиш.60 Whether the notables surrendered enthusiastically or saw no viable alternative after the struggle against Тоqтемиш and the destruction wrought by his army is open to question.

Sultan Ahmad was heading back to Tabriz when the Jochids had withdrawn but retreated to Baghdad again when Timūr approached. Prior to this, Timūr had accepted the services of Ādil Ağā and his associates, apparently to accommodate the local elites, but then ordered their execution once he arrived at Tabriz.61 The composition of the welcome committee suggests that the decision to surrender represented the consensus of important local leaders, but it seems that Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī did not agree with this.

Ḥāfiz-i Abrū reports that Timūr visited the bathhouse of Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī upon his arrival at Tabriz and the Armenian historian T’ovma Metsobets’i reports that the conqueror survived a plot to assassinate him in a public bathhouse there.62 It is indeed quite likely that Khwāja Shaykh tried to get the city back into the hands of his ally Sultan Ahmad. However, the Jalayerid was unable to restore control of Tabriz after Timūr left to resume his first western campaign before returning to his base in Samarqand. Various emirs attached to the Jalayerids, the Timurids and the Turkmen Qara Qoyunlu fought for the city until Timūr embarked on his second western campaign in 1759/1393, came back to Tabriz and installed his son Mīrānshāh as governor.63

In the same year, Timūr also temporarily expelled Sultan Ahmad from Baghdad and, according to Ibn Ḥajar, the Jalayerid killed Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī there before his

58 See Mustawfī Qazvīnī, Ṣayyīdī Yūsuf, Rawzat al-jīnūn, 2: 648 f., 656.
59 See Werner / Zakrzewski / Tilscher-Schneider, Die Kuḫuḫi-Stiftungen, 51 f., 76, 92, 104 f.
60 See Yazdī, Žaffarnāma, 1: 562; Zakrzewski, “Local Elites and Dynastic Succession”, 378 f.
escape. One explanation for this action and its timing may be that the Kujūjis in Tabriz were switching allegiance to the Timurids and that Sultan Ahmad could not allow Khwāja Shaykh to change sides. In any case, Mirānshāh consolidated his power in Tabriz and went so far as to claim independence from his father. The local elites probably supported Mirānshāh’s quest for independence resenting the subordination of Tabriz to faraway Samarqand. But Timūr could not tolerate a son trying to build a kingdom for himself, set out for his last western campaign in 801/1399, and removed Mirānshāh from the governorship of Tabriz.

IV. Between Timurids and Turkmen (Ninth/Fifteenth Century)

Although stripped of the governorship, Mirānshāh remained in Timūr’s service during that long campaign and, in the end, the western areas of the conqueror’s realm were reassigned to his family. But after the death of the dynastic founder in 807/1405 the Timurids in Azerbaijan started to fight each other almost immediately. They were also the only power in the region to lack support and repeatedly meet resistance at Tabriz. In contrast, the Jalayerid Sultan Ahmad was warmly welcomed but had to retreat to Baghdad again.

When a son of Mirānshāh had reoccupied Tabriz in 808/1406, a relative of Khwāja Shaykh Kujūji, named Khwāja Sayyidī Muḥammad, went to the encampment of the Qara Qoyunlu leader Qarā Yusuf urging him to protect the city. After initial hesitation, Qarā Yusuf took over Tabriz and decisively defeated the quarreling Timurids. Khwāja Sayyidī Muhammad was certainly not the only one among the local elites considering the Turkmen commander as the one most able to provide for the security of the city and expecting him to privilege Tabriz as the principal urban center of his realm.

Yet, several years later the inhabitants welcomed Sultan Aḥmad in Tabriz once more while Qarā Yusuf was campaigning in Anatolia against his Aq Qoyunlu rivals. Qarā Yusuf returned, defeated the Jalayerid and finally agreed to have him executed in 813/1411. The Kujūji family most likely belonged to those in Tabriz advocating for the execution of Sultan Ahmad, whose corpse was put on display in the madrasa of Khwāja Shaykh to make clear to the people that he was indeed dead.

Qarā Yusuf established himself firmly at Tabriz, had a golden throne manufactured and sent his sons to take over the other territories previously held by the Jalayerids.

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69 See ibid., 3: 166–169.
71 See Ḥāfiz-i Abrū, Zubda, 3: 401–404. – Mirkhwand, Rawzat al-safā, 6: 579–583, is the first author to report that the corpse of Sultan Ahmad was put on display in the madrasa of Khwāja Shaykh Kujūji.
72 See Ḥāfiz-i Abrū, Zubda, 3: 446 f.
He died in 823/1420 while Timūr’s successor Shāhrukh was marching against him in a first attempt to regain some control of the region for his dynasty.73 Initially Shāhrukh did not come to Tabriz in person, but instead the city surrendered to his forces. Some notables including members of the Kujuji family and an associate of the irs then accompanied the Timurid delegates to his encampment.74

When Shāhrukh came to Tabriz after having defeated the scattered sons of Qarā Yūsuf, the inhabitants were wary of him and he did not stay long.75 Thus, submission to the Timurid appears rather as an act of political expediency than the genuine desire of the local elites. According to Abū Bakr Thirānī, the inhabitants favored the Qara Qoyunlu and expelled an Aq Qoyunlu prince whom Shāhrukh had appointed as governor of Tabriz before returning to his main city Herat.76 However, it is unknown which son of Qarā Yūsuf the local elites preferred: Isfand, who gained the upper hand first, or Iskandar, who eventually drove his brother out of Azerbaijan and became lord of Tabriz.77

Some supporters of Qarā Yūsuf certainly also helped Iskandar to maintain himself in power at Tabriz, notably Khwāja Sāyiḍī Muḥammad Kujujī. He was named in a letter in connection with an attempt to assassinate Shāhrukh in Herat in 830/1427, allegedly committed by an adherent of the messianic Ḥūrūfī movement. According to this letter, a son of the founder of the movement who lived in Tabriz and was suspected of having sent the assassin, suggested that the Timurid commander interrogating him visit Khwāja Sāyiḍī Muḥammad who would prove his innocence.78

It is not clear whether Shāhrukh or any of his representatives met Khwāja Sāyiḍī Muḥammad Kujujī when the Timurid army came to Azerbaijan once more in 832/1429, replacing Iskandar with another son of Qarā Yūsuf. He is said to have met two prominent Sufis who had at least indirect ties to the Kujuji family.79 But, as before, the Timurid ruler had not come to stay and even left a bad impression by ordering the destruction of Qara Qoyunlu buildings in Tabriz.80 In any case, Iskandar was able to quickly reassert himself

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73 See ibid., 4: 711 f., 722, 725–735.
75 Hāfīẓ-Abrū, Zubda, 4: 773–797, expands greatly on the battle which Qarā Yūsuf’s sons Iskandar and Isfand (or Isfand or Isfahān Beg) fought against Shāhrukh’s forces and their Aq Qoyunlu allies.
77 See Thirānī, Kitāb-i Dīyārābkriyyīh, 95. He generally denominates Isfand as Isfahān Beg and seems to be the first author stating that he initially controlled Tabriz and the region. On Iskandar’s brother Isfand who would rule in Baghdad, also see Schmidt-Dumont, Marianne: Turkmenische Herrscher des 15. Jahrhunderts in Persien und Mesopotamien nach dem Tārīḥ al-Ǧāfīf. Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz 1970, 40–51.
as lord of the city, punishing the two Sufis and reigning until Shâhrûkh led a third and last campaign to Azerbaijan in 835/1432.81

This time, the Timurid left Jahânshâh, yet another son of Qârâ Yûsuf, behind as ruler in Azerbaijan when he returned to his lands. Two years after this campaign, Iskandar was able to retake Tabriz briefly, but Jahânshâh had already gained the support of the Qara Qoyunlu establishment and the local elites of Tabriz.82 The Kujujîs represented both groups and probably approved Jahânshâh crushing the Hûrûf movement after an uprising in 844/1441. Chief qâdi Najm al-Dîn Usqû’î (d. 879/1474–75), who sanctioned the move of the ruler, was a native of the hinterland of Tabriz with close ties to the local Sufi milieus out of which the Kujujîs emerged.83

The family of Khwâja Shaykh and Khwâja Sayyîdî Kujujî also remained engaged in politics, now serving Jahânshâh. Their relative ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Siddiq was a vizier of the Qara Qoyunlu ruler while the latter expanded his realm eastwards at the expense of the Timurids after Shâhrûkh’s death in 850/1447.84 ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn was dismissed and temporarily imprisoned in summer 859/1455 and replaced with a certain Shams al-Dîn Husayn Tabrizî.85 The latter did not hold this post for long. When Jahânshâh occupied the Timurid principal city of Herat in 862/1458, his son Hasan ‘Alî tried to seize power in Tabriz. Shams al-Dîn served as Hasan ‘Alî’s vizier and was executed upon Jahânshâh’s return, whereas the son was pardoned.86

It is difficult to tell which other representatives of the local elites possibly sided with Hasan ‘Alî against Jahânshâh at this point. As far as the Kujujîs are concerned, they seem to have remained loyal. Khwâja ‘Alî Kujujî (d. 884/1479–80), the family member still most active as a Sufi, was credited with having inspired the foundation of the Qara Qoyunlu royal vaqf-complex around the famous ‘Blue Mosque’ endowed by Jahânshâh’s wife in 869/1465.87 Although this credit cannot be accepted at face value, Khwâja ‘Alî may well have had good relations with the Qara Qoyunlu royal family.

His relative ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Siddiq played a key role in the struggle for succession that followed Jahânshâh’s defeat at the hands of his Aq Qoyunlu enemy Uzun Hasan and the death of the Qara Qoyunlu ruler in 871/1467.88 First, ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn Siddiq served as vizier of a niece of Jahânshâh who seized power and, then, of his son Hasan ‘Alî who took over shortly afterwards.89 He was not the only notable in Hasan–‘Alî’s service at that point, but the Qara Qoyunlu had no future at Tabriz any longer:

Instead, the city found itself in a struggle between Uzun Hasan and the Timurid Sultan Abû Sa’îd, a grandson of Mirânshâh, who tried to take back Azerbaijan for his

84 See Tîhrânî, Kitâb-i Dîyârbakrîyih, 258.
85 See ibid., 347–361. – Samarqandî, Mat’la’ al-sa’dayn, 4: 829–847, and subsequent historians in Herat say next to nothing about events at Tabriz.
88 See ibid., 434–442. Also see Werner, “Ein Vaqf für meine Töchter”, 106 f.
The two armies camped outside the city while the notables decided to wait for the outcome, allowing both sides to provision themselves in Tabriz.99 Uzun Hasan defeated Abū Ša‘īd, handed him over to a disgruntled Timurid prince for execution and entered the city in 873/1469, promising the crowd that welcomed him at the royal Qara Qoyunlu vaqf-complex to honor the memory of the just king Jahānshāh.100

The Kujujīs probably needed some time to gain the trust of the new lord of Tabriz. No family member is attested in Aq Qoyunlu court circles immediately after the dynastic change but thanks, most notably, to Khwāja ‘Alī, the family maintained close ties to the local Sufi milieus. These ties implied at least indirect connections to the Aq Qoyunlu royal family through an associate of Khwāja ‘Alī, a man named Sayyid Badr al-Dīn Ahmad. The family of this individual had emigrated from Azerbaijan during the ‘tyranny’ of the Chupanid Malik Ashraf but apparently never lost touch to the Sufis of Tabriz. Sayyid Badr al-Dīn first returned there during the reign of Jahānshāh and finally settled in the village of Lāla, about five kilometers south of the city, after Uzun Ḥasan’s takeover. Khwāja ‘Alī Kujuji helped Sayyid Badr al-Dīn to establish a Sufi lodge complex in Lāla, which the Aq Qoyunlu conqueror reportedly visited at least once.101

The case of Sayyid Badr al-Dīn is exemplifying that Tabriz continuously attracted numerous notables during the reigns of Jahānshāh, Uzun Ḥasan and the latter’s son Ya‘qūb regardless of the dynastic change. All of them privileged the city as principal urban center and the Aq Qoyunlu also followed their Qara Qoyunlu predecessors in setting up their own royal vaqf-complexes in Tabriz.102 As regards the Kujujīs, they reappear as preeminent representatives of the local elites interfering decisively in matters of dynastic politics after Ya‘qūb’s death in 895/1490 when Aq Qoyunlu rule gradually collapsed.

A certain Shaykh Muhammad Kujuji was or became vizier of Ya‘qūb’s minor son and successor Baysunghur but also played a major role in engineering the takeover of Ya‘qūb’s nephew Rustam.103 The latter, a youth himself, was duly enthroned in 897/1492. During his reign, the collapsing rule of the Aq Qoyunlu seemed to stabilize again but rival claimants and their supporters gained the upper hand. During the years of constant fighting between various Aq Qoyunlu factions, which followed the execution of Rustam in 902/1497, important notables of Tabriz soon viewed the Safavid leader Ismā‘īl as the most promising pretender.

A man called Shams al-Dīn Zakariyā Kujuji who had been a vizier of Alvand, the last Aq Qoyunlu ruler of Tabriz, went to Ismā‘īl’s camp inviting him to take over the city of Tabriz.104

100 See Tihrānī, Kitāb-i Dīvār-bakrīyiyih, 521–524.
whereupon he became his first vizier. His support was so crucial for the eventual succession of the Safavid that the chosen candidate reportedly called him “the key to Azerbaijan” when Shams al-Din Zakariya switched allegiance before the decisive battle between Alvand and Isma‘il. Having defeated some of the Aq Qoyunlu factions and being joined by others, Isma‘il finally entered Tabriz in 906/1501.

V. Conclusion

The examples of dynastic change at Tabriz discussed here show that the fundamental interest of the local leaders when dealing with rulers or pretenders trying to take over the city was to keep it intact. Hence, they would generally surrender to invaders who disposed of exceptional military power such as the Mongols, Timur or Shahrukh. They would offer resistance only to less powerful assailants deemed unfit to rule their city and they would do so only if subsequent accommodation on reasonable terms could be expected or if previous negotiations had proven futile. The Khwarazmshah Jalal al-Din and the Chupanid Malik Ashraf are examples of the former case while the Jochid Toqtemish exemplifies the latter.

With regard to the desire to keep the city intact, to obtain security, regain stability or maintain prosperity, it remained a constant concern and the local elites of Tabriz shared these basic interests with the elites of other cities. However, in addition to this, they expected Tabriz to be privileged as principal city of the realm especially in post-Ilkhani times. The Jalayerids and the Turkmen dynasties fulfilled this expectation and, therefore, the notables of Tabriz generally supported them. In contrast, the Timurids, with the partial exception of Mirânsâh, were unwilling or unable to effectively protect and continuously privilege Tabriz. Consequently, the local elites did rather not support them. Their fundamental interests sometimes made the notables of Tabriz accept pretenders without any actual connection to the city, such as the Jochid Jâni Beg or the Muzaffarids. But in general, a pretender had a better chance to gain acceptance and support if his dynasty had developed a firm attachment to Tabriz. This is the reason that the Eldigizid Atabeg Özbeg could establish himself despite initial opposition and that the Jalayerid Sultan Ahmad was repeatedly welcomed despite his increasingly weak position.

Finally, the local elites of Tabriz played various roles in the transfer of power from one ruler or dynasty to the next. They may not have agreed among themselves completely in each case and emigration represented a last resort for individuals who would not bear a specific ruler. Temporary exile often involved approaching alternative candidates – while at Tabriz, the notables usually negotiated terms of surrender.

But on occasion they were much more active as well. The Qara Qoyunlu leader Qara Yusuf and the Safavid Isma‘il were both invited by representatives of the local elites to take over Tabriz. The case of the Jalayerid Sultan Uveys was similar and one notable even secured his succession by saving his life. Lastly, the example of his successor Sultan Husayn shows that the local leaders would also not refrain from engineering the murder of a ruler if it suited their interests.

94 See ibid., 117.
### Timeline: Dynastic History of Tabriz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Ruler / Dynasty</th>
<th>Events, Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much of 6th/12th c.</td>
<td>Ahmadîlî Atabegs of Marîgha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>622/1225 – 629/1231</td>
<td>Khvārazmshah  Jalâl al-Dīn</td>
<td>internal division, local resistance to conquest, notables negotiate terms of surrender; then peaceful surrender to Mongols again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>629/1231 – 654/1256</td>
<td>Mongol amirs and governors</td>
<td>gradual development into center of imperial administration in Iran with local support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>654/1256 – 736/1335</td>
<td>Mongol Ilkhans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>736/1336 – 738/1338</td>
<td>Shaykh-Ḥasan (Buzurg) Jalayer</td>
<td>formally on behalf of alleged Hülegüid puppet sovereign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>738/1338 – 758/1357</td>
<td>Chupanids: Shaykh-Ḥasan (Kuchik), Malik Ashraf</td>
<td>formally on behalf of alleged Hülegüid puppet sovereigns; local resistance to Malik Ashraf, notables negotiate terms of surrender; no resistance to conquest by the Jochid ruler Jânî Beg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>758/1357 – 761/1360</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>after withdrawal of Jochids: control disputed between Chupanid emir, Muzaffarid ruler of Fars and the Jalayerid Uvays who takes over with local support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>761/1360 – 788/1386</td>
<td>Jalayerids: Uvays, Husayn, Ahmad</td>
<td>778/1376: no resistance to conquest by Muzaffarid ruler of Fars, perhaps invited by eminent notable; 784/1382: Sultan Ḥusayn killed following instructions given by eminent notable; 787/1385: after failed negotiations local resistance to conquest by Jochid ruler Toqtemish; 788/1386: peaceful surrender to Tīmūr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>788/1386 – 795/1393</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>control disputed, dynasties involved include Timurids, Jalayerids and Qara Qoyunlu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>795/1393 – 810/1408</td>
<td>Mirānshâh b. Tīmūr (his sons 'Umar and Abâ Bakr)</td>
<td>governor installed by Tīmūr, temporary claim of independence then reassignment of governorship to 'Umar; 807/1405: death of Tīmūr, intensifying conflicts between Mirānshâh and his sons, then local appeal to Qara Qoyunlu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


810/1408 – 875/1469

**Qara Qoyunlu:**
- Qara Yusuf, Iskandar, Jahanshah, Hasan-Ali

813/1411: no local opposition to return of the Jalayerid Sultan Ahmad, but then defeat and execution by Qara Yusuf
822/1420: no resistance to conquest by troops of Shahrukh b. Timur but to Aq Qoyunlu prince he installed as governor
833/1430: no resistance to conquest by troops of Shahrukh b. Timur, ousting of Qara Qoyunlu prince he installed as governor
836/1433: no resistance to conquest by troops of Shahrukh b. Timur who continued to claim formal suzerainty while virtually independent Qara Qoyunlu rule stabilized under Jahanshah
874/1468: defeat and execution of claimant Abu Sa'id b. Muhammad b. Miranshah by Aq Qoyunlu leader Uzun Hasan

875/1469 – 906/1501

**Aq Qoyunlu:**
- Uzun Hasan, Sultan-Khalil, Ya'qub, Baysunghur, Rustam, Ahmad, Alvand

905/1500: major Aq Qoyunlu courtier and local notable switches allegiance to Safavids

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An Idea of Iran on Mongol Foundations: Territory, Dynasties and Tabriz as Royal City (Seventh/Thirteenth to Ninth/Fifteenth Century)

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(Marburg University)

The Mongol conquests in the seventh/thirteenth century had tremendous effects all over Eurasia. Hence it seems worthwhile to ask how the invasions of Chinggis Khan (d. 624/1227) and his descendants and subsequent Mongol rule in the Middle East affected the idea of Iran. Bert Fragner has raised this question most forcefully and attributed significant changes in the idea of Iran to the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty.\(^1\) Chinggis Khan’s grandson Hülegü (d. 663/1265) founded this dynasty during his campaign to the Middle East, which entailed the extinction of the ‘Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad in 656/1258.

According to Fragner, the Ilkhanid rulers revived the term ‘Iran’ as a territorial-political designation and adopted it as the official name of their realm at the turn of the eighth/fourteenth century. Fragner further argues that all political concepts of ‘Iran’ in later periods derived from this alleged Mongol notion and notes one particularly important aspect characterizing it, in addition to the territorial vision and the name. This additional core aspect is, in Fragner’s words, ‘the idea of Tabriz being the undisputed and so to say natural capital of Iran’.\(^2\)

Tabriz is well known as the principal urban centre of the Mongols in Iran. The ruler most closely attached to the city was Hülegü’s great-grandson Ghazan (d. 703/1304) who embraced Islam shortly before his accession to the throne in 694/1295, ultimately securing the conversion of the Ilkhanid dynasty.\(^3\) Ghazan had a massive pious endowment (\(\text{\textit{vaqf}}\)) complex erected just outside the walls of Tabriz, which included the mausoleum of the ruler, a congregational mosque and a number of other structures.

After the collapse of the house of Hülegü in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, several successor dynasties of the Ilkhans up to the
early Safavids at the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century likewise accorded Tabriz the distinction of being the principal urban centre. Fragner notes that in the ninth/fifteenth century, the leaders of the Turkmen Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu would proclaim themselves king (kesra or padshah) of Iran as soon as they captured Tabriz, like the Safavid Esma‘il (d. 930/1524) when he took the city in 907/1501. 

This chapter attempts to refine Fragner’s argument regarding the changes in the idea of Iran in the wake of the Mongol conquests and to develop it further. The ultimate objective is to trace the emergence and perpetuation of the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran for which Tabriz would stand as royal city, advancing a twofold thesis. First, the Ilkhan Ghazan epitomized this idea and his mosque-mausoleum vaqf complex at Tabriz became its foundational pillar signalling the special royal status of the city. Second, similar complexes or other royal monuments erected in and around Tabriz by major post-Ilkhanid rulers helped perpetuate the special status of the city through the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries. Such complexes and monuments continued to mark Tabriz as royal city and it was and is possible to view them as constantly renewed material manifestations of the idea that it stood for a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran.

Advancing this twofold thesis implies raising the question of whether the territorial vision of Iran and the application of the name to the realm of the Ilkhans does indeed represent a Mongol notion, as Fragner asserts. The same question arises with regard to the special status of Tabriz as royal city, especially as perpetuated in the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries.

In the Turko-Mongol nomadic tradition, it was not uncommon to associate notions of legitimacy and sovereignty with specific localities. However, it seems unwise to assume that Ghazan and all other lords of Tabriz during the period under study shared the same notions of legitimacy and sovereignty. Moreover, one may doubt whether any of them considered Tabriz a royal city standing for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran (hereafter referred to simply as Iran), or attached major importance to this idea.

The next section will continue with a brief review of Fragner’s and other relevant research and further contextualize the thesis of this chapter, adding some remarks about concepts such as ‘royal city’ and ‘capital’. It will also introduce the main sources for this study, which consist largely of Persian historiographical works written between the seventh/thirteenth and tenth/sixteenth centuries. Then, the analysis will proceed in two steps.

One section will examine the Mongol foundations or, in other words, the emergence of the idea that Tabriz stands for Iran as a specific Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. A final section will trace the perpetuation of that idea under the successor dynasties of the house of Hülegü, especially the Turkmen Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu in the ninth/fifteenth century. In both sections, the
focus will be on visions of Iran as a territorially distinct royal realm bearing this name and on the material and symbolic signs marking Tabriz as its royal city.

**Scholarship, Sources and Concepts**

Fragner situates the revival of the term ‘Iran (or Iran-zamin)’ as a territorial-political designation in the context of post-‘Abbasid history and describes it as a deliberate policy pursued by the Mongols. He asserts that the Ilkhans reinvented that concept of the Sasanians, realizing that their dominions roughly corresponded to the realm of this pre-Islamic Persian dynasty. Still according to Fragner, the non-Muslim conquerors of the Iranian plateau eventually aimed at carving out a proper place for themselves in the political and cultural landscape of the Middle East against the background of disintegrative developments in the Mongol Empire at large. In Fragner’s view, this process culminated in the adoption of the prestigious ancient name ‘Iran’ as the official designation of the Ilkhanid realm and in the conversion of Ghazan, who would ‘proclaim himself “pādishāh-i Īrān va Islām”’.

Specialists in ancient Iranian history disagree whether the territorial-political concept of Iran is, in fact, more ancient than the Sasanians, but apparently agree that the land bearing this name may originally have been located east of the Iranian plateau. There also seems to have been some ambiguity regarding the exact territorial extension of Iran, both at the time of the Sasanians and under the Mongols. While the Oxus river was then widely accepted as Iran’s eastern frontier, the Euphrates or even the Nile were regarded as its western boundary. Be that as it may, the Ilkhanid realm was generally restricted to the lands between the Oxus and the Euphrates, despite occasional campaigns beyond these limits. In any case, it seems that the territorial vision of Iran was coupled with a historical vision insofar as the land had been ruled by successive royal dynasties since ancient times. As Charles Melville has shown, such a territorial-historical vision that equated the realm of the Mongol Ilkhans with the kingdom of Iran and named it accordingly, clearly predated Ghazan. This chapter will present additional evidence for the use of ‘Iran’ or ‘Iran-zamin’ as designations for the Ilkhanid dominions already in the middle decades of the seventh/thirteenth century. It will further argue that this rather reflects a vision adopted by the Persian elites and expressed mainly in works of history instead of a deliberate policy pursued by the Mongols. The term ‘Iran’ as a territorial designation formed part of the Persian historical tradition and geopolitical imagination and it seems more likely that the indigenous elites of the Iranian lands recognized the dominions of the Ilkhans as the realm of their own past kings.

In any case, Fragner’s emphasis on the importance of Ghazan and his conversion is, of course, completely justified. Yet this chapter will not expand on the religious aspect of the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom which the Ilkhan epitomized. Suffice it to say that from Ghazan onwards, all
rulers considered as kings of Iran professed Islam in one form or another and claimed legitimacy based on a combination of various religious and dynastic elements. The Mongols had brought with them the notion that the lineage of Chinggis Khan possessed a heavenly mandate to rule the world which other lineages could claim as the Chinggisids died out in the Iranian lands in the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries. Moreover, temporary non-Muslim rule and the effective extinction of the ‘Abbasid caliphate contributed to the growth and spread of universalist models of sacral kingship which often drew on elements of Sufism and Shi‘ism.

Ghazan’s importance for the purposes of this study does not so much derive from his conversion as such but from a related aspect which Fragner also stressed. The ruler represented the link between the territorial vision of Iran associated with the Ilkhanid dynasty and the special status of Tabriz as royal city. Fragner asserts that the city was granted the epithet *dar al-saltana*, the abode of sovereign rule, as its official designation in Ghazan’s reign to indicate the special royal status of Tabriz. In Fragner’s view it was in this way that the Mongol Ilkhans could be portrayed as legitimate successors to the ‘Abbasids and Tabriz as successor to the former *dar al-khelafa*, Baghdad.

Judith Pfeiffer recently edited a collective volume avowedly dealing with Tabriz between the seventh/thirteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries but concentrating strongly on the period of the Ilkhans. In her introduction, Pfeiffer states that ‘Mongol rule […] paved the way for the establishment of the territorial regional empires of the Safavids, Ottomans and Mughals’. But the volume does not explore the revival of the term ‘Iran’ as a territorial-political designation associated with the house of Hülegü. Hence, it also does not explore the idea that Tabriz itself came to stand for a kingdom bearing that name. The absence of this line of thought may be due to Pfeiffer’s disagreement with Fragner on the question of whether the special status that Tabriz acquired under the Mongols was somehow unique, like the status of Baghdad had been under the ‘Abbasids.

Pfeiffer is certainly right to point out that even ‘[w]hen Tabriz was at the height of its cultural, political and economic importance, it never was the only city that mattered (original emphasis)’. One might ask whether Baghdad was ever the only city that mattered when the ‘Abbasid caliphate still existed there, but this question would have to be answered elsewhere. What is relevant here is that the epithet *dar al-saltana* was not used exclusively for Tabriz and that other epithets and expressions were used to signal the special status of the city as well. All in all, there was little consistency in the use of honorary epithets like *dar al-saltana* and as with ‘Iran’, Fragner insists perhaps a bit too much on the official character of such designations.

Nonetheless, the status of Tabriz as royal city indeed developed as something unique, especially after the collapse of the Ilkhanid dynasty. In order to trace the emergence and perpetuation of that status, the analysis will
focus on honorary epithets applied to Tabriz, in particular when they are coupled with the term ‘Iran’ as a territorial-political designation. Most scholars tend to translate honorary epithets like *dar al-saltana* or *dar al-molk*, the abode of kingship, as ‘capital’, but David Durand-Guédy has argued convincingly that this kind of handy translation should perhaps be abandoned in contexts of Turko-Mongol nomadic domination. Hence the terms ‘principal city’ or ‘principal urban centre’ will be employed here instead of ‘capital’, and the term ‘royal city’ when speaking about the significance of Tabriz for the idea of Iran.

The nomadism of the Mongols and other rulers of the Iranian lands between the seventh/thirteenth and the ninth/fifteenth centuries was a crucial practical precondition for the emergence and perpetuation of the idea that Tabriz itself stands for the kingdom named Iran. With its excellent pastures, the extended region of Azerbaijan and adjacent areas in southern Caucasia and eastern Anatolia attracted the Chinggisids as they attracted Turkic and Turko-Mongol nomadic rulers before and after them. This extended region had already gained in geopolitical centrality prior to the Mongol conquests, became increasingly integrated and central under the Ilkhans and maintained that level of integration and centrality during much of the post-Ilkhanid period. Some preferred royal campsites were located in the environs of Tabriz and the city was a focal point of royal migration routes. Thus nomadic political practice kept the courts of the Ilkhans and their successor dynasties physically close to Tabriz, enabling the building activities of Ghazan and other rulers in and around the city.

While this study understands honorary epithets like *dar al-saltana* or *dar al-molk* as symbolic signs of the emerging and perpetuating special royal status of Tabriz, the royal monuments are taken as its material signs, with Ghazan’s mosque-mausoleum *vaqf* complex as its foundational pillar. Several scholars, including Charles Melville, Christoph Werner, Sandra Aube and Sussan Babaie, have analysed royal monuments of Tabriz from various angles, usually focusing on those built in the ninth/fifteenth century. Almost all the relevant monuments are either poorly preserved or have, like Ghazan’s complex, vanished completely. As material signs of the emerging and enduring idea that Tabriz stands for Iran, the royal monuments of the city will give support to the argument developed here rather than being the actual subjects of analysis.

The focus will be on the symbolic signs, honorary epithets applied to Tabriz mainly by Persian historians and, as noted above, especially when they are coupled with the term ‘Iran’ as a territorial-political designation. Works of Persian universal and dynastic history written between the middle of the seventh/thirteenth and the middle of the tenth/sixteenth century form the bulk of the sources. Those of the famous Ilkhanid court historians, such as Rashid al-Din (d. 718/1318) and Hamdollah Mostowfi (d. ca. 750/1349) will of course receive appropriate consideration.

Among the successors of the Mongols, the Timurids come to mind as great patrons of Persian historiography, and histories produced at Timurid courts will
not be neglected. However, works emanating from the courts of their rivals will be examined in somewhat greater detail. Examples are the *Tavarikh-e Sheykh Oveys*, a universal history written for the Jalayerid Soltan Oveys (d. 776/1374) by Qotb al-Din Ahari, and the *Ketab-e Diyarbakriya*, which Abu Bakr Tehrani began on the orders of Jahanshah Qara Qoyunlu and completed after the latter’s death in 872/1467 for his new patron Uzun Hasan Aq Qoyunlu (d. 882/1478).

Special attention will be paid to a recently discovered source from Tabriz, a versified universal history composed in the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century by the poet Zajjaji in emulation of the *Shahnama* and entitled *Homayun-nama*. Zajjaji’s *Homayun-nama* was written a bit too early to be counted among the numerous Persian verse chronicles of the Mongol period, but it clearly foreshadows the increasing importance that the *Shahnama* would gain under the Ilkhans and subsequent rulers of the Iranian lands. As a local source, the *Homayun-nama* also offers unique insights into visions of history cultivated among the notables of Tabriz while the first Ilkhanid rulers were consolidating their power in Iran.

The Persian histories of various kinds, some of which have been mentioned, will be supplemented by comparatively few sources of different sorts, including geographical works and travelogues written in the Iranian lands and beyond as well as documents, such as royal edicts and correspondence with foreign rulers. Another important local source is the Sufi pilgrimage guide to the cemeteries of Tabriz and surrounding villages written by Ebn-e Karbala’i (d. 997/1589), the *Rowzat al-jenan*. This work offers the most comprehensive information on the topography of Tabriz and a distinctly local perspective on the history of the Mongols in Iran and their successors.

The analysis, especially of the universal histories under consideration, will also examine how relevant authors arrange their narratives of individual dynasties and how they conceived the transfer of legitimacy from one dynasty to another. It is important to point out that the authors of these works had various options for envisioning the Mongol and post-Mongol periods which they lived through. The idea that Tabriz came to stand for a kingdom named Iran was associated with a specific Ilkhanid-Ghazanid legacy. The genesis of this legacy is the subject of the next section.

*The Mongol Foundations: An Ilkhanid-Ghazanid Legacy*

When Hülegü led his campaign to the Middle East in the 650s/1250s, founding the Ilkhanid dynasty, most of the Iranian lands had already been under Mongol rule for about 20 years. As will become evident below, the initial contact of Tabriz with the Mongols occurred during the first invasion in 617–18/1220–21. Since 628/1231, Azerbaijan and adjacent lands beyond the Iranian plateau had attracted the conquering armies and Tabriz gradually became the most
important city in the Chinggisid far west during that period of pre-Illkhanid Mongol rule, notably for financial administration. However, in spite of a considerable degree of continuity, Hülegü’s arrival also brought significant changes. Not only did the ‘Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad cease to exist in 656/1258, but a Chinggisid prince assumed direct control of the extended Iranian plateau area. But both Hülegü and his son and successor Abaqa (d. 680/1282) were challenged on different fronts, being surrounded by hostile powers. The Ilkans fought several wars with the Mamluk sultans of Egypt to the west and with two rival Chinggisid dynasties to the east and north, the Chaghatayids in Transoxiana and the Jochids in the Qepchaq Steppe.

Neither Hülegü nor Abaqa achieved lasting territorial gains but they were able to preserve their dominions between the Oxus and the Euphrates. These military developments were a necessary precondition for envisioning the Ilkhanid realm as a territorial-political entity named Iran. And some contemporary Persian authors did indeed envision the dominions of Hülegü and Abaqa in this way and named the realm accordingly.

The famous scholar Beyzavi, with his Nezam al-tavarikh, a short but very influential universal history written in 674/1275, is an excellent example. He states in the introduction that the subject of the work is ‘the sequence of rulers and kings of Iran which extends from the Euphrates to the Oxus’. Beyzavi closes his history with the Mongols, depicting the emerging house of Hülegü as the latest royal dynasty in this sequence: ‘Among his [Chinggis Khan’s] descendants who ruled in Iran and conquered the lands there was Hülegü Khan. […] At present, his son Abaqa Khan is king of Iran and the land of Rum’.

Melville, who thoroughly examined numerous manuscripts of Beyzavi’s history in a series of articles, noted a degree of inconsistency as to how many and which dynasties are featured as predecessors of the Mongol Ilkhans. Furthermore, Melville emphasized the innovative structure of Beyzavi’s work with a fourfold division of history. The first section is devoted to the prophets, the second to pre-Islamic kings of Iran, the third to the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid caliphs and the fourth to the dynasties that ruled the Iranian lands in Islamic times down to the Mongols. At least two other contemporary Persian universal histories adopt this very structure. One is Juzjani’s Tabaqat-e Naseri, completed in 658/1260, and the other is Zajjaji’s Homayun-nama, composed in the same meter as the Shahnama between the 650s/1250s and 670s/1270s. It seems that this fourfold division of history and its criteria were regarded as an adequate structural model by mid-seventh/thirteenth-century Persian authors.

While the similarity in structure indicates a common vision of history in general, there are also clear differences between the three works. The most obvious differences pertain to the portrayal of the Mongols and to the dynasties which Beyzavi, Juzjani and Zajjaji include in their histories as predecessors of the non-Muslim conquerors. Thus, Beyzavi includes the Salghorid Atabegs of
his native region of Fars who persisted as vassals of the Mongols for some time and, as noted above, presents the Ilkhans as merely a new royal dynasty of Iran. Juzjani, working in Delhi outside the Mongol dominions, focuses rather on dynasties of India and the eastern Iranian frontier lands and is openly hostile to the Mongols. Like Beyzavi, he puts the conquerors at the end of the fourth section but, unlike the Nezam al-tavarikh, the Tabaqat-e Naseri does not conclude with praise of Hülegü and Abaqa as kings of Iran. Instead Juzjani’s history strikes a final optimistic note by narrating the conversion to Islam of the Jochid Berke Khan (d. 665/1267), an enemy of the Ilkhans. Nonetheless, even Juzjani recognizes the territory conquered by Hülegü as the kingdom of Iran and names it accordingly (mamlekat-e Iran va ‘ajam).

Zajjaji likewise puts a strong local and regional flavour into his universal history, with special emphasis on Tabriz as royal city of Iran and on the Eldigüzid Atabegs of Azerbaijan. The Homayun-nama associates the special royal status of Tabriz with the Eldigüzid Atabeg Abu Bakr (d. 607/1210) who secured control of the city against two of his half-brothers in 589/1193 and continued to rule there after the end of the Seljuq dynasty in Iran in 590/1194. Zajjaji summarizes the result of Abu Bakr’s fight against his half-brothers as follows, ‘Finally, he was victorious against the bold ones, through manliness he gained kingship, the kingdom of Iran. In Tabriz Abu Bakr became shah, he established the royal court in that place.’

In order to give even greater weight to his assertion that Abu Bakr instituted the status of Tabriz as royal city of Iran, Zajjaji changes the structure of the fourth section of the Homayun-nama for the time after the demise of the Seljuq. Beginning with the reign of Abu Bakr, the author switches from narrating the history of dynasties to devoting individual chapters to the successive lords of Tabriz. It is only in this capacity that Zajjaji includes the Khvarazmshah Jalal al-Din (d. 628/1231), the heroic warrior against the Mongols. He states that Jalal al-Din’s reign lasted seven years, meaning the period that he ruled Tabriz as successor of the Eldigüzids. Unlike the works of Beyzavi and Juzjani, the Homayun-nama features no separate chapter on the Khvarazmshahs as a royal dynasty of Iran in its fourth section.

While Zajjaji makes it very clear that he regards the lords of Tabriz in the decades prior to the establishment of Mongol rule as kings of Iran, he does not explicitly indicate the territorial extension of the kingdom. However, the author was also not unaware of this. He blames Abu Bakr’s half-brothers who went to the courts of the Sharvanshahs and the Georgian Bagratids to seek redress against the Eldigüzid ruler for leaving Iran (z Iran beraftand). Zajjaji also makes special mention of Hülegü crossing the Oxus and calls the conqueror a ‘glorious king (shah-e sar-afraz)’. Yet he does not refer to the Ilkhanid dominions as Iran and, except for issues relating to his personal situation, reports no events after Hülegü’s sack of Baghdad.

It is likely that Zajjaji was uncertain whether the Ilkhans would be able to maintain control of the extended Iranian plateau area against their Chaghatayid,
and especially against their Jochid, enemies. Containing the Jochids was critical for the security of Azerbaijan, the Ilkhanid heartland with the principal city of Tabriz where the poet-historian lived. However, Zajjaji not only traces the status of Tabriz as royal city of Iran to the Eldigüzids as the last pre-Mongol regional Muslim dynasty; he also posits a special relation between Tabriz and Mongol rule, asserting that this relation was already forged at the time of Chinggis Khan himself.

It is important to bear in mind that Tabriz was one of the very few or perhaps even the only major city in Iran that had peaceful interactions with the Mongols from the outset, never offering resistance. Zajjaji reports the arrival of two generals of Chinggis Khan at the gates of Tabriz during the first invasion in 617–18/1220–21 and puts the following statement in their mouth, ‘They said that this pleasant city has peacefully surrendered to us, supporting our army and cavalry; this golden city here forms private property of the khan, for no [city] is more amiable than it in the world’.33

The Mongols may indeed have seen Tabriz as a city with a particularly favourable disposition towards them when Hülegü came to Azerbaijan. In any case, one of the changes which his arrival entailed is that Tabriz became increasingly closely attached to an imperial court based in the region. Rashid al-Din reports in his account of the beginning of Abaqa’s reign that the latter ‘made the dar al-molk Tabriz the seat of the royal throne’.34 He does not specify which throne here, and while Rashid al-Din designates Tabriz as dar al-molk or dar al-saltana many times in passages stretching from the time of the Eldigüzids to the reign of Ghazan, he never seems to couple these honorary epithets with the name ‘Iran’.35

However, in general, references to Iran as a territorial-political entity abound in Rashid al-Din’s history. Modern day scholars are rightfully fascinated by the global outlook of the work, containing not only the history of the Mongols but also of other peoples and nations such as the Turks, the Jews, the Christian Franks, Indians or Chinese. Some tend to overlook the fact that the structure of Rashid al-Din’s work reflects a special focus on Iran.

Thus, in the history of the Mongols, each section on Chinggis Khan and his descendants down to Hülegü’s campaign is followed by an account of the rulers of China, of the ‘Abbasid caliphs as well as of the sultans, kings and atabegs of Iran-zamin, Syria, Egypt and other lands. The second volume of Rashid al-Din’s massive work, which contains the histories of the other peoples and nations, also features a part on the Middle East. This part faithfully reproduces the structure adopted by Beyzavi, Juzjani and Zajjaji with its focus on the royal dynasties of Iran.36

The first volume containing the history of the Mongols leads, of course, up to Hülegü’s takeover of the land and ultimately to Ghazan’s reign as Muslim king of Iran. In his account of Hülegü’s campaign, Rashid al-Din speaks several times of the dominions of Iran where the conqueror was heading and of
the rulers of Iran who pledged allegiance to him. And he appears to be the earliest author to claim that Hulegū mounted a throne immediately after crossing the Oxus, meaning as soon as he set foot on the territory of Iran.\textsuperscript{37} Then Rashid al-Din portrays Abaqa as ‘dispensing justice and equity in the dominions of Iran’\textsuperscript{38} Finally, he quotes his patron, the convert Ilkhan Ghazan, as saying, ‘I am not unaware of the fact that utmost gratitude to God is compulsory and necessary for out of favour and beneficence He has brought all creatures of Iran (\textit{tamamat-e khalayeq-e Iran-zamin}) who are the deposits of the divine majesty under the yoke of obedience to me’\textsuperscript{39}

It is noteworthy that Rashid al-Din does not make Ghazan speak of being granted authority over all creatures of the world but only over those of Iran. He reports that Ghazan made this speech in summer 701/1302 at Ujan, the most valued royal campsite in the rural hinterland of Tabriz that had been used since pre-Mongol times. Rashid al-Din and many later authors would usually add the honorary epithet ‘city of Islam (\textit{shahr-e eslam})’ to the name of the site in remembrance of Ghazan’s conversion and his construction activities there. Banakati (d. 730/1329–30), for instance, who became the principal court poet at the end of Ghazan’s reign and then wrote an abridgment of Rashid al-Din’s history, praised Ujan in verse highlighting a golden tent Ghazan had set up there while noting that the site was connected to Tabriz.\textsuperscript{40}

According to Rashid al-Din, work on the golden tent had lasted three years so that Ghazan must have commissioned it just prior to his first Syria campaign in the winter of 699/1299–1300.\textsuperscript{41} This campaign entailed a brief occupation of Damascus, where Ghazan reportedly asked the assembled notables who he was, with Rashid al-Din making them reply, ‘You are shah Ghazan’ and then enumerate all the Ilkhan’s ancestors back to Chinggis Khan.\textsuperscript{42} There is a strong element of anti-Mamluk propaganda in this passage and one may doubt whether the notables of Damascus did indeed address Ghazan as ‘shah’ and cite his Chinggisid lineage. In any case, stressing Ghazan’s descent from Chinggis Khan certainly reflects the Ilkhan’s own notion of legitimacy and sovereignty, whereas calling him ‘shah’ probably rather reflects Rashid al-Din’s vision of the ruler as Muslim king of a territorially distinct kingdom named Iran.

Ghazan’s conversion enabled Rashid al-Din and subsequent authors to envision the kingdom of Iran as fully Islamic. But the famous vizier and historian also did a lot to portray the house of Hulegū as a veritable dynasty. Rashid al-Din consistently tries to delegitimize Ilkhanid rulers who did not belong to the straight line of descent from Hulegū through Abaqa and Arghun (d. 690/1291) to Ghazan.\textsuperscript{43} Arghun is the one who began construction works in the village of Sham to the west of Tabriz, where according to Rashid al-Din, he founded a city named Arghuniya. The historian writes, for instance, that Tabriz was like Egypt, with regard to population size, and that Arghuniya was like Cairo, the seat of the king (\textit{padshah-neshin}).\textsuperscript{44}
Ghazan expanded on the construction works of his father Arghun at Sham, building his mosque-mausoleum vaqf complex there so that the place became a thriving suburb of Tabriz. Being a Muslim, he was the first Mongol ruler whose place of burial was publicly known. Masashi Haneda has analysed Ghazan’s complex in considerable detail, listing to the extent possible the religious and charitable institutions that accompanied the royal mausoleum. Haneda understands Ghazaniya as a separate city representing a new type of urbanism that suited the nomadic Mongols. He calls this type the ‘pastoral and mausoleum city’, discussing geographical, economic and political factors determining the choice of the location of Ghazaniya and ensuring its survival.\(^{35}\) Haneda argues convincingly that the vaqf was of utmost importance for the continued existence of such places.

Other examples of pastoral and mausoleum cities which Haneda’s study compares with Ghazaniya are Soltaniya and Nasriya. The first was likewise begun by Arghun and completed by Ghazan’s brother and successor Öljeitü (d. 716/1316) in a major summer pasture area between Zanjan and Abhar and the second was an Aq Qoyunlu complex just north of Tabriz, which will be discussed below. Haneda stresses the similarities between all three, stating for instance that ‘the sites of Sulṭāniyya and Shām were very similar in that they were nomad camps’.\(^{46}\) But the two sites were also very different in that Sham was located in the immediate vicinity of Tabriz whereas Soltaniya was relatively remote from established cities.

Qashani, the chronicler of Öljeitü’s reign, reports the beginning of this ruler’s construction activities at Soltaniya in 705/1305–6, claiming that he built a city like the metropolis (mahrusa) Tabriz.\(^{47}\) At that time and in subsequent decades, both places were designated as dar al-molk in official decrees issued either at Soltaniya or at Tabriz, but in some cases also named without any honorary epithet.\(^{48}\) Yet it seems that Soltaniya could never become like Tabriz with its suburb of Sham, as Öljeitü did not leave a legacy matching that of Ghazan.

It is probably not only a local bias when Ebn-e Karbala’i, writing in the tenth/sixteenth century, praises Ghazan’s good deeds, presenting his conversion to Islam as the most important one. He takes care to underline that none of Ghazan’s forefathers was blessed with this fortunate turn, which is true for the ruler’s line of ancestors but not for the whole Chinggisid lineage and not even for the house of Hülegü. It is probably also not just a local bias when Ebn-e Karbala’i states clearly that Ghazan’s tomb was in Tabriz, in a complex called Shanb-e Ghazan, viewing the suburb of Sham as an integral part of the city.\(^{59}\)

Construction works on Ghazan’s mosque-mausoleum vaqf complex continued for several years after Öljeitü succeeded his brother in 703/1304.\(^{50}\) Describing Öljeitü’s enthronement at Ujan, which preceded the resumption of works at Soltaniya, Qashani could include a verse in his account that underlines the unique status of Tabriz as royal city unequivocally, ‘As long as there is
dynastic good fortune and kingship in Iran and Turan, Mohammed Öljeitü is khan in Turan and Iran. His army is in Iran and news of him in Constantinople, his seat is in Tabriz (neshastash hast dar Tabriz) and traces of him extend to Turkestan.51

Although these verses depict Öljeitü as lord of Iran and Turan, the following account of the arrangement of government refers to the dominions of Iran exclusively and repeatedly.52 And although Qashani notes in another passage that, ‘the metropolis Tabriz is the fortunate place for the kings and khans of the house of Hülegü’, the centre of power did indeed shift towards Soltaniya during the reigns of Öljeitü and his son and successor Abu Sa’id (d. 736/1335).53 Nonetheless, prominent members of the courts of both Ilkhans, including Persian viziers as well as Mongol military aristocrats such as the Chupanids who will reappear shortly, built their primary residences and especially mosque-mausoleum vaqf complexes at Tabriz, which remained the principal urban centre of the realm.54

This final period of the Ilkhanid dynasty in the early eighth/fourteenth century also saw the eventual fully fledged integration of the Mongol conquerors and rulers into the history of Iran. The principal evidence for this integration and the principal tool to achieve it were illustrations in precious court-commissioned manuscripts, especially the ‘Great Mongol Shahnama’ but also in copies of Rashid al-Din’s history.55 One person who belonged most probably to the production team of the ‘Great Mongol Shahnama’ was the well-known author Hamdollah Mostowfi.56 Given Mostowfi’s enthusiasm for the Shahnama, it cannot be surprising that his works are replete with references to Iran as a territorial-political entity. They are also very clear in stating that the house of Hülegü had become the royal dynasty of this now Islamic kingdom.

Tensions between the Ilkhans and their Jochid and Chaghatayid rivals rose again after the end of Öljeitü’s reign and Mostowfi declares that the rulers of these dynasties wrought destruction in Iran, almost annihilating the kingdom. The author goes so far as to call the Ilkhanid Mongol armies who fought the Chaghatayids and the Jochids ‘the Iranians’ even at the time of Hülegü.57 Mostowfi is also the writer who expresses most clearly the unique status of Tabriz as royal city of Islamic Iran. Soltaniya may have been a dar al-molk and Öljeitü’s mausoleum there a highly revered site, but Ghazan’s mausoleum made Tabriz the ‘dome of Islam of Iran (qobbat al-Eslam-e Iran)’.58

Ghazan had no offspring and, in consequence, the inheritance of the kingdom of Islamic Iran he epitomized could only be achieved through its royal city Tabriz. Such a vision must have gained additional appeal when Abu Sa’id died without a male heir in 736/1335 and the Ilkhanid dynasty effectively collapsed. Moreover, with Abu Sa’id’s death, the realm of the house of Hülegü broke apart into several regional principalities, which probably lent further weight to the idea that Tabriz stood for the territory of the kingdom as a whole.
**Built on Mongol Foundations: Post-Ilkhanid Dynasties and Royal Monuments of Tabriz**

At the end of Ilkhanid rule, the idea that Tabriz was standing for a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran as epitomized by Ghazan appears to have been well established even outside the Iranian lands. Thus the Mamluk bureaucrat al-'Omari (d. 749/1349) states that the section on the Ilkhanid lands in his geography is about ‘the kingdom of the Iranians (mamlekat al-iraniyyin)’ which extends from the Oxus to the Euphrates and from Kerman to Rum.\(^{59}\) Then al-'Omari notes that this kingdom fell to the house of Hülegü and goes on to explain that ‘the seat of the king in it [this kingdom] is now Tabriz, then Soltaniya, and the house Hülegü sees kingship belonging to who sits on the throne at Ujan, in the environs of Tabriz’.\(^{60}\) The author does not mention Ghazan’s mausoleum, having apparently other reasons to state about Tabriz that ‘it is nowadays the mother of the entire Iran’.\(^{61}\)

Dynastic notions of legitimacy and sovereignty naturally remained highly influential after the death of Abu Sa'id. Various contenders for succession to the Ilkhans raised their claim in the name of actual or alleged descendants of Hülegü whom they had under tutelage. However, the vision in the account which the contemporary Persian historian Qotb al-Din Ahari gives of events is in conformity with al-'Omari’s explanation of who could be considered a ruler. Ahari remarks, for instance, that one contender and his puppet sovereign ‘came to Ujan and seized the kingdom’ after a military victory in spring 736/1336.\(^{62}\) The next contender was the Jalayerid emir Sheykh-Hasan, known as Bozorg, who was then based in Anatolia and is portrayed in a very favourable light by the historian, being the father of Ahari’s patron. Ahari notes that Sheykh-Hasan and his Chinggisid protégé set out to ‘Iran and the foundation of the throne (pa-ye takht)’ with their allies and that, after defeating an opposing army in Moharram 737/August 1336, they ‘seized the kingdom’, descending on Tabriz.\(^{63}\) About a year later, an invasion attempt from Khorasan in the name of a rival Chinggisid claimant based there failed, which makes Ahari declare that Sheykh-Hasan gained ‘complete kingship and command of Iran (tamamat-e saltanat va emarat-e Iran-zamin)’.\(^{64}\)

Ahari must have been fully aware that complete kingship of Iran required at least some nominal suzerainty over all the former Ilkhanid territory, which neither Sheykh-Hasan nor any of his rivals achieved. Yet, bearing in mind the special status of Tabriz as royal city, Ahari is consistent in presenting only the puppet sovereigns based in Azerbaijan as successors to the Ilkhanid dynasty, whereas historians from eastern Iran also devote separate chapters to the Chinggisid claimant in Khorasan.\(^{65}\) Ahari even retains this structuring pattern for the period after summer 738/1338, when the Jalayerid Sheykh-Hasan-e Bozorg was expelled from the Ilkhanid heartland by an opponent from the abovementioned Chupanid family who was likewise named Sheykh-Hasan and known as Kuchek.\(^{66}\)
The Jalayerid had to be content with ruling Baghdad but continued trying to challenge his Chupanid rival. Relations between the two families were extremely complex and both also had matrimonial ties to the Ilkhanid dynasty. With regard to the perpetuation of the special royal status of Tabriz, the Chupanid Sheykh-Hasan-e Kuchek may appear as the first veritable successor of Ghazan. He founded a congregational mosque in 742/1341–42 and it is possible that the complex also included a tomb for himself or for his puppet sovereign from the house of Hulegu; perhaps one for each. The mosque was known by the honorific titles of both but mainly as *ostad-shagerd* after the famous master calligrapher ‘Abdollah Seyrafi and his pupil Mohammad Bandgir, both of whom decorated it.

Under Sheykh-Hasan-e Kuchek, the Chupanid realm extended southward to Fars and recurring invasion attempts from Khorasan remained unsuccessful. But there was also internal division and some of the ruler’s relatives even allied with the Jalayerid Sheykh-Hasan-e Bozorg. The complicated rivalry continued after Sheykh-Hasan-e Kuchek was murdered by his wife in 743 or 744/1343 and his brother Malek Ashraf assumed power. Persian historians unanimously describe Malek Ashraf’s reign as tyrannical and none deplores the campaign of the Jochid Jani Beg Khan (d. 758/1357) to Tabriz, where he executed the Chupanid ruler in 758/1357, as an unjustified attack on Iran.

The narrative conclusion of all accounts is the conquest of Tabriz by the Jalayerid Sheykh-Oveys, who succeeded his father Sheykh-Hasan-e Bozorg when the latter died in Baghdad in 757/1356. Ahari is understandably the most outspoken, commenting that divine decree had destined ‘this kingdom, throne and sovereignty (in *molk-o-mamlekat va in takht-o-saltanat*) for his patron once Sheykh-Oveys secured control of the royal city in 760/1359. In an earlier passage Ahari, whose history unfortunately breaks off immediately after the establishment of Sheykh-Oveys as lord of Tabriz, had already announced that ‘the great sultan, the supreme king of kings (soltan-e mo’azzam shahanshah-e a’zam)’ would take over the Ilkhanid heartland.

Sheykh-Oveys did indeed adopt the title *soltan* and is generally designated as such in the histories of the period. This title had been officially used by the Muslim Ilkhans, in particular from Ghazan onwards. Sheykh-Oveys also did not install any puppet sovereigns from the house of Hulegu or recognize any Chinggisid overlord, which his father had already stopped doing at some point. Of all the regional rulers in the Iranian lands in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, Sheykh-Oveys had perhaps the strongest dynastic connection with the Ilkhans, his mother being a former wife of Abu Sa’id and his grandmother a full sister of Oljeitü.

But since Sheykh-Oveys lacked a patrilineal Chinggisid genealogy, Abolala Soudavar speaks of ‘a semblance of legitimacy’ which the Jalayerids inherited through their descent, but that ‘to gain acceptance as successors to *il-khâns*, they had to act like *il-khâns* (original emphasis): following in the footsteps of
Abu Sa‘id, they patronised the Il-Khānid library-atelier and the production of illustrated literary manuscripts, commissioning copies of the *Kalilé-o Demné* and the *Shahname*. The Jalayerids were indeed great patrons of literature and there is one particular work dedicated to Sheykh-Oveys suggesting that, with the conquest of Tabriz, he may rather have aspired to be a successor of Ghazan. This was a verse chronicle memorializing Ghazan in the style of the *Shahnama* which was evidently entitled *Ghazan-nama.*

Another work dedicated to Sheykh-Oveys was Mohammed b. Hendushah Nakhjavani’s *Dastur al-kateb fī ta’yin al-marateb*, a collection of sample chancellery writings. Among the honorifics which the author showers on the ruler is the Persian royal title *shahanshah*, which Ahari had likewise so proudly employed to designate Soltan Sheykh-Oveys. Nakhjavani combines *shahanshah* with *soltan-e eslam* but also uses the titles *bahador khan* for Oveys, utilizing the customary combination of Iranian, Islamic and Mongol elements to express notions of sovereignty and legitimacy. He also makes numerous references to Iran as a territorial-political entity, relating it to several government offices and specifying in some instances that the land extended from the Oxus to Egypt. Only in one sample document, a victory letter or *fathnama*, does Nakhjavani link the territorial-political concept of ‘Iran’ with the *dar al-molk* Tabriz, albeit indirectly.

Erecting royal monuments in and around Tabriz was perhaps the best way to act like Ghazan and thereby to become his successor as king of ‘Iran’ even without coming close to controlling the entire former Ilkhanid realm. And the Jalayerid did erect royal monuments, leaving material traces in the urban and suburban fabric of Tabriz. He was credited with having built a palace known as *dowlatkhana*, which may have been an older structure enlarged by Sheykh-Oveys and which was probably located on the northern outskirts of the city. And there must have been a mausoleum as the Jalayerid sultan was buried in a village called Shadabad, just south of Tabriz, where he appears to have been devoted to the local family of Sufi sheykhs. Ebn-e Karbala’i unfortunately does not describe the tomb but notes that, after succeeding his father, Sheykh-Oveys ‘became the refuge of the sultans of Iran’.

Sheykh-Oveys died in 776/1374 and under his son and successor Soltan Hoseyn, both internal conflicts and external pressure on the Jalayerid realm increased. In 778/1376, the Mozaffarids of Fars, who had already briefly occupied Tabriz before the conquest of Oveys, captured the city again. It seems that an eminent local leader had invited them to take over the ‘great place of the throne (*takhtgah-e bozorg*)’ but they were soon forced to retreat. The same local leader, known as Khvaja Sheykh Kojoji, then procured the assassination of Soltan Hoseyn in 784/1382 and brought Hoseyn’s brother Soltan Ahmad to the throne, but things would even get worse.

In Zu’l-Qa’da 787/December 1385, the Jochid Toqtemish Khan (d. 809/1406) approached Tabriz and eventually sacked the city. Unlike Jani
Beg earlier, Toqtemish was not welcome at all. There is an anonymous local eyewitness account of the event that was written within a year of the attack, suggesting that the elites of Tabriz took great pride in its special status as royal city of Islamic Iran. The introduction deplores several times the catastrophe which befell the ‘dome of Islam (qobbat al-eslam) Tabriz’ and showers elaborate praise on a strongman emir of Soltan Ahmad named ‘Adel Aqa who enjoyed much support in the city at the time. However, like the sultan, he was obviously absent and a regional ruler of Mazandaran who was in Tabriz, ‘coveting the kingdom of Iran (sultanat va mamlekat-e Iran-zamin-ra matmah-e nazar gardanida)’ could not help the city either. The dome of Islam of Iran, as Mostowfi had put it, fell prey to ‘nearly 9000 infidel Turks’.

This Jochid attack was part of the conflict between Toqtemish and the conqueror Timur, whose expansion had already thrown the Iranian lands into disarray. Timur came to Tabriz in summer 788/1386, according to his chronicler Nezam al-Din Shami, who was a native of Sham-e Ghazan, to protect the qobbat al-eslam. Soltan Ahmad retreated to Baghdad once more and Timur eventually had ‘Adel Aqa executed after having made use of his services for some time. Then he returned to his base in Transoxiana, having risen to power in the former Chaghatayid dominions. Timur still ruled in the name of a Chinggisid puppet sovereign and considered Chinggis Khan himself as his model rather than any other Mongol ruler.

Persian historians working at Timurid courts, such as Sharaf al-Din ‘Ali Yazdi or later Mirkhvand, were aware that the conqueror came from beyond the territory of Iran and had to take possession of the kingdom bearing this name by military means. They would usually note explicitly that Timur’s western campaigns led him to Iran. From the perspective of the Timurid court historians, the conqueror finally took over the royal realm of the Ilkhans from the Jalayerids during his second major western campaign, which began in 794/1392. In the following year, Timur expelled Soltan Ahmad from Baghdad, an achievement that marks the conclusion of the continuation of Rashid al-Din’s history written by Hafez-e Abru.

Prior to his escape from Baghdad, Soltan Ahmad had his erstwhile ally Khvaja Sheykh Kojoji executed there, probably because the latter’s relatives in Tabriz had colluded with Timur’s representatives. After a few other battles and before returning to his principal city Samarqand, the conqueror installed his son Miranshah as governor of the Ilkhanid heartland of Azerbaijan and adjacent regions. Yazdi notes, quite in line with the broader Chinggisid legacy Timur tried to assume, that Miranshah was granted the ‘throne of Hülegü’.

Miranshah was based in Tabriz, where he soon attempted to assert his rule independently from Timur, as a decree issued in 798/1396 evinces. He had certainly become dissatisfied with his position among the Timurid princes but local leaders of Tabriz such as the Kojoji family may also have resented the relegation of the royal city of Islamic Iran to secondary status and pushed
Miranshah to rebel against his father. In any case it is noteworthy that the
rebellion of this prince in the city of Ghazan’s mausoleum caused such obvious
embarrassment to the Timurid court historians that they claimed Miranshah had
gone mad.\footnote{Miranshah to rebel against his father. In any case it is
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Be that as it may, Timur embarked on his third major western campaign in
802/1399, removed Miranshah from the governorship of Tabriz but left him in
the area after the end of the campaign, assigning the realm of Hülegü and his
throne in Tabriz to a son of Miranshah in 806/1404.\footnote{Be that as it may, Timur embarked on his third major western campaign in 802/1399, removed Miranshah from the governorship of Tabriz but left him in the area after the end of the campaign, assigning the realm of Hülegü and his throne in Tabriz to a son of Miranshah in 806/1404.}

Soltan Ahmad Jalayer was still alive when Timur died the following year, shortly after his return to Samarqand. The Jalayerid managed to take Tabriz back briefly in 809/1406 but it was the Turkmen leader Qara Yusof Qara Qoyunlu who expelled the quarrelling Timurids from Azerbaijan a year later, taking possession of the city.\footnote{Soltan Ahmad Jalayer was still alive when Timur died the following year, shortly after his return to Samarqand. The Jalayerid managed to take Tabriz back briefly in 809/1406 but it was the Turkmen leader Qara Yusof Qara Qoyunlu who expelled the quarrelling Timurids from Azerbaijan a year later, taking possession of the city.}

Qara Yusof had fought Timur together with Soltan Ahmad but when the
Jalayerid came to Tabriz again in 813/1411, he defeated him as well and
eventually had him executed. Like most other Jalayerid rulers, Soltan Ahmad
was buried in the Chupanid Demashqiya complex, which dated from the reign
of Ilkhan Abu Sa’id.\footnote{Qara Yusof had fought Timur together with Soltan Ahmad but when the Jalayerid came to Tabriz again in 813/1411, he defeated him as well and eventually had him executed. Like most other Jalayerid rulers, Soltan Ahmad was buried in the Chupanid Demashqiya complex, which dated from the reign of Ilkhan Abu Sa’id.}

Hafez-e Abur reports that, ‘when Emir Qara Yusof had completely freed his mind from the preoccupation of dealing with Soltan Ahmad and taken independent control of the takhtgah-e Tabriz, he wanted the throne of sovereignty to remain among his descendants, manufacturing a golden throne’. Because of dynastic sensitivities, a son of Qara Yusof who had previously been adopted by Soltan Ahmad was supposed to occupy this golden throne as successor to the Jalayerids.\footnote{Hafez-e Abur reports that, ‘when Emir Qara Yusof had completely freed his mind from the preoccupation of dealing with Soltan Ahmad and taken independent control of the takhtgah-e Tabriz, he wanted the throne of sovereignty to remain among his descendants, manufacturing a golden throne’. Because of dynastic sensitivities, a son of Qara Yusof who had previously been adopted by Soltan Ahmad was supposed to occupy this golden throne as successor to the Jalayerids.}

These sensitivities are entirely absent from the work of the tenth/sixteenth-
century historian Hasan Beg Rumlu. For him, the end of the Jalayerid dynasty
and the succession of the Turkmen leader as lord of Tabriz were sufficient to
open his report of the year 816/1413 with further exploits of ‘padshah-e Iran,
Qara Yusof Torkoman’.\footnote{These sensitivities are entirely absent from the work of the tenth/sixteenth-century historian Hasan Beg Rumlu. For him, the end of the Jalayerid dynasty and the succession of the Turkmen leader as lord of Tabriz were sufficient to open his report of the year 816/1413 with further exploits of ‘padshah-e Iran, Qara Yusof Torkoman’.}

The Bavarian squire Johann Schiltberger, who was
taken captive by the Ottomans at the battle of Nicopolis in 798/1396 and then
by Timur at the battle of Ankara in 804/1402, seems to have grasped the
reasoning behind the honour accorded to Qara Yusof by Rumlu. Schiltberger
spent some time with Miranshah in Azerbaijan and gives a vivid, though of
course often inaccurate account of the fights between the Timurids, Soltan
Ahmad and Qara Yusof.\footnote{The Bavarian squire Johann Schiltberger, who was taken captive by the Ottomans at the battle of Nicopolis in 798/1396 and then by Timur at the battle of Ankara in 804/1402, seems to have grasped the reasoning behind the honour accorded to Qara Yusof by Rumlu. Schiltberger spent some time with Miranshah in Azerbaijan and gives a vivid, though of course often inaccurate account of the fights between the Timurids, Soltan Ahmad and Qara Yusof.}

Being the lord of Tabriz gave Qara Yusof a certain claim to the legacy of
Ghazan as king of Islamic Iran. Tehrani calls the first Turkmen ruler of the
royal city ‘a great king (padshahi-yé bozorgvar).\footnote{Being the lord of Tabriz gave Qara Yusof a certain claim to the legacy of Ghazan as king of Islamic Iran. Tehrani calls the first Turkmen ruler of the royal city ‘a great king (padshahi-yé bozorgvar).}
The Timurid court historians were rather ambiguous about the significance of the Ilkhanid heartland which slipped back out of control so quickly. Shami, as a native, does speak about the ‘sayyeds, grandees and notables of Iran-zamin and especially of the qobbat al-eslam Tabriz’.\footnote{The Timurid court historians were rather ambiguous about the significance of the Ilkhanid heartland which slipped back out of control so quickly. Shami, as a native, does speak about the ‘sayyeds, grandees and notables of Iran-zamin and especially of the qobbat al-eslam Tabriz’.
Azerbaijan was the ‘takhtgah-e mamalek-e Iran’ but states at the same time that Timur’s successor Shahrokh in Herat was sitting ‘on the throne of the kingdom of Iran (bar sarir-e mamlekat-e Iran)’.\textsuperscript{104}

The ambiguity resulted partly from the fact that the Timurid realm continued to extend beyond Iran under Shahrokh, while the dominions in Transoxiana remained central. Moreover, major historians working during Shahrokh’s reign, such as Hafez-e Abbru and Yazdi, strengthened the image of Timur as a dynastic founder in his own right as well as the link between the emerging Timurid dynasty and the Chaghatayids.\textsuperscript{105} Timur’s relation to Iran derived from his conquest of the former Ilkhanid realm and, as Shahrokh preserved much of this conquest, his territory still encompassed Iran and Turan.\textsuperscript{106} Shahrokh may have tried to emulate Ghazan as an exemplary Muslim ruler but without control of Tabriz the foundation of the kingdom of Islamic Iran would be lacking.

Qara Yusof died in 823/1420 while Shahrokh was approaching Azerbaijan on the first of three campaigns against the Qara Qoyunlu and was succeeded by his son Eskandar after the return of the Timurid sultan to Herat. By the time of the second campaign, in 832/1429, the Qara Qoyunlu had erected buildings in Tabriz, which Shahrokh had one of his sons destroy.\textsuperscript{107} After the third and final campaign in, 835–36/1432–33, Eskandar Qara Qoyunlu likewise first ‘returned to the throne of Tabriz (bar sarir-e Tabriz ‘ayed gasht)’ according to Tehrani.\textsuperscript{108} But then Eskandar was killed by one of his sons, having already lost out to his brother Jahanshah, who formally recognized Shahrokh as overlord at the time. By the time of Shahrokh’s death in 850/1447, Jahanshah’s rule in Azerbaijan had stabilized to such an extent that he expanded his dominions eastward at the expense of the Timurids and briefly occupied Herat in 863/1458.\textsuperscript{109}

From his base in the Ilkhanid heartland, Jahanshah brought most of the former dominions of the house of Hülegü under his control. Hence nothing prevented Tehrani from presenting the ruler as the equal of the Timurids during the period following Shahrokh’s death, recounting parts of the succession struggle under the title ‘report of the Chaghatayid and Qara Qoyunlu sultans’.\textsuperscript{110} The author declares that he was ordered to draft a \textit{Tarikh-e soltani} while Jahanshah was occupying Herat and this draft must have developed into the \textit{Ketab-e Diyarbakriya} over the years.\textsuperscript{111} One reason why Jahanshah retreated from Herat was a rebellion of his son Hasan-‘Ali, giving rise to the threat that ‘the throne of Tabriz [might] be lost’.\textsuperscript{112}

Jahanshah secured the throne and the Qara Qoyunlu further strengthened their connection to the royal city. In 870/1465, his wife set up a \textit{vaqf} complex around the famous Blue Mosque in Tabriz, which included a mausoleum for the founder, her female descendants and the ruler, but which became known as the Mozaffariya after Jahanshah.\textsuperscript{113} The mosque is located in the south-eastern part of Tabriz and especially famed for its mostly dark blue tile mosaic. It is
possible that relevant artistic techniques had been transmitted locally at Tabriz since the time of the Ilkhans. The Blue Mosque has an inscription above the main portal commemorating Abu’l-Mozaffar Jahanshah b. Yusof Shah Noyen Jahanshah, showing the ongoing blending of Mongol and Iranian concepts.

While Jahanshah probably played a secondary role in the endowment and construction of the Mozaffariya complex, he left a royal monument of his own as well. According to Ebn-e Karbala’i, the Qara Qoyunlu ruler built a new dowlatkhana replacing the one attributed to the Jalayerid sultan Sheykh-Oveys. The dowlatkhana-ye Jahanshahi, as Tehrani calls it, was located in an area just north of Tabriz, known as Sahebabad, apparently not far from the older Jalayerid palace structure. Most scholars stress that the Aq Qoyunlu rulers of Tabriz continued to develop the same area later and some note that the name Sahebabad derived from the Ilkhanid vizier Saheb-Divan Shams al-Din Joveyni (ex. 683/1284). The latter had constructed a guest house there and the area which was known as the marketplace or meydân quarter under the Ilkhans also hosted religious buildings.

It is uncertain what remained of these structures in the ninth/fifteenth century or what may have been added in the meantime. However, in view of the continuity that can be observed in other domains, the impression sometimes conveyed in scholarship that the Sahebabad area with its meydan was devoid of buildings before the Turkmen rulers erected their monuments is probably misleading. Jahanshah died on campaign against his enemy Uzun Hasan Aq Qoyunlu, in 872/1467. When the news spread, the Timurid sultan Abu Sa’id, a grandson of Miranshah, attempted to win the Ilkhanid heartland back for his dynasty but was defeated by Uzun Hasan in Rajab 873/January 1469 and executed a month later.

According to Tehrani, who completed his history for Uzun Hasan, the defeat of Jahanshah marks a transfer of dynastic good fortune from the Qara Qoyunly to the Aq Qoyunlu that had been predicted in the Qur’an. But the author also makes it clear that Uzun Hasan was not Jahanshah’s successor as lord of the royal city. A succession struggle erupted in Tabriz among the Qara Qoyunlu, in which Jahanshah’s son Hasan-‘Ali gained the upper hand. Tehrani closes the chapter recounting these events by announcing that he will first go over to reporting the advance of the Timurid claimant Abu Sa’id and then ‘return to the account of the affairs of Soltan Hasan-‘Ali b. Jahanshah Mirza’.

But Hasan-‘Ali soon found himself in a desperate situation, committing suicide near Hamadan within just over a year of Jahanshah’s death and Uzun Hasan brought the territory previously ruled by the Qara Qoyunlu under his control. Tehrani notes that Uzun Hasan entered the dar al-saltana Tabriz in Zu’l-Hejja 873/June 1469 from the side of the Mozaffariya complex. The author stresses that the new ruler promised to the people that he would respect the management of the complex and return for a visit of the king and princes
(thus Jahanshah and his relatives were presumably buried there), before proceeding to the residence of Sahebabad which was ‘a building of the deceased sovereign’.\textsuperscript{122}

Having taken possession of Tabriz and the former Qara Qoyunlu dominions, Uzun Hasan attempted to extend his influence towards Khorasan by supporting a Timurid claimant and to check Ottoman expansion into Anatolia.\textsuperscript{123} The Aq Qoyunlu ruler was in steady correspondence with the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II (d. 886/1481) and one of Uzun Hasan’s letters is of particular interest for this study. This letter is a \textit{fathnama} proclaiming an Aq Qoyunlu victory over the Georgians that seems to refer to Uzun Hasan’s last campaign, after his defeat in battle against Mehmet II in 878/1473 and about a year before his death in 882/1478.

The letter appears as an attempt to present Uzun Hasan as a ruler on the same level as the Ottoman sultan, mainly by using royal titles which reflect their respective realms in historical depth. Thus it emphasizes the importance of continuing diplomatic relations between the Caesars or Emperors of Rum (\textit{al-qayaser}) and the kings of Iran (\textit{al-akaser}). One of the formulas used to politely address Mehmet II is \textit{qeysar-makan}, the position of the Caesar, and one could speculate if this might also be a reference to Constantinople as the place where the Ottoman sultan was based since his conquest of the Byzantine capital in 857/1453.\textsuperscript{124} In parallel, Uzun Hasan’s chancellery officials who drafted the letter may have thought of Tabriz as \textit{kesra-makan}, the place of the king of Iran.

In any case, the sequence of succession to Ghazan as the epitome of the idea of a territorially distinct kingdom named Iran, now extended to Uzun Hasan and the Aq Qoyunlu. Both the conqueror and his eventual successor Ya’qub acted like successors to Ghazan, leaving royal monuments in Tabriz and other members of the ruling family likewise constructed buildings there. The best known Aq Qoyunlu complexes are the Nasriya and the Hasht Behesht, both located in the Sahebabad area. The former was named after Uzun Hasan but, at least the greater part, was built during the reign of Ya’qub and it included their mausoleum as well as a congregational mosque and other religious structures. The latter was a palace which the Safavids continued to use as royal residence later.\textsuperscript{125}

The historian Fazlollah Khonji-Esfahani who worked for Ya’qub left no doubt that, after Uzun Hasan, the throne of Iran (\textit{takht-e Iran}) belonged to the member of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty in possession of the royal city, so that in 883/1478 Ya’qub finally ‘ascended the royal throne in the \textit{dar al-saltana} Tabriz’.\textsuperscript{126} And the Aq Qoyunlu ruler not only took on the Ghazanid legacy by erecting buildings in the immediate vicinity of the city but directed his attention to the major royal campsite of Ujan as well. Khonji relates that Ya’qub renovated a palace which Ghazan had built in Ujan and which had allegedly been falling into decay since the time of the Mongols.\textsuperscript{127}
After Ya'qub’s death in 896/1490, various Aq Qoyunlu factions kept fighting each other, installing successive rulers on the throne in Tabriz until Esma’i'l Safavi, a maternal grandson of Uzun Hasan, took over the city in 907/1501. This event is still viewed today as marking the transformation of the Safavid family into a royal dynasty of Iran. Like Uzun Hasan and Jahanshah before him, Esma’i'l was able to bring most of the former Ilkhanid realm under his control only after ascending the throne of Islamic Iran in the royal city Tabriz.

Hans Robert Roemer remarks with regard to the Turkmen predecessors of the Safavids that ‘[t]hough their rule extended deep into Persian territory, it represents from the point of view of the history of Persia merely peripheral formations beyond or on the frontiers of Iran’. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Turkmen rule was highly influential in perpetuating the idea that Tabriz stands for a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran as it had emerged under the Mongols. As such, it strengthened the very foundation on which a central element of the Safavid claim to royal dignity rested.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined Tabriz as a royal city from the seventh/thirteenth to the ninth/fifteenth centuries and attempted to show that it came to stand for the idea of a territorially distinct Islamic kingdom named Iran. From the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century onwards, Persian historians tended to identify the dominions of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty with a territory they recognized as Iran and to name it accordingly. The conversion of the Ilkhan Ghazan at the turn of the eighth/fourteenth century allowed them to envision that territorial-political entity as a fully Islamic kingdom and his mosque-mausoleum complex at Tabriz allowed them to envision the city as its manifestation.

The analysis has revealed that only few authors explicitly combined the territorial-political concept of ‘Iran’ with honorary epithets applied to Tabriz to signal its special status as royal city. Yet, in many cases these epithets can still be related to this concept implicitly. In view of the variety of Islamic, Iranian and Turko-Mongol nomadic elements that made up contemporary notions of sovereignty and legitimacy, the idea that Tabriz stood for Iran may also not have appealed to everybody. Authors with a local background seem more inclined to conceive and express that idea.

After the collapse of the Ilkhanid dynasty in the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century, hardly any political entity was able to establish a realm centred on the Iranian plateau. This may explain why explicit definitions of the territory of Iran seem to decrease noticeably until the end of the ninth/fifteenth century compared with the time of the Ilkhans. Nonetheless, many Persian authors apparently also envisioned a world of political entities, both within and beyond Iran, that had as basic features a territory and a ruling
dynasty. In most cases, notably that of Iran, the ruling dynasty was of course preceded and could be succeeded by others.

Tabriz was certainly very much a prize for the various nomadic formations that competed for succession to the Mongols and were generally portrayed as dynasties. However, only members of the Chupanid, the Jalayerid, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu ruling families erected royal building complexes similar to that of Ghazan. Those rulers who did so could be considered as successors to Ghazan and kings of Islamic Iran, especially in the ninth/fifteenth century, when the Turkmen dynasties gradually managed to bring the territory previously ruled by the Mongol Ilkhans under their control. The royal monuments which Chupanid, Jalayerid, Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu rulers erected in and around Tabriz continuously marked the city as a royal site, which could be seen as standing for the idea of a territorially distinct kingdom named Iran. In doing so, these monuments also indicated a sequence of dynastic succession to that kingdom which was literally built on a Mongol foundation.
Notes:

13. Ibid., p. 4.
17. While royal campsites in the immediate vicinity of Tabriz have not been analysed in detail, systematic studies exist on major grazing grounds in areas adjacent to Azerbaijan at the time of Hūlegū’s invasion and on migration routes in the reign of Ghazan’s brother and successor Öljeitū. John Masson Smith Jr, ‘Mongol nomadism and Middle Eastern geography’, pp. 39–56. Charles Melville, ‘The itineraries of Sultan Öljeitū, 1304–16’, pp. 55–70. Migration and residence patterns shifted slightly away from Tabriz during Öljeitū’s well-documented reign, but the city remained a central locality especially in the long run. A few important sites in the environs of Tabriz will be discussed but a detailed analysis of this matter through the entire period under study here is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter.


21. George Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran, pp. 42–95; Michal Biran, ‘The Battle of Herat’, pp. 175–219. Biran is one of the few scholars who follow Fragner in regarding the delineation of Iran’s boundaries as a legacy of the Mongols; also see Biran, Chinggis Khan, pp. 99–100.


26. Serāj al-Dīn Juzjāni, Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ‘A. Habibi Qandahāri; Hakim Zajjāji, Homāyun-nāma, ed. ‘A. Pir-neyā. This is the second part of the Homāyun-nāma, which comprises the universal history. The first part of the work, which is a biography of the Prophet Mohammed, was likewise edited by ‘Ali Pir-neyā and published in 2011. For additional information see also the reference to my article given in note 19.


28. Ibid., pp. 188–89, also uses the phrase belād-e Irān va ‘ajam.

29. Zajjāji, Homāyun-nāma, p. 1189, ‘sar-anjām dast az delirān be-bord, be-mardi molk, molk-e Irān be-bord; beh Tabriz budi Abu Bakr Shāh, zadi andar ān bum-bar bargāh’.

30. Ibid., p. 1227. It should in fact be six years as Jalāl al-Din conquered Tabriz in 622/1225.

31. Ibid., p. 1191.

32. Ibid., p. 1100.

33. Ibid., p. 1219, ‘be-goftand ke-in shahr-e khush il-e mā-st, keh yāri-deh-e lashkar va kheyyl-e mā-st; chenin shahr-e zarin bud khāss-e khān, keh khushtar nabāshad az in dar jahān’.


38. Ibid., p. 1070, ‘dar mamāleks-e Irān beh nashr-e ‘adal va ensāf mashghul bud’.


42. Ibid., pp. 1293–94.


46. Ibid., p. 161.

47. Abu’l-Qāsem Qāshāni, Žārīkh-e Ulijāyut, p. 45.


50. Qāshāni, Žārīkh-e Ulijāyut, p. 53.

51. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

52. Ibid., pp. 28–29.


60. Ibid., pp. 85–86.

61. Ibid., p. 88.


63. Ibid., pp. 221–222.

64. Ibid., pp. 221, 223.


The Timurid Century

72. Ahari, Tavārikh-e Sheykh-Oveys, p. 246.
73. Ibid., p. 225.
82. Zeyn al-Din, Zeyl, pp. 95–96; Shabānkāra’ī, Majma’ al-ansāb, p. 318.
94. Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, pp. 72–73.
97. Ibid., pp. 399–403.
98. Ibid., p. 446.
111. Ibid., p. 353.
112. Ibid., p. 359.
115. Aube, *La céramique*, p. 82.
121. Ibid., pp. 434–42.
122. Ibid., pp. 522–23.
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