CALCULATED COMPETITORS OR IDEOLOGICAL BEDFELLOWS? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY (NPD) AND DIE LINKE IN THE SAXON STATE PARLIAMENT DURING THE 5TH LEGISLATIVE PERIOD, 2009-2014

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Abstract

The institutional literature about party families contends that far right and far left political actors occupy opposite poles in the standard left/right dimension. However, recent demand-side studies about the influence of globalization have challenged this assumption due to the ongoing dealignment of traditional cleavages at the voter level that were highly salient for determining political conflict in Western European party systems. More recently, supply-side analyses of populism suggest that, in an attempt to appeal to similar segments of the electorate, far right and far left actors might share more commonalities than their disparate ideologies would indicate. Research about niche parties also suggests the potential for similarities. Often treated as unitary actors, the far right and far left are believed to behave differently than their mainstream competitors. However, these claims have not yet been substantiated in a comparative analysis with systematic measurements. The present work contributes to the secondary literature by taking a comparative supply side approach that examines party policies from the far left Die Linke, and the extreme right *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NPD) during the 5th legislative period in the Saxon State Parliament. The analysis introduces an innovative theoretical framework that is grounded in existing models of party competition. It assumes that political competition occurs in multiple dimensions of competition and parties must weigh the prospective costs and benefits of their available strategies. As niche parties, the NPD and Die Linke share ideological features and issue ownership reputations that restrict their behavior and produce policy overlaps in some dimensions. At the same time, it is these limitations that ultimately contribute to policy differences in others. A content analysis using hand-coding is performed on a new data source for measuring party policies: legislative motions for the agenda (Anträge). In this data source, positions, issue salience and rhetoric are measured in six dimensions of political competition that enhance the descriptive value of the study. The findings largely confirm the theoretical assumptions. The NPD and Die Linke select a strategy of product differentiation in their core dimensions of political competition. For issues in these areas, the parties' policies are uniquely dissimilar. One exception was in the socio-economic dimensions where the NPD and Die Linke shared overlapping left positions. This result is a significant empirical finding and further demonstrates the proletarization of the far right. In contrast, the NPD and Die Linke proposed similar policies in their peripheral dimensions of competition. Here, they are able to adapt their policies to the preferences of a larger set of voters without incurring high costs at the polls. Based on the findings, the study subscribes to recent analyses in the secondary literature, which argue that the traditional understanding of the left-right heuristic has become increasingly less able to describe political actors in Western European party systems. However, the niche label should not overlook fundamental differences between the NPD and Die Linke. Despite the similarities that emerged in their positions, salience and rhetoric, the NPD and Die Linke remain distinctive political actors. This fact is reflected in the nuances that distinguish their respective policy proposals.

Key words: Radical parties, political competition, niche actors, legislative behavior, Saxony

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List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany
ALLBUS	German General Survey Society
AUTNES	Austrian National Election Study
BVP	Bayerische Volkspartei
CAP	Comparative Agendas Project
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DKP	German Communist Party
EMU	European Monetary Union
EU	European Union
FDP	Freedom Democratic Party of Germany
FN	National Front
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GLES	German Longitudinal Election Study
KPD	Communist Party of Germany
LGBTQA	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Questioning and Allied
MLPD	Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPD	Nationa Democratic Party Germany
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers Party
PCF	French Communist Party
PdL	The People of Freedom
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
PEGIDA	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West
SED	East German Socialist Unity Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SRP	Socialist Reichs Party of Germany
SYRIZA	The Coalition of the Radical Left
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
WASG	Labor and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative

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B.R.
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1. Introduction

In October 2016, Sahra Wagenknecht, the opposition leader for the far left Die Linke, and Frauke Petry, the chairwoman of the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD), agreed to meet and be interviewed together for an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung*. Although both women are no strangers to giving interviews and making the rounds on political talkshows, they rarely share the same stage. Therefore, the interview was remarkable, because Petry and Wagenknecht assented to be questioned together. Similar to the mainstream parties in Germany, Die Linke refuses to treat its far right counterpart as a legitimate political actor. If the parties do acknowledge each other at all, the AfD and Die Linke are often outwardly hostile towards each other in the media, during legislative settings and on the streets. Hence, a combined interview with Petry and Wagenknecht broke a major taboo for both parties (Greven, 2016). However, the interview was foremost significant because, when asked specific policy questions, the answers revealed striking similarities between the far right AfD and the far left Die Linke. Of course, notable differences remained. Wagenknecht clearly distanced her party from the AfD's nationalism and there were obvious disparities in their views about tax policy. When asked if their parties were prepared to form a coalition together, Petry and Wagenknecht immediately balked at the idea. On other policy issues though, the leaders from the AfD and Die Linke displayed some common preferences. Both parties expressed skepticism about Angela Merkel's refugee policy and the European Union (EU). On socio-economic issues, Petry and Wagenknecht rejected the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) free trade agreements, as well as a potential government bailout for one of Germany's largest financial institutions, the Deutsche Bank. After the interview, Wagenknecht attempted to further clarify her shared positions with Petry, in order to avoid the appearance that she was in agreement with her right-wing counterpart.

Research Questions

Despite all attempts by Sahra Wagenknecht to justify her positions afterwards, the interview cited above provokes a series of larger questions about potential commonalities between far right and far left actors in Germany, and in contemporary party systems more generally. Reflecting on recent elections in the United States and Europe, Jan-Werner Müller (2016: 1-2) noted the tendency for widespread conflation of the right and left, especially in regards to populism. During the course of their campaigns, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders were both

classified as populists. In Europe, similar parallels have been drawn between Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders on the right to SYRIZA and PODEMOS on the left. In response to such sweeping political judgments, Müller poses an important question: how much do these seemingly disparate actors actually have in common? Thus, the current study seeks to address the following research questions: how do far right and far left actors behave in multi-dimensional competition where they face structural constraints on their ability to maneuver strategically in political space? To what extent do they develop overlapping policies? Why do such similarities occur?

The research addresses these questions with an in-depth case study that comparatively analyzes the policy proposals from the far right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and the far left Die Linke in the Saxon State Parliament during the 5th legislative period (2009-2014). The selected timeframe and setting provide a shared policy space that are ideal for studying overlaps and differences between radical political actors. The NPD and Die Linke were each represented in the Saxon State Parliament throughout the duration of the 5th legislative period. As a result, the empirical research design is strengthened by multiple factors that can be held constant. The parties responded to the same government policies and current events, were relegated to the opposition and subjected to a similar set of institutional rules in the legislature.

Despite the obvious limitations inherent in a case study, the research's decision to *directly* compare a far right and far left actor represents a significant contribution to the descriptive and explanatory knowledge of radical party behavior in Western Europe. At the European level, researchers and policy-makers alike often struggle to comparatively address the history of far right and far left political movements (Gliszczynska-Grabias, 2016). This dilemma is much more acute in Germany due to the country's unique experiences with political extremism. For example, many authors intentionally avoid direct comparisons (Kowalsky and Schroeder, 1994; Neugebauer, 2000; Decker and Brähler, 2006). In these instances, there is a pervading concern that the characteristics which are common to right-wing parties, such as racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, will be relativized when radical actors are examined together. As a result, comparative assessments are simply neglected.

Where supply-side analyses do exist, the extant literature is limited to normative comparisons of the far left and far right. Thus, the research is primarily characterized by speculative claims rather than a rigorous empirical approach. The underdeveloped state of comparative analyses in the secondary literature can be attributed to the perceived danger of radical parties. Especially in research about far right actors, there is often little new knowledge

or insights, but rather emotional and normative viewpoints (Mudde, 1996: 226). Again, Germany serves as an obvious example. In general, the research centers on the extremism theory (Backes, 1989) and does not include empirical evidence to support proposed claims (Everts, 2000; Bergsdorf, 2002; 2006; Hartleb, 2004). For example, Eckhard Jesse contrasted the NPD and Die Linke in his 2010 analysis by measuring extremism with indicators such as ideology, strategy and organization. Ultimately, Jesse concluded that the NPD and Die Linke are quite similar, although the former is slightly more extreme in his view. However, his analysis is supported by selected quotes that do not adhere to a valid and reliable methodology as far as sample selection and analysis is concerned. Consequently, more research is required, and the empirical foundation needs to be broadened. Comparative studies of this topic should also be informed by the wider theoretical and international debate rather than focusing on the peculiarities of the German historical development.

The current study undertakes these endeavors by analyzing supply-side strategies within the context of party competition. To be sure, the research does not attempt to establish a model that *perfectly* predicts policy overlaps between far right and far left parties. In fact, it does not suppose that there are any parsimonious answers available. As the subsequent chapters demonstrate, policy overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke are almost always accompanied by observable nuances particular to each actor. However, by directly and systematically comparing the policies proposed by the NPD and Die Linke, the research can more effectively determine where policy similarities are likely to occur. This is an important contribution that informs the extant scholarship about radical parties and enhances discussions about democracy in Western European political systems.

The Societal and Theoretical Relevance of the Research

The societal relevance of most studies about radical actors is related to questions concerning social and political stability in democratic countries. In recent decades, the precipitous rise of far right and far left parties in Western Europe has demanded much public and academic attention. Speaking solely about the populist radical right, Mudde (2013) also noted that these actors alone constitute the most successful party family type in postwar Western Europe. To be sure, radical left parties have also experienced improving political fortunes throughout Western Europe (Escalona and Vieira, 2013; March, 2016). The radical left is now more relevant in Europe than at any other time since the late 1980s (Keith and March, 2016). March and Rommerskirchen (2015) calculated that the average support for far left parties was only slightly less than that for those on the far right in Europe from 2000-2011. In light of these

gains, the focus and objectivity of research about radical actors has the potential to be very limited. Indeed, Bale (2012: 257) has observed that many studies about the far right, for example, are driven by a normative, partisan or ideological agenda. Particularly in Germany, there has always been some understandable concern. Thus, for the far right, especially, there is a disproportionate amount of attention devoted to these parties, but often minimal effort to objectively understand them (Mudde, 2013: 5).

However, even if the quality of studies that concern radical actors comes into question, it still remains that these parties are public actors that possess the ability to shape popular attitudes about democracy and various social groups. For example, far right parties have gained representation in most parliaments and even participated in governing coalitions (De Lange, 2012). Between 1990 and 2015, 17 coalition governments included or were supported by radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (Akkerman et al., 2016: 1). Indeed, a growing body of literature exists that is devoted to the impact of radical party influence. This not only pertains to effects on mainstream political actors and government policy (Williams, 2006; Bale et al., 2010; Han, 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016), but also radical party impact on public opinion (Semyonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2007; Dunn and Singh, 2011; Sprague-Jones, 2011; Just, 2015). Bale (2012: 257) wryly notes that there is a common motivation for examining radical parties, namely the potential that large numbers of people could be mobilized by their appeals. However, he also acknowledges that understanding how and why radical party appeals are successful is an important step towards curtailing their future success. In this regard, the current study contributes to the existing research by enhancing knowledge about the policies proposed by radical actors.

At the same time, understanding the appeals of radical parties is not only important for preventing instability, but it also gives cause to reflect upon the status quo of society and democracy more generally. In other words, it is imprudent to automatically perceive radical party claims as baseless. Rather, as Canovan (1999: 2) states in her analysis of populism, acknowledging the success of populism in established democracies can facilitate an advanced comprehension of democracy's complexities. Considering the transformative effects of globalization in recent decades, it has become all the more important to take radical party grievances into account. To this point, Peter Mair (2009: 5-6) contends that, for governing representatives, a growing tension exists between responsibility and responsiveness in contemporary democracies. Whereas these functions were once combined more easily, many parties have been forced to downplay their representative roles in an attempt to control difficult processes such as globalization and Europeanization. Mair (2009: 16-17) further argues that

this has resulted in the bifurcation of many European party systems in which there are two sets of actors: parties which claim to represent but do not govern (populist outsiders) and those which govern but no longer represent (mainstream parties). Thus, the research agrees with other observers (Decker 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013) who argue that it is not always certain if radical parties are merely a threat to democratic societies. Instead, they could also function as a useful signal. Although this is not the focus of the research questions, the results of the current analysis provide additional context for understanding "the shadows of democracy" (Canovan, 1999: 3).

In addition to the societal relevance associated with the study, the analysis makes several contributions that are relevant for theoretical discussions across multiple research areas. First, the monograph makes a significant contribution to the study of radical parties in multi-dimensional competition. Historically, the political space has been defined by a single, left-right dimension (Gabel and Huber, 2000). As a result, comparative analyses that examine radical party competition are frequently limited to the next proximal opponent in the traditional left-right spectrum. For example, the far right has challenged conservatives on immigration (Bale, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup; 2008; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008), whereas the radical left competes with the center left on socio-economic issues (Vail, 2009; Ramiro and Gomez, 2016). Some studies have attempted to examine party competition between the far right and the center left (Coffé, 2008; Arzheimer, 2012), as well as the far right and the new left (De Koster et al., 2012), but a direct comparison of the far right and far left has been omitted.

Therefore, the research is innovative, because it not only examines competition between the far right and far left directly, but it does so in several policy dimensions. This approach is a more adequate representation of party competition, which occurs in multiple policy areas (Albright, 2010). For example, in a comparative study indirectly related to the NPD, Bräuninger et al. (2016: 203) noted, that despite the party's nationalist and xenophobic views, it occupied a centrist position on the general left-right continuum. Thus, they recommended a different policy scale that could more accurately measure the parties' positions. The study follows their suggestion and tests for policy overlaps in socio-economic, socio-cultural, environmental and foreign affairs dimensions of party competition. These policy areas not only provide for variance on the study's dependent variable, but they are also developed according to theoretical considerations found in the secondary literature. Ultimately, with a multi-dimensional approach, the research is able to describe and explain radical policy overlaps more effectively than previous analyses in this research field.

Second, the analysis also contributes to legislative studies about far right and far left parties. A review of the secondary literature reveals that there is only one other recent case study about populist parties in the Netherlands that performs a comparative, empirical analysis about radical party behavior (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015). For the most part, previous studies have predominantly focused on the far right (Minkenberg, 2001; Heinisch, 2003; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005; Albertazzi, 2009; Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Batory, 2016) and the far left (Olsen et al., 2010) separately. Consequently, the focus of these analyses is reduced to a limited number of policy issues, such as immigration (Schain, 2006; Duncan, 2010; Van Spanje, 2010; Akkerman, 2012), democracy and populism more generally (Fröhlich-Steffen and Rensmann, 2005).

In contrast, this study directly assesses the behavior of both radical party types during the 5th legislative period in the Saxon State Parliament. Furthermore, the analysis exceeds the narrow policy scope of existing studies and examine a broader set of political conflicts. This approach increases the research's ability to describe the policies that the far right NPD and far left Die Linke propose on a multitude of issues that reflect actual party competition. Additionally, the research enhances the study of radical party behavior in legislative settings by evaluating an alternative form of representative activity: legislative motions for the agenda (Akirav, 2016). In their analysis of voting behavior in the Dutch Parliament, Otjes and Louwerse (2015), provide initial insights, but fail to consider the various contexts that could produce behavioral similarities. Conversely, the current study examines parliamentary Anträge, which are uniquely suited to offer an enhanced perspective about the reasons for preferred policies that are not disclosed in recorded votes. This is not only a significant contribution to the analysis of radical parties, but also legislative studies more broadly.

The research also extends the extant literature devoted to the study of populism. While there already exists a large collection of demand-side analyses that study factors fueling the success of radical parties in Western Europe (Norris, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009; Visser et al., 2014; Ramiro, 2016), much less is known about their rhetorical appeals. Some research has empirically established that both far right and far left parties employ populist and extremist messages more than their mainstream competitors (Ebling et al., 2012; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). However as Zaslove (2008: 331-332) adroitly points out, it nevertheless remains unclear to what extent the far right and far left comparatively mobilize voters with their populist appeals.

In this regard, the current research is unique, because the focus is a comparative analysis of commonalities and differences in populist rhetoric between radical parties. Although

numerous studies exist which suggest various features that characterize far right (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007) and far left populism (March and Mudde, 2005; March, 2007; 2011) in Western European party systems, they are not supported with empirical evidence. In contrast, the current study tests the potential for similar and dissimilar populist rhetoric with empirical data. The results substantiate the normative claims in the secondary literature and confirm that the far right NPD and far left Die Linke also display rhetorical tendencies in accordance with their respective party types.

Finally, the analysis also fills a gap in the literature about niche parties. In initial research, niche parties have been treated as unitary actors. Thus, their behavior has largely been compared and contrasted with mainstream competitors (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008; Jensen and Spoon, 2010; Ezrow et al., 2011; Abou-Chadi, 2016). At the same time though, these studies also contend that niche actors are comprised of various party family types. Nevertheless, due to competing niche party definitions in the secondary literature (Wagner, 2012a), comparative analyses remain underdeveloped (Meguid, 2008). In the event that they do focus on specific party family types that fall under the niche umbrella, these studies are also reduced to comparisons with mainstream opponents or across countries (Spoon, 2009; Alonso, 2012; Basile, 2015; Field and Hamann, 2015). However, as Meyer and Miller (2015: 1) note, "this approach may mask important differences within and across party families."

The present work transcends the scope of these analyses and deemphasizes the supposed singularity of parties that are classified as niche actors. Of course, it does not overlook the importance of the mainstream-niche dichotomy. Indeed, it plays a central role in the explanatory component of the study. The study attempts to answer the main research question with the argument that the NPD's and Die Linke's niche behavior provides similar strategic incentives for both parties. At the same time though, it accounts for the fact that the NPD and Die Linke belong to separate party families. As a result, the parties are confronted with different structural constraints that are ultimately reflected in their strategic attempts to mobilize voters and policy development. Here again, multi-dimensional competition is important, because these barriers, can first be inferred across issue areas.

A Note on Conceptualizing the Far Right and Far Left
A minor, but critical component of the present study, is the terminology applied to the NPD and Die Linke. The investigation of radical political actors has produced a plethora of descriptions for non-centric parties. Cas Mudde (2007: 11-12), identified 26 definitions and 58 different criteria for the far right alone. Although there is more consensus for far left parties,

Keith and March (2016: 5) acknowledge that there are an abundance of terms still in use. Suffice it to say then, the extensive amount of classifications has produced both descriptive redundancy and confusion. There are two characteristics that guide the definition of far right and far left in this study.

First, the current research subscribes to a minimal definition of far right and far left. A minimal definition includes only the core, necessary and sufficient characteristics of a concept (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Sartori (1970) concludes that minimal definitions have several distinct advantages over other conceptual approaches. First, they allow the researcher to make clear and dichotomous distinctions. This benefit is crucial for the theoretical framework. It not only enables the researcher to predict party behavior between the NPD and Die Linke, but also as niche actors in relation to their mainstream competitors. Second, a minimal definition can be detailed enough, but still provide the researcher conceptual flexibility. Although the current research is not a cross-national study, it is possible to understand the profiles of the NPD and Die Linke in the context of larger party families that are prevalent throughout West European political systems.

The NPD and Die Linke are defined as radical parties, because they take non-centrist positions that are to the left/right of their mainstream opponents. Die Linke possesses *radical* aspirations to transform capitalism and adheres to *leftist* principles including equality and internationalism. It is located to the left of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) which, like most social democratic parties, has largely ceased to propose a serious alternative to capitalism (Bailey, 2016: 56). At the center of its ideology, the NPD adheres to a *radical* interpretation of the nation that immediately identifies the party as a *right* actor. A far right party such as the NPD can be distinguished from center right actors because, unlike the patriotism displayed by Christian democratic and even neoconservative parties, radical right parties are generally perceived as nativist (Mudde, 2007: 27-28). Hence, they believe that the nation is comprised of an ethnically homogenous group of natives that excludes nonnative elements.[1]

A second conceptual point concerns the flexible application of terms to describe the NPD and Die Linke. Some authors claim that there are important differences between labels such as "extreme", "radical" and "far", especially on the right (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Camus, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Betz and Johnson, 2004). In Germany, where organizations that

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[1] For a more detailed description of the ideological differences between center right and radical right parties, as well as a deeper understanding of nativism, see Chapter 1 in Mudde (2007).

threaten the free democratic order are closely monitored, such distinctions determine if a party ought to be constitutionally prohibited. However, the current study is not interested in the measurement of democratic attitudes. Rather, it assumes that the concepts mentioned above are interchangeable, because they share a common, proximal assumption: each term characterizes an actor who possesses a non-centric ideology that is spatially positioned beyond the political mainstream according to the traditional left-right scale. The national context of the analysis also supports a flexible conceptualization. Establishing a definition in cross-national studies can produce problems related to relativity, because they must account for diverse party systems (Mudde, 2007: 25). In contrast, the research presented here performs a comparative case study of actors situated in a shared political culture and a shared ideological space. In relation to their mainstream counterparts in Germany, the parties are categorized with multiple, equivalent descriptions.

The Structure of the Study

The societal and theoretical contributions described earlier are made in several steps, which also serve as the organizing principle for the remaining chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 explores commonalities between the far right and far left in German history. This section is not intended to be an exhaustive historical account. Rather, it is designed to provide some initial background which suggests that overlapping behavior exhibited by the far right and far left in Germany is not without precedent. More specifically, evidence of direct competition between the extreme left Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Adolf Hitler's extreme right National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) is presented. However, before commencing with this endeavor, a description of the German working class is provided, which was a key electorate that both the KPD and NSDAP contested during the latter years of the Weimar Era. In the next section then, the parties' strategic attempts to appeal to the working classes are examined more closely. In particular, the analysis focuses on several examples of policy and rhetorical overlap. It finds that, while the KPD and NSDAP demonstrate similarities, the parties' strategic motivations were frequently constrained by ideological resistance. In the conclusion, the implications of these historical parallels for contemporary party competition between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke are discussed. Similar to their historical predecessors, the NPD and Die Linke are also confronted with structural constraints, such as ideology and issue ownership reputations, which influence their ability to develop policies in multi-dimensional party competition.

Chapter 3 fast-forwards to the present and introduces the main theoretical argument that is intended to answer the proposed research questions. Before establishing the model though, the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of the German extremism theory are first highlighted. Having identified these weaknesses, the chapter begins to outline an alternative explanatory model of strategic policy similarities within the context of multi-dimensional party competition. The framework begins with an analysis of goals as an incentive for party behavior. As primarily vote-seeking parties, the NPD and Die Linke possess a combination of policy tools for the purpose of mobilizing supporters, such as position-taking, emphasis and rhetoric. In the next part though, the structural constraints inherent to niche parties that inform policy decision-making in various issue areas are addressed. Due to their non-centric ideologies and limited issue ownership reputations, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to behave differently in the various dimensions of political competition. In their pre-identified core dimensions, where the parties face sunk costs, they should opt for strategies of product differentiation in their policies. In peripheral dimensions, however, the parties do not encounter the same limitations and are more likely to express policy overlaps. Finally, the chapter deduces a series of observable implications that are later tested empirically in Chapters 6-8.

Chapter 4 provides the demand-side context for the overall research project. The first section presents arguments from the secondary literature about the potential for the NPD's and Die Linke's electorates to contain a disproportionate amount of globalization losers. In the next step, the main observable implication for the chapter is deduced for testing purposes. A methods section explaining the indicators for the losers of globalization theory with questions from the *Politbarometer* voter survey is then introduced. Thereafter, a thorough analysis describing the outcomes is presented along with interviews from party representatives about their respective electorates. Finally, in the discussion, the findings are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about the importance of the results in relation to the expected party behavior described in the upcoming chapters.

The voter data are significant, because they indicate that the NPD and Die Linke share a common electorate. Individuals who experience subjective relative deprivation and maintain a vulnerable occupation status, such as the unemployed, manual workers and unskilled and semi-skilled employees, are more likely than other members of the electorate to cast a vote for either the NPD or Die Linke. Hence, the demand-side information suggest that both parties have electoral incentives to develop policies that could appeal to this group of voters. For its' part, the NPD does not disguise the fact that it often targets East German voters who have traditionally supported Die Linke, even though it failed to establish a voting base in the former

German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the years immediately following reunification (Botsch and Kopke, 2013). In the empirical chapters that follow, the study tests for the existence of policy overlaps in the form of positions, issue salience and rhetoric.

Chapter 5 presents the methodological design that is applied in the supply-side components of the study. In the first part of the chapter, the case selection, including justifications for the parties, period of analysis and legislative setting are explained. The following section identifies the advantages and disadvantages of performing a content analysis vis-à-vis alternative methodological approaches. This component is essential for the next part, which establishes why parliamentary Anträge are an ideal data source for a comparative analysis about radical party policies. The decision to use Anträge in the study and the selection of the sample size is supported by interviews with party representatives. Lastly, the concluding section introduces the political dimensions with additive scales in which positions, salience and rhetoric will be evaluated in the empirical chapters.

Chapter 6 commences the empirical phase of the research. It first looks at the most common measurement of political policies, namely party positions. After reviewing the proposed observable implications from Chapter 3, the measurement of party positions as an endogenous unit of analysis are outlined. The methods section is followed by a complete analysis of the similar and dissimilar policy positions from the NPD and Die Linke in each issue dimension. To provide more context about the empirical data, interviews with various party representatives from the NPD and Die Linke in the Saxon State Parliament are cited.

The results yield initial insights about radical party similarities and differences that are expanded upon in the next chapters. In accordance with the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 3, the parties demonstrate similar positions in their shared peripheral dimensions of competition, namely environmental protection and foreign affairs. Unlike core policy areas, the issues contained in peripheral dimensions do not play an important role in the parties' ideologies and issue ownership reputations. Thus, the parties do not face prohibitive costs at the polls if they fail to propose distinguishable positions. In core dimensions, the theory predicts that the parties opt for product differentiation, which produces disparate positions. Evidence for this is found in the socio-cultural dimensions where the NPD must distinguish itself from competitors on issues including immigration, multiculturalism and law and order. However, contrary to the observable implication stated in Chapter 3, the NPD and Die Linke exhibit overlapping positions in the socio-economic dimensions. The findings support claims that the NPD's evolving emphasis on social welfare issues in response to global capitalism

(Staud, 2005; Bergsdorf, 2007; Röpke and Speit, 2008; Sommer, 2008; Grumke, 2009; Puls, 2011; Brandstetter, 2013).

Chapter 7 investigates how the NPD and Die Linke begin to present their positions to a similar subset of voters. In other words, the chapter measures the parties' attempts to manipulate the salience of certain issues. However, before testing the observable implications from the theory chapter, the role of emphasis as an alternative policy tool in multi-dimensional party competition is briefly explained. A methods section clarifying the operationalization of the parties' salience scores is then introduced, and a thorough analysis describing the results is subsequently presented. Again, the findings are supported with interview material from members of the NPD's and Die Linke's parliamentary groups. In the discussion, the findings are recapitulated and their significance is explained for both parties' attempts to mobilize not only their core supporters, but also the losers of globalization.

The results confirm the theory's claims about strategic issue emphasis in multi-dimensional party competition. The NPD and Die Linke stress issues in their core dimensions and de-emphasize those in their peripheral policy areas. As a result, the NPD highlights socio-cultural issues that are associated with its core dimensions. The findings for the socio-economic dimensions reveal particularly important insights about party competition between the NPD and Die Linke. Although the parties display similar preferences on issues in these policy areas, only Die Linke emphasizes its positions on socio-economic issues. Furthermore, neither party stresses the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions, which constitute peripheral policy areas for both parties. Hence, the NPD and Die Linke do not appear to be direct competitors in any of the dimensions analyzed in the research. Rather, the NPD and Die Linke attempt to mobilize voters in their core dimensions in which they are likely to have the greatest electoral advantage.

The final empirical chapter assesses the third tool available to party leaders: rhetoric. Chapter 8 adheres to the following format. First, it highlights the importance of rhetoric as a strategic policy tool. It then revisits the observable implications that were proposed in Chapter 3. These theoretical claims concentrate on the expected quantity and quality of populist appeals expressed by the NPD and Die Linke in their respective parliamentary Anträge. Thereafter, a clear definition of populism is proposed in the methods section and corresponding indicators are developed for measurement purposes. Next, a thorough analysis describing the results is presented. The quantitative data are supplemented with direct quotes from both parties' parliamentary Anträge, which enhances the descriptive value of the results. In the last section,

the findings are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about the importance of the empirical results.

The empirical data verify the underlying cost-benefit assumption of the study's main theoretical argument. Although the NPD and Die Linke each use populist appeals, their rhetoric can be distinguished by ideological characteristics that are specific to both actors. The NPD, which resorts to populism far more than Die Linke in its Anträge, emphasizes socio-cultural issues in its populist messages, whereas Die Linke stresses socio-economic themes. These represent core issue areas for both parties that should enable the NPD and Die Linke to mobilize the most votes without compromising their ideologies and issue ownership reputations. For the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions, on the other hand, the parties largely refrain from articulating populist rhetoric in their appeals.

In the final chapter, the discussion summarizes the most important aspects of the research. It assesses the validity of the study's proposed theoretical framework based on the findings from the empirical chapters. Reflecting on the findings, the next section highlights the contributions that the analysis makes to the secondary literature about radical parties. In a last step, the shortcomings of the study are identified and outstanding research questions are posed that could be answered in future work.

2. Historical Evidence for Radical Policy Overlaps in Germany: the Weimar Republic

Perhaps more than any other country in Western Europe, Germany is recognized for its extreme political history. Its particular experiences with both National and Real Existing Socialism have reinforced popular conceptions about the relationship between democracy and political extremism. The collapse of Weimar democracy, which was accelerated and triggered by extreme actors, has foremost shaped the focus of studies about the far right and far left in post-war Germany. Much of the research is conducted in the context of Germany's 'vigilant democracy' and the Office for the Protection of the German Constitution's attempts to monitor anti-democratic organizations (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*). Therefore, instead of analyzing their actual policies, most studies concentrate on the opposition between the German Basic Law and extreme parties (Mcgowan, 2003; Moreau, 2008). The most renowned example is the publication from researchers Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse who annually publish the *Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie*, which contains a series of contributions about right- and left-wing extremist actors.[2] However, the tendency in Germany to analyze extreme parties in relation to democracy is not just limited to this annual yearbook. In the 1970s, when the *Verfassungsschutz*, modified its definition of anti-democratic actors from radical to extreme, German researchers also adopted the new terminology (Mcgowan, 2003: 8-9). Ultimately, the Weimar case initiated a tradition whereby extremist parties are only comparatively considered within the context of their views towards democracy.

Yet, the Weimar Republic is also an ideal case to explore how the heuristic boundaries between the far right and far left became transformed in other ways. A fascinating example is the phenomenon of National Bolshevism that briefly emerged after World War I, which brought together seasoned communists and *völkisch* groups in an alliance against Weimar democracy. More importantly, though, this unusual synthesis contained an ideological amalgamation of far right and left beliefs in many other policy areas including militarism, nationalism, socialism and an affinity for the Soviet Union (Van Ree, 2001: 292). In the end though, National Bolshevism only mobilized a small cadre of dedicated adherents and was overshadowed by other political developments in the Weimar Republic (Ascher and Lewy, 1956).

The limited relevance of National Bolshevism notwithstanding, the Weimar Republic remains an ideal situation with which to analyze far right and far left policy similarities, especially within the party competition framework of this study. The time periods share several

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[2] Started in 1989, the yearbook was in its 27th edition as of 2015.

important parallels. Similar to the case presented here, the Weimar Republic also contained two extreme actors at opposite ends of the left-right political spectrum: the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* and the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*. While they are not exact replicas, the NPD and Die Linke reveal some programmatic resemblances with their ideological predecessors. Like the main political actors in this study, the KPD and the Nazis also had contentious relationships with parliamentary democracy. There are demand-side commonalities as well. At different times during the Weimar Republic, the KPD and the NSDAP were able to capture support among Germany's working class electorate (Winkler, 1985; Falter, 1992; Brustein, 1996a; Stögbauer, 2001).

This chapter is not intended to serve as a thorough historical account of party competition between the KPD and NSDAP. The archival work required to complete such an academic endeavor is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the following sections provide context about some of the unique similarities that serve as a reference point for the current research. The conclusions that are drawn from a comparative analysis of the KPD and NSDAP offer useful insights about expected party behavior from the NPD and Die Linke. In turn, this process will begin to guide an understanding of policy overlaps and differences. Of course, the events that occur in a given era are unique to their time. Thus, it is unreasonable to assume that the political system of the Weimar Republic can be directly equated with contemporary Germany. In contrast to the relatively stable Federal Republic, Weimar Germany was constantly beset by political, economic and social instability in the aftermath of World War I. Nevertheless, the chapter makes two notable contributions to the context of the current study about far right and far left political actors.

First, the chapter establishes that Germany has a history of policy commonalities between ideologically disparate *parties*. Despite the violent contests that resulted from their physical confrontations, political competition between the extreme left KPD and the 'National Bolshevist' wing of the extreme right NSDAP often produced common ground (Bracher, 1955; Winkler, 1985; Fischer, 1996). The most well-known instances obviously include a common rejection of parliamentarianism and Weimar democracy more generally. However, in his book *Weimar Radicals. Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance* (2009), Timothy S. Brown notes that the KPD and the NSDAP also possessed overlapping positions on numerous domestic and international issues. Furthermore, the parties often employed similar rhetorical devices to appeal to voters whose outlooks were both nationalist and staunchly pro-labor. As a result, the left-right boundary that divided the KPD and the NSDAP occasionally became diluted, especially during the final years of the Weimar Republic.

Second, the chapter also demonstrates that vote-seeking commonalities are limited by structural constraints. Although the KPD and NSDAP shared similar policy positions as well as borrowed symbols and rhetoric from each other, these decisions often conflicted with both parties' core identities. For the Communists, competing with Nazi rhetoric produced glaring contradictions between party policy and ideology. Such inconsistencies were eventually met with stiff protests from Moscow. In a similar strand, the Nazis were uneasy with appearing overly associated with socialism. Hitler worried that the Strasserites' emphasis on class issues would overshadow the Nazi Party's core commitment to *völkisch* nationalism. Ultimately, sunk costs, such as ideology and issue ownership reputations, placed significant constraints on the parties' policy development. The insight gained from this lesson is considered in Chapter 3 when a theoretical model is introduced that attempts to explain the potential for policy commonalities between the NPD and Die Linke.

The remainder of the chapter adheres to the following format. First, it describes the working-class electorate that was the focus of the KPD's and NSDAP's policy appeals, especially in the final years of the Weimar Republic. Thereafter, the chapter changes focus and analyzes supply-side components. Hence, it introduces an overview of two issues where the Communists and National Socialists proposed similar policy positions: the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan. Finally, it discusses some implications for the current study that concentrates on contemporary policy similarities between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke.

2.1 Voters: An Overview of the Working Class Proletariat

Despite the scholarly interest in voting behavior that contributed to the rise of an anti-democratic party and the end of democracy in Weimar Germany (King et al. 2008: 954), studies that systematically analyze this subject remain scarce. Much of the problem stems from the fact that there are essentially no survey data from this period. For those studies that have utilized the available data, very few apply appropriate ecological methods that can be interpreted with a degree of confidence (Lohmöller et al., 1985; Falter and Zintl, 1985; Falter, 1991; King et al., 2008).

Based on the existing scholarship, however, it is possible to draw some basic conclusions about voting alignments in the Weimar Republic. Among religious groups, the *Zentrum,* along with its Bavarian counterpart, the *Bayerische Volkspartei* (BVP), appealed to significant numbers of Catholic voters (Evans, 1981), whereas the Protestant vote was divided

between various parties on the center and far right (Orlow, 1986). Despite the KPD's efforts, the Social Democrats were the dominant party among working class voters (Winkler, 1985). Elsewhere, the Nazi Party was particularly successful at mobilizing the lower-middle class electorate and self-employed. Thus, Seymour Lipset (1960) famously referred to fascism as "extremism of the middle". Although his assertion was later modified (Winkler, 1972; Childers, 1983; Falter, 1991), the core of Lipset's argument still maintains some validity: as the economic situation for middle class Germans declined in the final years of the Weimar Republic, the NSDAP was able to mobilize a significant amount of the German electorate. More recently, Stögbauer (2001) reveals that rising unemployment during the Great Depression had a positive effect on the vote totals for the NSDAP. In the same study, Stögbauer points out that the KPD was another party that benefitted at the polls during this time. However, the Communists never found much support among the middle classes (Brustein, 1996a). Therefore, it is possible that the KPD and NSDAP were able to mobilize another part of the German electorate.

The National Socialists and the Communists sought support from nearly all demographics, but their pursuit of votes often intersected on the working class electorate. Mühlberger (1980: 504) notes that an analysis of working class political alignments did not offer a straightforward picture. The German working class in the Weimar Republic did not display a homogenous voting behavior. Workers did not strictly support any particular type of political actor, despite their assumed preference for the pro-labor socio-economic positions espoused by left-wing parties. The 'traditional' working class parties, namely the SPD and KPD, only averaged around 30 per cent of the working class electorate at national elections (Falter and Hänisch, 1986: 180-181). Much of the working class electorate either voted for other parties or refrained from voting altogether. Complicating matters even further, the German working class in the Weimar Republic was not a uniform demographic (Falter, 1996). It was comprised of various types of workers, some of whom exhibited strong nationalist sentiments (Brustein, 1996a). Under the strain of the Great Depression and Germany's enormous reparation payments, unemployment among blue-collar labor rose steeply and real wages diminished (Brustein, 1996b: 140). As a result, the causes for these conditions prompted not only socialist, but also nationalist responses among the working class.

The multifaceted political outlook of the German working classes had important implications for the Communists' and the Nazis' party strategies. Not only the KPD, but also the NSDAP could realistically mobilize electoral support among the German working class. To be sure, the parties perceived the importance of the working class voter differently within

their respective ideological traditions. Nevertheless, both actors experienced reasonable success in their efforts to target and effectively mobilize the German proletariat for their own political objectives.

2.2 KPD: The Ideological Home of the Proletariat

The working class represented not only an important voting demographic for the Communist Party in Germany, but for Communists throughout interwar Europe. This was due to international communism's *raison d'être*: the establishment of an international dictatorship of the proletariat (Ward, 1981). Inherent in this objective is the expectation that the creation of such a state cannot be completed without a revolution led by the working class. Therefore, the KPD defined itself as the vanguard of the working class and the experiences of the entire proletarian struggle (Rosenhaft, 1983: 24). It is not surprising then that the KPD predominantly targeted working class voters. In districts with more blue-collar workers and fewer self-employed individuals than average, the share of KPD vote was much higher (Falter, 1992: 386).

However, the KPD was by no means the only party capable of appealing to the German proletariat. Throughout the Weimar period, the KPD competed with its ideological counterpart, the Social Democrats. In fact, despite the KPD's obvious interest in securing votes from workers, it was never able to mobilize substantial support among certain parts of the proletariat. The KPD's 'united front from below' strategy, which was aimed at trade union members in particular, failed to dislodge a significant amount of workers from the SPD (Rosenhaft, 1983: 29). Despite these problems, the KPD remained a formidable parliamentary group in the German Reichstag. By the early 1930s though, it had become increasingly clear to the KPD leadership that a new political opponent had emerged. In order to compete with the Nazis, the KPD would have to change its tactics.

2.3 NSDAP: Workers in the Greater German Volksgemeinschaft

Unlike the KPD, workers did not play such a central role in the Nazis overall political plans. In accordance with its ultra-nationalist identity, the party foremost endeavored to be a *Sammelpartei* (Bracher, 1955: 106) that achieve a classless *Volksgemeinschaft*. Still, in order to realize this goal, the National Socialists were also compelled to compete for the working class demographic (Striefler, 1993: 23). Contrary to the popular perception that the NSDAP mostly attracted support from the *petite bourgeoisie* and other constituents in Germany's

middle class, revisionists have largely acknowledged the Nazis' diverse voter base (Kele, 1972; Stokes, 1978; Hamilton, 1982; Childers, 1983). Indeed, the NSDAP has even been referred to as a *Volkspartei* (Fritz, 1987). This stems in part from the National Socialists' appeal among working class segments of the Weimar electorate.

In the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929, the NSDAP's overtures to and popularity among the workers continued to increase. By 1933, some estimates conclude that 40 per cent of the NSDAP's support came from workers alone (Stachura, 1993: 707). Moreover, the NSDAP offered policy positions that often resembled those from working class parties, such as the Social Democrats and the KPD. As evidence of this claim, the next section directly explores this matter and analyzes several examples of policy overlaps between the Communists and Nazis in greater detail.

2.4 Policy

The subsequent overview provides an analysis of several issues where policy overlap occurred between the KPD and the NSDAP. More specifically, it investigates the positions and rhetoric associated with the parties' policies regarding the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan. The section shows that, although the KPD and NSDAP proposed similar positions, they also faced severe structural constraints. Attempts to experiment with competing rhetoric, in particular, posed programmatic inconsistencies. Consequently, the parties' positions were based on arguments formulated according to each actor's respective ideology. As the following subsections demonstrate, this form of policy articulation afforded the KPD and the NSDAP the opportunity to garner votes from the working class without deviating from their core identities. First though, the policy section offers some general insights about the potential for policy parallels between the Communists and the Nazis during the Weimar Era.

2.4.1 General Opportunities for Overlap

The KPD and the NSDAP have been remembered for their shared opposition to parliamentary democracy, which ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Liebermann, 1998). In their study of roll-call votes in the Reichstag, Hansen and Debus (2012) show that MPs from the Communists and the National Socialists were the most opposed to the Weimar Republic. After the last national election in 1933, the KPD and NSDAP combined for 57 per cent of all seats in the Reichstag (Lehmann, 2010: 87). This made it nearly impossible to form and maintain sustainable coalitions, and the ability for a parliamentary democracy to function

more generally. However, the parties also held similar positions on a range of other policy issues. Conan Fischer (1991: 72) notes that, in the period 1924-1928, the KPD and far right parties, including the NSDAP, voted together 73 per cent of the time when there existed a parliamentary division. In contrast, the KPD and the SPD were on opposite sides 68 per cent of the time during the same period.

The pursuit of working class voters not only produced similar positions in some policy areas, but also a shared set of rhetorical appeals between the KPD and NSDAP. In some instances, their newspapers printed nearly matching headlines (Ward, 1981: 36). As Timothy S. Brown notes, this process was aided by a common rhetorical realm in which the parties attempted to employ competing rubrics of populist anti-authoritarianism (2009: 5). The National Socialists experimented with class-conscious expressions, whereas the Communists included nationalist rhetoric in their appeals. The next part examines how the parties experimented with their opponents' rhetoric, only to embrace policies that were consistent with their respective ideologies.

2.4.2 Appealing to the Working Class

An analysis of the KPD's and NSDAP's preferences on the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan offer several instances of position commonalities between the extremes. The basis for the parties' similarities results from a shared opposition to the crippling reparations that Germany was required to honor after World War I. As the country struggled to meet its demanding payment obligations, the Great Depression amplified the severity of the reparations. Workers, in particular, were vulnerable to economic downturns. By 1933, there were approximately half as many skilled industrial workers as there had been in 1925 (as cited in Brustein, 1996a: 122). Due to the severity of the crisis, the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan became two of the most salient issues in German politics during the latter half of the Weimar period. In contrast to the mainstream parties, the KPD and the NSDAP dually voiced their opposition to both international agreements.

In their support of working class voters, the KPD and NSDAP did not always explain their policy positions against the treaties with core party arguments. Occasionally, they deviated from the norm and experimented with their opponent's rationale. After the 1928 parliamentary elections, for example, the NSDAP understood that it needed more than just nationalism and anti-Semitism to attract working class voters. Therefore, the Nazis changed tactics and increasingly emphasized socialist policies in their program (Striefler, 1993: 43-44). Especially in Northern Germany, Gregor Strasser stressed social justice and nationalization of

the economy (Nyomarkay, 1965: 28). Moreover, Strasser believed that the German worker's struggle was comparable to Germany's efforts towards national liberation (Kissenkoetter, 1978: 24). Therefore, the Nazis claimed to oppose the reparations settlements, because of the economic effects that they would have on labor and unemployment. (Kele, 1972). The NSDAP also used class rhetoric to appeal directly to workers. Stealing a page from the Communists' playbook, the Nazi press utilized expressions such as "workers break your chains" and "workers unite" (Kele, 1972: 186-187). Nazi publications even adopted terms like "comrade" and "fellow worker" (Kele, 1972: 111). In other headlines, phrases such as "freedom and bread" and "for the oppressed – against the oppressors" were tactically employed (Striefler, 1993: 45).

Meanwhile, the KPD often appeared to be more nationalist than the NSDAP on many points (Striefler, 1993: 201). Undoubtedly, the KPD recognized the Nazis' ability to mobilize working class voters through ultra-nationalism (Ward, 1981; Stachura, 1993). Therefore, starting in 1930, the Communists regularly asserted that German national liberation could only be attained once the war reparations had been adjusted (Fischer, 1991: 108). In its manifesto entitled "Program from the National and Social Liberation of the German People", the KPD endeavored to attain nationalist credibility by dispelling the prevalent notion that Communism and nationalism were not antithetical (Ward, 1981: 50). Discussions about the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan were reframed with nationalist rhetoric: "Die Regierungsparteien und die Sozialdemokratie haben Hab und Gut, Leben und Existenz des werktätigen deutschen Volkes meistbietend an die Imperialisten des Auslands verkauft" (KPD, 1930). Thus, instead of arguing solely in terms of the proletariat and economic imperialism, these accords were also described with narratives about Germany's national struggle against foreign interests.

In reality though, the parties tended to link their positions and rhetoric to explanations that resembled their core ideologies. The context of the Nazis' opposition to these agreements is characteristic of the party's principle beliefs. The NSDAP was firmly committed to a program of *völkisch* nationalism that placed the cultural, biological and racial aspects of its movement above the socioeconomic (Brown, 2009: 133). When socialism and class doctrine were introduced they were invariably connected to conceptions of racism and ethnic nationalism (Brown, 2009: 45). From the perspective of the NSDAP, each international accord foremost represented an unjust violation of Germany's national sovereignty. Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that the Nazis primarily relied upon nativist arguments in their discussions about the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan. Speaking to the working class and jobless, the NSDAP insinuated that reparation payments from the Young Plan created jobs

in the creditor countries, but reduced employment opportunities for Germans (Fischer, 1996: 150-151).

The difficulty of framing these policy initiatives with authentic left-wing appeals is revealed by the power struggles within the NSDAP. From an organizational perspective, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the Nazi left ever possessed significant standing within the party as a whole. Hitler tolerated the socialist appeals in the NSDAP, so long as they remained sufficiently abstract (Kele, 1972: 98-99). During the Bamberg Conference in 1926, the influence of the Nazi left was permanently curtailed when Hitler, with the support of the *völkisch* contingent, rejected many of the Nazi left's initiatives. Although the Nazi leadership desired working class support, it was also concerned that too much attention to socialism could alienate the NSDAP's middle class base and loyal industrialists. The leadership expressed similar apprehensions over the effects that anti-capitalism might have on the pro-capitalist right-wing of the party (Kele, 1972: 168).

The Communists, on the other hand, perceived the agreements primarily as an economic phenomenon and a hindrance to closer ties with the Soviet Union. Despite their attempts to elevate the importance of national issues and demonstrate that they were the genuine party of national revolution, the KPD's version of nationalism was strictly a tactical one. At the core of their policy narratives, international capitalists were primarily responsible for the unjust treaties (Brown, 2009: 96). The Young Plan was an imperialist scheme to despoil German wage earners (Ward, 1981: 35). Thus, Versailles and the Young Plan represented instruments in a larger class struggle with capitalist interests (Fischer, 1991: 105). Moreover, they were also a hindrance to the KPD's ideal foreign policy. The Communist leadership complained that it would be impossible to establish the desired international proletariat, because of the financial obligations to Western creditors that were ensconced in the treaties. According to the German Communists, these arrangements represented an imperialist intervention against the Soviet Union and prevented closer relations between Berlin and Moscow (LaPorte, 2004).

To the same extent that the Nazis would never be able to convince the working class electorate of its socialist credentials without infringing upon the party's core identity, the Communists also faced formidable structural constraints. The Nazis surging results among the working class aside, the KPD always possessed limited autonomy over any major reforms to the party's ideology, because of its complicated relationship with the Soviet Union (Bracher, 1955). Although the Comintern actually encouraged the nationalist program in 1930, its content largely contradicted Communism's international *Weltanschauung*. Fischer (1991: 106-107)

contends that, in ideological terms, the KPD played a dangerous game. With its aggressive nationalism, the party often walked a thin line between open defiance of Communist orthodoxy and opportunistic strategy. This not only upset left-wing radicals within the KPD. On several occasions, the Comintern even objected to KPD rhetoric at the local level. Such a strategy was bound to fail, because it was impossible to simultaneously represent the national interests of Germany and the international ones of the Soviet Union (Brown, 2009: 96).

2.5 Discussion: Relevance for Contemporary Extremes

This chapter explored the dynamic of policy overlaps between extremist actors from an historical perspective. As stated at the outset, the purpose of this chapter is to provide historical background and is not central to the current study's theoretical arguments. Thus, the motivation for the analysis was twofold. First, it set out to demonstrate that Germany has a history of policy similarities between radical parties that goes beyond shared attitudes towards democracy. Although the analysis only concentrated on the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan, the study still lends credibility to the comparative approach about the NPD and Die Linke in the current research. Later examples further demonstrate how the boundaries between the far right and far left can become blurred, especially at the individual level. For instance, some prominent leaders originally associated with far left movements in the 1960s later became active in far right organizations (Seitenbecher, 2013). Horst Mahler, who was once a leader of the Red Army Faction, eventually joined and then represented the NPD at a trial to legally ban the party before the German Constitutional Court (Michael, 2009). In a second and related process, the chapter examined the specific arguments and rhetoric that accompanied the parties' policy proposals. Here, it focused on policy nuances and the authenticity of their overlapping appeals. With the inherent limitations of a case study, the results are nevertheless a significant first step toward comparatively understanding radical party behavior during political competition. The historical example from the Weimar Republic contains several implications about party strategy that will be considered for the current study that comparatively analyzes the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke in Saxony.

The first aspect of the Weimar Republic example to consider is the cross-cutting, demand-side preferences of the parties' shared electorate. Working class voters were not a homogenous group. Indeed, many voters displayed both nationalist and pro-labor dispositions. Chapter 4 reveals a similar tendency about the so-called "losers of globalization". In contemporary Germany, these individuals are expected to prefer demarcating policies, i.e., they

should favor restrictive national boundaries (Kriesi et al., 2008). However, preferences for demarcation can be applied to multiple policy dimensions. Thus, it is conceivable that the losers of globalization could reject international trade agreements on the one hand and open-door immigration policies on the other. A broad understanding of demarcating preferences should allow the NPD and Die Linke an expanded set of strategy options. Essentially, the parties can compete for the losers of globalization with demarcating positions in multiple dimensions of political competition. As the next chapter will demonstrate, this observation has important implications for party positioning and rhetoric, but especially issue salience. In other words, the NPD and Die Linke should emphasize demarcating positions in dimensions where they have an electoral advantage, namely in their core policy areas of political competition.

A second key point about strategy concerns the cost-benefit analysis of party policy development. While their positions remained constant, the KPD and NSDAP strategically borrowed justifications and rhetoric from each other. The benefits associated with this strategy could be high, but the parties were also playing a dangerous game. At times, they appeared to be deliberately playing into their opponents' hands. In reference to the KPD's nationalist rhetoric about the Treaty of Versailles, historian Götz Aly (2014: 199) wonders if members of the working class would have been better off simply voting for the original (i.e., the Nazis). Indeed, the parties were also concerned about the effects of structural constraints on their strategies. The Communists could not embrace a more nationalist message without compromising internationalism and defying Moscow. Likewise, Hitler feared that Gregor Strasser's socialist policies would overshadow the party's nationalist identity and potentially jeopardize the NSDAP's strong ties with industry and the *petite bourgeoisie*. Therefore, in Chapter 3, the theory will argue that the NPD and Die Linke are expected to formulate coherent policies that are consistent with their ideological dispositions and issue ownership reputations. This represents the more ideal strategy, because it enables leaders from both parties to maximize their appeals at minimal political cost. Both actors can simultaneously mobilize their bases in addition to the losers of globalization.

Overall, this chapter concludes that policy overlaps between radical parties in Germany is not only possible, but that it has occurred previously. When pursuing a shared electorate, the KPD and NSDAP adopted similar strategies that produced policy overlaps on the Treaty of Versailles and the Young Plan. However, they also encountered structural constraints that affected strategic maneuverability and policy development. This observation has implications for party competition between the NPD and Die Linke who also target a common group of voters: the losers of globalization. The next chapter further explores the importance of these

variables and introduces a theoretical framework to explain where and why policy similarities are expected to occur in radical party competition.

3. Theorizing Strategic Policy Development for Radical Parties and the Potential for Overlap

Traditional interpretations of Western European party systems do not provide much evidence that suggests the potential for radical policy overlaps. As part of his spatial model, Downs (1957) assumed that actors in a two-party system compete for the median voter by converging towards the center of the left-right political spectrum. However, in a multi-party system, he argued that it is more advantageous for parties to remain as ideologically distinct as possible. The party family literature also downplays policy similarities. It contends that parties are organized according to their historical origins and the representation of particular interests stemming from social cleavages (Mair and Mudde, 1998: 215). In the *familles spirituelles* model, far left (communist) and far right (extreme right-wing) parties occupy opposite ends of the left-right ideological spectrum (Von Beyme, 1985). In this framework, policy similarities are only likely to develop between extreme right and conservative parties, as well as communist and social democratic parties respectively. Ultimately, all parties, regardless of their position in the left-right dimension, are prisoners of their own history, which subsequently limits their capacity for adaption in the party system (Ware, 1996: 18). Based on these interpretations, it appears that policy commonalities are practically impossible.

The following chapter proposes an alternative interpretation to supply-side overlaps between far right and far left parties (the focus will return to the demand-side of political competition in Chapter 4). Contrary to the previous theories, it develops a model that both accounts for and explains the potential for policy similarities between radical parties. Grounded in the core assumptions of rational choice theory (Opp, 1999), the chapter expects party leaders from the NPD and Die Linke to strategically develop policies in pursuit of their vote-seeking goals while taking constraints into account. Essentially, their behavior should be the result of cost-benefit calculations. The theoretical point of departure is an understanding of the NPD and Die Linke as niche actors in a multi-dimensional political space. A framework based on niche party behavior is not only consistent with rational choice models of party competition and legislative behavior, but also considers the limitations inherent to niche actors in some dimensions. In other words, both the NPD and Die Linke are expected to maximize their utility by assessing realistic goals before strategically developing their respective policy proposals. However, unlike mainstream parties, their behavior is constrained by an unusual collection of radical ideologies and issue ownership reputations.

The main theoretical assertion is that policy overlaps between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke can be attributed to the parties' shared niche status. As the NPD and Die

Linke develop strategies for political competition, their non-centrist ideologies and issue ownership reputations represent sunk costs. When formulating policies, party leaders must consider existing associations with certain issues and commitments to extreme positions. However, these sunk costs are not evenly distributed across all policy dimensions. In some issue areas, the NPD and Die Linke are not punished when they diverge from the conventional behavior. Instead, they can behave without suffering major electoral penalties. It is in these instances that the NPD and Die Linke can afford to pursue similar strategies without incurring high costs. In turn, this increases the potential for overlapping policies as indicated in the parties' positions, emphasis and rhetorical devices.

Of course, the proposed theoretical framework also implies that niche structural constraints are expected to explain *differences* in the parties' various policy initiatives. In contrast to peripheral dimensions (for a definition, please see p. 40), the parties are not afforded the same amount of strategic flexibility in core issue areas. In these cases, the NPD and Die Linke should display dissimilar policy strategies, because they must distinguish themselves in the eyes of voters and activists alike. This strategy presents enhanced benefits with minimal costs, whereas similarity entails reduced benefits with prohibitive costs. Here again, the chapter assumes that evidence of these strategic outcomes can be inferred in the diverse set of policy tools available to both parties.

The remainder of the chapter adheres to the following format. It begins with an introduction to the German extremism theory, which is critically analyzed and refuted. Thereafter, the chapter is dedicated to developing an innovative theoretical framework that explains radical policy likeness within the institution of party competition. As a first step, it describes the multi-dimensional political space in which the NPD and Die Linke compete. Thereafter, the chapter examines the parties' ability to achieve certain goals and how this realization is predicted to affect actor behavior. In a subsequent step, it clarifies the expected strategies that the NPD and Die Linke will pursue in a party system where they face deep-seated structural constraints. Here, the theoretical arguments specifically focus on the NPD's and Die Linke's niche identities. In the next section, a series of observable implications are proposed that test for policy overlaps related to positions, salience and rhetoric. The final part of the chapter recapitulates the main theoretical argument and offers some concluding remarks.

3.1 The German Extremism Theory

The theoretical framework proposed in this study does not represent the first attempt to model radical party overlaps. The most noted example that explains similarities between radical actors is the German extremism theory. Based closely on the normative criteria of the German *Verfassungsschutz,* the extremism theory contends that far right and far left parties express a shared opposition to the free democratic order (Backes, 1989). In this Aristotelian model a vague distinction is intended to differentiate the parties in the democratic middle from the anti-democratic actors at the extremes. The *Hufeisenschema* illustrated in Figure 1 demonstrates this distinction on a single, democratic continuum. Parties associated with the political center are deemed normal, whereas actors located outside this space are labelled extreme. Reports from the *Verfassungsschutz* lend some credibility to the extremism theory, because both the NPD and certain factions within Die Linke are still considered anti-democratic by the German authorities.

Figure 1 Hufeisenschema According To The German Extremism Theory (Backes, 1989)

Nevertheless, the extremism theory has been criticized for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, the extremism theory's dichotomous evaluation criteria contrasts the image of the democratic state with its negative challengers (Dölemeyer and Mehrer, 2011: 9). This comparison is specific to the German political system. Minkenberg (2000:172) has pointed out that, because the extremism theory borrows heavily from judicial criteria that is unique to the

German form of *wehrhafte Demokratie*, it is unable to make general conclusions about extremist commonalities. In a non-German context, this theoretical model disregards an entire range of issues that are specific to the country under investigation.

Second, the extremism theory suffers from normative ambiguities that complicate party descriptions. It often remains unclear if a party is committed to overthrowing the free democratic order or simply attempting to reform the elements of the system from within.[3] For instance, populist actors are often critical of neoliberal democracy. However, they are not necessarily opposed to the institution of democracy itself. In many instances, populist parties positioned outside the political center are committed to reforms that will enhance democracy, albeit within a populist framework. Common manifestations of populist democratic initiatives include support for a directly-elected executive and referenda.

Normative ambiguities also prevent adequate descriptions of extreme parties. There are notable differences between right- and left-wing extremism, but these are subsumed with a definition that is based on democratic attitudes (Falter, 2011). In the German secondary literature especially, many authors believe that characteristics of right-wing extremism cannot be relativized in a comparative study (Kowalsky and Schroeder, 1994; Neugebauer, 2000; Decker and Brähler, 2006). Such features include the extreme right's penchant for racism, anti-Semitism and seditious commentary about the Holocaust. While these interpretations are highly subjective, the point remains that there are clear differences between the types of extremism exhibited by far right and far left actors.

Finally, the extremism theory's metric of democracy severely limits its ability to effectively measure party behavior. As a result, empirical research about the extremism theory remains underdeveloped (Dölemeyer and Mehrer, 2011: 19). In fact, it appears highly doubtful that democracy can be accurately inferred at all. In Germany, a rational political elite is not likely to risk the threat of a constitutional prohibition by openly opposing the free democratic order, even if this is indeed his/her ideal preferred policy. However, since only manifest inferences can be measured, democracy remains a poor indicator for the measurement of party policies. In other instances, the normative definition of democracy is refuted by its very measurement. Due to their numerous statements in favor of more democracy, populists should be some of the most democratic actors in Western European party systems. Yet this finding is

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[3] The German Office for the Protection of the Constitution makes a distinction between *verfassungsfeindlich* and *verfassungswidrig*. However, these concepts are also prone to conceptual confusion.

contradicted by the extremism theory, which claims that populist parties are fundamentally anti-democratic.

A closer analysis of the German extremism theory reveals significant theoretical and methodological inconsistencies. Heuristic simplicity aside, the normative assumptions inherent in the extremism theory are highly subjective and prone to absolute interpretations. These shortcomings severely limit the researcher's ability to accurately infer and describe extremist parties. In effect, radical party behavior is reduced to a shared motivation to overthrow the free democratic order. This is a gross over-simplification that does not reflect actual party behavior, not to mention party policies. What is needed instead is a more realistic and rigorous approach to the comparative study of radical actors.

3.2 Towards A Model of Policy Overlap Based on Party Competition

A more suitable approach to the analysis of radical parties is grounded in the context of party competition, which is the core feature of modern representative democracy (Dolezal et al., 2014). This concept is defined as an institution in which parties strategically cooperate or contest as political actors to gain power (Franzman, 2011: 320). The research makes two important assumptions about the nature of party competition. First, the political space where party competition occurs is comprised of two essential components: voters and parties (Alonso, 2012: 13). Both actors are linked by their diverse preferences about the problems that ought to be addressed by elected governments. In this relationship, voters represent the demand-side of political competition. Citizens elect political parties whom they believe are most qualified to represent their interests. Parties, on the other hand, characterize the supply-side element. In order to mobilize the electorate, parties attempt to convey a series of policy proposals that appeal to voters' preferences.

Second, the political space in party competition is multi-dimensional (Albright, 2010). At the macro level, globalization has caused a dealignment in the traditional lines of political conflict (Kriesi et al., 2008). Consequently, there are not only new issues, but also new dimensions that structure party competition. These subjects include policy areas such as immigration, environmental protection, European integration and lifestyle politics (Kitschelt, 1994). Many of these issues are cross-cutting issues, i.e., they transcend the socio-structural lines of political conflict that have traditionally shaped political competition (Bornschier, 2010a). As a result, the importance of individual issues has increased in voter decision-making throughout Western Europe (Franklin et al., 1992; Van Holsteyn et al., 2003; Mair et al., 2004;

Meguid, 2008). Evidence for this trend can be found in the steady decline of partisan voting (Dalton, 2000) and the decrease in party membership across Western Europe (Scarrow, 2000; Mair and van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen et al., 2012). Thus, not only are there more "political potentials", but also more dimensions in which they can be mobilized.

However, not all dimensions are weighted equally (Alonso, 2012). Policy dimensions are classified as either core or peripheral (Tavits, 2007). Core dimensions contain issues in which a party is particularly invested. Attachment to a core dimension is rooted in party history and the cleavages that organize party systems (Elias et al., 2015: 1). For example, in post-war party systems, social democratic actors displayed a demonstrated commitment to a welfarist position on the socio-economic dimension. This policy space contained issues that resonated with organized labor and which also figured prominently in the parties' beliefs about class struggle. In contrast, peripheral dimensions include issues that are relatively less important for a political actor. Traditionally, these issues have failed to mobilize a given party's electorate and do not figure into its core beliefs. Here again, an example serves to support this assertion. Aside from green actors, most parties have devoted relatively less attention to environmental issues, nor is this their *raison d'être*. As a result, the dimension containing environmental issues is of secondary importance to most parties.

Competing equally in all dimensions can be a costly and irrational endeavor when parties adhere to an unprofitable resource allocation (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Extant studies have established that parties can attempt to minimize costs in multi-dimensional competition through a variety of approaches (Meguid, 2005; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Rovny, 2012b; Rovny and Edwards, 2012). Despite their different recommendations, these strategies share a common feature - namely, the existence of a preferred, primary dimension of competition. Moreover, they imply that parties recognize and behave differently in their core and peripheral dimensions, which is a key point that will be developed throughout the chapter. In the next section then, the research begins to clarify how goals are expected to influence the development of party behavior in multi-dimensional competition with core and peripheral policy areas.

3.3 Party Behavior and Vote-Seeking Incentives for the NPD and Die Linke in Saxony
Party competition is driven by an actor's desire to achieve his/her aims (Franzmann, 2011: 320). In the rational choice tradition of political competition, party behavior is motivated by the pursuit of vote-, policy- and office-seeking goals (Strøm, 1990). The first objective assumes

that parties are merely vote maximizers who seek electoral support for the purpose of controlling government (Downs, 1957). Policy-seeking parties, as their name would imply, are primarily concerned with affecting the course of public policy. Finally, office-seeking parties are foremost influenced by the awards associated with public office.

Vote-, policy- and office-seeking motivations are neither mutually exclusive nor are they always perfectly aligned within this framework. In order to experience the intrinsic benefits of elected office or implement preferred public policies, leaders must accrue a certain amount of votes. However, party leaders are seldom able to realize all of their goals simultaneously (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 9). For example, they may be historically committed to policies that have declined in electoral popularity and hence need to be moderated, if party leaders wish to increase their party's vote. The reward for attaining some goals is reduced by the degree to which other actors can achieve the same objectives. In other words, depending on organizational and institutional constraints, party leaders face different incentives in their political behavior. As a result, they are forced to accept trade-offs and compromises that subsequently impact party strategy in future elections.

The NPD and Die Linke in Saxony can be assumed to be motivated by vote-seeking goals first and foremost, because they are practically excluded from direct policy influence. At a glance, the pursuit of policy- and/or office-seeking objectives might seem like a realistic possibility for Die Linke. The party has traditionally been the second largest parliamentary group in the Saxon State Parliament since it gained formal representation. Unlike the NPD, Die Linke has not been hindered by extremist stereotypes in East Germany. Instead, Die Linke has even been perceived as a *Volkspartei* (Hough, 2002). Outside of Saxony, Die Linke has also served as a coalition partner in nearly every other East German state. Thus, it appears plausible that the party is in a position to accomplish more than simply mobilize voters. However, there are several factors that inhibit policy- and office-seeking incentives for both parties.

First, the legislative setting of the Saxon State Parliament influences vote-seeking behavior. Mayhew (1974:13) assumes that legislative activity is primarily motivated by an electoral incentive for a party or representative to be reelected. Indeed, Benoit and Laver (2006) assert that political competition is a continuous process. Politicians, and parties for that matter, are constantly engaged in a political contest for votes. Under such circumstances then, parties should utilize the legislature as a public forum in which they not only explain votes and policy positions to other parties, but especially voters (Proksch and Slapin, 2012: 521). Research about speeches held during legislative debates has frequently adhered to this assumption. Rather than having a persuasive effect on policy-making, legislative speeches enable MPs to provide a

party or personal message to voters and partisan rank-and-file, as legislative debate receives coverage in all types of media (Bächtiger, 2014: 146). Proksch and Slapin (2012: 521) also point out that persuasion alone does not guide debate, because if legislators only cared about this aspect, there would not be any systematic variation in the organization of debate, not to mention any debate at all.

Second, a closer examination of the NPD's and Die Linke's institutional environment also reduces the possibility of policy- and office-seeking behavior. Compared to other parties in the Saxon State Parliament, the NPD and Die Linke were far less likely to accomplish their policy and office aims. For the NPD in particular, the party was completely isolated within the Saxon State Parliament. Due to their extremist views, the National Democrats encountered a rigorous *cordon sanitaire*. Not only were all legislative proposals from the NPD rejected on principle, but party representatives were frequently denounced by the other parliamentary groups during monthly plenary sessions.

Die Linke was not entirely isolated in the Saxon State Parliament, but the constellation of parties represented in the legislature was not conducive to policy- and office-seeking behavior either. This was primarily the result of the CDU's enduring dominance in Saxon politics. Since the Saxon State Parliament's inception in 1990, the Christian Democrats captured absolute majorities in four elections and were the senior coalition partner four additional times. Under these circumstances, it is almost certain that Die Linke will be excluded from office. In fact, aside from the NPD, the far left Die Linke is the least plausible coalition partner for the center right CDU. Alternatively, the prospect of a left-wing government has never been a consideration. Although Die Linke has traditionally been the largest opposition party, the SPD and the Greens have never captured enough votes to form a ruling coalition. Nor does Die Linke possess the potential for significant policy achievements. The CDU has rejected every legislative motion (Antrag) proposed by Die Linke since 1991. Despite the contention that Die Linke, can affect government policy, it remains difficult for the party to claim responsibility for any major legislative accomplishments.

The previous section established that the NPD and Die Linke should both exhibit vote-seeking behavior in party competition. As a legislative institution, the Saxon State Parliament provides a public forum where representatives are more inclined to benefit from communicating with voters instead of engaging in meaningful debates about proposed policies. For the parties in this study especially, the scarcity of policy and office goods largely reduces the parties' to vote-seeking goals. However, although the aim might be clear, selecting a strategy to attain this goal is not straightforward.

3.4 Party Strategies in Political Competition

In competitive electoral markets, parties can be modelled to represent producers of political brand names (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). These labels are a valuable heuristic in political competition (Snyder and Ting, 2002: 91). For voters, the party brand name signifies a low-cost informational short-cut. In the American context, for example, if a candidate is a Democrat, then a voter is likely to understand that the candidate is in favor of abortion, gay marriage, gun control, etc. (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008: 251). Such branding is particularly effective for the mobilization of uninformed voters. For the parties, they can also save costs by using their brands to screen potential candidates who run under their banner (Spence, 1974). Such an approach reduces the potential for candidates who are not sufficiently close to the party's platform and maintains a level of ideological homogeneity.

There exists an assortment of complementary policy tools that enable parties to promote their specific brands to voters (Clarke et al., 2004; Meguid, 2005, 2008; Vavreck, 2009; Rovny, 2012a; De Sio and Weber, 2014; Elias et al., 2015). Political actors can take positions, alter the salience of issues and persuade voters with rhetoric. This combination of political strategies accurately reflects the multi-dimensional nature of party competition where actors are confronted with a multitude of issues. Of course, all of these instruments represent independent tactics. Nonetheless, they are each the result of strategic decisions that are endogenous to party competition (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004: 167).

For each of these policy tools, parties are required to weigh the prospective costs and benefits of their available strategies. Benefits are understood as the maximization of votes that party leaders seek to accrue. Costs, on the other hand, represent compromises to the parties' specific brands, which can have significant organizational consequences. Deviation from the party brand risks the loyalty of committed party activists whose critical engagement is incumbent upon policy incentives (Strøm, 1990: 575). Overall then, actors face limits on their ability to maneuver unhindered in the electoral market. As Alonso (2012: 41) notes, "a party is not free to move anywhere it wants in the political space if it cares about its impact on the voters' opinion; and it does care. Parties must show integrity and responsibility: they must be credible in their statements and promise." Ultimately, strategy entails an analysis of the constraints that increase or decrease the possibility for the NPD and Die Linke to realize their vote-seeking goals.

The NPD and Die Linke are required to consider a specific set of constraints for their strategies, because they boast party brands that do not resemble typical, political actors. Rather, the NPD and Die Linke possess common niche features. There are several competing definitions in the secondary literature, but the niche party brand is always conceptualized relative to mainstream actors. Generally speaking, niche actors differ in their roles in electoral institutions and the ways that they are perceived by voters (Wagner, 2012a: 864). Moreover, comparative research about mainstream and niche parties has also demonstrated that they behave differently (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008; 2010; Jensen and Spoon, 2010). In this research, niche parties are classified according to two fundamental characteristics. First, unlike their mainstream competitors, niche parties adhere to non-centrist ideologies (Adams et al., 2006). Second, there is a general consensus that niche parties address a limited number of policy issues (Mudde, 1999; Meguid, 2005, 2008; Wagner, 2012a). Such parties commonly include, but are not limited to, green, ethno-territorial, radical right and radical left actors (Wagner, 2012a).

The NPD and Die Linke are classic examples of niche parties. The NPD is a right-wing extremist actor whose ideology is staunchly nationalist. Even though the NPD has undergone some programmatic development since the 1960s, the party is foremost committed to preserving the homogenous composition of Germany's ethnic *Volksgemeinschaft* (Backes, 2007). The *Verfassungsschutz* continues to monitor the NPD as a threat to Germany's free democratic order and it is currently facing a second trial before the German Constitutional Court that could potentially ban the party altogether. The NPD also matches the niche party profile, because it has consistently addressed a small set of policy issues. Similar to other members of the radical right party family in Western Europe, opposition to immigration, asylum and multiculturalism has traditionally comprised the NPD's core issues since the 1980s (Brandstetter, 2007: 333).

Die Linke occupies the other end of the left-right political spectrum in Germany. Initially, Die Linke earned a niche profile due to its focus on social justice for East Germans in the years immediately following reunification (Hough, 2000). Yet, as the East became more integrated within the Federal Republic, the party expanded the scope of this issue to all Germans, which is reflected in its diversified voting base (Doerschler and Banaszak, 2007). The radical nature of its ideology, however, has scarcely changed. Although no longer observed by the *Verfassungsschutz*, it is largely perceived as the post-Communist successor to the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) (Bouma, 2016). Die Linke adheres to a democratic socialist ideology (March, 2011) and the party is often cited as the prototypical example of a

populist, radical left actor in European analyses (Mudde, 2004; Zaslove, 2008). Furthermore, Die Linke is more radical than its mainstream competitors due to some of its controversial perspectives about the GDR. Although the party has largely acknowledged that socialism in the German Democratic Republic was flawed and that significant contraventions of civil rights occurred, Hough et al. (2007: 18) noted that Die Linke has often been slow to condemn anti-democratic aspects of the East German regime.

The NPD's and Die Linke's radical ideologies and limited issue ownership profiles have important implications for their strategic pursuit of votes. In order to achieve their vote-seeking objectives, mainstream and niche actors are expected to utilize different strategies. On the whole, mainstream competition strategies are afforded a greater degree of maneuverability. The traditional Downsian spatial model argues that it is more beneficial for mainstream parties to develop policies that converge on the median voter (Schofield, 2004; Ezrow, 2005; Adams et al., 2006). Meyer and Wagner (2013) even note that, under certain conditions, mainstream parties elect to strategically transition between mainstream and niche profiles. In her influential monograph, Meguid (2008) revealed that mainstream parties also possess a range of strategies to counteract niche competitors. The drawback of this flexibility is that mainstream actors encounter difficult trade-offs between vote-, policy- and office-seeking objectives. On the other hand though, they can adapt their positions, issue emphasis and rhetoric more easily to the preferences of the median voter.

Compared to their mainstream opponents, niche parties have far less capacity to respond strategically to challenges in the electoral market (Meguid, 2008). The success of niche parties stems from their unique policy profiles (Spoon, 2009). Simply stated, their brands are delineated by very distinct ideologies and issue ownership reputations. Niche parties are far less likely to engage in 'riding the wave' (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994). Instead, they should benefit from a strategy which Kitschelt (1994: 118) terms 'product differentiation'. According to this assertion, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to compete on the electoral market by taking extreme positions and emphasizing primary issues. This behavior does not involve costly trade-offs. Instead, it is more consistent with interpretations of policy-seeking behavior. Due to their non-centrist ideologies and issue ownership reputations, niche parties like the NPD and Die Linke appear to possess limited strategic options.

3.5 Niche Strategy in Multi-Dimensional Party Competition

Niche parties are not completely powerless relative to their mainstream competitors though. Indeed, niche actors have the capability to act strategically as well (Elias, 2009; Alonso, 2012; Zuber, 2012; Tromborg, 2015). However, returning to the multi-dimensional structure of political space, niche strategy develops on a dimension by dimension basis. To quote Rovny (2012a: 270), "party strategies are determined by a party's attachment to political issues, which implies that different political parties have varying interests in issue dimensions." In terms of political outcomes, the costs of expected policy deviation in one dimension might be high, whereas flexibility in another might be less risky. In the end though, the goal remains the same: winning the most votes as effectively as possible. Thus, not only must niche parties weigh a different set of costs and benefits than their mainstream competitors, but they must also do so for each existing dimension in a given party system.

As the previous section already asserted, dimensions can be distinguished according to core and peripheral policy areas. When calculating the costs and benefits of their strategies in these areas, the NPD and Die Linke are guided by a combination of ideology and issue ownership reputations. Gruber (2014: 29) observes that "different strategies for different parties are to be expected depending on whether or not an issue is associated with a party's ideological profile (i.e., whether it possesses *issue ownership*)." Ideology and issue ownership possess shared features in relation to policy development. Both determinants are information shortcuts that serve as reference points and organizing principles. In reference to ideology, Budge (1994: 446) suggests that it offers party leadership an assured sense of the policy boundaries. At the same time though, they can also present structural constraints for political actors.

Voter behavior functions according to a similar logic. On core issues, voters value ideology and commitment. Whereas peripheral issues suggest an imperative for pragmatism and responsiveness (Tavits, 2007: 154). Tavits assumes that core issues are inherently cultural, whereas peripheral are economic. However, this study argues that core and peripheral dimensions are specific to each party's ideology and issue ownership profiles. In other words, the core policy areas contain primary issues that the party has traditionally emphasized in relation to its ideology. Peripheral dimensions, on the other hand, are comprised of secondary issues that do not occupy a pivotal role in the party's principle beliefs and issue ownership reputations.

In terms of actual political strategy then, the NPD and Die Linke should pursue 'product differentiation' in their core policy dimensions. Figure 2 exhibits that this strategy maximizes

the utility of both parties with minimal costs. A typical niche approach in core dimensions assures devoted activists that the party is still committed to its ideological principles. Furthermore, it supplies voters with a cheap information shortcut about the party's most important issues and positions. Based on these considerations, the failure to differentiate in core dimensions is expected to incur prohibitive costs for the NPD and Die Linke.

Figure 2 Party Strategy For Die Linke And The NPD In Multi-Dimensional Competition. Core-Dimensions Are In Bold.

In contrast, the parties do not encounter the same structural hurdles in dimensions that only cover peripheral policy issues. In these areas, the cost of policy flexibility is much lower. In reality, neither activists nor voters are likely to be informed about the parties' policies in these dimensions. Moreover, they might not even associate them with the parties in the first place. Therefore, parties are afforded more strategic flexibility in peripheral dimensions. So which policy areas constitute core and peripheral dimensions for the parties in this study?

Referring back to the previous section about the parties' niche profiles, socio-cultural issues are expected to comprise the core dimensions for the NPD. On the other hand, Die Linke's core policy dimensions consist of socio-economic issues.[4] For the NPD, the socio-cultural dimensions of political competition contains the issues that correspond the most with

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[4] Several studies have observed that there are two crucial dimensions of political competition: economic and cultural (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kriesi et al., 2008). Additional research has organized these dimensions into left-right and authoritarian-libertarian policy areas (Evans et al., 1996; Hooghe, et al., 2002), where the former is sometimes seen as the equivalent of a socio-economic dimension (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009: 312). Socio-economic issues are those that refer to the role of government in the economy and can range from socialist to capitalist (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). These include, but are not limited to, to the redistribution of income, market regulation and social programs. Socio-cultural issues are quality of life matters commonly including immigration, multiculturalism and nationalism. While the terms socio-economic and socio-cultural are treated as orthogonal here, the research acknowledges that these terms are by no means mutually exclusive. Some issues exhibit overlaps that identify economic disparities through a cultural lens, such as welfare chauvinism is a subject that seeks to prevent immigrants from accessing welfare services enjoyed by 'native' citizens.

its contemporary ideological profile. These include multiculturalism, law and order, immigration, asylum and nationalism. On the other hand, the socio-economic dimensions contain the core issues for Die Linke. The importance of economic inequality in the party's ideology is particularly relevant for welfare and social justice, but also extends to economic conditions for labor groups. Policy development for these issues in core dimensions requires enhanced attention to upholding the parties' respective brands in the eyes of activists and voters alike. As a result, the parties face higher costs if they deviate from expected policies in these issue areas.

While the NPD and Die Linke have different core dimensions, there are two policy areas which are only of secondary importance to both parties: environmental protection and foreign affairs. Although they are less salient than the socio-economic and socio-cultural policy areas, environmental protection and foreign affairs are often treated as individual dimensions that have become increasingly relevant for structuring political competition in West European party systems (Dalton, 2009; Proksch and Lo, 2012). They constitute peripheral dimensions for the NPD and Die Linke, because they do not contain issues that are central to either party's respective ideology and issue ownership reputations. Instead, these policy areas are comprised of issues that do not pose ideological constraints for either actor. Such issues are unlikely to mobilize party activists and serve as information shortcuts for voters. In effect, they do not represent integral components of the parties' electoral brands. As a result, the NPD and Die Linke are afforded a greater degree of flexibility in these dimensions and are more likely to demonstrate overlapping policies.

The previous section has concluded that, although the NPD and Die Linke might behave similarly due to their niche profiles, they are not expected to use the same strategies in all issue areas of political competition. The costs associated with this approach are simply too high. Likewise, parties are unable to take any position that will make them the most attractive to a majority of the electorate. Eventually, this will result in a loss of credibility in the minds of voters and party activists. Finally, parties are unlikely to employ an assortment of rhetorical devices. The attempt to use too many forms of persuasion might create the impression that an actor is pandering to the electorate. In the end then, which strategies do niche parties, such as the NPD and Die Linke, ultimately employ in the form of positions, salience and rhetoric? Furthermore, if and where is it possible for a far right and far left party to display similar policies?

3.6 Position Overlaps:

The peripheral dimensions of political competition contain the most potential for overlapping positions between the NPD and Die Linke. In general, parties are less inclined to distinguish their positions on issues in peripheral policy areas. This is because, unlike subjects in core dimensions, peripheral issues do not comprise an important part of their ideological outlooks (Wagner, 2012b: 83). Therefore, the parties are not required to establish positions that are consistent with their brands. Rovny (2012a: 273) has noted that it is even detrimental for parties to take clear policy positions that will draw unwanted attention to their views on peripheral issues. According to this logic then, parties are not constrained by an expected policy preference and can maneuver freely in the political space. As a result, the study arrives at an initial observable implication about potential policy overlaps:

> *Observable Implication #1: The NPD and Die Linke will demonstrate similar positions in those dimensions that do not contain their core issues.*

Within the context of the study, the NPD and Die Linke have two peripheral dimensions in common: environmental protection and foreign affairs. For the former dimension, environmental protection, it seems plausible that this policy area could contain some importance for far right and far left actors. On the far right, previous research has shown that environmental conservation is a feature of right-wing identity politics (Olsen, 1994). On the left, broader trends in Western Europe indicate that it is no longer problematic for far left parties to appeal to voters with environmental positions (March, 2016: 38).

In reality though, environmental protection has never held significance for either actor. Traditionally, Green parties throughout Western Europe have proposed the most distinguishable positions on environmental issues (Wagner, 2012b: 68). The Greens originally formed as a result of environmental activism and introduced this policy dimension before any of their mainstream competitors (Meguid, 2008: 3-4). Even when other parties attempted to address environmental protection issues, they often struggled to integrate distinguishable positions into their political programs (Dalton, 2009: 1-2). In addition, environmental protection contains valence characteristics. According to valence theory, some issues do not contain an ordered set of preferences (Stokes, 1963). Rather, all voters are likely to favor one position. Since the environment is frequently perceived as a valence issue (Szarka, 2002), a strategy of product differentiation in this dimension would be highly irrational and costly, because it would imply that either party opposes conservation measures. For the NPD and Die Linke then, there is little incentive to distinguish themselves with extreme positions in this policy area.

It could be argued that product differentiation is an appropriate strategy for the foreign affairs dimension as well. On the issue of European integration, in particular, mainstream parties throughout Western Europe have converged towards the center in support of the European project (Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002; Moss, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2008). Therefore, it stands to reason then that either the NPD or Die Linke would propose Euroskeptic positions in their Anträge that can be easily distinguished among voters. However, if it is strategically advantageous for both the NPD *and* Die Linke to demonstrate Euroskeptic preferences vis-à-vis their mainstream opponents, then this implies that the parties' positions should actually develop similar to each other. Indeed, the secondary literature has established that party positions on European integration form an inverted U-curve, in which radical actors reject the European Union (Hooghe et al., 2002; Crum, 2007). Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) found that the far right and far left both exhibit nationalist preferences that lead to a common Euroskepticism. Therefore, a second observable implication about strategic position-taking is proposed:

> *Observable Implication #2: The NPD and Die Linke will reveal similar positions in the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions.*

3.7 Position Differences:

The same set of structural constraints that enable the NPD and Die Linke to demonstrate similar positions in the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions causes differences in other policy areas. Empirical evidence for niche party structural constraints is well-documented in position analyses. Unlike mainstream parties, Adams et al. (2006) confirmed that niche actors in Western Europe were punished when they moderated their policy positions. In addition, Ezrow (2008) reached a similar conclusion and confirmed that even when niche actors entered a party system with moderate positions, they performed poorly. Meanwhile, when niche parties appeared with non-centric positions, they experienced increased electoral success. However, these studies merely analyzed party competition in the context of a single, left-right dimension.

The current study goes beyond these one-dimensional studies and argues that the NPD and Die Linke only face such structural constraints in dimensions where they are ideologically invested. As opposed to Downs' median voter theorem then, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to formulate positions according to directional models of party competition in these policy areas (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Strategically speaking, they are limited to distinctive positions in their core dimensions and must avoid the center in order to increase

voter mobilization (Macdonald et al., 1991). Hence, the study arrives at the next observable implication about position-taking:

Observable Implication #3: The parties will develop dissimilar positions for those dimensions that contain their core issues.

Upon comparing the importance of socio-cultural issues in the parties' respective ideologies, the NPD faces greater structural constraints than Die Linke in this policy area. To be sure, far left parties have traditionally proposed positions that stress solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities and they risk alienating supporters with a tougher stance on immigration. Nevertheless, McGowan and Keith (2016) observed that, despite being generally inclusive, far left parties do display some variation in their attitudes about immigration. Recent comments from party leaders in Die Linke lend some credit to this finding.[5] The point is not to say that Die Linke will express positions that overlap with the NPD in this policy area. Rather, unlike the NPD, Die Linke is not constricted by ideological considerations. For the far right, socio-cultural issues are not only at the core of the party's ideology, they also possess electoral appeal to a diverse set of supporters (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Oesch, 2008). As Van der Brug et al. (2012: 72) observed in their study about radical right voters, "at the end of the day, the radical right parties tend to attract rational voters, who want to change immigration and integration policies and maintain national sovereignty." On socio-economic issues though, the roles are reversed.

In contrast to the NPD, Die Linke faces structural constraints on the development of its positions for socio-economic issues. The far left party family is largely identified by its opposition to forms of 'neoliberal' globalized capitalism, such as trade liberalization, marketization and privatization (Keith and March, 2016: 6). Essentially, radical positions on these issues represents the far left's political brand. Recent analyses of the economic policies from far right actors have revealed similar preferences. Over time, far right parties have abandoned their support for free market economics (Derks, 2006; Kitschelt, 2004; 2007). However, this observation does not amount to a wholesale strategy of product differentiation. In multi-dimensional competition, far right parties purposely blur their positions on economic

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[5] Former party chairman and Saarland politician Oskar Lafontaine suggested that Germany should institute a limit for refugees (Denkler, 2016). In addition to the interview conducted with Frauke Petry from the AfD that was referenced in the introduction of this work, current co-chairwoman and opposition leader Sahra Wagenknecht has repeatedly expressed viewpoints that closely resemble those from a far right actor. In a December 2016 interview with the magazine *Stern*, she attributed the terror attack on a Christmas Market in Berlin to Germany's "unregulated borders" and inadequate resources for the police. Earlier in the year, Wagenknecht articulated a similar criticism against Angela Merkel's border policy in connection with a terrorist attack in Ansbach (Neuerer, 2016).

issues (Rovny, 2012a). Die Linke does not enjoy a similar degree of flexibility on socio-economic issues. If the party were to suddenly abandon its support for an enhanced welfare state and redistributive policies, this could alienate supporters and potentials alike. Due to these reasons, a final observable implication pertaining to party positions is developed:

> *Observable Implication #4: The NPD and Die Linke will exhibit dissimilar positions in the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions.*

3.8 Salience Differences

Salience theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983) suggests that the NPD and Die Linke are expected to emphasize those issues that provide them with an electoral advantage. Similarly, Riker (1993: 81-82) claims that parties must take into account so-called dominance and dispersion principles. The dominance principle implies that, when one party wins the argument on a particular issue, it continues to exploit that subject, while the other side subsequently ceases to discuss it. In contrast, the dispersion principle assumes that when both actors fail to win the argument on an issue, they each cease to discuss it and emphasize a different, more advantageous issue instead. However, as Sides (2006) notes, Riker's dominance principle does not propose how parties determine that they have an advantage on a given issue.

The current study postulates that the NPD and Die Linke possess electoral credibility advantages when they exhibit associative issue ownership in a given political dimension. Tresch et al. (2015) describe associative issue ownership as a stereotype that provokes a spontaneous identification between parties and issues in the minds of voters. Associations can develop when a party devotes consistent attention to an issue. They can also emerge as a result of extreme positions that enable the party in question to stand out (Wagner, 2012b). The current research argues that the issues which have historically received the most attention and where the parties propose their most distinctive positions are in their core dimensions. In these areas, they have established credible commitments that create information shortcuts for voters. Therefore, the study expects the following:

> *Observable Implication #5: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will primarily emphasize those dimensions that contain their core issues.*

Not surprisingly though, the NPD and Die Linke have different issue ownership profiles. As a far right actor, the NPD is foremost associated with socio-cultural issues. That said, it cannot be denied that far right parties across Europe have always devoted considerable attention to socio-economic subjects. In order to complement their preferences for demarcation on socio-cultural issues and mobilize working class voters, far right parties have intensified criticisms

of global capitalism (Bastow, 1997; Ignazi, 2003; De Lange, 2007; Betz and Meret, 2012). Although there were important phases when German far right parties stressed other policy areas (Saalfeld, 1993; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993), these actors have traditionally appeared as single-issue movements, because of their negative perceptions of immigration (Sommer, 2008). For the NPD as well, foreign immigration has been a key issue in the party's ideology (Mudde, 2000). Opposition to immigration, asylum and multiculturalism has traditionally comprised the NPD's core issues since the 1980s (Brandstetter, 2007: 333). Immigration, and cultural issues more generally, acquired greater significance in the mid-1990s when Udo Voigt became party chairman and transformed the NPD's ideology to one based on racial rather than mere German nationalism (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009: 89). The importance of preserving the homogenous composition of the nation-state's ethnic *Volksgemeinschaft* also influences policy formulation in other issue areas (Backes, 2007). The NPD can maximize its electoral appeal by emphasizing socio-cultural issues without compromising its party brand. Hence, the following observable implication has been deduced:

> *Observable Implication #5a: The NPD is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions.*

For Die Linke, on the other hand, the most effective strategy is to emphasize socio-economic issues. Not only do socio-economic issues lie at the core of the far left's ideology (March and Mudde, 2005) but, in response to the *Third Way,* far left parties have garnered support by presenting themselves as the true left actors through an emphasis on Keynsian economics and a rejection of neoliberal capitalism (Vail, 2009; Bowyer and Vail, 2011; March, 2011a). In contrast, far left parties across Europe have struggled to convince voters of their positions on socio-cultural subjects (March, 2011b), especially during the current migrant crisis. Far left parties are required to find a tenuous balance between the interests of their working class supporters with a universalist position of solidarity towards immigrant communities (McGowan and Keith, 2016: 89). This is a dilemma for left actors more generally (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012; Odmalm and Bale, 2015), but the problem is particularly acute for far left parties. As a result, the costs of stressing issues in the socio-cultural dimensions far outweigh the potential benefits. Conversely, stressing socio-economic issues is not only consistent with Die Linke's ideology, but it also provides the party an advantage among left-wing voters. Based on this rationale the next observable implication is proposed:

> *Observable Implication #5b: Die Linke is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-economic dimensions.*

3.9 Salience Overlaps

The NPD and Die Linke should abandon issues in their peripheral dimensions. Referring back to Riker's (1993: 82) dispersion principle in the previous section, he states that, when neither party dominates the argument on a political issue, both sides abandon the subject altogether. Thus, political actors are expected to strategically downplay dimensions that contain issues which are detrimental to their electoral outcomes. Simply put, focusing on unfavorable policy areas is not only irrational, but it is also a waste of resources (Sides, 2006: 411).

Nevertheless, there is some evidence which indicates that it might be strategically advantageous for the NPD and Die Linke to emphasize at least one of their shared peripheral dimensions, - namely foreign affairs. It might seem that foreign affairs is not relevant for politics at the state level. Yet, as the empirical chapters will later demonstrate, the NPD and Die Linke did address a number of foreign affairs issues that directly affected Saxony.[6] Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) posit that issues related to the EU remain under-politicized in party competition.[7] The recent financial and economic crises have only increased the incentive for the NPD and Die Linke to emphasize issues in this policy area. Hobolt and Tilley (2016) demonstrate that the various Eurozone crises have directly contributed to the rise of challenger parties across Western Europe, including far right and far left actors. They argue that voters adversely affected by crises linked to the European level are seeking to punish mainstream parties by electing challengers instead. At a time when many voters are disappointed with the status quo, it could be beneficial for the NPD and Die Linke to stress their Euroskeptic positions to a frustrated electorate.

Current political climate aside, the NPD and Die Linke are unlikely to emphasize the foreign affairs dimension. Sitter (2003) argues that Euroskepticism is defined by a government-opposition dynamic that is primarily a response to certain crises. This implies that the parties will selectively emphasize European issues when it is propitious to do so. Consequently, the

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[6] For example, the NPD proposed several initiatives pertaining to the international military use of the Leipzig-Halle Airport. For its part, Die Linke was primarily concerned about exercising the subsidiarity principle on policies stemming from the EU. Both parties also submitted Anträge containing measures that asked the Saxon government to take action at the national and European levels.

[7] Processes of Europeanization have recently blurred the boundaries between European and national affairs. However, despite this trend, the subject of European integration continues to be treated as an external issue by many national parliaments, which attempt to influence EU policy to varying degrees (Auel, 2007; Winzen, 2012; Auel and Christiansen, 2015). Raunio (2009: 305) points out that national parliaments are still "gatekeepers" of European integration. For example, subsidiarity principle allows national parliaments to forgo some integration initiatives. The relevance of EU policies in national parliamentary debates also suggests that European integration is still perceived as a foreign policy issue. In national parliaments, domestic laws and other nationally salient issues are normally debated in the full chamber while EU matters are seldom discussed in the plenary (Raunio, 2009: 317). Thus, the issues relating to the European Union are assigned to the foreign affairs dimension in this study.

NPD and Die Linke are under no obligation to continually stress their Euroskeptic positions. Based on Riker's dominance principle, it is more cost-effective for the NPD and Die Linke to de-emphasize these dimensions and focus their attention elsewhere. On account of this inconsistency, the next series of observable implications are proposed:

> *Observable Implication #6: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will both de-emphasize issues in their peripheral policy dimensions.*

> *Observable Implication #6a: The NPD and Die Linke are expected to ignore environmental protection and foreign affairs.*

3.10 Rhetorical Overlaps

The final policy strategy, rhetoric, is often overlooked in party competition research. Nevertheless, there is evidence in the secondary literature that parties must weigh the costs and benefits of their political messages. Zaller (1992) has demonstrated that partisan voters have rhetorical filters. This implies that they have the ability to reject persuasive communications that are inconsistent with their ideologies. In order to be successful then, parties must recognize these boundaries and formulate their rhetoric accordingly.

The study contends that radical parties, such as the NPD and Die Linke, have clear strategic incentives to use populism in their rhetorical appeals.[8] As opposition parties in the Saxon State Parliament and traditional political outsiders, populism can assist the NPD and Die Linke to effectively position themselves in relation to mainstream actors (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). More specifically, populism affords radical parties the opportunity to differentiate themselves vis-à-vis the cartel of dominant parties (Katz and Mair, 1995; Taggart, 1998). At a time when shared policies have increased among mainstream actors throughout Western Europe (Mair, 2013), populism offers a clear alternative with cross-cutting potential. Furthermore, existing research confirms that a correlation exists between discontent with the political status quo and support for populist actors (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2001; Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013).

Yet, at the same time populist language does not exceed the rational boundaries of political behavior that would otherwise warrant undesired electoral and, in Germany at least, legal consequences. For parties with extreme ideologies, a revised populist message can overcome negative associations with the past (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015: 3-4). The

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[8] Populism is defined here as a form of rhetoric (Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Koopmans and Muis, 2009) that is characterized by a combination of people-centrism and anti-elitism (Mudde, 2004). For a more detailed discussion about the conceptualization and measurement of populism, please refer to Chapter 8.

antagonistic structure inherent to populism facilitates the transformation. Similar to the parties'
radical ideologies, there is a Manichean worldview inherent to populism in which society is
divided into good and bad elements. Rather than addressing the proletariat or a loaded version
of the nation, a general reference to 'the people' and 'elites' can soften the images of the NPD
and Die Linke among voters. The NPD and Die Linke must be especially cautious about the
content of their radical appeals due to Germany's 'militant democracy'.[9] This point is important
for all radical actors to consider, but especially far right parties, which have attained very
limited electoral success in the post-war era (Decker and Hartleb, 2007).

Finally, and on a similar point, the NPD and Die Linke should use populism in their
Anträge, because this rhetorical style resonates with the electorate that both parties are trying
to mobilize. As the voter data will demonstrate in Chapter 4, the so-called losers of
globalization are particularly predisposed to support the NPD and Die Linke. More than other
parts of the electorate, these voters feel mistreated and believe that society is in decline. With
such negative outlooks they are particularly receptive to populist appeals. Elchardus and Spruyt
(2016: 125-26) explain that, "the decline, perceived by many, is blamed on the establishment
politicians or rather, because no convincing solution to those problems is offered by the
political establishment, people turn to populism, to belief in the solutions offered by common
sense, which are often at odds with the analysis of established parties, intellectuals and elites.
These presumed solutions can be exploited by populist politicians."

Similar to position-taking and salience, the emphasis of the NPD's and Die Linke's
populist rhetoric is determined by the strategic costs and benefits associated with each party's
core and peripheral dimensions. Therefore, it is expected that the populist appeals from the
NPD and Die Linke can be distinguished based on their corresponding ideologies. This strategy
is aided by, what Taggart (2000) labels, populism's 'chameleon-like qualities'. In effect,
populism can be articulated according to different political directions. Deeghan-Krause and
Haughton (2009) further contend that populism must be connected to other ideologies. The
combination of a general populist framework with a particular ideological spin in their core
dimensions, provides strategic advantages for party leaders. They can convey distinctive
policies with a message that is coherent enough to entice protest and non-traditional voters. On
the other hand, they can activate latent political interests among their main supporters

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[9] In German, this is commonly referred to as *wehrhafte* or *streitbare Demokratie.* According to this condition, the
German Constitutional Court reserves judicial powers under Article 9 of the Basic Law that can ban groups and
parties regarded as threats to Germany's free democratic order. The purpose of militant democracy is to prevent
the installment of a regime like that which came to power in post-war Germany.

(Vavreck, 2009: 44). Thus, the study's initial observable implication about populism is proposed.

> *Observable Implication #7: The parties' strategies are similar in that they should utilize populism more in their core dimensions of political competition.*

3.11 Rhetorical Differences

Similar to the assumptions that were posed in the previous sections about position-taking and issue salience strategies, the NPD and Die Linke have different core dimensions. Mudde (2007) argues that nearly all far right actors in Western Europe use populist appeals in their rhetoric. At the center of the far right's ideology and, therefore, its populist appeals is the homogenous nation (Mudde, 2007: 22). Far right actors are committed to preserving the homogenous composition of their country by protecting it against foreign elements through opposition to immigration, asylum and multiculturalism.

In contrast, the populist discourse from far left parties is influenced by democratic socialism (Mudde, 2004: 549-550). Therefore, left-wing populism is characterized by an emphasis on egalitarianism and the importance of economic inequity as the basis of political and social arrangements (March, 2007: 66). In contrast to the far right then, radical left parties like Die Linke do not concentrate on protecting the people from dangerous cultural elements in their populist messages. Instead, economic neoliberalism, in the form of exploitative capitalism is the primary target of their populist appeals (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015: 4). Based on the accounts in the secondary literature about the far right and far left, the next set of observable implications are proposed:

> *Observable Implication #7a: The NPD's populist arguments will emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions of political competition.*

> *Observable Implication #7b: Die Linke's populist arguments will accentuate themes in the socio-economic dimensions of political competition.*

However, the strategic use of populist rhetoric is not just about emphasis, but also degree. Here again, the NPD and Die Linke should exhibit varying strategies. In their study of Western European party systems, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015: 6) conclude that the degree of an actor's populism is dependent on its radicalism. They also note that right-wing parties are slightly more inclined to use populist discourse than left-wing actors. Normative assertions from the extant literature further indicate that the far right NPD is likely to resort to populism more than Die Linke in its parliamentary Anträge. In Western Europe, populism was initially identified as a key feature of the far right. In fact, until recently, many comparative studies in

this research area concentrated exclusively on far right parties (Van Kessel, 2015: 2). Due to the sudden political upheaval caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of communist and democratic socialist parties were forced to develop new strategies in order to appeal to voters. Compared to their radical counterparts on the far right, the far left arrived much later to the populist game. Considering that it is the level of radicalism which determines the degree of a party's populism (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015), the following claims are offered for testing:

> *Observable Implication #8: The amount of populism in the parties' Anträge will be greater for the party that is more ideologically extreme.*

> *Observable Implication #8a: The NPD should display more populism in their Anträge than Die Linke.*

Table 1 Summary Of The Previous Observable Implications That Will Be Empirically Tested In Subsequent Chapters

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Observable Implication #1: The NPD and Die Linke will demonstrate similar positions in those dimensions that do not contain their core issues.

Observable Implication #2: The NPD and Die Linke will reveal similar positions in the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions.

Observable Implication #3: The parties will develop dissimilar positions for those dimensions that contain their core issues.

Observable Implication #4: The NPD and Die Linke will exhibit dissimilar positions in the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions.

Observable Implication #5: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will primarily emphasize those dimensions that contain their core issues.
> *Observable Implication #5a: The NPD is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions.*
> *Observable Implication #5b: Die Linke is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-economic dimensions.*

Observable Implication #6: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will both de-emphasize issues in their peripheral policy dimensions.
> *Observable Implication #6a: The NPD and Die Linke are expected to ignore environmental protection and foreign affairs.*

Observable Implication #7: The parties' strategies are similar in that they should utilize populism more in their core dimensions of political competition.
> *Observable Implication #7a: The NPD's populist arguments will emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions of political competition.*
> *Observable Implication #7b: Die Linke's populist arguments will accentuate themes in the socio-economic dimensions of political competition.*

Observable Implication #8: The amount of populism in the parties' Anträge will be greater for the party that is more ideologically extreme.
> *Observable Implication #8a: The NPD should display more populism in their Anträge than Die Linke.*

3.12 Summary

This chapter has presented a strategic answer to the puzzle of policy similarities between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. In contrast to the one-dimensional similarities advanced in the German extremism theory, the chapter developed a model that predicts radical party policy similarities within the context of political competition. At the core of the study's argument, as niche actors, the NPD and Die Linke are subject to a unique set of structural constraints that should influence their behavior and, thus, the development of their policy initiatives.

Nevertheless, the model introduced in this chapter does not offer a parsimonious answer to the overall research question. The policy similarities that emerge in the Anträge from the NPD and Die Linke only extend so far. Apparent commonalities are actually much more nuanced. The very structural constraints that motivate them to pursue similar strategies in the first place, also perpetuate their strategic disparities. In the end, the fact is that the NPD and Die Linke possess fundamentally different ideologies and issue ownership reputations. Since the nature of political competition is multi-dimensional, party leaders must determine which strategies are the most effective for each issue area. In subsequent empirical chapters, the study will perform detailed content analyses that test and evaluate these very claims.

However, before those claims can be verified, the research describes the voters that the NPD and Die Linke are likely to mobilize with their supply-side strategies. Based on voter data collected from the *Politbarometer* surveys, the research argues that the parties appeal to a shared electorate. More specifically, the NPD and Die Linke frequently garner support from the so-called 'losers of globalization'. Due to their negative outlook and marginalized occupational status, such voters generally prefer demarcating policies. The NPD and Die Linke each prescribe corresponding supply-side initiatives, but they do so in different dimensions of political competition. Whereas the NPD offers demarcating policies associated with socio-cultural dimensions, Die Linke competes for these voters with demarcating policies in socio-economic dimensions.

4. Preaching to the Same Choir? Mobilizing the Losers of Globalization

This chapter deals with the 'demand side' of party competition, i.e., the desires and preferences of voters – and the relevant party leaderships' perceptions of these demands. Although this perspective is not the focus of the present thesis, it provides important contextual information for the 'supply side' of the party leaderships' signals to media, activists and voters. The potential for overlapping policies between the NPD and Die Linke is greater if the parties compete for a common set of voters. Upon first glance, the notion that the far right and far left vie for a similar subset of the electorate might seem absurd. Ramiro (2016) notes that far right and far left parties are comprised of ideologically distinct groups of core supporters. Yet, he along with other observers concedes that, while their bases are dissimilar, the possibility should not be overlooked that far right and far left parties attempt to attract a peripheral group of voters (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Keith and McGowan, 2016). An example can be found in France during the 1980s. The decline of the French Communist Party (PCF) coincided with the mass defection of working class voters to the National Front (FN) (Mayer, 2002; 2014). This transition was enhanced by the PCF's welfare chauvinist program that the party developed during the 1970s in working class constituencies (Bell and Criddle, 1989). Finally, during recent elections in Greece and Denmark, far left parties have also attempted to win support from voters that bring them into direct competition with the far right. In these instances, the only possibility for electoral expansion was to target a common set of the working class electorate (Keith and McGowan, 2016: 104).

In response to the challenges of globalization, party systems have experienced fundamental changes. Mainstream parties across Western Europe have increasingly struggled to mobilize voters. Evidence for this trend is found in declining party membership rates, voter turnout and support for mainstream parties (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015:2-3). At the same time, the vote shares for other actors have grown considerably in many countries. Not only have Green parties become permanent actors in West European political systems, but new radical right and radical left parties have emerged as well. The goal of this chapter is not to measure the various macro- and micro-levels effects of globalization that influence radical voting behavior. Rather, as part of the research's ambition to measure policy similarities, the purpose of this chapter is to determine the potential for the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke to appeal to a shared group of voters. Therefore, the chapter attempts to answer the following question: are so-called "losers of globalization" disproportionately represented among both the NPD and Die Linke?

The findings presented in this chapter describe important demand-side context about the vote-seeking behavior of the NPD and Die Linke. Also referred to as the losers of modernization theory, the losers of globalization thesis is a contested, but plausible explanation for extremist voting and the rise of radical parties. Indeed, much of the original literature about the new radical right in Western Europe argued that the far right's success could be attributed to a recently developed base comprised in part of the so-called losers (Betz, 1990; Betz and Johnson, 2004). However, there are two major gaps in the extant research. First, the losers of globalization theory has not been adequately tested (Mudde, 2007). Although it represents a plausible explanation, there remains a lack of empirical data to support its overall assumptions. Second, the empirical studies that are available do not offer a comparative focus. The existing studies that measure the impact of modernization processes stemming from globalization on radical voting behavior concentrate almost exclusively on the far right (Götz, 1997; Mughan et al., 2003; Swank and Betz; 2003; Binder, 2005; Spier, 2010). Aside from some rare exceptions (Rotte and Steininger, 2000; Niedermayer, 2006; Van Kessel and Krouwel, 2012), comparative analyses are practically non-existent. Niedermayer discovers some evidence of loser support for both parties, but this was not the specific research focus of his work and the results are largely outdated. Thus, the current analysis is important to the overall study for two reasons. Although it does not control for a number of sociological variables that could explain voting behavior, such as age, sex, religion and education, the analysis contributes to the research on radical voters in Western Europe, because it comparatively examines loser support for radical parties. In addition, it offers a valuable demand-side perspective that complements the study's understanding of radical party policy development.

A demand-side analysis about radical voters within the context of the losers of globalization theory is consistent with the study's understanding of macro-level effects that influence party competition in Western Europe. It is assumed that modernization processes propelled by globalization have initiated economic, social and political changes in many Western societies (Loch and Heitmeyer, 2001). Consequently, the destabilizing impact of these effects has also produced micro-level transformations. Whereas so-called "winners" are able to adjust to these processes, the "losers" are negatively impacted by the changes (Spier, 2006). As a result, the former exhibit preferences for integration, whereas the latter favor demarcation. Additional scholarship also foresees micro-level consequences, but distinguishes between libertarian and authoritarian values (Inglehardt, 1977; 1997; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Knutsen, 1990; Flanagan and Lee, 2003). However, both strands of literature do agree that the cross-cutting nature of globalization effects has reshaped political outlooks. In particular,

Western European party systems have experienced a decline in voter partisanship (Kriesi et al., 2008). The erosion of certain social cleavages has diminished incentives for mainstream parties, especially the center left, to mobilize specific social groups and, instead, direct their general policy appeals to societal winners. The abandoned losers are potentials for other parties to represent their modified interests. As radical actors that vehemently reject certain aspects of globalization on national boundaries, the NPD and Die Linke have been afforded a political opportunity to attract voters that are subject to relative deprivation and social breakdown.

The limited scope of the analysis aside, the results presented in this chapter reveal important findings about the electorate of the radical parties in the current study. Compared to their mainstream competitors in Germany, the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke attract the highest share of globalization losers (Loch and Heitmeyer, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008; Spier 2010). These voters express skeptical attitudes about their economic situation and belong to social classes that are negatively impacted by the integrative effects of globalization. Due to their perceived relative deprivation and loss of social status, the losers prefer policies in favor of economic, social and political demarcation. The NPD and Die Linke each articulate policy initiatives that appeal to the losers' interests. The NPD proposes a program that completely rejects the processes of globalization (Pfahl-Traughber, 1999; Hartleb, 2009). Similar to many far right parties in Western Europe, the NPD rejects mass immigration and multiculturalism. On the other hand, Die Linke supports cultural integration, but also rejects the negative social effects attributed to neoliberal capitalism (Bailey, 2016). For the losers, the party advances an appealing message that is committed to eliminating economic inequality through enhanced social justice. Ultimately, the NPD and Die Linke pursue a similar subset of voters. However, as the previous theoretical chapter argued, the parties are expected to compete differently for the losers of globalization.

The remainder of the chapter adheres to the following format. First, the theory section presents arguments from the secondary literature about the potential for the NPD's and Die Linke's electorates to be comprised of globalization losers. In the next step, the main observable implication for the analysis is deduced for testing purposes. A methods section explaining the indicators for the losers of globalization theory with questions from the German *Politbarometer* voter survey is subsequently introduced. Thereafter, a thorough examination describing the results is presented. The empirical data are supported by interviews with representatives from the NPD and Die Linke. Finally, in the discussion, the main, empirical findings are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about the importance of the results in relation to the party behavior that will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

4.1 Theory Voting Alignments and Globalization at the Macro Level

In the Downsean rational choice framework of voting, proximal considerations drive demand-side decisions. Voters are distributed along a single, left-right continuum and are expected to maximize their utility by selecting the party that is closest to their preference. In this ordered system, Downs (1957: 137) famously claims that "parties do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office". Essentially, although their movement might be bounded to some extent, parties do not discriminate between voters and develop policies in order to mobilize as much of the electorate as possible.

At the same time though, parties are also committed to policies that represent the interests of a particular electorate. Hence, political sociology models assume that parties adhere to a bottom-up approach. In other words, parties do not just consist of "teams of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office". Rather, they are believed to reflect the social conflicts that develop from historical divisions among the electorate (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Clearly defined social communities produced closed political communities. As a result, voters are considered to *belong* to their parties. Instead of using reasoned choice to assess competing alternatives, voting was perceived as an expression of identity and commitment (Mair, 2013: 78). These established social cleavages not only explain the constellation of voting alignments in West European party systems, but also the development of electoral programs. In effect, this view implies that policy is largely influenced by the preferences of the social groups that parties represent. This assumption has greatly influenced the party family literature, which attributes characteristic hallmarks to political actors (Gruber, 2014: 22).

The rational choice models and the political sociology approaches represent two distinct frameworks, yet they are not mutually exclusive. While the former is based on vote-seeking and the latter is cited as policy-seeking in nature, niche parties are expected to display a combination of both behaviors. As Chapter 3 indicated, vote maximization for niche parties implies policy-seeking behavior in some dimensions of political competition. Furthermore, both models concede that, unless some societal change transpires that provokes a widespread public grievance, major changes to the party system will not occur (Iversflaten, 2008). Without an endogenous shock, voting alignments and, consequently, supply-side appeals remain the same. It is precisely this point which helps to explain potential policy overlaps between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. The relaxation of longstanding social cleavages weakens voting alignments and creates the opportunity for other parties to mobilize a new subset of voters.

However, the stability of established cleavages during the immediate post-war decades appears to preclude the possibility of new voter alignments. Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, cleavage structures were determined according to four historically important lines of conflict: church vs. state, workers vs. owners, urban vs. rural and center vs. periphery (Bornschier, 2010b: 54-55). Although the number and salience of these cleavages varied by country, the voter composition of most parties could be attributed to one of the aforementioned conflicts. For example, Christian Democratic parties mobilized religious voters along the church vs. state cleavage and the working class disproportionately supported Social Democratic and Socialist parties following the labor conflict inherent in the worker vs. owner cleavage. Observing the relative stability of voter partisanship during this period, Bartolini and Mair (1990) supported Lipset and Rokkan's original assertion that the conflicts structuring West European party systems have remained frozen.

The current study departs from this assumption and adheres to the argument proposed by Kriesi et al. (2008) that a *dealignment* has occurred. This development is attributed to the cross-cutting impact of globalization on the lines of conflict that have traditionally structured political competition in Western Europe. At the macro level, globalization has affected the ability of the nation-state to impose constraints on developments in several key dimensions. From an economic perspective, nation-states have increasingly been confronted with the challenge to regulate the international movement of goods, capital and labor. Similarly, the relaxation of physical borders, especially within Europe, has placed cultural strains on the nation-state. Through new modicums of communication and immigration, cultural differences and identities have been amplified. Finally, the transfer of authority to supranational actors has significantly contested the ability of nation-states to effectively resolve political problems in some policy areas (Loch and Heitmeyer, 2001: 11-12). As the recent financial and migrant crises demonstrated, many European countries struggled to address these urgent issues, because they abdicated policy-making decisions to the European Union.

4.2 Voting Alignments and Globalization: Micro Level

It is relatively well-established that the macro level effects of globalization also have important micro level implications. The transition from industrial to post-industrial economies in many West European countries has contributed to the development of different attitudes about globalization and its effects. To be sure, not all people stand to benefit from globalization, because the term itself does not necessarily denote a neutral or even positive process (Spier,

2006: 35). Rather, individuals experience and react to globalization differently. While some people are better prepared to adjust to economic, social and political changes, others feel increasingly threatened by the erosion of national boundaries (Van der Brug et al., 2013: 54).

There is some evidence that the varied reactions to globalization may have produced a new structural conflict that shapes voting alignments. As individuals assess their ability to confront the changes induced by globalization, they consciously identify with one of the following groups: the so-called winners or losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008: 4). The transformation of social groups into these binary categories has created the potential for modified voting alignments in party systems. The winners, who are more likely to benefit from the changes caused by globalization, possess the necessary skills and abilities that enable them to adapt to globalization processes (Spier, 2010: 59). Therefore, they are expected to express a preference for *integration* mechanisms and the removal of national boundaries. The losers, on the other hand, are those individuals who are more likely to be negatively impacted by the same changes. Since they are more susceptible to a diminished social status and financial security (Kriesi et al., 2008: 4-5), the losers maintain a preference for *demarcation* in the form of protectionist policies that preserve national independence.

Case in point is the working class, which has been significantly affected by the structural changes that have occurred as a result of Western Europe's transformation to a post-industrial society and the rise of a new left (Kitschelt, 1994). Laborers in sectors that are exposed to enhanced competition from cheap, migrant workers and open trade borders are expected to express cultural and economic positions that are no longer consistent with the programmatic appeals from former working class parties that have 'modernized' their economic and welfare policies along the lines of 'New Labour's' 'Third Way'. Writing about the United Kingdom in the run-up to the 2015 national elections, Goodwin and Milazzo (2015: 5) assert that

> "there was a growing gulf between Labour and its traditional working-class base that was represented by a quiet but simmering anger among blue-collar Britons who felt marginalized by the onslaught of globalization, anxious about ways of life that seemed to be under threat, and cut adrift from a Labour movement that some felt had ceased to represent them."

At the same time, far right parties have benefited from the gradual dealignment between center left parties and their traditional, working-class electorates. Recent voter studies demonstrate that the electorate for many far right parties is comprised of a disproportionate amount of manual workers (Arwine and Mayer, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Oesch and Rennwald, 2010; Goodwin, 2011; Rydgren, 2012; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). In Germany, there is even some

evidence that far right attitudes have increased among trade union members, who were traditionally viewed as the Social Democrats' core constituency (Fichter, 2008). Despite the Socialist and Social Democratic parties' previous function as a channel for the collective organization of the working class, it is now common to witness these voters oscillating between far right and center left parties (Norris, 2005: 133).

The previous example reveals, however, that the mere existence of a globalization cleavage does not necessarily imply a vote for a radical party. Rather, the losers of globalization, such as the working class and unemployed, merely represent a window of opportunity to mobilize new political potentials (Spier, 2006: 38). The next section further examines why there is supply-side potential for the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke to successfully mobilize the losers of globalization.

4.3 Supply-Side Catalysts: Mainstream Party Strategy

There is some compelling supply-side evidence which suggests that the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke are effectively positioned to mobilize the so-called losers of globalization. Unlike the subjects of this study, European mainstream parties generally tend to formulate a winners' program (Kriesi et al., 2008: 16). This has created a vacuum-like effect and opportunities for new challengers in several dimensions of competition, particularly in those policy areas where a large gap exists between elite and public opinion. On the issue of migration, for example, there has traditionally been a disconnect between mass opinion and policy (Schuck, 2007). To a lesser extent, a similar situation applies to European integration. Mainstream parties have historically supported European integration, which is identified as a neoliberal construct (Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002; Moss, 2004). Thus, even though the European dimension remains under-politicized (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004), a space exists for Eurosceptic views that appeal to voters with preferences for demarcation. Elsewhere, in studies about the center left, observers have also cited the development of an economic *Third Way*. Essentially, center left actors now strive to compete against center right and green parties with a program that largely rejects post-war Keynesianism in favor of neoliberal economic policies (Kitschelt, 1994; Giddens, 1998; Lavelle, 2008; Sassoon, 2010). Where center left parties have failed to recognize the concerns of their traditional electorates, entrepreneurial new parties can exploit emerging social cleavages (Norris, 2005: 133). Finally, in the new cultural dimension, Kriesi et al. (2008: 16) assert that mainstream parties adhere to liberal, social and cultural positions. As a result of mainstream party policy similarities in these issue dimensions,

opportunities have arisen for new parties to occupy the programmatic void with some combination of traditional authoritarian values (Betz and Meret, 2012: 110).

4.4 Competing Appeals from the Far Right and the Far Left

A closer examination of both the far right and the far left suggests that these parties are well-positioned to attract votes from the losers of globalization. Initial research claimed that far right parties developed programs intended for both the winners *and* losers (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). However, in recent studies, the observation that the far right combines neoliberal economic positions with authoritarian cultural views has been criticized for being obsolete. Instead, far right parties have adjusted their economic positions to complement their authoritarian cultural beliefs, which are devoted to protecting national interests (De Lange, 2007). The new winning formula appears to be a mixture of authoritarian socio-economic and socio-cultural appeals (Kitschelt, 2004; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009; Kriesi et al., 2012). The NPD has always subscribed to a nationalist ideology that is inherently opposed to cultural outsiders (Backes, 2007). More recently, the party has complemented this traditional belief with protectionist and market interventionist policies in response to the socio-economic effects of globalization (Sommer, 2008; Grumke, 2009; Puls, 2011; Botsch and Kopke, 2013). This supply-side approach is potentially appealing to losers that demand national measures intended to regulate the flow of capital and people across Germany's borders.

The far left is also well-positioned to compete for the losers of globalization. Across Western Europe, far left parties have attempted to capture former social democrats by presenting themselves as the "real Left" (March, 2011; 2016). To be certain, far left actors are generally omitted from extant studies about the losers of globalization. However, the far left's policy proposals to alleviate inequality through Keynsian economic policy and social justice represent attractive supply-side appeals (Patton, 2006; Bowyer and Vail, 2011). Niedermayer (2006) has already demonstrated that Die Linke draws a substantial number of globalization losers. Following its merger with Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG), Die Linke acquired more working class support (Nachtwey and Spier, 2007; Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011). Viola Neu (2004) has labelled Die Linke a "social protest party" that is disproportionately comprised of the unemployed, workers and less educated. Based on the supply-side accounts about the far right and far left contained in the secondary literature, the chapter proposes the following observable implication:

> *Observable Implication: The losers of globalization are represented more among the electorates for the NPD and Die Linke than their mainstream German competitors.*

The theory section has presented arguments that produced the chapter's sole observable implication. In the next part, the chapter's methodological framework is presented for testing purposes.

4.5 Methods and Data

Before the observable implications can be tested and the results presented, the next section outlines the methodological framework of the chapter. It does so by first explaining the suitability of the *Politbarometer* voter surveys as a source of data for the current study. Once this has been established, operationalization procedures are introduced for the chapter's main variable: the losers of globalization. For testing purposes, conceptual indicators are then suggested for subjective relative deprivation and occupational status.

4.5.1 Politbarometer Voter Surveys

In testing the observable implications about the propensity for the losers of globalization to vote for the NPD and Die Linke, data from the *Politbarometer* surveys are utilized. There are several advantages to using this source. Conducted monthly since 1977 by the *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.*, the *Politbarometer* represents one of the most established data surveys available for the observation of opinions. In addition to other relevant subjects for German society, it also maintains an extensive dataset about the political attitudes of eligible German voters. Questions include opinions about parties, political leaders and the direction in which the country is headed. Another major advantage of the *Politbarometer* surveys is that, compared to other notable German social surveys such as the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), it contains a relatively large sample size of right-wing extremist voters. Although a small portion of respondents voted for the German People's Union (DVU) and *Republikaner*, this is still an enormous benefit for the study, because demand-side analyses of the far right electorate are frequently plagued by a lack of available observations (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). Finally, the data from the *Politbarometer* surveys are easily accessible via the German Social Science Infrastructure Services.

Despite the comprehensive annual data presented in the *Politbarometer* surveys for each of the years in our overall study (2009-2014), the study purposely examines voter

responses during specific periods in proximity to the state elections that are organized every five years. Hence, the sample covers phases after, between and immediately prior to the parties' most important elections. Using this approach, it is possible to analyze the consistency of voting alignments and subsequently strengthen the findings. Thus, voter responses from 2010, 2012 and 2013 were examined. The first year, 2010, captures voter sentiments following the 2009 Saxon State and 2009 German Federal Elections. The second year, 2012, exhibits voter attitudes during an electoral interlude. Finally, the 2013 data cover most of the period immediately preceding the 2013 German Federal Elections, 2014 European Parliamentary Elections and the 2014 Saxon State Elections. Although the 2013 survey has slightly more observations, due to the impending federal and European Parliamentary Elections, the total number of respondents is relatively similar for all three data points.

4.5.2 Operationalizing the Losers

For the purpose of empirically demonstrating that the losers of globalization prefer the NPD and Die Linke, a series of questions from the *Politbarometer* surveys have been selected as indicators. This process was performed according to two straightforward criteria. First, the questions must be posed on a semi-regular basis. Although *Politbarometer* polls are conducted monthly, and occasionally more often, not all of the survey questions compiled in the annual cumulative datasets are repeated. In the interests of consistency and procuring enough observations, questions that were posed in multiple months for all three years of the analysis were chosen. Second, questions were selected that correspond with the theoretical implications about the losers of globalization. Thus, the questions reflect opinions about subjective relative deprivation and occupational status in Germany (Spier, 2010: 60). Similar to the first criterion, these types of survey questions are also posed in each of the years under investigation.

The first indicator, subjective relative deprivation, is one of the most common indicators for the losers of globalization. It assumes that an individual's perceived image as a loser within society is determined by that person's proximity to the poverty line (Spier, 2010: 88). Unlike its objective counterpart, subjective relative deprivation does not rely on absolute estimations of economic poverty. These standards are often difficult to establish, because measures of poverty are numerous and often dependent on context. Instead, subjective relative deprivation assumes that individuals themselves can more effectively evaluate their personal lack of resources. Consequently, this concept is measured with questions that directly inquire about the socio-economic outlook of German voters. These include: "How would you assess your current economic situation?", "What will your economic situation be like in one year?"

and "Do you believe that your job is safe?" Each of these questions clearly asks the respondent to provide a critical assessment of their own circumstances relative to others, as opposed to an objective judgment about the German economy and job market in general.

The second indicator for globalization losers is occupational status. In his study of Die Linke's electorate after 2005, Niedermayer (2006: 527) classifies losers as individuals who are either unemployed, manual workers, unskilled or semi-skilled white collar workers and lower grade civil servants whose wages comprise the bottom one-third of the national income pyramid. This translates to an approximate gross income of less than 1500 Euro per month. Employment status and occupation group are measured then with the following questions: "Are you currently employed" and, in the event that the respondent does have gainful employment, "Are you (one of the following)…?" However, in contrast to Niedermayer, lower grade civil servants are omitted from the dataset. Due to the party's anti-democratic inclinations and ongoing surveillance by the *Verfassungsschutz*, civil servant membership in the NPD has increasingly been challenged in several German states.[10] Although civil servants are still legally permitted to become members of the NPD, they are closely monitored and, in some cases, have even been pressured to resign from their posts. Under such circumstances, it appears improbable that a voter attachment between civil servants and the NPD can be established in the survey data. Based on this rationale, the socio-economic class of globalization losers is restricted to the unemployed, manual workers and unskilled or semi-skilled white collar employees.

In addition to the NPD and Die Linke, the selected indicators for the losers of globalization are also measured for the mainstream parties. These include the CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP and the Greens. Not only have all of these parties held elected office at the national level, but aside from the obvious exception of the CSU, they were all represented in the Saxon State Parliament during the 5th legislative period. Although *Politbarometer* polls for approximately 15 parties each year, smaller parties were also excluded for an additional reason. The results for these actors are dramatically distorted due to relatively limited sample sizes. Nevertheless, the data for all of the examined parties is weighted against the total number of responses included in each *Politbarometer* survey. Thus, the results are presented as frequencies within the overall sample of observations.

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[10] See for example: "Behörden dürfen Rechtsextremisten befeuern", (Die Zeit) September 6, 2012.
<http://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2012-09/kuendigung-staatsdiener-npd>.

4.6 Results

The subsequent analysis is divided into three parts that reveal the potential for the NPD and Die Linke to appeal to the losers of globalization. The initial series of empirical findings examines the indicators for subjective relative deprivation in the *Politbarometer* data. It is followed by a second dataset that provides results for the relationship between occupational status and party choice. In a final part, the empirical results are supported by interviews with parliamentary representatives from both parties. The combination of raw data from the *Politbarometer* surveys and interviews with legislators enables the research to provide a comprehensive picture of the potential for the parties to mobilize the same electorate.

4.6.1 Subjective Relative Deprivation

The empirical analysis confirms that the NPD and Die Linke tend to attract more globalization losers than their mainstream competitors. This inference is especially valid for the measurement of subjective relative deprivation. The data displayed in Table 2 reveals that voters for the NPD and Die Linke are more likely than other electorates to perceive their economic situation as poor. This attitude remains constant for each of the years that the respondents were asked to assess their economic status.

Table 2 How Would You Rate Your Current Economic Situation? Is It...

	2010			**2012**			**2013**		
	Good	Somewhat Good	Bad	Good	Somewhat Good	Bad	Good	Somewhat Good	Bad
CDU/CSU	58.54	35.50	5.70	64.30	31.38	4.32	67.11	28.95	3.94
SPD	48.32	42.55	8.88	53.75	38.61	7.64	54.70	38.72	6.58
FDP	55.17	37.23	7.60	63.60	31.45	4.95	66.75	28.56	4.68
Die Linke	35.15	44.78	19.89	41.33	42.11	16.56	42.97	43.48	13.55
Greens	56.67	36.22	7.03	60.09	33.52	6.39	62.18	30.70	7.12
NPD	27.78	48.82	23.39	43.41	36.94	19.65	36.74	30.49	32.78

Source: V3B, V28 (Jung et al., 2015a), V3B, V19 (Jung et al., 2014), V3B, V18 (Jung et al., 2015b).

Additionally, NPD and Die Linke voters are more likely to maintain this outlook compared to the German electorate as a whole. Indeed, in each of the survey years, the number of NPD and Die Linke supporters who responded that they are in bad economic circumstances is at least twice the national average. In 2013, the amount of NPD voters with this opinion (32.78) was actually five times the national mean (6.25). As Table 2 also demonstrates, it hardly seems surprising then that both parties consistently have the fewest number of voters that rate their

economic position as good. Relative to other voters then, supporters of the NPD and Die Linke are more likely to negatively perceive their economic situation.

Voters from the NPD and Die Linke are not only pessimistic about their current economic situation, they also harbor negative outlooks about the future as well. When asked to predict their economic circumstances in one year, Table 3 shows that those respondents favoring the NPD and Die Linke were more apt to assume that they will be worse off than voters from other parties. Similar responses were provided when asked about their current economic situation. NPD and Die Linke supporters expected their relative financial standing to diminish for each survey year. This feeling was so pervasive that, as Table 3 illustrates, both parties' voters eclipsed the national average in all three years. In 2013, NPD voters were twice as likely to expect declining economic prospects compared to the remainder of the electorate. In addition, the frequency of negative outlooks among NPD and Die Linke voters was roughly twice the amount for every party except the SPD. This is an interesting finding, which suggests that the SPD could still be considered a viable electoral alternative for some voters that have demarcation preferences. Indeed, it partially supports the claim that center left parties retain working class support when economic issues are salient (Arzheimer, 2012). Ultimately though, the NPD and Die Linke are far more liable to attract voters that are experiencing subjective relative deprivation than any other major political actor in Germany.

4.6.2 Occupational Status

The measurement of occupational status largely confirms the observable implication that the losers of globalization prefer the NPD and Die Linke over the mainstream parties. The data displayed in Table 4 substantiates that the NPD and Die Linke receive far more votes from the unemployed than any of their major political competitors. Each year both parties register 2-3 times the amount of electoral support from unemployed voters than their next nearest rival. Of course, this discrepancy extends to a comparison with the average ratio of unemployed voter support for all parties. In 2012, the NPD received more than 4 times the amount of support from unemployed voters (10.64) than the average total for voters from all other German parties (2.32). Both of these findings indicate that the demarcating policies from the NPD and Die Linke resonate especially well with these particular losers of globalization.

Taken as a whole, voters in vulnerable employment sectors also tend to prefer the NPD and Die Linke. This outcome corroborates similar results for both parties in previous research (Niedermayer, 2006). Since Niedermayer's study analyzed voter data from 2005, the present study can establish that the NPD and Die Linke have maintained their appeal among these

groups. First though, it is interesting to note that, regardless of occupation, the NPD and Die Linke garner the most votes from respondents who believe that their job status is in doubt. Table 4 shows that the parties always occupy either the first or second positions among the most competitive German parties. For manual workers, Table 4 exhibits that both parties receive the largest amount of support in all of the survey years. Thus, the empirical results do lend credibility to the assumptions in the extant literature that there has been a dealignment between the working class and center left parties. However, unlike the previous indicators, the disparity between radical and mainstream actors is much less. The SPD, and even to some extent the CDU/CSU, also obtain votes from low-skilled manual workers in Germany. This confirms other research suggesting that, although a dealignment has occurred, workers have not entirely abandoned mainstream parties on the left (Arzheimer, 2012). Rather, depending on the circumstances, they alternate between center left and radical parties.

Table 3 What Do You Believe Your Economic Situation Be In One Year? Do You Expect That Your Economic Situation Will Be……

	2010			**2012**			**2013**		
	Better	Same	Worse	Better	Same	Worse	Better	Same	Worse
CDU/CSU	21.03	64.41	12.91	14.52	70.48	15.00	15.71	72.46	11.82
SPD	15.72	61.15	21.70	15.13	65.50	19.37	16.33	66.51	17.16
FDP	23.46	60.35	15.22	23.90	61.30	14.81	23.72	62.46	13.82
Die Linke	16.63	51.15	30.55	12.20	57.04	30.76	15.83	57.74	26.43
Greens	18.43	64.20	16.49	16.11	68.74	15.14	17.43	70.41	12.16
NPD	25.56	40.57	32.17	24.57	43.02	32.41	21.61	47.35	31.04

Source: V3B, V29 (Jung et al., 2015), V3B, V20 (Jung et al., 2014), V3B, V19 (Jung et al., 2015).

Table 4 What Is Your Occupational Status? Do You Believe That Your Job Is At Risk?

	2010				**2012**				**2013**			
	Unemployed	Worker	Low-skilled	Job at risk?	Unemployed	Worker	Low-skilled	Job at risk?	Unemployed	Worker	Low-skilled	Job at risk?
CDU/CSU	2.20	8.18	14.89	5.89	1.65	8.16	14.91	9.91	1.45	7.19	13.64	9.19
SPD	3.22	9.43	16.03	8.07	1.97	9.93	16.69	13.74	2.16	9.98	15.99	13.03
FDP	2.11	4.99	12.89	8.48	2.09	3.94	13.17	10.14	1.12	5.86	10.55	8.92
Die Linke	7.99	10.31	16.07	13.42	7.39	11.91	17.95	19.24	5.44	10.54	17.18	18.16
Greens	2.66	4.45	13.38	8.64	1.55	4.05	13.76	12.27	2.78	3.08	13.92	13.33
NPD	9.59	10.24	9.14	27.13	10.64	9.43	16.69	16.32	7.13	12.43	15.23	22.37

Source: V3B, VK, VL, VK1 (Jung et al., 2015a), V3B, VK, VL, VK1 (Jung et al., 2014), V3, VK, VL, VK1 (Jung et al., 2015b).

The results for semi-skilled white collar workers reveal consistently high support for Die Linke. As Table 4 demonstrates, Die Linke earned the most voters from this group in all of the survey years. Conversely, the NPD actually received the least amount of electoral support from semi-skilled white collar workers in 2010. Yet, the party did strengthen its appeal among this group during the final two years of the sample with frequencies of 16.69 and 15.23 respectively. Similar to the data on manual workers though, the high frequencies for the NPD and Die Linke do not necessarily imply that the parties have a monopoly on support from semi-skilled white collar workers. The Social Democrats polled the same or better than the NPD in all of the sample years. A vote for the CDU/CSU or Greens is also not out of the question. Their lack of dominance among certain occupations notwithstanding, the favorable empirical results presented in this voting analysis signify that the NPD and Die Linke still have ample motive to target the losers of globalization.

4.6.3 The Parties' Perceptions of Their Voters
Original interviews with party leaders from the NPD and Die Linke in the Saxon State Parliament substantiate the empirical data. While the parties have disparate groups of supporters, representatives also acknowledge that the so-called losers of globalization can comprise an important part of their electorates. Klaus Tischendorf from Die Linke claimed that the CDU in Saxony has captured many such voters in recent years and that his own party has been able to attract more middle class support. However, he also concedes that Die Linke has traditionally appealed to the losers of globalization and does not deny that the party continues to mobilize this group.[11] Dr. Dietmar Pellmann also confirmed that Die Linke performs well among the unemployed and those on social welfare benefits, even though he sees room for improvement.[12] Finally, Enrico Stange made the most direct claim that the NPD and Die Linke pursue similar voters. He stated that, while regrettable, a portion of Die Linke's support in Saxony comes from swing voters who gravitate between the NPD and his own party.[13]

Representatives from the NPD were also aware that the losers of globalization are an important demographic for the party. Arne Schimmer vociferously denied that the NPD is strictly a party for the unemployed. Yet, he conceded that this is an important voting bloc for the party

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[11] Interview with Klaus Tischendorf, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden).
[12] Interview with Dr. Dietmar Pellmann, Die Linke (10.07.2014, Dresden).
[13] Interview with Enrico Stange, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden).

and that the majority of NPD voters are certainly not middle class.[14] Parliamentary Whip Dr. Johannes Müller described voters for the National Democrats as "feeling like their livelihood was threatened" and as if they are "coming away with less and less of that which they earn".[15] This certainly corresponds with the type of subjective relative deprivation that is an indicator for those individuals adversely affected by globalization. Lastly, Jürgen Gansel noted that NPD voters consist of the "little people" in German society (*kleine Leute*). He took pains to express that this term does not have a negative connotation. Rather voters for the NPD are often those who have to work hard to make a living and are highly sensitized to social injustices. Gansel contrasted the typical NPD voter to university employees with high incomes that support the Greens and other such left parties.[16]

4.7 Discussion

This chapter further explored party competition between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. Unlike the previous chapters, however, the motivation for this analysis was to explore *demand-side* overlaps. In response to voting dealignments in West European party systems and the emergence of a new cleavage, the chapter specifically concentrated on the ability of both actors to attract the so-called losers of globalization. The results of the study were strengthened by an established dataset, namely the *Politbarometer* surveys that are regularly conducted throughout Germany. The *Politbarometer* surveys are an ideal source for the measurement of globalization losers, because of the frequent polling and relatively large sample size for both parties. Although the data does not consider other variables that might also explain a vote for a radical party, they do provide first insights about the potential for both the NPD and Die Linke to mobilize globalization losers. The empirical data are supplemented by exclusive interviews with leaders from each party that offer firsthand insights about how the NPD and Die Linke perceive this electorate. Representatives from both sides confirmed that the parties are not only aware of their ability to attract the losers, but that there exists a potential for overlapping electorates. The chapter makes a contribution about the study of radical party electorates and the potential for policy position similarities that guide the supply-side analyses for the overall study.

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[14] Interview with Arne Schimmer, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden).
[15] Interview with Dr. Johannes Müller, NPD (12.06.2014, Dresden).
[16] Interview with Jürgen Gansel, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden).

First, the research fills a gap in the secondary literature, because it *comparatively* examines the ability of radical parties to mobilize the losers of globalization. Previous research either concentrated exclusively on far right voters (Götz, 1997; Mughan et al., 2003; Swank and Betz; 2003; Binder, 2005; Spier, 2010) or indirectly analyzed both groups (Rotte and Steininger, 2000; Niedermayer, 2006; Van Kessel and Krouwel, 2012). The limited focus notwithstanding, the findings presented here determined that the losers of globalization tend to prefer the NPD and Die Linke more than their mainstream competitors. Voters that were classified as unemployed, manual laborers and semi-skilled white collar workers often favored both radical parties. Furthermore, those voters with gainful employment that were concerned about their job security overwhelmingly preferred the NPD and Die Linke. Other survey questions that measured subjective relative deprivation yielded similar outcomes. For example, respondents who believed that their economic situation was already bad and likely to worsen in the following year also expressed the most support for the NPD and Die Linke. The voter data describes a logical alignment between the losers of globalization and radical parties. The losers possess preferences for market regulation, protectionism, organized borders and a strong national state. Unsurprisingly, they largely reject mainstream actors that espouse neoliberal economics, multiculturalism and enhanced European integration. Instead, this group often chooses parties, such as the NPD and Die Linke, which endorse national boundaries in some policy dimensions. Future analyses could strengthen the explanatory value of the losers of globalization theory by testing for additional variables, such as age, sex, religion and education.

In addition, the demand-side evidence contained in this chapter establishes important supply-side implications about party competition between radical parties that will be investigated in later chapters. In effect, the results suggest that the NPD and Die Linke each have strong incentives to target a similar subset of the electorate. The losers of globalization, many of whom were once staunchly aligned with the center left SPD, represent new political potentials for both parties. This point has not been lost on the actors themselves. After the Hartz-IV reforms that were initiated by the Schröder government, the NPD and Die Linke openly acknowledged each other as political rivals for the losers of globalization. For example, former party chairman Udo Voigt conceded that the NPD identified Die Linke voters as a potential electorate due to their general dissatisfaction with the dismantling of social services and growing unemployment among other

issues (Botsch and Kopke, 2013). Die Linke responded with campaign posters declaring that the word social justice "is written without the letters N.P.D!"[17]

At the same time though, appeals to voters with demarcation preferences can be applied broadly. As the theory section in this chapter already discussed, globalization has cross-cutting effects. Consequently, the demand-side preferences for national boundaries can exist across various policy dimensions. This affords niche actors like the NPD and Die Linke a greater degree of flexibility in the development of their respective policies. Similar to the Weimar Republic case presented in Chapter 2, the study anticipates that the parties will follow strategies that maximize their electoral benefits with minimal costs. Under these conditions, the NPD should attempt to mobilize the losers with policies that emphasize cultural demarcation, whereas Die Linke is expected to stress economic demarcation.

Overall, this chapter concludes that the NPD and Die Linke mobilize votes among a shared part of the German electorate. The losers of globalization i.e., voters who are characterized by their vulnerable occupation status and subjective relative deprivation, demonstrate preferences for demarcation. In turn, both the NPD and Die Linke express supply-side demarcation policies that appeal to these voters. In the succeeding chapters, the study will examine how the NPD and Die Linke develop their respective policies by comparatively analyzing positions, issue salience and rhetoric in their respective Anträge. However, prior to testing the observable implications that were proposed in the theory chapter, the methodological framework that guides the empirical analysis is subsequently outlined.

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[17] The original slogan from the PDS.Die Linke at the time reads in German as „Sozial gerecht schreibt sich ohne N.P.D!"

5. Design of the Study: Data and Methods

The following chapter summarizes the methodological framework applied in the current research. It describes four overarching components of the approach that are integral to each of the subsequent empirical analyses. First, the chapter aims to explain the case selection. To this end, arguments are provided that support an examination of the NPD's and Die Linke's parliamentary groups in Saxony. Thereafter, the focus shifts to the source of data. Thus, in the second section, the chapter introduces several reasons that explain why legislative motions are an appropriate source of measurement for party policies. In a third step, the chapter considers the methodological advantages of performing a content analysis. Finally, the last part of the chapter discusses the additive scales according to which positions, salience and rhetoric are evaluated in each political dimension.

5.1 Choosing the Parties: Why the NPD and Die Linke?

A comparative analysis of radical parties in Germany is almost certain to encounter case selection difficulties. As the previous chapters have already alluded to, Germany's unique historical experiences with political extremism have had a substantial influence on attitudes towards contemporary actors. As a result, they have also impacted the very prevalence of notable radical actors in post-war German politics. Prior to reunification, far right and far left parties in West Germany failed to achieve sustained electoral success. Apart from the NPD's entrance to a handful of state parliaments in the late 1960s and the brief relevance of the *Republikaner* under Franz Schönhuber, radical parties were foremost recognized for receiving bans from the German Constitutional Court.[18] Although Die Linke recently emerged as a stable political actor on the far left, far right parties remain less established. At a time when far right actors have been increasing their vote shares throughout most of Western Europe, Dolezal (2008b) has labelled Germany as "the dog that didn't bark". This discrepancy obviously poses case selection problems for a comparative study of radical actors.

Despite such challenges, however, there are two important conditions that speak in favor of a comparative study about radical party overlaps that analyzes the cases of the NPD and Die

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[18] Indeed, the far right *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (SRP) was the first party to be banned in 1949. Seven years later, the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* met a similar fate. Since then, no other party has been prohibited by the German Constitution Court, even though the NPD is currently being tried for the second time in fifteen years.

Linke – without understanding the differences between the parties. First, both actors' ideologies correspond with their heuristic labels, which are situated beyond the political mainstream in the left-right party spectrum. In contrast to center left actors such as the SPD, far left parties are characterized by their criticism of contemporary capitalism and preference for the redistribution of income (March and Mudde, 2005). Die Linke not only adheres to a similar ideology (March, 2011), but the party is often cited as the prototypical example of a radical left actor in European analyses (Mudde, 2004; Zaslove, 2008). At the center of its party program, Die Linke advocates the restoration of social justice for the people by increasing economic equality (Pauwels, 2014). Unlike its center left competitor, the SPD, Die Linke has been consistently opposed to capitalism and the privatization of social welfare programs.

Far right actors are committed to defending 'the people', defined in ethno-cultural and partly racial terms, against foreign elements who attempt to distort the nation through immigration, asylum and multiculturalism. Some observers have even labeled far right actors as anti-immigrant parties, because their fervent nativist hostility towards perceived outsiders distinguishes them from their competitors (Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2000; Gibson, 2002). The NPD also subscribes to a nationalist ideology that is determined to preserve an exclusionist nation-state. Uwe Backes (2007) notes that preserving the homogenous composition of the nation-state's ethnic *Volksgemeinschaft* influences policy formulation in other issue areas. Consequently, since the late 1970s, foreign immigration has been a key issue in the NPD's ideology (Mudde, 2000).

Second, both parties signify the most electorally successful actors on their respective ends of the ideological spectrum. Several short intervals notwithstanding, Die Linke has been represented in the *Bundestag* since 1994. Furthermore, it maintains seats in more than half of all state parliaments and presides over the third largest membership total of any German party. In contrast, the extreme left German Communist Party (DKP) and the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) have never been elected to a state parliament and possess a combined membership that is only a fraction of that from Die Linke.[19] In many instances, DKP and MLPD leaders encourage their supporters to vote for Die Linke and even allow their members to join the

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[19] The most recent statistics reveal that 60,551 individuals belonged to Die Linke in 2014. In contrast, the DKP and MLPD have a combined membership of approximately 4,200 people according to the Office for the Protection of the German Constitution.

latter's ticket (Bergsdorf and Van Hüllen, 2011; Oppelland and Träger, 2014; Pfahl-Traughber, 2014).

On the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, the NPD became the most recognized far right actor in contemporary German politics after its stunning state election victories in Saxony (2004) and Mecklenburg West-Pomerania (2006). It was subsequently re-elected to both state parliaments five years later and has one representative currently serving in the European Parliament. Aside from the AfD, there is no other far right party that can match the NPD's electoral achievements in recent history. Although the NPD's membership numbers have been steadily declining, it still claims more supporters than nearly all other far right parties and has established several electoral strongholds. Similar to Die Linke, it boasts a stable voter base in eastern Germany. For example, despite failing to surpass the 5 per cent electoral threshold at the 2014 Saxon State Elections, the NPD still garnered more than 83,000 direct votes.

The dual criteria of electoral success and ideological positioning along the left-right party spectrum prompts the following question: why is the NPD included in the study instead of the AfD? From an electoral standpoint, the AfD certainly provides a compelling case. However, as a relatively new party, it still remains unclear where precisely the AfD is located in the left-right ideological spectrum and if it can be classified as a typical far right actor (Lewandowsky, 2015; Franzmann, 2016; Lewandowsky et al., 2016). Indeed, despite an increasing amount of nationalist overtures, much of the scholarly literature perceives the AfD primarily as a Euroskeptic party (Arzheimer, 2015; Berbuir et al., 2015). Thus, while the AfD continues to experience internal struggles about its programmatic identity, the NPD better suits the selection criteria.

5.2 Why the Saxon State Parliament?

The Saxon State Parliament represents an ideal setting to examine policy similarities between the NPD and Die Linke. A study that focuses on parliamentary group behavior is also appropriate for an analysis of policy position commonalities, because of the vital role that *Fraktionen* play in contemporary party organizations. Mair and Katz (2014: 453-454) argue that the party in public office has achieved the most important status within the overall party apparatus. This can be attributed to two important developments. First, a growing number of parties have participated in government, which enhances the authority of the party in public office. Second, party organizations increasingly rely upon state subsidies instead of grass-roots donations. These

monetary resources are often disbursed according to the needs of the party in office and fund legislative jobs that can be bestowed upon loyal supporters. Mair (2013: 96) asserts that "to the extent which more and more of a party's activities are centered within parliament, these funds play an ever more important role in specifying the identity of the party and defining its role within the wider party system."

A cursory review of the party and parliamentary leadership for the main actors in this study confirms the importance of the party in public office. During interviews, most parliamentarians were quick to point out that they were not speaking as representatives of the *Partei*, but rather as members of their respective *Fraktion*. However, despite claims that they should not be conflated, the positions of some members could hardly be distinguished, especially among the party leadership. In Saxony, the party chairman also served as the leader of the parliamentary group on multiple occasions for the NPD and Die Linke. During the time period analyzed in this study, Rico Gebhardt (2012-14, Die Linke), Holger Apfel (2009-13, NPD) and Holger Szymanski (2013-14, NPD) simultaneously held both positions. Based on the theoretical and firsthand evidence presented here, it is assumed that the initiatives proposed by the *Fraktionen* are representative of the importance for the entire party insofar they define overall party policy.

The program of state level branches in Germany closely resembles the policies of the national party apparatus. Of course, Germany's federal system produces slight variations among party organizations. As Bräuninger and Debus (2012) demonstrated, the SPD in Bavaria, for example, is not an exact replica of the SPD in Lower Saxony. State party organizations develop in accordance with regional and historical traditions. Nevertheless, state parties are strongly influenced by the policy formulations developed at the national level. In Germany, Müller (2013) established that sub-national party branches tend to "toe the line" and only adjust their positions in response to changes in the national party's doctrine. In other words, they adhere as much as possible to the national party brand. Therefore, the study follows the assumption that the guiding political principles contained within the NPD's and Die Linke's national programs are reflected in their policies for Saxony.

A specific analysis of the NPD and Die Linke in Saxony is appropriate for several reasons. Most importantly, both parties were represented in the Saxon State Parliament. The NPD and Die Linke were each seated from 2004 through 2014. This is quite unusual for Germany where there has never been a far right party represented in the Bundestag. As opposed to Mecklenburg-

Pomerania, a comparative analysis of the parties in Saxony has more advantages, because the parties are likely to demonstrate similar political behavior. For the NPD, the Saxon parliamentary group was active in the state legislature, whereas the NPD representatives in Mecklenburg-Pomerania mostly maintained a symbolic presence. Thus, Saxony also poses an additional methodological advantage, because it contains a larger data set for the NPD in the form legislative productivity, such as bills, motions and speeches. Furthermore, as Chapter 3 already alluded to, both parties were firmly entrenched in the opposition during the research period in question. In Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, on the other hand, Die Linke was a viable coalition partner for the Social Democrats and even shared office with the SPD from 2002 to 2006. As a result, Die Linke's policy development in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania might be influenced by office-seeking incentives. The diverse constellation of political actors in the Saxon State Parliament presents a further argument in favor of Saxony, because it reflects the current ideological composition of the German party system. During the 5th legislative period, the CDU, Die Linke, SPD, FDP, Greens and NPD were all represented. Out of this group, the NPD and Die Linke occupied arguably the most extreme positions on a left-right scale. Finally, Saxony's unique position in German current affairs makes it a compelling environment in which to study radical actors. The state has been a hotbed for political activism in recent years. In particular, it has often served as the setting for backlash against the German government's asylum and immigration policies. Dresden has served as the epicenter of the highly contentious (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) demonstrations that express many far right narratives, which have the potential to resonate with voters from Die Linke as well (Meisner, 2015). In sum, the Saxon State Parliament is an ideal case for comparatively analyzing radical party policies, because multiple factors can be held constant, namely both the NPD and Die Linke were simultaneously represented, in the opposition and occupied the same policy space.

The study focuses on the 5th legislative session (2009-2014) in the Saxon State Parliament, because it was both the most recent and stable period of analysis for each actor. During the 4th legislative session from 2004 to 2009 the NPD and Die Linke were equally affected by major internal shocks. In 2007, Die Linke incurred a significant leadership change when parliamentary group chairman Peter Porsch was forced to step down after it was revealed that he had been involved with the East German Stasi. André Hahn managed to stabilize the fraction, but the scandal surrounding Porsch's departure and the absence of his leadership after 13 years in that position

were distractions from the party's legislative work. Organizational turmoil in the NPD was even more severe. In 2004, the fraction consisted of 12 representatives. However, by the end of the 4th legislative session, the NPD's parliamentary group was reduced to 6 members due to various resignations, scandals and one mortality. In contrast, only one major internal shock occurred during the period from 2009 to 2014 when Holger Apfel was expelled from the NPD in late 2013. Thus, in the interests of evaluating the most current policy initiatives and avoiding major disruptions to legislative productivity, the 5th legislative period is analyzed.

5.3 Data Collection

Selecting a suitable data source poses an additional methodological challenge to the measurement of radical party policies. Data generation for the measurement of party preferences can roughly be divided between reputational, behavioral and document-driven data (Ray 2007). Ray suggests that self-reported data, such as the *Eurobarometer* polls, constitute a fourth source, but these are derived from demand-side information and not considered in this section. In regards to the actual measurement of party policies, however, the range of sources in the secondary literature is essentially limited to four options: expert surveys, roll-call votes, manifestos and media texts. To be certain, these sources have been examined primarily for the purpose of measuring party positions. However, they are comparatively analyzed here for each of the policy tools contained in the research.

Expert surveys can gather data on a range of subjects and are highly resource efficient. Additionally, the participants who judge party positions are considered experts in their field and are expected to reasonably infer preferences on a range of issues. For research questions that focus on intra-party politics, for example, conducting an expert survey is a useful technique for analyzing factions that cannot be evaluated in standard party documents. Nevertheless, expert surveys are prone to several notable disadvantages. It is difficult to retrospectively collect data from expert surveys and chart points over time due to their time-specific dimensions. Furthermore, the validity of expert surveys is challenged by the actual content that experts are assumed to be measuring. This could include, for example, judging behavior rather than observed party preferences (Volkens, 2007: 117). Moreover, despite their expert label, it is doubtful that many observers are completely familiar with the entirety of the far right's ideological program in Germany. The limited success of these parties makes them more challenging to observe, especially over time. As

a result, the data contained in expert surveys can be prone to wide confidence intervals around the recorded point estimates, which raises doubts about their validity.

Roll-call votes are considered an excellent source for party policy preferences. For the most part, they have been applied in American legislative studies that compute ideological scales to determine spatial positions for members of Congress (Ray, 2007: 18). Unlike expert surveys and media texts, roll-call votes provide direct observations about a party's preferred policies. Although they only represent one aspect of legislative activity, roll-call votes convey the policy-making decisions that parties are required to make. Otjes and Louwerse (2015: 67-68) note that "as parties vote on the same issues, voting behavior is a good indicator of how often these parties behave in a similar way". Additionally, in many legislatures, party unity is very high, which minimizes the potential that representatives vote against the party line.

Despite the value that roll-call votes contribute to research about party discipline and behavior in a legislative setting, these data are not well-suited for the current study. The main problem is sample bias. In many parliaments, only a minority of issues are actually decided by recorded roll-call votes (Saalfeld, 1995; Thiem, 2009; Hug, 2010; Crisp and Driscoll, 2012). Furthermore, the rules for requesting a roll-call vote vary for regional parliaments in Germany (Stecker, 2010). On those issues where a roll-call vote is requested, they are selected by a purposive actor who has a particular interest in revealing legislative behavior to a larger audience (Carrubba et al., 2008: 544). Based on all of these related factors, there is a high potential for sample bias in roll-call vote data, which challenges the researcher's ability to accurately infer legislative behavior.

The first significant text source, the election manifesto, is often considered the preeminent source for the examination of party policies. Manifestos detail the party's core beliefs and outline initiatives that should be enacted upon election to public office. Also referred to as election programs, manifestos are usually 20-80 pages long and are published for regional, national and supra-national elections (Volkens et al., 2009: 237). Due to their length, manifestos cover a range of issues and can be observed for extensive time periods. In contrast to expert surveys and media texts, manifestos obviously do not share a penchant for external subjectivity, but rather they possess a greater degree of impartiality. Factions aside, electoral programs are primary sources comprised of direct statements about core beliefs and goals that have been approved by the party leadership.

The primary shortcoming of manifestos for this research can be attributed to their infrequent publication. Manifestos are produced every 4-5 years depending on the electoral contest, and basic party programs do not adhere to a consistent schedule. For example, the NPD did not produce a substantively new program between 1996 and 2010. During that same time period though, party chairman Udo Voigt introduced numerous policy changes that clearly distinguish the contemporary NPD from its predecessor (Brandstetter, 2013). Thus, unlike media texts, manifestos are unable to convey parties' policies on current issues that they are routinely required to address, which limits their ability to accurately reflect party competition. Moreover, manifestos are scarcely read and their contents are occasionally reported in media outlets prior to an election.

The final text source for inferring party policies is media articles. News articles have a distinct advantage over manifestos, because they are released more frequently and can thus measure short-term policy preference changes more accurately. This aspect is crucial, because in reality, parties are forced to develop preferences in response to new issues that might stem from exogenous events. News articles also possess an extensive readership. Despite the overall trend away from print media, newspaper articles reach a larger audience than party manifestos. Moreover, media articles are an excellent source for time-series studies that track long-term party policy changes.

Advantages aside, media texts also suffer from subjectivity and availability. Helbling et al. (2010) claim that media articles do not possess bias in the accuracy of their content. However, most prominent studies that analyze media texts with the intention of measuring party policies only include mainstream actors. In the German context, selection bias has a significant impact on the availability to accurately portray parties as well. The NPD is often intentionally ignored out of fear that the party's message will be disseminated to a larger audience. For example, in the weeks preceding the 2014 Saxon State Elections, the *Sächsische Zeitung* established a database that compiled information about the various candidates and their respective positions in all of the state's election districts. The NPD was not included in this project, despite the fact that they were elected to the previous two legislatures. While opponents and democracy advocates might applaud this approach, the researcher is confronted with a predisposed data source. On the other hand, when the media does report about the NPD, coverage is mostly limited to the party structure and provocations.

In general, media texts are exposed to political biases that are the consequence of ideological orientations in newspaper editorial lines. Therefore, many studies that analyze media articles include one left- and one right-wing newspaper or tabloid, in order to account for potential prejudices. However, increasing the number of sources merely extends the process of collecting relevant texts. Collecting articles is already a time-consuming endeavor and, depending on the timeframe of analysis and the saliency of an issue, a large number of texts might have to be analyzed.

After reviewing the various data sources for the measurement of party policies, each source contains both notable advantages and disadvantages. Essentially, the selection of a data source is dependent upon the nature of the individual research project. For example, expert surveys are not appropriate for a time series analysis of party policies, whereas manifestos are a poor source for investigating intra-party dissent. While recognizing the merits of the aforementioned data sources, the current research adopts an alternative source of information for measuring party policies, namely legislative motions.

5.4 Legislative Texts

Upon comparing expert surveys, roll-call votes, manifestos and media texts, it is evident that a source is required for this study, which is not only released on a regular basis, but also published directly by the party. Furthermore, it should provide sufficient context about the party's behavior. One data source that has been overlooked in the measurement of party positions is legislative texts. Although there is some variation between systems, Akirav (2016) identifies four basic types of legislative activity produced by representatives: bills, parliamentary questions, motions for the agenda and speeches. The inquisitive structure of parliamentary questions does not serve as a proper indicator for all three policy tools. While a parliamentary question can capture populist rhetoric and issue saliency, it does not reveal a preferred position. Therefore, in order to properly analyze party policies, bills, motions for the agenda and speeches are the most appropriate data sources.

However, bills and speeches are also beset by notable drawbacks that could impact the measurement of party policies. Speeches during floor sessions and public committee hearings are given regularly. They also provide context and articulate a preference for positions, issues and rhetoric. Nevertheless, the availability of speeches can cause measurement problems. In the Saxon

State Parliament, speeches given during a plenary session are recorded for the legislative record. In contrast, there is less access to speeches that are made during committee meetings. Indeed, the committees usually include a summary of legislative recommendations to the plenary (*Beschlussempfehlung*) but, in most instances, this does not include information about the policy debates that transpired. Since Die Linke submitted a significant number of Anträge to various committees during the 5th legislative period, the use of speeches would reduce the study's overall sample size considerably.

Bills are undoubtedly the most comprehensive example of a legislative text. A bill not only describes proposed policy initiatives in great depth, but it also presents significant context about the issue that the measure is intended to address. In addition, bills have the most impact because, when passed, they become the laws that govern society. However, their thoroughness and the significant amount of resources required to not only write a bill, but also amass support for the measure reduces the quantity of bills proposed. During the 5th legislative session in the Saxon State Parliament, 180 bills were proposed among all parties versus 11,658 submitted documents containing at least one parliamentary question. If only bills from the NPD and Die Linke are considered, the data set becomes even smaller. Ultimately, an examination of proposed bills does not contain enough points of observation.

5.5 The Source of Data: Parlamentarischer Antrag

The final legislative text, legislative motions, is a primary source that provides ample context about preferred party policies on a regular basis. Legislative motions contain a range of functions. In its most basic form though, Kabel (1989) asserts that legislative motions are the key to determining parliamentary procedure. More generally, an Antrag is a formal request for the parliament to reach a decision about an issue. The type of action to be decided upon in an Antrag can include something as basic as altering the rules of procedure or demanding that the parliament or government address a specific policy issue. Action is only taken when a majority of the legislative body votes in favor of the proposed Antrag.

By and large, an Antrag is a more important form of legislative productivity for the opposition than governing parties. This does not imply that governing parties refrain from submitting Anträge altogether. Whereas the opposition prompts the state government to take action, governing parties emphasize reporting in their Anträge. As members of the CDU

parliamentary group in Saxony explained, if a governing party proposed an action-based Antrag that challenged the status quo, this would portray it as incompetent.[20] Perhaps they are less obvious, but there are clear advantages to reporting as well. In the Saxon case, CDU and FDP representatives can purposely ask the parliament to report information, which demonstrates that both parties are fulfilling their mandate as a governing coalition. Ultimately though, the content of legislative motions proposed by governing parties is substantively less action-driven. However, this point is irrelevant for the current study, because the NPD and Die Linke are in the opposition.

In the Saxon State Parliament, there exist four types of Anträge: regular motions (Antrag), amendments (Änderungsantrag), motions for a resolution (Entschließungsantrag) and urgent motions (Dringlicher Antrag). Only regular Anträge and Dringliche Anträge are acceptable sources of data for comparing policies, because the content of these documents is originally developed by the parties and they can be evaluated without additional context. Amendments and motions for a resolution are often responses to a previously proposed motion that does not always originate from the parties under investigation. Without knowing the full context of the proposed motion, it is often difficult to infer if the party is in favor of an entire policy or merely individual elements. Such ambiguities would eventually pose significant doubts about the validity of any policy measurements.

There are two overarching motivations that explain why parties elect to propose regular and urgent motions. In reality though, the reasons are not mutually exclusive. Ideally, they should strike a balance between, what Mair (2009) terms, responsiveness and responsibility. The first incentive corresponds with the latter behavior, which is that a party is compelled to react to a current event. In this case, an actor desires to demonstrate responsibility over responsiveness. Examples include aid for flood victims in Saxony, assistance to workers affected by the loss of a regional industry and requests for an investigation into police activity at neo-Nazi demonstrations. For urgent motions, in particular, the parties signify that their Antrag is time-sensitive and deserves to be considered immediately. The other major inspiration for an Antrag is derived from a desire to possess representative legitimacy. Each of the parliamentary groups elected to the Saxon State Parliament outlined a series of pledges during their election campaigns. Once elected, the parties are expected to honor many of those promises with legislation that changes the status quo. Thus, the latter impetus for an Antrag favors responsiveness to constituent interests over governmental

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[20] Interview with Christian Piwarz and Heinz-Bernd Bettig, CDU (Dresden, 11.06.2014)

responsibility. Hence, Anträge are more than simply "cheap talk" (Austen-Smith, 1990). Rather, the information that they contain are costly to produce and, although Anträge might not be able to directly influence legislative decisions, they represent a greater commitment on the part of the party to a given policy issue (Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996).

The Saxon State Parliament consists of two fora in which the policies expressed in an Antrag can be discussed: the plenary and expert committees. The plenary is by far the most notable legislative forum where Anträge can be submitted. Plenary sessions are held before the entire parliament over the course of two days during every month when the legislature is in session. The steady rate of proposed Anträge is guaranteed by a parliamentary rule that allows all parties to submit a maximum of two Anträge that have not already been put forward to a committee for the upcoming plenary session (Gey and Schöne, 2011: 48). The Anträge are subsequently debated according to specific times that are allotted based on the size of the parliamentary groups. Expert committees (Ausschuss/Ausschüsse), on the other hand, also meet once a month, but are mostly limited to an audience of actual committee members. Some special hearings that usually require expert input are open to the public. In contrast to the plenary, parties can submit an unlimited number of Anträge to the respective committees.

5.6 The Advantages of an Antrag

Anträge possess a number of qualities that enhance their effectiveness as an acceptable data source for the measurement of party policies. First, all Anträge are required to adhere to a clearly defined format. In accordance with Saxony's parliamentary rules, all Anträge must begin with the words "Der Landtag möge beschliessen…." and contain a Begründung section that explains the content of the document (Holzapfel, 2010: 316). The Begründung is often lengthier than the demands section, but this is not always the case. The two-part structure of an Antrag is exceptionally suited for the research objectives of the study. In the demands section, the issues addressed by each party can be clearly inferred and classified according to the appropriate policy area. Then, in the Begründung, each party delivers a relevant justification for the measures proposed in the demands section. The justification is essentially a discourse that provides insightful perspectives about the parties' policy suggestions. In this discourse, the parties simultaneously attempt to sell the benefits of their proposals and position themselves against the status quo. Anträge are, thus, an important catalyst for transmitting party positions to voters. The unmistakable division between actions that

must be decided and the attached explanation is a configuration that allows the researcher to identify preferences and then later examine causality.

Second, an Antrag is a primary source and consistent with the entire party's views. In order for an Antrag to be accepted, it must be sponsored by a parliamentary fraction or a minimum of seven representatives. This condition ensures that an Antrag is interpreted as the preferred policies of the parties and not the views of views of rogue legislators. The coherence of an Antrag is more or less ensured by the internal party procedure for proposing a legislative motion. Although individual representatives and staffers can draft an Antrag, they are reviewed by the party leadership (*Fraktionsvorstand*) before being forwarded to either the plenary or legislative committees. The leadership group consists of some combination of the parliamentary group chairperson (*Fraktionsvorsitzender*), whip (*Parlamentarischer Geschäftsführer*) and several deputy chairperson (*Stellvertretende Fraktionsvorsitzende*). This group can recommend that an Antrag be submitted, revised or withheld. Ultimately though, these members function as a gatekeeper for all proposed policy initiatives.

Third, and in comparison to manifestos, Anträge enable policies to be measured while the parties are actually holding office. As a result, their content is more significant than that from a manifesto, because programs merely outline what the party intends to accomplish once it *is* in elected office. Anträge, on the other hand, are an up-to-date account of a party's views. Some researchers have analyzed parties' legislative activity, in order to evaluate the fulfillment of pledges that were expressed in election manifestos (Pomper, 1967; Royed, 1996). However, such actions have not been measured for their actual policies. An Antrag is ideal, because it reveals if the party in question satisfied its election promises in addition to a preferred policy.

Lastly, Anträge have the potential to be disseminated to a larger audience. A manifesto, for example, is published for internal purposes. The target audience is party activists whose support is critical for labor-intensive campaigns (Strøm, 1990). Of course, an Antrag is less likely to be read by the public than a newspaper article. Still, Anträge are frequently written with the intent to attract media attention. In the plenary, the opposition parties' main goals consist of using the televised sessions to affect public opinion with clearly articulated policy views and provide alternative positions to the governing coalition. Parties in the Saxon State Parliament are aware that Anträge for the televised plenary sessions are a limited commodity. Hence, the fractions strategically introduce policies with the expectation that they must clearly outline their views for

a larger audience. One opposition party whip confirmed this notion and maintained that the plenary was the best way to convey his party's views on key issues that are salient among the electorate and where the party has already formulated a very clear position.[21] The NPD, which has previously been described as failing to take its parliamentary responsibilities seriously (Brodkorb and Schlotmann, 2008), expressed a similar opinion. The National Democrats purposely sent fewer Anträge to the committees and used the plenary as an opportunity to submit motions that would have publicity effects, especially for the party's core issues.[22] Such activities attract desired media attention and can further serve to propagate the parties' views.

The NPD and Die Linke also featured Anträge, in addition to other legislative productivity, in their own media outlets. Die Linke, for instance, published and distributed two newsletters, *Links im Landtag* and *Parlamentsreport,* which contained updates about the party's work in Dresden. While the NPD was still represented in the Saxon State Parliament, it also printed a periodical titled *Klartext*, which was distributed to households throughout the state. In addition, both parties posted news items about Anträge to their respective parliamentary websites. Although it is uncertain if such publications have a significant readership outside of a small cadre of dedicated supporters, their existence is a further example of the parties' attempts to promote Anträge through media channels.

5.7 The Sample Size

A total of 1,121 regular and urgent motions were proposed by all the parties during the 5th legislative period in the Saxon State Parliament. Table 5 displays that Die Linke were the most active party in the legislature (378), whereas the NPD proposed the least number of Anträge (140). The disparity in Anträge between the NPD and Die Linke can be attributed to the size and role of each parliamentary group. As the largest opposition party in the parliament, Die Linke possessed far more resources than the NPD. In particular, the size and structure of Die Linke's parliamentary group enabled the party to produce multiple Anträge for the plenary and committees. Representatives from Die Linke were responsible for a limited number of policy areas where they produced legislation on just these matters. The NPD, on the other hand, had fewer representatives and a smaller staff. A review of the NPD's parliamentary website indicates that representatives

[21] Interview with Stefan Brangs, SPD (Dresden, 10.06.2014)
[22] Interview with Holger Szymanski, NPD (Dresden, 29.04.2014)

were assigned specific policy areas, but chief whip Johannes Müller denied that this is how the party operated internally.[23] In interviews, members noted that producing an Antrag was a joint effort. Very often, the production of an NPD Antrag involved members who gathered ideas, performed research and participated in the writing phase.[24] Even though the party did not see the strategic value of submitting Anträge to the committees, due to the size of their *Fraktion*, it seems doubtful that NPD representatives could have simultaneously written multiple motions if they had tried.

Table 5 Total number of Anträge submitted and analyzed

Totals	NPD	Die Linke
Number of Anträge Submitted	140	378
Number of Cosponsored Anträge	0	36
Number of Anträge Analyzed	123	269

At the conclusion of the 5th legislative period, of the 378 Anträge submitted by Die Linke, 36 were co-sponsored by another party, primarily the Social Democrats, Greens or a combination thereof. Due to the *cordon sanitaire* against the party, the NPD did not co-sponsor a single motion. Similar to amendments and motions for a resolution, co-sponsored Anträge are not included in the sample. Here again, it is difficult to determine if the party supported all of the content in the Antrag or only limited segments. For instance, it is possible that the Antrag could be the result of a compromise that does not entirely reflect the policy views of all parties. Two additional Anträge forms are excluded from the sample. On several rare occasions, the NPD and Die Linke each proposed an identical version of a previous Antrag. Although it could be argued that the policies contained therein maintain greater importance, duplicates are not included. Additionally, Anträge that *only* request information from the state government or address parliamentary procedure, are discounted. The content of such motions is either too technical or too exploratory to make inferences about preferred policies. In the end, the final sample is comprised of 123 Anträge from the NPD and 269

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[23] Interview with Johannes Müller, NPD (Dresden, 12.06.2014)
[24] Interviews with Arne Schimmer, NPD (Dresden, 11.06.2014), Johannes Müller, NPD (Dresden, 12.06.2014), Alexander Delle, NPD (Dresden, 10.06.2014).

from Die Linke (Table 5). All of the Anträge were digitally accessed and downloaded via the Saxon State Parliament's online archive for legislative records.[25]

5.8 Measuring Policy Similarities in Anträge with Content Analysis

Determining cases and the source of data are crucial components in the measurement of party policies. The next logical step is to develop a methodological approach that explains how systematic inferences can be made about the parties' respective views. Central to this process is the use of political texts as opposed to expert surveys or roll-call votes. Texts, or legislative motions in this study, do not have reader-independent qualities. Similar to signs and pictures, the messages contained within a text cannot stand alone (Krippendorff, 2013: 28). They require an interpreter to decipher their meaning(s), but not all readers understand a text similarly. The content itself can provoke various responses particular to individual experiences and contexts (Krippendorff, 2013: 29). Based on these unique qualities, how can policy data be inferred from Anträge?

The study performs a series of content analyses to answer this question and measure party policies. Content analysis is a research technique that enables observers to make replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use (Krippendorff, 2013: 24). Content analysis is one of the oldest methods for inquisitorial pursuits involving texts. As a research technique, it offers new insights, enhances understanding of phenomena and informs practical actions (Krippendorff, 2013: 24). In the current study, inference relates to the expression of policies by the NPD and Die Linke in parliamentary Anträge within the framework of party competition. The exact approach to infer policies within according to the content analysis methodology, however, is subject to variation.

In the secondary literature, the measurement of party policies through content analysis can be divided into two distinct groups: the human- and computer-based approaches (Volkens et al., 2009). The latter approach, computer-assisted content analysis, implies the automated tabulation of word tokens for a target text that has been prepared for the computer (Neuendorf, 2002: 52). With the advent of new computer software, the ability to effectively perform computer-assisted content analysis in the measurement of party policies has been significantly improved. Scaling

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[25]The web address is http://edas.landtag.sachsen.de/

algorithms such as *Wordscores* and *Wordfish* possess noticeable advantages over the traditional hand-coding approach. They can process large amounts of carefully prepared text, are highly objective, reliable and efficient. Furthermore, both programs have high cross-validity scores with results from hand-coding analyses (Laver and Garry, 2000; Laver et al., 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008).

The other content analysis approach, human-based hand coding, has traditionally been the most prevalent in party policy studies. Neuendorf (2002: 52) defines the human-based approach as the use of people as coders, with each individual employing a standard codebook and coding form to read, view or otherwise decode the target content based on pre-established variables. The foremost hand coding technique in comparative party research is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The CMP has been instrumental towards establishing the analysis of party programs with hand-coding procedures and a classification scheme that is derived from the salience theory of party competition (Budge et al., 1987; Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). Although the CMP methodology has been criticized on a number of points (Pelizzo, 2003; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Dinas and Gemenis, 2010; Gemenis, 2013), it still remains a trusted source for party policy analyses and is frequently cross-validated with other measurement techniques.

When selecting the proper content analysis methodology, there are important trade-offs between reliability and validity that must to be considered. Due to their automated coding procedures, quantitative approaches, including the computer-assisted content analysis programs *Wordfish* and *Wordscores*, yield results that can be consistently replicated. Hence, the results are generally considered more reliable than those generated by a hand-coding analysis (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). However, since these programs attempt to infer the meaning of individual words, they are less able to account for the broader context of the content under examination. This negatively impacts the ability of quantitative approaches to make valid observations. Qualitative hand-coding techniques face the opposite trade-off. The results possess greater validity, because a human coder is more likely than a computer to understand the contextual meaning of a given text and "measure that which is supposed to be measured" (Neuendorf, 2002: 112). Yet, unlike computers, human judgment is prone to biases and random error that inhibit the researcher's ability to produce the same results on repeated trials.

Despite some convincing reasons to seriously consider the use of a computer-assisted content analysis, several practical and epistemological arguments contradict this notion. From a technical standpoint, the text lengths for Anträge in some policy areas can often be inadequate. Computer-assisted content analysis programs rely on relative word frequencies in order to generate positions with a predefined algorithm (Proksch and Slapin, 2010). Texts must reach a certain length, usually a minimum of 500 words, otherwise word weights will be uncertain (Proksch and Slapin, 2009). Based on the rigorous text processing that includes stemming as well as the removal of numbers and stop words, there is a very real possibility that some dimensions that are relatively less salient, will be omitted (for example, Environmental Protection for the NPD and Foreign Affairs for Die Linke). Such a development poses a major challenge to the research design, because some theoretically relevant dimensions would not be examined.

Second, and as previously mentioned in the discussion about trade-offs, the validity of results produced by computer-assisted content analysis methods is questionable, because it is not always certain that individual words can actually measure the concept of party preferences. As stated at the beginning of this section, Krippendorff's definition of content analysis maintains that inferences cannot be made without considering their proper context. Unlike hand-coding, which allows for the interpretation of endogenous and exogenous[26] units within a larger sample, computer-assisted content analysis usually counts words without considering their substantive meaning. This is highly problematic for a small-n comparative case study that emphasizes scope in the discourse surrounding party positions. Hand-coding also counts frequencies, but the intervention of a human coder substantially increases the likelihood that individual statements will be evaluated within a broader context. The importance of validity for the measurement of positions, salience and rhetoric will be discussed in greater detail in each of the empirical chapters.

Finally, despite the emergence of computer-assisted programs and their tangible benefits for large volumes of text, hand-coding still remains the most common approach in the content analysis of political texts (Neuendorf 2002). This is not to say, of course, that hand-coding is a

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[26] In the context of a content analysis, Däubler et al. (2012: 938) assert that a unit is specified exogenously if it does not require human judgment on the basis of predefined rules. Examples include a word, sentence or paragraph. When a unit is defined endogenously, it entails a process of human judgment as part of the content analysis itself, in order to ascertain where one unit begins and ends. Endogenous units are often thematic. Regardless of the actual data-generating method, content analyses invariably rely on endogenous procedures, because the researcher must use human judgment when applying classifications to a text unit. For more information about differences in endogenous and exogenous units, please reference Chapter 6.

better method overall. Rather, the researcher should have the liberty to select the approach that is most suitable for his/her respective research project. If a study is designed to analyze a large number of cases and texts over an extended time period, then computer-assisted content analysis could perhaps function as a more advantageous approach. The research, however, consists of a limited number of cases and is concerned with a relatively short, but very recent legislative session. In addition, it is essential that positions, salience and rhetoric are understood within their proper context. Therefore, a hand-coding content analysis is the ideal approach for the study of policy resemblances between the NPD and Die Linke in their legislative motions.

5.9 The Dimensional Structure of the Political Space

Fundamental to the measurement of policies are dimensions, which have the function of capturing the potential for political (dis)agreement between political actors. Without the formation of proper dimensions, it would be impossible to visualize relative distances between agents located in a shared political space. Dimensions enhance descriptions of politics and the policies proposed by political actors. The more dimensions that are analyzed, the more detailed the description of political actors can be (Benoit and Laver, 2001: 15). However, a balance must be struck between abstraction and specificity. A space that consists of a single, aggregated dimension reveals little about the nuanced distances between political actors. Likewise a space that is described in too much detail can obscure the researchers' ability to accurately define the policies of political actors. To demonstrate this point, Benoit and Laver (2006: 14) cite the example of a nautical map that plots a voyage across the Atlantic. In this endeavor, having a chart that identifies every grain of sand is less useful than one that portrays large land masses.

The most common approach to developing a political space for the measurement of party policy analyses is the single, ideological dimension. The main problem with a single, political space based on ideology, however, is precisely that it only describes the relative distance of party ideologies. Such a method is not consistent with the aims of this research, because it fails to measure the NPD's and Die Linke's party *policies*. Contrary to previous studies that equate ideology with policy, these terms represent two different concepts. Policy was previously defined as the manifest expression of party preferences in the form of positions, salience and rhetoric. In contrast, ideology is generally perceived as a larger set of beliefs that contain implications for the development of "good" policy. (Hinich and Munger, 1994). However, as Budge (1994: 446) notes:

"ideology is sufficiently ambiguous to permit some movement within the prescribed area, particularly if this simply involves the adjustment of policy priorities within the ideology itself rather than abandoning previously prescribed conditions." This supposition motivates the overall research puzzle, which seeks to understand if and why two radical parties with diametrically opposed ideologies can display similar policies. There is little debate in the secondary literature that the NPD and Die Linke are ideological opposites, and it is assumed from the outset that the parties adhere to different beliefs due to their historical origins.

A multi-dimensional political space that analyzes party policies, as opposed to ideology, is a more appropriate approach for a study that attempts to investigate similarities between the NPD and Die Linke. This approach is not only able to describe party policies and understand causal mechanisms, but it also matches the correct level of observation. Moreover, a multi-dimensional method is an accurate reflection of Western society (Keman, 2007). As the previous sections indicated, the introduction of new values produced additional issues that have diversified the number of political conflicts throughout Western Europe. A single, highly aggregated dimension, is unable to accurately capture the nature of party competition.

The selection of multiple dimensions in which to measure party policies does not adhere to a rigorous set of criteria. In reference to positions, Benoit and Laver (2012: 196) have classified established policy dimensions into two general categories: *a priori* and *a posteori*. The latter version inductively attempts to create latent constructs from existing measurements about political space. For this purpose, factor analyses are commonly employed to determine the contours of a given dimension. *A posteori* dimensions are appropriate for research that does not aspire to test particular theoretical assumptions about party competition or where it is unclear what the main political conflicts are. *A priori* implies that assumptions are made about dimensions before empirical research has been performed. In other words, the research attempts to estimate unknown preferences on known scales. *A priori* dimensions are employed, for example, in expert surveys, the Comparative Manifesto Project and many computer-assisted content analyses.

A priori dimensions are better suited to the motivations and aims of the research project for two reasons. First, the research already makes a number of theoretical assumptions about the nature of political competition. In Chapter 3, observable implications were proposed about the potential for policy overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke. In order to test these claims, the dimensions should measure the parties' ability to maneuver within policy spaces that are consistent

with the theoretical assumptions. Second, previous studies about party competition in Germany also indicate which *a priori* dimensions should be analyzed. Through factor analyses and other methods, researchers have already established many of the dimensions that depict political conflict in Germany. Therefore, the salience of these dimensions is also taken into account.

5.10 The Proposed Policy Dimensions

Considering these advantages, party policies from the NPD and Die Linke are measured in six *a priori* issue dimensions. The first four dimensions contain theoretical implications for disparate policies. Although they each address a specific subset of issues, the dimensions can be described as either socio-economic or socio-cultural in nature. The socio-economic policies areas are labelled 'state involvement in the economy' and 'welfare and social services' dimensions. There are obvious theoretical claims in the extant literature that warrant an examination of far right and far left policies in this issue area. Recalling the observable implications proposed in Chapter 3, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to exhibit dissimilar policies in these areas. The socio-economic dimension is a core issue area for Die Linke. As a result, Die Linke could face steep electoral costs if the party is unable to distinguish itself from the NPD on issues that fall under socio-economic policy.

The socio-economic dimensions are followed by two policy areas that contain socio-cultural issues: 'justice' and 'fabric of society'. The secondary literature indicates that social conflict in Western Europe has been transformed by a new cultural cleavage. Political research unanimously suggests that the far left and far right will adopt dichotomous policies in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. The socio-cultural dimension is a core issue area for the NPD. If the National Democrats were to deviate from their anticipated policies, they could be severely punished at the polls. Thus, there is clear evidence to suggest that the NPD and Die Linke will also display different policies in the socio-cultural dimensions.

The establishment of socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions is further supported by previous studies specific to party competition in Germany. At various times in the post-war era, research in the secondary literature has measured German party policies according to these political conflicts (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Pappi and Shikano, 2002; Bräuninger and Debus, 2012). Various expert survey analyses have also concentrated on these dimensions (Laver and

Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006). Ultimately, there are both significant theoretical and practical motivations for examining the dimensions listed above.

Two additional dimensions are included for the measurement of party policies. Although they have not traditionally been analyzed in studies of the German party system, the 'environmental protection' and 'foreign affairs' dimensions provide variation on the study's dependent variable as well as theoretical relevance. An environmental protection dimension foresees similar policies proposed by the NPD and Die Linke. Recalling Stokes' valence theory that was introduced in Chapter 3, not all issues entail confrontational policy positions. Rather, there is only one ideal point that precludes alternative positions. As opposed to the Greens, environmental protection is not a core issue dimension for neither the NPD nor Die Linke. With its valence features and secondary importance to both parties, the NPD and Die Linke are not constricted by issue reputations. Consequently, the potential is greater for the parties to display overlapping policies.

Finally, a foreign policy dimension covers issues beyond both Saxony's and Germany's borders. The theory in the secondary literature predicts the potential for policy overlaps at the supra-national level. Several studies have argued and demonstrated that left-right positions on the EU represent an inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al., 2002; van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Mair, 2013).[27] Other authors have suggested that both ideological (Haas, 1958; Dunphy, 2004) and strategic (Taggart, 1998; Hix, 1999) incentives explain Euroskepticism at the extremes. On the surface, it might appear meaningless to analyze this dimension for parties at the state level. However there are plausible reasons in favor of its inclusion. The NPD is not represented in the Bundestag, and therefore uses its regional presence in Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania to articulate views about all policy matters. Second, international and European affairs can also impact the state level. Die Linke are critical of European measures that violate the subsidiarity principle and both parties have expressed disapproval about the international use of the Leipzig/Halle Airport for military operations. Table 6 summarizes the policy dimensions that are considered in the study.

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[27] Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 3 about the reasons for assigning EU issues to the foreign affairs dimension.

Table 6 Proposed policy dimensions

Dimension Name
State Involvement in the Economy
Welfare State and Social Services
Fabric of Society
Justice
Environmental Protection
Foreign Affairs

One dimension that has been neglected, but which could arguably produce similar policies between the far right and far left in Germany according to the secondary literature, is attitudes towards democracy. The extremism theory claims that the ideology of far right and far left parties is inherently anti-democratic (Backes, 1989). Although the CMP coding scheme provides several categories that could scale attitudes towards democracy (202 Democracy: Positive, 203 Constitutionalism: Positive and 204 Constitutionalism: Negative), it is inconceivable that this issue is a realistic aspect of party competition. Even if the NPD or Die Linke were opposed to democracy and constitutionalism, it remains unlikely that any rational party would advocate such an incendiary policy in a public forum such as a state parliament for fear of being banned by the German Constitutional Court. In fact, radical parties frequently agitate for more democracy, including the introduction of popular referenda and a directly-elected president. As a result, an anti-democratic attitudes dimension based on the extremism theory, has not been considered in the measurement of party policies.

5.11 Scaling Party Policies with Additive Coding Indexes

Scaling procedures are an inherent component of policy measurement within a given dimension. Scales quantify the location of party policies in a political dimension and the relative distance between actors. In the study of party positions, most researchers have implemented a basic left-right scale to calculate the relative distance between actor preferences. Indeed, a scale with left and right poles is a useful heuristic. It is a continuum that has been used since the French Revolution as a means to organize political and ideological relationships. Voters and parties alike rely upon such political labels for self-identification (Arian and Shamir, 1983: 139-140). Even though the exact definitions vary across settings and their meanings have changed with the

development of new issues in advanced industrial economies, Huber and Inglehart (1995) reveal that political dimensions are generally delineated by left and right poles.

While it is commonly accepted that the basic political spectrum is anchored by such ends, the issue categories that comprise the left-right scale are frequently disputed. Traditionally, the left-right scale has been conceptualized according to party competition on the basis of socio-economic issues (Benoit and Laver, 2006: 132). In this left-right scale, one end of the spectrum is designated for actors preferring liberal social policies and state intervention in the economy. Conversely, the other pole is intended to capture those actors who have conservative views on social policy and desire minimal state intervention. This approach is less than ideal for the current study, because it fails to represent a whole host of issues pertaining to dimensions, such as environmental protection and foreign affairs.

An alternative, and perhaps the most renowned policy scale, is the CMP Rile Index. Based on the salience theory of party competition, CMP identifies 56 standard categories that are intended to cover virtually all policy areas. The Rile scale itself, however, is only comprised of 26 categories that are evenly characterized as left and right. Unlike the traditional left-right scale, the Rile index extends well beyond just socio-economic issues. As Table 7 indicates, it contains categories that describe policy preferences on issues in numerous dimensions including foreign affairs, culture and democracy. Thus, Volkens (2001) claims that the Rile scale categories apply to 98 per cent of all party program content. Despite this attribute, the Rile index is also unsuitable for a multi-dimensional analysis of party policies. It is illogical to apply a general scale that covers multiple policy areas to a specific dimension. Rather, what is needed instead, is a flexible approach that develops scales according to the policy dimensions under investigation.

Table 7 The CMP Left-Right Scale with Codes

The CMP Left-Right Scale	
Left Categories	**Right Categories**
103 Anti-Imperialism	104 Military: Positive
105 Military: Negative	201 Freedom and Human Rights
106 Peace	203 Constitutionalism: Positive
107 Internationalism: Positive	305 Political Authority
202 Democracy	401 Free Enterprise
403 Market Regulation	402 Incentives
404 Economic Planning	407 Protectionism: Negative
406 Protectionism: Positive	414 Economic Orthodoxy
412 Controlled Economy: Positive	505 Welfare State Limitation
413 Nationalization	601 National Way of Life: Positive
504 Welfare State Expansion	603 Traditional Morality: Positive
506 Education Expansion	605 Law and Order
701 Labor Groups: Positive	606 Social Harmony

Source: Budge et al. (2001).

The creation of additive policy scales represents an ideal option. In this process, new policy scales are developed using existing classifications. This approach provides both the desired level of dimensional specificity while also drawing on some of the more common metrics in policy measurement analyses. Although the CMP Rile scale has not been adapted for the current study, the CMP codes can be effectively integrated into policy scales. Contrary to the common assertion that the majority of the CMP codes are intended to reflect the saliency theory of party competition, all but one (408 Economic Goals) of the 56 categories is actually consistent with this theory (Laver, 2001b: 66). As a result, some researchers have constructed revised scales with "confrontational pairings" (Lowe et al., 2011: 132) based on the original CMP codes (Laver, 2001b; McDonald and Mendes, 2001). A similar logic is applied for each of the policy dimensions in this study.

Although they overlap, the proposed socio-economic scales are designed to separately measure policy differences specific to the parties' economic views and those pertaining to the welfare state. For that reason, the state involvement in the economy scale is comprised of coding categories that cover broad economic philosophies, which are often associated with the political left or right. The left consists of economic planning (404), controlled economy (412) and economic orthodoxy (414), whereas the right is limited to free enterprise (401). More specific policies that measure preferences for state involvement include incentives (402), market regulation (403),

nationalization (413) and the scale's only confrontational pairings, protectionism (406/407). Finally, in the tradition of the labor movement, category 701 purposely deals with workers.

Compared to the state involvement in the economy scale, the welfare and social services dimension originally developed by Lowe et al. (2011) is comprised of much broader coding categories. The welfare state expansion/limitation codes (504/505) cover a wide spectrum of issues. They include healthcare, childcare, housing and social programs more generally. Public education, which is one of the most substantial state services, is also organized in this scale. Due to its importance, public education is assigned its own coding category in the form of education expansion/limitation (506/507). The only code without an opposing category, social justice (503), refers to issues of equality and the distribution of resources that can be managed by the state. This code is expected to be especially relevant for Die Linke for which, as the previous chapters noted, social justice maintains an integral role in the party's ideology.

The scales for the socio-cultural dimensions are also intended to infer the parties' policies for two distinct, but related issue areas. Compared to fabric of society, the law and order dimensional scale contains comprehensive issues about internal security. In a different study, Veen (2011) labels this dimension "justice", but the codes mostly resemble policy areas that are germane to upholding the law. Thus, freedom and human rights (201) addresses issues related to protecting individual civil liberties. On the right side of the scale, law and order (605) expresses support for enhanced internal security with a larger police presence and stiffer penalties for criminals. Immigration has been assigned its own codes (205/206) due to previous criticisms about its categorization under the standard CMP classification procedure (Dolezal, 2008a: 66). It pertains to any subject involving the free movement of people across state borders, including asylum. As a prototypical far right party, it is anticipated that this code will be most salient for the NPD.

The scale for the second socio-cultural dimension, fabric of society, focuses on identity and demographics. Along with the foreign affairs scale, it contains the most confrontational pairings of any proposed scale. National way of life (601/602), traditional morality (603/604) and multiculturalism (607/608) all possess paired left and right categories that address very specific policy areas. The remaining three codes, social harmony (606), underprivileged minority groups (705) and non-economic groups (706) round out the fabric of society scale. The latter two codes are very general and could be indiscriminately applied to numerous texts. Therefore, in accordance

with the CMP coding instructions, categories 705 and 706 are only utilized when a more appropriate code cannot be selected.

Within the theoretical framework of the valence theory, developing a scale for the environmental protection dimension appears counterintuitive. Indeed, at first glance, codes 416 (anti-growth economy) and 501 (environmental protection) in the CMP codebook seem to confirm the valence characteristics of this issue area. However, Clarke et al. (2004) assume that valence issues also possess spatial attributes that do not exclude policy variation in some regards. As an example, Lowe et al. (2011: 137) observe that, in some instances, parties favor pro-growth policies that do not outwardly reject environmental protection, but emphasize the benefits of industry while tolerating damage to the environment. Therefore, growth (410) is juxtaposed with codes 416 and 501 as part of the environmental protection scale.

The foreign affairs scale rounds out the proposed indexes and contains all CMP categories at the supranational level. Military (105) and peace (106) are the only categories without a contrasting code, but they nevertheless represent logical opposites in the left-right scale. Otherwise, foreign special relationships (101/102), internationalism (107/109) and European integration (108/110) are all pairs of confrontational codes. Here again, there appears to be a considerable amount of overlap between the codes, especially between European and international affairs. However, any redundancy is minimized by the fact that Anträge dealing foremost with the EU or other European countries are assigned codes 108 or 110. All other motions with an international focus are classified according to their views about international cooperation and relations with specific non-EU countries. Below, Table 8 summarizes all of the proposed scales and their respective dimensions.

Table 8 Additive Policy Dimension Scales

Policy Dimension	"Left" Position	"Right" Position	Secondary Source
Welfare and Social Services	503 Social Justice + 504 Welfare State Expansion + 506 Education Expansion +	505 Welfare State Limitation + 507 Education Limitation +	Lowe et al. 2010
State Involvement in Economy	403 Market Regulation + 404 Economic Planning + 406 Protectionism + 412 Controlled Economy + 413 Nationalization + 701 Labor Groups +	401 Free Enterprise + 402 Incentives + 407 Protectionism - 414 Economic Orthodoxy +	Proposed
Fabric of Society	601 National Way of Life + 603 Traditional Morality - 607 Multiculturalism + 705 Underprivileged Minority Groups + 706 Non-Economic Groups +	602 National Way of Life - 604 Traditional Morality - 606 Social Harmony + 608 Multiculturalism -	Proposed
Justice	201 Freedom and Human Rights + 205 Immigration Expansion +	206 Immigration Limitation + 605 Law and Order +	Veen 2011
International and European Affairs	101 Foreign Special Relationships + 105 Military - 106 Peace + 107 Internationalism + 108 European Integration +	102 Foreign Special Relationships - 109 Internationalism - 110 European Integration -	Proposed
Environmental Protection	416 Anti-Growth Economy + 501 Environmental Protection +	410 Economic Growth +	Lowe et al. 2010

Not only are the scales suitable for the study because they can be specially tailored to each dimension, but also because each CMP code is applied to a single policy area. This prevents unnecessary overlaps that can complicate understandings of left and right in each dimension and avoids duplicate inferences in the overall data collection. Furthermore, the proposed dimensional scales incorporate the majority of the CMP codes. Exactly 38 of the 56 original categories are implemented without accounting for the improvised immigration codes. Many of the original CMP categories that were omitted are issues that no longer reflect contemporary party competition in Western Europe or are general codes that should only be applied if there are no other options available. These include, for example, coding categories such as anti-imperialism (103) and middle class and professional groups (704). Therefore, the proposed scales are able to provide a representative metric for distinguishing party policies.

5.12 Summary

The preceding chapter has outlined the basic methodological framework for the entire research project. It began with an assessment of the case selection and the specific motivations for examining the NPD and Die Linke at the state level in Saxony. Thereafter, the chapter considered the source of data. The advantages of using political texts were initially demonstrated and then two forms of legislative Anträge (regular and urgent) were subsequently identified as ideal data sources. In a next step, the chapter outlined the process by which policies from the NPD and Die Linke are to be measured among the chosen sample of Anträge. After comparing the pros and cons of various approaches and referencing the aims of the research, a hand-coding content analysis was ultimately proposed. The final two sections outlined important technical features for the measurement of the parties' policies. Relying primarily on previous examples in the secondary literature about party positions, detailed policy dimensions and corresponding scales were developed for each of the forthcoming empirical chapters. The policy areas include two socio-economic dimensions (state involvement in the economy and welfare and social services), two socio-cultural dimensions (justice and fabric of society), in addition to separate dimensions for environmental protection and foreign affairs.

However, while the approaches outlined here establish a basis for the overall methodology in the following chapters, they are by no means comprehensive. In each of the empirical analyses, additional methodological procedures are presented which outline the measurement of some

component of the parties' policies. The focus of the first analysis is party positions, to which the analysis now turns.

6. Measuring Party Position Similarities in Political Competition

> "III. Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> gegenüber der Bundesregierung und im Bundesrat auf die Einführung eines
> branchenübergreifenden gesetzlichen Mindestlohnes hinzuwirken und sich dafür
> einzusetzen." (Drs 5/1795)

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> sich im Bundesrat mit einer eigenen Initiative für die Einführung eines
> flächendeckenden branchenübergreifenden gesetzlichen Mindestlohns
> einzusetzen." (Drs 5/7429)

The nearly identical policy proposals listed above were submitted as part of separate Anträge during the 5th legislative period in the Saxon State Parliament. At first glance, it seems reasonable to assume that they were introduced by the same party or, at the very least, two actors on the same side of the left-right ideological spectrum. The initiatives reveal party positions with a similar direction about the state's involvement in the economy. In both instances, the authors urged the state government to petition the federal authorities for a nationwide minimum wage. In reality though, the nearly identical measures were proposed by two very different parties: the diametrically opposed far right NPD and far left Die Linke. The example above could, of course, be interpreted as an isolated incident between two actors whose only position overlaps are attributed to shared attitudes about the free democratic order. However, it also begs the question whether the NPD and Die Linke exhibit further positional similarities in their policy proposals. The following analysis of party positions from the NPD and Die Linke aims to address this question and provide initial insights about the potential for policy overlaps between far right and far left parties. Unlike previous studies that concentrate solely on their attitudes about democracy, this chapter contains the first set of empirical data that comparatively measures the NPD's and Die Linke's positions in multi-dimensional political competition. It is guided by the following questions: do the parties demonstrate similar positions in their respective legislative motions? If so, in which dimensions do these overlaps occur? Why does position overlap occur in some dimensions, but not others?

The findings confirm the theoretical framework initially outlined in Chapter 3. As niche actors, the NPD and Die Linke are constrained in their core dimensions, but have the potential to take similar positions in their peripheral policy areas. Thus, although they appear to be the unlikeliest of bedfellows, the NPD and Die Linke share similar positions on issues in the foreign

affairs and environmental protection dimensions. As expected though, the parties' positions strongly differ in the socio-cultural dimensions of political competition (justice and fabric of society) where it is more effective for them to pursue a strategy of product differentiation.

The chapter also reveals that the NPD and Die Linke demonstrate overlapping positions in the socio-economic dimensions (welfare state and social services and state involvement in the economy). This finding is significant, because it demonstrates that, contrary to previous assumptions in the secondary literature (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz and Immerfall, 1998), far right parties do not propose neoliberal economic positions in their policy proposals. Rather, they now complement their socio-cultural positions with preferences for demarcation on socio-economic issues. Overall, the results express a more detailed description of extreme actors' positions that goes beyond the basic left-right scale and normative classifications. This represents a major contribution to comparative studies of the far right and far left that have previously been limited in scope. In addition, they offer initial insights about the potential for policy similarities between the NPD and Die Linke, which will serve as a basis for subsequent analyses.

The chapter is structured according to the following format. In the next section, the relevant theoretical arguments from Chapter 3 are briefly summarized and the observable implications for party positions are reintroduced. In the first part of the methods section, the main concept of the chapter, party positions, is defined. Thereafter, the focus shifts to the specific operationalization of party positions. Existing unitization procedures are first evaluated. Then, considering the importance of reliability and validity, two types of endogenous units are developed that match the purpose of a legislative motion: primary action measures and political declarations. Once established, the next part of the chapter clarifies how the units are converted from frequencies to aggregated positions in each policy dimension. The results are presented in two forms. The empirical data offer initial insights about the legitimacy of the observable implications. These findings are supplemented with rich descriptive data that illustrates the inherent nuances of the parties' positions. Finally, the findings are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about the importance of the results.

6.1 Theory: Position Movement in Core and Peripheral Dimensions of Party Competition

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 proposed that, since the NPD and Die Linke are unable to directly pursue policy- and office-seeking goals in Saxony, the behavior of both parties is primarily motivated by vote maximization. One of the most commonly recognized strategies for this purpose is the signaling of policy positions. As rational, actors, the parties are expected to develop policies after conducting a cost-benefit analysis for the issues at stake. In his classic work on the spatial model of political competition, Anthony Downs (1957) originally suggested that, in order to maximize the utility of their policies, parties should tailor their positions to the median voter. In a single, left-right dimension, this implies that the NPD and Die Linke should convey moderate positions that appeal to as much of the electorate as possible.

However, the strategy for electoral success is not as straightforward for the NPD and Die Linke. These parties face unique challenges that do not apply to their mainstream competitors. The NPD and Die Linke are niche actors with non-centric ideologies that address a limited set of policy issues. In the electoral market, they mobilize voters not despite, but because of their radical positions. If the NPD and Die Linke moderate their positions too much, they run the risk of being punished at the polls (Adams et al., 2006). A second factor that complicates the development of a strategy for the NPD and Die Linke is the multi-dimensional structure of party competition. In his criticism of unidimensionality, Stokes (1963) noted that parties contest a number of issues that are independent of each other in the minds of voters. Rather than simply moving along a single, left-right dimension, the parties are forced to develop positions for an entire range of policy areas. However, not all issue dimensions are created equal. Some policy areas contain issues that are more important for the parties than others (Tavits, 2007).

Competing in a multi-dimensional political space as niche actors with radical ideologies and issue ownership reputations, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to develop positions differently for their core and peripheral dimensions. In their core dimensions, they must uphold a credible commitment to an anticipated preference. As a result, the parties are expected to demonstrate product differentiation (Kitschelt, 1994) in order to maximize their shares of the vote. For the NPD, this pertains to the socio-cultural dimensions (justice and fabric of society). On the other hand, the core dimensions for Die Linke are socio-economic in nature (welfare state and social services and state involvement in the economy). In other instances, the NPD and Die Linke are competing on issues in peripheral dimensions where it is less costly for the parties to distinguish

themselves, namely the foreign affairs and environmental protection policy areas. Here, they are not constrained by previous policy commitments and can appeal to voters by moving more freely throughout the political space. Based on these theoretical assumptions the following series of observable implications was produced for testing purposes:

> *Observable Implication #1: The NPD and Die Linke will demonstrate similar positions in those dimensions that do not contain their core issues.*

> *Observable Implication #2: The NPD and Die Linke will reveal similar positions in the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions.*

> *Observable Implication #3: The parties will develop dissimilar positions for those dimensions that contain their core issues.*

> *Observable Implication #4: The NPD and Die Linke will exhibit dissimilar positions in the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions.*

Now that the observable implications have been restated, the focus of the chapter shifts to the methodological approach for the measurement of party positions.

6.2 Methodology for Party Positions

The next section clarifies how the observable implications are tested. It first proposes a definition for the term 'policy position'. The subsequent discussion further examines how party positions should be operationalized in an Antrag based on two important criteria: validity and reliability. Thereafter, an endogenous unit is introduced with several examples that demonstrate its functionality. The next step explains the actual coding procedure for party positions. Then, in the final part of the methodology section, a conversion equation is presented which describes how coding frequencies are transformed into party positions within a given policy dimension.

6.2.1 What is a Position?

Any study that endeavors to analyze democratic political competition will invariably concentrate on the party positions expressed in public policies (Laver, 2001a: 3). Positions enable the researcher to comparatively describe many components of parties and party systems. Position studies often serve as the basis for analyses concerning the potential for coalitions, party family differences within and across systems, polarization, the effectiveness of representative

government, as well as the overall direction of competition (Mair, 2001: 11). Furthermore, positions are always issue-specific and can vary in their level of abstraction (Gruber, 2014: 109). However, what is the actual definition of a party position?

Fundamentally, Benoit and Laver (2006) suggest that each individual is motivated by a set of beliefs, needs, and desires that condition how s/he behaves in a given situation. Put more succinctly, individuals, or in this case parties, possess preferences that are subject to the context in which they are operating. Actors can possess both latent and manifest preferences, but only the latter can be observed. In order to describe these revealed preferences more effectively, positions are explained with the notion of distance, because actors can only be understood according to their relative locations in a policy space (Benoit and Laver, 2006: 11). Positions are also susceptible to movement. The vast party competition literature and even a cursory examination of the Comparative Manifesto Project's longitudinal data reveal that positions are subject to change based on a broad range of exogenous and endogenous shocks.

The possibility for party position movement signifies direction, which is the primary focus of this chapter. The spatial distance between positions demonstrates whether the NPD and Die Linke maintain similar or dissimilar policy preferences within Saxony's party system. Although several examples of potential policy overlaps have been suggested in the secondary literature, the relative locations of the NPD's and Die Linke's positions have never been comparatively investigated. In fact, aside from several expert surveys (Laver and Hunt, 1992; Benoit and Laver, 2006), party position measurements for the German far right are practically nonexistent. The dearth of empirical analysis is due primarily to the German far right's lack of electoral success at the national level. On the other hand, as Die Linke has established itself as a major actor in the German party systems, its positions have consistently been included in recent policy analyses.

There are several additional conceptual clarifications that must be considered in any discussion about positions. Positions and emphasis are not equivalent. They represent two distinct parameters of party policy that were developed from different interpretations of competition: spatial and salience. However, as the theory section has already argued, a comprehensive understanding of party competition involves both positions and salience. It is possible for two parties to possess different positions, but equally emphasize the same issues (Laver and Garry, 2000: 620). The next chapter will concentrate exclusively on the role of issue salience in political competition between the NPD and Die Linke. Nor, as Chapter 3 already suggested, are party

positions synonymous with ideology, although these concepts are sometimes mentioned interchangeably. Indeed, preferences as expressed through positions could be the manifestation of an ideology, but it is also possible that a revealed party position is the result of some vote- or office-seeking strategy.

The uncertainty surrounding sincere and strategic motives affects inferences about party positions. Laver and Benoit (2006: 14-16) identified two variations of positions: ideal and public. Since ideal positions are unobservable, the political scientist is limited to inferring public positions through units of measurement in the form of words and deeds. Thus, in a content analysis, the unit is an identifiable message or message component, which serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a sample, on which variables are measured, or which serves as the basis for reporting analyses (Neuendorf, 2002: 71). Carney (1971: 52) has stated that units can consist of words, characters, themes, time periods, interactions, or any other result of dividing communication into smaller fragments. Units are captured directly with sources of data including party manifestos, media articles, speeches, legislative documents, etc. or through votes and expert surveys. However, determining the exact unit of measurement is a formidable task for the current study. Not only is this the first study in which Anträge have been used as a data source, but the hierarchical structure of an Antrag presents the reader with a myriad of items that could be coded seemingly independent of each other. How then can one effectively unitize an Antrag?

6.2.2 Towards a Unit of Measurement: Assessing Validity and Reliability
When establishing an appropriate unit of measurement, two criteria must be taken into account: validity and reliability. The former addresses the ability of the unit to measure the main concept in this study: party positions. The latter is defined as the extent to which the measuring hand coding procedure produces the same results after repeated trials (Neuendorf, 2002: 12). In comparison to its quantitative counterpart, social scientists concur that qualitative research demonstrates a high level of validity in the measurement of party positions. Unlike computer-assisted content analyses that treat individual words as data in order to establish party positions, hand coding introduces human judgment, which more effectively enables the true content of a manifesto, article or legislative motion to be inferred within the political context in which parties operate. Indeed, although computer-assisted content analysis appears to be emerging as the more popular method due to its efficient procedure and high reliability, the human component involved in hand-coding

is still regarded as the more valid approach, as long as it retains an accepted level of impartiality. For the purposes of this research, the goal is to observe the NPD and Die Linke's policy preferences. Recalling the description of an Antrag in Chapter 5, the intent of this document is to compel the state government to take action. Therefore, the corresponding unit of measurement must be explicit enough to infer preferred actions on the political issues in question.

The methods applied to the measurement of party positions often include a trade-off between the goals of validity and reliability. Generally speaking, the automated processes that comprise computer-assisted content analysis afford a high level of reliability. Researchers can expect that a program such as *Wordfish* will not only consistently compute positions according to the same algorithm, but that it is less prone to human judgment errors that produce measurement mistakes. This applies to both stages of Krippendorff's (2013) data-generating process: unitization and classification. In the former example, computer-assisted content analysis examines individual words, which is one of the simplest exogenous units of analysis possible.

Endogenous approaches to party positions, such as CMP and the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), have traditionally suffered from problems related to insufficient reliability. Mikhaylov et al. (2012) demonstrated that even trained CMP exert coders are susceptible to subjective human judgments that contribute to misclassification and stochastic coding errors. As a result, CMP data is highly vulnerable to noise and a centrist bias. The endogenous nature of identifying quasi-sentences increases misclassification, because different readers detect inconsistent units within the same text. Furthermore, the unitization of quasi-sentences in and of itself is an entirely unnecessary process. Däubler et al. (2012) found that nearly all of the natural sentences in their sample had only one quasi-sentence and those containing more than one quasi-sentence have the same classification.

Some authors have attempted to improve reliability for observing party positions through the use of the exogenous natural sentence as the unit of measurement in both media articles (Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012; Helbing and Tresch, 2010) and in party manifestos (Dolezal et al., 2016). One variation of using natural sentences, is the core sentence approach, which is based upon a relational method of content analysis and evaluates statements according to an actor-actor as well as an actor-issue scheme. Directional codes are then distributed, in order to convey either approval (+1), rejection (-1) or ambiguity (0) between each sentence's subject and object. Compared to the CMP's endogenous quasi-sentences, the core

sentence approach is certainly a more systematic way to identify textual units of measurement and increase reliability in the hand-coding method.

Nevertheless, the core sentence approach is a poor fit for the data source in this research. The grammatical composition of an Antrag is not conducive to evaluating natural sentences. Whereas party programs and newspaper articles are constructed with mostly concise, straightforward sentences, the Antrag's structure often contains lengthy statements whose overall message is sometimes convoluted in bureaucratic jargon and inconsequential anecdotes. This is especially the case for Anträge that are intended for legislative committees and are thus more technical in nature. The following is an example of a natural sentence that does not even qualify as one of the longest text segments from the sample:

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert, dem Landtag auf der Grundlage der unterbreiteten Angebote und Forderungen der landesweiten Interessenvertretungen der sächsischen Beamten, Polizisten und Richter für einen den verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben entsprechenden und der derzeitigen Einkommenssituation der Beamtinnen und Beamten insbesondere im einfachen, mittleren und gehobenen Dienst Rechnung tragenden und zeitlich eng zu befristenden Vorschlag zum Umgang mit den Sonderzahlungen für Beamte, Richter und Versorgungsempfänger bzw. ein Konzept für das Integrieren der derzeitigen Sonderzahlungen in eine neue Besoldungsstruktur zu unterbreiten." (Drs 5/3404)

Due to the relational basis of matching subjects and issues with predicates, core sentences, such as the previous example, have the potential to lead to significant overcoding instead of focusing on the overall message that is expressed in the text segment. The network that captures actor to actor and actor to issue relationships is challenging to adhere to for larger text segments that introduce a significant volume of objects. In effect, the number of actor-issue and actor-actor directional relationships is increased, which consequently amplifies the potential for more misclassifications. The same type of undesired noise emerges, even though the core sentence approach was designed to prevent this. Is it necessary to code "*Beamten, Polizei* and *Richter*" individually, although they are all civil servants?

Mikhaylov et al. (2012) have also proposed a compelling argument for coding natural sentences without a relational method, but the grammatical structure of many Anträge again makes this approach impractical. Although the demands section of an Antrag is organized with numbers and bullet points indicating the actions that should be taken, the punctuation that should divide these points is inconsistent. The subsequent Antrag would be coded as one unit due to the existing

commas, despite the fact that the party has asked the state government to undertake three different actions.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
>
>> 1. unverzüglich eine Bundesratsinitiative für eine Änderung des Grundgesetzes zu ergreifen, um in Deutschland Volksabstimmungen auf nationaler Ebene zu ermöglichen,
>> 2. mit den ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln für eine breite Unterstützung einer solchen Änderung des Grundgesetzes durch Bundesrat, Bundestag und Bundesregierung zu werben,
>> 3. dafür Sorge zu tragen und sich dafür einzusetzen, daß die erste Volksabstimmung auf nationaler Ebene zur Frage eines Ausscheidens Deutschlands aus der „Europäischen Währungsunion" und zur Wiedereinführung der Deutschen Mark als nationaler Währung abgehalten wird." (Drs 5/7453)

In other cases, the comma is replaced by a semi-colon or the punctuation is omitted entirely.

Aside from the natural sentence, it might also seem logical to designate all numbered or bulleted text segments and paragraphs as a deterministic unit. However, the hierarchical structure of an Antrag that divides text into bullet points and subtopics demonstrates that not all actions are equal. In fact, many subtopics that are listed as bullet points do not contain any actions. Instead, they refer to aspects of a measure that should be considered by the state government or criteria that ought to be implemented within an initiative. The subsequent passage is such an example:

> "…..und ersucht dazu die Staatsregierung,
> 1. im Bundesrat einen Gesetzvorschlag zur Verankerung grundlegender Individualrechte von Kindern und Jugendlichen im Grundgesetz einzubringen, mit dem insbesondere
>
> - der Vorrang des Kindeswohls bei allen Kinder und Jugendliche betreffende Entscheidungen,
> - das Recht der Kinder und Jugendlichen auf ihre Anerkennung als eigenständige Persönlichkeiten,
> - das Recht der Kinder und Jugendlichen auf ihre individuelle Entwicklung und Entfaltung sowie eine diesbezügliche Förderung,
> - das Recht der Kinder und Jugendlichen auf Schutz, Förderung und einen angemessenen Lebensstandard,
> - das Recht der Kinder und Jugendlichen auf Beteiligung und Mitbestimmung, insbesondere die Berücksichtigung ihrer Meinung entsprechend ihres Alters und Reifegrads sowie
> - die Verpflichtung des Staates, für kind- und jugendgerechte Lebensbedingungen Sorge zu tragen, ausdrücklich in den Teil I des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufgenommen werden soll." (Drs 5/42)

The most important part of the text is the proposal for a bill insuring individual rights to children and youth in general. The bill is the policy instrument that the party has proposed in order to enact its ultimate goal of individual rights for children and youth. The detailed aspects therein, which are signified with bullet points, cannot be considered, nor for that matter exist, independent of the suggested bill. In other cases, single words that are devoid of meaning would be coded under the bulleted or numbered text approach as displayed in the following example:

"Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,

dem Landtag bis zum 31. März 2012 ein mit den Trägern der Wohlfahrtspflege sowie mit sonstigen fachlichen relevanten Trägern abgestimmtes Konzept für die zukünftige flächendeckende sowie qualitative und quantitative bedarfsgerechte Ausgestaltung der sozialen Beratungsinfrastruktur in Sachsen sowie zu deren nachhaltiger Finanzierung vorzulegen. Dabei soll insbesondere die Beratungseinrichtungsarten
    a) allgemeine Sozialberatungen
    b) Erwerbslosenberatungen
    c) Beratungsstellen der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe
    d) Bildungsberatungen
    e) Koordinierungs- und Informationsstellen für Selbsthilfegruppen
    f) Beratungsstellen für Menschen mit Behinderungen
    g) Insolvenzberatungen
    h) Schuldnerberatungen
    i) Verbraucherschutzberatungen
    j) Antidiskriminierungsberatungen mit mehrdimensionalen Ansatz
    k) Migrationsberatungsstellen
    l) Pflegestützpunkte
    m) unabhängige Patientenberatungsstellen
    n) Suchtberatungen
    o) AIDS-Beratungsstellen
    p) Familienberatungen
    q) Mehrgenerationenhäuser
    r) Beratungen für Lesben, Schwüle, Bi- und Transsexuelle
    s) Schwangerschafts(konflikt)beratungen
    t) Frauen- und Kinderschutzeinrichtungen
    u) Täterberatungen
    v) Interventionsstellen im Falle von häuslicher und Beziehungsgewalt
    w) Beratungsstellen im Falle von Menschenhandel und
       Zwangsverheiratung
    x) Opferberatungen
Berücksichtigung finden." (Drs 5/6912)

Essentially, the parties prioritize actions, and this process is reflected in the order of the initiatives that are proposed. Classifying every bullet point in an Antrag contributes undesirable noise to the calculated party positions and ignores the particular structure of the document.

The generation of an endogenous unit that is modeled on an action-based concept, is not without precedent. In addition to the CMP's quasi-sentence approach, Koopmans and Statham (1999; Koopmans, 2002) developed the political claims analysis for the purpose of coding protest activities and social movements in media text. Claims are defined as the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action in the public sphere. This implies two conditions: claims must be the result of purposive strategic action and they must be political in nature (Koopmans, 2002: 5). Claims are not confined to the grammatical structure of the text in question. Rather, they rely upon a "subject-action-addressee-action-object-justification" sequence that is linked to exploring frames. Helbing and Tresch (2011) successfully calculated party positions by applying the political claims analysis approach to media articles and, more importantly, they demonstrated that data acquired from media articles using political claims analysis converged with the positions in party manifestos.

Overall, the suggested examples in the secondary literature that are intended to improve reliability cannot be implemented without negatively impacting construct validity. The exceptional grammatical structure of an Antrag is largely responsible for the ineffectiveness of exogenous units of analysis, such as natural sentences and bulleted points. However, the frequency with which Anträge are published, the basic structure that clearly separates the demands and explanations, and the abundance of explicit policy statements while the parties are in elected office are all reasons that qualify Anträge as an ideal data source. In addition to the widely acknowledged CMP quasi-sentence, the political claims analysis approach represents compelling evidence that a holistic, endogenous unitization method can be applied to action-based documents. Keeping in mind that measurement in content analysis includes a trade-off between reliability and validity (Däubler et al., 2012: 938), it is evident that the endogenous unitization favors the latter. It should also be recalled from the section explaining the choice for hand-coding in Chapter 5 that the research design for this study is a small-N, comparative case study. The analysis is primarily focused on the detailed narratives that accompany party positions. An exogenous unit, such as those utilized in the core and natural sentence approaches, was originally intended for research projects containing numerous cases that were evaluated by substantial coding teams. In order to coordinate

a consistent coding procedure for a multitude of languages and coders, those projects emphasized reliability in their research.

6.2.3 Units of Measurement: Political Declarations and Primary Measure Actions
Keeping in mind the unique structure of an Antrag, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of previous unitization procedures, two action-based units have been established for the current study: political declarations and primary measure actions. Since Anträge are action-based documents that appeal to the parliament and/or state government to reach a decision, and policy preferences by definition should exhibit a desired goal or outcome on a particular issue, political declarations and primary action measures represent valid construct units. They also contain features that enhance the reliability for an endogenous unit. Political declarations are written as natural sentences and can easily be coded as such. The following is a typical example of two political declarations that were proposed by the NPD in Drs 5/10339.

> "I. Der Landtag stellt fest:
> 1. Die Situation von Müttern in Sachsen ist dramatisch und bedarf dringender Verbesserungen. Trotz langsam steigender Geburtenraten werden junge Familien nur unzureichend gefördert."

The sentiments in the passage above are explicit enough to infer the direction of the parties' preferences. In this case, the position is more support for mothers and families in Germany.

Primary action measures possess validity, because they signify the most important actions that the state government or parliament should take within an Antrag. The following excerpt from the NPD is a typical primary measure action.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert, sich auf Bundesebene dafür einzusetzen, daß die sogenannte Optionspflicht für in Deutschland geborene Kinder ausländischer Eltern erhalten bleibt." (Drs 5/13304)

The passage above is a rather straightforward example of a primary measure action. In more complex documents that contain larger text passages, the primary action measures can often be identified based on the hierarchical symbols that organize the content, which augments reliability. Another indicator that a unit should be classified as a primary measure action is its proximity to the original appeal to the state government. This quote from Die Linke in Drs 5/12728 demonstrates a primary action measure that can be distinguished from accompanying sub-action measures.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
> die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen dafür zu schaffen, dass die
> Grundstückeigentümer (natürliche und juristische Personen), Privathaushalte und
> Kommunen in zumutbarer und wirtschaftlich vertretbarer Weise eine verlässliche
> Eigenvorsorge für künftig eintretende sog. Elementarschadensereignisse treffen
> können und hierzu…."
>> - gemeinsam mit anderen Bundesländern im Bundesrat eine
>> Gesetzinitiative für die unverzügliche Einführung eines für alles
>> Versicherungsnehmer bezahlbaren, flächendeckenden
>> Versicherungsschutzes gegen Schäden durch Naturgewalten und
>> Extremwetterereignisse (Elementarschäden-Pflichtversicherung) im
>> Rahmen einer Gebäudepflichtversicherung auf den Weg zu bringen.
>> - Grundstückeigentümer, Privathaushalte und Kommunen durch eine
>> gezielte Förderung bei der hochwasserangepassten Planung, Bau und
>> Sanierung von Gebäden zu unterstützen sowie
>> - Eigentümer hochwassgefährdeter Grundstücke sowie Privathaushalte
>> und Kommun gezielt über die erforderliche Eigenvorsorge sowie die
>> dazu gewährten Förder- und Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten zu
>> informieren."

The bulleted text that succeeds the original point is comprised of individual recommendations about insurance self-provisions for natural hazards, but which cannot exist without the initial passage. If the individual sub-action measures were also to be coded, this would produce multiple classifications that are not central to the Antrag's intent and, thus, a negative impact for the position validity. Such an approach might appear rather subjective. However, as Budge has previously stated, assumptions have to be made about what is important in the text and what can be left out (Budge, 2001: 75). Thus, aggregating up to the primary measures in the Anträge is a more systematic way to unitize the text and measure the preferences that are expressed.[28]

With the unit of measurement established as either a political declaration or primary measure action, the next step is to classify the identified units in each Antrag. The direction of the proposed policy positions from the NPD and Die Linke are categorized according to the 58 codes initially introduced in Chapter 5. These codes were adopted from the original set of 56 categories first introduced by the Comparative Manifesto Project. Two additional classifications were added that specifically address the issue of immigration. For each unit of measurement, only one classification was assigned.

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[28]For more information about unitization and classification procedures, please reference the coding manual located in Appendix C.

The reliability of the coded units was established with an intercoder reliability test. For this purpose, a trained, student coder was asked to identify the appropriate unit and classification in a sample of Anträge that was randomly selected. Adhering to the 10 per cent rule that is standard practice for an intercoder reliability test in content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002), the student coder evaluated a total of 40 Anträge (20 from the NPD and 20 from Die Linke). The selected motions varied in length, number of units and policy areas that they addressed. The reliability score was calculated according to Cohen's kappa (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007), which reduces the potential for sheer coincidence in the final results. After conducting the tests and computing the results, an overall score of .74 was achieved for the Anträge that were included in the inter-rater reliability test. Based on Banerjee and Capozzoli (1999) the reliability values may be taken to represent very good agreement beyond chance.

6.2.4 Converting Coding Frequencies to Positions

A scaling procedure is necessary in the measurement of party of positions, in order to convert the categorized units into points within a continuous policy dimension (Lowe et al., 2011: 125). The conversion of observed category counts into actual positions consists of three approaches: the standard CMP approach, the relative proportional difference and the logit scale measurements. In accordance with saliency theory the standard CMP formula measures the difference between frequencies from left and right quasi-sentences that are divided by the total number of sentences in a manifesto.

$$P = R - L / N.$$

The primary drawback of this equation is that uncodable sentences can drastically alter the estimated party position, because a high N value will moderate the total outcome of the counted units. This point is especially pertinent for the current research, because the focus of party position measurements is within dimensions and not across dimensions. This is also the reason why the CMP formula exactly resembles the Kim and Fording alternative, which is presented next. There are indeed some dimensions where either the NPD or Die Linke achieve a perfect or near perfect +1/-1 score, because they only register classifications from one side of the scale. However, the converted code total is inaccurately moderated in the overall position when the total number of classified units is added to the formula.

Kim and Fording (2002) proposed a solution to this problem that eliminates the influence of uncodable sentences. Instead of calculating positions relative to the total number of coded units, they recommend that counts should only be relative to the opposing category:

$$P = R - L \, / \, R + L$$

Similar to the standard CMP formula, the Kim and Fording alternative suffers from fixed endpoints. For example, if no right codes were classified, the total position would be -1 regardless of how many left codes were counted. Similarly, the position of a party with 0 left codes would be 1, irrespective of the values of R. As a result, the cumulative estimated positions have a tendency to gravitate towards the boundaries of the scales.

The final approach, the logit method, proposed by Lowe et al. (2011), accounts for proportions between left and right counts. It deemphasizes the importance of manipulating absolute quantities of codes allocated, and instead considers the balance of right vs. left classifications (Lowe et al., 2011: 131).

$$P = \log (R + 0.5) - \log (L + 0.5)$$

In this case, fixed points can be avoided and the equation only recognizes left and right sentences. The most beneficial aspect of the logit approach for this study is the flexibility it affords to create scales for multiple dimensions. Based on this reason in particular, the logit method is the preferred choice for party measurements.

6.3 Results

The results section is divided into two major components that correspond with the chapter's observable implications. The first part contains the empirical findings for each of the policy dimensions. Thereafter, an in-depth analysis of position similarities and differences is conducted with direct quotes from the parties' respective Anträge. The combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis provides a broad, but thorough examination of the parties' positions.

6.3.1 The View from Afar: Party Positions in the Policy Spaces
The empirical analysis strongly confirms Observable Implications 1 and 2. The frequencies in Table 9 reveal that both the NPD and Die Linke display similar positions in those dimensions that do not contain their core issues. These pertain to the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions.

Table 9 Positions And Code Frequencies In The Peripheral Dimensions For Both Parties

Dimension (Positions)	NPD	Die Linke
	Lowe et al.[29]	Lowe et al.
Foreign Affairs	0.58	0.20
101 Foreign Special Relationships Positive	3	0
102 Foreign Special Relationships Negative	0	0
105 Military Negative	9	10
106 Peace Positive	0	0
107 Internationalism Positive	1	0
108 European Integration Positive	0	0
109 Internationalism Negative	3	0
110 European Integration Negative	48	16
Total Number of Codes	64	26
Left/Right Codes	13/51	10/16
Environmental Protection	-0.58	-2.05
410 Economic Growth: Positive	2	0
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	0	10
501 Environmental Protection: Positive	9	45
Total Number of Codes	11	55
Left/Right Codes	9/2	55/0

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

In the former policy area, the parties favored environmental protection on various issues. Direct similarities occurred on subjects such as animal protection rights and water conservation. Elsewhere, the NPD proposed a measure to close nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic, because of the threats they posed to human safety and the environment. Die Linke covered a broader range of issues with positions in favor of environmental protection. The party produced multiple Anträge supporting the regulation of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, established climate protection goals and advocated for a reduction in noise pollution. The position scores suggest that Die Linke is far more in favor of environmental protection than the NPD. Indeed, Die

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[29] Refers to the equation for converting code frequencies into party positions ($P = \log (R + 0.5) - \log (L + 0.5)$) proposed by Lowe et al. (2011: 131). This table also applies to Tables 10 and 11 in this chapter where the same equation is applied.

Linke did not propose a single unit that was classified with a right code, whereas two such units were assigned to the NPD. On account of the relatively small sample size, the impact of these right codes significantly affected the NPD's overall position score. However, it should be noted that, in those instances where the NPD did prefer economic growth (410), it was not in the context of environmental policy. Rather the measures were proposed in conjunction with programs intended to revitalize the economy in the Vogtland region and meet labor needs in critical parts of the workforce. Hence, in the true nature of a valence issue, the NPD was not directly opposed to environmental protection. This finding contradicts those assertions in the secondary literature which claim that environmental protection is not the ideal valence issue that many perceive it to be (Katsanidou and Gemenis, 2010; Lowe et al., 2011).

The empirical findings presented in Table 9 also show that the other peripheral dimension for the NPD and Die Linke, foreign affairs, contains overlapping positions as well. This result can be explained by the parties' overwhelmingly negative views on European integration (110), which is listed as a right code according to the foreign affairs dimensional scale. The outcome supports the assertion from Hooghe et al. (2002) that an inverted u-curve structures party positions on European integration. As Euroskeptic parties, the NPD and Die Linke occupy parallel, but also opposite ends of this formation. Although they differ as to the exact problems, the NPD and Die Linke overwhelmingly rejected the European Union in its current state. The NPD utilized the various crises within the Eurozone to express its general discontent with additional institutional and cultural integration. For its part, Die Linke criticized the lack of social-mindedness in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and claimed Saxony's right to subsidiarity on various issues. The parties' positions would have been farther to the right, if they had not also shared negative views about German military involvement (105), which is a left code. They each asked the Saxon State Parliament to keep German troops out of international conflicts and refrain from aiding military operations in other ways.

Observable Implications 3 and 4, which predicted dissimilar policy positions in the parties' core dimensions, were only partially confirmed. Table 10 indicates that the NPD and Die Linke did express opposing views in the socio-cultural dimensions of party competition. The fabric of society and law and order policy areas, which contain the NPD's core issues, produced differing positions between the parties. The NPD's positions demonstrated preferences for demarcation, whereas Die Linke favored integration. At first glance though, the position scores in the fabric of

society dimension seem to reject the expected differences that the secondary literature suggests. However, the high frequency of national solidarity codes for Die Linke is deceiving. The parties displayed overlapping policy preferences on national solidarity in response to several major floods that affected Saxony during the 5th legislative session. This subject was arguably a valence issue. On this matter, as one would expect, both parties asked the state government to designate recovery funds and compensate victims through other forms of relief.

Table 10 Party Positions And Code Frequencies In The Socio-Cultural Dimensions

Dimension (Positions)	NPD Lowe et al.	Die Linke Lowe et al.
Fabric of Society	1.16	0.52
601 National Way of Life Positive	14	7
602 National Way of Life Negative	0	1
603 Traditional Morality Positive	19	0
604 Traditional Morality Negative	0	0
606 Social Harmony Positive	19	27
607 Multiculturalism Positive	0	5
608 Multiculturalism Negative	12	0
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups Positive	0	0
706 Non-Economic Groups Positive	4	4
Total Number of Codes	68	44
Left/Right Codes	4/64	10/34
Justice	0.76	-0.91
201 Freedom and Human Rights Positive	11	46
205 Immigration Expansion Positive	1	23
206 Immigration Limitation Positive	35	0
605 Law and Order Positive	37	8
Total Number of Codes	84	77
Left/Right Codes	12/72	69/8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

The point is that, without these coded units, Die Linke's position score would be much more moderate. Nevertheless, it is still somewhat surprising that the party's appeals to multiculturalism

are so limited. Table 10 illustrates that Die Linke had only 5 primary action measures in 2 Anträge that were classified as multiculturalism: positive (607). Even though Die Linke expressed support for asylum seekers and individuals with alternative lifestyles in other dimensions, the number of primary measure actions that expressly championed multiculturalism was relatively low. Then again, Saxony is often perceived as an unusually conservative state and even some voters from Die Linke have been supportive of the PEGIDA movement there. A 2015 poll released by the Forsa Institute revealed that just over a quarter of supporters from Die Linke were open to participating in PEGIDA marches, which was twice the national average (Mathes, 2015). In interviews about the situation in East Germany, the party leadership has continuously struggled to develop a strategy that could pacify anxieties about the migrant crisis without compromising its positions (Steffen, 2016). Due to the limited amount of observations in the sample though, it is impossible to further explore explanations for Die Linke's reluctance to support multiculturalism. Based on the nuances of the nature of the national solidarity and national way of life codes, the positions in the fabric of society dimension do not appear to be similar.

In the law and order dimension, the NPD preferred national borders over the free movement of people. The party proposed extreme right positions on issues such as restrictive immigration, the repeal of asylum laws, heightened border control and tougher legal sentences for criminal offenders. Conversely, the majority of Die Linke's manifest preferences in the law and order dimension were classified with left categories. Often viewing itself as the outspoken counterbalance to the NPD's radical views, Die Linke defended the interests of perceived outsiders and de-emphasized the significance of national borders. This pattern extended to the fabric of society dimension as well. The NPD rejected multicultural initiatives, argued in favor of German national ways of life and supported traditional gender roles. Die Linke, in line with its democratic socialist ideology, introduced measures that urged cultural inclusivity and an acceptance of progressive gender roles.

Table 11 Party Positions And Code Frequencies In The Socio-Economic Dimensions

Dimension (Positions)	NPD	Die Linke
	Lowe et al.	Lowe et al.
State Involvement in the Economy	-1.25	-1.61
401 Free Enterprise Positive	0	0
402 Incentives Positive	1	0
403 Market Regulation Positive	43	18
404 Economic Planning Positive	0	0
406 Protectionism Positive	2	0
407 Protectionism Negative	0	1
412 Controlled Economy Positive	2	1
413 Nationalization Positive	0	5
414 Economic Orthodoxy Positive	2	0
701 Labor Groups Positive	14	36
702 Labor Groups Negative	0	0
Total Number of Codes	64	61
Left/Right Codes	61/3	60/1
Welfare State and Social Services	-1.91	-1.86
503 Social Justice Positive	7	55
504 Welfare Expansion Positive	23	74
505 Welfare Limitation Positive	0	2
506 Education Expansion Positive	10	52
507 Education Limitation Positive	0	0
Total Number of Codes	40	183
Left/Right Codes	40/0	181/2

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

However, contrary to the observable implications, the parties exhibited similar positions in each of the socio-economic policy areas under investigation. Table 11 shows that the NPD is actually positioned slightly to the left of Die Linke in the welfare state and social services dimension and even received a perfect left position score Due to the far right's penchant for welfare chauvinism, this result is not a total surprise. However, in the state involvement in the economy dimension, the NPD proposed mostly left-wing measures in its Anträge. While Die Linke's protectionist positions in the state involvement in the economy dimension are commensurate with those of a typical, far

left party, the findings for the NPD challenge the original theoretical assumptions about far right actors (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Betz and Immerfall, 1998). Instead of proposing neoliberal policies that promote a free market economy, the results for the NPD are consistent with recent analyses in the secondary literature which, did not perform serious empirical testing (Staud, 2005; Bergsdorf, 2007; Röpke and Speit. 2008; Sommer, 2008; Grumke, 2009; Puls, 2011; Brandstetter; 2013). Nevertheless, the claims contained in these studies – namely that the far right is opposed to integrated capitalism – could be confirmed here. In response to the integrating effects of globalization, the NPD has complemented its demarcating preferences on socio-cultural issues with those on socio-economic issues.

At the macro level, overlaps in the socio-economic dimensions can be explained by common preferences on issues such as Hartz-IV, consumer protection and the general desire for a social market economy. The NPD and Die Linke encouraged market regulation and better conditions for labor groups, - a sign that both parties targeted a similar electorate with their initiatives. In the welfare state and social services dimension, the NPD and Die Linke proposed left positions on issues like childcare provisions and fees for social courts. Elsewhere, the NPD focused on the pension system, care for the elderly, housing allowances and fire codes. Die Linke's left positions were more thorough. Nearly all of the more than 180 coded units in the welfare state and social services dimension were classified as left categories on the CMP scale. In those instances where Die Linke was opposed to increasing welfare initiatives, the party's position was actually more nuanced. Essentially, it challenged existing or alternative measures that, it believed, did not go far enough to meet the social issue at stake.

6.3.2 Overlapping Party Positions: Same Same But Different
The following in-depth analysis complements the broad overview of party positions in the previous section with rich, descriptive information. It commences with the positions from the NPD and Die Linke in the environmental protection dimension. Despite the two units that registered as economic growth (410), the NPD displayed a clear penchant for environmental protection over economic interests. One notable example of this shared preference was the proposal to maintain or improve the quality of natural resources. The NPD introduced several Anträge, with the intended purpose of preventing chemical contamination in Saxony's water supply, such as in Drs 5/7596. The NPD called upon the state government to reduce the potential threat of harmful micro elements to plants,

animals and miroorganisms. Of course, there are implicit concerns for the health of Saxony's citizens as well. To this end, the NPD requested that the state government upgrade Saxony's sewage treatment facilities and take other measures to reduce micro elements in the water supply.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird gebeten,
> (….) II. für den Freistaat Sachsen das Ziel zu formulieren,
> 1. daß die Wasserqualität so beschaffen sein soll, daß Spurenstoffe die Fortpflanzung und Entwicklung empfindlicher Pflanzen, Tiere und Mikroorganismen über deren gesamten Lebensdauer nicht beeinträchtigen;
> 2. auf eine Ausrüstung aller größeren Kläranlagen (über 100.000 Einwohnerwerte) mit weitergehenden Reinigungsstufen zur Eliminierung von Spurenstoffen hinzuwirken;
> 3. Maßnahmen zur Reduktion des Eintrags von Spurenstoffen in die Umwelt zu ergreifen."

The party later followed up the previous Antrag with another motion about the harmful effects of fertilizer in the public water supply. The NPD urged the state government to both ban fertilizers containing uranium and create public awareness for environmentally harmful products. It did so without considering the economic impact that such regulations might have on agriculture and industry.

Die Linke also made a concerted effort to address water contamination. In Drs 5/11206, the party was troubled about the environmental effects of brown coal drilling in the Lausitz region, which has long been a large employer in the local community there. In response to the extensive environmental damage that had already been inflicted, Die Linke requested that the state government partner with Brandenburg to monitor and eventually establish limits for the amount of harmful contaminants polluting the local water supply.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht, (….)
> II.
> bis zum Jahresende mit dem Land Brandenburg sowie den Unternehmen Vattenfall und LMBV ein gemeinsames verbindliches Konzept zur Beobachtung und Verminderung bergbaubedingter Stoffbelastungen in den betroffenen Fließgewässern sowie ein dazugehöriges fortzuschreibendes Arbeitsprogramm aufzustellen. Ziel ist dabei ein abgestimmtes und zielorientiertes Monitoring der Stofffrachten im Grund- und Oberflächenwasser und die Minimierung der stofflichen Beslastung der Gewässer. Die Daten sollen in einem bundesländerübergreifenden Monitoring zusammenfließen. Die Maßnahmen in den zwei Bundesländern sollen sich sinnvoll und zielorientiert ergänzen.
>
> III.

> sich auf Bundesebene für die Einführung sachlich gerechtfertiger und handlungsauslösender Grenzwerte für Acidität, Eisen gelöst, Eisen gesamt und Sulfat in Oberflächengewässern sowie für eine sinnvolle Harmonsierung und übersichtliche Regelung der stofflichen Vorgaben für Grund- und Oberflächengewässer einzusetzen."

Die Linke's environmental concerns comprised one component of a larger program that raised economic objections about the presence of mining companies in the Lausitz region. Although it did acknowledge potential employment concerns for affected workers, Die Linke clearly prioritized environmental protection.

A closer look at the foreign affairs measures also reveals how the parties' positions trended in a similar direction. In particular, each actor pursued policies that attempted to limit the decision-making authority of the European Union and restore powers to the local level. Die Linke sought to curb the EU's decision-making abilities in certain policy areas. Rather than rejecting supra-national authority entirely though, the party sought instead to exercise Saxony's right to subsidiarity. Under this provision in the Treaty of Maastricht, decision-making authority is reserved for the most local level possible. The EU can only pass laws if a less centralized entity is unable to do so. In Anträge from Die Linke, examples covered a broad range of subjects. Issues included regulations pertaining to the consistency of honey, the integration of regional economies, countering right-wing political organizations and the protection of sensitive digital information. Drs 5/10453 provides a typical example of a subsidiarity Antrag.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> 1. im Bundesrat in geeigneter Weise auf Subsidaritätsbedenken hinzuweisen und ggf. einen Antrag zur Erhebung einer Subsidaritätsrüge gem. Artikel 12 Buchstabe b EUV betreffend des Vorschlages für eine RICHTLINE DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2001/110/EG des Rates über Honig (KOM 2012/0530 endg.) zu stellen, um damit die nationalen und bundesländerbezogenen Kompetenzen im Bereich des Verbraucherschutzes und der Lebensmittelsicherheit hinsichtlich der Erzeugung und des Handel smit gentechnisch veränderten Lebensmitteln, hier insbesondere mit Blick auf die gebotene Einhaltung der für die Zulassung genetisch veränderter Lebensmittel geltenden Grenzwerte für Honig trotz der durch den Richtlinienvorschlag erfolgten Definition von Pollen als Bestandteil von Honig (und nicht als Zutat), zu wahren und nicht einzuschränken."

As Drs 5/10453 indicates, such measures were typically technical in nature and always adhered to the same written format. Thus, it seems doubtful that Anträge about subsidiarity were likely to mobilize Euroskeptic voters from across the political spectrum.

NPD Anträge were equally opposed to the expansion of EU authority. Wherever possible, the NPD sought to restore decision-making authority to the national level. Of course, such preferences correspond with the party's ultranationalist ideology. During the 5th legislative session, the National Democrats were provided ample opportunities to express this position. The period from 2009 to 2014 was marked by various bailout crises stemming from insolvent EU member states and delayed responses from political leaders in Brussels. In the midst of this turmoil, the party proposed radical alternatives that undermined the EU. For example, it argued for the termination of the Euro currency and the return of the German Mark in multiple Anträge, such as Drs 5/1796 and Drs 5/7453, respectively. Both initiatives were designed to strip the European Union of its monetary authority and restore jurisdiction in this area to the individual member states.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> (….) 5. eine Bundesratsinitiative für die Erstellung eines verfassungsrechtlich abgesicherten Plans zum Ausstieg aus der Währungsunion zur Wiederherstellung der Stabilität einzubringen."

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
> (….) 3. dafür Sorge zu tragen und sich dafür einzusetzen, daß die erste Volksabstimmung auf nationaler Ebene zur Frage eines Ausscheidens Deutschlands aus der Europäischen Währungsunion und zur Wiedereinführung der Deutschen Mark als nationaler Währung abgehalten wird."

Sound monetary policy aside, the comparison with Germany's former currency provided a useful contrast. The German Mark remains a national symbol for many Germans in a country where such emblems are often controversial. By juxtaposing the Euro with a popular national symbol like the *Deutsche Mark,* the NPD could appeal to more voters, regardless of the measures' actual feasibility.

Additional position overlaps pertaining to foreign affairs extended to positions about the military. Both parties were opposed to German military involvement abroad, which is classified as a left category in the foreign affairs dimension. The contemporary NPD's views on military matters demonstrate how much the party's preferences have evolved when compared with those of its predecessor. Concerned about Soviet advancement and nostalgic for the nationalist past, the NPD of the 1960s favored an active, West German military (Nagle, 1970). Somewhat ironically though, the NPD cited national interests in its opposition to German military participation. In general, the National Democrats are opposed to any military involvement that is not in Germany's interests. Thus, the party demanded that the German government refrain from participating in the

United States' global war on terror, even if this merely took the form of denying American military access to transportation routes in Saxony, as indicated in Drs 5/8622.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> sich auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene dafür einzusetzen, daß die militärische Nutzung des Flughafens Leipzig/Halle eingestellt wird."

Despite the NPD's displeasure with American foreign policy more generally, it did not express opposition to the United States' military endeavors alone. The National Democrats wanted the German military to abstain from missions in Mali and on the Turkish-Syrian border that were organized by the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respectively.

Die Linke also requested that Germany desist from any military involvement in foreign operations. Similar to the NPD, the party focused on the transportation of troops, weapons and other military convoys through Saxony that might be used in a military conflict. In this regard, Die Linke also referred specifically to the Leipzig-Halle Airport, as evidenced in Drs 5/702.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
> mit dem gebotenen Nachdruck gegenüber die Bundesregierung auf die Verhängung eines sofortigen Stopps von Truppen-, Waffen- und Materialtransporten für Einsätze der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan über den Flughafen Leipzig-Halle zu drängen."

Die Linke cited several reasons for its opposition to the military use of the Leipzig-Halle Airport. Unlike the NPD, which was primarily concerned about Germany's national interests, Die Linke accused the state government of being complicit in the deaths of innocent civilians in Afghanistan that occurred during a NATO maneuver. It also admonished the state government for failing to maintain the separation of military and civilian spheres, which is a violation of the Saxon Constitution.

However, behind the overlapping positions from the NPD and Die Linke in the foreign affairs dimension, the parties' preferences are marked by clear disparities. The European integration issue provides an appropriate case for comparison. From a qualitative perspective, the intensity and focus of each parties' Euroskepticism is noticeably different, despite the shared direction of their positions. In its opposition to European integration, the NPD primarily cited cultural reasons in their arguments to preserve national sovereignty. Conversely, Die Linke attempted to mobilize voters with social appeals and, to a lesser extent, decentralization. This

finding is consistent with the work from De Vries and Edwards (2009), which found that, on the issue of European integration, the battle cry for the extreme right concerns national identity considerations, whereas the extreme left cues voters against the EU with warnings about economic insecurity. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the theoretical framework proposed for the overall study. Essentially, even in a common peripheral dimension like foreign affairs, the NPD and Die Linke developed similar positions in a manner that is still consistent with the beliefs at the core of their respective ideologies.

The NPD and Die Linke also displayed differences in the intensity of their Euroskepticism. Both parties disapproved of the European Union, but the NPD demanded more drastic measures that would have radically altered the trajectory of European integration. Indeed, many of the proposed initiatives threatened the existence of the EU altogether. The NPD rejected the free movement of peoples, which has become a cornerstone of the European Project. It also challenged solidarity initiatives, such as bailouts for insolvent member states and general contributions to the fiscal budget. In contrast, Die Linke demanded that the EU, but especially the European Monetary Union, become more "socially-minded". This demand was meant to improve institutional deficiencies, rather than remove the EU entirely and is consistent with far left party attitudes more generally (Charalambous, 2011). This finding about the degree of Euroskepticism complements recent demand-side research, which indicates that far left voters are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but are not opposed to further integration. Rather they seek institutional reforms to the European Union (Van Elsas et al., 2016). Or, in the language of Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008), the NPD displays a hard version of Euroskepticism, whereas the Die Linke exhibits soft criticism.

As the last section unexpectedly demonstrated, the socio-economic dimensions produced position likeness. One issue where the NPD and Die Linke expressed overlapping policy positions was that of labor groups. Both parties proposed categorically left positions. Considering the voter data presented in Chapter 4, each actor had ample motive to express views that appealed to workers. The NPD called for an end to "One Euro Jobs" and temporary workers. For companies who employ the latter, the NPD was adamant that these firms provide evidence that they are not in a position to hire their workers full-time. The party also resisted cuts to the Hartz-IV benefits

meant to aid the unemployed and, at the same time, petitioned the government to adjust the payments to current cost of living levels. [30] The following is an example from Drs 5/3059.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> sich im Bundesrat dafür einzusetzen, daß die Regelsätze des Arbeitslosengeldes nach SGB II rückwirkend zum 1. Juli 2010 an die tatsächliche Entwicklung der Lebenshaltungskosten nach dem Verbraucherpreisindex angepaßt werden; den besonderen Anforderungen, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht in seinem Urteil vom 09.02.2010 an die Berechnung der Regelsätze des SGB II stellt, sind im Hinblick auf die bis Jahresende ohnehin zu erfolgende Neuberechnung Rechnung zu tragen."

Reading the NPD's calls for fair labor standards and secure jobs, the party's pleas could almost be mistaken for those of Die Linke. For example, in Drs 5/5536, the NPD asked the government to ensure that free enterprises in Germany adhere to the principles of a social market economy.

> "Der Sächsische Landtag fordert die Sächsische Staatsregierung auf, auf Bundesebene, insbesondere im Bundesrat, Initiativen zu ergreifen, die einer Stärkung des sozial verpflichteten Unternehmertums, der Mittelstandsförderung und der Schaffung und Sicherung vollwertiger und familiengerechtiger Arbeitsplätze in Deutschland dienen sollen.

In the Antrag, social-mindedness is emphasized above profit and economic growth.

Die Linke's positions corresponded with traditional center and far left parties. It appealed to its working class clientele with a series of initiatives that would improve standards for labor groups when they were both employed and out of work. The measure cited in Drs 5/11734 demonstrates how Die Linke sought better protection for workers, especially in the area of mental health.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
> sich unverzüglich für die Verabschiedung von Regelungen auf Bundesebene zur Verbesserung des gesundheitlichen Arbeitsschutzes einzusetzen, die geeignet sind, insbesondere die bestehende Schutzlücke hinsichtlich der in der Arbeitswelt zunehmenden psychischen Belastungen für die Beschäftigten zu schließen."

Die Linke's proposal for enhanced mental health at the workplace makes the party appear both responsible and responsive. With this dual approach, the party can show that it is addressing an

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[30] Although there is a strong social welfare component in Hartz-IV, measures that concentrate on unemployment benefits were coded as part of the state involvement in the economy dimension as code 701. Measures that focused exclusively on social welfare benefits that were unrelated to unemployment benefits, were categorized as part of the welfare state and social services dimension as codes 504 and 505. For more information about coding rules, please refer to the codebook in Appendix C.

urgent labor issue that requires legislative attention, while simultaneously appealing to the core of its voter base.

The findings for the state involvement in the economy dimension suggest positional similarities, but the results also provide a more nuanced picture. On many issues, the NPD's and Die Linke's positions could be distinguished by characteristics typical of each party. To the casual observer, this disparity was not always easy to infer. Take, for example, the minimum wage issue, which was coded as controlled economy: positive (412). In multiple Anträge, the NPD and Die Linke supported the introduction of a national minimum wage before a similar measure was enacted at the federal level later in the legislative period. Die Linke proposed a 10 Euro minimum, whereas the NPD advocated for 8.80 Euro in its motions. On the surface, these figures only suggest that Die Linke was slightly more generous than its political rival. In reality though, the 8.80 Euro value has symbolic significance for the NPD. The letter "h" is the eighth letter of the alphabet. When written twice, it produces the abbreviation "hh", which stands for *Heil Hitler* within far right milieus in Germany.[31] Thus, when considered within this context, the NPD was purposely appealing to voters who might favor a minimum wage while simultaneously signaling to its core supporters.

At other times though, the differences were more explicit. One way in which the NPD's and Die Linke's Anträge about labor groups could be distinguished was the very issue that the parties addressed. Job outsourcing was an ideal subject for the NPD. In addition to defending the common worker against large financial interests, the party was afforded the opportunity to reinforce its nationalist credentials by putting German interests first. When several firms left Saxony and relocated elsewhere, the NPD proposed measures to aid newly unemployed workers, but also reserved criticism for German companies that abandoned their dedicated laborers. The party even called for cooperation with other states to ensure that German jobs were protected, such as in Drs 5/7810.

> "Der Landtag möge beschließen.
> die Staatsregierung zu ersuchen,
> (….) 2. mit den Landesregierungen von Bayern, Hessen und Baden-Württemberg
> sowie mit den betreffenden Wirtschafts- und Finanzakteuren weitere
> wirtschaftspolitische Gespräche über die Zukunft der deutschen
> Druckmaschinenindustrie im allgemeinen und des Plauener Werkes im

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[31] Other manifestations of this symbol exist in the clothing line Helly Hansen, which sports a logo with the initials "HH" on its apparel and is thus a popular choice among right-wing extremists (Miller-Idriss 2009).

> besonderen aufzunehmen, und zwar insbesondere mit folgenden kurzfristigen Zielen:
>
> a.)   eine Zerschlagung des Druckmaschinenherstellers *Manroland* zu verhindern,
>
> b.)   insbesondere den Standort von *Manroland* in Plauen (ehem. *Plamag*) zu erhalten,
>
> c.)   die Übernahme des Konzerns oder ausgewählter Teile davon, z.B. des Bogendruckmaschinen-Werkes in Offenbach, durch ostasiatische Unternehmen zu verhindern und
>
> d.)   dadurch einer Gefährdung der verbleibenden deutschen Druckmaschinenhersteller auf den Weltmärkten vorzubeugen."

Such measures enabled the NPD to appear responsive to the needs of small communities who were being adversely affected by the economic impact of globalization. In areas where the mainstream parties were less invested in the pursuit of votes, the NPD's demarcating positions resonated as both protectionist and protest.

Die Linke's positions about working groups could be distinguished by the attention that it devoted to labor grievances stemming from individuals who once worked in the German Democratic Republic. Often considered a regional actor in the secondary literature, Die Linke and East German interests have often been synonymous. Hough (2002) even suggested that the Party of Democratic Socialism, the forerunner to Die Linke, resembled an East German catch-all party. During the 5th legislative session, the party favored an improved retirement program for public servants who previously worked in the GDR, but were not given full pensions after reunification. Drs 5/3741 advocated specifically for professors.

> "2. Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> unbeachtlich laufender rechtlicher Auseinandersetzungen mit betroffenen Professorinnen und Professoren neuen Rechts, die derzeit eine unangemessenen niedrige Altersversorgung erhalten, eine entsprechende Vereinbarung über eine angemessene, die gesetzliche Rente aufstockende Altersversorgung abzuschließen, die der in den seinerzeitigen Dienstverträgen beinhalteten Vergütungszusage gerecht wird."

As a result, Die Linke once again appeared as a political actor that merely served to represent East German interests.

The welfare state and social services provided additional position overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke, but also differences. On the issue of childcare provisions, the NPD was a forceful advocate for more state funding. This initiative was part of a more extensive program intended to support Saxons who wanted to have children. Other measures included pension credits

based on the number of children that a woman had, advising centers for couples planning to start a family and financial compensation for women who elected to give up their careers in favor of being stay-at-home mothers. The motion cited in Drs 5/1793 corresponds with the NPD's pro-family agenda, because it was designed to intensify support for families once they already had children.

> "(....) II. Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht, sich gegenüber der Bundesregierung dafür einzusetzen, daß der vom Bund bereitgestellte Finanzierungsanteil für den Ausbau der Kinderbetreuung nach dem KiföG von vier auf bis zu sieben Milliarden Euro, dem tatsächlichen Bedarf entsprechend, aufgestockt werde.

In the corresponding justification, the NPD conceded that it did not prefer a system in which children are not raised by their parents. However, much like the motions related to Hartz-IV, the party was prepared to accept expanded funding for public daycare facilities so that Saxon families were entitled to some additional support.

Not to be outdone, Die Linke also preferred better childcare provisions. The second measure in Drs 5/9001 shows that, like the NPD, Die Linke wanted to encourage a balance between the dual commitments of family and career. In the third initiative, the party asked the state government to not only observe the current regulations about full-time childcare standards, but to also improve the existing conditions.

> "Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
> (….) 2. konkrete Maßnahmen, insbesondere gesetzgeberische Initiativen einzuleiten, mit dem Ziel, die Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf nachhaltig zu verbessern.
> 3. ein überzeugendes Konzept vorzulegen, wie der Rechtsanspruch auf eine ganztägige Betreuung ab August 2013 unter Wahrung der im Sächsisches Gesetz zur Förderung von Kindern in Tageseinrichtungen (Gesetz über Kindertageseinrichtungen – SächsKitaG) festgeschriebenen Qualitätstandards bzw. bei schrittweiser Verbesserung dieser Standards in allen sächsischen Landkreisen und den kreisfreien Städten vollständig gesichert werden kann."

Although it cannot be inferred from the texts quoted above, another shared feature of the parties' childcare measures was the centrality of women and choice in their respective rationales. Both parties' positions were motivated by the role they believe that women play in society and their right to choose having a family and/or career. This is an important aspect that will be subsequently addressed.

Once again though, the direction of the parties' preferences were similar, but a closer reading of their positions reveals notable differences that correspond with each actor's respective ideology. Die Linke supported social programs that were universally beneficial and demanded both redistributive and cultural social justice for all individuals. In measures where it did identify a specific demographic, the purpose of the initiative was to provide social justice and welfare services for a particular group that had historically been the victim of discrimination. These included asylum seekers, individuals with disabilities, as well as the gay and lesbian communities. The NPD, on the other hand, favored welfare programs and social justice for specific segments of the German population. Social welfare proposals were selectively developed. In numerous Anträge that dealt primarily with immigration and asylum, the NPD introduced measures that would exclude undesirable demographics from social benefits and services. This type of welfare chauvinism is a typical characteristic among far right parties in Western Europe (De Koster et al., 2012).

The parties also sent mixed signals on childcare provisions and pension credits for women with children. Die Linke argued that women deserved improved childcare programs so that they could balance their careers and family life, because the party believed that women should have the option to return to the workforce in a timely fashion. The NPD also wanted to support new mothers. However, the National Democrats sought to entice women to stay at home and become full-time mothers. This, the party argued, would inspire more German couples to start families. In accordance with its nationalist ideology, the NPD argued that families were essential to preserving Germany's ethnic identity, as indicated in Drs 5/3061.

> "I. Der Landtag stellt fest:
> (….) 4. Im Interesse des Volkserhalts, wie auch der Sicherung des
> umlagefinanzierten Rentensystems, ist die Einführung eines über die
> bisherigen Kindererziehungs- und Kinderberücksichtigungszeiten
> hinausgehenden Kinderbonus in der Rentenversicherung, mit dem die
> sustanzerhaltende generative Leistung der Eltern honoriert wird, dringend
> geboten."

Indeed, most of the NPD's welfare state expansion: positive codes (504) were supplemented with units that were classified as traditional morality: positive (603). The differences can be attributed to beliefs about the role of women and the nuclear family in society.

6.4 Discussion

This chapter constitutes a first step toward understanding the potential for policy overlaps between the far right NPD and far left Die Linke in the course of political competition. The analysis concentrated specifically on position-taking, which is one of the most important strategies that parties use to capture votes. Aside from the centrality of this strategy in party competition, there were two supply-side incentives for conducting the analysis. The initial reason was descriptive. Unlike previous studies that focused solely on democracy (Backes, 1989; Everts, 2000; Jesse, 2010), the main exploratory incentive for the current analysis was to determine the party positions of the NPD and Die Linke in a multi-dimensional political space. The explanatory motivation for the research stems from theories of niche party behavior (Adams et al., 2006; Meguid, 2005, 2008; Ezrow, 2008). These claims suggest that, due to their ideological profiles and issue ownership reputations, the NPD and Die Linke were expected to display similar positions in some policy spaces and opposing positions in others. With the inherent limitations of a case study, the results are nevertheless a significant first step toward understanding party competition between radical actors. As a result, the chapter draws several notable conclusions that serve to answer the overall research question and subsequently extend the secondary literature about radical and niche party behavior.

First, the findings reveal that, in the course of party competition, it is indeed possible for far right and far left actors to display overlapping policy positions on an assortment of contemporary issues. This result challenges heuristic terminologies, which have traditionally dominated understandings of radical parties. Contrary to the assumption in the *famille spirituelle* literature (Von Beyme, 1985; Ware, 1996), which implies that the NPD and Die Linke occupy opposite ends of the left-right political spectrum, the parties exhibited overlapping policy preferences in the socio-economic, environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions. Only in the socio-cultural dimensions, where the NPD proposed measures that stressed demarcation and Die Linke favored cultural inclusivity, did their views differ. On socio-economic issues, both parties prefer more state involvement in the economy and favor enhanced welfare state expansion and social justice. These constitute protective measures that downplay the significance of profit margins and growth. Turning to the remaining two dimensions of political competition, the NPD and Die Linke present almost identical positions. In the sample of Anträge, both parties were skeptical about European integration, but for different reasons. The NPD regarded the EU as a

threat to Germany's cultural identity, while Die Linke criticized its tendency for ever-increasing centralization and general lack of social-mindedness. Environmental protection, despite the confrontational configuration of the dimension, proved to be a valence issue. On the whole, both subjects preferred environmental protection over economic growth. Instead of settling for measures of democratic attitudes, the chapter is innovative, because it provides the first set of empirical data about radical party positions on current issues in multi-dimensional competition.

The results also suggest that position overlaps and differences can be explained by the parties' status as niche actors. In effect, the parties develop strategies based on a cost-benefit analysis for the various policy spaces of multi-dimensional competition. In the environmental protection and foreign affairs dimensions, which are peripheral policy areas for both the NPD and Die Linke, the parties display similar positions. For issues in these areas, the parties are afforded more flexibility, because they are not constrained by ideology and issue ownership reputations. On the other hand, the NPD and Die Linke were expected to opt for product differentiation and, thus, dissimilar positions in those dimensions where they were expected to have radical positions.

However, this only occurred in two of the dimensions, namely the socio-cultural policy areas (fabric of society and justice) where the NPD displayed ultranationalist positions consistent with its ideology. Contrary to the theoretical assumptions, the positions from the NPD and Die Linke could not be empirically distinguished in the socio-economic dimensions (state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services). This outcome lends credence to Ignazi's (2003) assertion that there has been an ongoing proletarization of the far right. As the center left has shifted attention away from the working class and unemployed electorates, parties such as the NPD are expected to mobilize these voters with left positions on socio-economic issues (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009; Kriesi et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it remains unclear if the NPD and Die Linke are directly competing against each other for the so-called losers of globalization. For this to be true, the parties should each emphasize their demarcating economic positions. The next chapter, which emphasizes issue salience, will investigate the potential for direct competition further.

Finally, the analysis discovered that, despite instances of position commonalities in some policy dimensions, the parties do not shed features of their respective ideologies completely. Very often, the focus and justification of the parties' positions could be attributed to their core beliefs. This supports the contention in the secondary literature that, although they share a common

behavior vis-à-vis their mainstream competitors, it should not be overlooked that the niche party family is still comprised of an ideologically diverse set of political actors (Wagner, 2012a). The NPD and Die Linke share a common profile relative to their mainstream counterparts but, at the same time, represent distinct party brands. The result was constant not only for the position scores in aggregated policy dimensions, but also on individual issues. For example, the NPD and Die Linke both agreed that the state should increase childcare provisions. However, Die Linke supported such initiatives because it believed that women ought to be able to return to the workforce, whereas the NPD wanted to make conditions more attractive for them to stay at home and raise children. The parties' arguments stem from their core beliefs about the role of women in society. Although they might arrive at the same point in a given policy dimension, the NPD and Die Linke are only identical in so many ways.

In summary, this chapter concludes that, in the course of multi-dimensional competition, it is possible for the far right NPD and far left Die Linke to propose overlapping policy positions. Despite these similarities, the parties can still be distinguished based on the ideological features of their positions. On the whole though, their shared preferences confirm the study's main argument: in those dimensions where the parties are not committed to a strategy of product differentiation, namely core policy areas, their positions are similar. This implication could not be confirmed for the socio-economic dimensions. However, the next chapter about issue salience will explore if the NPD is attempting to emphasize its left-wing positions on socio-economic issues to voters. The results will substantiate whether the NPD and Die Linke compete directly against each other for the same electorate.

7. Measuring Direct Confrontation: Issue Salience for the NPD and Die Linke

The previous chapter established that the NPD and Die Linke proposed overlapping positions in multiple policy dimensions during the 5th legislative period. Similarities occurred in the environmental protection, foreign affairs, state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services policy areas. While the results for the first two dimensions were consistent with the study's theoretical expectations about niche party behavior, the findings for the socio-economic dimensions came as a surprise. Socio-economic issues were not assumed to be an important feature in the niche profiles of far right parties. Thus, it was not predicted that the NPD would opt for a strategy of product differentiation, which ultimately produced similar positions in the socio-economic dimensions. However, as structural dealignments have developed between center left parties and the working class in Western Europe, the far right and the far left have positioned themselves for these voters (Kriesi et al., 2008). Yet, positions represent only one aspect of party competition. Political actors can also attempt to improve their electoral fortunes by advancing those positions where they have an advantage (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Meyer and Wagner, 2013). Although their preferences overlap in some areas, it still remains uncertain if the NPD actually appeals to voters with a similar set of positions as Die Linke. Therefore, the current chapter examines the relationship between positions and issue emphasis in the parties' legislative motions. It does do by measuring both the annual and overall issue salience scores for the NPD and Die Linke. As a result, this approach generates additional insights about the extent of direct party competition between the NPD and Die Linke. The chapter is motivated by the following questions: which dimensions of political competition do the NPD and Die Linke emphasize the most? Why do the parties stress these dimensions above others? Do the NPD and Die Linke exhibit converting position and salience scores in any of the dimensions under examination?

Overall, the cumulative results reveal two important findings. First, they demonstrate that the NPD and Die Linke compete in those dimensions where they traditionally maintain associative issue ownership. Die Linke competes most actively in the socio-economic dimensions of political competition. Indeed, the party not only emphasized those dimensions for the entire legislative period, but also on an annual basis. In contrast, the NPD's overall salience scores were highest for the socio-cultural dimensions. Second, the results indicate that the NPD and Die Linke are not direct electoral competitors, despite the fact that they exhibit comparable positions in several policy dimensions. The NPD and Die Linke both placed relatively little emphasis on the foreign

policy and environmental protection dimensions, which indicates that the parties were not actively competing against each other on such issues. In contrast, the socio-economic (state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services) and socio-cultural (justice and fabric of society) dimensions displayed dissimilar issue salience scores. The results have interesting implications for voter studies, because they suggest that, even if the NPD and Die Linke are competing for a similar part of the electorate, they are utilizing different dimensions to appeal to voters. This finding is consistent with more recent work, which concludes that the far right usually resorts to cultural issues, whereas the far left applies socio-economic messages to attract similar voters (Potter and Tavits, 2015).

The remainder of the chapter adheres to the following format. First, the theory section considers salience strategies for the NPD and Die Linke within the study's overall framework that was introduced in Chapter 3 and offers a specific series of observable implications about issue ownership that were deduced for testing purposes. Next, a methods section explaining the operationalization of the parties' salience scores is then presented. Once the methods have been established, the chapter precedes to describe the empirical results. The findings are supported with interviews from representatives of both the NPD and Die Linke that were conducted in 2014 towards the conclusion of the 5th legislative period. In the discussion, the results are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about their significance for the current research and the study of party competition between radical political actors more generally.

7.1 Theory: Costs and Benefits of Issue Ownership

Chapter 3 has already noted that, in addition to position-taking, political competition also resembles a conflict over conflicts where parties attempt to shape political discourse and voter decision-making (Schattschneider, 1960; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Hobolt and De Vries, 2015). Heresethics, or the manipulation of salient issues, provides parties with an effective strategy that does not force them to compromise their positions through convergence, nor squander valuable resources for the purpose of persuading voters who are immune to the party's rhetoric (Riker, 1996: 9). However, since political competition occurs in multiple dimensions and parties possess limited resources, they can only afford to emphasize a select number of issues. Therefore, Riker continues that heresthical choices for manipulation must take into account the dominance and dispersion principles. Essentially, when one party dominates

the volume of rhetorical appeals on a particular issue, the other side abandons electoral advances on that theme. Conversely, when neither party dominates, both sides abandon the issue altogether (Riker, 1996: 6). Thus, similar to salience theory, actors are expected to emphasize issues in those dimensions of political competition where they perceive an electoral advantage and downplay those that are detrimental (Rovny, 2012a: 273).

When parties possess ownership of an issue, they will emphasize that issue's dimension more than others, because it reinforces a positive reputation among voters in favor of the original owner (Petrocik, 1996: 826). Petrocik (1996: 827) originally claimed that issue ownership could be established based on a party's history. If an incumbent competently addressed a certain subject or demonstrated a commitment to a given policy matter, then it is expected to possess credibility in that issue dimension and, thus, issue ownership. For instance, in the United States, Petrocik shows that the Democratic Party is regarded as the most capable to address education, welfare and civil rights, whereas the Republicans are generally viewed as competent on foreign affairs, national defense and crime. The former path to issue ownership is prone to fluctuation depending on the party's performance in government. The reputation for the latter, however, is gradually attained and often remains stable over extensive periods due to ideological motivations. As a result, it is less vulnerable to issue trespassing and issue convergence (Tresch et al., 2015).

For the purposes of the current research, it is assumed that the NPD and Die Linke possess electoral credibility advantages when they exhibit *associative* issue ownership in a political dimension. Tresch et al. (2015) describe associative issue ownership as a stereotype that provokes a spontaneous identification between parties and issues in voters' minds. Since the NPD has never been a member in a state or national government and Die Linke only became the leading coalition partner in Thurinigia as of 2014,[32] neither party can produce a record from public office that would demonstrate competence in any policy dimension. On the other hand, both parties have historically shown a commitment to several issue dimensions that they have successfully politicized during campaigns and in their legislative work. Therefore, associative issue ownership represents a more appropriate representation of the parties' dominance on a particular policy matter.

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[32] It should be noted that Die Linke has previously shared office at the state level as a coalition partner in Mecklenburg-Pomerania and Berlin (Koß and Hough, 2006). Unlike in Thuringia, however, Die Linke (PDS at the time) was a junior coalition partner in both of these state governments.

Acknowledging their niche party profiles, Chapter 3 established that the NPD and Die Linke each possess one policy dimension to which they have historically demonstrated an unceasing commitment. This policy area represents their core dimension (Tavits, 2007). Due to the importance of issues such as immigration, asylum, nationalism and law and order in the NPD's *völkisch* ideology, the party has been associated with the socio-cultural dimensions (fabric of society and justice). Conversely, as a result of Die Linke's democratic socialist ideology, the party has been linked to social justice and welfare services in the socio-economic dimensions of competition (state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services). In the minds of voters then, the parties have issue ownership reputations for these policy areas, which they are obligated to uphold. Thus, they are expected to emphasize these core dimensions respectively, in order to avoid incurring significant electoral costs at the polls.

The cost-benefit incentive to emphasize issues in the foreign affairs and environmental protection dimensions is quite low, because they constitute peripheral policy areas. Voters simply do not associate the NPD and Die Linke with the issues in these dimensions. Nor do these dimensions contain issues that are central to either party's ideology. For the foreign affairs dimension, in particular, the NPD and Die Linke are not expected to emphasize this policy area, because of Germany's unique attitudes towards Europe. Euroskepticism has not traditionally been a formula for success in German elections. German parties have generally supported the European integration project and rarely exploited opportunities to advance critical positions (Busch and Knelangen, 2004). Indeed, Lees (2002) argues that the far right's association with Euroskepticism has discredited the issue altogether. Unlike in the United Kingdom and some Scandinavian countries, the limited potential to win votes with an enhanced Euroskeptic message, makes it doubtful that the NPD and Die Linke would attempt to develop an associative reputation to voters on this issue. The benefits of emphasizing said policy areas do not correspond with the cost of dedicating an outsized amount of Anträge to them. Based on the preceding theoretical arguments then, the following observable implications about expected salience strategies were deduced for testing purposes:

> *Observable Implication #5: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will primarily emphasize those dimensions that contain their core issues.*

> *Observable Implication #5a: The NPD is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimension.*

Observable Implication #5b: Die Linke is expected to primarily emphasize issues in the socio-economic dimension.

Observable Implication #6: The parties' strategies are similar in that they will both de-emphasize issues in their peripheral policy dimensions.

Observable Implication #6a: The NPD and Die Linke are expected to ignore environmental protection and foreign affairs.

The next section clarifies the measurement procedures for testing each of the proposed observable implications.

7.2 Data and Methods

The methods section commences with a definition of salience as it is understood in the current research. Thereafter, existing methods for the measurement of issue salience are assessed. The advantages and disadvantages of the Comparative Agendas Project and the relational method are considered before eventually selecting the CMP approach. In a final part, the formula for converting coding frequencies to actual salience scores is stated alongside a table containing all of the possible emphasis-position combinations.

Operationalizing Emphasis: Salience

The methodological objective of the chapter is to operationalize party competition in the form of issue emphasis. As an indicator for this concept, the salience of policy areas proposed in the Anträge from the NPD and Die Linke are analyzed. As Chapter 3 already stated, in addition to positions and rhetoric, research about political competition demonstrates that parties utilize salience in an effort to appeal to voters (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge et al., 2001). Borrowing from Netjes and Binnema (2007: 40), salience is defined here as the extent to which party leadership considers an issue as vital for its electoral appeal. The NPD and Die Linke possess a finite number of Anträge in which to express their political views. During monthly plenary sessions, for example, a maximum of 2 Anträge can be submitted per each televised assembly. Under these conditions the parties are expected to strategically budget their overall sample of Anträge. In order to demonstrate to voters that they care about a certain policy area, the NPD and Die Linke should devote a larger proportion of their legislative budget to issues in that dimension (Veen, 2011: 278). Put simply, an issue that is often mentioned in the parties' Anträge signifies

importance, whereas issues that are seldom referred to possess only marginal electoral value (Robertson, 1976).

Although there are fewer examples of issue salience measurement in the secondary literature, several of the most common hand-coding approaches are that of the Comparative Agendas Project, the relational method and the Comparative Manifesto Project. The former was specifically designed to measure salience. Originally implemented to infer issue attention in the U.S. Congress, the Comparative Agendas Project has been used to observe policy-making trends in dozens of countries (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Similar to CMP, the Agendas Project maintains a large dataset that is an excellent resource for longitudinal research. Perhaps most importantly, it is designed for legislative analyses such as the current study. The CAP codebook has been applied to various forms of legislative productivity. Some examples are bills, laws, hearings, questions and roll call votes among others. It is comprised of over 20 major topics and 200 subtopics to describe legislative activities, which is far more extensive than the CMP codebook. The coding process is relatively straightforward as well. For legislative motions, the document is the unit of measurement, which must be simply read and assigned an appropriate policy category. The codex index is undoubtedly elaborate, but the categories are sufficiently distinct so that classification errors can be minimized. As a result, the CAP approach has a high degree of reliability.

Despite the obvious benefits of the CAP coding procedure, there are several problems with this approach. These stem from issues with unitization and classification. The first argument pertains to the unit of measurement. Simply coding the title or the Antrag itself not only biases the results, but it also ignores the action-based nature of an Antrag. Unitizing the title assumes that all document titles accurately describe the intent of the motion. Yet, many titles do not suggest the party's intention at all. Rather, it is only upon a closer reading of the entire text and the measures contained therein that motives are actually revealed. This was especially the case for Anträge addressing multi-faceted issues, such as energy and government operations. The former could easily be comprised of measures related to the environment or economic matters. This point is relevant for the next drawback about CAP unitization, which is that parties often address several issue dimensions within a single Antrag. Indeed, the majority of Anträge from the NPD and Die Linke contained measures with multiple codes, which were often grounded in different dimensions. For example, when the NPD discussed more social support for young mothers (socio-

economic), these measures were often proposed alongside initiatives about a woman's role in society (socio-cultural). By overlooking these potential inferences and ignoring the action-based nature of an Antrag, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain acceptable measurement validity. This suggests that a more comprehensive analysis is required. Of course, one could argue that employing the hundreds of subtopics in the CAP codebook might enhance the validity of the measurements. However, with the introduction of so many subtopics, a major trade-off between reliability and validity would ensue.

The CAP classification process generates a second disadvantage, namely the lack of positional direction. The research operates under the assumption that positions and emphasis complement each other, rather than pose opposing interpretations of political competition. As Rovny (2012a: 274) notes, by studying salience and positioning on different issue dimensions, it accommodates the possibility that parties implement varying competitive logics on different issues. Therefore, although the primary focus of the current chapter is the salience of policy dimensions as a measure of political competition between the far right and far left, positions are a critical feature of issue emphasis. Unfortunately, the CAP codes only offer insights about a political actor's preference *for* an issue and not *on* an issue. In order to address the downside of this omission, an additional coding procedure would be required. For the researcher, this would cost both additional time and resources. In short, the CAP method is not an ideal approach for the measurement of issue salience in this study, because it is poorly suited for the analysis of an Antrag and does not offer insights about party positions.

The relational method, despite its limited application, also poses some benefits to the hand-coder. In the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) the relational method was applied in a content analysis, which was similar to a version already discussed in Chapter 6 about party positions. Unlike other approaches, the relational method can measure positions and issue salience independently (Dolezal et al., 2014). In contrast to CMP, for example, this enables the researcher to circumvent any pitfalls stemming from each of these measurements. The unitization procedure is predicated on natural sentences in the text that contain kernel sentences, which are otherwise referred to as statements. The purpose of this unit is to avoid ambiguity and thematic aspects in the coding procedure. As a result, the unitization process strengthens both validity and reliability, respectively. It also contains an extensive coding scheme that enhances coding validity. For this

purpose, there are three different classification levels within a given document, which enriches the descriptive value of the method.

However, many of the drawbacks of the relational approach that were discussed in Chapter 6, also pertain to the measurement of issue salience. Foremost is the emphasis on coding subject to object relationships in an Antrag and the potential impact that this has on validity.[33] More specifically, the unnecessary duplication of coded units does not automatically indicate the importance of a certain subject, especially if it is in the same natural sentence. Anträge often contain lists of subjects with a thematic common denominator. The following is an example from an Antrag proposed by Die Linke (Drs 5/2176).

> "Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
> bis zum 3. Dezember 2010, dem Internationalen Tag der Menschen mit Behinderung, unter Einbeziehung der entsprechenden Vertretungen und Verbände einen Aktionsplan zu erstellen, der Ziele, Maßnahmen und Verantwortlichkeiten in der Zuständigkeit der Staatsregierung zur Umsetzung der UN-Konvention über die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen im Freistaat Sachsen insbesondere in den nachfolgend genannten Handlungs- bzw. Politikfeldern zusammenfasst:
> > a) Erziehung und Bildung
> > b) Arbeit
> > c) Wohnen
> > d) Kultur, Freizeit, Sport
> > e) Gesundheit und Pflege
> > f) Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte
> > g) Interessenvertretung
> > h) Mobilität und Barierrefreiheit
> > i) Barierrefreie Kommunikation und Information
> > j) Disability Mainstreaming (innerhalb der Behörden)"

The Antrag is concerned with implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Saxony. However, if all subject to issue and object to issue relationships are supposed to be coded, regardless of redundancy, the salience score for this particular policy increases dramatically. This does not imply that improving rights for individuals with disabilities is more important for Die Linke relative to all other issues. Die Linke could just be clarifying the exact rights, rather than emphasizing their importance. A thematic unit, on the other hand, would

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[33] For more information about coding subject to object relationships, please reference Dolezal et al. (2016). In their analysis of Austrian election manifestos, they measure preferences by identifying all 'subjects' (political actors), 'objects' (an issue or another political actors) and 'predicates' (words that demonstrate a directional relationship, e.g., approve, reject, favor) in each natural sentence. Based on the relationship of these three variables, the coder assigns a numerical values to each unit. Additional information can be found in Chapter 5, Section 1.

be able to capture the purpose of the Antrag more effectively without making major assumptions about the parties' intentions.

In terms of reliability, the relational method advanced in AUTNES possesses the same major advantage but, at the same time, disadvantage as the CAP procedure. The elaborate coding scheme provides the possibility for thorough description, but it also challenges the ability of other coders to replicate the results. At a more basic level, it is difficult to understand the conceptual differences between issue categories, issue sub-categories and issues. While an Antrag is an hierarchical document, the proposal section is not organized the same way throughout the sample. Essentially, the degree of abstraction between these levels might not be consistently obvious for every motion. Some documents are divided into multiple sections and sub-sections, whereas others contain a basic block of text. The coder would first have to perceive these differences before even beginning the classification procedure. A second methodological concern is the sheer number of classifications. For 'issues' alone, there are 650 possible coding categories, which is almost three times the amount of sub-topics used in the CAP approach. In their study about salience theory Dolezal et al. (2014) find that reliability scores for the relational approach are good to excellent at the aggregate (issue categories) and intermediate (issue sub-categories) levels, but they drop off precipitously when the number of categories is increased to 650 at the third level. Hence, as the level of observation becomes more complex, the reliability gradually declines. What is needed instead is an approach that matches the purpose of an Antrag, enables the researcher to describe the text without compromising coding reliability and can infer both party positions as well as issue salience.

The Comparative Manifesto Project methodology is an ideal approach to any analysis of issue salience for several reasons. First, the theoretical basis of the CMP method corresponds with the need to measure party positions and issue salience together. Although there are some confrontational categories, the CMP codebook was originally designed to measure party positions according to the salience theory (Budge et al., 2001). As a result, the CMP codes measure both forms of strategy in party competition. The ability of the CMP classification scheme to accurately represent party competition provides an additional advantage. The CMP classification scheme is much more straightforward than those for CAP and AUTNES. Despite having only 58 coding categories, these are enough classifications to accurately describe the text without having to account for 220 or 650 different possibilities. Previous research into position measurements has

also demonstrated that the CMP classifications are an accurate representation of party competition. Although the efficiency of the CMP unitization procedure has been criticized (Däubler et al., 2012), the right-left classification scheme developed to produce aggregated party positions positively correlates with highly reliable computer-assisted content analysis techniques (Bräuninger et al., 2013). In the previous chapter that measured party positions, however, the study did not adhere to the CMP's quasi-sentence unitization method. Instead, a thematic unitization was developed. Primary action measures and political declarations in the Anträge are a more effective way of capturing the intent of an Antrag and produce good reliability scores. Thus, it is possible to avoid the traditional unitization pitfalls in the CMP procedure, but also maintain the accuracy of the classification categories for calculating positions and issue salience. In other words, the CMP approach, as it would be applied in this study about issue salience, is both more valid and reliable than the other methods that have already been evaluated.

A second set of reasons in favor of the CMP methodology is sheer convenience and coherence. The CMP approach to measuring issue salience is essentially the same as the procedure that was applied in the previous chapter for party positions. The last chapter already established a full dataset complete with an endogenous unit of measurement and coding scheme, namely the political declaration or primary measure actions in each parties' respective Anträge. Introducing an entirely new unit of measurement and category codes would complicate efforts to describe the results. Furthermore, a reliability test for both the units of measurement and classifications was already conducted in the positions chapter. The outcome of these tests indicates that the coding procedure is an acceptable approach to the systematic analysis of an Antrag. Rather than reinventing the wheel, it is only logical to adhere to the same method for the measurement of issue salience.

The conversion from code frequencies to salience scores is performed with the equation proposed by Veen (2011). With the CMP formula, the left codes are subtracted from the right classifications and the difference is divided by the total number of observations. The quotient not only represents issue salience, but also party positions. In reality, such a formula makes very little sense for calculating dimension salience, because it excludes all of the units coded with left classifications. In the Veen model, on the other hand, dimension salience is generated by dividing all the codes for a given policy area by the entire amount of units in the sample, which creates a proportion.

$$R + L / N$$

The Veen model is consistent with budgetary constraint assumptions of salience in party documents. The underlying postulation is that parties must weigh the electoral costs and benefits of devoting attention to issues in the limited number of Anträge that they are allowed to submit (Veen, 2011: 279).

Adhering to the argument that party competition is comprised of multiple strategies, the chapter takes into account both the position direction and issue salience in the parties' Anträge. By analyzing these policy tools together, it will be possible to determine if the NPD and Die Linke are directly competing against each other in the same dimension. For this, there are 6 combinations that can possibly emerge, which are outlined below in Table 12.

Table 12 Total Number Of Position And Salience Combinations

Positions	Salience
Similar	High/High
Similar	High/Low
Similar	Low/Low
Different	High/High
Different	High/Low
Different	Low/Low

The most interesting combination is obviously the option that entails high salience for both parties with overlapping positions. Such a result would indicate that the NPD and Die Linke are electorally committed to a similar dimension and attempting to attract voters with comparable policy appeals. Likewise, high salience and dissimilar positions would demonstrate that the NPD and Die Linke are both electoral competitors and ideological adversaries. When the parties exhibit patterns with low salience scores or a mixture of high and low salience, then they are not active competitors in the same issue dimension and the issue is not central to the party's ideological profile. Having explained the methodological approach to the measurement of issue salience, the next section presents and explores the empirical findings.

7.3 Results

The empirical findings are organized into several parts. In the first section, the quantitative data are presented and the observable implications are subsequently confirmed or refuted. Both the annual and overall results are illustrated for each actor. Although the research does not aspire to be a longitudinal study of issue salience, the findings provide additional insights about the parties' commitment to the dimensions under investigation. The analysis is supplemented with interviews conducted with legislative representatives from the NPD and Die Linke during the 5th legislative session. Finally, in the last section, issue salience and position scores are presented together, in order to determine if the parties are directly competing against one another for the same set of voters.

7.3.1 Salience Scores for the Core Dimensions – Socio-Economic and Socio-Cultural

The empirical results find evidence that confirms observable implications 5 and 5a about issue salience in Die Linke's and the NPD's core dimensions. In accordance with the theory first outlined in Chapter 3, both parties stressed those dimensions where they were likely to have an associative advantage over their opponents. The percentages in Table 13 demonstrate that the combined scores for Die Linke in the state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services policy areas are the most salient of all the dimensions. For perspective, they are almost 18 percentage points higher than the NPD's totals in the same policy areas. Although the NPD annually emphasized the state involvement in the economy dimension more than Die Linke, the difference in the scores was minor for all years except 2010-11. The higher salience for the NPD in the state involvement in the economy dimension was offset by Die Linke's emphasis on welfare state and social services. In several years, the combined salience scores for Die Linke were nearly twice as much as those for the NPD.

The annual breakdown of issue salience in the socio-economic dimensions in Tables 14 and 15 also confirms this trend. The mark for the highest salience scores in a given year was set with 37.6 per cent in the welfare state and social services policy area. In fact, as Table 15 reveals, each of the salience scores for this policy area represented the highest annual salience score for the party. The next closest score was 18.1 per cent in the justice dimension in 2013-14, which was still almost 10 points less than the lowest welfare state and social services result (27.7). Although, the overall percentages decreased in the final year of the legislative period, coded units in the socio-

economic dimensions comprised between 41.5 and 49.2 per cent of all primary measure actions and political declarations for Die Linke in 4 out of 5 years in the study. The party's attention to socio-economic issues was so pervasive that, in multiple years, nearly one out of every two measures that Die Linke proposed during the 5th legislative session was dedicated to this policy area. The party clearly attempted to distinguish itself in these dimensions and take advantage of its issue ownership reputation in the mind of voters.

Table 13 Overall Salience Scores For Both Parties

Dimension	NPD (%) Veen[34]	Die Linke (%) Veen
State Involvement in the Economy	16.5	10.9
Welfare State and Social Services	10.3	32.6
Justice	21.6	13.7
Fabric of Society	17.5	7.8
Foreign Affairs	16.5	4.6
Environmental Protection	2.8	9.8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Table 14 Annual Salience Scores For The NPD

Dimension	NPD Salience (%)					
	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	Overall
State Involvement in the Economy	15.1	27.4	14.8	18.0	9.4	16.5
Welfare State and Social Services	9.0	3.2	18.5	6.6	7.8	10.3
Justice	16.0	17.7	24.1	14.8	35.9	21.6
Fabric of Society	37.6	11.3	6.5	18.0	12.5	17.5

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Table 15 Annual Salience Scores For Die Linke

Dimension	Die Linke Salience (%)					
	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	Overall
State Involvement in the Economy	12.0	12.3	10.9	12.3	4.8	10.9
Welfare State and Social Services	30.7	29.2	37.6	36.9	27.7	32.6
Justice	15.3	17.0	8.9	9.0	18.1	13.7
Fabric of Society	8.0	8.5	5.9	8.2	7.2	7.8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

A further breakdown of the dimensions reveals that welfare state and social services surpassed all other policy areas. The three most salient classification codes for Die Linke are contained in this dimension. A breakdown of the individual categories (as shown in the appendix) reveals that there

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[34] Refers to Veen's (2011: 279) equation for calculating issue salience: $R+L/N$.

were 74 instances of welfare expansion: positive (504), 55 coded units for social justice: positive (503) and 52 cases of education: positive (502). The high frequency of measures coded in the welfare state and social services dimension ensured that Die Linke addressed a variety of policy issues. Of course, all of these initiatives sought to enhance equality and social services for Saxon citizens. Many of the social equality measures were committed to alleviating unnecessary or excessive costs to underprivileged citizens. Some examples consisted of prohibitive court fees, pension discrimination against those who worked in the GDR, public transportation costs for low-income households, medical payments for the insured and heating charges for unemployed persons. However, a greater number of initiatives emphasized fair treatment for underrepresented minorities and special groups in Saxony. Die Linke stressed equal rights for handicapped individuals seeking better access to the labor market, budgeting initiatives that would promote gender equality and general measures that prevented discrimination. On health matters, these included, but were not limited to, funding for immunizations, primary prevention, medical personnel in retirement homes, hospitals, emergency medical technicians, patient advising, social work in schools and civic insurance.

Interviews with legislators from Die Linke confirm the significance of issue ownership reputations in the parties' decisions to emphasize their core dimensions over all other policy areas. Die Linke's emphasis on the socio-economic dimensions, but especially welfare state and social services, can be attributed to the party's ideology and continued association with these issues in the minds of voters. During interviews, party leaders from Die Linke understood that it was to their advantage to politicize this dimension. Representative Enrico Stange observed that Die Linke purposely stressed the welfare state and social services policy area to the detriment of their center left competitor, the SPD. The Social Democrat's commitment to this dimension often fluctuated, but Die Linke made it a point to consistently ensure that all people have access to fair living conditions.[35] Based on this strategy, one would expect then that Die Linke was the clear choice for voters concerned with social matters. Dr. Dietmar Pellmann, who was Die Linke's spokesman for social policy during the 5th legislative session, also indicated that voters are aware of the party's reputation in this area and that, as a result, it is the most competent on those issues associated with the dimension. He certainly did not expect someone who was profiting from the status quo to vote

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[35] Interview with Enrico Stange, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden)

for Die Linke.[36] Pellmann further stated that it was only natural for Die Linke to emphasize welfare state and social services, because the issues in this dimension made up an important component of the party's basic values (*Grundwerteverortung*).

Die Linke was particularly adamant about education in Saxony and proposed a comprehensive program of education measures. The party proposed initiatives that were meant to eradicate illiteracy, improve media competency, make Saxon secondary schools more accessible, train more teachers, modernize sex education, prevent school closures in rural regions and finance school fieldtrips. At the university level, Die Linke proposed measures to minimize the costs for students, increase funding for institutions focused on the fine arts and increase enrollment in certain academic programs, especially teacher training. The latter issue was not only intended to support higher education in Saxony, but also to ensure the quality and future of the public school system in general.

Germany's federal structure suggests an additional factor that can explain the importance of the welfare state and social services dimension. Parliamentarians from Die Linke stressed the issue of education, because it was one of the few areas that was not determined predominantly at the national level. On many policy matters, the German states can only influence minor details of a policy that was originally conceived by the federal government. However, within Germany's federal system, the state governments alone have jurisdiction over a limited number of spheres. These include local affairs, finances for municipalities and education policy. Even though the party remained in the opposition throughout the 5th legislative period, education posed a unique opportunity for Die Linke to directly shape state policy in Saxony and demonstrate associative issue ownership in the minds of voters. This fact played an important role in Die Linke's legislative strategy. Representative Kerstin Köditz and Party Whip Klaus Tischendorf noted that Die Linke proposed education Anträge for almost every plenary session. With television cameras rolling, Die Linke utilized the legislative floor to receive maximum exposure for the party's policies and, at the same time, influence the allocation of funds controlled by the CDU/FDP-led government.[37] However, before these claims can be fully substantiated, additional research that includes information about policy areas determined largely at the federal level is required.

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[36] Interview with Dr. Dietmar Pellmann, Die Linke (10.07.2014, Dresden)
[37] Interviews with Kerstin Köditz and Klaus Tischendorf, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden)

Issue ownership reputations can also explain why Die Linke emphasized some subjects within the socio-economic dimensions more than others. Unlike welfare state and social services, the party placed a relatively low level of emphasis on the state involvement in the economy dimension by Die Linke. The leader of Die Linke's parliamentary working group on social issues, Dr. Dietmar Pellmann, commented that voters often viewed Die Linke skeptically on purely economic matters and traditionally associated this dimension instead with either the CDU or FDP.[38] The empirical results lend credence to Pellmann's comments. The highest salience score for Die Linke in this dimension was 12.3 per cent, which it attained in two separate years (2010-11 and 2012-13). One issue that Die Linke stressed in this policy area was unemployment benefits for workers. This demographic has traditionally been a key demographic for center and far left parties, but the NPD's appeal among the unemployed and low-skilled workers made it even more imperative for Die Linke to emphasize its opposition to Hartz-IV cuts. However, by 2013-14, the percentage of motions devoted to economic issues dropped precipitously to 4.8. This decline coincided with the effective start of the campaign season in Saxony, which indicates that Die Linke did not believe that such issues would provide an electoral advantage. The results seem to challenge contentions proposed by some authors that Die Linke has developed into a regular working class party in East Germany (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011). Overall, the party submitted less measures that addressed key economic issues for the working class, such as labor groups, protectionism and market regulation. Instead, Die Linke attempted to mobilize this electorate with appeals about the welfare state and social services.

Another interesting observation that can be inferred from the salience data about Die Linke's core dimensions is the conspicuous absence of Anträge pertaining to social justice for East Germans. Once considered a regional party, Die Linke referenced inequality between East and West Germans in only a very limited number of Anträge across the entirety of the dimensions analyzed in this study. Representative Enrico Stange suggested that fair wages for East German workers still remained an important issue but, in reality, this was not reflected in the final data for Die Linke.[39] The labor groups: positive code (701), contained the most mentions about the need for equality between East and West Germans. However, for the majority of coded units in the

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[38] Interview with Dr. Dietmar Pellmann, Die Linke (10.07.2014, Dresden)
[39] Interview with Enrico Stange, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden)

sample, Die Linke discussed the need to strengthen the position of labor groups without alluding to regional motivations.

Of course, this could be attributed to the political environment. Saxony is an East German state and it is more or less understood that all legislation produced in the Saxon Parliament is meant to affect East Germans. Then again, many of the Anträge in the overall sample contained motions that demanded action at either the national or supranational levels. This was especially the case for the foreign affairs dimension, but also other policy areas where policy-making authority resides with the federal government. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the parties proposed measures that were meant to address specific East German needs, whereas others were intended for a more general audience.

A more plausible explanation for the limited number of positions about East German interests is that Die Linke is no longer just a regional party. Rather, as other researchers have also concluded (Patton, 2012; Oppelland and Träger, 2014), Die Linke aspires to establish a national electorate and share political office. Therefore, after many internal party discussions, Die Linke has streamlined much of its program. Instead of representing just East Germans as the losers of reunification, the party has attempted to create a nationwide appeal with a program that is largely based on social justice. With this strategy, the party can cut across traditional cleavages and effectively appeal to the losers of globalization throughout Germany. Discussions with legislators from Die Linke seemed to confirm this trend. The parliamentary whip, Klaus Tischendorf, noted that Die Linke now strives to be a standard opposition party that does not just cater to the interests of former citizens from the GDR. Twenty-five years after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, blaming problems on reunification no longer resonates with voters in the East. Instead, he likened the contemporary party to other actors throughout Western Europe and Scandinavia that have positioned themselves to the left of social democrats.[40] The content might have changed slightly, but the general issues remain the same.

The findings also contribute to the secondary literature about the far right's programmatic development in the socio-economic dimensions of political competition. As the data in Table 14 indicates, the NPD did not consistently stress socio-economic issues throughout the legislative period. Although the overall salience score for state involvement in the economy was just as high as the justice dimension, the NPD sporadically emphasized the socio-economic dimensions during

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[40] Interview with Klaus Tischendorf, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden)

the first three years, and then gradually lost interest in favor of other policy areas. For example, the state involvement in the economy dimension peaked in 2010-11 at 27.4 per cent, which was the highest salience score for that year, but then declined by almost two-thirds by the end of the legislative session. The welfare state and social services dimension never reached the same levels. In 2010-11, it actually posted the lowest salience score outside of the environmental protection policy area in a given year. The results for the socio-economic dimensions demonstrate that, despite the recent literature about the NPD's commitment to anti-globalization initiatives (Sommer, 2008; Grumke, 2009; Puls, 2011), it does not emphasize these issues to voters. Furthermore, the study also reveals that far right parties are not only able to blur their socio-economic positions (Rovny, 2013), but also the very salience of the issue dimension itself. During the critical time before the upcoming elections at the end of the legislative period the NPD gradually shifted attention away from the socio-economic dimension. It was also during this period that the NPD steadily emphasized socio-cultural issues that it has traditionally been associated with.

The salience scores in Tables 14 also confirm observable implications 5 and 5b, which state that the NPD should emphasize issues in its core dimensions. Indeed, the NPD highlighted the socio-cultural dimensions more than all of the other policy areas. Almost 40 per cent of the NPD's motions covered issues in the socio-cultural dimensions compared to 27 per cent for the socio-economic ones. The two highest salience scores in any given year occurred in the fabric of society (37.6) and justice dimensions (35.9). In addition, the National Democrats clearly distinguished themselves vis-à-vis Die Linke. Overall, the NPD's cumulative score is slightly more than 18 points higher than Die Linke's overall salience. Evaluated separately, the NPD recorded higher salience scores than Die Linke in each of the socio-cultural dimensions throughout the entire 5th legislative period. For the socio-cultural dimensions, Die Linke never posted a salience score that exceeded 18.1 per cent. The fabric of society policy never surpassed more than 8.5 per cent in a given year. However, somewhat surprisingly, the importance of the socio-cultural dimensions was by no means stable for the NPD during the entire legislative period. Although the party emphasized justice on a regular basis, both of the socio-cultural dimensions were prone to fluctuations. For example, the fabric of society dimension score peaked at 37.6 per cent during 2009-2010 – the highest recorded salience score for the NPD - but suddenly dropped to 6.5 per cent in 2011-2012 before slightly rising again.

Within the socio-cultural dimensions, the NPD emphasized many of the issues that have become synonymous with the party's program over time. As the appendix illustrates 35 units were coded as immigration limitation: positive (206) as part of the justice dimension. While the NPD did refer to immigration more generally in many of its Anträge, asylum was often the main focus for units that received this classification, especially as the refugee crisis in Europe began to intensify. Another typical issue associated with far right parties, law and order: positive (605), was the focus of 37 motions. The NPD covered issues including more resources for fighting crime, secure borders and harsher penalties for public offenders. Comparatively speaking, immigration limitation: positive and law and order: positive were two of the most salient categories in the entire sample of NPD Anträge. The salience of issues in the fabric of society dimension was also evenly distributed. Traditional morality: positive (603) and social harmony: positive (606) were each applied 19 times. Following these issues, the codes for national way of life: positive (601) and multiculturalism: negative (608) were employed 14 and 12 times respectively. Within those specific categories, the NPD used its Anträge to address themes such as citizenship laws, Anglicisms in the German language, recognition for German soldiers who served during World War II, gender mainstreaming initiatives, a ban against Islamic clothing garments and a moratorium on the continued construction of mosques in Saxony. Based on the empirical evidence then, the NPD clearly attempted to gain an electoral advantage by manipulating the structure of political competition predicated on socio-cultural conflicts.

Interviews with legislative representatives also support the NPD's inclination to accentuate its core dimensions, namely socio-cultural issues. By emphasizing subjects in these policy areas, party leaders recognized that they could maximize their electoral appeal among voters without forsaking their ultra-nationalist profile. Then parliamentary group leader Holger Szymanski identified asylum, which belongs to the law and order dimension, as a core issue for the party (*Kernthema*) and one that also garnered public attention.[41] When asked to describe the most important policy areas in the NPD's Anträge, most representatives identified at least two issues from the justice dimension. No other policy area contained more than one issue that was mentioned during the interviews. Representative Jürgen Gansel declared that socio-cultural issues were most important for the NPD, because they comprised a central role in the party's nationalist profile.[42]

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[41] Interview with Holger Szymanski, NPD (29.04.2014, Dresden)
[42] Interview with Jürgen Gansel, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden)

When speaking about immigration, his cohort Arne Schimmer also mentioned that attention to this issue was simply a basic principle of nationalist politics (*Grundsatz nationaler Politik*).[43] Lastly, party whip Dr. Johannes Müller not only conceded that anti-immigration was one of the core areas of policy attention for the NPD, but that the party also had the highest degree of perceived competence among NPD voters on this issue.[44] These remarks reveal that the party felt obligated to emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions. Hence, the NPD's motivation for emphasizing the socio-cultural dimensions was a natural combination of party identity and issue ownership reputation.

The findings for Die Linke in the socio-cultural dimensions are significant as well, because they reveal that the party's strategy more closely resembles that of the old left than the new. Whereas the new left, such as the Greens, often emphasize progressive socio-cultural issues, socio-economic subjects are more salient for the old left (De Koster et al., 2012: 4). The justice dimension is actually the second most salient for Die Linke overall, but it is a distant second to welfare state and social services. In fact, the latter is nearly 20 points higher than the salience score for the justice dimension (Table 15). Additionally, the number of units assigned to the fabric of society policy area combined is less than any of the individual left codes in welfare state and social services. The combined units for justice are also the equivalent of the score for the single category of welfare state expansion: positive. When the party did address these subjects, it emphasized mostly civil rights issues. These included data protection initiatives, the right of assembly, increased privileges for asylum seekers and an improved atmosphere for newly-arrived immigrants. Absent from Die Linke's motions were socio-cultural issues that are often associated with the left, such as multiculturalism and opposition to traditional ways of life. As the previous chapter already speculated, Die Linke has struggled to develop an effective response to the refugee crisis in Europe that satisfies many of its older supporters, in particular. Regardless, as the theory section of this chapter already argued, Die Linke does not gain an advantage from emphasizing issues in one of its peripheral dimensions.

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[43] Interview with Arne Schimmer, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden)
[44] Interview with Dr. Johannes Müller, NPD (12.06.2014, Dresden)

7.3.2 Salience Scores for the Peripheral Dimensions – Foreign Affairs and Environmental Protection

Observable implications 6 and 6a were also substantiated. Returning to the theory from Chapter 3, in the peripheral dimensions of political competition (foreign affairs and environmental protection), the parties did not face high costs if they failed to emphasize certain issues, because they were not obligated to demonstrate credible commitments. Registering only a 4 per cent salience score, Table 17 shows that foreign affairs was the least important dimension for Die Linke overall. On an annual basis, it contained the two lowest salience scores for the party in 2009-2010 and 2011-2012. Similar to the fabric of society dimension, foreign affairs did not register a salience score above 10 per cent during any of the years that were examined. Thus, it appears that, in accordance with Lees' (2002) supposition that Euroskepticism is not a winning strategy in Germany, Die Linke de-emphasized the foreign affairs issues.

Table 16 Annual Salience Scores For The NPD In Peripheral Dimensions

Dimension	NPD Salience (%)					
	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	Overall
Foreign Affairs	9.0	14.5	11.1	34.4	20.3	16.5
Environmental Protection	1.0	4.8	6.5	0	0	2.8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Table 17 Annual Salience Scores For Die Linke In Peripheral Dimensions

Dimension	Die Linke Salience (%)					
	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	Overall
Foreign Affairs	2.7	6.6	2.0	4.9	8.4	4.0
Environmental Protection	13.3	2.8	12.9	11.0	7.2	9.0

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Taken together, the salience of the foreign affairs dimension for the NPD is relatively modest. With 16.5 per cent, foreign affairs was emphasized more than environmental protection and welfare state and social services. However, compared to the combined salience scores for the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, foreign policy is 10 to 22 points less important. During the first three years of the legislative session, the portion of Anträge pertaining to foreign

affairs never eclipsed 14.5 per cent and appeared to be trending down after 2011-12. However, in contrast to Die Linke, the salience of this dimension in several individual years should not be overlooked. During the final two years of the legislative period, the NPD emphasized the foreign affairs policy area more than the combined values for the socio-economic dimensions. In 2012-13, the NPD even emphasized foreign affairs more than those issues in its core dimensions, namely fabric of society and justice. The 34.4 per cent salience score in 2012-2013 was the third highest rating for any dimension in a single year and the most for any policy area unrelated to socio-cultural issues. Furthermore, the category European integration: negative (110) was the most salient classification among the NPD's proposed Anträge. It was coded 48 times which, analyzed individually, is more than immigration limitation: positive (35 codes) and law and order: positive (37 codes).

In interviews with representatives from the NPD, the European Union was also cited as a point of emphasis for the parliamentary group. Not only was this a subject which the NPD felt very strongly about for ideological reasons, but party leaders were also confident that it resonated with voters. Arne Schimmer believed that policy matters about the European Union, such as individual contributions and bailout packages for insolvent countries pose real concerns for the NPD's electorate. He went on to add that these issues are emblematic of voter frustrations about the lack of democratic legitimacy and transparency surrounding the EU.[45] Schimmer also acknowledged that foreign affairs, but especially European integration, was a policy area where the NPD could noticeably distinguish itself from other parties. He conceded that, from time to time, Die Linke was also critical of the EU in its Anträge, but that there was no other party that addressed the issue to the extent of the NPD. Representative Jürgen Gansel also recognized the electoral value of the European Union. He contended that issues about the EU have tremendous potential for mobilizing protest voters, which is an important electorate for far right parties such as the NPD.[46]

Without speculating too much about the occasionally high salience of the foreign affairs dimension for the NPD, there are other potential explanations for its emphasis. First, EU integration, which is contained within the foreign affairs dimensions, is perceived as a maverick issue (Maor and Smith, 1993). In other words, it often transcends other political dimensions. Many

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[45] Interview with Arne Schimmer, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden)
[46] Interview with Jürgen Gansel, NPD (11.06.2014, Dresden)

of the NPD coded units that addressed the EU were directly related to specific immigration policies, which is an important dimension for the party. Examples included a delayed admittance for Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen Area, the repeal of the free movement of labor in Europe, opposition to visa privileges for Turkish citizens and restrictions on access to social welfare services in Germany. However, a similar pattern failed to develop for Die Linke. While the party did encourage the EU to become more social-minded, the majority of its Euroskeptic measures were focused on decentralization, which is not a core issue for the party. A second clarification could be the new political competition that the NPD encountered from the AfD beginning in 2012. The increased salience during the final two years of the legislative period certainly corresponds with this assumption. Although the NPD never attained electoral success as a result of the issue, for the first time in recent memory, a less extreme party on the right challenged the NPD on the EU. Finally, in contrast to Die Linke, the NPD's lack of representation at the national and European levels might have compelled the party to address supranational politics at the state level. Party chairman Udo Voigt was elected to the European Parliament in 2014, but this was towards the very end of the 5th legislative period. Aside from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern though, the NPD did not have access to any other legislative institutions at that time. Despite the explanatory potential of these theories though, they all warrant additional investigation.

The environmental protection dimension also verified the final observable implications, because both parties produced relatively low salience scores. The findings presented in Table 17 illustrate that Die Linke did not ignore issues of environmental protection entirely. At 9 per cent overall, this dimension was more salient than justice and foreign affairs, but less important than Die Linke's core dimensions. On an annual basis, it occasionally flirted with this policy dimension in some years, but never dedicated a consistent amount of emphasis over the course of the legislative period. For example, while Die Linke addressed the environment in its Anträge 13.3 per cent of the time in 2009-10, it followed up this amount with a mere 2.8 per cent the following year. In 2011-12, the party rededicated itself to the issues in this policy area, before steadily losing interest again prior to the 2014 elections.

Dietmar Pellman conceded that it was extremely difficult to compete with the Greens on this issue. In particular, he explained that, unlike the Greens who can address such issues whenever they please, Die Linke is forced to consider the social ramifications of enhanced environmental protectionism. Pellman noted that he could not simply encourage individuals to buy expensive,

organic products when they are also receiving welfare benefits.[47] For many Die Linke voters, such a program would fail to resonate, because it is obviously contradictory to their socio-economic interests. The party stressed the importance of economic reforms meant to phase out the brown coal industry in the eastern parts of Saxony, but environmental protection largely remained an issue of secondary concern for Die Linke.

Likewise, the NPD rarely addressed environmental protection, which had the lowest salience score overall for either party. With a paltry 2.8 per cent over the course of the legislative period, the NPD could hardly be considered a major proponent of environmental protection. In nearly all of the observed years, the environmental protection dimension contained the absolute lowest salience score for the NPD. The exception was 2011-12 when it – somewhat surprisingly - tied for the least emphasis with the fabric of society policy area at 6.5 per cent. Table 16 reveals that the NPD completely disregarded the environmental protection dimension altogether during the last two years of the legislative period before the election period. Environmental protection issues were so insignificant that the party failed to register a single coded unit as environmental protection in this time. These represent the only points in the entire dataset when either party neglected to record a single measure in any of the dimensions.

In addition to being a peripheral policy area, interviews with the NPD's member on the Committee for the Environment and Agriculture revealed another explanation for the party's low salience score in the environmental protection dimension. NPD parliamentarian Gitta Schüßler admitted that some of the neglect could be attributed to organizational decisions within the parliamentary group. During the party's 10 year period of representation in Dresden, the National Democrats experienced an unusually high level of turnover in personnel. Consequently, this forced the NPD to reassign legislative roles within the parliamentary group. For example, Schüßler had earlier been the NPD committee member for this policy area, but was then moved elsewhere before being assigned a second time to the same committee. Since the NPD continuously rotated its representative responsible for environmental protection, this prevented anyone from truly understanding the issues and formulating policy proposals.[48] Yet she, as well as other NPD representatives confirmed that when reorganizing committee assignments, there were other policy areas that simply took precedence over environmental protection. Essentially, even the NPD's

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[47] Interview with Dietmar Pellman, Die Linke (11.06.2014, Dresden)
[48] Interview with Gitta Schüßler, NPD (10.07.2014, Dresden)

internal organization revealed that environmental protection was not an important issue dimension. Without any previous association with this issue dimension and the ability to resonate with supporters, environmental protection was not an important programmatic feature for both the NPD and Die Linke.

7.3.3 Position Direction and Issue Salience

In the final part of the analysis, the empirical results are enhanced by presenting the NPD's and Die Linke's respective issue salience scores alongside their party positions. Since political competition includes both spatial and salience strategies, this section provides a more complete depiction of direct party competition between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. The information displayed in Tables 18, 19 and 20 further demonstrates that the NPD and Die Linke are not direct electoral competitors. In their core policy dimensions, the parties' electoral strategies for the entire legislative period could be distinguished by some combination of high issue salience and dissimilar positions (socio-economic and socio-cultural). On the other hand, the NPD and Die Linke exhibited low salience and similar positions in policy areas that are considered to be peripheral dimensions for both actors (foreign affairs and environmental protection). This observation confirms the theoretical assumptions about niche party behavior that were outlined in Chapter 3. In effect, it is more advantageous for the NPD and Die Linke to stress radical positions in those policy areas where they have traditionally demonstrated an issue ownership reputation.

Table 18 Overall Salience And Position Scores For Both Parties

Dimension	Die Linke		NPD	
	Position	**Salience (%)**	**Position**	**Salience (%)**
State Involvement in the Economy	-1.61	10.9	-1.25	16.5
Welfare State and Social Services	-1.86	32.6	-1.91	10.3
Justice	-0.91	13.7	0.76	21.6
Fabric of Society	0.52	7.8	1.16	17.5
Foreign Affairs	0.20	4.0	0.58	16.5
Environmental Protection	-2.05	9.0	-0.58	2.8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Table 19 Annual Salience And Position Scores For Die Linke

Dimension	Die Linke Positions and Salience											
	2009-10 Pos	2009-10 Sal (%)	2010-11 Pos	2010-11 Sal (%)	2011-12 Pos	2011-12 Sal (%)	2012-13 Pos	2012-13 Sal (%)	2013-14 Pos	2013-14 Sal (%)	Overall Pos	Overall Sal (%)
State Involvement in the Economy	-1.57	12	-1.43	12.3	-1.36	10.9	-1.49	12.3	-0.95	4.8	-1.61	10.9
Welfare State and Social Services	-1.48	30.7	-1.8	29.2	-1.4	37.6	-1.96	36.9	-1.67	27.7	-1.86	32.6
Justice	-0.93	15.3	-0.85	17	-0.48	8.9	-0.85	9	-0.99	18.1	-0.91	13.7
Fabric of Society	0.48	8	1.28	8.5	0.26	5.9	0.33	8.2	0.26	7.2	0.52	7.8
Foreign Affairs	0.95	2.7	1.18	6.6	0.7	2	1.11	4.9	1.18	8.4	0.2	4
Environmental Protection	-1.61	13.3	-0.85	2.8	-1.43	12.9	-1.43	11	-1.11	7.2	-2.05	9

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Table 20 Annual Salience And Position Scores For The NPD

Dimension	NPD Positions and Salience											
	2009-10 Pos	2009-10 Sal (%)	2010-11 Pos	2010-11 Sal (%)	2011-12 Pos	2011-12 Sal (%)	2012-13 Pos	2012-13 Sal (%)	2013-14 Pos	2013-14 Sal (%)	Overall Pos	Overall Sal (%)
State Involvement in the Economy	-1.46	15.1	-0.8	27.4	-1.01	14.8	-1.36	18	-1.11	9.4	-1.25	16.5
Welfare State and Social Services	-1.28	9	-0.7	3.2	-1.61	18.5	-0.95	6.6	-1.04	7.8	-1.91	10.3
Justice	0.55	16	7	17.7	1.72	24.1	0.75	14.8	1.67	35.9	0.76	21.6
Fabric of Society	0.85	37.6	1.18	11.3	1.18	6.5	1.36	18	1.23	12.5	1.16	17.5
Foreign Affairs	1.27	9	1.28	14.5	0.43	11.1	1.63	34.4	0.32	20.3	0.58	16.5
Environmental Protection	0.48	1	-0.22	4.8	-1.18	6.5	0	0	0	0	-0.58	2.8

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

In fact, the parties do not exhibit overlapping positions and high issue salience in any of the dimensions under investigation. The NPD's salience obfuscation in the socio-economic dimensions - core policy areas for Die Linke - prevented this from happening in one instance. While their positions were nearly identical for state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services in 2009-10, Die Linke emphasized these dimensions about 18 percentage points more than the NPD. In 2011-12, the position for the NPD was slightly to the left of that for Die Linke in the welfare state and social services dimension, but the latter stressed issues in this policy area twice as much as its far right counterpart. Based on the results, it can be verified that far right parties such as the NPD have complemented their demarcating socio-cultural positions with demarcating preferences in the socio-economic dimensions (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009; Kriesi et al., 2012). However, the findings for the NPD are consistent with Rovny's (2013) research, which argues that far right parties blur their economic positions by de-emphasizing their left preferences.

While the NPD's emphasis on the socio-economic policy areas fluctuated, it was more consistent on socio-cultural issues in its measures. Table 20 shows that, although the exact dimension sometimes varied, the NPD consistently stressed right positions in either the justice or fabric of society policy areas. The parties' opposing positions make them clear ideological adversaries, but Die Linke does not *actively* oppose the NPD in this dimension. Contrary to the comments from one representative who indicated that Die Linke often believed it was their duty to counter the NPD's extreme motions, the salience for socio-cultural issues never eclipsed 18.1 per cent in a single dimension.[49] Nevertheless, the data reveal that the party remained committed to its left-leaning positions in the socio-economic dimensions.

In the parties' peripheral dimensions, foreign affairs and environmental protection, the NPD and Die Linke display clear programmatic overlaps based on the direction of their overall positions, but are not actively competing, because of the relatively low issue emphasis. As Tables 19 and 20 indicate, the NPD and Die Linke support environmental protection, but neither party emphasized issues in this policy area in more than 10 per cent of the measures that were proposed. The parties also share a similar position direction in the foreign affairs dimension due to a common Euroskepticism. However, despite the NPD's increasing interest in this policy area towards the conclusion of the legislative period, neither party consistently emphasized this dimension.

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[49] Interview with Kerstin Köditz, Die Linke (23.06.2014, Dresden)

Ultimately, the findings for the socio-economic and the peripheral dimensions suggest that the NPD and Die Linke have some ideological commonalities, even if they do not necessarily share the same ideologies. Yet, even with the inclusion of the parties' positions, the empirical evidence about issue salience still reveals that the NPD and Die Linke are not direct electoral opponents in the six issue dimensions that were analyzed.

7.4 Discussion

This chapter further explored direct party competition between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. Following the analysis of party positions in the previous chapter, the motivation was twofold. First, it sought to directly compare the issue dimensions that the NPD and Die Linke emphasize in their respective Anträge. In much of the extant literature about niche party behavior, the far right and far left are not considered separately, but rather as unitary actors who are only compared with their mainstream competitors (Meguid, 2008). Second, the chapter examined whether the NPD and Die Linke actively compete for voters in each dimension with similar policy appeals. Although previous studies have attempted to examine party competition between the far right and the center left (Coffé, 2008; Arzheimer, 2013), as well as the far right and the new left (De Koster, et al., 2012), a direct comparison of the far right and far left has been omitted. Although the findings are limited to the legislative activity of the NPD and Die Linke in Saxony, the results are nevertheless a significant first step toward understanding direct competition between far right and far left actors in Western European party systems. The salience chapter makes several important contributions to research about radical party behavior and political competition.

First, the chapter demonstrated that the NPD and Die Linke strategically limited emphasis to those dimensions in which they traditionally maintain associative issue ownership, i.e., their core policy areas. Conversely, the parties downplayed their peripheral dimensions where they do not have an electoral advantage. These findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 3. Despite the fact that other research has revealed a structural dealignment of cleavages in Western European political systems (Kriesi et al., 2008; Bornschier, 2010a), neither party engaged in issue trespassing (Damore, 2005; Sides, 2006) during the 5th legislative period. Die Linke retained its traditional commitment to the party's core dimensions which contained issues in the socio-economic policy areas (state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services). Thus, in comparison to its counterparts on the left side of the political spectrum,

the SPD and the Greens, Die Linke represents an old left party that focuses on class conflict. On the other hand, the NPD consistently highlighted extreme positions in the socio-cultural dimensions (fabric of society and justice). Relative to other policy issues, the party specifically emphasized immigration, asylum and nationalism in a large portion of its motions. Finally, and as expected, both parties largely downplayed the foreign affairs and environmental protection dimensions. As peripheral policy areas, these dimensions contain issues where the NPD and Die Linke have never displayed credible commitments and, consequently, do not maintain an electoral advantage over their competitors.

Second, it was possible to effectively establish that the far right and far left in Germany are not *direct*, electoral competitors. Although there are some positional overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke in their shared, peripheral dimensions, both parties abstained from emphasizing issues in the foreign affairs and environmental protection policy areas. In the state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services dimensions, where the parties expressed similar positions, only Die Linke displayed a commitment to socio-economic issues. On the other hand, the dissimilar positions and salience scores in the socio-cultural dimensions show that the NPD and Die Linke are clear ideological opposites, but only the former attempted to manipulate the dimension for an electoral advantage.

Instead, the findings determine that the NPD and Die Linke are competing for similar elements of the electorate, but within different dimensions of political competition. Like other supply-side research comparing electoral competition between the far right and center left (Arzheimer, 2013; Potter and Tavits, 2015), it appears that the far right and far left target voters by emphasizing issue dimensions where they have a perceived advantage. Recalling the preferences for the losers of globalization in Chapter 4, this voting bloc is expected to support demarcating positions. The NPD and Die Linke emphasized such preferences in their proposed Anträge. However, the former stressed demarcation on socio-cultural issues, whereas the latter highlighted demarcation on socio-economic issues. From a cost-benefit perspective, these represent the most effective electoral strategies, because both actors are able to maximize the utility of their appeals without comprising their party brands.

Overall, this chapter concludes that, despite their policy overlaps, the NPD and Die Linke are not electoral competitors in the major issue dimensions that were analyzed. In accordance with issue ownership theory for niche actors, both parties emphasized the political dimensions that they

have traditionally been associated with and soft-pedalled those issues that do not pose an advantage for their electoral aspirations. Although the NPD and Die Linke might target comparable voter bases, the parties refrain from utilizing the same programmatic appeals. In the next chapter, the focus will shift to the third and final strategy in political competition: party rhetoric.

8. Radical Rhetoric: Persuading the Electorate with Populism

The electoral success of far right and far left parties in Western Europe has coincided with what Cas Mudde (2004) calls, "a populist Zeitgeist". In response to various cultural, economic and political crises often stemming from the effects of globalization, radical parties have effectively applied populist rhetoric in recent state, national and European elections (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). More specifically, they often combine an enhanced focus on 'the people', criticism of elites and, especially among the far right, exclusionist appeals, in their messages. As a result, radical parties have attained electoral advantages by positioning themselves as outsiders against their mainstream, 'establishment' competitors. Despite the accepted view that far right and far left parties both employ populist appeals in their rhetoric, the secondary literature has largely ignored comparative analyses of their respective populist messages. The following chapter modifies the research focus of radical populism and thereby attempts to fill a gap in the extant literature. Thus, this analysis concentrates on the commonalities and differences between the populist appeals expressed by the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke in their proposed parliamentary Anträge from the Saxon State Parliament during the 5th legislative session. Essentially, how can the populist arguments from the far right NPD and the far Die Linke be distinguished? Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to measure the impact of radical populist appeals on electoral success. Rather, the primary focus of the research is the communication style of radical populist rhetoric in party competition. For instance, do the parties introduce similar degrees of populism in their Anträge? Do the NPD and Die Linke emphasize similar arguments in their populist appeals?

Overall, the results reveal important findings about populist rhetoric from the far right and far left. First, they demonstrate that the degree of applied populist appeals is noticeably different. Although the NPD and Die Linke share a common propensity to utilize populist appeals when describing policy positions in their respective Anträge, this more or less represents the extent of their commonalities. Taken as a whole, a significantly larger percentage of populist appeals could be attributed to the NPD. The findings also suggest that the focus of the NPD's and Die Linke's populist arguments is different, because of their disparate ideologies. Both parties employ a general populist outline in their rhetoric that contains people-centrist and anti-elitist elements. However, the NPD employs culturally-driven populist appeals in its rhetoric that contain core far right values, such as nationalism and the exclusion of perceived outsiders. In contrast, Die Linke advanced populist appeals that correlate with basic far left principles, such as overcoming economic

inequality. These results confirm the main theoretical expectations of the study. As niche actors, the NPD and Die Linke behave similarly by utilizing populist appeals. Yet, the parties are constrained by ideological commitments in their core dimensions of political competition, which ultimately distinguishes the quantity and quality of the populism in their Anträge.

The remainder of the chapter adheres to the following format. First, the theory section reestablishes the basic arguments about the use of populism in the parties' Anträge that were originally presented in Chapter 3. From this, several observable implications that consider the expected quantity and quality of populist appeals expressed by the NPD and Die Linke in their respective parliamentary Anträge are reintroduced for testing purposes. Thereafter, a methods section explaining the operationalization of populism is discussed. Once the methods have been established, a thorough analysis describing the results subsequently ensues. In order to illustrate both the quantity and quality of the parties' populism, a combination of empirical data and direct quotations from the NPD and Die Linke are employed. Lastly, in the discussion, the findings are summarized and some concluding remarks are offered about the importance of the results.

8.1 Theory: The Role of Rhetoric in Party Competition

The previous chapters analyzed two of the most commonly recognized strategies in the course of political competition. Motivated by their desire to mobilize electoral support, the NPD and Die Linke appealed to voters by proposing positions and manipulating the salience of policy issues. Often overlooked among theories of party strategy is the notion that political competition is also structured by the attempts of actors to actually *convince* voters of their policy positions. Riker (1996: 4) argues that campaigns are essentially rhetorical exercises intended to persuade voters to view issues in the way the candidate wishes them to be perceived. Parties must communicate their positions with elegance and eloquence (Riker, 1996, 9). In other words, style and substance both matter. Sides (2006: 409) correctly mentions that individuals process information differently and, thus, can often remain immune to attempts at persuasion. Nevertheless, parties and their candidates take the development of their political messages very seriously. As evidenced by the importance of public opinion polls and focus-group testing, parties dedicate extensive resources towards crafting effective rhetorical appeals in order to attract publicity for their positions. (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). Put simply, parties recognize that political rhetoric is an important weapon that can be exercised to increase their appeal among voters (Holian, 2004).

As niche parties, the NPD and Die Linke are unlikely to develop the same rhetorical styles as their mainstream competitors. Instead, the parties have clear strategic incentives to use populism in their political rhetoric. Since the NPD and Die Linke were in the opposition throughout the 5th legislative period and adhere to outlying ideologies, populist appeals provide the parties with several benefits vis-à-vis their opponents. As a strategy, populism enables radical actors to gain an advantage by transforming the structure of political competition into a perceived contest between the entrenched establishment and democratic outsiders (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). At a time when there is an acute demand for parties in Western Europe that challenge the political and social status quo (Mény and Surel, 2002; Zaslove, 2008), populist rhetoric allows radical actors to mobilize a variety of disenchanted voters. An additional advantage of populist rhetoric is its ability to reduce the stigma associated with radical parties. The image of such actors can be softened among voters by substituting expressions like 'the people' and 'elites' for the proletariat or the nation. This point is relevant for Germany especially, where far right and far left party success has often been limited due to associations with National Socialism and Actually Existing Socialism (Givens, 2005; Art, 2007).

Unlike other research in the secondary literature which defines populism as a thin-centered ideology (Freeden, 1996; Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015) or an organizational characteristic (Taggart, 1995; Weyland, 2001; Barr, 2009), populism is understood here as a form of rhetoric (Hawkins, 2009; 2010; Koopmans and Muis, 2009). Although they overlap, rhetoric is not the same as style. The latter considers the visual and performative aspects of populism that are designed to capture the charismatic and passionate dimensions often employed by populist actors (Knight, 1998; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2009; Moffitt, 2016). Rhetoric, or discourse as it is commonly labelled, is foremost concerned with language. More specifically, it focuses on the ability of actors to assign meanings through the use of linguistic forms (Hawkins, 2009). But how does populism actually appear in political texts and speeches?

At the most basic level, populist rhetoric is comprised of different degrees (quantity) and emphases (quality). Hence, a party can express more or less populist appeals and it can exhibit similar or dissimilar focal points. At its most basic level, all populist rhetoric consists of references to 'the people' and criticisms of established elites (Mudde, 2004). The definition of populism that is proposed here is not necessarily typical of a particular party. Indeed, any actor can conceivably

glorify the people or criticize certain types of elites (Pauwels, 2014: 18). Thus, the study agrees with Rooduijn et al. (2014: 564) that populism inherently is a property of a message rather than a property of the actors sending the message.

How the parties actually decide to apply populism in their respective Anträge is determined by strategic costs and benefits associated with each dimension of political competition. Referring back to Chapter 3, the NPD and Die Linke are expected to emphasize populism in their core policy areas, because these dimensions contain issues that play an important role in the parties' ideological profiles. For the NPD, this implies that its populist arguments will be distinguished by a focus on socio-cultural issues (Mudde, 2007), whereas Die Linke's brand of populism can be characterized as socio-economic in nature (Mudde, 2004). Ideology also affects the degree to which parties employ populism in their Anträge. Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) conclude that radicalness causes a party to be more or less populist. Not only is the NPD considered to be more radical than Die Linke, but far right parties are generally associated with populism more than their far left counterparts (Van Kessel, 2015). Keeping these theoretical claims in mind, the subsequent observable implications have been proposed for testing:

> *Observable Implication #7: The parties' strategies are similar in that they should utilize populism more in their core dimensions of political competition.*

> *Observable Implication #7a: The NPD's populist arguments will emphasize issues in the socio-cultural dimensions of political competition.*

> *Observable Implication #7b: Die Linke's populist arguments will accentuate themes in the socio-economic dimensions of political competition.*

> *Observable Implication #8: The amount of populism in the parties' Anträge will be greater for the party that is more ideologically extreme.*

> *Observable Implication #8a: The NPD should display more populism in their Anträge than Die Linke.*

With the observable implications deduced, the next section explains the methods for measuring the quantity and quality of populism in the party's Anträge.

8.2 Methods: Measuring Populism in the Anträge Proposed by the NPD and Die Linke

The methods section begins with an examination of the two most common forms of content analysis in the measurement of populism: hand-coding and computer-assisted procedures. After considering the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, the study ultimately opts for the former method. Next, the main features of populism, people-centrism and anti-elitism, are operationalized. For this step, the operationalization procedure maintains a level of methodological consistency by adapting approaches that were applied in the position and salience chapters. Then, in the final part of the section, the conversion from classified units of measurement to populism scores is addressed.

8.2.1 The Classical Content Analysis: Hand-Coding

On the whole, the measurement of populism remains an underdeveloped research endeavor, but there are two methods that have been utilized in the secondary literature. The first approach is the computer-assisted content analysis, which has been applied in several studies of populism (Armony and Armony, 2005; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Reungoat, 2010). Similar to the *Wordscores* method for measuring party positions (Laver and Garry, 2000; Pennings, 2011), several studies have conducted a computer-assisted content analysis of election manifestos that relied on *a priori* dictionary coding (Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). For this type of procedure, a dictionary of words is assembled that contains possible indicators for populism, including people centrism and anti-elitism. The major advantage of the computer-assisted content method is that it is less time-consuming and requires fewer resources than hand-coding (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011: 1275). Moreover, without the potential for human error, computer-assisted content analyses are often perceived as highly reliable (Volkens, 2007).

Despite the perceived advantages associated with a computer-assisted content analysis, there are several arguments that speak against this approach. The most significant shortcoming is the ability of computer-assisted content analyses to produce valid measurements of populism. As Chapter 5 already contended, computer-assisted content analyses often fail to accurately interpret the substantive meaning of the words that they are counting. This deficiency is especially problematic, because an analysis of rhetoric requires an enhanced attention to context. More precisely, some expressions that might appear to be people-centric or anti-elitist should not be interpreted as such. For example, in the current study, the parties often refer to Saxony and

Germany in their justifications, which seems to suggest people-centric discourse. However, in many instances, the author is actually speaking about the state government and its leaders more generally. Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011: 1275) discovered that a similar inconsistency applies to the words 'our' and 'we', which prompted them to only consider anti-elitism in their study. As a result, they admitted that their measurements were likely to be less than valid. Ultimately, a computer-assisted content analysis does not recognize subtle contextual nuances, which negatively impacts the method's validity.

A second, and related, disadvantage associated with computer-assisted content analyses is the challenge to develop a coding dictionary beforehand. Determining indicators for populism introduces the same potential for decision-making bias that often emerges in hand-coding procedures. This has negative implications for the measurement reliability of populism. Pauwels (2014) asserts that three types of populism exist: neoliberal, social and national. While the breadth of terms such as 'the people' and 'elites' allows for an extensive range of indicators, accounting for all of these possibilities poses a major conceptual test for the researcher. For cross-national studies, this issue is even more acute (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011) but, in the current study as well, it remains difficult to consistently predict and code variations of populism. Even if such a dictionary can be compiled, it would have to be continuously updated with new indicators that reflect the current state of discourse in political competition. Reliability is often regarded as the strong suit of computer-assisted approaches, but the obstacles inherent in the measurement of populism reduce the effectiveness of this method.

A classical content analysis using hand-coding avoids many of the pitfalls that beset computer-assisted methodologies. It enables the coder to more effectively decipher message characteristics that are not always evident without prior knowledge of the subject matter. An example concerning anti-elitism suffices to demonstrate this point. The word "Politik" has multiple meanings in the German language. Depending on the context, it can describe a policy as such or it can refer to the state of politics more generally. This semantic difference is key for the current research. The former is a literal description of an existing or proposed policy, whereas the latter could be a loaded criticism of political elites. Compared to an automated computing process that simply counts words, a human coder is better suited to understand this distinction as it appears in the context of an Antrag. In turn, the data produced from a hand-coding approach are likely to be more valid than those from a computer-assisted procedure.

The hand-coding method contains the additional benefit of displaying higher levels of reliability than anticipated. In the only existing comparison of measurements for populism, Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011: 1279) not only demonstrated that hand-coding exhibited higher levels of validity. They also found that the reliability scores for hand-coding were comparable to the computer-assisted approach. This most likely stems in part from the inability to develop consistent, *a priori* dictionaries for the computer-assisted procedure. Regardless, the findings refute the presumed advantage that automated processes have in terms of measurement reliability and simultaneously lend support to the hand-coding approach. Based on the superior validity and acceptable reliability, the study agrees with Rooduijn and Pauwels that the hand-coding procedure is the preferred method for the measurement of populism. Now that this method has been established as the selected approach, the next section clarifies the operationalization of populism in the parties' Anträge.

8.2.2 Measuring Populism in an Antrag: The Begründung

The two-part structure of an Antrag is exceptionally suited for the measurement of populism. Chapter 5 already indicated that an Antrag first consists of a demands section that contains the specific issues addressed by each party. Thereafter, in the mandatory Begründung, a justification is offered for those measures proposed in the demands section. Unlike the latter component though, which is often stated in an ordered fashion, the justification more closely resembles the text structure of a press release or manifesto. In this manner, the Begründung essentially amounts to a free-flowing discourse that provides further insights about the parties' policy suggestions. As a result, the parties are afforded opportunities to develop rhetorical appeals that can be measured for populist communication styles.

Specific references to 'the people' and anti-elitism are likely to emerge at several different points in a Begründung. Since the party has already suggested a series of initiatives to address a certain issue, it is only natural that the justification identify a corresponding problem. However, in many instances, the parties are not content to simply state a criticism of the status quo. Instead, they often have to explain why a problem is labelled as such. One strategy is to assign blame to certain actors that take the form of elites. At the same time, a problem might be defined as such, because it is not in the interests of 'the people'. Obviously, it is also possible for a larger, populist narrative to be developed whereby particular elites do not heed the concerns of the common citizen.

Whatever the combination, the main point is that the allusion to a problem creates the potential for populistic rhetoric in the justification part of an Antrag.

A second point in the Begründung where populist rhetoric commonly appears is when the parties explain the advantages of their initiatives that were originally proposed in the demands section. If the problem is more likely to provoke anti-elitism, the justification for the parties' action measures is more closely associated with 'the people'. Regardless of their real motives, parties are determined to be seen as serving the common good. Therefore, in addition to their core values, they often invoke 'the people' as part of the rationale for their policy proposals. Although less frequent, references to elites can also occur in the part of the discourse. For example, the NPD or Die Linke might argue that their proposals should be implemented, because they curb the influence of elites. Now that it has been established why and when populism materializes in the Begründung of an Antrag, the next section explains how it is operationalized.

8.2.3 Operationalizing Populism: Degree

For the purpose of measuring the degree of populism in the parties' Anträge, the proposed hand-coding procedure adheres to two basic steps, in accordance with Krippendorf's (2013) standard content analysis approach: unitization and classification. The unit of measurement is the Begründung itself. Other studies that empirically measure populism have defined the unit of measurement as a paragraph (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015) and non-specific section excerpts in party manifestos (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). In an Antrag, the discursive composition of the Begründung correlates with the stated research objectives, namely to measure populism as a communication style. As a result, the Begründung has been selected as the unit of measurement.

The classification procedure adheres to the methodological framework outlined in Matthijs Rooduijn's coding manual for the measurement of "Populism in Election Programs". Thus, an Antrag is only labelled as populist if it contains people-centric *and* anti-elitist references. For instance, the following statement from the NPD in the Begründung Drs 5/7453 is an example of populist rhetoric:

> "Das Argument, daß die Deutschen angeblich aufgrund ihrer Vergangenheit auf ewig ihr Recht auf die Ausübung direktdemokratischer Mitbestimmungsrechte verwirkt haben sollen, zeugt nicht nur vom abgrundtiefen Mißtrauen der politischen Klasse gegenüber dem eigenen Volk, sondern dient der politischen Klasse mehr und mehr auch als zynischer Vorwand, um die eigene Macht zu sichern."

In this text passage, the NPD refers directly to the 'German people' and juxtaposes them against the 'political class'. The combination of these characteristics is commensurate with the definition that was already proposed in the beginning of this chapter and ensures that the classification procedure is rigorously applied. If the Begründung only includes people-centrism or anti-elitism, then the rhetoric is not considered populist, even if there are multiple references throughout the text. Additionally, only the parties themselves, and not a single Antrag, can be more or less populist. If there are numerous examples of people-centrism and anti-elitism in the same Begründung, then the Antrag is considered just as populist as motion that only contains one reference of each. However, what qualifies as people-centrism and anti-elitism?

Similar to the classical content analysis coding procedure described by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), people-centrism is measured by posing the following question for each Begründung: "Does the party refer to the people?" Such mentions could include words like 'citizens', 'the nation', 'the society', 'the electorate', 'the people' and 'the public'. The general description of these terms implies that 'the people' is understood as a monolithic group with which the party identifies. Hence, personal pronouns such as 'our', 'us' and 'we' are also an appropriate indicator for people-centrism. In contrast, references to individual groups of citizens are not considered to be populist. Case in point is Drs 5/9730 where Die Linke alludes to "many people" (*viele Menschen*). Although this example refers to the people in some capacity, it is not regarded as people-centric, because Die Linke is referring to a subset of individuals, but not one that comprises an entire monolithic group. However, in the same Begründung, Die Linke also refers to "the citizens" (*die Bürgerinnen und Bürger*), which is a broad description of the people at large and, thus, classified as people-centric.

The second indicator for populism, anti-elitism, is measured with the question: "Do the authors of the manifesto criticize elites?" The targets of anti-elitist rhetoric should be generally described. Examples could include politicians, the media, business and cultural elites, the judiciary etc. Capitalism and multinational corporations can be categorized if they are intended to be representative of a certain type of elite. However, criticisms about the functioning or power of an institution are not considered anti-elitist, but rather the condemnation of a system. Hence, disparaging remarks about the European Union are not anti-elitist, whereas attacks on "Brussels" qualify as legitimate criticisms of elites. More specifically, any criticisms of specific politicians,

parties, the government or particular institutions are not labelled anti-elitist. To illustrate this point, in Drs 5/3112, the NPD blames the "red-green government" under former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for the increase of temporary employment in Germany. The specific mention of the red-green coalition (*rot-grün Bundesregierung*) in the Begründung rules out the potential for anti-elitism. Yet, in the same justification, the NPD directly criticizes "companies" (*Firmen*) for relying heavily on temporary employment practices. The general reference to companies, without naming a specific business or sector, is evidence for anti-elitism.

8.2.4 Operationalizing Populism: Emphasis

In a second step, the demands section for those parliamentary Anträge containing populist appeals were analyzed for emphasis. The demands section represents a logical indicator for the type of populism that is emphasized in an Antrag. Keeping in mind the two-part structure of a legislative motion, the content of a Begründung is largely dictated by the primary action measures and political declarations in the demands section. Fortunately, identifying these units was a very simple and straightforward process. Since the empirical research conducted in the previous chapters already coded primary action measures and political declarations in the demands section, each Begründung already corresponded with a classified set of units.

The classification procedure is consistent with the coding procedures employed in previous analytical chapters. As such, it utilizes the codes comprised in the Comparative Manifesto Project. Applying the CMP classification system is both an ideal and innovative approach. Traditionally associated with the measurement of party positions, this study is the first instance where the CMP codes have been applied to evaluate populism. Yet, since an Antrag is an official party *policy* document, it seems logical to use the CMP codes on this particular data source. The CMP classification procedure offers an optimal approach, because of its ability to accurately describe political competition. It contains 56 broadly-defined codes that were developed to describe party positions in various policy areas. For this study, the original set of codes has been modified so that it includes two extra categories for immigration, which have been included in other codebooks that were inspired by the original CMP version (see, for example, Wüest and Volkens, 2003). The CMP codes are not just thorough. They also provide a valid representation of the issues that parties address during political competition (Däubler et al., 2012; Bräuninger et al., 2013). This is an

essential attribute for accurately observing the type of populism that is emphasized in the parties' Anträge.

In order to measure the dimensions that the NPD and Die Linke emphasize, every classified unit is assigned to an additive policy area. These dimensions were first outlined in Chapter 5 and was applied in each of the empirical analyses. As a reminder, the policy areas were generated based on two criteria: the proposed observable implications stated in the theoretical section and dimensions of political competition cited in the secondary literature. They include two socio-economic (welfare state and social services and state involvement in the economy) and two socio-cultural (justice and fabric of society) policy areas. In order to provide a more complete picture, three further categories were created that subsist of policy areas such as international affairs, environmental protection and a group termed 'other' for CMP codes that do not conform to any major policy dimension.

Drs 5/9257 from the NPD demonstrates how populism emphasis is determined in a typical Antrag. First, the Begründung is considered populist, because the NPD referred specifically to "Germans" (people-centrism) and criticized "politicians from the established parties" (anti-elitism). With the Begründung established as populist, the demands section is revisited in order to determine the type of populism that the NPD elected to emphasize. In this document, the NPD proposed three primary action measures:

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert:

1.   Mitglieder salafistischer Gemeinden, Vereine oder anderer Organisationsformen in Sachsen, die durch Gewalttaten, Haßpredigten oder andere Straftaten, die den öffentlichen Frieden gefährden, aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auszuweisen;

2.   sich im Rahmen der Innenministerkonferenz für die generelle Ausweisung bekennender Salafisten einzusetzen;

3.   sich für den Entzug der deutschen Staatsbürgerschaft von islamistischen Aktivisten mit Migrationshintergrund einzusetzen, die in aggressiv-kämpferischer Weise gegen die Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland verstoßen."

Each of these identified units was classified with the law and order: positive code (605), because the National Democrats called for stricter measures against organizations associated with radical

Islam, in particular Salafist groups. Since this code belongs to the justice dimension, the populism emphasis in Drs 5/9257 is socio-cultural in nature.

Once the Anträge have been coded for indicators of populist rhetoric, the degrees and emphases of populism can be calculated. Both of these manifestations of populism are measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100. As a result, a simple percentage is computed for each party. Emphasis is calculated by first identifying all of the coded demands that are associated with a populist Begründung and organizing them according to policy area. Thereafter, the amount of populist demands for each dimension is divided by the overall amount of political declarations and primary measure actions that are accompanied by a populist Begründung in the sample. Hence, if there are 50 units accompanied by a populist Begründung and one dimension contains 5 of those demands, the emphasis for that policy area is 10 per cent. For the observable implications that measure degree, the total number of classified political declarations and primary measure actions are simply summed for those documents containing populist appeals and then divided by the total number of coded demands in the sample.

Similar to the scores produced for positions, an intercoder reliability test was also conducted specifically for the Begründungen. Here again, a trained, student coder was asked to rate a randomly-selected sample of Begründungen and identify the appropriate classification in each Antrag. The standard 10 per cent rule was applied for intercoder reliability (Neuendorf, 2002). Therefore, the student coder examined a total of 40 Anträge (20 from the NPD and Die Linke respectively). Since the Begründungen could only be classified as populist or non-populist, it did not make sense to compute the reliability score with Cohen's kappa. When taking the possibility of coincidence into account, this calculation method is considered to be too conservative (Lombard et al., 2002). Since the classification process for populist rhetoric only contains two variables (populist and not populist), the scores produced from Cohen's kappa are unlikely to be satisfactory. Instead, the reliability score was calculated as a percentage. After conducting the tests and computing the results, an overall score of 85 per cent was achieved for the Anträge that were included in the inter-rater reliability test. The reliability values may be taken to represent very good agreement according to the criteria outlined by Banerjee et al. (1999).[50]

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[50] In addition to the exact intercoder reliability measurements, a lengthier discussion about the differences between Cohen's kappa and percentages can be found in the appendix.

8.3 Results

The findings are presented for the degree and emphasis of populism in the parties' Anträge. For both sections, empirical data is provided that is intended to confirm or refute the observable implications. In the section about emphasis, the study takes a closer look at the types of populism expressed in each party's Anträge. The quantitative data is supported by text passages containing examples of populist rhetoric that serve to further illustrate the stylistic differences between the NPD and Die Linke.

8.3.1 The Degree of Populism

The empirical analysis confirms the first observable implication proposed about the degree of populism in the Anträge from the NPD and Die Linke. Table 21 displays the scaled percentage scores for both parties. At first glance, it is clear that the NPD and Die Linke each display populist communication styles in their respective Anträge. This finding is consistent with assumptions from the secondary literature in several ways. First, it reaffirms that both parties regard populism as a useful rhetorical strategy to challenge the political establishment, i.e., their mainstream competitors (Taggart, 1998). From the perspective of Die Linke, this finding is significant, because it supports Rooduijn and Akkerman's (2015: 9) assertion that far left parties have gradually abandoned their glorification of the proletariat in favor of an emphasis on the people. However, the data displays a remarkable disparity between the amount of populism exhibited by the two parties. The NPD, which is generally perceived as more radical than Die Linke, applied populist appeals in 15.4% of its Begründungen, whereas the proportion for Die Linke was only 3%. Comparatively speaking, the NPD applied populist rhetoric approximately five times more than its far left opponent.

Table 21 Populism Degree In The Anträge For Both Parties

Party	Degree (%)
NPD	15.4
Die Linke	3.0

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

The findings from this case study are consistent with Rooduijn and Akkerman's (2015) large-n study and Pauwels' (2014) analysis of the German party system. Although they examined manifestos and established a different measurement unit, Rooduijn and Akkerman also found that

the far right parties in Western Europe were, on the whole, more populist than those on the far left. Compared with their data, the radical parties in the German case appear to be both more and less populist than their European counterparts. Die Linke's populism was less than the median score for far left parties in Western Europe (7.1), whereas the NPD's populism was more radical than the median score for other far right parties (10.3).

Without speculating too much, there are several possible reasons for Die Linke's lower populism score in relation to other far left parties in Europe. It could be attributed to the fact that the party organization in eastern Germany is usually considered to be less radical than its western equivalent. Although the PDS merged with the West German WASG, many of the original members of the western PDS were hardcore communists formerly associated with the DKP and MLPD (Bouma, 2016). Another explanation could be that, as the largest opposition party in the Saxon State Parliament, Die Linke desires to be taken seriously in the event that it might win political office in the future, especially at the national level where the subject of a red-red-green coalition is occasionally discussed (Hough, 2010). Finally, since Rooduijn and Akkerman only provided a median score, it is possible that the other far left parties in their analysis are simply more radical than Die Linke. Although this might seem doubtful in the case of the Dutch Socialist Party, other actors, such as the French and Italian Communist Parties, still adhere to key tenets of orthodox Marxism. March (2011) labels the latter as reformed communists which are considered to be more radical than Die Linke. However, each of these proposed theories requires further investigation in an additional study.

That the degree of populism in the NPD's Anträge is not only higher than the amount expressed by Die Linke, but also other far right parties is not surprising. Due to its nativist ideology and penchant for biological racism, the NPD is generally perceived as one of the more extreme actors among the far right party family (Mudde, 1995). This is certainly the case when compared to the other far right actors that were included in Rooduijn and Akkerman's study. Although skeptics might disagree, the secondary literature argues that actors such as the French National Front and the Freedom Parties in Austria and Italy (FPÖ/PdL) have tried to distance themselves from any association with the "old right" (Ignazi, 1992; Betz, 1993; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). The exact opposite trend can be observed for the NPD (Pfahl-Traughber, 2009). Stöss (2013: 597) writes that, after Udo Voigt took over as chairman in 1996, the party's identity went from being national-conservative to a neonazi one. The combination of the party's ideology and the

impossibility of forming a coalition at any level causes the NPD to use far more populism in its rhetoric.

Die Linke's relatively low percentage of populist rhetoric can be better understood by analyzing the individual results for people-centrism and anti-elitism. Although Die Linke refrained from using as much populism in its Anträge as the NPD, the party was not resistant to using features associated with this rhetorical style. However, on this point, there is a significant imbalance between the two indicators. Table 22 reveals that Die Linke referenced 'the people' 124 times in over one-third of all Anträge that were proposed during the 5th legislative session. The overall total and percentage of Anträge from Die Linke containing populism pales in comparison to this figure. The reason for this discrepancy can be attributed to a general trend in the data, namely the limited number of Begründungen that articulated anti-elitist sentiment. In contrast to the findings reported for people-centrism, Table 22 shows that anti-elitism was only recorded 13 times in 12 separate Anträge. This amounted to a paltry 4.5 per cent of the overall sample. For some observers, these results suggest that Die Linke displays a thin form of populism (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). However, since the study interprets populism as the combination of people-centrism and anti-elitism, the findings only imply that, in line with the first observable implication, Die Linke is much less inclined to exercise populist rhetoric than its far right opponent.

Table 22 Number And Percentage Of Populist Indicators In The Anträge For Both Parties

Party	People-Centrism	Percentage	Anti-Elitism	Percentage
NPD	98	41	44	22
Die Linke	124	35	13	4.5

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

Conversely, the ratio of people-centrism to anti-elitism is slightly more balanced in the Anträge proposed by the NPD. Similar to Die Linke, people-centrism is the dominant feature in the party's populism. However, in contrast to Die Linke, the NPD was much more critical of elites. Table 22 shows that, taken together, the NPD expressed 98 instances of people-centrism in 57 various Anträge. For the other populism indicator, anti-elitism, the NPD produced 44 examples in 31 different motions. This proportion has obvious implications for the relative percentages of populism expressed in the party's Anträge. Out of the 140 Anträge that were included in the sample size, nearly 41 per cent of the NPD's Begründungen contained people-centric appeals whereas 22 per cent of the party's justifications were marked by anti-elitism. Since it has more anti-elitist

references in the sample size, the NPD subsequently exhibited a higher degree of populist rhetoric than Die Linke.

8.3.2 The Emphasis of Populism

The second observable implication, which infers the focus of claims in the parties' populist appeals, can also be confirmed. Despite the fact that the NPD and Die Linke resorted to a basic form of populism that can be delineated by people-centrism and anti-elitism, the focus of their arguments was contrived with input from each actor's respective ideology. Hence, the NPD's rhetoric was characterized by national populism whereas Die Linke conveyed social populism (Pauwels, 2014). These findings substantiate the overall theoretical framework of the study. The electoral benefits for both parties are greater when they attempt to mobilize voters with populist appeals in their respective, core dimensions of political competition, namely the socio-cultural (justice and fabric of society) and socio-economic (welfare state and social services and state involvement in the economy) policy areas. In contrast, it is less advantageous to tailor their populism to issues in their shared peripheral dimensions (environmental protection and foreign affairs).

Table 23 reveals that, although the NPD did not limit its populist appeals to socio-cultural issues alone, this policy area was the primary emphasis of the party's arguments. Nearly half (44.6 per cent) of all primary measure actions and political declarations that were justified with populist appeals were associated with issues in the socio-cultural dimensions. Approximately one-third (31.3 per cent) of populist appeals could be linked to socio-economic issues. Nevertheless, it is evident that the focus in the NPD's populism mostly consists of cultural arguments. The results presented in Table 23 demonstrate that the remaining policy areas, foreign affairs and environmental protection, were hardly relevant for the NPD's formulation of populism. Appeals associated with these policy areas comprised only 16.9 per cent of the total populist rhetoric in the NPD's Anträge. When the peripheral dimensions are examined separately the proportion of populism found in each policy area is even less. Populist Begründungen that emphasized foreign affairs accounted for only 4.8 per cent and environmental protection was a meager 2.4 per cent. Ultimately, the nativist core of the far right NPD's ideology is a strong indicator for the specific type of populism that it applies.

Table 23 Populism Emphasis In The Anträge For Both Parties

Dimension	NPD (%)	Die Linke (%)
State Involvement in the Economy	28.9	4.3
Welfare State and Social Services	2.4	43.5
Justice	27.7	17.4
Fabric of Society	16.9	0.0
Foreign Affairs	4.8	13.0
Environmental Protection	2.4	4.3
Other	16.9	17.4

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

In contrast, Die Linke's populist appeals were constructed with a focus on socio-economic issues. Almost half (47.8 per cent) of all primary measure actions and political declarations in the demands section of Die Linke's Anträge were justified with populist appeals associated with socio-economic policy areas. Some specific examples included social welfare funding for children, drug clinics and care for the elderly. However, unlike the results for the NPD, none of the remaining policy areas were relatively important for Die Linke's populist appeals. In fact, there is no other dimension that surpasses 17.4 per cent of the entire sample (socio-cultural, other issues and international affairs). Similar to the NPD, the percentage of environmental protection demands with populist appeals was very low (4.3 per cent). For both parties then, the benefit of developing populist rhetoric that concentrates on issues in their peripheral dimensions simply does not compensate for the costs that are required. Obviously, the lower degree of populism in Die Linke's Anträge reduces the available sample of arguments for analysis. Nevertheless, based on those Anträge that could be examined, an emphasis on socio-economic issues is characteristic of Die Linke's populist appeals. Similar to nationalism for the NPD, Die Linke's democratic socialist ideology is an important determinant for the formation of its populism. The next section provides a closer qualitative analysis of the various argumentation styles and focal points in the Anträge from the NPD and Die Linke.

8.3.3 Radical Party Populism in Context

Beyond the numbers, an in-depth analysis of the parties' populist discourse further demonstrates their opposing rhetorical appeals. An appropriate starting point is the individual indicators for populism: people-centrism and anti-elitism. To be sure, the former indicator did produce some

commonalities. For example, as Table 24 illustrates, the NPD and Die Linke each employed a general series of expressions such as "the public", "the citizens", "society", "the populace", "the country", "Germany" and "Saxony". None of these terms contains a loaded meaning that would potentially betray the political identity of the author. However, such similarities represent the extent of the people-centric overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke.

Table 24 Examples Of People-Centrism And Anti-Elitism For Both Parties

Indicator	NPD	Die Linke	Shared
People-Centrism	Aus deutscher Sicht	Die allgemeine Öffentlichkeit	Die Bevölkerung
	Das deutsche Volk	Unsere Nachbarn	Die Bürger
	Die Deutschen	Die gesamte Gesellschaft	Die Gesellschaft
	Uns	Wohl der Allgemeinheit	Das Land
	Die deutsche Öffentlichkeit	Jeder Mensch	Die Öffentlichkeit
	Unsere schlesischen Landesleute	EU-Bürger	Das Volk
	Unser Volk	Die Unionsbürger	Freistaat Sachsen
	Unser Land	Jeder	Sachsen
	Unsere Landesleute	Alle	Das öffentliche Interesse
	Volksgemeinschaft		Die öffentliche Sicherheit
	Das eigene Volk		Allgemeinwohl
	Die deutsche Nation		
	Die deutschen Bürger		
	Die digenen Bürger		
	Unsere Gesellschaft		
	Unsere Gemeinschaft		
	Deutsches Interesse		
Anti-Elitism	Islam-Lobby	Die Telekommunkations-Unternehmen	Justiz
	Die etablierten Parteien	Stromkartell	
	Die etablierten Medien	Wirtschaftliche Interesse	
	Die politische Klasse	Pharmabranche	
	Die etablierten Politiker	Die weitgehend unkontrollierten Marktkräfte	
	Ausländische Konzerne	Finanzielle Spekulationsgeschäfte	
	Die Atomindustrie	Spitzenverdiener/innen	
	Die politische Führung		
	Die Bundes- und Landespolitik		
	Die Parlamentarier		
	Die neoliberalen Kreise		
	Die herrschenden Politik		
	Brüsseler EU-Bürokratie		
	Brüssel		
	Großkonzerne		
	68er		

Source: Own calculations based on Anträge in the Saxon State Parliament

The rhetoric displayed in the NPD's Begründungen resembles the type of national populism commonly expressed by far right actors throughout Western Europe (Pauwels, 2014: 25-27). Thus, as the empirical data already demonstrated, the NPD's populism is associated with issues such as immigration, asylum and multiculturalism. This particular emphasis is reflected in the NPD's understanding of the 'the people' and elites. For the National Democrats, 'the people' signified an ethnic interpretation of Germans and Saxons. Therefore, the party utilized expressions that referred to "das Volk", which has become increasingly associated with far right discourse in Germany (Peters, 2015).[51] The phrase "Volk" implies the existence of insiders and outsiders in the NPD's Begründungen that is consistent with the Manichean worldviews that characterize far right ideology (Mudde, 2007). The groups associated with these labels are fairly obvious. Ethnic Germans constitute members of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, whereas immigrants, Muslims and other minority groups are portrayed as foreign elements. Variations of the term "Volk" included "das deutsche Volk", "das eigene Volk", "unser Volk" and "Volkserhalt". In contrast, people-centric references to "das Volk" rarely, if ever, emerged in the Begründungen written by Die Linke.

Elsewhere in their motions, the National Democrats conveyed people-centric sentiments that did not always refer directly to a physical group of individuals, but still conveyed the importance of 'the people' in these statements. For example, Table 24 shows that the party employed language such as "our judicial culture", "our western culture", "our country", "German interests", "our society" and "our community" among others. For many of these expressions as well, there is an underlying cultural meaning that can be found in the party's rhetoric. The language implies that only indigenous Germans share a common set of cultural values, traditions and beliefs that are not innate to outsiders.

Indeed, the NPD's people-centric terminology was often juxtaposed against a demographic that could not be affiliated with the party's limited definition of 'the people'. Since far right parties believe that is not possible to join an ethnicity, the NPD's people-centrism has an exclusive character (Heywood, 2003). For the most part, the outsider groups were cultural in nature. The party's Begründungen included expressions like "increasing Islamization", "Salafism", "Muslims", "foreigners", "foreign workers", "economic refugees" and "refugees" in general. The

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[51] During the Dresden PEGIDA demonstrations that started in late 2014, participants chanted "Wir sind das Volk", which was meant to be a takeoff on the Monday Demonstrations that occurred in Leipzig immediately preceding the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (Connolly, 2014).

NPD also identified specific groups that it deemed were "both unwilling and unable to integrate into German society", such as Turks, Roma and Sinti. As a result, they were considered to be threats to the homogenous nation-state and the cultural integrity of indigenous Germans (Betz and Johnson, 2004).

The NPD's ethnic understanding of 'the people' contributed to a larger, populist narrative that emphasized cultural reasons for criticisms of elites. For Anträge that were coded as part of the justice dimension, the National Democrats seized upon the migrant crisis that became salient during the 5th legislative period. One example was Drs 5/9594 in which it blamed "the established parties" for allowing refugees to take advantage of the "German people", because they failed to limit the country's asylum laws and remove petitioners whose applications had already been rejected. Additionally, the NPD worried that such negligence on the part of elites would make Germany more attractive for "economic refugees". In a later Antrag, Drs 5/10357, the NPD criticized policy makers and the media for trying to "make us believe" that the criminal activity taking place in and around asylum centers was not so severe. This was part of a larger justification from the NPD about why the German government should develop more restrictive asylum laws and expel asylum seekers with criminal records.

For Anträge coded as part of the other socio-cultural dimension, fabric of society, populist appeals were used to describe a range of proposed initiatives. On the issue of low childbirth rates and support for having traditional families in Germany, the NPD blasted the "old generation of '68ers" and the "established parties" in Drs 5/10339. The use of '68er is a reference to politicians and social activists whose non-traditional political views were formed during a period marked by the emergence of the New Left. The NPD accused these groups of failing to understand reality and the demographic problems plaguing "our society". The '68ers were particularly criticized for having an understanding of women that is too "reactionary" and "ideological". As part of the NPD's opposition to a multicultural society, politicians were also heavily criticized for their unwillingness to effectively confront certain types of foreigners that were unwelcome. The groups that were frequently perceived as outsiders in the NPD's populist rhetoric were Roma and Sinti, but also Muslims and Islam more generally. Here is just one instance from Drs 5/10329 that urged the state government to halt the advance of Salafists in Saxony:

> "Wie so oft, ist es bei den Vertretern des politischen und gesellschaftlichen Establishments vor allem die eigene Schwäche, die Unfähigkeit, zur eigenen Identität zu stehen und sie offensiv zu verteidigen, die das Erstarken des unserer

> Kultur, unserer Identität und unseren Traditionen diametral entgegenstehenden Islamismus begründet.”

While it can certainly be argued that Salafism represents an extreme type of Islam that is even observed by the *Verfassungsschutz*, the NPD justified the Antrag as an attempt to prevent Islamism and the potential “Islamization” of Germany. Therefore, the previous quote does more than just criticize elites for their inability to exclude a radical form of Islam. In reality, Salafism is a convenient symbol for preventing any variation of Islam from existing in Germany. The quote from Drs 5/10329 is noteworthy, because it also utilizes a far right Manichean framework to contrast Islam with an extreme form of nationalism. The NPD exuded a pride in “our culture, our identity and our traditions that are diametrically opposed to Islamism”. Even without knowing exactly what the culture, identity and traditions are, the NPD has assigned a positive value to these features, whereas anything affiliated with Islamism is inherently bad.

The NPD did not always require a foreign threat, such as culturally-resistant asylum seekers and immigrants, in order to promote nationalism in its Anträge. The party could also criticize elites directly for their refusal to promote a German national identity or present a more balanced picture of Germany's past. For example, in Drs 5/8372 the NPD merged people-centrism and anti-elitism in its proposal to honor a German soldier from the Second World War who saved the lives of nearly 200 British passengers struck by a German U-boat. This motion might seem like a neutral attempt to recognize a brave individual. Ironically though, that same soldier was the U-boat commander responsible for sinking the ship in the first place. Therefore, it seems doubtful that the NPD's only intention was to honor his actions. Rather, as one of the initiatives in the demands section revealed, the soldier was supposed to be a role model for current members of the German Navy. Reverence for military figures is an extremely contentious issue and often represent attempts by the far right to relativize Germany's past. As a result, the German media and historians often try to downplay any attempts to glorify the military, which is likely why the NPD specifically criticized these elites in Drs 5/8372.

> “Durch die jahrzehntelang Feindpropoganda und die Übernahme dieses bewusst verzerrten Bildes in die offizielle/offiziöse bundesdeutsche Geschichtsschreibung sowie in die etablierten Medien hat sich in der Öffentlichkeit ein falsches Bild von der deutschen Seekriegsführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg verfestigt.”

The use of the word *Feindpropoganda* in the text reinforces the argument that elites, such as the media and German historians, do not have the country's best interests in mind. Rather, they are

the perceived enemies that purposely spread false propaganda about the German Navy during the War. Whether the result of invasive foreigners or simply the need to instill nationalist values in the minds of voters, the NPD's populist appeals are undoubtedly substantiated with far right ideological arguments that stress cultural issues.

Die Linke, on the other hand, subscribed to a version of 'the people' that was completely the opposite of the NPD. In accordance with its belief in social equality, the party used language that stressed the importance of inclusivity. Even when Die Linke did focus on a single group, it often did so for the purpose of integrating them into German society and ensuring that they were treated equally. This was especially true for Anträge about asylum seekers, individuals with disabilities and those affiliated with the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Questioning and Allied (LGBTQA) community. As a result, the following terms were seen almost exclusively in the Begründungen from Die Linke: "all people", "everyone", "for each Saxon", "all citizens", "the common interest", "the entire society" and "every person". Die Linke even referred to 'the people' as citizens of the European Union, which is further evidence of the party's soft Euroskepticism that was first described in Chapter 6. Based on the prevalence of such language, it seems logical that populism expressed by Die Linke would consist of socio-cultural appeals.

Yet, despite the perceived emphasis on inclusivity and cultural groups in Die Linke's people-centric discourse, this did not translate to a socio-cultural form of populism. A more thorough investigation of Die Linke's Begründungen reveals economic-based, populist appeals. This is consistent with assumptions in the secondary literature, which assert that far left actors adhere to social populism due to their democratic socialist ideologies (Pauwels, 2014: 23-25). As expected then, criticism of elites is based on socio-economic arguments. In Drs 5/4916, the party disparaged high income earners that are given certain tax privileges for their dependent children. Meanwhile, the same treatment is not afforded to parents from the middle and lower classes. As part of their rationale for proposing measures that would improve the quality of care in nursing homes and persons with disabilities, Die Linke cited the "uncontrollable forces of the free market" in Drs 5/5860. A similar narrative about social injustice caused by economic inequality also appeared in Drs 5/7983. Die Linke argued that the availability of broadband systems was at the mercy of telecommunications companies. The party further implied that such a situation could have been avoided if there was more government regulation, rather than relying on voluntary measures from providers.

Die Linke also based their criticism of elites on the failure to address social welfare issues. Drs 5/11169 contained a detailed series of health measures that were intended to address Saxony's ongoing drug epidemic that is particularly acute in rural regions along the Czech border.[52] In the Begründung, Die Linke blamed politicians responsible for health and social policy for ignoring the urgency of drug use in Saxony. In particular, the party criticized the lack of concern about crystal methamphetamines.

> "Leider hat die sächsische Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik die Problematik lange ignoriert und die Substanz weder spezifisch statistisch erfasst, noch aktiv die Erarbeitung neuer bzw. an den Bedarf angepasster Behandlungsmethoden und -konzepte unterstützt. Frühzeitige Anpassungen des Suchthilfesystems an neue Suchtmittel und deren spezifische Folgen, können entscheidend dazu beitragen Entwicklungen wie die derzeitige Crystal-Problematik abzubremsen und die Folgen für die Betroffenen sowie die gesamte Gesellschaft zu lindern."

Upon first glance, the text does not appear to be populist, because Die Linke specifically mentioned "those affected" by the problem of crystal methamphetamines. However, in the same sentence, the party makes clear reference to "the entire society". Elsewhere in the Begründung, Die Linke further emphasized the importance of 'the people', by stating that the issue was a "problem for all of society" and one that could have "immense costs for all of society".

Even when the party did use populism to describe a policy issue in a non-economic dimension, a closer reading of the justification disclosed that the actual focus was economic or social inequality. This supports the assertion in recent work that far left parties seek to take advantage of economically-driven Euroskepticism for the purpose of attracting pro-EU voters who are extremely dissatisfied with the handling of the European sovereign debt crisis (Beadonnet and Gomez, 2016: 16). The Begründung in Drs 5/12991, which proposed primary action measures that were coded as part of the foreign affairs dimension, is a classic example. The Antrag itself was meant to address issues with the EMU in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, but was ultimately framed as a matter of social justice.

> "Langfristig kann es nicht nur darum gehen, lediglich neoliberale Auswüchse in der EU einzugrenzen und sozialer erträglicher zu machen. Vielmehr muss das gegenwärtige System vom Kopf auf die Füße gestellt werden, damit der letzte Zweck der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion nicht darin besteht, dass die

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[52] Interestingly, the crystal meth epidemic in Saxony became a major issue for the NPD. Towards the end of the 5th legislative period, the NPD proposed multiple Anträge addressing this drug problem. Party representatives also cited it as one of the most important issues in the course of several interviews.

> Unionsbürger die Banken retten, sondern Bürgern in der EU ein Leben in sozialer Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit zu ermöglichen."

Essentially, elites in Brussels were criticized, because they prioritized the interests of banks over those of the common citizen. In addition, they were blamed for failing to implement a "social dimension" (*soziale Dimension*) of the EMU despite recommendations to do so from the European Commission. When describing the status quo, it interesting to note that the party also relied on a Manichean perspective. However, instead of organizing the world into groups of indigenous and foreign populations, Die Linke structured conflict into neoliberal interests versus social security and justice for the people.

As with all content analyses that adhere to a hand-coding approach, human judgment can produce various interpretations of a given text (Neuendorf, 2002: 11). Indeed, some of Die Linke's references to 'the people', with descriptions including "each" or "each person" might not seem to represent the *volonté générale* that is a feature of populism. Furthermore, as Table 24 illustrates, Die Linke's perceived people-centrism and anti-elitism might not appear to be the semantical equivalent of the radical language expressed by the NPD. However, Müller (2016: 2-3) points out that the nature of political discourse might make any party seem populist. In reality, it would have been nearly impossible for either party to refrain from addressing 'the people' or criticizing elites in their Anträge. In their duty as elected members of the Saxon State Parliament, legislators from all parties believed that they were working on behalf of 'the people'. In effect, every political actor wants to appeal to 'the people' and be understood by as many citizens as possible. It is also unlikely that political actors can avoid criticizing elites whether this appears justified or not. Political parties endeavor to change the status quo, which almost inevitably entails some criticism of those persons currently in power. As the study of populism increases, future research should examine the qualitative aspects of people-centrism and anti-elitism in populist rhetoric more closely. Similar to interpretations of Euroskepticism it might also be possible to identify hard and soft forms of populism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008)

8.4 Discussion

This chapter further explored the dynamic of rhetoric in supply-side party competition between the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke. The motivation for the analysis was twofold. First, the research set out to directly compare the degree of populist appeals presented in both parties'

parliamentary Anträge. In a second and related process, the focus of the arguments that were emphasized in the parties' respective legislative motions was also examined. With the inherent limitations of a case study, the results are nevertheless a significant first step toward understanding the different populist communication styles that radical parties employ during party competition. The chapter makes several notable contributions to the research about radical parties and political discourse.

First, this research fills a gap in the secondary literature about populism, because it is an initial step towards systematically distinguishing the appeals from the far right and the far left in their respective parliamentary Anträge. Previously, the empirical literature only measured the potential for radical parties to use populism in comparison to their mainstream competitors (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). Although there is room for interpretation regarding some of the qualitative aspects of people-centrism and anti-elitism, the results in this study effectively established that the focus of the parties' populist rhetoric could be distinguished based on ideological traditions. As a far right party with nativist predispositions, the NPD's populism was associated mostly with socio-cultural issues. Die Linke, for its part, linked the populism in its Anträge to socio-economic issues that are frequently stressed by far left parties. Furthermore, the detailed discourse analysis revealed ideological characteristics in the populist arguments that are also distinct to each party. The NPD criticized elites for their inattention to important cultural issues that could affect the ethnic German people, whereas Die Linke condemned elites, because they failed to correct economic inequalities for all segments of society. Ultimately, the parties demonstrated a similar populist communication style in their rhetorical appeals, but they did so with dissimilar ideologies.

In addition, the findings conclude that the parties displayed different degrees of populism in their Anträge. The NPD produced significantly more populist appeals in its motions than Die Linke. The findings are consistent with the larger populist trends in Western Europe (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015) and also substantiate the claims in normative analyses, which suggest that the NPD is an extremist actor. The far right NPD exhibited approximately five times the amount of populism in its Antraege than the far left Die Linke. In his analysis of populism in German party manifestos, Pauwels (2014) discovered a similarly disproportionate ratio between the NPD and Die Linke. However, he refused to label the party as populist, because "of the elitist and antidemocratic character of the NPD" (Pauwels, 2014: 41). Ideological debates aside, the findings

presented here and, in the Pauwels study itself, provide clear evidence that the NPD adheres, at the very least, to a populist communication style.

Overall, this chapter concludes that, even if the rhetorical strategy is to persuade the same groups of voters that they are political outsiders, the far right NPD and the far left Die Linke employ different populist appeals in their legislative motions. Although they each stress a basic populist framework, the degree and focus of both parties' populism is unique to the actors' respective programmatic profile. Or, stated more succinctly, the discrepancies can be attributed to their distinct ideologies.

9. Conclusions and Discussion: Policy Overlaps Between Radical Parties

Across Western Europe, radical actors have made impressive gains in recent elections. Their success is so pervasive that they have not only won European parliamentary elections and joined ruling coalitions but, in the case of Greece, they even formed a majority government together. The success of radical parties, however, does not appear to be a coincidence. At a time when a new structural conflict in Western Europe has developed between the so-called winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008), far right and far left actors seem primed to mobilize new political potentials. While mainstream parties have attempted to mobilize the winners, the so-called losers, who have not benefited from globalization's modernizing effects (Spier, 2006), remain at stake. In general, these voters demonstrate a preference for demarcating policies that strengthen national sovereignty against the adverse impacts of globalization. Generally speaking, far right and far left actors have traditionally articulated such preferences in their party programs. The far right party family has consistently opposed liberal immigration measures that threaten the homogenous composition of Western European nation-states (Mudde, 2007), whereas the far left party family has historically favored ownership of key industries over neoliberal capitalism. Yet, as the example about Frauke Petry and Sahra Wagenknecht served to illustrate, when pursuing a common subset of voters, these might not be the only policy similarities that exist between far right and far left actors.

9.1 The Purpose of this Research

The current study aimed to answer the following research questions: how do far right and far left actors behave in multi-dimensional competition where they face structural constraints on their ability to maneuver strategically in political space? To what extent do they develop overlapping policies? Why does this occur? How are they positioning themselves vis-à-vis each other in the same political scene. Towards this end, the study sought to accomplish two major objectives. The first goal was exploratory. Recent studies have suggested that the far right and far left display increasingly similar behavior (De Koster et al., 2012; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). In the German case, researchers have observed that the NPD's social critiques of neoliberal capitalism, and globalization more generally, represent a departure from its old right party program (Staud, 2005; Bergsdorf, 2007; Röpke and Speit, 2008; Sommer, 2008; Grumke, 2009; Puls, 2011; Botsch and Kopke, 2013; Brandstetter; 2013). However, these claims have not

yet been substantiated with systematic measurements. Nor have they been considered within the context of multi-dimensional competition.

The preceding analysis addressed these deficits by providing empirical evidence for policy overlaps between the far right NPD and far left Die Linke in multiple issue areas. This is a more accurate reflection of political competition in Western European party systems (Albright, 2010; Alonso, 2012). As a result, the research holds tremendous descriptive value about radical party behavior. It offers insights about the potential for policy overlaps in two socio-economic (welfare state and social services and state involvement in the economy) and socio-cultural dimensions (fabric of society and justice). In addition, two additional dimensions, environmental protection and foreign affairs, were analyzed for further overlaps. For each of these dimensions, policies were evaluated according to three different strategies that are available to parties in the course of political competition: positions, salience and rhetoric (Gruber, 2014; Basile, 2015; Elias et al., 2015). Overall, the results are significant, because they furnish initial insights about where policy overlaps and disparities actually emerge.

A second, and related goal, was to explain why the NPD and Die Linke display similar and dissimilar policies in the issue areas that were analyzed. The secondary literature does not provide many clues about how the far right and far left compete for these voters. Direct comparisons, by and large, do not exist. The current study seeks to address this deficiency. Rather, existing studies analyze competition in relation to the next proximal actor in the traditional left-right spectrum (Bale, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup; 2008; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008; Vail, 2009; Ramiro and Gomez; 2016). In German studies of radical parties, the extremism theory portends that commonalities develop between far right and far left actors due to their shared opposition to the free democratic order (Backes, 1989). Aside from relying on the claim of a common anti-democratic dimension in extreme left-wing and right-wing thinking, the classic extremism theory suffers from both theoretical and methodological deficiencies. On the most basic level, its dichotomous, theoretical framework is an unrealistic interpretation of party competition in an ideological space. However, the extremism theory also suffers from ambiguities surrounding challenges to the free democratic order and the probability that rational actors would openly challenge such a system in Germany's *wehrhafte Demokratie*. Indeed, radical parties are often the most vocal proponents of direct democracy, although this may be based on a holistic rather than a pluralist notion of 'the popular will'.

This study proposed an alternative theoretical framework that is grounded in existing models of party competition. Hence, it begins with an assessment of the parties' goals (Strøm, 1990; Strøm and Müller, 1999). Since the NPD and Die Linke are unlikely to join a governing coalition in Saxony and have little means to enact their desired policy outcomes from their minority position, their behavior is likely to be motivated by vote-seeking objectives. The NPD and Die Linke are extreme insofar they do not target the median voter (Downs, 1957). Rather they can be modeled as niche actors that behave differently than their mainstream counterparts (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Jensen and Spoon, 2010; Wagner, 2012a). In comparison to their mainstream rivals, niche parties adhere to non-centrist ideologies (Adams et al., 2006) and address a limited number of policy issues (Mudde, 1999; Meguid, 2005, 2008; Wagner, 2012a). As niche actors then, the NPD and Die Linke do not possess the same range of policy strategies as their mainstream competitors. Instead, their noncentric ideologies and narrow profiles represent structural constraints that pose limits to their policy development (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008). However, in multi-dimensional competition, the NPD and Die Linke face different constrictions on their attempts to develop party policies (Tavits, 2007).

As rational actors, niche parties such as the NPD and Die Linke must weigh the electoral costs and benefits associated with each of the dimensions before formulating a corresponding policy. In this context, a distinction is made between policy areas that contain 'core' and 'peripheral' issues. Core dimensions are comprised of issues in which a party is particularly invested. Attachment to a core dimension is rooted in party history and the cleavages that organize party systems. With issues such as immigration, nationalism and law and order, the social-cultural dimensions are core policy areas for the NPD. In contrast, social justice and welfare issues make the socio-economic dimensions core policy areas for Die Linke. In core dimensions, the NPD and Die Linke must honor existing ideological commitments and issue ownership reputations. Failure to take radical positions, emphasize issues and apply extreme rhetoric would dilute their brands in the eyes of voters. Here, it is advantageous for them to follow strategies of product differentiation (Kitschelt, 1994), which cause policy variation. In peripheral dimensions, on the other hand, the NPD and Die Linke do not face the same constraints. These policy areas, namely environmental protection and foreign affairs, contain issues that the NPD and Die Linke have historically disregarded or they are not at the core of the parties' ideologies. Consequently, the NPD and Die Linke are afforded more flexibility to develop policies that appeal to a larger group of voters. Since

the parties do not face prohibitive costs if they fail to distinguish themselves, they are more likely to follow a strategy of 'riding the wave' (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994) and, thus, policy similarities. Ultimately, the same constraints that affect policy overlaps between the NPD and Die Linke in multi-dimensional competition - ideology and issue ownership reputations - are responsible for policy differences as well.

The present study attempted to answer the research questions by developing and implementing an innovative research design. In accordance with work about the rising importance of the party in office within the overall party apparatus (Katz and Mair, 1995), the study analyzed the parliamentary activities of the NPD's and Die Linke's respective parliamentary groups. The Saxon State Parliament offers an excellent institutional setting to comparatively study the NPD and Die Linke in direct competition. Both parties were represented during the 5th legislative period and confined to the opposition (Jesse et al., 2014). Moreover, in the left-right party spectrum, the NPD and Die Linke were the most radical actors represented in the Saxon State Parliament. These conditions improve the quality of the research by keeping other possible variables constant and ensuring that the parties respond to identical policy influences (e.g., the government's policy initiatives).

The study was further strengthened by the source of data, namely the parliamentary Anträge proposed by both parties. This represented a new data source for the measurement of positions, issue salience and rhetoric. Yet, the two-part structure of an Antrag is a perfect political text for satisfying the stated research objectives. It is a primary source, readily available, produced on a regular basis, clearly organized and representative of the entire party's views. In the first part, the demands section contains obvious policy preferences on a multitude of issues. The next section consists of a mandatory justification in which the parties must explain why they are asking the state parliament to enact their demands. This is an ideal opportunity to understand the context of the parties' positions and evaluate the nature of their rhetorical appeals.

For the actual content analysis, a new approach was designed for the purpose of evaluating policy strategies in an Antrag. In this process, positions and issue salience were operationalized as primary measure actions and political declarations. Thus, the operationalization procedure was not only consistent with the study's understanding of a position, but also reflected the intent of an Antrag. Despite the novelty of the coding procedure, an intercoder reliability test produced very good results. After classifying the units with codes borrowed from the Comparative Manifesto

Project, they were then scaled along multiple, additive dimensions – a method that has become a widely used alternative to the traditional Rile index (Lowe et al., 2011; Veen; 2011; Bischof, 2015; Koenig, forthcoming). The use of additive dimensions enabled the research to more effectively test the study's observable implications, and also describe the NPD and Die Linke as more than just left or right.

The content analysis that was performed in Chapter 8 for the measurement of populism, also developed an original application of proven research techniques. Existing studies claim that far right and far left populism can be distinguished, but these works do not offer sufficient empirical evidence to support their assertions (Zaslove, 2008; Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). In the current research though, the two-part structure of a parliamentary Antrag played a pivotal role once again. The populist rhetoric that was expressed in the Begründungen described the demands that were already classified according to the CMP coding scheme. Since the codes were also used in the study's additive dimensions, the emphasis of the parties' populism could be immediately and reliably inferred.

The observable implications that were deduced from the theoretical framework in Chapter 3 were largely confirmed by the empirical results. In their position-taking strategies, the NPD and Die Linke demonstrated similar positions in their shared peripheral dimensions: environmental protection and foreign affairs. Both parties supported conservation measures and were opposed to integration initiatives intended to remove national sovereignty in favor of the EU, despite the fact that their skepticism was markedly different. The NPD's opposition stemmed from national identity issues whereas Die Linke voiced criticism about the European Union's neoliberal economics. This disparity is consistent with the type of Euroskepticism expressed by far right and far left parties throughout Western Europe (De Vries and Edwards, 2009; Halikiopoulu et al., 2012).

The findings were slightly less conclusive for the parties' positions in their core dimensions. In the socio-cultural policy areas, the NPD expressed preferences in its Anträge that opposed multiculturalism, immigration and Germany's current asylum statutes. At the same time, it propagated initiatives for a stronger national culture based on an exclusive interpretation of society. As a result, the NPD's positions could be easily distinguished from those of Die Linke which has traditionally supported inclusivity. The parties' positions in the socio-economic dimensions did not entirely confirm the theoretical expectations. While Die Linke did propose left-

wing measures, the position scores for state involvement in the economy and welfare state and social services were not discernible from those for the NPD. This is because the National Democrats also displayed a preference for market regulation, protectionism and support for labor groups. The NPD's left-wing positions on socio-economic issues confirms that the far right has undergone a degree of proletarization (Ignazi, 2003: 216).

The salience of the socio-economic dimensions for both parties, however, is consistent with the study's theoretical model. Although the NPD conveyed left-wing preferences that could not be empirically differentiated from those of Die Linke, the National Democrats did not stress these positions to voters. Rather, in line with the theory's assumption about emphasizing issues in core dimensions, the NPD devoted the most attention to socio-cultural issues in its proposed Anträge, especially as the 2014 Saxon State Elections approached. As expected, the socio-economic dimensions were the most salient for Die Linke. In some years, nearly half of all coded units for Die Linke were classified as socio-economic issues. The party clearly sought to remind voters that it should be foremost associated with questions of social justice, welfare provisions, health and education.

In addition to confirming the theory's main argument that the NPD and Die Linke should emphasize those dimensions where they have an issue ownership advantage, the salience results provide important insights about how the parties compete for their shared electorate: the losers of globalization. As Chapter 4 indicated, these voters have been adversely impacted by the destabilizing effects of globalization. They prefer demarcating policies and vote for the NPD and Die Linke more than other actors. The NPD and Die Linke both attempt to mobilize the losers with demarcating policy preferences, but they do not directly compete with each other in the same dimension. Rather, the parties appeal to the losers by stressing demarcating positions on issues in their respective core dimensions. From a cost-benefit perspective, this is the most effective strategy available to either actor. The parties can appeal to voters and supporters alike without compromising their ideologies and issue ownership commitments. Similar to mainstream actors on the left and right then, radical left parties compete for voters with socio-economic themes, whereas radical right parties emphasize socio-cultural issues (Potter and Tavits, 2015).

The results for issue salience also revealed that the NPD and Die Linke strategically de-emphasized their peripheral dimensions. In most years, environmental protection and foreign affairs recorded the lowest salience scores for both parties. The NPD even failed to propose a

single Antrag related to environmental protectionism during the final two years of the legislative period. The foreign affairs dimension was equally unimportant to Die Linke. The party occasionally proposed an Antrag regarding European integration, but such motions were few and far between relative to other policy areas. Simply put, the parties recognized that stressing issues in their peripheral dimensions was a strategy with which they were unlikely to accrue electoral benefits, particularly among the losers of globalization.

Lastly, an analysis of party rhetoric also supported the main theoretical argument of the study. In their attempts to persuade voters, the NPD and Die Linke employed populist language in their Anträge that could be distinguished by the parties' respective ideologies. That said, the policies from the NPD and Die Linke were similar in that they both expressed a similar populist framework. Their styles of populism adhered to a common, Manichean structure that juxtaposed the 'good people' with 'bad elites'. In this way, both parties used populism to convey a "moralistic imagination of politics" to voters (Müller, 2016: 19). As opposition parties with radical profiles, the use of populism in the parties' Anträge was a logical strategy. It enabled both actors to compete more effectively against their mainstream competitors and soften certain characteristics of their rhetoric. Comparatively speaking, the NPD articulated more populism than Die Linke due to the extreme nature of its right-wing ideology. The finding is consistent with extant scholarship, which assumes that the degree of populism is commensurate with a political actors' radicalism (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). However, this was not the only disparity that emerged in the parties' rhetorical devices.

Taken together, each actor emphasized aspects of people-centrism and anti-elitism that correlated with their core beliefs. The results corroborate the claims in previous research about populism (Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015), but are the first to systematically measure far right and far left differences in the same political context of the Saxon State Parliament. For the NPD, the focus of its populism was socio-cultural. The National Democrats blamed elites for failing to preserve Germany's homogenous composition and simultaneously promote a national, cultural identity. Unlike Die Linke, the NPD's understanding of the people was based on an ethnic interpretation, which was reflected in the frequent use of the term 'Volk' throughout the parties' motions. In contrast, Die Linke emphasized socio-economic themes in its populist rhetoric. Elites were criticized for neglecting to address economic disparities caused by neoliberal capitalism.

Reflecting on the empirical findings, the NPD and Die Linke share niche features that restrict their behavior and produce policy overlaps. On this point, the study agrees with Mair (2013) that the traditional understanding of the left-right heuristic has become increasingly less able to describe political actors in Western European party systems. However, the niche label should not overlook fundamental differences between the NPD and Die Linke (Wagner, 2012a). Despite the similarities that emerged in their positions, salience and rhetoric, the NPD and Die Linke remain distinctive political actors. This fact is reflected in the nuances that distinguish their respective policy proposals. Both parties express skepticism about the European Union, but entirely different justifications for their positions. The NPD and Die Linke each articulate populism in their Anträge, but have dissimilar criticisms of elites and the people that they supposedly betray.

9.2 Limitations and Prospects for Future Research

To conclude, there are several limitations to the research that must be acknowledged. The first pertains to the generalizability of a case study. The comparative focus of the previous research is a major first steps towards describing and explaining the potential for policy similarities and differences between radical political actors in multi-dimensional party competition. Germany, due to its unique history with National Socialism and Real Existing Socialism, provides a fascinating setting for this type of academic endeavor. Still, the scope of the study is restricted to the German state of Saxony. To be sure, the case selection was primarily dictated by the opportunity to study both parties in the same setting both spatially and temporally. The study tests observable implications derived from the general theories like models of niche party behavior. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that there are features particular to the Saxon party system that might ultimately explain policy overlaps in the current analysis. Thus, the study's main theoretical argument should be subject to further testing.

An option for future work would be to enhance the comparative focus of the research by expanding the number of cases. Whereas this option was previously impossible in Germany, it now appears to be feasible due to the dramatic success of the AfD in state level elections and almost certain entrance to the Bundestag in September 2017.[53] A comparative analysis of Die

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[53] As of this writing, the AfD is currently represented in 10 of Germany's 16 state legislatures and positioned to make more gains in 2017. In several states, primarily in East Germany, the AfD is now the third largest party. In contrast,

Linke and the AfD at the state level would also yield valuable insights about the influence of party organization in the context of Germany's federal system. In addition, with the rise of challenger parties across Europe, a cross-national approach could also be performed. While demand-side analyses have paid some attention to overlaps among voters (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Ramiro, 2016), supply-side research remains underdeveloped. As far right and far left actors establish themselves in party systems across Europe, longitudinal studies could eventually observe the expected policy development for the type of radical parties outlined here.

On a similar point, a second limitation was the decision to exclude mainstream competitors in the empirical analysis. As the introduction alluded to earlier, a major motivation for this work was to transcend left-right characterizations of radical parties. Without claiming an identity of AfD and NPD, Die Linke with their next closest competitors or other niche actors in the German party system, the research was purposely designed to conduct a direct investigation. From a methodological perspective, an examination of the policies proposed by all German parties would not have been feasible. The intensive, hand coding procedures, which enrich the descriptive data about policy differences and similarities, could not be performed on the roughly 1,100 standard and urgent Anträge proposed during the 5th legislative session without a team of trained coders. A computer-assisted content analysis would have yielded more data in less time, but it would have been unable to reveal the subtle policy differences that are observed in a case study. However, resources and motivations aside, this observation is not meant to suggest that the impetus for a larger analysis does not exist.

In reality, far right and far left parties do not compete solely against each other (Meguid, 2005, 2008; Adams et al., 2006). Rather, they must also contend with policy proposals from parties positioned across the political spectrum. From an exploratory standpoint, including the policies from mainstream parties would enhance the descriptive value of the study. With an established benchmark, such an analysis would be able to determine *how* radical or, depending on the dimension, mainstream the NPD and Die Linke are within the overall party system. As a result, a comprehensive study augments the explanatory aspect of the research as well. By demonstrating that the NPD and Die Linke do not just distinguish or, conversely, lump together their policies,

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the NPD is no longer represented at the state level after failing to surpass the 5% threshold in the 2016 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern elections.

future research could further substantiate the theoretical framework presented here and improve generalizability.

The present research represents an initial investigation into the policy similarities that emerge as a result of political competition between far right and far left actors, but it is doubtful to be the last. The supply-side study of radical parties is a research subject that will remain salient for the foreseeable future. As the past decades have demonstrated, Western European countries experienced a significant rise in challenger parties (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Euroskeptic, ethno-territorial, radical left and radical right parties have become established actors in many party systems. As mainstream catch-all parties come under pressure at the polls, some of these challengers have even been invited to join governing coalitions. For mainstream actors, the task of balancing responsibility and responsiveness will continue to be tested (Mair, 2013). In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis and the ongoing migrant situation, challenger parties are likely to encounter additional opportunities to mobilize dissatisfied elements of the electorate. Although the crises are ongoing, initial analyses already indicate that challenger parties have benefitted the most from the economic hardships of the Great Recession, whereas mainstream incumbents have been punished at the polls (Hernandez and Kriesi, 2016).

Looking forward, additional research is required to understand how peripheral actors compete with each other in the current political climate. Future studies could build upon the current analysis by further exploring the supply-side appeals of radical actors. For instance, they could concentrate on specific far right and far left party strategies to exploit the various crises. In particular, a longitudinal study might compare radical party positions, salience and rhetoric both during and before the crisis. Referring back to the study's assertion that the NPD and Die Linke behave differently in their core and peripheral dimensions, such an analysis could observe in which policy areas radical parties offer more extreme positions, selectively emphasize certain issues and articulate populist rhetoric. Combined with proper voter data for the same time period, it could then be possible to measure the extent that radical party appeals are ultimately successful.

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Appendix A

The following interviews were conducted with party representatives between April and July 2014. All interviews were conducted in the parliamentary offices of each representative in Dresden and subsequently transcribed. The content of these transcribed interviews, which can be found on the attached CD, are only intended for the purposes of this dissertation.

CDU:

Christian Piwarz and Heinz Bernd Bettig – June 11th, 2014

Die Linke:

Kerstin Köditz – June 23rd, 2014
Enrico Stange – June 23rd, 2014
Klaus Tischendorf – June 23rd, 2014
Dr. Dietmar Pellmann – July 10th, 2014

NPD:

Holger Szymanski – April 29th, 2014
Alexander Delle – June 10th, 2014
Jürgen Gansel – June 11th, 2014
Arne Schimmer – June 11th, 2014
Dr. Johannes Müller – June 12th, 2014
Gitta Schüßler – July 10th, 2014

SPD:

Stefan Brangs, June 10th, 2014

Appendix B

Not all of the Anträge proposed by the NPD and Die Linke were included in the research sample. Overall, there were 392 regular and urgent Anträge evaluated as part of the study's content analysis. The entire sample of legislative motions is listed below by party. Each Antrag can be accessed individually at http://edas.landtag.sachsen.de/ and is signified with the official designation for a legislative document during the 5th legislative period (Drs 5/)

Die Linke:

40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 92, 280, 299, 469, 493, 494, 495, 496, 603, 604, 697, 698, 699, 701, 702, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 925, 1050, 1194, 1239, 1305, 1348, 1350, 1351, 1434, 1435, 1518, 1611, 1644, 1954, 2086, 2117, 2119, 2120, 2124, 2125, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2181, 2325, 2393, 2417, 2443, 2447, 2538, 2601, 2755, 2756, 2759, 2891, 3036, 3037, 3039, 3040, 3042, 3404, 3454, 3464, 3741, 3742, 3743, 3745, 3754, 4009, 4111, 4221, 4277, 4278, 4320, 4513, 4749, 4754, 4757, 4788, 4806, 4904, 4915, 4916, 4922, 4923, 5081, 5301, 5322, 5332, 5353, 5393, 5467, 5468, 5485, 5583, 5584, 5611, 5656, 5692, 5830, 5833, 5859, 5860, 5870, 5871, 5872, 5885, 5919, 5920, 6048, 6177, 6178, 6231, 6233, 6235, 6304, 6372, 6538, 6869, 6912, 6936, 6962, 7187, 7224, 7235, 7276, 7363, 7364, 7365, 7428, 7429, 7466, 7493, 7497, 7599, 7600, 7710, 7724, 7726, 7727, 7731, 7778, 7779, 7889, 7983, 7984, 7985, 8034, 8100, 8218, 8440, 8622, 8715, 8747, 8748, 8749, 8924, 9001, 9106, 9107, 9109, 9268, 9604, 9605, 9618, 9619, 9635, 9738, 9739, 10062, 10063, 10178, 10179, 10204, 10206, 10227, 10334, 10367, 10435, 10553, 10623, 10624, 11165, 11166, 11169, 11206, 11418, 11454, 11488, 11544, 11598, 11599, 11600, 11722, 11723, 11724, 11734, 11753, 11754, 11910, 11911, 11930, 11931, 12133, 12134, 12202, 12203, 12206, 12289, 12325, 12415, 12416, 12417, 12444, 12599, 12612, 12628, 12689, 12690, 12728, 12795, 12796, 12797, 12798, 12839, 12901, 12991, 13073, 13108, 13154, 13282, 13372, 13373, 13523, 13539, 13579, 13601, 13673, 13742, 13743, 13804, 13809, 14041, 14153, 14183, 14207, 14292, 14396, 14423, 14424, 14428, 14434, 14579, 14651, 14716, 14745

NPD:

219, 288, 289, 385, 564, 565, 566, 971, 1512, 1513, 1792, 1793, 1794, 1795, 1796, 1935, 2045, 2084, 2166, 2329, 2589, 2643, 2644, 3059, 3060, 3061, 3092, 3112, 3402, 3500, 3536, 4279, 4650, 4651, 4751, 4752, 4804, 5247, 5536, 5553, 5554, 5771, 5806, 5834, 5873, 6084, 6085, 6117, 6118, 6130, 6712, 6713, 6868, 7452, 7453, 7463, 7510, 7547, 7595, 7596, 7597, 7598, 7810, 7936, 7937, 7947, 8022, 8108, 8155, 8371, 8372, 8373, 8374, 8549, 8652, 8653, 8660, 8965, 8969, 9149, 9207, 9257, 9258, 9259, 9594, 10161, 10181, 10329, 10339, 10357, 10644, 10646, 11081, 11082, 11084, 11256, 11680, 11681, 11888, 11889, 12130, 12131, 12341, 12342, 12507, 12574, 12858, 12859, 13127, 13128, 13303, 13304, 13575, 13576, 13905, 13906, 14142, 14143, 14409, 14465, 14594, 14723, 14724

Appendix C

To code positions and issue salience, the following codebook was developed and applied to the Anträge in the study sample. The same codebook was later applied for the intercoder reliability test.

Data Source:

The source of data for the measurement of party positions is the Antrag (legislative motion). An Antrag directly asks the parliament and then indirectly the state government or, in some very rare instances, an administrative agency to take an **action** in the form of a decision. In its most basic appearance, the Antrag is divided into two distinct sections: the first contains the motions that request stated actions to be enacted and a second component that explains the rationale for such actions in their stated form (Begründung).

The initial demands section of the motion is comprised of at least one action that adheres to a subject-action-addressee-action-object sequence. In other words, the parties (subject) petition (action) the parliament and/or state government (addressee) to reach a decision (action) about a specified policy issue (object). The attention to the issue reveals a directional preference for the action that should be taken, which is subsequently classified according to dimensional scales.

The Anträge are hierarchical in nature. The demands section is demarcated into tiers that are comprised of paragraphs, sentences and basic clauses that sometimes lack a proper verb or subject. The various levels of the motion (excluding the Begründung), are signified using numbers, bullet points, roman numerals, letters and hyphens. Not all motions, however, contain each of these divisions. In its most simple format, a motion consists of a single, natural sentence that urges the state government or parliament to take action. Other, more detailed motions employ a complex structure that specifies particular components of a measure through various bullet points and numbering.

Types of Actions:

There are three ideal types of decisions that the parliament is asked to act upon.

1. Report

Can be expressed using the following verbs or expressions: berichten, unterrichten, darlegen, darstellen, informieren, einen Bericht/ein Gutachten erstatten, eine Studie/Analyse/Evaluation machen/vorlegen.

Although they are actions that the parties want the government or parliament to take, they do not reveal a specific preference for any type of policy. Rather, they are instruments intended for the collection of information. Despite appearing to be a meaningless exercise, requesting information can serve to hold the state government accountable and the response from the respective ministries often contribute to the formation of other parliamentary activities, such as

proposing a bill or writing a more comprehensive legislate motion. However, since report actions do not indicate a desired policy preference, they are not coded for the purposes of measuring party positions.

2. Declaration

Can be expressed using the following verbs or expressions: feststellen, würdigen, bekräftigen, aussprechen, zum Ausdruck bringen, missbilligen, bekennen, erkennen, verurteilen, erklärt.

For the most part, declarations are actions that should be acted upon by the parliament, rather than the state government. Not all declarations however, reveal a directional policy preference. For example, in several motions, Die Linke merely states the situation or a set of circumstances, but do not endorse or reject them. In these instances, the statement should be classified as uncodable. In very rare instances, political declarations can be hierarchical, which is demonstrated through the presence of bullet points. If this circumstance arises, the statements should be unitized and coded in an aggregated matter, so that only the primary statements are considered.

3. Measure

These represent initiatives that either the parliament, but mostly the state government should adopt in a certain policy area. Measures are the most common form of action and also the most likely to reveal a desired policy preference, although this might not always be codable with the revised CMP coding scheme. If there is not an appropriate classification for a unitized measure, then it should be listed as uncodable. The most prominent examples are administrative measures that are unrelated to government efficiency, such as transferring bureaucratic competencies to a different agency or requesting that the state government declare its position or provide a recommendation about an issue.

Note: There are two cases not covered by the action types described above. The first is an action that merely asks the state government to take a position on a matter (Stellung nehmen). The other, more common nondescript action asks the state government to review something (prüfen, überprüfen, eine Überprüfung ziehen). Both of these types have been coded into their own respective categories (Stellung nehmen, prüfen/überprüfen), however the latter action can be classified using the standard CMP coding scheme if there is clear evidence that it is linked to a specific policy preference that is communicated through a supplementary action. The following is one of the rare examples of such an instance:

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert, dem Landtag bis zum Ende des 2. Quartals 2012 auf der Grundlage einer detaillierten fachlichen Prüfung und Erhebung eine nachhaltige Strategie zum Umgang mit den in Sachsen vorhandenen und erschließbaren Vorräten an Bodenschätzen und Rohstoffen (Bodenschatz- und Rohstoffstrategie Sachsen) vorzulegen, die insbesondere folgende Schwerpunkte zum Gegenstand hat:….." (Drs 5/7984)

If this action from Die Linke had just been limited to submitting an examination, but not developing a strategy to address the reserves of brown coal and natural resources in Saxony, then

it would be coded as "prüfen/überprüfen". Instead, it was labelled as 411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive.

Procuring Anträge

The Selection of Anträge
In general, all Anträge for the 5th legislative period in the Saxon State Parliament (29.09.09 – 29.09.14) that are sponsored by the NPD and Die Linke, which also contain at least one political declaration and/or one measure action, should be selected for analysis. Anträge that are only comprised of report actions, should be excluded. Furthermore, duplicate Anträge should not be included either.

Locating Anträge

The Saxon State Parliament administers a document databank known as the 'EDASwebservices documentation system'. The databank contains records for all of the legislative business that has been conducted during the six legislative periods since reunification. Upon clicking on "Parlamentsdokumente" and "Dokumentarten/-typen", the Anträge can be sorted and accessed through either PDF or Word format. Alternatively, the NPD and Die Linke websites dedicated to the parliamentary groups in the Saxon State Parliament have separate archives consisting of legislative texts, but these are more limited.

Unitization and Classification

The basic coding procedure for the Anträge follows the two step data-generating process outlined by Krippendorff (2013) and most other hand-content coding analyses: unitization and classification.

Unitizing

The practice of unitizing is intended to identify the party statements that are most important for comprehending the text. As an initial step, the coder should first read the entire demands section and the title of the Antrag in order to familiarize themselves with the content. Report actions, which are linked to a specific series of key words should be ignored, because they do not contain party preferences for policy issues.

For political declaration actions, the unit of analysis is the natural sentence. Prefaces denote the presence of a political declaration action. The second unit of analysis, primary measure actions, can be distinguished based on their direct relationship to the action that the parliament or state government is being urged to initiate. Actions immediately succeed or are directly linked back to a limited number of prefaced phrases. In combination with the aforementioned prefaces, it is also important to recognize the hierarchical structure of the demands section. Usually, but not always, the first sentence or the first numerically listed bullet point(s) will signify the primary measure action(s) that the party has proposed. Additional details and policy instruments are very often listed below the primary action measure(s), but should not be coded. Only the primary measure actions should be classified, because they provide specific actions that are intended to achieve a

concrete policy outcome. In the second step, the coder must then determine the preference direction of the desired outcome. Primary measure action preface could include the following:

- der Landtag möge beschließen,
- der Landtag erklärt,
- der Landtag nimmt wahr,
- der Landtag stellt fest,
- der Landtag setzt sich dafür ein,
- der Landtag bringt seine dringende Erwartung zum Ausdruck,
- die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,
- die Staatsregierung wird beauftragt,
- die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,
- die Staatsregierung wird empfohlen,
- die Staatsregierung hat für den Freistaat Sachsen das Ziel zu formulieren,

Such phrases are either succeeded by a specific policy instrument that is intended to enable the realization of the subsequent action, a non-specific policy instrument, the action itself or a combination thereof.

Specific examples of policy instruments include:

NPD – eine Bundesratsinitiative starten/ergreifen, über eine Bundesratsinitiative einsetzen/einbringen, das Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz anweisen, auf eine Bundesratsinitiative hinwirken, die tatsächlichen/rechtlichen Rahmen(bedingungen) schaffen, einen Aktionsplan vorlegen, ein Aktionsprogramm entwickeln/umsetzen, auf eine Bundesinitiative an den Deutschen Bundestag hinwirken, durch eine Verwaltungsanweisung sicherstellen, Vollzugsbehörden anweisen, ein Konzept vorlegen/entwickeln/erstellen, für eine Novelle eines Gesetzes einsetzen, Gesetz ändern, eine Regelung einführen/ändern/treffen, Reformen konzipieren, eine Verfassungsklage vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht einreichen, einen Runden Tisch ins Leben rufen, Vetorecht ausüben, Gespräche aufnehmen, haushälterischen und sonstigen Veranlassungen treffen, ein Modell entwickeln.

Die Linke – eine gesetzliche Grundlage herstellen, rechtlichen und organisatorischen Voraussetzungen schaffen, ein Konzept/eine Konzeption vorlegen/entwickeln, die richterliche Unabhängigkeit veranlassen, die Sächsische Katastrophenschutzverordnung nicht zu ändern/ersetzen, eine Verwaltungsvorschrift erlassen, an die zuständigen Behörden appellieren, verbindliche Rahmenbedingungen schaffen, die Sächsischen Bildungsagenturen/die Landeskartellbehörde anweisen, eine Förderstrategie/Aktions- und Maßnahmeplan erarbeiten, (entsprechendes Gesetz) Gebrauch machen, ein Sofortprogramm auflegen, ein Aktionsplan erstellen, einen Katalog erstellen, der Entwurf einer Schulgesetzänderung vorlegen, die Vorschrift ändern, die erforderliche Mittel zur Verfügung stellen, einen Umsetzungsplan vorlegen, auf ein bundesweites Moratorium hinwirken, über die Gesellschaftserstellung des Freistaates an der Energiebörse Leipzig (EEX) Einfluss nehmen, einen Energiegipfel einberufen, Gesetzinitiative auf den Weg einbringen, im Bundesrat auf Subsidaritätsbedenken hinweisen,

Non-specific policy mediums are:

NPD – Maßnahmen/Initiativen darstellen/ergreifen/veranlassen/treffen/vorantreiben, die Voraussetzung dafür schaffen, dafür Sorge tragen, sich mit Nachdruck einsetzen, auf etwas einwirken, gegenüber der Bundesregierung einsetzen, sich auf die Landes-/Bundes-/Europa-/nationaler/internationaler/auf allen politischen Ebene(n) einsetzen, rechtlichen und politischen Möglichkeiten nutzen, alle Versuche unterbinden, auf etwas hinwirken, rechtlichen Möglichkeiten sichern, gegenüber Bund/EU klarstellen.

Die Linke – mit Nachdruck vorbringen, sich auf Bundesebene/EU-Ebene/dafür einsetzen, erforderliche Schritte einleiten, Vorkehrungen/Maßnahmen/Initiativen/Schritte treffen/ergreifen/einleiten, mit Nachdruck dafür Sorge zu tragen, die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen/Schritte schaffen/veranlassen, die erforderlichen Konsequenzen ziehen, im Bundesrat sowie gegenüber dem Bund und der EU aktiv und nachdrücklich darauf hinwirken, im Bundesrat dafür einsetzen, Vorschläge unterbreiten, darauf hinwirken, die rechtliche, finanzielle, personelle und sächliche Unterstützung gewähren, wirksame Mittel und Instrumente einführen, dafür zu sorgen,

Example of a direct transition to a measure action:

The following motion from the NPD (Drs 5/13304) is an ideal example of a direct transition to a measure action type in its most basic form:

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert, sich auf Bundesebene dafür einzusetzen, daß die sogenannte Optionspflicht für in Deutschland geborene Kinder ausländischer Eltern erhalten bleibt."

In this passage, the authors have skipped the policy instrument altogether and proceeded straight to the intended measure action that urges the state government to retain the obligation for children of foreign parents to declare their citizenship by a certain age.

Example of a combination of specific and non-specific policy mediums that are succeeded by an action:

"Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht, das Deutsche Patent- und Markenamt zu ersuchen, gegenüber der GEMA seine Einflussmöglichkeiten als Aufsichtsbehörde auszuschöpfen, um eine solche Ausgestaltung der Tarifstruktur im Hinblick auf den Bestand und die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Veranstalter von Kultur- und Kunstveranstaltungen sowie auf das gesellschaftliche und gemeinnützige Wirken von Vereinen und Verbänden angesichts der exorbitanten Gebührensteigerungen von mehreren Hundert Prozent als unausgewogen, existentiell gefährdend und ausgesprochen hinderlich ansehen." (Drs 5/10624)

Identifying Multiple Units Within a Sentence or Bullet Point

It is possible for a single bullet point to contain more than one direct measure action, but only if it can be determined that distinctive issues with a clear policy outcome are being addressed.

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,

1. sich auf Bundesebene gegen eine Beteiligung deutscher Soldaten an einer möglichen UN-mandierten Mission von EU-Truppen in Mali und eine Stationierung von "Patriot"-Staffeln der Bundeswehr im Rahmen eines NATO Einsatzes an der türkisch-syrischen Grenze einzusetzen;" (Drs 5/10664)

In the previous section, the discourse captures two actions that refer to Germany's military involvement in two entirely separate international conflicts. Unlike measure actions that are accompanied by a prescribed policy instrument, the coder is unable to rely on textual cues that distinguish primary measure actions with a direct transition. However, such double codes are rare.

A related primary measure action articulation that results in more than one unit and classification is when parties demand an end to a policy that they reject (negative action) and within the same sentence or bullet point call for an action (positive action) that is supposed to accomplish the exact opposite.

"Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,

die Sächsischen Bildungsarten anzuweisen, die gegenwärtig geübte Praxis, den Schulen nur noch jährliche Pauschalbeträge für Klassen- und Schulfahrten pro Klasse und Schule zur Verfügung zu stellen, unverzüglich zu beenden und den Schulen künftig schuljahresbezogen die erforderlichen Mittel auf der Grundlage der tatsächlichen Aufwendungen für Schul- und Klassenfahrten zu gewähren." (Drs 5/1050).

Unusual Units and Rules

Bullet points or sentences comprised of a primary measure action that is reinforced by a demand for the corresponding funding should not be coded twice. The following excerpt is an example of a measure action that is accompanied by the demand for funding, but which is only coded once:

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,

1. zur Verwirklichung des grundgesetzlich verankerten Schutzes der Tiere ein unabhängiges Amt einer/eines Landesbeauftragten für Tierschutz einzurichten und mit entsprechenden personellen und sachlichen Mitteln auszustatten." (Drs 5/9107)

Within this bullet point, it would be redundant to code the means for the proposed primary measure action, because it is assumed that some medium will always be required in order to enact the parties' suggested demands. A similar point is reserved for actions that casually refer to a proper policy instrument, in order to support the party's initial demand.

"Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,

auf die geplante Novellierung des Gesetzes zum Schutz und zur Pflege der Kulturdenkmale im Freistaat Sachsen (Sächsisches Denkmalschutzgesetz – SächsDSchG), die zur faktischen Abschaffung des Denkmalschutzes im Freistaat Sachsen führen würde, zu verzichten und den zu dem Zweck erarbeiteten unverüglich zurückzuziehen." (Drs 5/2756).

In the process of aggregating, it is essential that the primary measure action itself is coded and not actions the actions therein. This rule applies mostly to actions that are accompanied by a specific policy instrument, such as a Konzept, Initiative, Strategie or Plan.

"Die Staatsregierung wird aufgefordert,

sich im Bundesrat, gegenüber der Bundesregierung und auf andere geeignete Weise dafür einzusetzen, dass in Wege einer Gesetzinitiative:" (Drs 5/12612)

The text above is succeeded by thirteen individual actions that are part of the Gesetzinitiative, but are not primary actions. Nevertheless, these sub-actions should not be ignored. They provide context for the overall preferred outcome of a policy area, which the single Gesetzinitiative is intended to address. After reviewing the sub-action preferences, the Gesetzinitiative can be classified appropriately.

The parameters of a unit can also be recognized through the type of words that link the primary measure action to sub-actions. At the conclusion of a sentence or paragraph without bullet points that immediately follows one of the prefaces listed in section (), words such as dazu, hierzu, insbesondere, dabei insbesondere, damit, daraus folgend insbesondere, um, hierzu insbesondere, indem insbesondere, indem u.a., und bei dessen Erarbeitung and zu diesem Zweck can sometimes appear. These words signify a transition from the primary measure action to sub-actions and clarifications about proposed measures that should not be classified.

 All primary measure actions that include a detailed description of an amendment to either an existing law or the constitution should be considered as one unit.

 It is also possible for both a political declaration and a primary measure action to be situated in the same sentence and/or bullet point.

"Der Landtag möge beschliessen:

1. Der Landtag spricht sich für eine umgehende ersatzlose Aufhebung der die Sanktionen und Leistungseinschränkungen gegenüber Leistungsbeziehenden regelenden §§ 31 und 32 SGB II aus und fordert die Staatsregierung auf, umgehend eine dementsprechende zielführende Bundesratsinitiative zu ergreifen." (Drs 5/14153).

For a multi-action passage that contains a political declaration and primary measure action, both elements should be unitized and classified. Additionally, it sometimes occurs that the preface for a series of primary measure actions is embedded in the preceding text passage that already contains a political declaration.

"Der Landtag möge beschliessen:

der Landtag spricht sich aus Anlass des 20. Jahrestages der Verabschiebung der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention vom 20. November 1989, dem internationalen Tag der Kinderrechte, für eine von Sachsen ausgehende Initiative zur weiteren Stärkung der rechtlichen Stellung von Kindern und Jugendlichen (Kinderrechtsinitiative Sachsen) aus und ersucht dazu die Staatregierung:……" (Drs 5/42).

The subsequent primary measure actions that follow the request to the state government should be classified.

Another unusual text formation involves *conditional* primary measure actions. These are appeals for action that the parliament or state government should enact only if certain demands are not met.

"Der Landtag möge beschliessen:

I. Die Staatsregierung wird ersucht,

dem vorliegenden Entwurf des Fünfzehnten Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag mit Stand vom 21.10.2010 und den darin enthaltenen "Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag" die Zustimmung zu versagen, soweit und solange:……" (Drs 5/4278).

Although a set of conditions are outlined, which describe the necessary standards, which should be met before the contract can be signed, only the action refusing the approval of the contract should be coded and classified.

Some statements in the Antrag contain ambiguous language that first states the desired policy outcome before prescribing the corresponding primary measure actions to achieve this goal.

"III. Um die Rahmenbedingungen für eine gentechnikfreie Landbewirtschaftung in Sachsen zu verbessern, wird die Staatsregierung weiterhin aufgefordert:….." (5/5321).

Only the individual primary measure actions that follow the stated goal should be unitized and coded, not the passage stating the goal itself.

Classification

The allocation of a code to an identified unit, i.e. a political declaration and primary measure actions, should first consider the following questions: does the expressed statement reveal a preference for a certain policy or obect? What is the outcome preference of the declared primary measure action?

The first question might appear superfluous, because one would assume that all political declarations reveal a preference, but there are indeed some examples where the subject is merely

affirming facts or speaking in generalities. The subsequent passage from Die Linke represents such an occurrence:

"I. Der Landtag stellt fest:

4. Das Gender Budgeting ist die konsequente Unterstutzung der verfassungsdeterminierten Zielstellung der Gleichstellung von Frau und Mann in der Gesellschaft." (Drs 5/13809)

Based on this sentence alone, it is impossible to infer whether Die Linke support or disapprove of 'Gender Budgeting'. Rather the statement should be understood within the context that Die Linke are merely asking the parliament to declare what 'Gender Budgeting' entails. Consequently, the sentence would be coded as 000 Uncodable.

For primary measure actions, the coder must determine which classification from the provided dimension scales is most appropriate for the identified unit. The codes are derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project's handbook that includes 56 preferences and the two proposed immigration categories.

1. External Relations:

101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive
104 Military: Positive
105 Military: Negative
106 Peace: Positive
107 Internationalism: Positive
108 European Integration: Positive
109 Internationalism: Negative
110 European Integration: Negative

2. Freedom and Democracy

201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive
202 Democracy: Positive
203 Constitutionalism: Positive
204 Constitutionalism: Negative
205 Immigration Expansion: Positive
206 Immigration Limitation: Positive

3. Political System

301 Decentralisation: Positive
302 Centralisation: Positive
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive
304 Political Corruption: Negative

305 Political Authority: Positive

4. Economy

401 Free Enterprise: Positive
402 Incentives: Positive
403 Market Regulation: Positive
404 Economic Planning: Positive
405 Corporatism: Positive
406 Protectionism: Positive
407 Protectionism: Negative
408 Economic Goals
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive
410 Economic Growth
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive
412 Controlled Economy: Positive
413 Nationalisation: Positive
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive

5. Welfare and Quality of Life

501 Environmental Protection: Positive
502 Culture: Positive
503 Equality: Positive
504 Welfare State Expansion
505 Welfare State Limitation
506 Education Expansion
507 Education Limitation

6. Fabric of Society

601 National Way of Life: Positive
602 National Way of Life: Negative
603 Traditional Morality: Positive
604 Traditional Morality: Negative
605 Law and Order: Positive
606 Civic Mindedness: Positive
607 Multiculturalism: Positive
608 Multiculturalism: Negative

7. Social Groups

701 Labour Groups: Positive
702 Labour Groups: Negative

703 Agriculture: Positive
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive
705 Minority Groups: Positive
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive

000 Uncodable

Units can only be assigned one code. If there is a political declaration or primary measure action that appears to belong to more than one preference category, the coder must determine which code is most appropriate for the desired policy outcome.

Similar to the CMP instructions, catch-all categories should be avoided if possible, however they can be applied if a more suitable code is available. Catch-all categories are codes, such as 303, 305, 408 and the 700 level categories except for 703.

<u>When to Use 000 Uncodable:</u>

The code 000 Uncodable should be avoided if at all possible. However, if an appropriate meaningful code cannot be ascertained, then the 000 code should be applied. For example, purely bureaucratic, primary measure actions that refer to the transfer of powers from one agency to another or an initiative that is strictly limited to parliamentary procedure could be classified as uncodable.