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# Public Attitudes to European Integration in Germany after Maastricht: Inventory and Typology

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## 1. Introduction

Public opinion in Germany exhibits some clear traces of 'Europessimism'. After the June 1992 Maastricht referendum in Denmark a polling firm asked for opinions about its result. While 40 per cent of respondents were indifferent, 34 per cent found it to be 'positive', and only 26 per cent showed regret (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 1992). Such attitudes did not instantly spring to life in the early 1990s, but for already quite some time certain public reservations *vis-à-vis* European integration could be observed, particularly regarding not the general principle, but rather specific Community problems and policies (see, e.g., Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Brunner, 1981; Büchner, 1990; Inglehart and Reif, 1991).

There are a number of factors, however, on the basis of which uncertainty over public acceptance now and for the future has to be more strongly emphasized than in the past. First, the notion that younger voters are more pro-

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European has become questionable (Janssen, 1991; Piepenschneider and Wolf, 1991). Secondly, it has been demonstrated that support for further European integration is strongly correlated with assessments of current economic developments (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). During periods of economic growth support increases, in recession it declines. Thirdly, after the Maastricht Treaty the personal relevance for citizens of prospects of further integration has grown. On the one hand, the substitution of national currencies within the framework of monetary union would affect everyone personally, and in a very sensitive place – the wallet. Considering the fact that for Germans the Deutschmark symbolizes prosperity, economic strength, and stability, this prospect is especially threatening. On the other hand, Maastricht has brought the ‘constitutional question’ of the European Union to the attention of broader segments of the population (Reif, 1992). Finally, the first referendum in Denmark rendered scepticism *vis-à-vis* European integration much less of a taboo; critics need no longer fear isolation (see Marsh and O’Brien, 1989).

The Treaty of Maastricht has led to a revival of the debate over the future of European integration – in Germany and elsewhere. Public attitudes have to be taken into account in this debate. Here we will attempt to contribute toward the latter, by examining original survey data collected in mid-1992. Our structure is as follows: first, the data base will be briefly described. Second, evaluations of the EU will be compared to those of other international organizations, and the personal salience of integration topics for respondents will be analysed. Third, some specific attitudes towards political and military integration of Europe and the role of Germany in a unified Europe will be examined. In each of these steps, public attitudes will be differentiated between East and West Germany and by party preference. Finally, an attempt to classify patterns of opinions about European integration will be presented, proceeding from the assumption that we are dealing with multi-dimensional attitudes.

## 2. Data

The data analysed here come from the first phase of a three-phase panel survey carried out within a research project on public attitudes towards foreign and security policy in Germany, funded by the ‘Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft’ (DFG). The survey was conducted in June and July 1992 (shortly after the first Maastricht referendum in Denmark). Face-to-face interviews lasted on average about one hour. 1046 randomly sampled German citizens of voting age from the ‘old’ Länder (including West Berlin) and 1043 from the ‘new’ Länder (including East Berlin) were interviewed. Fieldwork was conducted by Basis Research (Frankfurt and Dresden). Questions about European integration were not the only focal point of the survey, but a number of items did address this issue area.

### 3. Evaluation of the EU and the Importance of Integration

The EU is very well known among German citizens. Respondents were presented with a list of five international organizations for evaluation (EU, the Western European Union, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United Nations), and were given the option to say that they did not know the respective organization. For the EU, NATO, and UN only about 0.5 per cent chose this option. The CSCE was somewhat less well known, and least familiar was the WEU, with over one-quarter of respondents in the 'don't know' category. While the CSCE was better known in East Germany than in the West, all other organizations were less well known there. This difference was strongest for the WEU, of which over a third of East German respondents were not aware.

In evaluations on a five-point scale (1='very negative', 5='very positive') the EU ranks in the middle. Most favourable grades on average were given to the UN and CSCE (average 4.0), followed by the EU and NATO (3.7), and finally the WEU (3.5). There are clear differences between East and West German evaluations of NATO, WEU and CSCE. The first two are distinctly less popular in East Germany, while CSCE is regarded considerably higher than in the West. Positive sentiments about the EU are least frequent among voters of the Republican Party, of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and of the Greens. On the other hand, voters of the 'old' parties (the Christian Democrats – CDU/CSU, the Social Democrats – SPD, and the Free Democrats – FDP) on average regard the EC more positively.

The *personal* salience for respondents of the speed of European integration can be compared to three other foreign policy position issues surveyed in our study, i.e. first, whether Germans should make financial sacrifices to improve living conditions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; second, whether the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces) should be used worldwide to defend Western interests or whether it should be confined to the defence of Germany itself; and, finally, whether or not Germany should forgo all territorial claims against Eastern European nations. While the territorial claims issue rates on average just below the mid-point of the salience scale (2.9 on a scale from 1 to 5), the question of sacrifices for the East is considered most important (3.6). Speed of European integration and options for Bundeswehr operations follow closely behind (3.4 each). In East Germany the timing of European unification is considered distinctly less important than in the West. Voters of the PDS, the successor party of the East German Socialist Unity Party, and 'other' minor parties rate the speed of integration as least important. At the other extreme are voters of the FDP, the Greens and the Republikaner, the latter probably due to their strong opposition to integration, about which more will be said later.

Despite this relatively high ranking of personal importance, the topic of integration plays only a very minor role in shaping voting behaviour. In total, just over 5 per cent of the sample chose this item from a list as the first or second most important reason for their voting decision. In East Germany this share is even lower – only slightly over 2 per cent. Such responses are most frequent among voters for the coalition parties, particularly the FDP (14 per cent). Integration again is least important for sympathizers of the PDS (3 per cent). SPD adherents rank just slightly above average, and voters of the Republikaner and Green Party mention European integration above average as grounds for their voting intention, but less often than voters of the coalition parties.

#### **4. Attitudes Towards the Political Unification of Europe**

In order to gauge opinion about the political dimension of European integration, respondents were presented with a seven-point scale, with the extremes defined as 'European integration has already gone much too far' v. 'there soon should be a common European government'. On this continuum respondents were first asked to identify the positions of four parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and Greens), and then their own position. Figure 1 shows our sample on average (3.5) somewhat to the anti-integration side of the mid-point of this scale (4.0). The Greens are perceived exactly in the middle, and the other three parties as being more positive toward integration. The CDU/CSU tops the list. At an average of 5.6 it is perceived more than two scale points away from the average respondent in the direction of the speedier introduction of a common European government. While East Germans are more opposed to this idea than West Germans, they regard the CDU/CSU as even more pro-integration. Thus, the distance between the average respondent and the mean perceived position of the CDU/CSU in the 'new' Länder amounts to almost three scale points.

A sizeable difference can be discerned between Republikaner and PDS voters and those with 'other' responses to the voting question, on the one hand, and voters of the three established and Green parties, on the other hand. Most open to the idea of a European government are FDP voters, followed, in that order, by those of the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the Greens, but all of these four groups are relatively close together in their views. Sympathizers of the Republican Party express by far the strongest objections. On average, they deviate from the extreme position on the scale, that European integration 'has already gone much too far', by less than 1.5 points. Perceptions of the positions taken by the four parties are rather uniform among most partisan groups. Only Republikaner voters deviate, again, as they assess all four as most pro-integration. These voters are themselves most opposed to a European government, but at the same time believe most strongly that the other parties are in favour of such a design.




Figure 1: Attitudes Towards Political Integration and Perceived Positions of Parties

This finding of in many cases considerable distances between the attitudes of the respondents toward a European government and the perceived positions of most parties is further differentiated in Table 1. That the parties are on average clearly perceived to be more pro-integration than the respondents themselves implies that many of them must perceive *all* four parties as distant from themselves in the *same* direction on the continuum. Therefore, Table 1 reports the percentages of respondents who perceive *all* these parties to be *less* or *more* pro-integration than they themselves are. In addition, for the second group this table also contains average distances between respondents' own positions and those perceived for these four parties.

The first row of Table 1 indicates that those who, in comparison to their own attitude, view all four parties not to be pro-integration enough, are a tiny minority (about 6 per cent). By contrast, the opposite group of those who see all four parties, compared to their own position, as willing to go too fast amounts to 42 per cent, even 46 per cent in the 'new' Länder. The differences between supporters of different parties are enormous. Less than one-third of coalition voters fall into this second group. Among SPD and Green voters it is just below 40, and among PDS voters and 'others' slightly less than 50 per cent. Not surprisingly, however, 72 per cent of Republikaner voters exhibit this attitude pattern.

Table 1: Percentages of Respondents with Complete Answers who Perceive Four Parties to Deviate from their Own Position on Political Unification in the Same Direction

	<i>Voting preference</i>									
	<i>Total</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>CDU/ CSU</i>	<i>SPD</i>	<i>FDP</i>	<i>GRU/ B90</i>	<i>REP</i>	<i>PDS</i>	<i>Other resp.</i>
% more strongly in favour of common government than all four parties	6.1	6.7	3.9	4.1	8.5	7.6	6.8	3.6	4.0	5.4
% more strongly opposed to common government than all four parties	41.7	40.6	46.3	33.0	38.8	28.8	39.4	72.0	46.5	48.1
Average distance between respondents in second group and the parties	3.1	3.0	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.8	3.8	3.2	3.3
Number of cases	2089	1046	1043	403	562	99	168	97	103	657

Question: 'Should European unification be pushed ahead so that there soon will be a common European government, or has European unification already gone much too far in your opinion?' (Analogous questions for perceived positions of four parties: CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Greens; presentation of a seven-point scale from 1='European unification has already gone much too far' to 7='there soon should be a common European government'.)

The GRU/B90 category combines voters of the Green Party and the East German 'Bündnis 90', who have since joined into a single party.

All figures in this and all following tables (except East-West comparisons) are weighted by the share of both parts of the country among the population 18 years of age and older.

The last row in Table 1 indicates how strong this disagreement with the parties is within our second group. Maximum disagreement amounts to six scale points; it would occur when a respondent places himself at the extreme (anti) point of 1 on our scale, and perceives all four parties at the opposite extreme (7). For the nearly 42 per cent of Germans who regard all four parties as more pro-integration than themselves, this difference of opinion has quite a considerable dimension. On average, this distance is 3.1 scale points, 3.3 in East Germany. Differentiation according to party preference corroborates the strong polarization just described. Among supporters of the coalition parties, the SPD and the Greens, perceptions that all these parties are too much in favour of a European government are not only encountered considerably less frequently, but even if such a pattern of attitudes occurs, the intensity of disagreement with the parties is lowest (less than three points). Among PDS voters and 'others' this pattern is somewhat more frequent, and more intense once it occurs. Sympathizers of the Republikaner Party stand out as the extreme case: not only is this pattern of attitudes very

commonly held, the average distance of opinion to the other parties also amounts to almost four points on our scale. Republikaner voters (somewhat less than 5 per cent of the sample) vehemently oppose further political integration of Europe and do not see their views represented by the other parties.

### 5. Attitudes Towards European Security Co-operation and the German Role in Europe

In addition to the questions analysed so far, our survey also examined attitudes about a common European army (see also Manigart and Marlier, 1993) and the role that Germany should play in Europe. Although the respondents, as we have seen, are for the greater part not enthusiastic about further European *political* integration, the statement, 'A united Europe needs a common army' receives substantial approval (Table 2). In total over 54 per cent agree with this statement (almost one quarter agree 'completely'), and only 27 per cent disagree. In the 'new' Länder agreement is slightly lower than in the West. When distinguishing by party preference, supporters of the Greens and the PDS turn out to be the strongest opponents of a European army. Among them, objection outweighs agreement, although not very strongly; with approximately 45 per cent of responses it fails to meet an absolute majority. Among SPD voters and persons with 'other' responses to partisan support, agreement is just a little below the overall average. Voters of the FDP and the Republikaner (with about 57 per cent each) agree above average. Thus, sympathizers of the Republikaner show here a contradictory view to their opinions about European political integration. To the latter they are most fiercely opposed, but they are quite in favour of a common

Table 2: Attitudes Towards a Common European Army

% agreement	Voting preference										
	Total	West	East	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	GRU/ B90	REP	PDS	Other resp.	
Not at all	14.8	13.8	19.3	7.2	16.4	7.6	24.8	13.9	31.7	16.5	
Rather disagree	12.5	12.4	12.5	6.6	13.1	12.2	22.3	2.2	12.9	15.6	
Partially agree/disagree	18.2	18.5	17.3	15.4	18.3	23.7	17.5	26.9	24.8	17.6	
Rather agree	30.4	30.0	32.3	37.0	30.5	29.4	22.4	33.2	19.8	27.9	
Completely	24.0	25.3	18.7	33.8	21.7	27.1	13.0	23.9	10.9	22.4	
% don't know, no answer	6.4	6.3	7.0	2.5	3.4	1.2	4.1	3.9	1.9	14.2	

Question: 'On this list are some further statements and opinions. Please tell me for each statement on a scale of -2 to +2, how much you personally agree or disagree. ... A unified Europe needs a common army'.

Table 3: Attitudes Towards a German Leadership Role in Europe

% agreement	Voting preference									
	Total	West	East	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	GRU/ B90	REP	PDS	Other resp.
Not at all	25.1	20.7	43.5	16.0	26.2	27.3	37.3	16.1	74.5	25.5
Most likely not	18.1	18.1	18.1	15.9	18.1	18.6	23.8	14.6	9.8	19.3
Perhaps yes/perhaps no	27.7	29.8	19.0	28.2	25.8	30.1	22.4	28.0	10.8	31.4
Most likely yes	19.9	21.8	12.2	26.5	20.7	14.9	12.5	21.6	3.9	17.9
Completely	9.2	9.7	7.2	13.4	9.3	9.1	4.0	19.6	1.0	6.0
% don't know, no answer	3.8	3.9	3.4	1.2	2.2	4.2	2.2	1.4	1.0	8.2

Question: 'On this list are some further statements and opinions. Please tell me for each statement on a scale of -2 to +2, how much you personally agree or disagree. ... United Germany has the right to play the leading role in Europe'.

European army. Finally, the adherents of the CDU/CSU are (at over 70 per cent agreement) most supportive.

Regarding a German claim to a strong leadership role in Europe, respondents were much more hesitant. Forty-three per cent do not agree with the statement that 'Unified Germany has the right to play the leading role in Europe', one-quarter agree 'not at all' (Table 3). In contrast, 29 per cent of respondents agree (only 9 per cent 'completely'). With a rejection rate of 62, and 19 per cent agreement, scepticism is noticeably higher in East than in West Germany. The strongest objection comes from PDS voters. Eighty-five per cent of them do not agree with our statement, 75 per cent agree 'not at all'. With 61 per cent rejection, opposition from Green Party voters is also strong. Voters of the SPD and FDP (and those classified as 'others') correspond closely to the total average. Only among sympathizers of the CDU/CSU and the Republikaner can a (relative) majority in favour of a German leadership role in Europe be found – about 40 per cent each agree with our statement, less than one-third do not. Nevertheless, views of European politics differ widely between these two partisan groups because the agreement of the Republikaner voters does *not* extend to further political integration. With some simplification one can summarize that their 'vision' is not a politically, but a militarily unified Europe, in which Germany would set the tone.

## 6. Typology of Attitude Patterns Towards European Integration

In the distributions of opinions analysed so far it appears that there are characteristic combinations of individual attitudes. What such types of attitude patterns look like, and how they are distributed in the population, will now be investigated



in more detail. We will rely here on the method of cluster analysis – a useful technique which groups together respondents into a given number of clusters using their values on specified variables, so that the distances between cluster averages are maximized and, on the other hand, distances of individual respondents from the respective group average are minimized (see Lorr, 1983).

Three of the individual items previously summarized will be used for clustering, i.e. evaluation of the EU, position *vis-à-vis* European political integration, and agreement to the idea of a common European army. The reason is that these three questions gauge three main dimensions of European integration. Since the dominant focus of the EU has been on economic integration, and the completion of the Single European Market has been hailed as decisive progress, it can be assumed that evaluations of the EU predominantly mirror assessments of economic integration. Positions on the continuum from ‘common government’ to ‘European integration has already gone too far’ clearly reflect attitudes toward further political and institutional integration. Finally, the question for agreement with a European army undoubtedly taps the dimension of integration in the field of military security.<sup>1</sup>

The number of clusters to be extracted is set at eight, since we are dealing with three separate dimensions of opinions. If one assumes that discrete patterns of attitudes come about because respondents on each scale have either high or low values, with three dimensions there will be eight separate types of opinions. One can imagine this as a cube, where each corner corresponds to a different type of opinion. Every cluster is characterized by the average of its respondents on the economic, political and military integration dimensions (see Table 4 and Figure 2). These averages yield the co-ordinates of each attitude pattern in a three-dimensional policy space. The variance of individual opinions on our three integration dimensions is accounted for very well by membership in these eight clusters: 67 per cent for attitudes toward economic and 72 per cent each for opinions about political and military integration.

These eight patterns can be characterized as follows: the first three (about 15 per cent) are largely in opposition to European integration. Respondents of the first type rate distinctly below average on all three dimensions. This 8 per cent segment of the sample represents the ‘core’ of rejection of European integration. Members of the second cluster (5 per cent) are very opposed to economic integration, and also object to a European government, however, they are quite favourable toward military integration. The third cluster (only 2 per cent) exhibits a highly inconsistent combination of views; its members evaluate

<sup>1</sup>The main difference between our typology and that of Weidenfeld and Piepenschneider (1990) is that theirs is one-dimensional, whereas ours is multi-dimensional. In their study respondents are grouped into five classes of intensity of ‘pro-Europeanism’, according to support for unification, regret if the EU would fail, and self-identification as ‘Europeans’. Different functional areas of integration do not enter into this typology.

Table 4: Average Evaluations of the EU and Attitudes Towards Political and Military Integration by Type of Attitude (Cluster Analysis)

	<i>Evaluation of the EU</i>	<i>Speed of political integration</i>	<i>European army</i>	<i>Importance of political integration</i>	<i>% Europe reason for vote</i>
Total average	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.4	5.4
Attitude type 1	2.2	1.5	1.7	3.3	3.2
Attitude type 2	1.5	2.1	4.2	3.4	2.1
Attitude type 3	2.2	5.3	1.6	3.3	4.0
Attitude type 4	4.0	2.7	1.5	3.2	0.1
Attitude type 5	3.3	4.0	3.7	3.3	4.9
Attitude type 6	4.1	2.0	4.1	3.4	4.1
Attitude type 7	4.2	5.6	1.4	3.5	7.3
Attitude type 8	4.6	5.5	4.3	3.7	10.6
Attitude types 1-3	2.0	2.2	2.6	3.3	2.9
Attitude types 4-6	3.8	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.7
Attitude types 7-8	4.6	5.5	3.9	3.7	10.1

Type 1: Against all three dimensions of integration

Type 2: Against economic and political, in favour of military integration

Type 3: Against economic and military, in favour of political integration

Type 4: Against political and military, in favour of economic integration

Type 5: In favour of political and military, against economic integration

Type 6: In favour of economic and military, against political integration

Type 7: In favour of economic and political, against military integration

Type 8: In favour of all three dimensions of integration

**Questions:**

*Evaluation of the EU:* 'Here is a list of some international organizations and institutions. Please tell me for each one what your opinion of it is – or whether you have never heard or read anything about it. Please just tell me the number.' (List: UNO, WEU, NATO, EU and CSCE, both with abbreviation and full name; 1='very negative', 2='somewhat negative', 3='partially negative/partially positive', 4='somewhat positive', 5='very positive').

*Speed of political integration:* See Table 1.

*European army:* See Table 2.

*Importance of political integration:* 'And how important is this topic for you personally?' (This question followed the item cited in the note to Table 1; 1='completely unimportant', 2='not that important', 3='medium importance', 4='important', 5='very important'.)

*Europe reason for vote:* 'On this list are a few topics that are at issue in elections. When you vote for a party, which of the issues on this list is foremost on your mind – or does none of them play an important role in your decision?' ... 'Could you please tell me what is second most important in determining your vote?' (List: environmental protection, foreign policy, economic growth and high standard of living, law and order, protection from military threat, social security, European integration, full employment.)




Figure 2: Types of Attitudes Towards European Integration

economic and military integration very negatively, but they support the rapid introduction of a European government.

Within attitude patterns four to six (with 56 per cent more than half of our sample) there are no larger deviations from the total averages. These respondents can be described as rather 'middle of the road'. Members of the fourth cluster (13 per cent) evaluate economic integration slightly above average, but they object to political and especially to military integration. The fifth group (21 per cent) comprises those who are favourable below average *vis-à-vis* economic integration, but somewhat above average regarding the political and military dimensions. The second most frequent type of opinions (23 per cent) is found in cluster 6. These people view economic and military integration more positively than average, however, they are less open to the idea of a European government.

Attitude patterns seven and eight are two sorts of supporters of European integration (28 per cent). They differ mainly in their positions toward a joint military establishment. Members of both clusters are most favourable regarding economic and political integration. But while those of cluster 7 (with only 4 per cent this is the second smallest group) object strongly to military integration, those of group 8 (with 24 per cent the most frequent type) lie clearly above average on *all three* dimensions.

The subgroups identified here do not only diverge on the three dimensions used for clustering. They also differ considerably in the importance they assign to European integration. In the last two columns of Table 4, average personal

Table 5: Distribution of Types of Attitudes Towards European Integration (Cluster Analysis)

Per cent	Voting preference									
	Total	West	East	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	GRU/ B90	REP	PDS	Other resp.
Attitude type 1	7.9	7.6	8.7	2.8	6.6	7.5	11.5	18.7	20.4	8.9
Attitude type 2	5.4	5.7	3.7	5.8	1.8	3.8	3.6	18.4	2.9	6.9
Attitude type 3	1.9	2.1	1.2	1.1	2.9	0.0	5.3	0.0	2.9	1.3
Attitude type 4	12.7	11.7	17.2	7.1	15.1	8.7	18.6	2.8	19.4	14.8
Attitude type 5	21.1	21.7	18.6	21.5	21.0	22.5	12.2	12.0	20.4	24.7
Attitude type 6	22.6	21.1	28.9	22.1	21.4	14.0	16.5	32.2	17.5	25.6
Attitude type 7	4.2	4.5	3.2	3.4	4.2	3.8	10.8	0.0	2.9	4.0
Attitude type 8	24.2	25.5	18.5	36.1	26.9	39.7	21.4	15.9	13.6	13.8
Attitude types 1-3	15.1	15.5	13.7	9.7	11.3	11.3	20.4	37.1	26.2	17.1
Attitude types 4-6	56.4	54.5	64.6	50.7	57.6	45.2	47.3	47.0	57.3	65.1
Attitude types 7-8	28.4	30.0	21.7	39.6	31.1	43.5	32.3	5.9	16.5	17.8

Attitude types as in Table 4.

importance of the speed of political integration and the share of those who state European integration as a reason for their voting decision are reported. Only in the clusters designated here as supporters (7-8) can above average salience of the theme be observed. Clusters 1-3, classified as opponents, differ only little in their personal salience rating from the indifferent types (groups 4-6).

In Table 5 the collective distribution of our eight types of opinions is further differentiated, as in earlier tables, between East and West Germany and by party preference. In the East both those opposed to integration (groups 1-3) and supporters (groups 7-8) are considerably less, and the indifferent groups (4-6) are more frequent than in the West (65 v. 55 per cent). According to party preference, Republikaner voters lead the opposition. Among adherents of the PDS there are just as few supporters, but more moderates, so that opposition is less common than for Republikaner voters. Still, only among voters of these two parties does rejection exceed consent. In the group of respondents with 'other' answers as to voting intentions, almost two-thirds hold moderate positions; the remainder are evenly split. Among sympathizers of the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and the Greens, positive attitudes clearly outnumber negative ones. The most positive balance of attitudes toward integration is found within the constituency

of the CDU/CSU and FDP. Approval there is nearly four times as frequent as rejection.

If one inspects the distribution of the eight separate attitude patterns by voting preference, SPD voters come closest to the general average. Among CDU/CSU and FDP voters the high share of cluster 8 (support on all three dimensions) is most conspicuous. Supporters of the Green Party exhibit a far below average percentage of type 5 opinions (opposed to economic, but in favour of political and military integration), and a clearly above average share of type 7 respondents (for economic and political, but against military integration). The distribution of opinion types among Republikaner sympathizers deviates most strongly from the average. Measured against it, types 4, 5 and 8 appear much too seldom, types one, two and six much too often. This reflects the dominance of views within this group which combine rejection of political and economic with support for military co-operation. In the case of the voters of the PDS, both extreme clusters 1 and 8 diverge widely from the overall distribution. Support on all three dimensions is by over 10 percentage points below, and universal rejection is 12 percentage points above average.

Figure 3 elaborates the strong differences of opinion about political integration between the three combined groups. We have seen (Table 1) that a much




Figure 3: Opinions about Political Integration by Types of Attitude

higher share of the sample opposes a European government more strongly than they perceive all three 'old' parties and the Greens to do, than endorse it more strongly than all these parties (42 v. 6 per cent). However, outright dramatic differences exist in this regard between the three groups of opinion clusters. Among the most anti-integration respondents (clusters 1-3), almost two-thirds perceive all these four parties to be more open to a European government than they themselves are. Among the moderates (types 4-6) this still stands at over 45 per cent. Those supportive of integration (clusters 7-8) exhibit this pattern far less frequently (about 10 per cent), while the opposite view, that all four parties – measured against one's own position – are *too little* inclined toward a European government, is held even more often. This is further underscored by the distances from these parties. The almost two-thirds of those opposed to integration who exhibit this pattern deviate on average by 3.7 points on our seven-point scale from the four parties. Among the few supporters of integration with this pattern average distance to these parties' attributed positions amounts to only 1.7 scale points. For the indifferent respondents this is exactly three points. Thus, both in the share of such patterns as well as their intensity they are more similar to the anti- than to the pro-integrationists. This could suggest an important conclusion, i.e. that transition from indifference to rejection might be easier and more likely than transition from indifference to support.

## 7. Conclusions

This inventory of attitudes in Germany toward European integration in the middle of 1992 provides some important insights. First, it has been established that differentiation by dimensions of integration is indispensable. The EU, with its focus on economic responsibilities is viewed rather positively, and Germans also appear quite supportive of military co-operation. When integration is restricted to the functional areas of economics and military security, our data yield no serious problems with popular acceptance. This is different, however, with political union. Greatly simplified, there is a majority who say 'yes' to a European economic and security community, but 'no' to a common political decision-making structure.

Most of these attitudes are strongly polarized by party preference, and in East Germany they are as a rule still more sceptical than in the West. Supporters of the 'old' parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP) almost always are most supportive of integration. However, their share of the electorate has been decreasing now for years through a decline in voter turnout and gains by other parties. Since a reversal of this trend does not appear to be likely in the foreseeable future, a rise in sceptical types of attitudes toward European integration can be expected.

Our typology of attitudes according to three dimensions shows that pro-integration patterns are considerably more frequent than clear-cut opposition. However, the share of unmistakable supporters is only half as large as those with relatively indifferent attitudes and low personal salience of the topic. This latter group makes up well over half of our sample. These respondents could move both ways, but from the relative similarity of the various attitude patterns a shift from indifference to opposition would seem more likely than in the opposite direction.

Regarding public acceptance of further European integration, the key follow-up question arising from our results is, why do so many Germans have few problems with regulating economic and security policy at the European level, but at the same time are sceptical about common governmental structures? This question can only be posed. Attempting an answer would go far beyond the scope of this contribution.

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