

Immune to National Interests?

Potential and Limitations of Strategic Framing in the
European Parliament

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the European Parliament**

Abstract

Given the dual crisis the European Union (EU) faces today in terms of its democratic legitimacy as well as its problem-solving capacity, a stronger role for supranational parliamentary arenas such as the European Parliament (EP) has been suggested. This suggestion is based on the EP's supposed capacity of relativising national interests, which are frequently considered detrimental to effective European governance, by voting along ideological lines. The present dissertation examines the empirical basis for this suggestion. In an increasingly politicised EU, actors are asked to justify their decisions while at the same time, such justifications can be strategically used to shape the structure of political conflict. The innovative focus of the present dissertation thus lies on the strategic communication of the national parties' representatives, as up-to-date research on conflict in the EP and research on the reasons Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) give for their decisions are largely missing. The usage of such framing strategies and its consequences for the structure of conflict is outlined first in a "theory of territorialisation". It is argued, that national party delegations carefully weigh their goals of ideology-based policy-seeking and territorially-bound vote-seeking against each other, using a toolbox of framing strategies in order to avoid defection from ideological predilections whenever possible. As a result, conflict in the EP will only be more territorial than ideological if the issue at stake is politicised and involves certain, cross-national distributional effects. This theoretical framework outlines the micro-level processes in terms of party delegations' framing strategies much more precisely than extant theories, which can be evaluated most exactly by the particular methodological approach chosen: A Policy Frame Analysis is conducted on the press releases issued by 34 parties from six Member States in the run-up to the 2014 European Elections, focussing on the debate on Europeanised welfare ("welfare tourism"), the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As it is found, only the conflict on CAP Reform is territorialised, just as could be expected based on the theory of territorialisation. Even in this case, MEPs appear to represent the variety potential of determinants of policy preferences in a highly differentiated manner. As it is thus concluded, the role of certain combinations of issue characteristics notwithstanding, the impact of national interests on MEPs' communication appears to be strongly limited indeed. A further shift of competences to the EP might thus improve EU governance in the supposed manner, while in order to win support for this shift, it will arguably have to be justified – or framed – in innovative ways lacking recently on the part of the supporters of European integration.

Key words: European Parliament – framing – structure of conflict – welfare tourism – CAP – TTIP

Zusammenfassung

Angesichts der zweifachen Krise der Europäischen Union (EU) bezüglich ihrer demokratischen Legitimation und ihrer Problemlösungskapazitäten wurde eine Stärkung der supranationalen parlamentarischen Foren, wie etwa des Europäischen Parlaments (EP), angeregt. Dieser Vorschlag basiert auf der dem EP unterstellten Eigenschaft, nationale Interessen, welche häufig als Hemmnis für eine effektive europäische Regierungsführung erachtet werden, zu relativieren. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die empirische Grundlage dieses Vorschlags. In einer zunehmend politisierten EU sind die Akteure verstärkt angehalten, ihre Entscheidungen zu rechtfertigen, können aber solche Rechtfertigungen strategisch zur Beeinflussung der Konfliktstruktur nutzen. Ein besonders innovatives Element der vorliegenden Dissertation besteht daher im Fokus auf die strategische Kommunikation der Repräsentanten der nationalen Parteien, da aktuelle Studien zu Konflikten im EP sowie zu den Gründen, die Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments (MdEPs) angeben, bisher weitgehend fehlen. Der Gebrauch solcher *framing*-Strategien und seine Folgen für die Konfliktstruktur werden zunächst in einer „Theorie der Territorialisierung“ dargelegt. Es wird argumentiert, dass nationale Parteidelegationen ihre Ziele in Form von ideologiebasiertem *policy*-Streben sowie territorial gebundenem Wahlerfolgen sorgsam gegeneinander abwägen, und dabei eine Reihe von *framing*-Strategien nutzen um den endgültigen Bruch mit ideologischen Vorlieben wann immer möglich zu vermeiden. Somit werden Konflikte im EP nur dann eher territorial als ideologisch geprägt sein, wenn der betreffende Sachverhalt politisiert ist und sichere, länderübergreifende Verteilungseffekte nach sich zieht. Dieser theoretische Rahmen beschreibt die Mikro-Ebenen-Prozesse bezüglich der Kommunikationsstrategien der Parteidelegation weitaus präziser als bestehende Theorien, und kann durch den speziellen methodischen Ansatz äußerst exakt evaluiert werden. Dieser beinhaltet eine *Policy Frame Analysis*, die auf die Pressemitteilungen von 34 Parteien aus sechs Mitgliedstaaten im Vorlauf der Europawahlen 2014 angewandt wird, fokussiert auf die Debatte zur Europäisierung des Sozialstaats („Sozialtourismus“), die 2013er Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) und die Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (THIP bzw. TTIP). Wie herausgefunden wird, ist nur der Konflikt zur GAP-Reform territorialisiert, ganz wie es auf Grundlage der Theorie der Territorialisierung erwartet werden konnte. Tatsächlich scheinen die MdEPs die Vielfalt der möglichen Determinanten von *policy*-Präferenzen äußerst differenziert zu repräsentieren. Die Arbeit lässt somit den Schluss zu, dass, ungeachtet der Auswirkung bestimmter Kombinationen von Sachverhaltseigenschaften, der Einfluss nationaler Interessen auf die Kommunikation der MdEPs tatsächlich stark begrenzt zu sein scheint. Eine weitere Verlagerung von Kompetenzen an da EP könnte daher die Regierungsführung der EU in der angenommenen Weise verbessern, während diese Verlagerung wohl auf eine innovative Art und Weise begründet – oder ‚geframed‘ – werden müsste, wie sie insbesondere die Befürworter der europäischen Integration in jüngerer Zeit haben vermissen lassen, um Zustimmung zu erhalten.

Schlüsselbegriffe: Europäisches Parlament – *framing* – Konfliktstruktur – Sozialtourismus – GAP - TTIP

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Parties and party groups

Austria

| | |
|-----------|---|
| (A) FPÖ | Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) |
| (A) Grüne | the Greens (Die Grünen) |
| (A) NEOs | New Austria (Neues Österreich) |
| (A) ÖVP | Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei) |
| (A) SPÖ | Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) |

Germany

| | |
|-------------|---|
| (D) AfD | Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) |
| (D) B90 | Alliance '90/The Greens (Bündnis '90/Die Grünen) |
| (D) CDU/CSU | Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union) |
| (D) FDP | Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) |
| (D) LINKE | THE LEFT (DIE LINKE), former Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei Demokratischer Sozialismus, PDS) |
| (D) NPD | National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) |
| (D) SPD | Social Democratic Party of Germany, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands |

France

| | |
|-----------|---|
| (F) FdG | Left Front (Front de Gauche) |
| (F) FN | National Front (Front National) |
| (F) MoDem | Democratic Mouvement (Mouvement Démocrate) |
| (F) PS | Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) |
| (F) UMP | Union for a People's Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) |
| (F) Verts | The Greens (Les Verts) |

Ireland

| | |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|
| (IRE) FF | Soldiers of Destiny (Fianna Fáil) |
| (IRE) FG | Family of the Irish (Fine Gael) |
| (IRE) Greens | Green party (also: Comhaontas Glas) |
| (IRE) Lab | Labour Party (Ireland) |
| (IRE) SF | Ourselves (Sinn Féin) |

Italy

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| (I) AN/FdI | National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)/ Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia) |
| (I) FI | Go Italy! (Forza Italia) |
| (I) Lista Tsipras | The Other Europe With Tsipras (L'Altra Europa con Tsipras), former Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione Comunista, RC) |
| (I) PD | Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) |
| (I) Verdi | The Greens (I Verdi) |

United Kingdom

| | |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| (UK) BNP | British National Party |
| (UK) Cons | Conservative Party |
| (UK) Greens | Green Party (of England and Wales) |
| (UK) Lab | Labour Party (UK) |
| (UK) Lib Dem | Liberal Democrats |
| UKIP | United Kingdom Independence Party |

European Political Groups

| | |
|------|---|
| ALDE | Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe |
| ECR | European Conservatives and Reformists |
| EFD | Europe of Freedom and Democracy |

Parties and party groups

| | |
|------------|---|
| EPP | European People's Party |
| Greens-EFA | The Greens – European Free Alliance |
| GUE-NGL | United European Left (Gauche Unitaire Européenne)- Nordic Green Left |
| NI | Non-attached (Non-Inscrits) |
| S&D | Socialists and Democrats |

Other abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 3G2P | Three Goals, Two Principals |
| ACTA | Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement |
| AEMs | agri-environmental measures |
| AGRI, COMAGRI | Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| CCP | Common Commercial Policy |
| CGE | computable general equilibrium |
| CMO | Common Market Organisation |
| CMP | Comparative Manifesto Project |
| CRD | Citizens' Rights Directive |
| csQCA | crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis |
| EGAF | European Globalisation Adjustment Fund |
| EMPL | Committee on Employment and Social Affairs |
| EP | European Parliament |
| EPG(s) | European Political Group(s) |
| ESF | European Social Fund |
| EU | European Union |
| FTA | Free Trade Area |
| GAL-TAN | GreenAlternativeLibertarian- TraditionalAuthoritarianNationalist |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GIs | geographical indications |
| GMOs | Genetically Modified Organisms |
| INTA | Committee on International Trade |
| IPR | Intellectual Property Rights |
| IR | International Relations |
| ISDS | Investor-State-Dispute-Settlements |
| LFA | Least Favoured Areas |
| LIBE | Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs |
| L-R | Left-Right |
| MEP(s) | Member(s) of the European Parliament |
| MFF | Multi-Annual Financial Framework |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NTBs | non-tariff barriers to trade |
| PFA | Policy Frame Analysis |
| PO | Producer Organisations |
| PPC | Perceived Preference Coherence |
| QCA | Qualitative Comparative Analysis |
| RCV | Roll-call vote |
| RWP | Right-Wing Populist |
| SFP | Single-Farm-Payment |
| SNCB | special non-contributory cash benefits |
| STV | Single-Transferable-Vote |
| TAFTA | Transatlantic Free Trade Area |
| ToT | Theory of Territorialisation |
| TTIP | Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership |
| VAT | Value Added Tax |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

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1. Introduction: National Interests in a Supranational Parliament?

Under what conditions exactly do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis European Parliament (EP) is territorial rather than ideological? In this introductory chapter, I first of all point out that the foregoing question is of considerable societal relevance, given calls for increasing the EP's competences to tackle the EU's massive crisis of legitimacy. As is demonstrated thereafter, however, the extant academic literature on the EP does not provide a solid basis for this claim yet: Firstly, in simple empirical terms, the exact conditions of 'defection' along territorial rather than ideological lines are not entirely clear, even less so given post-Crisis levels of politicisation, while the justifications MEPs provide for their decisions have been neglected almost entirely. Secondly, existing theories may well have explained the predominance of ideologically structured conflict in general, but rarely provide equally detailed accounts of exceptions to the rule. Meanwhile, however, such exceptions might become more relevant, given the politicisation of EU politics as well as past and potential further increases in EP competence. Moreover, MEPs as actors strategically shaping the direction of debates are either entirely ignored or overrated in terms of their framing capacities. This might be because, thirdly, the research design choices made and methods of measurement applied so far did not allow for testing theoretical claims on the role of national interests for MEP-to-voter communication, as there is a lack of qualitative yet comparative research employing suitable methods of text analysis. Before this background, the final section of this chapter provides an outline of a study that should cover the respective gap in the academic literature, such that the claims made in the debate on the EU's legitimacy after the Crisis can be based on an empirical footing.

1.1 Rationales of the study: state of the Union and state of the art

The state of the Union: Two birds, one stone?

The so-called 'Brexit', the voluntary decision of British voters to terminate their country's membership of the European Union (EU), is the most recent and, arguably, the most obvious sign of the deep crisis of legitimacy the EU finds itself in today. While the EU's 'input-oriented legitimization' (cf. Scharpf 1999) has already been challenged under the well-known label 'democratic deficit' (cf. Follesdal and Hix 2006) since the 1990s, since the year 2010 also its 'output-oriented legitimization' (cf. Scharpf 1999) is under pressure, as the world's most prominent example of regional integration seems increasingly unable to address internal and external challenges: the so-called 'Euro crisis' (henceforth: the Crisis) shook the myth of European integration as a key to prosperity and is still not resolved for sure, while it was followed by the foreign policy crisis in the Ukraine, the EU's immediate neighbourhood, as well as by the so-called 'refugee crisis' exposing European disunity in yet another policy domain. Interestingly, in Smismans's (2013) account of the Crisis, the two components of the EU's crisis of legitimacy appear inextricably linked:

The adoption of a common European response to the economic crisis has proved difficult because solidarity among European countries cannot be taken for granted, *and political decision-makers tend to communicate with their own national electorate and media in terms of defending their national interest.* (Smismans 2013, 351, my emphasis)

Accordingly, therefore, increasing the EU's input-oriented legitimization would appear key to re-establish its output-oriented legitimization as well.

Traditionally, increasing parliamentary competences at the EU-level has been a common institutional response to the critics of the EU's democratic deficit (Chrysochou 2007), and similar calls in terms of input-legitimization have been made also in the context of the Crisis (Piketty 2014; Schmidt 2012). Indeed, according to Frank Schimmelfennig (2015), by creating a eurozone parliament, the issue of output-oriented legitimization would be addressed simultaneously, in that – supposedly obstructive – national interests would be “relativised”, which in turn would reduce polarisation (ibid.). Noteworthy, Schimmelfennig bases this suggestion explicitly on what he refers to as the “experience with the European Parliament” (ibid.). The idea of hitting two birds (i.e. increasing both the EU's input- as well as output-oriented legitimization) with one stone (i.e. the further strengthening of supranational parliamentary institutions) seems quite appealing in principle. Indeed, also within journalistic and political circles, ‘national egoisms’ are frequently identified as an impediment to solving the various problems the EU faces currently, be it again the eurozone crisis (e.g. Radomsky 2015), the crisis in Ukraine (e.g. Stefanini and Gurzu 2015) or the refugee crisis (e.g. Breker 2015). Before following Schimmelfennig's suggestion in terms of new or stronger supranational parliaments, at least two caveats should be considered with regard to this supposedly easy way out.

First, with regard to output-oriented legitimization, it would have to be an established fact that the EP is more or less immune to the supposedly obstructive territorialisation of conflict, even with regard to those kinds of issues often still left to the intergovernmental institutions precisely because of their sensitivity in terms of national interests. Second, with regard to input-oriented legitimization, it should be noted that a shift of competences to parliamentary arenas can address only what Chrysochou (2007) calls the *institutional* component of the ‘democratic deficit’, but not the *socio-psychological* one, i.e. the absence of a common European identity or ‘demos’. So far, it is also part of the ‘experience’ with the EP, that increasing its competence has been met by a simultaneous decrease in turn-out in European elections (cf. ibid. 2007). Since, on the one hand, the literature on state- and nation-building would tell us that formal national institutions have often preceded national identities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992), a stronger identification with the EU might still follow over time. On the other hand, the same body of literature also acknowledges the role of national media in the process of creating ‘imagined communities’ such as nations (Anderson 1991), which given the lack of relevant, common European media would seem limited but not impossible at the EU-level (Risse 2010). Consequently, one might argue, that the shift towards a supranational parliamentary arena can only be socio-psychologically effective insofar as the empowered members of such an assembly were able to justify their decisions in a manner analogous to the emerging transnational public sphere (cf. Risse 2010). In other words, the arguments they make should be applicable in a similar way beyond the confinements of their home member state. In short, *it should thus be clarified how the Members of the European Parliament behave in the face of national interests, and in particular, how they justify their decisions vis-à-vis their national electorates*. As is argued in the next subsection, however, this question is not sufficiently covered by the extant academic literature.

The state of the art: Defining the research gap

For on the one hand, there is evidence that that European Political Groups (EPGs) are highly cohesive (in fact most of it showing that this is increasingly so, with the notable exception of Bowler and McElroy 2015), such that political conflict in the EP is indeed mainly following ideological rather than national or broader territorial lines (Attina 1990; Brzinski 1995; Faas 2003; Hix 1999; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; McElroy and Benoit 2011; Noury 2002; Raunio 1996; Ringe 2010). Most studies have further found that ideology matters in terms of the traditional Left-Right (L-R) scale primarily and secondarily with regard to positions on European integration in general (pro-/anti-EU dimension). This finding has developed into something very close to what might be called established knowledge, at least textbook-knowledge (cf. Burns 2013), and this is arguably what Schimmelfennig is referring to as “the experience with the European Parliament” (see above). In mainly quantitative terms, extant research would thus seem to support the idea that national interests in the EP are ‘relativised’.

On the other hand, it is equally part of the aforementioned textbook-knowledge that “occasional instances” of defection (Burns 2013, 167) occur regularly, that is, national party delegations disagree with their respective EPG by not voting in the same manner. Noteworthy, national party delegations themselves are almost absolutely cohesive (Faas 2003, 854; Thiem 2009). Using various definitions and testing it more or less explicitly, scholars usually identify (or just suspect) ‘national interests’ as the root cause of defections (Costello and Thomson 2014; Faas 2003; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Noury 2002; Rasmussen 2008). If this is true, then the general predominance of ideologically structured conflict does not imply that the EP or rather its members are immune to national interests.

Zooming in further on the instances of defection, however, it must be acknowledged that the role of national interests in the EP seems to be even more complex. First, Hix et al. argue, that defections always occur in a rather circumscribed manner:

Even if some MEPs vote along national lines in a particular vote, all the other MEPs invariably vote along European party lines. Moreover, those MEPs who broke from transnational party lines in some votes will vote with their European parties in all other votes on the legislation. (ibid. 2007, 215)

One could thus argue that even in the presence of national interests leading to defections by national party delegations, there *never* is any instance of what will be referred to throughout this study as complete ‘territorialisation’ of conflict in the EP, in the sense that ideology would not matter at all and would be replaced by nationality as the dominant factor determining the positions of the bulk of MEPs.

Second, it seems that national interests do not always matter equally. For instance, Hix and Noury (2007) show that in the policy domain of migration, national economic interests do not seem to matter much. Chen (2015) comes to a similar result with regard to the case of the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA). In fact, it seems that national interests are at best a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for defection by individual national party delegations. Faas (2003) demonstrates, for instance, that institutional arrangements in terms of candidate selection and electoral laws influence the likelihood

of defection. Scholars also observe that national party groups are more likely to defect in order to support their national governments (Costello and Thomson 2014), especially for the parties being in control of the respective government (Costello and Thomson 2014; Faas 2003; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). Moreover, when elections are approaching, defections become more likely (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). At the same time, new MEPs appear to be socialized into the EP insofar as they seem to defect less over time, which was particularly visible with regard to the new MEPs joining after the Eastern enlargement (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Wielen, R. J. V. 2012). Finally, Bailer et al. (2009) find that characteristics of EPG leaders can positively impact on EPG cohesion (i.e. help to prevent defections), for instance, if they are more experienced MEPs. In sum, a number of institutional parameters would seem to make defection by national party delegations more or less likely, i.e. they appear to influence the impact of national interests on the EP. Nevertheless, knowing which intervening institutional factors influence the role of national interests for defection is not very satisfying, unless one also has some systematic account of the origin of national interests.

Third, it further appears that the substance of the policy issue in question plays a role for actor alignments in the EP. In general, so-called grand coalitions between the two main party groups, for instance, are more likely in the domains of environment and public health, but less common or even absent when it comes to economic or social policy issues (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2002; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). At a more abstract level, two issue characteristics have also been found to influence the likelihood of defection in particular. Firstly, a number of scholars establish a relationship between the salience that actors (mostly national parties ‘at home’) attach to an issue and the probability of defection, in that national party delegations are prone to defection mainly when the issue in question is highly salient to them (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Rasmussen 2008). Secondly, it seems that issues involving cross-national distribution foster defection, as is hinted at by Noury (2002) as well as Costello and Thomson (2014) and empirically confirmed by Faas (2003) and Rasmussen (2008) for agricultural policy and structural policy. What these findings on issue-related conditions for defection demonstrate, however, is the need for conceptual clarity, in that both salience and distributional effects might or might not be more or less implied in the notion of ‘national interest’.

Interestingly, the wider literature on conflict in EU politics, be it regarding the Council of the EU or the positions of national parties on European integration, exposes a similar degree of complexity as is found with regard to conflict in the EP. Within the literature on the Council, for instance, there is not even consensus on the general pattern of conflict (cf. Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015): First, some scholars come to the rather counterintuitive result that ideology in terms of the classic L-R scale is an even better predictor of actor alignments than nationality or at least plays a considerable role (Aspinwall 2002; Mattila 2004). Second, however, other scholars do observe territorial patterns in geographical terms of North versus South or old versus new Member States (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004) or in terms of net payers versus net recipients of the EU budget (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005), or even observe a mixed pattern (Hosli, Mattila, and Uriot 2011). Furthermore, some scholars attribute some role to the type of capitalism and the resulting

preference for more or less market regulation (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004). This overview may not be exhaustive, but it confirms the range of factors that also seem to matter for the structure of conflict in the EP as such.

The extant literature on national party positions on European integration mirrors the main finding concerning the structure of conflict in the EP. Not only can parties' positions on European integration be meaningfully captured by classic, ideological scales in terms of Left versus Right or Green-Alternative-Libertarian versus Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL-TAN or 'new politics' dimension) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), it is even found that ideology and membership in a particular party family is the most important predictor of party positions, in that parties' views on integration resemble much more those of their family members than those of their fellow nationals (Arnold, Sapir, and Vries 2012; Hellström 2008; 2009b). Nonetheless, scholars also find a moderating influence of broader geographical (Marks and Steenbergen 2004) or even nation-specific factors (Hellström 2008; 2009b). An interesting addition from this strand of research is the finding that national parties respond to their voters' preferences on integration (Arnold, Sapir, and Vries 2012; Carrubba 2001). Some of these studies further differentiate between integration in the various policy areas and are able to demonstrate that some ideological dimensions are more important concerning some policy *areas* than others (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). However, they do not go into more detail than this. In other words, studies on national parties tend to be focused on the question of building the European *polity* rather than on its *politics*. By contrast, conflict in the EP is precisely about substantive decisions, and also the EP as a crisis manager would be concerned first of all with solving particular problems rather than necessarily negotiating new treaties with every new problem. In sum, therefore, a study that could provide a more structured idea of what conflict in the EP is like might also serve as a starting point for further insights into these neighbouring fields shaped by similarly complex dynamics.

Given the complexity of conflict in the EP (and beyond) that results from all the institutional and issue-specific factors, the question that increasingly shapes the academic debate is not so much how MEPs take positions in general or on one particular issue; rather, the question is *under what conditions* they side either with their fellow nationals or their colleagues from the EPG (cf. Otjes and van der Veer 2016). In this respect, it is particularly important to stress that, as Costello and Thomson (2014) note, most of what is known about conflict in the EP refers to a situation prior to the Crisis. Thus, the empirical results discussed so far cannot display the impact of changes in general conditions such as the generally increasing politicisation of the EU (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2012), which arguably was further intensified by the Crisis (Blauberger, Puntischer Riekmann, and Wydra 2014). Indeed, the only two studies known to the author that at least analyse conflict over policy issues related to the Crisis itself might indicate that these changes matter: Braghiroli (2014) finds that membership of the Eurozone is the factor that explains voting patterns over economic and monetary issues best, while Otjes and van der Veer (2016) find that in terms of ideological dimensions, the classic Left-Right dimension has lost in explanatory power, while the pro-/anti-EU dimension is increasingly important for explaining MEPs' voting behaviour even on those

issues that they identify as ‘economic’ ones. Even less so it has been studied, under what conditions conflict is territorialised *in a post-Crisis European Parliament*.

What Costello and Thomson (2014) further note, however, is that the question how MEPs ‘give reasons’ has also been barely investigated so far. Noteworthy, given politicisation, MEPs would actually be under an increasing pressure to justify their policy suggestions vis-à-vis their electorates. Moreover, the particular way they do so may not only influence the prospects for compromise across borders in the short term, but also impact on the EU’s legitimacy in the longer term, if the applicability of justifications is territorially limited. Hence, this aspect of conflict in the EP would seem to deserve scholarly attention. Paradoxically, it seems that only Proksch and Slapin (2010) have analysed more nuanced forms of positioning such as EP debates. They have not, however, considered them as justifications for voting decisions, but rather as alternative measurements of policy positions. The precise research question that the present study seeks to address, therefore, is the following: *Under what conditions exactly do MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis EP is territorial rather than ideological?*

Noteworthy, this question has not only been neglected thus far in strictly empirical terms: Of the three main strands of theorising conflict in the EP, none appears suitable to address it adequately. There is, first, the “Institutional Theory of Behaviour in the European Parliament” (Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999) that underpins most of the empirical literature thus far. It stipulates that MEPs pursue three goals, namely policy, re-election and office (here: attractive positions within the EP), while being mandated by two principals, namely their respective national party and their EPG (henceforth referred to as the 3G2P approach). While it is strongest when it comes to pointing out the institutional factors that might influence the decision “to defect or not to defect” (Faas 2003), these factors that might matter much less when it comes to explaining the reasons MEPs give for their behaviour, an aspect that is not explicitly covered by the theory at all. Moreover, its account concerning the goal of office-seeking within the EP is heavily criticised by Nils Ringe (2005; 2010).

The Perceived Preference Coherence (PPC) approach Ringe has developed in turn, provides that due to informational challenges (overload as well as scarcity), MEPs rely on their expert colleagues in the legislative committees – from the same national party or at least from the same EPG – for voting advice. These experts, in turn, are expected to have an interest for intra-EPG compromise and to use their position for strategically setting (mostly ideological) focal points in order to convince their non-expert colleagues. While this approach thus at least partly (i.e. within the EP) takes into account the way that MEPs give reasons for their policy preferences, it fails to elaborate on the structural limitations of expert MEPs’ capacity to shape the structure of conflict actively. As is pointed out in more detail in Chapter 2, however, it thus becomes difficult to explain why they would ever defect at all.

Unlike the 3G2P or PPC approaches, the so-called bicameral approach (Costello and Thomson 2014) does not primarily aim to account for the predominance of ideological conflict in the EP, but rather for the exceptional cases of defection that the present study seeks to explain as well. In doing so, the bicameral approach identified the lobbying efforts of national governments as the main source of

defection. Yet, Costello and Thomson do not develop an explanation of why MEPs – and those who are in domestic opposition in particular – should actually give in to these lobbying efforts, at least not one that is independent of the demands of the national *party* ‘at home’. In this sense, it hence does not offer an innovation beyond what one would already expect based on the 3G2P approach. While the precise strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are pointed out in more detail in the theoretical chapter of this study, it is thus held here that a theoretical account of territorialisation in the EP is needed.

Such a theory would, of course, not need to be developed from scratch, even if it were not for the three approaches specifically developed for the EP. On the one hand, contributions to EU studies from the field of International Relations (IR) such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) offer quite precise concepts of how national interests (or preferences) are aggregated and come to influence policy-makers. They have been taken up by the more theory-driven works on conflict in the Council (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), whereas other works on the Council have, albeit not very systematically or consistently, made various alternative suggestions for how else nationality might shape actor alignments within this particular institution (Aspinwall 2002; Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Hoyland and Hansen 2014; Mattila 2004; Thomson 2006; 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; Treib 2010).¹ On the other hand, contributions drawing on a Comparative Politics tradition explain in some more detail how exactly ideological cleavages, involving both ideational as well as structural aspects, shape political parties’ positions on European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). On top of this, scholars of EU politics have begun to integrate these two traditions (Marks 2004) and have further started to consider the role of politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The point is, however, that these integrative approaches have left behind the solid micro-level conceptions of actors, their goals and their strategies for achieving them.

Reviewing the empirical state of the art it was noted that national interests do not always shape conflict in the EP, but that apparently there are complex configurations of conditions that need to be present in order for them to matter. The theory to be developed would have to capture this complexity, and, in order to test its worth, the respective research design, methods and data would have to reflect this complexity as well. In this respect, it is worth noting that extant research designs have for the most part been quantitative ones, designed to identify the impact of one particular variable (while controlling for others), but not interested really in the combinations that lead to the outcome of defection or territorialisation. A few other studies have examined, whether national interests matter in a particular case, ranging from migration, over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) to the so-called Takeover Directive (Chen 2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Ringe 2005; 2010), without however systematically comparing the case to other cases. Such a systematic comparison that allows for the valid operationalisation of the complex conditions that theoretically would seem to shape the structure of conflict on the one hand, while on the other hand allowing for some limited generalisation beyond the case, is thus lacking so far. Only for the question of party positions of national party positions on

¹ This list is not exhaustive, but for another overview see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider (2015).

European integration in general has such a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA, cf. Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) been applied (Hellström 2009b).

If the reasons MEPs give are to be taken into account, methodologically it is obviously necessary to move beyond the analysis of roll-call votes (RCV) that has been dominating the literature on conflict in the EP ever since the 1990s, in spite of heavy critique (Carrubba et al. 2006). Yet, if the goal is to study the way MEPs ‘give reasons’, analysing textual data by simply turning words into numbers, as Proksch and Slapin (2010) do, may not be sufficient. In the wider literature on party positions on European integration, some first promising steps towards the measurement of parties’ framing efforts have been made (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010), but would have to be developed further to fit the present purpose. Finally, while the analysis of the reasons MEPs give must draw on textual data, the only notable analysis of this kind by Proksch and Slapin (2010) in terms of EP debates might suffer from a selection bias as well: as the same authors have found, MEPs speaking up in the debates are often those who defect and are thus not representative (Slapin and Proksch 2010). Hence, new sources of textual data need to be examined, even if these are not as easily accessible and neatly translated into one language as EP debates are and thereby defeat common applications of computerised textual analysis.

In sum, it appears that the research question, *under what conditions exactly do MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis EP is territorial rather than ideological* is neither answered empirically by the extant state of the art, nor are theoretical or methodological tools in place that would seem to allow for addressing it in an adequate manner. The next section thus provides an overview of how the present study is meant to fill this gap step by step.

1.2 Outline of the study

As a basis for the rest of the study, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework which I refer to as a ‘theory of territorialisation’. The chapter begins with a more detailed critique of the extant theoretical approaches concerning conflict and cohesion in the EP. Next, some key concepts regarding the *explanandum* such as (structure of) conflict, territorialisation and defection are clarified. As it is defined for the present study, defection by individual national party delegations constitutes the precondition at the micro-level for the macro-level observation of territorialisation of conflict regarding a given issue. Consequently, the policy issue and the national party delegation form the unit of analysis at the macro- and micro-level, respectively. Next, in order to explain why and how exactly nationality and ideology matter for parties in the EP and the eventual structure of conflict, I draw on theories applied to the EU coming from the tradition on International Relations, namely Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, and from the tradition of Comparative Politics, namely Marks and Wilson ‘cleavage approach’ to party positions on European integration, as these traditions are most explicit and precise with regard to the respective concepts and causal mechanisms. Before this background, it is then possible to evaluate the EU-specific approaches on the structure of conflict, namely what I refer to as the

‘distribution model’ of conflict in European politics developed by Gary Marks and the related post-functional theory developed by Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks.

The second part of the theory chapter is a refinement of a so far underspecified aspect of the latter theory, which moreover can be linked to the deficiencies of Nils Ringe’s PPC approach to conflict in the EP in terms of parties’ communication strategies. This is achieved by drawing on the growing literature on ‘framing’. As a result of this discussion, it is argued that studying the reasons parties give in order to justify their policy preferences is not only worthwhile for its own sake, that is, simply because it has not been done so far. Much more importantly, the room for manoeuvre parties have for framing the issue in question, which itself is a function of the issue characteristics such as uncertainty, is actually causally decisive for understanding defection and hence territorialisation. Before eventually summarising these insights and formulating concrete theoretical expectations, the (ir)relevance of institutional constraints is discussed extensively with regard to the particular question at hand.

In Chapter 3, it is pointed out how exactly a qualitative-comparative research design at both macro- and micro level can add to the extant knowledge on conflict and cohesion in the EP. After elaborating on the need for innovation in terms of research design, methods and data when studying conflict in the EP, it is explained how a qualitative-comparative design addresses a different kind of question as it is outcome-centred and is meant to account for those configurations of conditions that actually lead to the outcome, rather than just individually making it more or less likely. Avoiding quasi-cultural disputes on the general usefulness or even superiority of QCA, it is argued then that such a design simply allows for taking the complex case characteristics involved here into account in a more valid manner. This assertion is followed by the selection of cases at both levels, that is, the sample of policy issues functioning as cases at the macro-level as well as the sample of parties at the micro-level. Regarding the former, I select the debate on Europeanised welfare (better known by the pejorative notion of ‘welfare tourism’), the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). These issues are chosen because they were heavily discussed in the run-up to the 2014 European elections and are commonly thought of as issues of ‘national interest’ in a wider sense, which means that salience and politicisation can be held constantly high, as the necessity of this condition for defection is fairly well established already. These issues vary, however, with regard to what the theoretical chapter identifies as key conditions for defection also, namely the direction of distributional effects (intra- or cross-national) and uncertainty.

The selection of parties is informed, first of all, by the necessity of focussing on a subsample of EU Member States only. This necessity partly results from issues of feasibility, as in order to make the best of this qualitative-comparative approach, rather detailed knowledge of the countries’ economic interests as well as of the party system are needed to an extent that does not allow for covering more or even all EU countries. In addition, it must be made sure that the parties within these countries are actually comparable in terms of their ideological traditions, otherwise it is not possible to trace certain observations back to an ideologically relevant cause. Nevertheless, the selection of countries must still display variation with regard to issue-specific patterns such as distributional effects and national traditions such as the type of

capitalism prevailing in a country. Hence, the study is focussed on Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Italy. At country level, parties are selected so as to cover as many of ideological families as possible, while at the same time considering mainly those parties that either were present in the EP 2009-2014 or at least could reasonably expect to enter the EP after May 2014. Moreover, the sample of parties explicitly excludes strictly regional and regionalist parties, since these parties clearly have constituency concerns that do not correspond necessarily to the broader national interest.

The rest of the chapter then explains the choice of Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as the method of measurement, the decision in favour of press releases as data as well as the process of collecting these. Most obviously, given the role attributed to framing strategies in the theoretical chapter, it is rather straightforward to then also choose a method designed to analyse framing. More specifically, this method has a number of additional advantages for the purposes of this study. For instance, it forces the researcher to identify possible lines of argument *a priori*, which in turn allows for the equally *a priori* specification of the potential focal points (ideological or national) included in the frames. Moreover, the method analytically distinguishes between the various dimensions of a frame, thereby also separating the policy suggested from its justification. In practice, such a fine-grained distinction is more difficult but not impossible, as the generally promising results of a reliability test conducted specifically for the purposes of the study demonstrate. Finally, the method avoids some difficulties that might otherwise arise when using rather small data sets in terms of texts, and is able to compare lines of argument across languages. The latter is a particular asset given that the data chose for the purposes of this study, namely (web-based) press releases by national party delegations. Such press releases are chosen as a very direct and explicit, yet comparable (unlike speeches, which depend too much on context) means of party communication with their electorate. Since they are issued in the respective national languages, the commonly known computerised techniques of text analysis would not be suited to directly compare statements across countries.

The empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6 all follow the same general outline: After a first introduction to the substantive issue at hand in terms of the particular area of EU policy, a more detailed elaboration regarding the characteristics of the issue as a case is provided. Next, the issue-specific policy frames that might be used by the MEPs are identified, forming the basis of the codebooks provided in Annex II. It is then possible to formulate observational implications of the theory of territorialisation presented earlier, before the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are discussed in terms of the framing strategies they uncover. Finally, some case-specific and hence preliminary conclusions are drawn. For the case of Europeanised welfare (Chapter 4), the latter include the finding that the theory of territorialisation correctly predicted an ideological structure of conflict. Most importantly, the results of the PFA indeed allow for the conclusion that uncertainty is the key condition behind this outcome, as the parties mainly stress those dimensions of policy frames used for justification rather than actual policy preferences. While this case therefore mainly demonstrates the potential of framing, the case of CAP reform (Chapter 5) essentially shows its limitations due to structural conditions. Here, the observed territorialised overall

pattern corresponds to the certainty of cross-national distribution. The final case study on TTIP (Chapter 6) then illustrates how intra-national distributional effects are reflected in the EP even in policy areas traditionally associated with ‘national’ interests. Moreover, it provides a first idea of how certainty might be socially constructed. Each case thus supports the theoretical framework developed for the present study, even down to the micro-level of individual parties’ framing strategies, minor deviations notwithstanding. In addition, however, each case study demonstrates the value of the approach taken: This occurs, for instance, by introducing case knowledge at the issue level, which if neglected would lead to a misinterpretation of the results. The case studies further uncover the weakness of roll-call vote analysis in terms of insufficient differentiation between positions and their often neglected connection to the state of negotiations, which calls the all too usual aggregation of votes, across policy areas or even across issues, into question.

In Chapter 7, it is thus concluded that the EP is certainly not immune to national interests. Nonetheless, it arguably depicts potential intra-national conflicts more precisely than it occurs in intergovernmental institutions, where the claim to represent ‘the’ national interest is underlined by the simple fact of holding the respective office. In fact, as MEPs strive to reconcile their various goals, territorialisation can only occur if a number of conditions, namely politicisation, cross-national distribution and certainty are combined. In short, the study thus demonstrates the potential but also the limitations of framing strategies in a post-Crisis European Parliament. In case goal-conflict is unavoidable, MEPs seem to decide in favour of vote-seeking. Hence, it is suggested here that a forum shift might not solve the EU’s problems in terms of crisis management due to ‘national egoisms’ as such; rather, it must be complemented by a change in vote-seeking incentives in the short term and a change in terms of identification in the longer term. While in practice, anything resembling supranationalisation – be it in the shape of shifting competences to the EP or by creating pan-European lists – would seem difficult to achieve politically at the moment, the results of the present study also allow for a further suggestion: Those interested in European cooperation or even further integration need to engage in much more creative ways of framing the issues of EU politics, rather than leaving this field to their opponents almost entirely.

While thereby the study corresponds to the societal and academic rationales formulated in the preceding section and culminating in the research question, the insights gained in the course of this study contribute to wider topics and questions as well. First of all, as the study is qualitatively designed, it also provides some insights with regard to the substantive policy issues covered and in this sense might be interesting also for scholars concerned with the policy-making rather than politics in the EP. It further provides comparative information on the political parties analysed in this particular context, and hence might be of interest also for scholars of parties and party systems. In addition, the theoretical framework developed based on assumptions concerning national political parties as gate-keepers in EU politics in general might feed back into research on related topics. For instances, provided that the respective flows of information and incentive structures are taken into account, the theory developed might be adapted to explain conflict in the Council of the EU. Similarly, for the study of political parties and their goals in

terms of policy, office and votes in particular, the EP provides an interesting natural experiment, which in this study is carried out at a level very close to the actual causal mechanisms. In addition, it might inform the new post-functionalist strain of theorising European integration as to which integrative steps are politically feasible under what conditions in the era following the 'permissive consensus'. Finally, the methodological aspects of such a study might feed into the debate on textual analyses, and the question of validity and reliability in particular, as it bridges the divide between classic content and discourse analysis.

2. A Theory of Territorialisation

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study, referred to henceforth as the ‘theory of territorialisation’ (ToT). Before doing so, however, it is first pointed out in some detail, why exactly the theoretical state of the art on conflict in the European Parliament is not suited to actually address the question, under what conditions MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict is territorial rather than ideological: the extant theories are not designed to explain defection, but mainly the usual case of high ideological cohesion. They further neglect the consequences of increasing politicisation, the resulting changes in vote-seeking incentives and the requirement for giving reasons, remaining mostly silent on MEP-to-voter communication. To lay the basis for the ToT, therefore, it is first specified what is understood here as a political conflict, when one could speak of an ideological or territorial structure of conflict, territorialisation is defined as the result of individual actors’ defection, and national political parties are identified as the unit of analysis at the micro-level. In order to derive the conditions for defection and territorialisation, I then relate the notions of ideology and national interest to the general goals of political parties by referring to extant, more general theories on conflict over European integration. Thereafter, I specify further how exactly such general structural conditions can be linked to parties’ way of ‘giving reasons’ or ‘framing’ by transferring recent advances in theorizing on party strategies in two-dimensional policy spaces to conflict in EU politics as defined here. It is argued, that the various framing strategies turn MEPs into actors trying to convince voters rather than passive respondents to the latter’s preferences, albeit structural conditions limit their room for manoeuvre. Since the resulting theory of territorialisation is developed, at that point, with regard to national parties mainly, it is then necessary to discuss in how far the particular institutional framework of the EP leads MEPs to act counter to their national parties’ preferences. As it is argued, MEPs neither have much incentive for nor much room for what is called ‘agency drift’, so that the theory of territorialisation should be applicable to conflict in the EP almost without further caveats. Hence, it is concluded that conflict in the EP will be shaped by the issue-specific structural conditions of politicisation, distributional effects, and uncertainty, with parties using whatever room for manoeuvre they have under these conditions to avoid defection and hence territorialisation as an automatic response goal conflict. Consequently, the structure of conflict in the EP will only be territorialised if politicisation is high (which it increasingly is for all EU issues), if distributional effects are cross-national rather than intra-national and if scope and direction of these effects are certain.

2.1 Extant theories on conflict in the EP and their deficits

When evidence, based on roll-call voting analyses, was growing that conflict in the European Parliament mainly evolves along ideological lines (see Chapter 1), this was the puzzle calling for explanation at a theoretical level. As is pointed out in some detail in this subsection, this has led to the development of two main strands of theory on the conflict in the EP which, while disagreeing in many ways, both fail to account fully for the – so far – exceptional cases of defection or even territorialisation, and further are unsuited to explain the way in which parties give reasons for their policy preferences. More recently, the so-called ‘bicameral’ theory for defection based on inter-institutional relations was developed. As is further argued in due course, however, these inter-institutional factors should be better considered as a proxy for national (party) interests, rather than a causal mechanism in their own right. Having reviewed these extant theoretical accounts conflict in the EP, I thus call for a theory of territorialisation, founded on a micro-level account of defection by national party delegations, taking into account the change in macro-level parameters resulting from increasing politicisation of EU politics and suitable for explaining MEPs communication strategies. Before concluding the section, it is argued that such a theory need not start from scratch but instead can draw not only on the useful elements from theories on the EP, but also from wider theories on parties and conflict from Comparative Politics, International Relations and EU studies proper.

The Three-Goals-Two-Principals (3G2P) approach

The first strand of theory concerning conflict in the EP was founded by researchers from the European Parliamentary Research Group including Simon Hix at the London School of Economics, and was subsequently developed further mainly by Hix and his colleagues (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999). It seeks to explain the behaviour of MEPs as party political actors driven by three kinds of goals, namely policy, office, and re-election, who try to achieve these goals within a particular institutional set-up that makes MEPs agents of two principals, namely their respective national parties and the European Party Groups they join in the EP. Throughout the present study, it is thus referred to as the Three-Goals-Two-Principals (or: 3G2P) theory.

In the institutional setting of the EP, the goal of ‘policy’ (or policy-seeking) according to 3G2P refers to the MEPs personal ideological or policy preferences; ‘office’ (or office-seeking) refers to the attainment of attractive positions within the EP such as committee chairs or rapporteur positions; and ‘re-election’ (also: vote-seeking) refers to the goal of obtaining a seat in EP again at the next European election (cf. Hix, Noury, and Roland 1999, 12). A dilemma arises for MEPs inasmuch as the realization of these is linked with the two principals in partly contradicting ways: On the one hand, prospects for re-election are largely dependent on national parties, as European elections are European by name but in practice are fought nationally by national parties, who moreover select the candidates in the first place (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 495–96). While voters are generally assumed to be largely indifferent to EU politics and the EP in particular (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 26–28, see also Faas 2003), MEPs must hence stay loyal to their respective national parties in order to stand for EP elections again.

On the other hand, national parties want to cooperate with other national parties in order to shape policy while saving transaction costs compared to an issue-by-issue coalition-building. They thus form European Political Groups (EPGs), mostly with parties from the same ideological family, as they expect to share more preferences with these parties than with their fellow nationals (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 495–97). In turn, however, these EPGs control the aforementioned offices within the EP, so that in order to achieve their office-seeking goals, MEPs must show loyalty towards their respective

EPG (ibid.). Whenever the preferences of the EPG and those of the national party diverge, therefore, MEPs would be caught in a goal conflict, so that the following question arises: “when forced to make a trade-off between re-election, policy-oriented and office-seeking actions, how will an MEP act?” (Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999, 15). As I point out next, however, this question can only be partly answered by means of this theory.

In fact, in the very first version of this “Institutional Theory of Behaviour in the European Parliament” from 1999, Hix et al. formulate no less than ten hypotheses concerning various institutional sub-settings (candidate- vs party-centred system, competitive vs consensus system, national and European electoral circles, electoral support for integration/ the EP, electoral support for national party, party-centrism/extremism, government participation, the kind of legislative procedure, participation in the Commission) affecting the weighting of the various goals by the MEPs and hence the likelihood of defection. This version of the theory, slightly added by Faas (2003) with some further variables on national party control over MEPs and variables on Member States’ electoral rules, however, was indeed limited to institutional variables and hence failed to formulate indications as to what one might call the root cause of defection in terms of national/domestic interests: the latter are mentioned, but not actually defined or specified. Later works in the same theoretical tradition then point out that redistribution across national borders might induce conflict along territorial lines, but, as policies entailing such redistribution are largely missing in the EU or confined to the national level, such territorialisation was unlikely (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007, 59–66). Largely unconstrained by worries over re-election and free to pursue personal policy-seeking and even more so office-seeking goals, MEPs would thus largely behave in a cohesive manner within their respective EPG, which indeed would explain what has emerged as a kind of empirical consensus discussed earlier.

Given the overall empirical state of the art, the 3G2P theory arguably has proven its value, in that it can account for this overall picture rather well. Yet, in how far is this theory helpful with respect to the remaining gaps concerning the role of national interests in the EP in terms of territorialisation and defection in the post-Crisis era, and what insights does it provide concerning MEPs’ communication strategies in this context? In order to address this question, one might start with its post-Crisis aspect, that is, one might ask in how far the theory is still up-to-date. As a result of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, for instance, the EP is now a full co-legislator regarding some more controversial policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (European Commission 2013e), a policy that is highly re-distributive (Noury 2002). Indeed, it seems that EPGs are not entirely cohesive in this area (Nissen 2014). Yet, one might argue, while the 3G2P theory would expect a *generally* ideological structure of conflict precisely given the rareness of redistributive EU policies, it would still be able to account for such cases in principle as they do not challenge its core.

Another change in EU politics has been its increasing ‘politicisation’ over the years (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2012), probably further enhanced by the Crisis (Blauberger, Puntischer Riekmann, and Wydra 2014; Costello and Thomson 2014). If, in this sense, broad masses of citizens become interested in EU politics, national parties have an even bigger vote-seeking incentive to exert

control over their MEPs. In fact, the ‘two principals’ aspect of the 3G2P theory was criticised on an empirical basis even earlier, in that MEPs are said to have but one principal, namely their respective national party, to whom they obey whenever asked to (Thiem 2009). In combination with politicisation, this might not mean that every issue is equally salient from the beginning, but the salience of EU politics for national parties is now generally higher which, as was mentioned, increases the likelihood of defection. This further is important insofar as it means that the whole bunch of intervening institutional variables making MEPs more or less vote-seeking becomes increasingly irrelevant, as MEPs can expect to be monitored much more permanently by their national parties or even directly by the voter. As a consequence, vote-seeking considerations should now affect their thinking much more regularly, especially since they cannot know for sure which European policies so far going under the radar might be politicised along with European integration more generally.

While the relevance of institutional variables relating to the degree of control by national parties and its implications for MEP vote-seeking is generally reduced by increased politicisation, these variables might matter even less concerning the way MEPs ‘give reasons’ for their positions, which is another key aspect of the remaining empirical gap regarding conflict in the EP to be addressed in the present study: When MEPs communicate with their electorate in order to justify their positions, for instance, the legislative procedure applied to the issue in question might be less important than it is for voting. More important even, in the moment MEPs decide to communicate in this manner, they automatically expose themselves to monitoring (by both national parties and voters). In sum, those aspects concerning which the 3G2P or “Institutional” theory of behaviour in the EP is most explicit and most developed are arguably less important for the purposes of the present study. By contrast, this theory does neither provide an explicit account of what exactly national interests are and how they come to influence which parties, nor how they are reflected in MEPs’ communication in terms of justification. Noteworthy, this does not make the theory wrong or implausible as such. It just means that this theory needs to be, at least, elaborated for the present purpose.

The theory of Perceived Preference Coherence (PPC)

The second strand of theorizing conflict and cohesion in the EP as formulated by Nils Ringe (Ringe 2005; 2010) is, however, much harsher in its critique and effectively attacks the very bases of what I have called the 3G2P theory here. Ringe finds it theoretically implausible and empirically disproven that EPGs actually have much of a carrot or stick for MEPs, so that EPG cohesion could not be explained by the office-seeking incentives of MEPs. This is because, for instance, the number of offices that EPGs can offer to individual MEPs in exchange for their loyalty is so small that no individual MEP could ever expect his or her loyalty to pay off. Likewise, he challenges the idea that cohesion could be due to shared policy preferences, as he argues that with regard to most issues, the vast majority of MEPs would not even be able to name their preferences clearly, given the fact that issues in EU politics are usually characterised by either an information overload or scarcity of information. In addition, he holds that not even national

parties usually act as principals of MEPs, but instead very rarely tell MEPs what to do, while the rule would be an intense dialogue between the two.

Instead, Ringe (2010) develops what he calls a Perceived Preferences Coherence (PPC) approach. The large degree of ideological cohesion, according to this theory, is the result of processes that are endogenous to the EP. At the heart of this process is the aforementioned ‘informational deficit’ in the EP. This can only be handled by means of division of labour, he holds: some MEPs specialise in particular policy areas and are or become experts. Since an individual MEP can do so only for a limited number of policy areas, the vast majority of MEPs will usually be non-experts without any specified preference for a given issue. Without having fixed or even specified preferences themselves, the non-experts have to rely on a trusted expert MEP, and here is where EPG and national party affiliations matter as a cognitive shortcut. Expert MEPs, in turn, come together in the various committees of the EP, where expertise is concentrated. These MEPs then negotiate and deliberate among each other, most of all among experts from the same EPG, where they try to achieve a compromise position so as to win over most of their non-expert colleagues and thus have a chance for influencing policy. In order to convince non-experts, expert MEPs have to establish so-called ‘focal points’ that tell others what a certain issue ‘is all about’ and that link the issue in question to something non-experts can agree to in general. Mostly, these focal points will be linked to the respective party family’s ideology so as to ease compromise within the respective EPG. This allows non-experts to *perceive of* the policy suggested by the expert as corresponding to their own preferences (hence Perceived Preference Coherence). In this manner, then, Ringe is able to account for the same observed general outcome – namely ideologically structured conflict – via a very different route.

Yet, the question the present study raises is not so much what the general pattern of conflict in the EP is or why it is what it is. Instead, the question is under what conditions this usual, ideological structure is more or less territorialised, presumably due to ‘national interests’. As however this is not Ringe’s main issue of interest, it takes some effort to identify and order his exact predictions regarding this aspect. For a start, Ringe (2010) notes:

Yet, EP politics are not completely de-territorialised; while members of transnational party groups, MEPs are also representatives of national constituencies who have to be concerned about the consequences of their policy decisions for their member states. (Ringe 2010, 7)

Hence, he continues, MEPs would trust experts from their national party delegation even more than other experts from the same EPG, as they would know that the former would not only share their ideological views but also their constituency concerns (*ibid.*), with ‘constituency’ referring to the respective MEP’s nation (*ibid.*, 38-39). As constituency concerns can thus be equated here with national interests, the next question then is how exactly these impact on MEP behaviour.

Not so much unlike earlier approaches, Ringe argues that one mechanism is again vote-seeking, a goal for MEPs that cannot be satisfied by the EPGs (*ibid.*, 2010, 28), because, he argues “it is the national parties that draw up electoral lists in EP elections” (*ibid.* 2010, 19). Interestingly, however, this does not mean that national parties are the key principals of MEPs; instead Ringe holds:

In rare instances, national party delegations receive specific voting instructions from their national leadership, but most of the time they act as their own principals while engaging in a continuous exchange of views and information with their national party leaderships. (ibid., 2010, 19; see also ibid., 2010, 79).

Noteworthy, it seems that for constituency concerns to enter MEPs' minds, pressure from national parties is not needed: They might also just themselves care about their electoral fortunes or even be 'genuine' representatives of their constituencies (ibid., 2010, 94). Whatever the exact way in which national interests enter MEPs' considerations, Ringe notes that they might potentially lead to a situation where MEPs are forced to trade-off ideological preferences and constituency concerns (ibid., 2010, 95-96). According to Ringe, the potential for the occurrence of such dilemmas is, however, rather low, as due to the range of policies made at the EU level, there is little that MEPs could actually distribute to their constituencies in terms of tangible benefits (ibid. 2010, 37). In addition, the link between MEPs and voters is not very developed, and European policies are usually not very salient in national publics (ibid., 2010, 94). Thus, only if a particular issue is indeed exceptionally important for a national party delegation's constituency will they defect from the EPG line at all (ibid., 2010, 60). Implicitly, then, one can identify again the issue-level conditions of distributional effects and salience here that were also confirmed in the empirical state of the art.

Noteworthy, these remarks on vote-seeking as an incentive for disagreement within EPGs constitute (at most) side remarks within Ringe's work and are repeatedly downplayed as relating only to some exceptional cases. What is more, however, they do not sit well with the PPC-model and with its key causal mechanism, namely the provision of focal points by expert MEPs (see Ringe 2010, 89–108; Ringe 2005, 732–34). Providers of focal points, i.e. the expert MEPs with regard to a given issue, are relatively free in their choice of focal points, constrained only by the larger policy spaces in which they operate. In case of the EP, these are shaped by ideological dimensions in terms of the classic Left-Right and the pro-/anti-EU dimension, next to nationally-based focal points. By setting a particular focal point, they can influence the way in which non-experts interpret the issue in question, without even having to change their preferences, by (de-)emphasising particular aspects of the issue. As a consequence, they should have considerable power.

Further, Ringe notes that "without intra-party divisions in committee, a united committee working group would be expected to provide only a single focal point (or a cohesive set of focal points) to the party's invested nonexperts" (ibid., 2010, 98). Since focal points relate to either ideology or nationality, in these instances they will arguably be of ideological origin. As Ringe holds that experts MEPs have numerous incentives to coordinate successfully (ibid., 2010, 40), one should expect that they should usually try to set just one such focal point (or a cohesive set of them). The only motive why they would not do so, is vote-seeking related to national interests, as was noted in the preceding paragraph.

It is here, however, that a contradiction between the overall model based on the idea of focal points and the way Ringe accounts for the exceptional case of defection emerges: If their non-expert colleagues faced with an informational deficit depend on the focal points provided by expert MEPs, why would one not assume the same about voters? In a world where objective interests never directly translate into policy preferences, as Ringe assumes (ibid. 2010, 5 & 31), such an assumption would seem highly

plausible, except maybe with regard to a number of ‘expert voters’. From this perspective, in turn, the trade-off between nationally-based vote-seeking and ideology-driven policy-seeking would disappear to some extent, as it would be up to the MEPs how to interpret a policy issue. Only if MEPs *themselves* decided to set a nationally-based focal point would defection become a reasonable option. The point is, however, that thereby they would deliberately construct a goal conflict for themselves, which does not seem plausible.

This does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to think of any reasons why MEPs might set nationally-based focal points: One might question Ringe’s rejection of ‘objective interests’ to the extent that at times, it might be more or less obvious how outcome and policy preferences might relate, or that at least actors might *think* they know how they relate. In fact, Ringe’s own operationalisation of ‘national interests’, in terms of “different measurements” across his case studies, demonstrates that his theory does not provide a uniform conception of national interests that could be actually compared across cases, as the examples provided include national economic interests (NB: ‘types of capitalism’, i.e. overlapping in an unfortunate manner with regulatory traditions), legal status quo on issues of societal regulation (same sex marriage) and national party finance rules (ibid. 2010, 112). Moreover, one might think of dynamics in party competition at the national level that induce national party delegations to ‘play the national card’, to give another example. Yet, the key point here is that Ringe’s PPC approach does not provide such explanations.

In sum, then, Ringe’s PPC approach might constitute an interesting starting point for filling the theoretical gap left by the Hix et al.’s 3G2P theory, insofar as it provides some first ideas on how ideology and national interests enter MEPs’ communication in terms of focal points and how the provision of focal points is a strategic decision made by MEPs. Unfortunately, however, PPC does neither include a precise definition of national interests, nor does it convincingly and consistently explain when exactly (or why at all) expert MEPs should decide to favour a nationally-based focal point over an ideological one. In addition, the remarks in terms of updates regarding certain parameters such as EP competences, politicisation and national party control over MEPs – made already with regard to 3G2P – also apply here.

The ‘bicameral’ theory

In contrast to Ringe, who conceives of cohesion in the EP as a result of an essentially endogenous processes, the final theoretical perspective on conflict in the EP, which shall be referred to here as the ‘bicameral’ theory, holds that an important stimulus for defection lies *outside* the EP, namely in the Council of the EU. This approach, developed by Rory Costello and Robert Thomson, is in many ways quite close to 3G2P theory, as it considers MEPs as serving the respective two principals (ibid. 2014, 1). It further supports the idea of vote-seeking incentives entering MEPs’ considerations via the channel of national parties, albeit not exclusively (ibid., 2014, 2-3). It differs not only from 3G2P but also from Ringe’s PPC in the sense that it provides a theoretical perspective specifically designed to explain defection and claims to identify “the main determinants” (ibid.) that lead parties to defect or, more precisely, makes defection more likely.

This determinant, according to Costello and Thomson, consists in the lobbying efforts directed towards the MEPs from a given Member State by the respective national government represented in the Council (ibid., 2014, 3). Whenever the latter disagree with the position of a national party delegation's EPG, they will have an incentive for pressuring MEPs from their home country. Hence, Costello and Thomson postulate: "MEPs in a national delegation are more likely to disagree with their party group when their member state in the Council also disagrees with the party group" (ibid.). Noteworthy, the incentive for lobbying – and hence MEPs' likelihood of defection – will increase with a. the salience the national government attaches to an issue and b. the degree to which a government is isolated in the Council, because even a compromise found within the Council will be relatively far away from its individual preferences. They further expect the effects of lobbying to be stronger on MEPs that are members of those same national parties that form the government, since these same national parties are gate-keepers for candidate selection (ibid., 2014, 3-4). While it provides an explanation focused specifically on defections, this theory is yet underdeveloped, as is pointed out in the following.

The main point concerning which the theory is rather incomplete is the question why parties should actually listen to their respective governments in the Council. To be fair, there are some arguments presented by Costello and Thomson, but these mostly refer to the national interest or national party positions that national party delegations would want to take into account for vote-seeking reasons. What they claim, however, is that lobbying by national governments is the actually decisive link. Yet, it does not become clear at all from their line of argument, why it would really take the national government in this causal chain. This is not to say, of course, that it is impossible to think of any arguments. For instance, in combination with Ringe's PPC theory, one might argue that national governments provide additional focal points that non-expert MEPs are guided by; in order to be consistent here, however, one would then also have to consider that non-expert MEPs are not equally receptive of all focal points according to Ringe: trust in the provider is a precondition for really taking a focal point into account. It is unclear, however, why or at least when exactly a non-expert MEP would place more trust in the national government rather than expert colleagues from his own EPG – especially when the MEP's party is not part of the government. The bicameral approach to conflict in the EP – at this point – at best constitutes an explanation for defection by parties *in government*, but not an explanation (not even hypothetically) for territorialisation defined as defection by a whole national block.

But even for parties in government, one might want to be sceptical about the effect of lobbying by the national party. First, governments in Europe – even in the UK these days – usually consist of party coalitions. While the coalition partners might be bound by a coalition agreement in domestic politics, they might be free to disagree in the EP nonetheless. Second, in case of the parties directly represented by a minister in the Council, this particular minister is not necessarily loyal to the national party line. Empirically, in fact, Costello and Thomson's findings do not even support this aspect of the theory completely (ibid., 2014, 8). What is more, however, the national governments' position as such does not constitute a sufficient condition for defection, as in the majority of cases, MEPs still stay with their EPG (ibid., 2014, 9). Indeed, Costello and Thomson admit that it would not even take the direct intervention of

national actors to explain their results, in that underlying national interests might directly influence MEPs (ibid.). Noteworthy, their argument that the effect of the intervening variables of salience and isolation is confirmed is rather weak (ibid.), in that the mechanisms underlying the government's situation might exist equally independent of the governments' lobbying efforts. In sum, unless there is a better theoretical account of how exactly the national governments' lobbying efforts matter, the latter are not more than a proxy for 'national interests' more generally. In addition to these shortcomings, the bicameral approach provides even less of an account of MEP's own communication in terms of 'giving reasons' than Ringe's PPC theory.

The theoretical gap in brief

To summarise, what is lacking in the theoretical state of the art is an up-to-date, post-Crisis account of conflict in the EP that is a. able to fully account for defection based on clear conceptions of ideology and even more so 'national interests' as opposed to other national influences and b. suited to explain MEPs' communication with their electorates in terms of the reasons they give, and, while taking MEPs as goal-driven, active and strategic shapers of debates, is also able to circumscribe the limits of what MEPs can achieve in this manner. Noteworthy, the various aspects making up this gap are interlinked: justifications ('giving reasons') matter much more in a politicised EU, and the degree to which 'national interests' constitute constraints on policy-seeking partly seems to depend on MEPs capacity to influence voters' preferences by setting focal points.

This is not to say, of course, that such a theory would have to be built from scratch. While certainly the EP-specific theories already provide some valuable components of such a new theory, the missing ones can arguably be found in the wider literature. On the one hand, contributions to EU studies from the field of International Relations (IR) such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) offer quite precise concepts of how national interests (or preferences) are aggregated and come to influence policy-makers to smaller or larger extents. They have been picked up by the more theory-driven works on conflict in the Council (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), whereas other works on the Council have, albeit not very systematically or consistently, made various alternative suggestions for how else nationality might shape actor alignments within this particular institution (Aspinwall 2002; Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Hoyland and Hansen 2014; Mattila 2004; Thomson 2006; 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; Treib 2010).² On the other hand, contributions drawing on a Comparative Politics tradition explain in some more detail how exactly ideological cleavages, involving both ideational as well as structural aspects, shape political parties' positions on European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). On top of this, scholars of EU politics have begun to integrate these two traditions (Marks 2004) and have further started to consider the role of politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The point is,

² This list is not exhaustive, but for another overview see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider (2015).

however, that these various theoretical arguments still have to be recombined into one consistent whole while taking into account the particular features of the EP.

2.2 The role of ideology and nationality for the structure of conflict in EU politics

In this section, I first clarify a number of concepts on which the theory to be developed is based. For a start, political conflict is defined as incompatibility of preferences on a general rule (policy) concerning a given issue. Accordingly, the concept of its ‘structure’ is contrasted with ‘dimensions’ established in the extant literature as issue-specific rather than aggregate, and as being either ideological or territorial. National parties are identified next as the appropriate level of aggregation within the EP, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Second, it is argued that the persistence of so-called cleavages has led to a situation where policy-seeking and vote-seeking often overlap, since the particular sets of ideas correspond to distributional interests of particular core electorates. By transferring considerations on party goals to EU politics, it is further possible to provide an up-to-date (i.e. post-Crisis) micro-level foundation to some of the extant theories on conflict in the EU. Here, the aforementioned overlap of goals can be broken up due to national interests in terms of cross-national distributional effects, because votes are tied to a particular national territory rather than to similar societal groups across countries. Several extant theories on conflict in EU politics further hold that the fact that distributional effects – including those giving rise to potential national interests – are not always certain, and that such uncertainty provides ‘leeway’ to political parties for pursuing their ideological predilections.

Territorialisation of conflict as the result of defection by national parties

If a post-Crisis European Parliament were not able to relativise national interests and hence conflict were equally ‘territorialised’ as conflict seems to be in intergovernmental institutions, the forum shift suggested by some commentators would not solve the EU’s legitimacy crises in the expected manner. Before theoretical expectations regarding the conditions for such ‘territorialisation’ of conflict can even be formulated, however, it is necessary to be very clear what exactly is meant by this concept here. For a start, one might ask what, really, is a ‘structure of conflict’, and what is it like if it is (not) territorialised? In fact, many scholars do not even specify what they understand by the notion of political conflict, even if, such as Marks and Steenbergen (2004), they edit a whole book about it.

By contrast, a definition even of this seemingly basic concept is provided here, because it is found helpful for deriving the cornerstones of the theoretical framework to be built. The following definition by Claudia Landwehr (2009) was selected, as it indeed would seem to be applicable to the context of European policy-making:³

Individual preferences in non-political choice situations, such as consumer choice, differ from political preferences first of all in that they are indexical (cf. Estlund 1990). If A wants x for A and B wants y for B, there will be no conflict if x and y are ordinary goods. . . Political preferences, by contrast, need to refer to *general* rules. If A wants to implement x as a general rule, this will have consequences for B, if B is a member of the same collective. *If A wants x to become a general, binding rule, and B wants y to become such a rule, the situation is one of conflict*, where, assuming non-dictatorship, neither actor can achieve her goal without the co-operation of the other. (Landwehr 2009, 61)

Unlike other international organisations, the European Union can pass legislation – i.e. general rules – that is binding (and enforceable) not just for states, but also for individuals within these states, which is known

³ Unlike, for instance, definitions from the field of conflict studies that usually link conflict to physical violence.

as direct effect (cf. Chalmers et al. 2006, 365–81). The EP is by now a full co-legislator in most policy areas covered by EU legislation (cf. Burns 2013). Thus, it is appropriate here to consider the incompatibility of preferences – in the EP and beyond – over a given EU policy as ‘political conflict’.

Accordingly, when Members of the European Parliament deliberate and decide upon a given piece of legislation (x) and do so in diverging ways, this is an observable instance of conflict (albeit not the only one), since in this situation, MEP A (apparently) wants x to become a general rule, while MEP B does not (because he or she prefers y). In reality, there are of course many MEPs deciding on many different policies. Thus, in order to reduce complexity, a large part of the extant literature tries to establish certain patterns, for instance in the voting behaviour, of all these MEPs and across various (or even all) policy issues in question. They refer to these patterns in various ways, for instance as ‘dimensions of politics’ in the EP (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). As was pointed out in detail in the preceding chapter, what most researchers have found so far is that voting patterns correlate strongly with ideological dimensions (most notably the Left-Right dimension) as well as that European Political Groups, which in turn are formed by ideologically close national parties, are quite cohesive. Hence, it was so far held that conflict in the EP is *usually* ideologically structured and that the main dimension of conflict in the EP is the classic L-R dimension. At the same time, it was noted that voting patterns do not always correlate equally with ideological dimensions as EPGs are not equally cohesive regarding all kinds of issues.

It is important here, therefore, to point out exactly what is understood here by the ‘structure of conflict’ as opposed to such general ‘dimensions of politics’. For the *general* dimensions of politics in the EP are already known and arguably also adequately accounted for on a theoretical level. The aforementioned definition of political conflict, however, refers to one particular disagreement between policy preferences over a given public policy, and without pre-empting the following subsections, it can already be noted that apparently such concrete policy preferences are issue-dependent. Thus, the concept of ‘structure of conflict’ is defined here as the pattern in policy preferences among *many* actors, but regarding *one* particular policy issue. This concept is thus much less abstract than that of ‘dimensions’ in a ‘policy space’ (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006). In analogy, what is to be explained in the first place are very much substantive policy preferences rather than ‘positions’, as the latter are equally abstract and might also refer to aggregations of preferences across various issues. Expressing and justifying such preferences then constitutes an act of position taking (e.g. Proksch and Slapin 2010) or *positioning*. The methodological implications of these definitions will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Inasmuch as indeed European Political Groups (EPGs) are formed by ideologically similar national political parties, or rather, their respective delegations (McElroy and Benoit 2011), it follows that the more cohesive EPGs are, the more *ideological* the structure of conflict will be, for it means that actors adhering to the same ideology have the same or at least similar policy preferences. It was also noted in the preceding chapter, however, that there is evidence of ‘defection’ from EPGs by some MEPs or even whole national party delegations. In this sense, it seems that ‘defection’ causes the structure of conflict to be less ideological. Thus, when the term ‘defection’ is used henceforth in this study, I refer not just to divergence from an EPG, but more to behaviour that is not in line with a party’s own ideology. Without

prejudice to the more precise considerations concerning the influence of national interests on the structure of conflict that are formulated in the following section, it can be noted here that the aforementioned extant literature generally assumes defection to be a consequence of ‘national interests’.

As a matter of fact, while most MEPs share some basic ideological convictions with a larger or smaller number of other MEPs, each and every MEP shares a nationality with at least some other MEPs. Whether eventually caused by such national interests or not, another easily discernible pattern in the constellation of preferences might thence correspond to the various nationalities. Given the nature of nation-states forming the EU as territorially defined units, it then would be appropriate to speak of a *territorial* structure of conflict / of a territorially structured conflict. Just like one would still speak of an ideologically structured conflict whenever Greens and Socialists preferring policy *A* stand opposed to Conservatives and Liberals preferring policy *B*, one would equally speak of a territorial structure for instance whenever the preferences of actors from one group of states are more similar amongst each other than they are to those of one or more other groups.

From the preceding paragraph it becomes clear that defection – by individual MEPs or national party delegations – from the EPG is the micro-level process that leads the overall, macro-level structure of conflict to change from ideological to territorial. The more parties defect due to national interests, the more territorialised the structure of a given conflict will be. ‘Territorialisation’ thus refers here to the degree of the phenomenon, but not necessarily to a temporal trend. On the one hand, the defection of a single actor certainly does not change the fact that the structure of conflict would be described better by the term ‘ideological’. On the other hand, as is shown later, open defection from the EPG can often only be observed for a limited number of parties, since for the others there might not be any contradiction between national interest and ideological predilection at all. As a result, it would not be necessary to find that all parties defect before one can speak of a territorial structure of conflict in the sense of full-scale territorialisation. Instead, simply if it is observed that overall, more actors express preferences similar to other actors from their respective home country rather than from their respective party family, then the structure of conflict will be deemed ‘territorial’ (or, vice versa, ideological).




Figure 1: Simplified illustration of ideologically structured conflict. Letters denote nationality, numbers ideology. The bold line separates actors in favour of EU policy x from those preferring EU policy y. Source: Own compilation.




Figure 2: Simplified illustration of territorially structured conflict. Letters denote nationality, numbers ideology. The bold line separates actors in favour of EU policy x from those preferring EU policy y. Source: Own compilation.

In addition, it should be clarified here, that I use the terms ideological conflict and ideologically structured conflict as well as, respectively, territorial (structure of) conflict and territorially structured conflict interchangeably. More importantly even, all these terms for me are observational, i.e. they are instances of the dependent variable ‘structure of conflict’, but carry no causal implication. Why this is appropriate only becomes clear once the exact mechanisms via which ideology and nationality influence actors’ expressed policy preferences on EU policy have been spelled out. As a first step into the latter direction, it is necessary to get a better idea of who exactly these actors are and what general goals they pursue.

Above it was argued based on Landwehr’s definition of political conflict, that the structure of conflict in the EP consists in the pattern of actor preferences on EU policy. When trying to explain the structure of conflict in the EP as either ideological or territorial, an obvious starting point could thus be to

consider the ways in which ideology and nationality influence the (expressed) policy preferences of its individual members. For the purpose of developing a theory of territorialisation, however, I consider national party delegations as representatives of national political parties and as very much homogeneous actors inasmuch as expressed policy preferences are concerned. This decision is based on five different reasons: First of all, it should be mathematically impossible for a conflict to be territorially structured in line with the aforementioned definition if only a few individual MEPs defect while the bulk of the national party delegation remains loyal to the EPG. Hence, the preferences of individual MEPs are not as such of interest here. Second, however, it is also appropriate to consider national party delegations as homogeneous actors, since they can be attributed both an ideology and a nationality, the measure is in principle still fine-grained enough. In fact, it is empirically found that cohesion within this subset is even higher than for the EPGs as a whole (cf. e.g. Thiem 2009). Thirdly, with a view to the contribution made with this study, it will be easier for future research to transfer theoretical arguments made here to other institutions if the arguments are made with regard to national parties as key actors, since national political parties not only control the selection of MEPs but also control the membership of other EU institutions (Hix and Lord 1997). Fourthly, vice versa it will be easier to build the present theory of territorialisation based on existing theories on political parties in EU politics or on other EU institutions, because partly the same or similar mechanisms might be at work within the EP. Fifthly and related, the general goals of political parties have been thoroughly theorised already, which is helpful for considering expectations regarding the more concrete policy preferences such parties might express. That said, the influence that the particular institutional setting of the EP might have on national party delegations is nonetheless integrated into the framework later. Based on these reasons, the next step is to discuss how exactly the policy preferences expressed national party delegations *as members of national political parties* are shaped by their ideological and territorial backgrounds.

A national party approach: how ideology and nationality shape the structure of conflict

In the preceding section, it was established that in order to build a theory of territorialisation in the EP it might be helpful to – for a start – consider national party delegations as true and internally coherent representatives of national political parties. One of the arguments for doing so was that the general goals of national political parties have been thoroughly theorized in the extant literature, which could then be put in a relationship with ideology and nationality/national interests, such that expectations for expressed policy preferences and their patterns within the EP – i.e. the structure of conflict – could be deduced. In their seminal work on goal conflicts faced by political parties, Müller and Strom (1999a) provide a highly useful summary of these goals, which further corresponds roughly to the idea of party goals included in what I have referred to as the 3G2P theory developed by Hix et al. (1999). Hence, this approach is used here to discuss national party goals in some detail.

Müller and Strom name three such goals: policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking (ibid. 1999, 5). Concerning the first of these, they point out:

At the heart of the policy-seeking model lies a belief in the reality and significance of the contest over public policy decisions that characterizes democracy. Citizens of democracies become politically engaged because these choices matter, and they support certain political parties over others because these parties make a difference. (Müller and Strom 1999b, 8)

My own emphasis here is on the general idea that party politicians are active in politics because they want to ‘make a difference’. This can mean that they want to change the status quo in a manner that suits them better just as it can mean that they want to avoid developments of which they do not approve (ibid. 1999, 7). Noteworthy, the aforementioned definition of political conflict as incompatibility of preferences over public policy arguably fits well with policy-seeking parties.

Yet, political parties have classically been assumed to “formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs c 1957, 30-31). In Downs’s conception, in fact, parties are even held to be vote-maximisers. The benefits resulting from a maximum of votes may be most obvious in two-party systems, but according to Downs even applies where coalition governments are the rule (cf. Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 8). To some extent, this vote-seeking perspective runs counter to an office-seeking conception of political parties (most prominently represented by Riker 1962), where parties would be satisfied with any number of votes that provides them with the desired control over public office and the attached benefits in forms of private goods for the office holders (Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 6). Traditionally, ‘office’ in this sense has been considered as executive office. Noteworthy, the 3G2P approach to MEP behaviour (see also Faas 2003; Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999) applies a broader notion of office, for instance with regard to distinguished positions within the legislative branch which also yield personal benefits for the office holder.

Especially with regard to vote-seeking and office-seeking, it becomes clear that party actors might sometimes take a certain public stance on a policy issue that does not necessarily reflect their own preference over the actual content of public policy, but is merely instrumental. Müller and Strom even hold that vote-seeking can only be reasonably thought of in this manner (ibid. 1999, 9). This means that, while building a theory of conflict in European politics which is based on the broader goals national parties in terms of votes, office and policy, what will be explained and eventually observed are expressed or revealed preferences, without claiming that these are the sincere preferences of the respective political actors (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006, 15–16). However, since vote-seeking parties will try to suggest policies that are as close as possible to the policy preferences of as many voters as possible, preferences revealed by parties still have their basis in the actual policy preferences of voters; thus, they reflect a real-world conflict.

The main contribution of Müller and Strom is arguably not the fact that they gave an overview of models of party goals, but rather that they recognised that all of these models were parsimonious but hence incomplete (ibid. 1999, 11). They hold that all parties are, in principle, policy-seeking, office-seeking *and* vote-seeking and accordingly set out to explore, how parties or, more precisely, party leaders make ‘hard choices’ when these goals conflict (ibid. 1999, 12). Moreover, they identify three kinds of ‘determinants’ for the eventual choice aspects, namely party organisation, political institutions, and situational aspects (ibid. 1999, 15- 27). All of these determinants arguably find their expression in the

context of EU politics generally as well as regarding the particular setting of the EP. For instance, Faas's (2003) analysis mentioned in the introductory chapter partly covers the aspects of party organisation (decentralised vs centralised candidate selection) and political institutions (electoral rules). His analysis arguably neglects situational aspects, among which one might count also the kind of issue characteristics such as salience and distributional effects that were identified by the extant state of the art (see also Chapter 1). In contrast to Müller and Strom's work, however, the aim of the present study is not so much to explain the 'hard choices' between the various goals as such, but also to explain the result of these choices in terms of the structure of conflict as either ideological or territorial. Hence, the next step here is first of all to explain how ideology and nationality (in various ways) relate to these goals. To this end, definitions of 'ideology' and 'national interest' are provided first, before using theories on EU politics from Comparative Politics and International relations, respectively, for the purpose of establishing the link to the different party goals.

Ideologies can be defined as "collections of ideas with intellectually derivable normative implications for behaviour and for how society should be organised" as Hinich and Munger (1994) summarise a handful of definitions by other scholars. In more substantial terms, political ideologies can be seen as sets of ideas regarding a particular conception of human nature, of social structure, justice, liberty, authority, the relation between state and society and the role of the state in the economy (Festenstein and Kenny 2005; Ware 1996). In the daily practice of political scientist (including those working on the EP), the idea of ideology is often reduced to a rather abstract but measurable 'position' on a certain equally abstract political dimension, such as the traditional Left-Right scale or the pro-/anti-EU dimension. The position on such a scale, usually, is meant to capture the preferences of an actor on a whole bunch of policy issues (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006). The position on such a general scale can then be compared to the expressed preferences – equally operationalised as a measurable 'position' – on a subset of policies or just one individual policy. This is done, for instance, in many of the studies of voting behaviour on MEPs cited in Chapter 1 and as such is an absolutely legitimate exercise. Especially for the sections to follow, it is important to clarify and remember, however, that what is abstractly measured as a party's ideological position on a given scale is not the ideology itself. Instead, as was just noted, the ideology itself is *a set of ideas*. This set of ideas, as I point out next, then is one possible determinant of expressed policy preferences that political scientists eventually measure.

Edmund Burke has classically defined a political party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" (Burke quoted in Sartori 2005, 8). This definition of a party may as such be incomplete or even normative rather than descriptive (Pomper 1992, 2), but it captures an aspect about parties that has become established textbook knowledge: parties are formed by "like-minded citizens to promote their shared vision of the common good" (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 413-414). As should become clear given the definitions presented in the preceding paragraph, this vision of the common good shared by the members of a party is precisely what is referred to as a party's ideology. As Volkens and Klingemann put it: "Ideologies in this sense represent the core identities of parties and provide blueprints of alternative

solutions for current problems of society” (2002, 144). The notion of a ‘blueprint’ makes the link between shared beliefs and shared preferences over public policy, at least inasmuch as the members forming a party are concerned. Hence there is a clear link between policy-seeking – the strife for implementation of particular policies for their own sake, i.e. because they appeal to party members in the first place – and ideology, which is the blueprint for preferences for particular policies.

By contrast, vote- or office-seeking members – i.e. members who in a given situation also have to pay attention to these two goals – may be willing to implement policies that are not in line with the respective party’s ideology (cf. Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 10). Noteworthy, Müller and Strom seem to assume that goal conflict in this sense is the rule:

Occasionally, party leaders may find themselves in the fortunate situation that the strategies that maximize one of their objectives are also the best means to the others. Much more commonly, however, there are likely to be trade-offs between their different policy goals, and party leaders find that they have to compromise on some goals in order to reach others. (Müller and Strom 1999b, 10)

However, they do not really provide any theoretical or empirical reasons for this – their case studies, after all, have been chosen intentionally as situations of ‘hard choices’. In fact, it seems possible to make a case in the opposite direction, at least on theoretical grounds, as there are reasons why ideological purity might be compatible with vote-seeking. First, as Downs (c 1957) already argued, ideology allows voters to reduce information costs, because if each party has a clear ideological profile, voters do not have to investigate for each and every issue, what a party’s position will be. Consequently, as Hinich and Munger (1994) hold, parties have an interest in terms vote-seeking in developing a reputation of being ‘credible’. This is because, after all, voters can hardly know whether a party will do what it promised before the election unless they know by experience that the party is trustworthy and will not change its mind on issues already on the agenda and will take predictable positions regarding new issues, which is guaranteed by the internal consistency of an ideology. Parties defecting all too readily might thus lose this credibility. Hence, it may well be the case that goal conflict is much less common than Müller and Strom assume.

In addition, however, a further argument concerning the potential for overlap between ideology-driven policy-seeking and vote-seeking goals should be considered. In line with the work of Kriesi et al. (2012), it is based on the idea that political conflicts in Western Europe still largely relate to so-called ‘cleavages’ as they were conceived first by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). In such a setting, the existing ideologies as sets of ideas informing political parties’ policy-seeking goals are further suited to appeal to particular sets of voters more or less organised in social classes. In this sense, for instance, the so-called class cleavage would consist of a socio-structural basis of a working class opposing a class of capitalists, parties that set out to represent each of these groups by suggesting policy solutions based on ideological frameworks that fit these groups’ concerns (cf. Grande and Kriesi 2012, 9). Hence, when for instance a Socialist party suggests a policy derived from its ideology this would usually be appreciated by the working class who then votes for this party. As Grande and Kriesi (2012) note, it may well be that the traditional cleavages have been transformed to some extent, but that does not make them disappear. As a result, ideologically-driven policy-seeking and vote-seeking would still frequently *not* be at odds.

Indeed, the fact that ideologies have served parties well for navigating through traditional domestic politics may be a reason why national parties will not drop all their ideological convictions when entering the European arena. This is more or less what Marks and Wilson (2000) forward as an argument for applying a cleavage approach to party positions on European integration:

Most political parties have established constituencies and long-standing agendas that mobilise intense commitments on the parts of leaders and activists. Political parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues. The range of a political party's likely responses to a new issue is therefore a product of the ideologies of party leaders and the endogenous constraints of party organization, constituency ties and reputation. In other words, a political party has its own 'bounded rationality', that shapes the way in which it comes to terms with new challenges and uncertainties. (ibid. 2000, 434)

Concerning the issue of European integration, the rationality of parties is particularly bounded, according to Marks and Wilson, as “their policy positions cannot . . . be predicted as an efficient response to electoral incentives” (Marks and Wilson 2000, 435). The reason for this is that for voters, in turn, the issue of European integration so far – i.e. around the turn of the century – has been too complex to grasp in terms of an accurate cost-benefit calculation, so that “the social bases of support and opposition to European integration are indistinct” (Marks and Wilson 2000, 435). Hence, parties continue to use their ideological traditions as ‘prisms’ for interpreting European integration (Marks und Wilson 2000, 435). In principle, what applies to European integration at large might also apply to individual policy issues raised in EU politics and to the respective structures of conflict. The implications of this ‘cleavage approach’ for the structure of conflict in EU politics are thus considered next, before discussing its shortcomings, such as the fact that it takes vote-seeking to be rather irrelevant in EU politics.

If parties generally only had to care about their policy-seeking goals, they could well remain true to their respective ideology whenever formulating policy preferences in EU politics. Hence, it would seem straightforward to find that conflict in the EP is mostly ideologically structured. It is at this point, however, that it was important to state that the concept of an ‘ideologically structured conflict’ was mainly observational, for even Marks and Wilson would account for some, arguably limited, degree of territorialisation. After all, one of the aims of Lipset and Rokkan was to also explain the differences in cleavage structures across countries, which in turn are rooted in national historical circumstances. Accordingly, also Marks and Wilson distinguish various sub-groups of party families, which are not equally supportive of European integration. Thus, insofar as national historical circumstances have shaped an individual party’s ideology in a way that is different from the other family members’ ideologies, the respective party might even decide to defect. For this to happen, however, the intra-ideological variation would have to result in a higher degree of disagreement within the same party family than the respective cleavages would within each country. Hence, ideologically structured conflict would still be the rule.

In a number of ways, the cleavage approach mirrors what Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach provides for the particular context of the EP: there, non-expert MEPs are also held reduce uncertainty for

themselves by looking for ideological focal points in the respective experts' accounts of a given policy, such that the overall result usually is ideologically structured conflict.⁴ Like non-expert MEPs, voters might equally look for ideological focal points only, and if their usual party of choice manages to provide those with regard to EU issues, they will vote for them just like in domestic politics. Indeed, this explanation might build a bridge to the second-order conception of European elections, according to which voters in European elections make their voting decisions over issues of domestic rather than European politics (cf. Reif and Schmitt 1980). It might, however, also share the latter's main shortcoming, namely the failure to account for the fact that EU politics are increasingly politicised, which in turn implies that voters actually *do* have rather clear preferences regarding EU issues (Hooghe and Marks 2012). As a consequence, parties would have to suggest policies that not only correspond to their own policy-seeking goals, but also satisfy voters' EU-specific policy preferences.

If voters' EU-specific policy preferences always paralleled the domestic cleavages, politicisation arguably would not make a difference, as the vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals of national parties would largely overlap in EU politics. As a result, intra-ideological variation would indeed be the only source of defection. The extant literature on the EP, however, generally attributes defection to the presence of so-called 'national interests'. It might be, of course, that this literature has wrongfully made this attribution, confusing intra-ideological variation with national interests. But it might also be the case that national interests are the cause of goal conflict and thus change parties' calculus. In order to theoretically explore whether and why this is the case, however, it must first be clarified what is to be understood by 'national interests' and then how they might actually matter for national parties' goals.

Since national interests are a key concept in the sub-discipline of International Relations (IR), it is here that one has to look for insights first. Classically, Realism has assumed national interests to be stable, in that all states would be striving for wealth, security or power and that these preferences would be always present and well ordered (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 481). This concept of national interests, however, is not suitable for the purposes of this study for three reasons. First of all, it is highly difficult to operationalise for a given policy issue because of its vagueness, and without a precise operationalisation might lend itself to post-rationalisation. Second, the idea of stability of national interests hinges on the conception of political actors in IR as 'statesmen', who according to Morgenthau "will distinguish with Lincoln between their *'official duty'*, which is to think and act in terms of the national interest and their *'personal wish'* which is to see their own moral values and political principles realised throughout the world" (Morgenthau, Michelson, and Davis 1973, p. 7). This idea of political actors as statesmen is however hard to integrate with the idea of party government, where individual in power would be assumed to pursue party goals, arguably biased slightly in the direction of their own benefit (office). Third, national interests of this kind would seem to make any kind of intra-national disagreement over the right course of EU politics almost obsolete and hence its empirical presence – in the EP in particular –

⁴ Noteworthy, however, at least the experts are assumed know their concrete policy preferences. This might be because Ringe's approach refers to concrete legislative proposals, rather than European integration as such.

inexplicable. In fact, EU studies have hardly been influenced by realism in general, and instead have been centred on the debate between neofunctionalist and (liberal) intergovernmentalists.

However, neofunctionalism (Haas 1977) is not very helpful for the purposes of this study either, for it is very much based on the idea that due to the process of European integration, national interests increasingly converge and thus does not lend itself really for the study of conflict. By contrast, intergovernmentalism, and its 'liberal' variant in particular (Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1998), that this study draws on for a discussion of the role of national interests in EU politics. Not only has it been considered "one of the – if not the – most influential accounts of the European integration process" (Cini 2007, 109), even "a touchstone against which all integration theory is now judged" (ibid.), but its core ideas further have been applied successfully in explaining the more day-to-day political conflicts in the Council of the EU (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015). More importantly for the present study, I demonstrate below that it only partly displays the kinds of problems pointed out with regard to realism above.

According to Moravcsik, what governments eventually represent in international negotiations as the 'national interest' is not fixed, but is the result of a domestic process of preference formation. In this process, societal groups articulate their particular interests concerning a given issue vis-à-vis their respective national governments. The basis for their own evaluation of the respective issue is formed by the distributional effects of the measures under discussion, as "[t]he costs and benefits of policy coordination are often unevenly distributed among and within nations, rendering nearly inevitable a measure of international and domestic conflict between winners and losers" (Moravcsik 1993, 486–87). Moravcsik further holds that societal groups are not equally successfully in making their voice heard. As he argues:

Most important among these winners and losers are producers. The systematic political bias in favor of existing producer groups and against those, notably consumers, taxpayers, third-country producers, and also potential future producers, stems from the former's more intense, certain, and institutionally represented organised interests. Producers may exert direct, instrumental pressure on politicians or may wield structural power, as when a desire to encourage business investment and growth requires the satisfaction of broad business demands. (Moravcsik 1998, 36)

This producer bias is so strong that, he finds, governments actually never oppose strong producer interest groups. In short, from a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the national interest is determined by the distributional effects a given integrative measure has on the national producers. Thereby, this theory provides a clear conception of 'national interests' and points to distributional effects as the main determinant of the structure of conflict.

Noteworthy, while governments do what producers want them to do and represent their views at the European level as their country's 'national interest', this does not mean that this is the optimal policy for the nation as a whole (Moravcsik 1993, 487). This, clearly, stands in sharp contrast to the realist idea of 'statesmen'. Just as the idea of stable national interests in the realist conception rests on the idea of government actors as 'statesmen', however, the liberal idea of domestic formation of national interests is based on a particular idea of government actors as 'agents' of societal groups:

For liberals, the relationship between society and the government is assumed to be one of principal-agent; societal principals delegate power to (or otherwise constrain) governmental agents. The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a

coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations. (Moravcsik 1993, 483)

The exact relationship differs by policy area, since “[d]ifferent policy areas engender characteristic distributions of costs and benefits for societal groups, from which follow variations in patterns of domestic political mobilization, opportunities for governments to circumvent domestic opposition, and motivations for international co-operation” (Moravcsik 1993, 488). Occasionally, however, governmental ‘agents’ are able to follow their own agenda. He points out two extreme scenarios: On the one hand, if producers can know for sure that costs/benefits of a policy will be high, they will strongly pressure the government to oppose/support it, leaving not much room for manoeuvre on the part of the government. On the other hand, where the exact distributional effects are uncertain or negligible, governments enjoy some leeway (Moravcsik 1993, 487–88). So how exactly do governments use such opportunities?

Moravcsik mainly describes two alternatives, which he derives from alternative explanations of European integration and which he both subsumes under the heading of ‘geopolitics’. One alternative, is the pursuit of ‘broader’ goals, derived mainly from neo-realism. From this perspective, economic co-operation will be pursued only as a result of considerations on national security, which also means that they often take a longer-term perspective (Moravcsik 1993, 494). The other option for governments is to follow the personal, ideological commitments of their leaders, e.g. in terms of more nationalist or federal (as pro-integrationist) attitudes (Moravcsik 1998, 27). Importantly, however, according to Moravcsik, both of these options would never matter more than economic considerations (Moravcsik 1998, 6–7). Especially the latter option is important here, as it is more likely to apply to the kinds of conflict to be explained in this study and as it has implications for the structure of conflict as either ideological or territorial.

Indeed, this theory – as it is – might very well allow for deriving hypotheses for the structure of conflict, while remaining within the framework of what I have called a national party approach: If national parties behaved like national governments as theorised by Moravcsik, the structure of conflict in EU politics will generally be territorial, with issue-specific coalitions being defined by the distributional effects a policy has for the producers across countries. The reason for this is that for vote- and eventually office-seeking reasons, parties would be assumed to depend on producer groups’ support. Ideologically structured conflict would only be possible whenever there is uncertainty over distributional effects of a policy, so that parties are not bound in terms of votes and office by a particular societal mandate and instead are free to pursue their policy-seeking goals. Thus it is obviously possible to apply Moravcsik’s theory to national parties rather than to governments as well as to policy issues rather than Treaty negotiations on integrative measures.

This transfer, however, is not without flaws, for while the term ‘government’ is easily replaced with the term ‘parties’, the calculus might not be exactly the same, even less so in an increasingly politicised EU. First, inasmuch as distributional effects are concerned, it is the producer bias assumed by Moravcsik that might be questioned. First of all, if the goal of policy-seeking is considered as a goal on

equal par with the other goals, one might argue that the members of the various political parties for ideological reasons are not equally supportive of producer interests. Parties of the Left – in the sense of both the traditional class cleavage or of the ‘new politics’ cleavage – might in fact see it as part of their mission to change policy to the advantage of workers or consumers, respectively, and thus often to the detriment of producers. By contrast, from Moravcsik’s perspective, it appears that policy-seeking goals are only pursued whenever uncertainty leaves the necessary leeway to do so. Admittedly, this would seem rational in so far as votes are instrumental to changing policy at all, and for this reason such a ranking is assumed also here.

Yet, even when assuming policy-seeking to be secondary to vote-seeking, the assumption of a producer bias applying equally to all parties is problematic. Interestingly, it is again the process of increasing politicisation that, while earlier making the pro-ideology biased cleavage approach less plausible, now serves to balance the pro-territory biased liberal intergovernmentalism. Given politicisation, not only producers, but more or less all citizens (and hence voters) should be increasingly interested and informed about EU politics and its distributional consequences. According to Hooghe and Marks, this should weaken the producer bias:

Mass politics trumps interest group politics when both come into play. Interest groups are most effective when they have the field to themselves. When the spotlight of politicisation is turned on an issue, when political parties and the public are focussed on an issue, interest group lobbying may actually be counterproductive. Public debate in the context of elections and referendums pre-empts the efforts of small, highly motivated groups to control outcomes. (Hooghe and Marks 2012, 845)

In line with a liberal view of society, it might often be impossible to equally represent producer groups and other societal interests. This will be the especially whenever the costs and benefits of an EU policy are unevenly distributed within countries, which indeed also Moravcsik would expect to be the case regularly, as was noted above. The difference is, however, that in a politicised EU, parties cannot simply focus on pleasing producers. Instead, parties thus have to make a choice about whom to represent, or at least whom to represent primarily, as so-called mainstream parties might try not to scare off any societal groups completely. In such a situation they are likely to fall back to the old cleavages, such that in fact, vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals overlap again, which would entail an ideologically structured conflict. In other words, in a politicised EU, one would expect that distributional effects would not only shape the line of conflict between parties from countries with winning producers versus those with losing producers, but would also shape conflict within these countries along existing intra-national cleavages.

By adapting Moravcsik’s theory for the needs of the present study, one thus arrives at a general model that in parts corresponds to the theoretical framework that Marks (2004) presents in his conclusion on an edited volume on European integration and political conflict: he develops a model that, as in Moravcsik’s case, largely builds on the role of distributional effects for the structure of conflict. However, he explicitly distinguishes intra-national and cross-national distributional effects of a policy. If the former prevail regarding a given policy, the respective conflict will be ideological. By contrast, if the distributional effects of a policy are primarily inter- or cross-national, the conflict will be territorially structured instead. Noteworthy, Marks himself does not go very much into detail with regard to the causal

processes behind these expectations. Before the background of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection, however, it is possible to elaborate on this point and evaluate the plausibility of the model at the same time.

First of all, one must recall that any party, even in European elections, can only win votes from a within its own national electorate. Vote-seeking, thus, is always tied to a particular national territory, as it will never as such pay off to please voters from other Member States. Consider now, for instance, an individual national party that, for historical reasons, has grown to be the representative of the respective domestic producers and has adopted a generally producer-friendly ideology. If then producers in general tend to be the losers from a policy envisaged at the EU level, the party in question has a vote-seeking incentive to oppose the policy. If the policy is to the advantage of other domestic groups such as consumers or workers, it is plausible that the parties mostly representing these groups end up in the opposite camp, so that the overall structure will be ideological as usual. However, it might also be the case that the envisaged policy only harms the producers of this one country, while it benefits producers of other countries. In other words, there is cross-national distribution among producers. In such a situation, the party in question might oppose the policy although the producer-friendly counterparts from other countries – who given their general producer-friendliness are likely to be part of the same EPG – are in favour. Hence, in this situation of goal conflict, the individual party representing the losing producers might actually decide to defect in order not to lose votes from its core constituency, thereby skipping its own ideological convictions for the time being.

As was argued in the preceding section, such an individual defection does not imply full-scale territorialisation. The latter will only occur if the distributional effects of the policy are, on the whole, primarily cross-national. For the other parties from the same country as the individually defecting party might not have an incentive to leave their policy-seeking goals behind as long as their own core constituency wins from the policy as there is also some considerable intra-national distribution. It must now be noted, however, that the vast majority of voters (in most cases more over 90 per cent) tends to identify more strongly with their nation than they do with Europe (cf. Risse 2010). Hence, already if the other societal groups in the country do not directly lose from the policy, they would consequently prefer seeing their own producer groups win. This is why, as soon as cross-national distribution in this sense is stronger than the intra-national distributional effects, further territorialisation of conflict is to follow. Noteworthy, there also is a minority of citizens who identify more strongly with Europe than with their own country, so that any party who counts such as citizens among its core constituency would not follow suit in this particular setting.

Obviously, if a country is on the whole worse off from a policy, for instance because some system of cross-country financial transfers is established, all parties in the country losing from the system might accordingly have a vote-seeking incentive to oppose such transfer (and vice versa). Inasmuch as it entails personal losses for the generally Europhile minority, this should include even parties representing the latter. Hence the general assumption (e.g. McKay, 2002; Risse, 2010) that large-scale redistributive policies are politically impossible in the EU. Nevertheless, such a system of financial transfers is of course

only relevant for actors who actually care about material values. Before this background, it must be noted here that Marks's definition of distributional effects reaches beyond such purely material considerations, in that he, first, speaks of distribution of 'values' much more generally and second, he points out: "Distribution (or allocation) of values involves who is allowed to do what as well as who gets what" (ibid., 2004, 248). That said, it usually is of course easier to actually operationalise and capture the material aspects of distribution, especially in large-N studies.

What has been achieved then by first discussing liberal intergovernmentalism and then what I would call Marks's 'distribution model' is that territorial interests have been made more concrete in terms of cross-national distributional effects. In how far these are 'national' interests in the full sense of the word may vary, of course. Assuming, for instance, that EU legislation on CO₂-emissions of cars leaves German car producers worse off but leads to a reduction in the future costs of climate change for the rest of the EU citizens – including Germans!, parties representing German car producers might of course claim to defend 'the' national interest and might even defect from their EPG. Nevertheless, territorialisation would only result from this if also the other parties perceived a vote-seeking incentive in defending the German car industry, which some of them in this case possibly will not. As a result, only if 'national interests' are literally the interests of the nation as a whole will they lead to a complete territorialisation of conflict.

Prior to considering the shortcoming of the distribution model, even in the more elaborate version provided here, another insight from Marks and Steenbergen's (2004) work must be considered. As they find, distributional effects as entailed by the implications of a policy for the EU budget, for instance, are not the only condition that can lead to a territorial structure of conflict. In addition, the varieties (or types) of capitalism found in the Member States also seem to influence the preferences of both parties and voters (Marks 2004). Before the background of the theoretical considerations so far, there are two reasons why this might be the case. First, in line with the cleavage approach, it might be that the types of capitalism have worked as historical forces leading to intra-ideological variation, so that parties and voters wanting to reduce uncertainty by means of ideology will be influenced in their preference formation by the respective type. Second, inasmuch as, for instance, a certain policy leaves firms rooted in one type of capitalism better or worse off than those from another type, there might be indirect cross-national distributional effects working in the manner laid out above. The type of capitalism thus constitutes another manifestation of how nationality can shape the policy preferences of parties.

The main problem with Marks's model is, however, quite apparent before the background of the theories discussed prior to this distribution-centred model. As was mentioned above, Moravcsik points out that the distributional effects of a policy are not always certain, leaving some leeway to – in his framework – national governments for pursuing their ideological predilections in terms of nationalism or federalism. As is argued next, the so-called 'post-functionalist' theory of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009) includes some considerations on the role of uncertainty, but needs to be elaborated for the present purposes in several ways.

This ‘postfunctionalist theory of European integration’ is, in fact, an attempt to come to terms with the failures of earlier theories of integration – the already mentioned liberal intergovernmentalism as well as neofunctionalism⁵– to account for failing referenda on European treaty reforms, amongst others. These are explained as a consequence of the process of politicisation as the involvement of the broader masses of citizens in EU politics. By bringing in these masses, it is argued, there are now actors involved who “have neither the knowledge nor the time to figure out their economic interests in relation to European integration” (ibid., 2009, 10), and hence they might rely on so-called ‘cues’.

Political parties, amongst others, might try to provide such cues and might do so along the lines of classic notions of Left and Right, but a further cue, according to Hooghe and Marks, is ‘identity’ (ibid, 10-11). Identity refers to the degree to which a person identifies with his or her nation-state or the EU, respectively. Here, it is decisive whether a person disposes of an exclusive or inclusive national identity. The former identify with their nation-state only, while the latter identify most with their nation-state, but also with some notion of a European community (cf. Risse 2010). This, in turn, is said to influence the openness of a person to Euroscepticism (i.e. opposition to European integration) (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 13). According to Hooghe and Marks, such identities become causally important for the structure of conflict “to the extent that an issue has (a) opaque economic implications and (b) transparent communal implications that are (c) debated in public forums b (d) mass organizations rather than specialized interest groups” (ibid.). This implies that, for identity to become politically relevant, however, identity must be used by political parties.

If parties compete by cueing on identity, Hooghe and Marks point out, the conflict will not evolve any longer along the lines of traditional, economic Left and Right, but will evolve along the lines of a non-economic left-right dimension, also referred to as green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) dimension. On this dimension, right-wing populists and nationalists form the TAN pole, as “[t]hey oppose European integration for the same reasons that they oppose immigration: it undermines national community” (ibid. 2009, 17). Conservative parties also lean more to the TAN pole, whereas Green parties are closest to the GAL pole, and Centre-Left parties sit uncomfortably in between (given the economically liberal features of integration). Taking identity into account would thus seem to provide additional explanatory potential for the structure of conflict. Another part of the post-functional theory is concerned with the idea of political elites ‘politicizing’ an issue, partly by deciding in which arena it shall be debated and decided upon (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 18–21). If, however, the goal is to eventually understand conflict in the European Parliament, these considerations are arguably negligible, for issues discussed and decided in the EP have already made it on this particular institutions agenda.

In sum, then, what is gained by including the post-functionalists arguments for the present purpose of identifying the conditions for defection and eventual territorialisation? On the hand, there are

⁵ Neofunctionalism is explicitly not included here, as it is much more based on the idea of shared interests rather than conflict.

parts included in the theory which, in some sense, seem to provide less additional explanatory potential than is claimed by Hooghe and Marks. They claim, for instance, that the inclusion of identity “sharply differentiates postfunctionalism from neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism” (ibid., 2009, 13). Nevertheless, conflict along the GAL-TAN dimension simply constitutes another form of ideologically structured conflict, one that, amongst others, becomes particularly relevant for what Hooghe and Marks call ‘jurisdictional’ issues, i.e. those issues fulfilling condition (b) in the above list. Apart from treaty changes, these issues are arguably less pronounced in EU politics. Moreover, their condition (a) – opaqueness of distributional effects – resembles Moravcsik’s considerations on (un)certainty of distributional effects, and so does the structure of conflict: ideological, between nationalists (Moravcsik) or individuals with exclusive national identities (Hooghe and Marks) versus more federalist actors (Moravcsik) or individuals who at least identify somewhat with Europe (Hooghe and Marks).

On the other hand, however, Moravcsik saw nationalist and federalist ideologies as influencing the preferences of governmental elites (under uncertainty only, of course), whereas Hooghe and Marks point out the relevance of identity for preferences over integration among the masses of citizens. What is more, they further point out that it takes political elites to make use of the possibility to cue citizens along the lines of identity, and it is here, probably, that the more interesting part of their contribution lies: they recognise that identity as such does not necessarily lead to any policy preferences, but needs to be translated by political parties. Thereby, political parties themselves become actors in the sense that they a certain range for actively shaping the structure of conflict.

At this point, various theoretical approaches to the structure of conflict in EU politics have been reviewed and put in a relation to each other, including those stemming clearly from Comparative Politics or International Relations traditions as well as those meant to reintegrate the two for the purpose of understanding the conflict in the particular European setting. What has been achieved thereby was to explain how ideology and nationality (including national interests as well as national traditions) might shape the expressed policy preferences of national political parties in a post-Crisis EU: namely due to the interaction of general party goals and conditions such as politicisation – assumed to be a general feature of post-Crisis EU politics, the scope and direction of distributional effects as well as their (un)certainty. As was pointed out, the latter condition of uncertainty is considered by various theoretical strands as conducive to ideologically structured conflict due to the rhetorical room for manoeuvre it provides the political actors with.




Figure 3: A theoretical framework for conflict in the EP based on structural constraints. Source: Own compilation.

To some extent, this latter aspect is in line with Ringe's (2010) idea about the structure of policy preferences in the EP: Ringe assumes that most MEPs do not possess sufficient information or lack the expertise to judge the abundant information with regard to most policy issues, i.e. they thus find themselves in a situation of uncertainty. For Ringe, however, this state of uncertainty does not apply to a number of policy-specific expert MEPs, who provide their colleagues with – mostly ideological, but sometimes also national – focal points that serve as informational shortcuts allowing non-experts to make a decision. Since experts within an EPG strive to agree on ideological focal points for strategic reasons (amongst others, greater cohesion gives them more leverage to actually get their preferred policy adopted), the overall structure of conflict would thus be ideological most of the time. Both the condition (uncertainty) and outcome (ideological conflict) are thus the same, whether we follow the theoretical arguments made in this section based on a national party approach or Ringe's EP-specific model.

However, I have criticised in the preceding chapter already that within Ringe's approach, the limitations of expert MEPs' capacity to shape the structure of conflict – usually towards an ideological direction – are not clearly named. Most importantly with regard to the present research question, it did not become clear why exactly they would *ever* give in to national interests such that the structure of conflict would be territorialised, given that they seemed to have basically unlimited power to set focal points as well as an interest in agreeing on an ideological one. Ringe was thus able to explain the overall pattern of conflict in the EP for most issues, but any exception to the rule would be hard to account for.

By contrast, the theoretical approaches considered above generally do not seem to assume that uncertainty about distributional effects is a constant feature of EU politics. Rather, uncertainty of distributional effects appears to apply more to some aspects of integration than to others. Consequently, it seems that there are limits to the capacity political parties to actively shape the structure of conflict, for when uncertainty does not prevail, they mainly seem to react to stimuli such as distributional effects for reasons of vote-seeking. The idea of such issue-related variance in uncertainty becomes highly plausible once a number of simple examples is considered. For instance, a permanent system of fiscal transfers explicitly designed to redistribute resources from rich to poor Member States, such as it was occasionally discussed in the context of the Crisis, would have quite certain distributional effects (at least in the short term), in that winners and losers of such a system would be easily identified. By contrast, for most voters the exact distributional effects of the EU's internal market, for instance, remain much more opaque. While, given politicisation, this does not mean that they do not form preferences in this respect, political parties might indeed have a better chance of not being punished for a particular position on this issue or even of shaping voters' preferences in their turn. Yet, the idea that uncertainty is issue-related rather than simply omnipresent would seem to define both the potential and limitations of national parties' (and, by assumption, MEPs') capacity to actively shape the structure of conflict.

Obviously, this idea of uncertainty as an issue-related condition can at best form a starting point for further elaboration, since neither Moravcsik nor Hooghe and Marks explain exactly why, how and in how far actors are able and willing to make effective usage of the alleged 'leeway'. The link between parties' strategic options in terms of communication and the eventual structure of conflict is thus elaborated in more detail in the next section. As is shown thereby, the ways in which parties find themselves able 'give reasons' is an important element in understanding their choice for defection or loyalty in a politicised European Union.

2.3 Using the 'leeway': The potential and limitations of framing in EU politics

In this section, it is suggested that political parties generally try to actively persuade their voters by giving reasons (referred to elsewhere as a 'Rikerian' perspective), rather than just passively responding to their preferences shaped in turn by structural conditions ('Rokkanian' view, respectively). They are assumed to do so by making use of often pre-existing 'policy frames', which can be understood as lines of argument narrowing down the social phenomenon to a particular set of norms and values, a problem definition, a causal narrative as well as a corresponding policy 'solution'. The actual potential for framing EU policy issues have only been slightly touched upon by the extant literature. In this study, therefore, inspired by recent advances in theorizing on party competition in two-dimensional policy spaces, four framing strategies at the issue level are suggested and linked to the various combinations of structural conditions identified beforehand. It is argued, that without politicisation, certainty or cross-national distribution, parties can simply stick to their ideological 'prism' in a manner predicted by the cleavage theory. Even if these conditions are present but intra-national distribution is at stake as well, a so-called blurring strategy that mixes various policy frames but remains predominantly ideologically driven might seem preferable for some parties (depending on the exact shape of intra-national distribution) over full-scale defection. Consequently, only if the short-term electoral benefits of non-defection will outweigh potential losses in policy-seeking and long-term credibility will parties actually defect, which will usually only be the case if their core electorate is directly affected. National traditions may ease this step and guide the precise shape of defection (i.e. the choice of the frame), because they can generally be assumed to resonate well with the national electorate and reduce the loss of credibility due to conspicuously strategic behaviour. The section is concluded by a summary of the overall theoretical framework thus far, now including an elaborate micro level component.

Giving reasons as framing: Towards a more Rikerian approach to party politics in the EU

A unifying feature for most of the theoretical considerations discussed in the preceding section has been a focus on structure, which is typical for what Rovny (2015) calls the ‘Rokkanian’ tradition of theorising party competition (including the structure of conflict). This was advantageous with regard to identifying what arguably constitutes a major constrain on parties’ or MEPs’ capacity to set focal points with a view to convince others, a feature more or less absent from Ringe’s PPC approach. The latter simply takes uncertainty to be an almost omnipresent feature of EP politics, whereas above, it was conceptualised as issue-dependent. Noteworthy, however, the post-functionalist theory of European integration slightly departs from the Rokkanian tradition, which still clearly dominated Marks’s distribution model, in that – within the confines of uncertainty – it conceives of parties as actors of actively shaping the structure of conflict, rather than being driven by structural imperatives. It thereby slightly approaches what Rovny contrastingly refers to as the ‘Rikerian’ tradition (cf. *ibid.*), where the structure of conflict is shaped by parties’ strategic considerations and, most notably, is actively manipulated by them.

This tradition is integrated into the present theoretical framework for two reasons. First, the aspects of post-functionalism falling into this tradition are yet underspecified in the version presented by Hooghe and Marks (2009). Second, given that there is an empirical gap in the extant literature on conflict in the EP when it comes to the study of the reasons parties give for their stances on EU policies, this strand of literature appears particularly helpful: the fact that parties *do* give reasons at all for their expressed policy preferences is crucial within this tradition, as it is part of the causal chain explaining the eventual structure of conflict. What might be called the Rikerian tradition, as a way of thinking about political conflict, is the basic idea that by manipulation issue definitions, by adding dimensions of choice, and by focusing attention on a particular aspect of a debate, it is actually possible the influence voters’ ideal points, or, less abstractly, *convince* them (Riker 1986; 1996). In other words, parties take on an active role, rather than simply responding to pre-existing preferences of voters, and the way they give reasons can only be understood by attributing this active role to them. In turn, the structure of conflict will not simply refer voters’ preferences, but will reflect the strategic choices available to parties. This is why the neglect of theoretical and empirical investigation on ‘giving reasons’ in the EP literature should finally be compensated for. It is in this sense, that Riker is seen by some as the pioneer of the expanding literature on the influence of ‘framing’ (Riker himself uses the concept of ‘heresthetics’) on the structure of political conflict (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008, 442; see also: Daviter 2007). Admittedly, Marks and Hooghe take up the concept of ‘framing’ as well as that of ‘cueing’ for explaining how parties can make use of uncertainty (2009, 13). Especially with regard to the former, however, there is yet room for further elaboration.

This is because the so-called ‘cues’ might be considered as the more superficial of these two mechanisms. They “provide informational shortcuts that may enable voters that tend to be poorly informed about political issues to make decisions as if they were well informed”, as Bechtel et al. (2015, 686) summarise with reference to the works of Lupia and Druckmann. This might mean, for instance, that

voters support a certain policy based simply on the fact that they support the actor (or group of actors) suggesting it. Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue that national party's evaluations of European integration strongly influence the position on integration within their national electorates, and in their later post-functional theory point to the potential for using national identity as a cue (ibid., 2009). Within Ringe's (2010) PPC framework, one might also consider the shared membership of an EPG or even national party delegation within the European Parliament as a kind of cue that makes MEPs generally more receptive to the focal points provided by their fellow nationals. As one variant of this, it can be argued that simply *claiming* to represent the national interest can function as a cue for poorly informed citizens, something which national governments are generally assumed to do (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 22). That said, depending on which kinds of identities they try to play on – exclusive or inclusive national identity, European identity – they might present a given policy as being in the national, the national and European or generally European interest, respectively. If however more or less all actors do so, there arguably will be competing interpretations of the national interest, so that actors will further be forced to provide the most convincing interpretation of the issue at stake. Additionally, politicisation of EU politics also implies that a decreasing number of voters is sufficiently uninformed to be guided by cues *only*.

Hence, 'framing' as a much more sophisticated technique should be more significant and will form a core element of the rest of the present study, also because of the way it is defined by Entmann:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. (ibid., 1993, 52; emphasis in the original)

Framing, then, is a more precise notion for what has so far been considered here as 'giving reasons' or justifications (cf. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 498) and yet in this definition is directly linked to a given policy for which an actor expresses a preference and thereby is linked to the eventual structure of conflict. Indeed, it is assumed here that political actors are almost permanently framing issues, as there is a general societal expectation that politicians justify their decisions, while at the same time, it seems hardly feasible to present an issue in a manner that pays equal attention to all possibly attached values, causes, definitions and, most obviously, all possible policy solutions. Rather, political actors are likely to frame issues strategically, and, to make the link to Ringe's PPC approach, provide the right focal points, which one might think of as the various elements of a frame, to non-expert colleagues and voters. The question thus is, however, how exactly parties in EU politics make their framing decisions, and in particular when and how their frames lead the structure of conflict to be ideological or territorial.

In fact, this study is by no means the first to consider the role of strategic communication in terms of 'cueing' or 'framing' in the EU more generally. Even before developing their post-functionalist theory of European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2005) had explored, albeit rather indirectly, the influence of the political party positions as providers of cues on public opinion. While focussing on the domain of biotechnology policy, Falk Daviter (2007; 2009; 2011) has pointed out in much detail the ways in which framing has shaped both the structure of conflict and policy outcomes at the EU level. In addition, Mark Rhinard (2010) has examined the Commission's capacity to shape policy by means of

framing even in policy domains that are as entrenched as the Common Agricultural Policy, while others have analysed how lobbyists use framing in order to influence policy-makers (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008; Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper 2015). This list may not be exhaustive, but in general it appears that framing as a tool in party competition at the EU level, be it by national parties directly or via their MEPs, has apparently not been studied extensively yet. After all, Daviter (2007; 2009; 2011) mainly seems to consider the EP largely as a more or less unitary actor within an inter-institutional conflict. Finally, while Helbling et al. (2010) analyse how parties frame European integration, they do so on a rather broad scale, with the issues of the European Constitution and Turkish accession serving as examples of deepening and widening, respectively. The latter issues, clearly, are about polity, but less about politics. Indeed, when it comes to political conflict within the EP, framing as an element of strategic communication by MEPs vis-à-vis their voters has not been discussed so far.

Recently, there have been some noteworthy advances in theorising party competition in two-dimensional policy spaces, with one dimension concerning the classic Left-Right dimension, the other a territorial one, in the context of national politics (Elias, Szocsik, and Zuber 2015). They have been developed with a view to account for party behaviour in a setting where mainstream parties competing along traditional cleavages (and preferring to continue doing so) are confronted with a more or less new competitor in the shape of an ethnoregionalist party raising issues that are not traditionally part of the older cleavages. Noteworthy, both the strategies of mainstream parties in reacting to these new challenges as well as the strategies for the newcomers trying to develop a broader profile are considered (*ibid.*, 2015, 843–46). It is easy to see the parallels to a politicised EU where, as pointed out by the cleavage approach (Marks and Wilson 2000), mainstream parties would as such prefer to continue competition on integration issues along the lines of established cleavages but – as I have pointed out in my critique of this approach – there is potential also for a territorial dimension. Right-wing populist parties might have pushed this dimension in particular, as Hooghe and Marks (2009) note. Indeed, Elias et al. (2015) at one point use parties' positioning on European integration issues as an example of one particular strategy, namely 'subsuming' (*ibid.*, 846). It thus seems promising to discuss in some detail the possible transfers of the 'tool box' (*cf. ibid.*, 840) of strategies available to parties in such a two-dimensional setting to the particular setting of EU politics.

Before doing so in the next subsection, the four strategies as presented by Elias et al. (2015, 843–46) are briefly introduced here. First, there is the so-called 'uni-dimensional strategy', which means that parties basically ignore the dimension that for them is secondary. Using examples from the original setting of national politics entered by a regionalist party, this would mean that mainstream parties continue to position themselves only on the economic Left-Right dimension, whereas their regionalist challengers focus only on what in this case is the territorial dimension. Second, there is the so-called blurring strategy, where parties take "vague, contradictory, or ambiguous positions" concerning issues that tap on their respective secondary dimension, so that they "at least do not deter voters on these issues" (Rovny, 2013, 5-6, quoted in Elias et al. 2015, 844). Third, parties might engage in 'subsuming', in that they frame an issue in such a way that it seems to fit into their usual, preferred dimension. They might, for example, talk

about an issue of territorial relevance as a more general problem of economic inequality. Fourth, parties could adopt a fully two-dimensional strategy, and actually “take clear, distinguishable positions on issues that belong to both dimensions” (ibid., 2015, 845). If, for example, an ethno-regionalist party wants to attract votes from a wider electorate than those voters who sufficient care about the territorially dimension, they need to offer an explicit programme also on economic issues.

While these four constitute the strategic tool box available to parties within two-dimensional policy spaces, this does not imply that they are completely free in choosing their strategies. Indeed, as Rovny (2015) concludes, there are structural constraints that need to be taken into account as well. According to Rovny, future research should thus be aware of possible deeper social divides pertaining to, amongst others, economic inequalities, institutional imperatives, organizational characteristics or political issue frames (ibid., 917). Given that the focus of the literature discussed in the preceding section was indeed on structural determinants, this study is now in a highly advantageous position: structural considerations can be *directly* integrated when trying to take inspiration from the theoretical framework on strategies in two-dimensional spaces to EU politics.

As for institutional and organisational constraints, especially those that related to the particular institutional environment within which MEPs find themselves, I have already noted that these will be discussed in some detail in a later section (Section 2.4). The limitations set by what Rovny might mean by ‘political issue frames’, or ‘policy frames’ as I will refer to them throughout, are considered quite important here indeed: also for methodological reasons (see Chapter 3), I assume that actors in EU politics, especially outside executive institutions disposing of high administrative capacity, do not constantly rhetorically reinvent the wheel, in that most of the time, they choose among a set of pre-existing, policy-specific frames that they adapt only slightly to the particular question at hand. This assumption seems justified insofar as most actors outside the executive do neither have the resources to be overly innovative nor do they have a rationale to do so frequently, since focal points included in the frames that are already somewhat familiar have a much better chance to resonate with the public. Indeed, it might even be the case that they are provided with such frames by societal groups that they are lobbied by and in turn wish to represent, or at least engage in exchanges with them. Thus, in the next subsection, it is discussed how parties make their choices among existing frames rather than how they come to create new frames necessarily.

Integrating Rokkan and Riker: How communication strategies structure conflict in EU politics

Before coming to the substantive transfer of the theory on party strategies in two-dimensional spaces from national to European politics, an important clarification must be made here so that the structural considerations on conflict in EU politics (see Section 2.2) can be integrated with these strategic ones. This clarification concerns the fact that the theoretical framework outlined by Elias et al. (2015) mostly refers to the two-dimensions of a political space at large, with dimensions constituted of many different issues, whereas a. the structure of conflict as defined in Section 2.2 always concerns a particular policy issue and b. the structural parameters in terms of distributional effects and uncertainty are considered to be issue-

related. This also implies that framing efforts discussed here will always concern so-called ‘policy frames’, as was briefly mentioned in the preceding subsection.

Table 1: The four dimensions of a policy frame

| dimension | normative | constitutive | cognitive | policy |
|-------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| function | Attach values, judge, evaluate | Label and identify something as a ‘problem’ | Provide causal narratives | Suggest remedy |
| question | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? | What is the problem? | What has led to the problem? | What should be done about the problem? |
| Example (agricultural policy) | Frame A: Food production, food safety → farming as an end in itself | Frame A: Economic uncertainty of farming, extreme price volatility | Frame A: Farming is special, an industry apart that cannot be made subject to market laws because of weather conditions and rigidity of demand; food speculation enhances the problem | Frame A: Market intervention; safety net for young farmers |
| | Frame B: efficiency | Frame B: Market distortions and their social cost | Frame B: wrong incentives set by subsidies | Frame B: Liberalisation, i.e. more market orientation, no more subsidies (at least cut CAP budget) |

With Radulova (2011) I define policy frames as consisting of four dimensions, which I illustrate by drawing on the example of the so-called Euro crisis (see Table 1). The first is the normative dimension which “pertains to the function of the frame to judge and attach values to phenomena from the social reality” (ibid. 2011, 43). It can be summarised in the question: “What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem?” (ibid. 2011, 91). In this sense, for instance, the situation in Greece will not be a problem for the other Member States if there is no connection whatsoever – e.g. economic interdependences or solidarity – between Greece and the others. Secondly, the constitutive dimension “pertains to the function of the frame to label and identify various social phenomena as problems” (ibid. 2011, 43) and answers the question “What is the problem?” (ibid. 2011, 90). Thirdly, the cognitive dimension “pertains to the function of the frame to narrate about what has led to the problem and thus to present social reality in terms of cause-effect relations” (ibid. 2011, 44). Rising interest rates on state bonds may be framed as the result of either an irresponsible budgetary policy or financial speculation. Obviously, such causal narratives matter for the policies that would appear suitable to remedy the problem. The latter constitute the policy dimension (What can be done about the problem?). As Radulova notes, “[p]ublic policies are typically based on policy frames that implicitly or explicitly contain the four dimensions” (ibid., 44). In sum, it should become clear that the four dimensions of a policy frame mirror the aspects of a frame as defined above with reference to Entmann (i.e. problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation). Yet, a policy frame is much more issue-specific and hence is different from the kinds of frames studied by, for example, Helbling et al. (2010) as ‘economic’,

‘nationalistic’ or ‘cosmopolitan’, which at this level of abstraction might be applied across issues belonging to the broad area of ‘European integration’.




Figure 4: The social reality of Common Agricultural Policy as seen through different frames. Source: own compilation.

Another possible hindrance to a one-to-one transfer results from the fact that the concept of a ‘territorial dimension’ is not the same as a territorial structure of conflict in the sense defined above. This is not to say that there is no comparable territorial dimension, also known as the pro-/anti-EU dimension, in EU politics, with Right-wing populist or nationalist parties challenging European integration as such in a similar manner as ethno-regionalist parties challenge national unity in the context studied by Elias et al. (2015). Nor shall it be denied thereby that these parties competing on this dimension have contributed to politicisation as a general game changer in EU politics, in that it requires all parties to take this dimension into account. In EU studies, there indeed also is a vivid discussion concerning the question in how far the pro-/anti-EU or territorial dimension constitutes a second dimension or in how far it overlaps with the traditional, economic Left-Right or at least the GAL-TAN dimension (cf. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Yet, even if one assumes that this is an independent second dimension, I still argue here that a party’s position on this dimension is equally informed by its respective ideology and will equally lead to an ideologically structured conflict as defined above, namely with parties with more pro-European ideologies opposing anti-Europeans both within their own countries and in other countries.

By contrast, what is to be explained by the present study, is the choice of a national party to defect or not to defect from its ideology, with this micro-level decision potentially leading to a macro-level territorialisation of conflict. If they do so, it was argued in the preceding section, they will do so because of issue-specific goal conflicts between ideology-driven policy-seeking and territory-based vote-seeking, a situation that arises only because of the particular setting of EU politics. To defect would mean resolving the goal conflict by deciding in favour of vote-seeking. The point of discussing the four strategies identified by Elias et al. for the present study then is not necessarily to transfer these strategies directly, but to think about similar kinds strategies that can be applied with a view to avoid defection once a party more or less deliberately takes a position on a given issue.

If the structural constraints in terms of politicisation, distributional effects and uncertainty are integrated into the transfer of the framing strategies, it soon becomes clear that, while the four different strategies – or their equivalents for the present context of defection and territorialisation – might in principle all be available, they are not always equally attractive for national parties in EU politics. Before politicisation, parties might not have been under any vote-seeking pressure, even if some competitor invoked actual or alleged national interests: as long as nobody cared about EU politics at all and people would indeed use European elections as second-order elections only, as claimed by Reiff and Schmitt (1980), the equivalent of a ‘uni-dimensional’ strategy would have been to ignore any national interest and simply to interpret EU issues from a strictly ideological perspective. In doing so, the party would focus on just those aspects of a social phenomenon that can be grasped and made sense of by its own ideology without much further ado, e.g. the labour-related aspects of migration in case of a Social Democratic party. This behaviour would correspond to the ‘cleavage approach’ discussed earlier (Marks and Wilson 2000). Parties who, by chance, find themselves in a situation where national interest and ideology overlap completely regarding a given issue, can of course stick to this strategy. This also means, that the alternative strategies considered next – blurring, subsuming, and defection – are of interest mainly for parties that otherwise would be facing some degree of goal conflict, while those parties facing goal convergence in this sense can always opt for the default, uni-dimensional ‘prism’ strategy. The structure of conflict, in turn, is determined by the choice of those parties who are not in this lucky position.

As soon as politicisation sets in, simply ignoring national interests in terms of cross-national distribution does not seem rational anymore for those national parties facing goal conflict. Empirical evidence from national level studies points into a similar direction, as uni-dimensional strategies are only observed where there is no regionalist competitor at all (Rovny 2015, 913), which would resemble the EU prior to politicisation. Thus, even when distributional effects are intra-national or uncertain, it might already constitute a competitive advantage to provide cues in terms of references to national identity or alleged national interests. Above I have argued, however, that cueing in this manner might quickly become less effective, once competitors react by providing the same cues.

One could argue, then, that prior to politicisation of EU politics, parties generally enjoyed a lot of ‘leeway’. Several of the theories reviewed earlier further argue, that they will do so under uncertainty, and could therefore just follow their ideological predilections in what here would be called a ‘uni-

dimensional' fashion. Indeed, a uni-dimensional strategy arguably remains viable if the distributional effects in relation to a policy issue are cross-national but (yet) highly uncertain.⁶ In case it seems that a policy issue has the potential to redistribute resources across countries, but the winners and losers are not yet obvious, there is both room but also demand for speculative predictions. Voters (just as anyone else) are then clearly unable to make their decisions simply on the basis of the policy suggestions the various parties make, cause they cannot know whether it will eventually benefit them. Hence, they rely partly on cues in terms of appeals to nationality⁷ – which pretty much all parties will provide equally, as was already argued, in that everyone will claim that their policy suggestion fits 'the' national (in some cases: and European) interest. What will make a difference for most voters, therefore, is the line of argument a party offers in terms of the other three dimensions of the policy frame: the norms and values parties evoke, the way they describe the problem and the causal narratives they present. With politicisation, it might further be rational to offer more than one kind of justification in order to convince their voters, as long as these do not run diametrically counter to each other (see below on 'blurring').

What policy frames, then, will parties choose (or, less commonly, develop) in such a situation? It is the policy frame(s) that fits their respective ideology best. There are several reasons for this. First, parties are likely use ideology as a 'prism' (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000) to make sense of the situation for themselves first of all. Accordingly, they will themselves be most convinced by the policy frame – or combinations of elements of frames – closest to their ideology or will even develop a frame on their own by drawing on their ideology. Second, doing so implies that the policy frame is in line with their policy-seeking goals, which is valuable for the party as such. None of these reasons, however, are to deny that, especially given politicisation, parties will then also reflect on voters' preferences in relation to their frames. If indeed they use the frame in combination with nationality cues, they can avoid a possible goal conflict. After all, an ideology-oriented choice of the policy frame will attract at least attract those voters that are generally guided by their own ideological convictions. In addition, an ideologically-oriented frame might eventually even convince those voters who have no or only very unspecified ideological convictions. Whether this will happen or not is not foreseeable beforehand, so parties might simply opt for trial and error. For which distributional effects will eventually materialise or considered as certain by the wider public is by definition not foreseeable under uncertainty, nor is it necessarily under parties' control. As a result, uncertainty frees parties from the pressure to defect from their respective ideology despite potential cross-national distributional effects.

In many cases, this will mean that the structure of conflict will hence be ideological under uncertainty. There might nevertheless be some intra-party family variation, induced by general intra-ideological variation (what is Left and Right might vary by degrees across countries) or because a given ideology does not clearly relate to any of the available policy frames. In the latter situation, parties are

⁶ If distributional effects would seem to be intra-national mainly but are yet uncertain, the structure of conflict will be ideologically anyway. Hence, this configuration is not discussed here in detail.

⁷ Of course, party identification can also work as a cue but is generally in decline, as Dalton and Wattenberg (2002) note, and arguably less important for most voters than their nationality.

likely to take orientation from national traditions both for themselves as well as because it is likely that the respective policy frame includes focal points that sound familiar to voters, which increases the chance of the frame resonating well with their voters' views (cf. Opp 2009, 234–46 concerning frame resonance). This might also be why, with regard to some issues such as foreign policy for which classic Left-Right ideologies are not that explicit, there can even be a territorial structure of conflict under uncertainty. At the same time, it should be noted that most issues are rather explicitly covered by party ideologies, due to parties' general strife to integrate new issues into existing cleavages where possible.

For illustration purposes, one might think of policy frames as sets bound together by their own substantive logic, circumscribed quite literally by the line of argument. A party's statements, together forming a set of its own, can then include arguments that belong to one policy frame or another, or several frames. A party using a 'uni-dimensional strategy' will then make arguments drawn from one of these sets alone, namely the one closest to its own ideology. For instance, given the particular constellation of intra-national distributional effects, party ideology and the preferences of their particular core electorate (as discussed in detail in Chapter 5), Green parties could simply stick to their ideologically preferred frame favouring a 'greening' of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) despite the presence of national interests (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Uni-dimensional / 'prism' strategy used by Green parties on the Common Agricultural Policy. Source: Own compilation.

The issue-level equivalent of a 'blurring' strategy is attractive whenever there is not a full-scale goal conflict yet between vote- and policy-seeking. Rather than vote-seeking driving parties to support policy A while policy-seeking would point to policy B, the vote-seeking part alone might be ambiguous: some voters the party might potentially attract favour policy A, others prefer policy B. This could be the case when a policy has (certain) distributional effects within as well as across countries, for instance if some producers win from a policy that harms other producers, so that a producer-friendly party is not faced with a clear mandate; or producers win from a policy while consumers lose from it, so that a party that is producer-friendly but also wants to attract consumers is in a dilemma even for vote-seeking reasons alone; or the national interest differs from the national tradition. In such a situation, it makes sense for a party to combine statements belonging to various policy frames. Indeed, as in real life most policies will have mixed distributional effects in some way or another, blurring in this sense is likely to be used highly frequently as well, possibly also in combination with other strategies.

While the party might eventually have to make some decisions regarding a policy or at least a non-contradictory combination of policies to address the issue in question, a blurring strategy at the issue-level might more often mean to mix elements of different policy frames on the three dimensions other than the policy dimension of a policy frame. Thereby, a party can at least acknowledge the values of some voters it leaves behind in terms of policies. For instance, the party could stress that it does care about the environment as much as everyone else (normative dimension of a hypothetical pro-consumer frame), but that the stricter environmental regulation will only scare producers off to countries with less strict regulation so that the stricter regulation policy is to be rejected (cognitive and policy dimension of a hypothetical pro-producer frame). Or, using again the CAP as an example, Social Democratic parties from net-paying countries might emphasise the frame involving soft forms of market intervention aiming at environmental and other public goods, from which their core electorates will benefit, while given the national interest they might mention – just as a side remark – that direct payments to farmers should be gradually reduced (Figure 6).




Figure 6: Blurring strategy used by Social Democratic parties from net-paying countries regarding the Common Agricultural Policy. Source: Own compilation.

What, then, does ‘blurring’ imply with regard to the structure of conflict? This arguably depends on the exact mix of frames a party combines when blurring. On the one hand, a party might combine frames that, in their distributional consequences across countries, are rather similar. Thereby, the party would simply broaden its electoral support across several societal groups without risking a loss of credibility (wide blurring). This will not, however, make the structure of conflict more territorial. On the other hand, a party could decide to defect as defined below, but still use some elements of the frame it is supposed to refer to for ideological reasons (covering up). In this case, the structure of conflict will still be territorialised to the degree that defection is also used by other parties. Most importantly, however, a party could ease the pressure to defect by mixing arguments from the frame it prefers for ideological reasons with those of a frame that is in line with the national interest (strict blurring). It thereby does not ignore the national interest entirely, but does not fully give in to it up to the point of defection either. This makes most sense if the ideologically preferable frame is also advantageous in distributional terms for some groups constituting a party’s core electorate, but not necessarily for all of them or for the nation as a whole. In these instances of mixed distributional effects, then, the possibility of blurring at the party level reduces the overall degree of territorialisation.

At the issue-level, ‘subsuming’ must mean more than simply to present a new issue from one’s own ideological perspective, because this, essentially, is what one would expect a party to do already as a default (‘uni-dimensional’ or ‘prism’ strategy). Hence, what is understood by ‘subsuming’ here, is the much more demanding and creative act of resolving a potential goal conflict rather actively by re-framing the issue in an innovative way. This might mean to set the whole issue in a different context or to just slightly adapt elements of certain justifications belonging to other frames in such a way that they can be integrated into one’s ideologically preferred frame. Such creative acts are not likely to be the rule, and indeed would be almost impossible to predict. Hence, also their impact on the structure of conflict is difficult to predict. Yet, simply ignoring this possible tool would leave the framework incomplete. One example could be the framing effort by UKIP on the Common Agricultural Policy, who did not simply criticise the CAP as it is calling accordingly for re-nationalisation, but further outlined a *national* agricultural policy including most elements of the CAP as envisioned by what is called the ‘multifunctional’ frame (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Subsuming strategy used by UKIP on Common Agricultural Policy. Source: Own compilation.

Finally, parties might follow a ‘two-dimensional’ strategy (Elias, Szocsik, and Zuber 2015). With reference to Robertson, Elias et al. argue that parties are using such a strategy if they “have positions on at least four issues ABCD, and their stances on A and B and their stances on C and D correlate, but their stances between A and C and between A and D and between B and C do not correlate” (ibid., 2015, 842). Again, it must be noted that they are referring to political spaces with two supposedly independent, but still ideological dimensions and that for the context of EU politics, it is still debated in how far a potential pro-/anti-EU dimension is really independent from the traditional L-R dimension, as well as that in either case, the structure of conflict will still be ideological rather than territorial (see above). The equivalent of a two-dimensional strategy in the present context, however, would imply that the majority of statements including a party’s expressed preferences regarding some issue cannot be traced back in any way to its respective ideology. In other words, the issue-level EU politics equivalent to a two-dimensional strategy is ‘defection’. For instance, a Conservative party that, despite its usual pro-market ideology, would call for massive market interventions as a part of the Common Agricultural Policy with a view to its national interest as well as the interests of parts of its core electorate (farmers), could be considered ‘defecting’ (Figure 8).




Figure 8: Defection strategy used by a Conservative party from a net-recipient country on CAP. Source: Own compilation.

If now the resulting question, namely when and why parties would use this strategy and defect, is discussed, this can be done based on the foundation that has been built up in this chapter. For a start, it is clear that defection is not an attractive strategy for issues of very low salience, for issues with mainly intra-national distributional effects as well as with distributional effects that are highly uncertain: after all, there are other strategies that under the aforementioned conditions seem preferable as they avoid a goal conflict between vote-seeking and policy-seeking. Indeed, even when cross-national distributional effects are high and certain, but coupled with intra-national distribution, there might be overlaps between ideological preference and preferable distributional effects at least for a party's core electorates that make a blurring strategy still more attractive than defection along territorial lines. Outright defection will thus be a strategy chosen only under a very specific configuration of conditions: Only if there is certain, cross-national distribution that runs counter to one's ideological predilections and not giving in to it would not result in direct losses within the core electorate will a party defect. Hence, full-scale territorialisation will only be observed if there is no intra-national distribution to distract from the overall 'national' interest.

The foregoing scenario in fact constitutes a more solidly theorised version of earlier speculations on the motives for defection. A potential counterargument, however, might be built on the notion of 'credibility'. It has been argued, that the strategic room for manoeuvre for parties to change their position spontaneously in order to approach the median voter is limited by their overall need for 'credibility': only if voters perceive of a party as consistently pursuing a general and roughly consistent ideological course will they be able to trust the party to stick to its promises once they have been elected into office (Hinich and Munger 1994). In fact, this argument could be even stronger when it comes to the reasons parties give, since a party that easily replaces one value commitment by another might seem not to actually hold any values. Before this background, it may thus be questioned whether parties will really defect concerning individual policy issues without difficulty and how they justify policy preferences in such situations.

It is nonetheless held here that indeed parties will defect in the aforementioned manner and that even in their choice of policy frames they will leave ideological considerations behind, for reasons I point out in the following. Firstly, it must be noted that parties will defect only given a particular configurations of conditions and otherwise will indeed use the strategic tools presented above precisely to avoid defection and goal conflict. This means, that with regard to many issues, parties in a post-Crisis EU might nevertheless behave in line with their ideology, such that there general credibility is exposed only to a

minimal risk. Secondly, given that conflict in EU politics is generally structured by both ideology and nationality, it might be an equally important pillar of a national party's policy to be perceived of as a party that consistently represents 'the' national interest. Ideologically-driven framing under the conditions actually calling for defection might be read as a break with such a reputation that also in the longer term arguably might hit parties harder than a temporary deviation from one's ideological line could.

One aspect that deserves consideration when talking about electoral punishment for obvious strategic movements is the concept of 'niche parties'. Amongst others, it has been argued by Adams et al. (2006) that so-called niche parties are fundamentally different from mainstream parties, in that they react differently (i.e. hesitantly) to shifts in public opinion, because they are punished more severely for such movements. More specifically in the context of the EP, Jensen and Spoon (2010) have further held that niche party MEPs react differently to institutional stimuli such as participation in national governments, as in the latter case they will become more pro-EU. At first sight, it might thus be argued that this will influence their calculus for defection also.

There are, however, a number of reasons why these arguments on niche parties might not be as relevant here as they might seem. First of all, it must be noted that there are varying definitions of niche parties in the literature. On the one hand, in the case of Adams et al., it is based on extreme ideologies or "noncentrist niche ideology" (ibid. 2006, 513), which seems somehow tautological, but is meant to include Green parties. On the other hand, Jensen and Spoon follow Meguid in referring to parties that focus on the 'new politics' dimension. It thus seems that 'niche' generally is rather vaguely defined. Second, in the case of Adams et al., strategic movement refers to Left-Right scores in national politics, so that a direct transfer of the idea that strategic movements by niche parties are generally punished harshly may not be appropriate. This is precisely because of the electoral role of national interests pointed out earlier: a movement based on national interests might be judged in a completely different manner than one within the context of national politics by the voters. Third, the question is up to which point it makes sense to still consider a party a niche party as opposed to a 'normal', mainstream party. If, for instance, a party manages to get into government, this would seem to demand compromises in terms of office-seeking that make such a party more mainstream. Also, if parties considered 'niche' according to both definitions such as UKIP or the Front National are as successful as they have been in the European elections of 2014, this also seems counter-intuitive to the idea that they fill a particular 'niche' only. Fourth, inasmuch as the participation in government of niche parties as defined by the 'new politics' dimension is concerned, it might rather be their new role as – for the most part – junior coalition partners that makes a difference, as opposed to other parties from other party families who almost never enter government (far Left) or who also regularly lead governments (centre Left/Right). Fifth, in this and other ways, the findings of Jensen and Spoon might well be very contingent on the period of time covered and of the general developments the respective parties went through during this period of time. In sum, therefore, considering each party family based on its respective ideology and core electorate should be preferable to the niche party concept for the present purpose, without assuming that some of these families are more prone to defect than others per se.

Once the decision to defect has been made, then, it makes most sense to follow through with the reasons a party gives, that is, to make use of the policy frame that by way of arguing would lead to the suggested policy. Otherwise, inasmuch as any attention is paid to the reasons parties give under certainty, the issue-specific inconsistency is arguably much more easily spotted and exploited by opponents than the temporary break with overall ideological convictions. Opponents, in turn, can hardly criticise the reasons included in the territorially advantageous policy frame without exposing themselves. If for reasons of internal inconsistency – i.e. policy-dimension in line with the national interest, other dimensions ideological – a party is not considered credible with regard to the issue at stake anyway, then the sacrifice of policy-seeking goals concerning the issue would be made in vain. In sum, while defection as such would arguably not be detrimental to a party’s overall credibility, defection on the policy dimension only may well be detrimental to a party’s issue-specific credibility.

In addition, it might be argued that the risk of losing credibility due to defection can be reduced in at least two ways. First, parties might decide to defect in the first place and primarily use the frame that would suit the respective national interest best while still partly using the ideologically preferred frame, applying some kind of back-up blurring strategy, especially in terms of what might be called ‘norms-dropping’ (“[Norm] is important, but...”). Second, if defection along the lines of a particular national interest would coincide with using the frame that corresponds to the prevailing national tradition (e.g. a Right-wing party from a state capitalist country in financial difficulty calls for solidarity, deplores market failure and demands Eurobonds), such defection is less likely to be perceived as a purely strategic move as the national tradition lends some authenticity. In sum, therefore, defection may be attractive only under certain conditions, but it would not appear as overly risky in terms of credibility then.

Table 2: Relationship between structural conditions, framing strategies, and resulting structures of conflict

| Structural determinants | | | Strategy | Structure of conflict |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-----------|--|------------------------------|
| politicisation | distributional effects | certainty | | |
| low | intra-/cross-national | low/high | uni-dimensional (or ‘prism’) (subsuming) | ideological |
| high | intra-national | low/high | uni-dimensional, blurring (subsuming) | ideological |
| high | cross-national | low | uni-dimensional, blurring (subsuming) | ideological |
| high | mixed | high | blurring, defection (subsuming) | ideological, territorialised |
| high | cross-national | high | defection (subsuming) | territorial |

Table 2 summarises the theory of territorialisation as developed in this chapter thus far. It is built of an up-to-date reconfiguration – especially in terms of increasing politicisation – of structural conditions at the macro (i.e. issue) level as mentioned in various strands of extant literature on conflict in EU politics on the one hand, and elaborated in terms of party goals and framing strategies to achieve these inspired by the

literature on party goals and their strategies in two-dimensional spaces on the other hand. Given the latter aspect, the predictions for the macro level should become more precise and the causal narrative behind them can be more easily evaluated.

In addition, these additional micro level considerations turn parties from passive respondents into much more *active* shapers of the structure of conflict: While a uni-dimensional, ‘prism’ strategy should generally be considered the default option for all parties, some of them sometimes need to consider alternative strategies. Noteworthy, even with full territorialisation, of course, some parties are not defecting, since for them national interest and ideological predilection overlap per chance. Hence, the strategies named in the third column of the table refer to those parties for whom such an overlap does not exist. As should have become clear, however, these parties will defect only reluctantly and will make use of alternative strategies as long as possible. One of these, namely subsuming, is rather independent of the structural conditions mentioned, but due to the elements of creativity that make up this strategy is not predictable.

The remaining question is, in how far this model adequately represents the way in which the structure of conflict in EU politics – and in the EP in particular – is actually shaped. After all, so far the behaviour of actors in EU politics has been understood as the behaviour of cohesive national parties expressing and justifying their preferences on EU policy issues, with these national parties – while institutions themselves – acting more or less in an institutionally very underspecified environment. In other words, it must be considered next, in how far the particular institutional setting that MEPs face leads to a change in their calculus. Thus, it is discussed in the next section, in how far the goals and policy-specific preferences of MEPs can be expected to diverge from those of national parties discussed here and in particular, whether MEPs will defect under the same conditions.

2.4 The (ir)relevance of institutional variables: Agency drift, really?

The theoretical framework developed so far is built to explain the behaviour of national political parties in EU politics, without considering, for the most part, the concrete institutional environment(s) within which they are operating. In this section, it is discussed in how far national party delegations within the EP can be expected to behave in a manner that contrasts with the preferences of their national parties (and hence with the theory developed) due to the respective institutional variables. First, it is argued that ideologically rather coherent European Political Groups (EPGs) will have very similar goals in terms of policy-seeking as national parties have, and that the main source of divergence – intra-EP office-seeking – has been overrated so far, whereas the importance of vote-seeking as the source of national party influence is increasing. Second, it is pointed out how all theoretical perspectives commonly applied to parliamentary committees (informational, partisan, distributional) are compatible with the idea of MEPs as true representatives of national parties, with only the first perspective demanding some scope conditions (extremely technical might be special). Similarly, the influence of interest groups for non-technical issues should be captured by the idea of core electorates. Moreover, it is argued that other EU institutions have little room for influencing individual party delegations beyond national parties, noting that governments might have informational advantages at times (again, mainly technical issues) due to their administrative back-up while the Commission can work as a provider of possible policy frames, among which MEPs may however still choose rather freely. Finally, even if MEPs had any incentive to ‘betray’ their national party, it can be expected that in a politicised EU, these parties as principals will increasingly make use of the control mechanisms already noted in the literature, while in the instance of publicly giving reasons, MEPs expose themselves to ex post control quite clearly. As it is concluded, the institutional environment of the EP seems to provide neither reason nor room for agency drift by MEPs vis-à-vis their national parties, so that so that the theory of territorialisation as developed here would seem to apply as long as scope conditions in terms of electoral rules and the role of technical expertise for some issues are taken into account.

In how far can MEPs be expected to share national party preferences?

At the core of the theory of territorialisation is the idea that national political parties pursue a set of general goals – known as policy, office, and votes – which they try to reconcile inasmuch as possible by means of framing strategies, while prioritising vote-seeking if necessary due to structural constraints. It must be noted here that the present study is by no means the first to take inspiration from the literature on party goals as a starting point for understanding politics within the EP (Faas 2003; Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999; Whitaker 2011). In particular, the literature that I have referred to as the ‘Three Goals, Two Principals’ (3G2P)-approach critically builds on this conception of MEP goals. The difference is, however, that other scholars tend to apply these ideas directly to the goals of MEPs and to focus on their interaction within the institutional environment of EP, rather than structural constraints in the form of issue characteristics or strategic options in terms of framing. This means, however, that the 3G2P literature can now be used to identify and think again about institutional variables.

In fact, one goal of national political parties in EU politics has been hardly discussed when constructing the theory of territorialisation the preceding sections, namely office-seeking. From the 3G2P perspective, however, it constitutes an important goal for MEPs, as they are assumed to strive for attractive positions as committee chairs, rapporteurs etc. within the EP (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). The allocation of these positions, in turn, is controlled by the European Political Groups (EPGs), within which the vast majority of MEPs is organised. Hence, the 3G2P approach postulates, an EPG acts as one of two principals demanding loyalty from ‘their’ MEPs and can use its power over office allocation within the EP as an incentive. Loyalty to the EPGs, which are largely ideologically formed (McElroy and Benoit 2011), clearly is the opposite of defection from a party’s ideological conviction. Inasmuch as this

aspect of the 3G2P approach holds, MEPs might want to think twice before they defect and in this sense, the concrete environment of the EP might influence the structure of conflict. As was already noted, however, there are strong theoretical (Ringe 2010) and empirical (Thiem 2009) arguments against the role of office-seeking as a goal for MEPs and the role of EPGs as principals, respectively. Therefore, it is not assumed here that intra-EP office-seeking constitutes influences MEPs' decision to defect in a manner that contrasts with the theory of territorialisation presented here.

This does not mean, however, that EPGs would not play any role for MEPs. In fact, they can hope to see much more of their policy preferences implemented by cooperating within EPGs. Thus, they have a general interest in keeping EPGs functioning, which clearly would not be the case if defections were the rule. This also means, however, that loyalty to an EPG is linked mainly to the goal of policy-seeking, not office-seeking. In other words, there is an institutional link between policy-seeking and ideological rather than territorial conflict – which however only *reinforces* the link between policy-seeking and ideology that was established above for national parties in EU politics generally. In sum, while it was arguably appropriate to neglect office-seeking in the present context, in terms of policy-seeking there is overlap rather than conflict between MEPs and both of their alleged principals.

This leaves the third goal, namely vote-seeking to be discussed here: in how far can MEPs' re-election goal be assumed to coincide with the vote-seeking goal of the respective national parties in European elections? With regard to the first question, Faas (2003) notes that national parties are the only actors who can select candidates for seats in the EP, while EPGs do not have any control over this process (*ibid.*, 2003, 844). Whenever the national party wants its MEPs to defect, therefore, it can in principle use its selection power in order to connect its own vote-seeking goal – for as was argued above regarding national parties, vote-seeking is usually what is behind defection – with MEPs' strife for re-election. In fact, as the chances of re-election of an MEP are generally preconditioned by the electoral success of the national party, national parties might often not even actively have to do anything to force their MEPs into compliance. It should be noted here further that even the leadership of the EPG might not be entirely opposed to occasional defection by some national party delegations: to the contrary, it can be argued that they too have an interest in getting those MEPs re-elected who brought them into office in the first place (cf. Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011, 40). Interestingly, from this perspective defection would seem to constitute more of a 'betrayal' concerning MEPs' own ideological beliefs than concerning the overall interest of the EPG.

As a result, once one discards the idea that MEPs are torn between loyalty to their EPG for office-seeking reasons and loyalty to the national party for vote-seeking reasons, it becomes much less obvious why MEPs would apply a different calculus in terms of weighting votes and policy, with the former being instrumental to the latter and hence ranking higher, than the one that was pointed out in detail for national parties in EU politics more generally. It would seem that they will be loyal to the EPG whenever one would expect the national party to argue ideologically, and would defect from their EPG whenever one would expect the national party to switch to a territorially-oriented line of argument. The results of the roll call analysis conducted by Thiem (2009) appear to support this argument of national

parties as the only principal empirically. Mühlböck's (2012) contrary finding might rather be due to the fact that she takes the voting behaviour of ministers in the Council as true representative of the national party, which is hardly any more justified than assuming MEPs to represent the party and ministers to be disloyal in the observed instances.

The EP's committees – a source of preference divergence between MEPs and national parties?

Even if it is assumed here that the goals of national parties and 'their' MEPs are in principle highly compatible and that, unlike a good deal of the literature tended to assume, European Party Groups are not likely to influence MEPs in a manner that runs counter to national party goals, this alone does not exclude the possibility of agency drift by MEPs. One reason might be that there are institutional structures within the EP beyond those formed for obvious political reasons. The central – at least presumably – functional institutional structure in the EP consists in its legislative committees. There are, in fact, three main theoretical strands of literature that have been developed largely to explain committees in the United States Congress, but which have been successfully and repeatedly transferred to the EP (Whitaker 2005; Whitaker 2011; Yordanova 2009). As Yordanova notes, these three strands of theory are neither mutually exclusive nor easy to merge into one, and should thus be considered simultaneously (*ibid.*, 2009, 261). This is what is done in this subsection, while special attention will be given to the consequences of each theory for the relationship between national parties and their MEPs.

It is straightforward here to start with the informational theory of legislative organization (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; 1990; Krehbiel), for as will become clear, this theory is behind Ringe's (2010) PPC approach. Indeed, Yordanova summarises the main argument of the informational theory as follows:

Because of high uncertainty about the link between policy means and outcomes in a setting without a majority party, to acquire information the legislature creates institutional incentives (e.g. strategic resources, parliamentary rights and restrictive rules) for committee members to pursue specialization and share it sincerely with the chamber. (*ibid.*, 2009, 263).

Having recognised the obvious resemblance with the basic assumptions of the PPC approach, it follows that one would expect similar consequences for the relationship between national parties and MEPs: By specializing on particular policies, the respective expert MEPs acquire an informational advantage over the rest of the EP as well as *vis-à-vis* their national parties. Such informational asymmetries are, in fact, assumed to be at the root of what is called agency drift in most of the Principal-Agent literature (cf. Blom and Vanhoonacker 2014). Indeed, Ringe claims that "positions toward a legislative proposal are the product of committee deliberation and negotiation" (*ibid.*, 2010, 55), and Roederer-Rynning has even argued that committees influence the way its members frame a policy problem, which may result in situations where conflict within the EP also emerges between different committees (*ibid.* 2015, 333, 346-349). Clearly, inasmuch as the structure of conflict within the EP is actually the result of entirely endogenous processes, it will be difficult to explain conflict in the EP by means of a theory that is based on national party goals and does not take committees into account.

Nevertheless, it is held here that claims concerning the endogeneity of conflict should be taken with a pinch of salt for a number of reasons. First of all, it is important to distinguish the *underlying* structure of conflict from its concrete manifestations at the various stages of the negotiation process. To illustrate this, think of the kind of situation that arises during each Ordinary Legislative Procedure, namely when the EP has – by majority vote – arrived at a certain policy position and then confronts the Council that has arrived at a different position. The point is then, that negotiation has already led to compromises within each of these institutions, compromises that might not even be equally supported by all members of each institution. To say then that the structure of conflict is inter-institutional would arguably miss out on the possibility that there might be an ideological or territorial pattern that spans across both institutions. Similarly, just because the compromise agreed within one committee is different from that of another one, the underlying structure of conflict can still be ideological or territorial, especially since the composition of committees might not be identical party-wise.

Partly, this is an issue of preference measurement, of course. Consider again the example of the agricultural committee (COMAGRI) regarding the latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), that was also used as an example of conflict between committees above: it becomes clear that as soon as one zooms closer to the preferences of the various actors within COMAGRI, that conflict existed *inside* the committee and, to an extent, persisted even after committee votes (Roederer-Rynning 2015, 346–49). Even Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach, while drawing heavily on the informational theory, would acknowledge the possibility of conflict within a committee and of its transfer to the plenary due to the fact that non-expert MEPs tend to trust those experts with whom they share a party affiliation.

Nevertheless, even if committees do not lead to homogeneity of preferences among its members, the informational advantage that committee members have over the rest of the EP and over their national parties could still allow them to follow their own agenda, rather than that of the national party. One might point here again to the overlap in general goals of national parties and their MEPs that makes such agency drift less likely, but even if this were not given, the following could still be argued: given the issue-related variance in uncertainty, the informational asymmetry may not always be equally large. In other words, with regard to some issues, national parties and even citizens may be better informed about the consequences of various policy options than they are concerning other issues. Recall then that it is precisely this degree of issue-related certainty that in line with the theoretical framework presented above constitutes one important and probably necessary condition for national parties to consider defection in the first place. As a result, the general informational advantage of committee members should not make a difference when it comes to the question of defection. Vice versa, when national parties do not even have clear and defined preferences over a given policy themselves, it could hardly be argued that an expert MEP developing a potential party position could drift away from its principals’ mandate.

Moreover, according to the second, ‘partisan’ theory on legislative committees (Cox and McCubbins 2007), political parties are central actors within parliamentary assemblies who, amongst others, have the power to influence committee appointments and can use this power to punish or reward loyal

members. In the context of the EP, however, it is important whether the notion of ‘parties’ should be transferred to the European Party Groups or the national parties. On the one hand, Yordanova (2009) argues that while EPGs and their leaders in particular are the ones would assign committee positions, there is little evidence that loyalty is rewarded in these terms. This, however, is exactly what was assumed here already (with reference to Ringe, 2010) in the sense that MEPs were considered not to be driven by office-seeking within the EP, as they could not expect loyalty to pay off. On the other hand, Whitaker (2001; 2011) holds that in fact national parties and national delegation leaders in the EP are involved in the assignment of committee positions (increasingly so) and that “the small amount of room for moving beyond proportionality in EP committee assignments is used in line with national parties’ priorities” (ibid., 2011, 125). Whitaker (2005) further shows that by and large, and especially concerning the more important, legislative committees, national party delegations manage to guarantee that their representatives within a committee are indeed representative of the national delegation as a whole. This second strand of theorizing committees as well as the aforementioned empirics would yield even less arguments for but instead arguments *against* the possibility of agency drift by MEPs.

The implications of the third and final theory, the so-called distributive or distributional theory (Shepsle and Weingast 1987), for the present study partly depend again on the exact manner in which the theory is transferred from the US context to the EP. Generally, the theory provides that committees are staffed depending on the electoral benefits its potential members can hope for, given that membership allows for influence over those policies that are central to the a given MEPs’ constituency. While Yordanova (2009, 262) argues that there is no electoral connection between MEPs and any territorially defined constituency strong enough to allow for a direct transfer of the theory, the view taken here based on the increasing politicisation of EU politics would allow for it: the fact that votes can only be won within a particular national territory while EU policy issues become increasingly politicised would seem to provide the necessary link. Hence, national party delegations would have an interest in being represented in those committees that are important in terms of issue-specific national interests. There is some overlap here with Whitaker’s (2011) finding that parties strategically choose to staff committees that are of particular salience to them, only that here the salience is mainly driven by vote-seeking goals. As long as national party delegations are considered collective actors, there is thus no contradiction between the assumption of this theory on committees and the idea that MEPs are true representatives of their national parties.

However, it could also be argued that MEPs self-select those committees in order to promote interests other than those of the electoral constituency (usually: the nation), that is, special interests (Yordanova 2009, 262). As a classic example, scholars tend to refer to COMAGRI, the EP’s agricultural committee, which is staffed to 31 per cent by people who have a special interest in agriculture in the sense that they themselves are or have been farmers or farmers’ representatives (i.e. union members or leaders) (Roederer-Rynning 2015, 339). Inasmuch as committee members with special interests use their influence to pursue a personal rather than a party agenda, they at least have an incentive to drift potentially from

their principal's preferences and – inasmuch as they exist (see above) – might abuse informational asymmetries for their purpose.

While not completely implausible, there are nevertheless a number of hurdles that make agency drift due to special interests rather unlikely. First of all, the pursuit of special interests which are completely at odds with the general policy goals of the party are unlikely insofar as someone who, for instance, has special interests given his persona membership of a migrant-friendly NGO is not going to join a far-Right party. In other words, there is a self-selection also at an earlier stage, namely for joining a certain party and not another. Second, as the partisan theory would stipulate, national parties and their delegations within the EP might not want to choose someone as their representative in a committee whom they suspect to pursue interests that the party or delegation at large does not agree with. Finally, in order to make full use of their committee position, committee members depend on the trust of their fellow MEPs. From interviews with MEPs it appears that they can be assured of this trust more generally but in the longer run, their fellow MEPs might notice that they have been misguided and react to it (Whitaker 2005, 9–10). Hence, I argue, the distributional theory is more relevant with regard to the vote-seeking goals of the national delegation as a whole rather than with the special interests of individual members. Using this latter approach to emphasise the role of national parties might seem unusual at first, given that in the US context, one would use this approach to stress the irrelevance of parties. However, this is simply due to the particular incentive structure in terms of vote-seeking in both of these settings: in the US context, this leads federal parties to be weak indeed, but their component individual members to be strong, whereas in the European context, it leads European Party Groups to be weak, but their national parties to be strong.

In sum, none of the three approaches on legislative committees would seem to suggest that the theoretical framework developed for national parties in EU politics could not be successfully transferred to the EP. From an informational perspective, it would seem that at least the decision to defect is not influenced by the committee system, as issue-related certainty is considered a necessary condition for defection also under the theory of territorialisation. Moreover, the partisan perspective can be interpreted to suggest itself that the goals of national parties shape committees and the behaviour of their members. Finally, the distributional theory makes most sense within the EP inasmuch as the vote-seeking goals of national parties as a whole are concerned. For the rest of this project, committees are therefore considered as important with regard to the division of labour among MEPs, in that indeed non-expert MEPs are likely to follow 'their' committee member. Indeed, if an issue is of particular importance to a national party for either territorial or ideological reasons, they will try to place their own expert within the committee or otherwise will not blindly rely on the committee member, even if he or she is part of the same EPG. Thus, committees are not expected to be decisive when it comes to the question of defection and, thereby, territorialisation, for neither ideological nor territorial conflicts are eliminated due to the existence of such expert bodies within the EP.

More power, more pressure? Interest group influence on MEPs

Arguably, the bearers of ‘special interests’ do not wait for one of their members to be elected into the European Parliament and to self-select for a committee position. As for instance a kind of handbook for industry lobbyists issued by the Federal Association of the German Industry (BDI 2009) shows, lobbyists are well aware of the increased power of the EP in general and the influence its committees undeniable wield over eventual policy outcomes (not necessarily conflict, though), and hence they address MEPs directly (see also: Yordanova 2009, 254). It thus might be asked, in how far lobbyists are able to influence MEPs in such a way that they express and justify just those kinds of policy preferences that they, lobbyists, want them to while their national parties ‘back home’ would not.

In order to approach an answer to this question, one might first of all ask another: Why would they? According to Heike Klüver (2013), interest groups generally have three goods to offer to decision-makers, namely information in terms of policy expertise, economic power related to the businesses they represent as well as the electoral support of their members. The more of these goods they can offer in coalition with like-minded interests, the higher their influence over decision-makers, including MEPs. In addition, Klüver argues, lobbying success depends on the issue in question, as both the value of the various goods offered by lobbyists to decision-makers depends on issue characteristics, but also the kinds of coalitions that can be formed (*ibid.*). It must thus be discussed next, whether these goods that lobbyists can offer constitute a kind of input that makes them express and justify different policy preferences.

This might be the case, for instance, if parties of the centre Left or even far Left are persuaded by lobbyists in a way that their national parties at home could not accept. Rasmussen finds business influence to be particularly high, when the policy issue in question is very technical (2015, 368–69), which is in line with Klüver’s idea that the influence of lobby groups generally rises with increasing complexity (*ibid.* 2013, 19). Both these scholars agree that for highly technical issues, MEPs depend on the input of lobbyists, which the latter might use to their own advantage. This might seem to contradict the idea pointed out above that parties might use ideology to reduce uncertainty also for themselves. Arguably, some very technical issues might be so specific that the gap to ideologies as general blueprints for policy is too difficult to bridge without further input. In line with the theory developed here, however, such completely ideology-free issues would likewise be irrelevant to parties in terms of policy-seeking. In addition, Rasmussen notes that these technical issues are usually of a very low salience in terms of their relevance for the masses of citizens (*ibid.* 2015, 368–69), and hence, also do not matter for parties in terms of vote-seeking. Given their irrelevance to party goals, then, it could hardly be argued that MEPs are drifting away from their national party’s mandate when following lobbyists’ advice.

Noteworthy, Rasmussen also acknowledges that highly technical issues sometimes acquire a higher level of salience for a limited amount of time, for instance in case of “a scandal that will evoke anti-business sentiments” (*ibid.*) and then, business interests would be much less successful. Behind the seemingly unsystematic concept of a ‘scandal’, however, one can identify a change in conditions that are very well specified in the theory of territorialisation. First, this is a change in politicisation of the issue, as

the concept of a scandal arguably implies that the wider electorate is made aware of the issue and is able to articulate its preferences. Second, the articulation of preferences among citizens is facilitated by the fact that, at least with regard to the part of the issue that concerns the scandal, there is certainty of distributional effects, as it becomes apparent that some actors have been harmed due to the behaviour of others – for instance consumers who discover that they are affected by the negative externalities of production without being compensated for it. Third, therefore, the direction of these distributional effects will be identified and the structure of conflict will evolve in the respective manner, e.g. ideological in case of production externalities. In sum, there might be highly technical issues, which, as long as their salience is also low, are outside the scope of the theory of territorialisation as developed above, but become explicable by the theory of territorialisation as soon as they are politicised.

In general, therefore, the influence of interest groups on MEPs should be captured very much by the theoretical framework developed for this study. After all, from the discussion of Moravcsik's ideas regarding domestic preference formation and their transfer to the positioning of national parties on matters of EU politics, it was followed that societal interests will influence the expressed policy preferences of national parties for reasons of vote-seeking. Similarly, Klüver argues that MEPs are influenced by interest groups depending on their citizen support, as they need a proxy for voters' preferences, as well as depending on their economic power, as a proxy for future economic voting (*ibid.*, 2013, 40–53). Since Klüver sets out to explain the overall influence of lobbying on, amongst others, the EP as a whole without differentiating between individual MEPs, national delegations or party groups, this argument does not contradict the idea that MEPs, like their national parties, will have closer ties to some interest groups than to others (e.g. Leftist parties would listen more to trade unions than to producer groups, Green parties more to environmental NGOs etc.). In addition, there is evidence that MEPs have much closer ties to interest groups from their own Member State than to European ones, as Bouwen (2004) finds. He argues, that this is the case because MEPs have close ties to their national parties and eventually depend on national electorates (*ibid.*, 2004, 491–93), which is precisely what would follow from applying the theory of territorialisation to the specific context of the EP.

MEPs and their inter-institutional contacts

Following the argument by Costello and Thomson (2014) mentioned earlier, interest groups are not the only actors lobbying MEPs: according to them, members of the Council of the EU, i.e. the national governments, might also have an interest in lobbying MEPs who are fellow nationals, especially if the issue in question is of high salience to the respective government and if the government in question is in a very isolated position within the Council in respect to this issue. They also provide some empirical evidence for their argument by relating governments' positions to MEP votes. If indeed MEPs were influenced in this manner due to inter-institutional contacts, and if this included that even MEPs from opposition parties would give in to the Council's lobbying efforts while this would be contrary to the predictions made for the respective national parties, one might indeed speak of agency drift. The empirical evidence provided by other researchers is somewhat contradictory: Hix et al. (2006) find very little

evidence of a general influence of the variable ‘government participation’, while Faas (2003) finds government participation to increase the likelihood of defection. Mühlböck (2013) finds that in fact, Council and EP members belonging to the same national party rarely vote in the same manner, which she explains by the ‘consensus culture’ (i.e. the observation that few votes are ever contested openly) in the Council and the existence of EPGs. From this perspective, it would seem that Costello and Thomson’s analysis is more to the point, since unlike the other studies it does not depend on voting data and thus basically controls for the consensus culture. In order to judge, at a theoretical level, why MEPs would give in to so such lobbying, the question must again be discussed, what rationales MEPs could possibly have for doing so.

Strikingly, however, the arguments provided by Costello and Thomson all involve pressure from MEPs’ national parties (ibid. 2014, 3). If there is no direct link between the national government and MEPs that is independent from their common party affiliation, there is a. no reason to assume that parties other than those participating in the government might give in to the lobbying so that b. the evidence found by Costello and Thomson might just be a matter of correlation, not causation. That said, it is very well possible to think of potential direct links, which are discussed in turn.

First, Saurugger (in Klüver, 2013, p. 42) argues that national governments have better access to national lobby groups and the information the latter provide. If MEPs depended on this information, then they might be influenced by national governments indeed. However, as was mentioned in the preceding subsection, MEPs actually do seem to have quite established contacts with national lobby groups themselves, so that they would not need national governments for that. Before this background, it is in fact more plausible to expect MEPs from national opposition parties in particular to use direct information from such lobbyists in order to accuse the government of failing to represent ‘the’ national interest, rather than trusting it blindly. This would serve their party at home as well as it would serve them within inter-institutional negotiations. In fact, it seems that one should rather expect MEPs from national opposition parties to attack the national government whenever there is room to do so: either because there are intra-national distributional effects that might be exploited or because distributional effects are still uncertain and thus amenable to strategic framing.

As Franchino (in Klüver 2013, p. 42) argues, however, national governments can draw also on the technical expertise of national ministries, not just on input from lobbyists. Such administrative backup is clearly lacking on the part of MEPs. On matters which, for instance, are highly technical in legal terms and have no direct ideological component, MEPs might thus indeed rely on their government’s input. As with highly technical issues for which MEPs rely on e.g. business lobbyists’ input however, issues of this sort are likely to be of low salience in both policy- and vote-seeking terms and thus might indeed be outside the scope of the theory of territorialisation as laid out above. In most other instances, however, one would expect MEPs to defect in line with national governments’ lobbying pressure only under such conditions that would also make their national parties defect from their ideology (politicisation AND cross-national distribution AND certainty).

Nevertheless, the general discussion of the influence of government participation on MEPs points to one further aspect that should be taken into account more generally, albeit it does not involve agency drift, namely the influence of participating in a governing *coalition*. It is thinkable, that a party is more likely to defect because of its coalition partner, be it as a signal of government unity to the electorate or as a signal to the partner in question. At the same time, it is thinkable that MEPs are freer to behave differently from their coalition partner at home precisely because the coalition exists at the national level. Which of these scenarios applies more must stay and empirical question.

In contrast to the Council, the European Commission is generally considered to be most influential in its role as an agenda-setter (cf. Egeberg 2007). With regard to the communication strategies of MEPs in particular, the role of the Commission as an agenda-setter might be crucial in terms of its capacity to act as a ‘frame entrepreneur’ (Rhinard 2010): Unlike MEPs who are more likely to choose among existing policy frames – due to their limited resources, the Commission can use the development of new frames as a tool to influence the potential for new coalitions and hence policy reform. Amongst others, such a new frame might constitute an additional option for justifying their policy preferences. Since however one would expect such frames are developed precisely in the agenda-setting phase and with a lot of preparation rather than in a spontaneous manner, they are likely to change the structure of conflict only in larger intervals. More importantly, the criteria for choosing a certain frame from among the frames that exist at a given moment in time remain the same.

As for the role of ‘the’ EP within the overall constellation of legislative institutions in the EU, it must be admitted that this aspect is neglected here. This because the idea that the EP pursues a collective institutional interest which shapes MEPs expressed preferences seems hard to integrate into a theory that builds on the idea that MEPs have diverging preferences because of their diverging national and ideological backgrounds. Indeed, one might also wonder in how far such institutional interests actually exist or whether they are not often confused with the compromise the majority of the EP can agree on, or with the position of influential MEPs concerning an issue – just like national governments are taken to represent ‘the’ national interest by some scholars. Inasmuch as such genuinely institutional interests do exist, however, such institutional interests will hardly be captured in terms of actual *policy* frames, and thus might generally constitute a matter of investigation of their own.

Could national parties control MEPs in case of diverging preferences?

The preceding subsections have discussed in how far institutional factors related to the setting of the EP bear any potential to induce agency drift on the part of MEPs vis-à-vis their national parties as principals. While for the most part, it was held that these factors do not have much potential in this respect, or in some cases would rather lead MEPs to act in line with their respective national party’s mandate, not all possible factors might have been considered, and some of those that have been discussed could not be totally denied of having an impact. Hence, a final element in discussing the applicability of the theory of territorialisation as developed above to the particular context of the EP is the discussion in how far national parties could actively prevent MEPs from pursuing their own, contradicting agenda.

In other words, in how far can national parties assure that ‘their’ MEPs defect whenever they want them to – and only then? A first seemingly trivial point to note is that, most of the time, they will select only amongst their members. To the extent that parties are indeed formed by people sharing a certain worldview, as was argued above, this aspect should not be underestimated. In fact, it can be used also as an argument against the view that MEPs adopt a more ‘European’ perspective during their term in the EP and thereby become less loyal to their national parties (Rasmussen 2008): after all, they are socialised into national parties much earlier and remain members of national parties throughout, such that this socialization process is much deeper. Noteworthy, this is not to deny that individual MEPs who are newcomers to the EP can ‘learn’ how to build intra-EPG compromise based on ideological focal points and thence defect less over time than they do in the very beginning (cf. Rasmussen 2008).

Apart from selecting only members, national parties discriminate amongst members, for instance among MEPs who behaved loyally to the party and those who did not. It must be noted, however, that there is some variation in candidate selection process across countries and parties, ranging from highly centralised selection by the party leadership to decentralised selection by regional party organisations (Faas 2003, 844; Mühlböck 2012, 613–14). Both the preferences as well as the capacity for monitoring might vary among such party actors in charge of selection (ibid.). One might argue now that nevertheless MEPs would have to convince the national electorate eventually as a precondition for being selected, since without votes for the national party, there will be no seats to be distributed. However, some caveats must be noted also here that result from another institutional feature, namely variation in electoral laws applied at country level, ranging from party-centred to candidate-centred systems. In the latter, the candidate MEP enjoys a considerable degree of freedom (cf. Faas 2003, 845-846), arguably even more so than a candidate who merely needs the support of a certain regional electorate or selectorate.

For these features to matter, however, the candidate in question would have to have something to offer to, for instance, a particular region that does not concern the country as a whole. It must thus be noted also that the impact of these variables impact arguably depends on the policy issue. Moreover, it must be noted that although, for instance, the Irish Fianna Fail operates within a Single-Transferable-Vote (STV) system, it scores comparatively high on Mühlböck’s measure of control over candidate selection (self-reported by MEPs) (ibid., 2012, 614) and indeed defects much more frequently than, for instance, Irish Labour operating in the same context in terms of electoral laws (Faas 2003, 855). Last but not least, it must be noted that party-centred electoral systems are the rule. In sum, therefore, candidate selection procedures and electoral laws should be controlled for in some way or another, but nevertheless their overall impact might be limited.

This is all the more true since these two variables are not the only mechanism of national party control over MEPs. In fact, Mühlböck (2012) distinguishes *ex ante* and *ex post* control mechanisms, with candidate selection constituting out of several *ex ante* control mechanisms. Influencing the nomination to committees that was discussed in the subsection on the role of committee membership constitutes another. Yet another one is prior instructions to MEPs, something which Ringe (2010, 211) considers more or less completely absent from EP decision-making. Mühlböck also notes: “The overall occurrence

of prior instructions shown in the data is rather low” (ibid., 2012, 617). However, two points should be noted in this regard. First, with increasing politicisation, all national parties are likely to generally keep a closer eye on their MEPs than at the time that the data Mühlböck uses for her study were collected. Moreover, it should be noted that already for the 5th EP (1999-2004), it has been found that the number of defections rises towards the end of the legislative period, that is, it increases together with the pressure that national parties exert on MEPs in line with their own vote-seeking goals. Hence, I would like to argue that national parties might simply not deem it necessary to always instruct their MEPs on every issue, counting instead on the pre-selection of their candidates. Only when an issue is of a high profile and when vote-seeking comes to matter most they will intervene.

As an *ex post* control mechanism, Mühlböck counts the requirement to report to the national party. Here, again, Mühlböck notices considerable variation across parties and countries and the question for this paper therefore is, whether the awareness of having to report eventually changes MEPs’ behaviour and must thus be controlled for. As however the kind of behaviour of MEPs this study focusses on is the way that MEPs give reasons, *ex post* control is basically implied in the observation: ‘giving reasons’ in terms of framing would seem to include public statements or statements directed to the national party at the very least.

Summary

In sum, it appears that there is generally little reason – in terms of MEPs’ incentives – and little room – due to national parties’ control mechanisms – for agency drift. This is not by any means meant as a denial of the neo-institutionalists’ claim that “institutions matter” (cf. Hall and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. 1996). Rather, in this case, most of the EP’s institutional features discussed here seem to work in a direction that reinforces the tendency of MEPs to behave in accordance with national party goals. As a result, the theory of territorialisation as developed in the preceding sections would seem to carry considerable explanatory potential also within the particular institutional setting of the EP. That is, as long as two kinds of caveats are taken into account. First, where the nature of the electoral system, de-centralisation of candidate selection and issue characteristics in terms of distributional effects allow for it, agency drift might occur due to regional (as in sub-national) incentives. Second, the issue in question should not be overly technical in the sense that expertise rests only with special interests or national administrations, for in such situations, neither ideology nor national interests would seem to play a role at all.

This is not to downplay the weight of such issues quantitatively, in that indeed it might be that there is a large number of these issues. But those issues that qualitatively are of interest, i.e. those issues referred to as ‘high profile’ should be covered by the theory. This limitation would seem appropriate for two reasons: First, concerning the societal rationale of the study, the EU’s current crises are arguably not due to its incapacity to resolve technical details, but to effectively address much more fundamental societal challenges. Second, from an academic perspective, it must be noted that defection does not seem to occur on low-profile anyway. The theory of territorialisation as it was developed here thus would still seem as an appropriate tool to address both rationales formulated at the start of this paper.

Readers familiar with the typical roll-call analyses in EP studies might have noticed the neglect of a few further institutional variables, most notably the kind of legislative procedure, which impacts on the degree of influence of the EP as well as a consideration of majority requirements. The conscious neglect of these variables is however based on the argument that as soon as preferences (and hence conflict) are not measured in terms of roll-call votes, these variables lose drastically in importance. Noteworthy, this aspect is linked to the more general question of how to measure conflict in the EP provided in the next chapter. It will then also be discussed, in how far the fact that the overlap of positions between national parties and their MEPs is first of all a theoretical assumption can be balanced empirically by means of triangulation.

2.5 Conclusion: theoretical expectations for the structure of conflict

This theoretical chapter set out by reviewing the theoretical contributions on conflict in the EP from the extant literature. It was found that the 3G2P approach by Hix and others not only underspecified the root causes of defection in the form of a clear conception of ‘national interests’ but further did not provide any expectations regarding the way MEPs justify their policy suggestions. The PPC approach by Nils Ringe was found to score better on the latter aspect, but failed to point out why, given their seemingly unlimited informational advantage, MEPs would ever decide to defect when cooperation within the EPG would in principle appear more advantageous. Finally, the bicameral approach by Thomson and Costello could not provide any arguments for defection that would apply independent from the role of national parties. Hence, the ‘theory of territorialisation’ was to be developed for the purposes of this study.

As a starting point, definitions of political conflict and its structure were provided first, with territorial conflict being the result of defections, defined as policy preferences contrasting with ideological core beliefs, by actors in EU politics. National parties were then identified as the central actors in this respect. Next the concepts of ideology and national interest were discussed, with the former referring to a set of ideas serving as the blueprint for policy among party members and the latter as arising from the cross-national distributional effects of EU policy. Based on these definitions, a theoretical framework was developed, integrating theories from the wider literature on conflict in EU politics by relating these back to general party goals as a common denominator. This theoretical framework was further elaborated for the purpose of explaining the reasons national parties give for their preferences in EU politics. To this end, giving reasons was considered as an act of strategic framing, with various strategies being transferred from recent contributions in a more ‘Rikerian’ strand of literature regarding party competition in two-dimensional, national policy spaces. The final step then constituted in taking these theoretical considerations back to the particular setting of the EP. In the respective discussion, it was found that MEPs can for the purposes of this study be assumed as by and large true representatives of their national parties.

Therefore, by a way of conclusion, the following theoretical expectations concerning the structure of conflict in the EP can be formulated.

First, conflict in the EP will be rather ideological if

an issue remains non-politicised despite the general trend towards politicisation in EU politics

observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional ‘prism’, no vote-seeking pressure so ideological ‘default’

OR

an issue has intra-national distributional effects

observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional, some blurring to gloss over heterogeneous effects within a party’s core electorate or to attract at least some votes on the other side of the cleavage

OR

an issue has cross-national, but uncertain distributional effects

observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional ‘prism’, as focus is on justification, often also blurring to broaden electoral appeal

Second, conflict in the EP will be rather territorial if

an issue is politicised

AND

has cross-national distributional effects

AND certainty of these effects is high (the degree of territorialisation depends on intra-national distribution)

observed strategy at the micro level: defection by those parties facing goal conflict of policy and votes, covered up by reversed blurring or by taking orientation from national traditions; some blurring instead of defection when intra-national distribution is involved as well

In short, on the one hand, low politicisation, overwhelming intra-national distribution and uncertainty should constitute sufficient conditions for ideologically structured conflict, while national traditions such as the type of capitalism should be controlled for as a source of limited territorialisation beyond distributional effects. On the other hand, a combination of high politicisation, cross-national distribution and certainty is needed for territorialisation. In order to test this theory empirically, the next step is to identify ways of operationalising the key conditions adequately and of measuring relevant data in such a way that the strategic framing efforts can indeed be observed directly. This step is carried out in the next chapter.

3. Approach

In the preceding chapter, a theory of territorialisation was developed that potentially explains how conflict in the post-Crisis European Parliament is structured under which conditions, given also that the national parties represented in the EP have various strategies at their disposal for expressing and justifying their policy preferences by using their room for manoeuvre given certain structural parameters. The present chapter now discusses, how exactly this theoretical framework should be evaluated, starting with a critical review of the methodological state of the art. It is found that there is a lack of smaller 'N' research designs suited to operationalise the concepts of national interests and ideology in a manner that is sufficiently accurate for testing the value of the theoretical framework, and that data on direct MEP-to-voter communication remains understudied. Sections 3.2 therefore suggest a qualitative-comparative research design, to be applied to just three of policy issues and to a subgroup of national party delegations only, while in return allowing for a well-grounded identification of national interests and ideological family membership. The respective case selection processes regarding policy issues (Europeanised welfare, Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), the subgroup of parties (only those from Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, France and Italy) and their attribution to the various party families based on ideological grounds are pointed out in detail. At the micro-level, techniques from Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) are suggested as a method of analysis as suited for the number of cases on the one hand, and as in line with the more general line of thought implied in the theory of territorialisation in terms of causal complexity. Next it is argued, that the policy preferences and justifications of these national party delegations concerning these issues should be measured by means of a Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) on the press releases they issue. This method is selected for its unique capacity to measure and distinguish both policy preference and justification and applicability to a rather small sample of texts written in several languages. It will allow for an analysis of the structure of conflict for each issue and of the various framing strategies used as operationalised at the end of the chapter. By way of conclusion, it is noted how the various aspects constituting this approach to evaluating the theoretical framework cannot only be justified on their own grounds each, but also that the way they interact redeems the remaining disadvantages of each individual aspect: For instance, a small 'N' allows not only for better operationalisation of national interests and ideology, but also for more labour-intensive hand-coding in terms of textual analysis, which in turn allows for the analysis to include several languages.

3.1 The state of the art and its deficits

In this section, the state of the art on conflict in the European Parliament is critically reviewed in terms of the research designs applied, methods of measurement used and sources of data analysed so far. As I point out, extant research designs at both the macro-level of policy issues as well as at the micro-level of national party delegations tend to be overwhelmingly quantitative. The enormous insights gained by the usage of these designs regarding some general patterns notwithstanding, they tend to work with operationalisations of both national interests and ideology that are unsuitable for adequately uncovering the detailed causal narrative laid out in the theory of territorialisation. Moreover, the extant literature misses out on techniques for the measurement of both preferences and justifications that are apt to analyse the more or less direct communication – usually in the respective native language – between MEPs and their voters.

Research designs in the extant literature

In terms of research design, most of the extant literature tends to adhere to one of two extremes. At the one and certainly more populated end, there are large-N studies including many votes on many issues. Such designs were applied when actor alignments in the EP were studied for the first time, as the big question was whether ideology or nationality would account for the larger number of voting observations (Attina 1990; Kreppel 2000; Noury 2002). In later applications of large-N designs, the question increasingly became whether some intervening variables increase or decrease cohesion/ make defection more or less likely (Faas 2003; Klüver and Spoon 2013). This approach has definitely led to crucial insights on conflict in the EP, most importantly with regard to the general pattern of conflict in the EP in terms of voting behaviour, but also with regard which kinds of variables seem to matter at all.

Such a large-N design does not, however, constitute an ideal choice for answering the present research question and for subjecting the theory developed in the preceding chapter to an empirical evaluation. First, it might be argued that the general approach to social phenomena that usually comes with this kind of designs, namely a focus on the *explanans*, is not what the present research question is about. Rather, the present research question is *y*-centred rather than *x*-centred, that is, it is interested in explaining the (non-)occurrence of a certain outcome rather than the role of a given variables or a set of variables (cf. Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Second and more important, ‘national interests’, even defined rather concretely as a result of cross-national distributional effects, can hardly be operationalized and empirically distinguished from other (e.g. ideological) motives in a valid manner within large-N studies, as I point out in more detail in the following.

In the EP-specific literature, in fact, most studies have not even tried to operationalize ‘national interests’ *a priori* in any way, and have simply assumed that these are behind defection necessarily (e.g. Faas 2003). In the related literature of voting behaviour in the Council, some attempts were made in terms of geographical patterns, for example in terms of rich North vs poor South/East (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004).⁸ Bailer et al. (2015, 439) have rightfully criticised the usage of such

⁸ Indeed, this difference between the two bodies of literature – i.e. that on the EP and that on the Council – might be due partly to the fact that the scholars working on the two institutions have different backgrounds: Comparative

geographical patterns for the lack of a clear link to the assumed causal mechanism. In terms of operationalisation, a first step in the right direction would certainly be to replace geographical patterns with the status as net-payers and net-recipients from the EU budget (e.g. Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005). If then, however, as is the case in most large-N designs, policy preferences (measured usually as votes) on legislative proposals are lumped together across time and across issues, or within a just given time period or policy area, there still remains a risk of over-aggregation (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015, 440). For measuring the structure of conflict, Bailer et al. thus suggest moving down to the level of individual proposals. Paradoxically, however, while they are well aware of the fact that distinguishing the role of ideology and distributional effects would “ideally” call for information about partisanship and structural factors at the each individual proposal, they still include 156 policy proposals in their study which in their own words makes it “not feasible” to disaggregate partisanship and structural factors in the foregoing manner (ibid. 2015, 443). It seems, then, that analyzing conflict in the EP on a large number of policy issues, it will arguably always be difficult to establish that it was indeed a particular national interest that led a party to defection, just like it would be difficult to trace the opposite, namely ideological cohesion, back to a party’s ideological convictions.

There is yet another extreme of research designs in the extant literature, namely those (few) studies that, while still statistically analysing roll-call votes of individual MEPs, focus on just one policy area or issue (Chen 2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005). Thus, at the macro-level of structures of conflict, these should be considered as small-N designs. These studies tend to go into detail about what the national or ‘economic’ interests of the Member States could be with regard to the issue or policy area, which, as such, would seem to complement the large-N studies criticised above. Yet, since they do not relate the case-specific considerations to any general concept of ‘national interests’, they for the most part do not even try to allow for any wider conclusions, but remain limited, for instance, to the domain of migration policy (Hix and Noury 2007) or trade policy (Chen 2015). Indeed, even within this limited range generalisation would seem difficult, since the findings are based on roll-call votes on very specific pieces of legislation with accordingly very specific issue characteristics.

Moreover, these studies usually still aim to establish, whether it is e.g. “economic interests or politics” that shape the structure of conflict, rather than going into the complex interactions of the various factors that will eventually determine the MEPs’ decisions at the micro-level (i.e. who eventually does defect and who does not, given which configuration of conditions). One issue, namely the so-called Takeover Directive has even been repeatedly selected as a case (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005; 2010). Noteworthy, this issue is characterised by unfortunate empirical overlap between the two ways in which nationality might matter, in that the type of capitalism might matter in this case both as a national tradition shaping definitions of Left and Right as well as in terms of the distributional effects the Directive could have. Moreover, it was deliberated over a time span of five years, and hence swings in actor

Politics in the case of the EP, International Relations in the case of the Council. The latter are thus more used to working with the concept of ‘national interests’.

alignments might also be triggered by the electoral cycle. Thus, it might not constitute an ideal case study in general, but it certainly does not with regard to the present theoretical framework.

Ringe's 2010 publication partly constitutes a step in the right direction, in that it is focussed on just six case studies examined before the background of one and the same theoretical framework (cf. *ibid.*, 2010, 109-207). Unfortunately, however, Ringe generally treats national traditions and legal status quo as being identical with the national interest (*ibid.*, 2010, 112). Hence, for instance, a country with restrictive same-sex legislation is attributed a national interest of keeping this legal status quo. Unlike with the definition of national interests in terms of cross-national distribution, however, it is not clear at all why such a national tradition would necessarily unify parties within national blocks, since such traditions might be more supported by some voters and some parties in the country than by others.

Consider, for instance, the type of capitalism: in the case of the Takeover Directive national tradition and national interest might have coincided, in that firms from a particular system might have won or lost from one model being adopted at EU level at the expense of another. In general, however, parties from a country with a liberal (statist) type of capitalism might not all be equally opposed to (supportive of) state intervention into the economy. To the contrary, the question of how much state intervention is appropriate is what has shaped politics within the countries since decades in terms of 'Left' and 'Right', and the respective agreement within party families but across types of capitalism is precisely why transnational party groups could be formed in the first place. Moreover, Ringe selects his cases based on the fact that they are all "high profile" (*ibid.*, 2010, 200), while seeking variance on most other variables he considers relevant. His case selection thus misses out on the one condition that would seem decisive before the background of the theory of territorialisation, namely distributional effects. The overall finding that the structure of conflict in the EP is shaped by endogeneous factors becomes more likely since he does not specify which case was chosen for which kinds of characteristics exactly, and how these fit the eventual structure of conflict or not.

In sum, therefore, there still is room for improvement when it comes to research designs, in that with regard to the macro-level of policy issues, what is needed is an approach including a systematic, theory-driven case selection strategy that allows for cross-case comparison while being 'close' enough to the case to allow for a valid operationalization of e.g. national interests. As I point out next, such a qualitative-comparative approach is also missing so far from the micro-level analysis of MEP or national party behaviour, albeit at that level, too, it might complement existing insights.

For indeed, even those studies focussing on just one policy area or legislative proposal (Chen 2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005) nonetheless tend to use quantitative tools when analysing what for the present study would constitute the micro-level, namely the expression of preferences by MEPs, usually in terms of votes. It might be argued, however, that given the very high cohesion of national party delegations, which is even above that of EPGs (cf. Thiem 2009), the analysis of individual MEPs' voting behaviour is a way of 'artificially' increasing the number of observations. Aggregation at the level of national party delegations would thus be more appropriate in

principle, especially since individual MEPs are unlikely to alter the overall structure of conflict in a meaningful manner.

In order to study as many observations of MEP behaviour as possible, extant studies operationalise micro-level variables such as party ideology in terms of the classic Left-Right and other scales, or in terms of EPG membership. As I have mentioned in the preceding chapter already, these scales are merely proxies of party ideology. Using such proxies to operationalise ideology may not be generally illegitimate. Yet, if one wanted to distinguish the effects of ideology *as a set of ideas*, guiding parties' policy-seeking, from the effect of established relationships between parties and particular societal groups as core electorates, guiding their vote-seeking, using these proxies across issues might not suffice. If ideology is taken seriously as a factor explaining the expression of policy preferences, then, a party's attribution to a particular *familles spirituelles* as a group of parties sharing similar ideas should be based on a more profound knowledge of each party's belief system. Within a quantitative design to be applied to all national party delegations, this is usually not feasible.

Extant studies, especially those conducted by Simon Hix and his co-authors, tend to use statistical techniques such as NOMINATE for the identification of patterns in MEP behaviour. These, of course, require a sufficiently large number of observations, one that is probably larger than the number of observations resulting from aggregating at the level of national party delegations and selecting among the whole of these in order to feasibly operationalise their ideological orientation. However, NOMINATE in particular is not without limitations in the first place: As Otjes and Van der Veer note, this and similar techniques have been highly valuable for establishing the general patterns of conflict, but are problematic due to their inductive features: only those dimensions can be found that the researcher looks for explicitly (ibid. 2016, 9). Indeed, while the present study suggests that the structure of conflict will be either territorial or ideological, it would be preferable to use a design that is nevertheless able to identify unforeseen patterns.

Otjes and Van der Veer further hold that there should be a shift towards the question "*under what conditions* MEPs vote in a particular way" (ibid. 2016, 4; emphasis in the original). Noteworthy, at least with regard to the probability of defection there have been several studies examining conditions that make the latter more or less likely (Bailer, Schulz, and Selb 2009; Faas 2003; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). In this sense, the alleged gap identified by Otjes and Van der Veer is less apparent than they might claim.

Had Otjes and Van der Veer argued that the question "under what conditions" includes *combinations* of conditions, they might have had a point: In the extant literature, only very few interaction terms are used in order to account for such combined effects (cf. e.g. Costello and Thomson 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). The theoretical framework developed in the preceding chapter, indeed seems to suggest that it is rarely just a single variable or condition that leads to the selection of a particular framing strategy. By definition, for instance, a party is only defecting if it acts against its ideological belief and in favour of a given national interest, which means that a party that acts in line with both ideology and nationality is not defecting. Apart from this and other expected combinations,

it could also be the case that a party only defects in the presence of a particular national interest that is simultaneously in line with a particular national tradition. When testing the usefulness of the present theoretical framework, therefore, both expected and unexpected interactions at the micro-level should be accounted for. The fact that the extant literature does not do so could be due to some difficulties in including and interpreting many or higher-order interactions in statistical designs, a problem that only gets aggravated when the number of cases is smaller (Hellström 2009a, 6–8). In order to, amongst others, adequately operationalise ideology for the purposes of the present study, this would nevertheless seem necessary. It would thus seem desirable to analyse the micro-level behaviour of national party delegations using techniques other than the quantitative ones hitherto applied.

Methods of measurement and data

Considering next the methods of measurement and sources of data that have been used in studies on conflict in the EP, a similar and partly related imbalance in the state of the art on conflict in the EP can be observed: the bulk of studies has focused thus far on the (statistical) analysis of so-called roll call votes (RCV), i.e. those votes which are recorded with regard to each individual MEP. Scholars continue to use these votes as data, albeit meanwhile it is well known that the analysis of roll-call votes in the EP might involve a serious selection bias that might lead to an overestimation of party cohesion (Carrubba et al. 2006). In defence of RCV analysis, authors still using the respective data have argued that the bias might not be as important, since RCV would be called for only for the very important issues (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) or by focusing on selected ‘high profile issues’ (Ringe 2010, 86). Yet, the critique of RCV analysis has gone further than this.

Rasmussen (2008), for instance, has criticised that RCV do not provide any information as to “whether a MEP’s support of a proposal is to be taken as fervent conviction, modest support or grudging support” (ibid., 12). Similarly, Proksch and Slapin (2010) have argued that the picture provided by means of RCV data is not very nuanced. This might be problematic indeed also if one considers the fact that there is a kind of ‘consensus culture’ in the EU, so that a lot of negotiation has taken place prior to the eventual vote, which hence is a vote on the suggested compromise rather than on the original proposal. This is well known for the Council of the EU (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006), but Bowler and McElroy (2015) also demonstrate regarding the EP, that cohesion is particularly high whenever the two major EPGs have already agreed on a compromise, so that many votes celebrated as indications of functioning European parties are actually ‘hurrah votes’.

For example, if the centre-Left EPG (Socialists and Democrats, S&D) votes in favour of a certain proposal while the far-Left EPG (European United Left/Nordic Green Left, GUE/NGL) does not, this does not necessarily mean that disagreement was greater between those two than between S&D and the centre-Right European People’s Party (EPP); it could also just be due to the fact that majority requirements did not allow for a compromise between S&D and GUE/NGL to be adopted in the first place. It can thus in general be questioned, whether RCV really display the structure of conflict in the best

possible manner. Most importantly from the perspective of the present study, RCV analysis does definitely not reveal anything about the justifications that MEPs provide in the communication with their voters.

Expert surveys are less frequently used than RCV data, but they still constitute a rather prominent methodological approach to study actor positions in the EP (cf. Costello and Thomson 2014). The points of criticism that might be noted with regard to this method are, however, almost parallel. Firstly, in fact, while for RCV the problem of bias is at least well known, in the case of expert surveys it is usually not even clear what exactly experts base their judgement on (cf. Ray 2007). Secondly, the measurement is not actually that much more nuanced, since the simple ‘yes/no’-dichotomy is exchanged for five to seven-point scales in terms of support or rejection of European integration or a certain aspect of it in terms of policy area. Finally and again most importantly here, expert surveys do not measure MEPs’ justifications either.

Some scholars have used more or less structured interviews in order to overcome such problems. Rasmussen (2008), for instance, has directly asked a sample of Danish MEPs about their voting style and the motives behind it. As her example shows, however, it is difficult to carry out such qualitative interviews for a large and representative number of MEPs. Moreover, while the interviewees may be more or less honest in their replies, they possibly do not give the kinds of justifications that they provide to their respective electorates. It is this latter kind of justification, however, that might be of interest for its own sake, especially given the potential goal conflicts MEPs face. Ringe (2005; 2010) also uses interviews in order to identify, amongst others, how key policy-makers strategically try to set focal points. This might be problematic as well, as the actors involved might overestimate their own impact on things and fail to acknowledge external influences, such that the idea of an endogenous process might be more easily confirmed than rejected. Costello and Thomson (2014) use data resulting from semi-structured interviews, but they more or less directly mention the most important short-comings themselves: First, they admit that “expert informants were asked to recall a considerable amount of information” (ibid., 4), so that it might be questionable in how far they can provide a reliable, unbiased account of events. Second, they themselves call for studies that “examine the reasons MEPs themselves give for their behaviour” (ibid., 10), thereby admitting that their approach does not allow for this.

If the analysis of the reasons MEPs give is the goal, then, there will hardly be an alternative to the analysis of political texts. Most prominently, such analyses have been carried out by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) on party manifestoes and in the form of hand-coded content analysis (Budge et al. 2001). In EU studies, manifestos have usually been analysed only with regard to their pro- or anti-Europeaness, even if computerised methods were used meanwhile (for an overview see Ray 2007, 16–17). One of the reasons might be that the more fine-grained measures concerning particular policy issues are more difficult to do, given that not all parties do express their preferences on the same set of policy issues and might not do so in enough detail in the manifestos. In fact, even Helbling et al. (2010) are mainly interested in measuring party positions with regard to the two broadest aspects of European integration, namely deepening and widening, exemplified by positions on Turkish accession and the Constitutional Treaty. Noteworthy also, the level at which they measure frames, as being cultural

(nationalist vs. multicultural universalist), economic (labour & social security vs. economic prosperity), and other utilitarian (Political efficiency & efficacy vs. security & ecology) is much too broad for the present purpose of studying frames on concrete policies. Studies on European manifestos so far would thus seem to use methods of measurement that are not suitable for the study of expressed preferences and justifications at a policy issue level. Finally, even if they did, there would yet be another problem with manifestos as a source of data: they might be influenced by and might influence future MEPs, but to say that the justifications they include are the exact ones MEPs themselves give once elected would have to be built entirely on the theoretical assumption that MEPs are true representatives of their national parties (see Chapter 2 for the respective discussion).

MEPs themselves regularly justify their policy preferences as ‘explanations of vote’ during plenary debates. Yet, there are some caveats here as well, which are partly due to the nature of EP debates themselves, and partly due to the manner they have been analysed thus far. First, there is again some kind of selection bias involved, resulting from the selection of speakers in a debate: Slapin and Proksch, who elsewhere suggested themselves that parliamentary debates could be an alternative to RCV, find that apart from EPG leaders, it is precisely those individual MEPs who later defect who speak up disproportionately often in debates (Slapin and Proksch 2010). This, in turn, might explain their other finding that conflict in EP debates seems to be much more territorial than voting patterns are (Proksch and Slapin 2010). This could be held also against Ringe (2010), who amongst others carries out an analysis of EP debates in order to identify the focal points used, without considering the selection of speakers. Indeed, one would not be able to measure the preferences and justifications of those who do not speak, without being entirely sure that their silence means agreement, and it would not be possible, then, to produce a data-set that includes the positions of more or less all parties in a priorly defined sample.

Moreover, both Slapin and Proksch (2010) and Ringe (2010) seem to perceive of EP debates as communication among fellow MEPs mainly, while Slapin and Proksch further interpret the speeches by defecting MEPs as a signal to the national party. The first view might seem plausible to some extent, as a justification right before a vote might have some influence on fellow MEPs. In this case, however, EP debates would be less suited for addressing any questions concerning MEPs’ communication strategies vis-à-vis their electorates. The second view seems somewhat questionable, however, as MEPs might have channels of communicating with the national party other than EP debates and if defection is partly the result of monitoring by national parties, this justification might not be needed. Communication with voters seems to be, at best, a minor aspect of EP debates.

In addition to these general features of EP debates, one might also question the manner in which scholars have so far analysed these. Slapin and Proksch as well as Ringe do so in a very quantitative manner, in the sense that both count the usage of particular words. Generally, one might wonder in how far such quantitative text analysis is a valid manner of analyzing the reasons MEPs give, as it seems more suited to identify the substantive aspects MEPs focus on than to identify actual lines of argument. Moreover, the counting of words that is at the basis of both analyses might underestimate the possibility that MEPs reply to each other, so that – in Ringe’s case – the impression of an endogenous preference

formation might again be exaggerated. The ‘Wordfish’ software used by Slapin and Proksch might be well suited for large data sets, but such techniques typically imply losses of validity for smaller ones, so that its application for particular policy issues might be more problematic. More importantly, the issue in question is necessarily reduced to one dimension identified by the software itself (Proksch and Slapin 2010; Slapin and Proksch 2008), which might not adequately reflect the complexity of EU politics and takes away some of the advantages of textual data over a dichotomous vote.

It is in this respect that the usage of the software package T-LAB as introduced recently into EU studies within the domain of interest group research by (Klüver and Mahoney 2015) constitutes a real step ahead. With the help of this technique, frames, which are operationalised as co-occurring words (‘clusters’) in actors’ expressions of preferences, can be identified and their dimensionality assessed. This operationalisation certainly constitutes a good approximation of frames as defined by Entmann (whose definition is used both by Klüver and Mahoney as well as for the present paper), and for studies on very large number of documents might even form the best tool available to date. In practice, however, frames as defined by Entmann are much more about the ‘meaning’ of words rather than their co-occurrence: Different words might well carry a similar meaning, depending on how they are used, which is not captured by this technique but might be important when the overall number of words is smaller. As it was already established above that what is needed in terms of research design is rather a smaller number of policy issues, it might be both possible and necessary to analyse the respective texts issued by MEPs on these issues by a technique that is valid also for smaller numbers of words and more apt to capture meaning.

Quite decisive for the present study, however, is the fact that the texts used for the kind of quantitative analysis performed by Klüver and Mahoney must all be written in the same language (ibid., 2015, 230). After all, the idea is to analyse how MEPs express and justify their preferences, not least vis-à-vis their voters, which might often imply that these MEPs communicate in their respective national languages. This would not be problematic if EP debates could be used, since they are translated. Given the aforementioned arguments against the use of EP debates as data, however, it seems worthwhile looking for alternative sources of data and hence also for a technique that can be applied across languages.

One further argument for analyzing EP debates provided by Slapin and Proksch (2010) has been the degree of freedom from institutional constraints that MEPs enjoy in debates as compared to voting. However, this might apply even more to web-based channels of communication and indeed, scholars have started to analyse MEPs’ and candidates usage of such channels (Nulty et al. 2015; Vergeer, Hermans, and Cunha 2013). Yet it seems that these studies have so far focused mainly on the usage of such technology itself, while its content has been secondary. Even Nulty et al. (2015), who claim to be the first to include an analysis of content, only do so in a limited manner: they focus on the expression of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions regarding EU issues, and do so with regard to candidates’ Twitter activities. Arguably, that the 140 signs constituting the upper limit for so-called ‘Tweets’ might not suffice to adequately ‘give reasons’ and that such Tweets are used with a different purpose often. Finally, Nulty et al. acknowledge that the usage of Twitter among MEPs is not as widespread yet, as only 21 per cent of all

MEP candidates were found to even have a presence on the platform. It would thus appear more compatible with the goals of the present project, if a – potentially web-based – channel of MEP/party-to-voter communication could be identified that is used by more or less all MEPs or at least their national delegations and would further include more elaborate lines of argument MEPs use in their justifications.

3.2 Research design: Qualitative and comparative

In this section, I present the small-N research design meant to close the gap identified before. To this end, I first identify cases of policy issues at the macro-level, after having clarified the criteria for doing so in terms of a balance between differences and similarities of the cases. As I argue based on the foregoing theoretical discussion, all policy issues selected should be highly politicised, should have been debated in the run-up to the 2014 European elections (thereby holding effects of the electoral cycle, of the Crisis, and of the Lisbon Treaty constant), and should be generally associated with some idea of ‘national interests’. By contrast, they should display variation when it comes to the more precisely conceptualised aspects of ‘national interests’ in terms of distributional effects and their certainty. In order to improve the operationalization of national interests and ideology, I further limit myself to just a handful of countries and selected parties within them. This selection is made in terms of feasibility (keeping the number low and familiarity with countries and parties high), comparability (including only Western European countries with members of traditional party families), variation in the relevant national traditions (type of welfare regime and type of capitalism), and political weight (in order to keep a certain representativeness of the overall conflict in the EP). In addition, of course, the set of countries should be selected in such a way that both sides of a distributional conflict are included. The further selection of parties *within* countries is based on a conception of party family membership that is based on ideology in the strict sense, and for this reason requires a more detailed justification than the usage of an abstract Left-Right measurement would. Parties should be selected so as to provide a broad ideological tableau per country, while excluding those that could not be considered relevant competitors with regard to the 2014 elections. In order to systematically examine the eventual measurement results sample of parties, I suggest the usage of Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA). On the one hand, this is done because the number of observations will be *too large* discussing each party’s strategy individually. On the other hand, this method of analysis is chosen because the number of observations per policy issue is *too small* for statistical analysis. Last but not least, in contrast to the extant literature, by using QCA I will not only account for ‘interaction effects’ but will assume their presence from the outset, which seems appropriate given the apparent causal complexity behind a party’s decision to defect.

Macro level: A small-N study of policy issues

In the above review of the research designs in the state of the art on conflict in the EP, it was noted that at the macro level of policy issues, at which the structure of conflict shall be measured here, there is a lack of small-N case study designs that systematically compare the structure of conflict regarding a handful of policy issues. ‘Systematically’ means here that the cases selected are examined before the background of one the same theoretical and conceptual framework, and in order to effectively do so, the balance between homogeneity and heterogeneity of cases must be adequately struck (cf. Berg-Schlusser and Meur 2009b). As conflict in the European Parliament is not generally a new research agenda, it seems reasonable to strife for *homogeneity* where there is most agreement already within the extant literature as well as between the literature and the theory to be evaluated, and to strife for *heterogeneity* where either the extant literature is still undecided or at odds with the theory to be evaluated. For the present study, the implications of this general principle for case selection are as follows.

First, since it is generally assumed, albeit based on varying or unspecified definitions, that ‘national interests’ cause MEPs to defect (see preceding chapters), one homogeneous selection criterion should be that the cases – i.e. policy issues – selected have been taken to involve national interest – for

some reason or another. Second, it has been repeatedly found that defection occurs concerning issues that are salient (Costello and Thomson 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2013). In the theoretical chapter of this study, a certain degree of salience as either electoral relevance (i.e. politicisation) or ideological relevance (i.e. not purely technical) was identified as a scope condition of the theory of territorialisation. Since therefore the condition of politicisation is rather uncontroversial, it might be more efficient to focus on issues that are highly politicised. In pragmatic terms, this also increases the availability of data concerning parties' justifications by means of framing. Third, it seems that electoral cycles at the EU-level matter, be it because of rising pressure from the national level (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011) or because of increasing experience ('learning') on the part of MEPs (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Wielen, R. J. V. 2012; Rasmussen 2008) and their leaders (Bailer, Schulz, and Selb 2009). In addition, there are only few post-Crisis studies (Costello and Thomson 2014; Otjes and van der Veer 2016), and related to this, relatively few studies so far refer to conflict in the EP after the Treaty of Lisbon, which has provided the EP with increased competences and influence in a number of policy areas. In this latter respect, it is less important for the present purpose, whether a concrete legislative process has been started already, but rather that the EP will eventually have a real say and now is already expressing and justifying preferences.⁹ As an overall result of these last three aspects, it appears most interesting to focus on only policy issues that were discussed towards the end of the last electoral cycle, that is, between January 2013 and May 2014.

Hence, there will be variation only with regard to the specific manifestations of what has been loosely referred to as 'national interests', but should be analysed more precisely in terms of the scope, direction and certainty of distributional effects. That said, not all possible configurations of these conditions are equally relevant in terms of the contribution the present study could make: First, issues with distributional effects that are close to non-existent are likely to be technical and not very salient. Second, issues characterised by the absence of more than one condition deemed necessary for territorialisation are also of minor interest, as finding the structure of conflict to be ideological regarding these issues would not be surprising from any theoretical perspective. Indeed, such cases where the outcome (here: territorial conflict) to be explained is (probably) absent and an expected necessary condition (here: cross-national distribution) is absent as well, are generally less attractive from a qualitative point of view (cf. Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 177–91). Third, at the other end of the spectrum, that is, where most likely cases for territorialisation characterised by high politicisation and highly certain cross-national distributional effects with basically no intra-national distribution would be found, the problem is a different one as I shall briefly point out in the next paragraph.

While it might be rather useful to include such a case, it is empirically hard to find. On the one hand, before the Crisis, any large-scale mechanism for cross-national redistribution was politically unthinkable in the EU (cf. e.g. McKay 2002, 80–81), albeit this is a typical feature of other federations (and a typical source of territorial conflict, cf. Lecours and Beland 2010). Some scholars argue, that so-called 'Eurobonds', discussed as a response to the Crisis, would have moved the EU into this direction

⁹ This is similar to the reasoning behind the selection of 'key votes' carried out by Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014).

(Begg 2011). It is revealing, however, that it was just this particular measure that at least reached the stage of a Commission Green Paper and was discussed in the EP subsequently, that was *not* an explicitly redistributive scheme comparable to the German *Länderfinanzausgleich*, for instance. Hence, it was possible for some political actors to simply deny any redistributive aspect of collective bonds (cf. Wirtz 2012). On the other hand, the most obvious existing measure of cross-national distribution, namely the so-called Cohesion Funds that are part of the EU's Structural Policy (Bourne 2007), do not constitute a most likely case for territorialisation either: First, with only 39.7 billion Euros spent on under this heading, they constitute only a small portion of the EU's GDP, of the overall budget, and even out of the total budget for Structural Policy (183.9 billion) (European Commission 2013d). While the share of the Structural Policy within the EU budget is steadily growing, most of it is thus distributed on a regional basis and thus also entails intra-national distributional effects (cf. Bourne 2007). Second, and probably related, the EU's Structural Policy has barely been politicised in the sense defined above, that is, as a matter of interest for the masses of citizens. A most likely case for territorialisation possessing all characteristics assumed as conducive to territorialisation and lacks all others, can therefore not be included here.

Table 3: Potential cases and their characteristics ranked by relevance; selected cases in bold

| (potential) cases | politicisation | Cross-national distribution | Intra-national distribution | Certainty |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| ? (most likely case) | High | High | Low | High |
| Welfare migration | High | High | Low | Low |
| CAP Reform | High | High | High | High |
| TTIP | High | Low | High | High |
| territorialisation highly unlikely | High | Low | High | Low |
| territorialisation highly unlikely | High | High | High | Low |
| Technical issues | Low (by definition) | Low | Low | High |
| Technical issues | Low (by definition) | Low | Low | Low |
| Cohesion funds | Low | High | Low | High |

The following cases have been selected as representatives of the remaining kinds of cases that appear most relevant for the purposes of this study: The question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants, the latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). While the detailed description of their characteristics provided at the start of each substantive chapter will make the point for their selection even stronger, their selection shall be briefly justified here with reference to the foregoing criteria. In addition it is pointed out, why the selected cases for each configuration of conditions appears particularly interesting as such.

The debate on **welfare access for intra-EU migrants** took off in the second half of 2013 with the date of Romania's and Bulgaria's full accession to the Schengen area approaching (01-01-2014), was made the topic of an EP resolution in January 2014 (European Parliament 2014), and continues to be one of the most vivid political debates in the post-Crisis EU. Indeed, it can be considered as a kind of symbol of the new era of EU politicisation after the Crisis: First, semantically, terms such as 'benefits tourism' and

‘welfare tourism’ or slogans such as ‘who betrays, flies’¹⁰ used by some political actors and media could not be further away from the technical language EU politics was notoriously famous for before the Crisis. Second, geographically, the United Kingdom has been a hotspot of the debate and continues to be, given its government’s insistence on changes to free movement in this respect during the negotiations on future terms of membership (cf. e.g. Foster 2016). Noteworthy, both UK parties and citizens have since long had a rather cautious or sceptic attitude towards the EU (Risse 2010). Interestingly, however, ‘welfare tourism’ has been made a campaigning issue also elsewhere (European Parliament 2014).

The change in debating Europe could hardly be better exemplified than by the interview a German (with its presumably pro-European population and party system, cf. Risse, 2010 and Lees 2008) Christian Democrat (a presumably pro-European party family, cf. Marks & Wilson, 2000), namely Elmar Brok, leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee (i.e. not an expert on the issue), gave to the major German tabloid (i.e. not the quality press known formerly to cover EU issues to a greater extent, cf. Bijmans 2011, 29), the BILD Zeitung on this very issue (Hoeren 2014). Interviewed about the issue of ‘welfare tourism’, Christel Schaldemose, a Danish Social Democrat MEP, has even called migration “one of the biggest issues during the election campaign” (Debating Europe 2013). Finally, while during the time period considered there was no legally binding decision on the issue, it should be noted that the key piece of legislation concerning intra-EU migration, namely Directive 2004/38, can eventually be changed only with approval of the EP. The question of welfare for intra-EU migrants thus generally fulfils the selection criteria in terms of conditions to be shared among the selected cases (timing, politicisation, EP competence).

It is also with regard to those case characteristics for which variation is desired that the question of welfare for intra-EU migrants is particularly interesting. On the one hand, social policy in general might be considered a ‘typical’ policy area for Left-Right contestation (cf. Treib 2010). On the other hand, welfare systems can have cross-national distributional effects and thereby lead to territorialisation of political conflict, especially when there are differences in economic development, as the case of Belgium demonstrates (Béland and Lecours 2005; Béland and Lecours 2007; Cantillon, Mussche, and Popelier 2011). Arguably, the case of welfare access of intra-EU migrants resembles the latter, with Romania and Bulgaria adding a degree of economic inequality to the EU without precedent (cf. Eurostat 2016b). In fact, it is arguably both core electorates of the Left and of the Right that might feel threatened by so-called ‘welfare tourism’, as it is the former that would be competing with intra-EU migrants for government resources while the latter would be forced to finance any additional expenditure. Intra-national distribution should thus be negligible in this particular case.

The EU, of course, is not Belgium, and it does not have one common welfare system, but rather a collection of Europeanised national welfare states (Kleinman 2002). What exactly this means, that is, up to which point exactly these national welfare states are Europeanised, is *legally* uncertain. To support this

¹⁰ „Wer betrügt, der fliegt“, a major campaigning slogan of German Christian Social Union (CSU), cf. Roßmann (2013).

statement, a more elaborate kind of argument will be necessary and is thus provided in more detail in the respective chapter. For the time being, it should serve as an indication that both EU and national courts have been dealing with respective questions quite frequently in recent years, with a view to clarifying the situation that apparently left some room for interpretation thus far (cf. Lynch 2014). To date, experts still debate even the legality of the exemptions granted to the UK in the aforementioned negotiations on terms of British EU membership (e.g. Peers 2016). Legal matters aside, there also is an ongoing scientific debate from an economic perspective. First of all, it is unclear in how far migrants are actually attracted by the prospect of receiving welfare in a host country compared to other pull factors at all (Barrett and McCarthy 2008). Second, it is unclear in how far this makes migrants a blessing or a threat for national welfare systems, as for instance the inner-German debate between the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the ifo institute shows (Bonin 2014; Sinn 2013). Finally and most obviously, since the levels of inequality between Romania and Bulgaria vis-à-vis the rest of the were unprecedented, there could be no direct empirical experience by the time the debate was started and barely even after the few months into 2014 when the European elections took place, i.e. there was no validly measurable budgetary impact yet. In sum, the question of welfare migration thus displays the characteristics of a case corresponding to the second row of the above table, chosen mainly in order to examine the role of uncertainty for the structure of conflict.

By contrast, the **Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)** is a rather old EU policy, with decades of experience giving a rather good idea of who has won from it so far and who has lost. More important, the certainty of its distributional effects is increased by the fact that it is funded (mainly) via the EU budget and indeed tended to be its single largest component (with 298 billion spent in the period 2007-2013 on direct payments to farmers and market measures, and an additional 80 billion rural development) (European Commission 2013a). Based on the knowledge about each Member State's contribution to the overall budget on the one hand and the amounts of money it receives in form of the CAP expenditure, it is then very easy to calculate the cross-national distributional effects of the policy (e.g. Zahrt 2010). Hence, of all empirically existing cases, the CAP comes closest to the kind of most likely case mentioned earlier, except that it also has intra-national distributional effects, as it is clearly farmers who receive a subsidy financed by the rest of society. If thus the combined presence of certain and cross-national distribution leads to territorialisation, this should be observed here. Since it is a strongly interventionist policy that is very much at odds with free market principles (Rieger 2005), it is further interesting from an ideological and type of capitalism perspective.

While as such an old policy, the CAP however continues to be reformed regularly. With the latest round of reforms being finalized in 2013, the 2013 Reform of CAP displays the time-related characteristics listed above. Moreover, both Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014) consider the votes on CAP reform among the ten or fifteen (respectively) key votes of the 7th European Parliament, which includes votes that of salience to citizens across Europe and catching media attention (Hix 2013, 1; Nissen 2014, 20), hence they can be considered as politicised issues according to the definition of politicisation used for

the present study.¹¹ Generally, the CAP is further considered as a matter involving national interests in EU politics (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Noury 2002). Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP was given co-decision powers in the policy area (Swinnen, Johan F. M and Knops 2012). In sum, therefore, the conditions to be held constant across cases are present in the case of the 2013 Reform of CAP.

Like the CAP, the **Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)** between the EU and the United States (US) is considered as a key vote in the 7th EP by the aforementioned studies (Hix 2013; Nissen 2014), and with the resolution to open negotiations with the US in May 2013 and first negotiation rounds in early 2014, clearly also fulfils the politicisation and timing conditions. As in the area of agricultural policy, the EP is now also a vital player in the domain of EU trade policy (European Commission DG Trade 2011). Since furthermore Moravcsik (1993; 1998) applied his whole conception of national interests to the economic integration in Europe (from free trade area to currency union), TTIP is a case that would classically be considered to involve ‘national interests’ more or less loosely defined, too. What makes it interesting for its own sake, however, is the fact that it might thus serve also as a test case for Moravcsik’s ‘producer bias’ in the particular context of a post-Crisis EP (rather than at pre-Crisis intergovernmental summits).

As for the distributional effects of TTIP and their certainty, it should be noted first of all that TTIP obviously is not a directly redistributive policy. Yet, it is a theoretical possibility of course, that some countries’ economies will gain from the agreement, while those of others might lose. Studies trying to predict the impact of TTIP on the EU’s economies find, however, that all countries would benefit from it in terms of increases in real GDP per capita, independent of the exact shape of the eventual agreement (Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013), which, as I point out in Chapter 6, is confirmed by country-specific studies. Felbermayer et al. further find that TTIP would not foster divergence in terms of real income among the Member States, albeit some countries can expect larger overall gains than others (*ibid.*, 2013, 24–26). The cross-national distribution effects of TTIP are therefore considered low here. Noteworthy, some sectors of the economy, or even some industries within certain sectors are likely to lose individually from the agreement (cf. Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 11 Thelle et al. 2015, respectively). Given the protectionist bias that classical trade theory assumes (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 12 & 133), this might eventually lead the voices of losers to be louder in those countries expected not to gain overwhelmingly from the agreement. Studying the structure of conflict in TTIP is thus also interesting from the perspective of trade policy research.

In fact, this applies even more to those aspects of the agreement that do not just concern various kinds of producers within the EU, but also the consumers. For what is mainly negotiated under the heading of ‘regulatory cooperation’, which is meant to reduce so-called non-tariff-barriers to trade (NTBs) and is a typical element of the current generation of trade agreements, is expected to become its most decisive yet controversial part (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014). For reasons I point out in more detail in

¹¹ The question of welfare for intra-EU migrants could not be included in their respective lists, since the first vote in this respect was only held in January 2014 and thus lay outside the time frame of these studies.

Chapter 6, this aspect of TTIP entails an intra-national distributional conflict between producers and consumers, which indeed has been identified by de Ville and Siles-Brügge as the main pattern of conflict over TTIP (ibid., 2015). The latter study has not, however, systematically analysed the importance of this pattern vis-à-vis potentially additional territorial ones. Hence, it can be used as one basis for considering the intra-national distributional effects as high, but not as the final word on the overall structure of conflict.

Finally, it must be discussed here at least briefly, why the certainty of the distributional effects just discussed should be considered ‘high’. After all, in the aforementioned work by de Ville and Siles-Brügge, scientific studies using so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for calculating the potential impact of agreements such as TTIP are treated as exercises in “managing fictional expectations” (ibid. 2015, 33–37). In the chapter on TTIP, I name several arguments for still considering the certainty of the distributional effects of TTIP as high, of which the following are most important and straightforward: First, unlike in the case of welfare migration, there is something close to a scientific consensus here (beyond studies using CGE modelling) that TTIP is beneficial for all EU Member States. Second, Member State governments command their own studies that confirm this view and hence *create* certainty for themselves, while additionally being lobbied by concrete beneficiaries and losers from TTIP and thus provided with information. While furthermore the decades of experience with other EU trade agreements do increase the certainty regarding the distributional effects of TTIP to the same level as in the case of CAP, it will still be much more difficult to dispute its purely economic consequences.

In sum, by focusing only on the three cases of welfare for intra-EU migrants, the 2013 reform of CAP, and TTIP, it is possible to cover the most theoretically interesting and empirically existing configurations of conditions assumed to shape the structure of conflict. In order to be more accurate than the extant literature, however, any superficial or general operationalisation of national interests will have to be replaced by a better informed, issue-specific one. Similarly, in order to know whether a particular policy frame will be in line with an ideology or not, one needs to be aware of the features of the respective ideology as a set of ideas and needs to group parties based on their adherence to such ideas, not just their ‘position’ on some general dimension, their EPG membership or even their name. Additionally, with a view to distinguish the impact of national interests in a distributional sense from national traditions, and to understand potentially intervening idiosyncrasies of a given national party system or individual party, it seems advisable to also restrict the sample of parties (or national party delegations) examined at the micro level to a selection of countries only. Justifications for the exact selection of countries and parties are thence provided in the following subsections.

Micro-level: Selecting parties by country

In this subsection I explain the further focus on a limited selection of parties within a just a subset of EU Member States. To this end, I first point out why and in how far such further limitation is needed at all, before formulating general as well as issue-related reasons for selecting parties from Germany, Austria,

France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Ireland only. Thereafter, I elaborate on the exact choice of parties per country and party family.

If the goal is to move from broad proxies on national interests (e.g. rich North vs poor South) to concrete knowledge on an issue-basis, to know about potentially relevant national historical conditions and about similarities in structural economic features that would allow for distinguishing the latter from ideological like-mindedness (cf. Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), it would be difficult to cover all EU Member States in the intended analysis. Moreover, it might be desirable to be familiar with the basic dynamics of the respective party systems and with national peculiarities, and for this purpose alone it might be necessary to be in command of the respective national languages. The latter is also needed in order to allow for the analysis of non-translated textual data including the direct communication of MEPs with their voters, which for given the deficits of e.g. EP debates as data (see Section 3.1) seems advisable. This, in turn, means that a computerised analysis of frames is impossible (Klüver and Mahoney 2015), which then again would limit the overall amount of text that could be analysed at all (namely by coding manually). Obviously, it would not seem feasible to simply acquire the knowledge of whatever language which might seem worthwhile knowing for the sake of the study. The resulting overall limitations for studying the structure of conflict in the EP are of course considerable. Given the gap in the extant literature in terms of methods and data, however, the trade-off appears acceptable in principle, *as long as* it can still be assured that there is a meaningful variance within the sample of countries and parties selected.

Before discussing this point further, it should be noted here that, similar to the selection of issues above, it might also be advisable for the selection of countries and parties to guarantee a certain level of homogeneity in order to assure comparability in addition to feasibility. This necessitates another trade-off: On the one hand, some of the largest cross-national distributional effects can be expected from the relatively rich ‘old’ Member States in Western Europe towards the comparatively poor ‘new’ Member States in the East (cf. e.g. Thomson 2009), it might seem desirable to include both old and new Member States. On the other hand, however, the Central and Eastern European party systems are still very much in flux as a result of the transition from Communist rule (cf. Budge et al. 2001, 8–9), and the membership of Eastern European families in the known *familles spirituelles* of Western Europe is questionable (Bressanelli 2012; Mair and Mudde 1998, 213–14). Some minimum degree of ideological equivalence across countries would however be required in order to relate similar kinds of arguing back to similar ideological traditions where applicable. This, in turn, would be necessary in order to actually distinguish policy-driven expressions of preferences from those being due to vote-seeking at the micro-level, and it would be necessary at the macro-level for not confusing differences due to varying interpretations of Left and Right with those related to distributional effects. For reasons of comparability, then, the selection of parties is limited to Western European Member States only.

Within Western Europe, interpretations of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ might not diametrically oppose each other, yet they might vary slightly across countries due to the degree of state intervention into the economy that would be considered ‘normal’. This phenomenon, usually referred as the ‘type of capitalism’, has been found to influence party positions on European integration and EU politics (cf. e.g.

Marks 2004; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; Thomson 2009; Ringe 2010), and should thus arguably be taken into account as well. The type of capitalism further constitutes a potentially relevant national tradition with regard to at least two of the three policy issues selected above, namely CAP and TTIP. Reducing the present study to parties from countries characterised by one type of capitalism only might however constitute one limitation too much, in that it would then be even more difficult to still find variation for all three policy issues in terms of distributional effects. Hence, the selection of countries should include at least two countries per type of capitalism, because in this manner systematic variation should become noticeable and distinguishable from other conditions.

A final criterion that is independent of the case (i.e. issue) selection at the macro-level might be the political weight of the countries selected within the EU as a whole. Arguably, focusing on just one very unimportant Member State it might be possible to identify, whether there is defection in line with possible national interests or not, might in principle constitute at least a limited test of the theoretical framework developed. Nevertheless, the findings resulting from the present study will be much more valuable from a substantial perspective if at least to some extent they provide an idea of the conflict in the whole EU. Therefore, it seems preferable to include the most powerful member states in the sample, that is, inasmuch as this is possible given the foregoing criteria.

The sample of countries composed of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Ireland not only fulfils these criteria, but further displays sufficient variation in terms of the issue-specific national interests. In how far this is the case and which exact indicators are chosen or not is explained in detail in the respective chapters on each case. At this point, I simply provide a quick overview: With regard to each case, I point out the variation in terms of cross-national distributional effects and relevant national traditions.

First, with regard to the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants, this selection of countries is arguably not perfect in that Romania and Bulgaria, the alleged countries of origin of prospective 'welfare tourists' are not included. Given, however, the aforementioned criterion of comparability, adding them to the sample would not be a good idea. The Crisis has, however, considerably affected overall migration flows within the EU (Hanewinkel 2013). Most importantly, the countries most affected by the Crisis became less attractive destinations for intra-EU migrants, who instead shifted to those faring better, but also for their own citizens. Within the present sample, Italy, France, Germany, and the UK have experienced an increase in immigration from Romania and Bulgaria, whereas many intra-EU migrants have left Ireland. In 2012, relative to its overall population, Ireland had the highest net emigration in the whole EU (Kenny 2013). Noteworthy also, Crisis-ridden Italy may still have experienced net immigration, but its net immigration has been falling throughout the Crisis, which is mainly due to the emigration of Italian nationals (ISTAT 2013). As a result, with Ireland included in the sample, there is at least one country which in principle might have interests that are different from those of France, Germany, the UK and Austria, who are still mainly 'host' countries to potential welfare tourists: Irish

politicians might want to portray themselves as protecting also Irish emigrants abroad.¹² Italy finds itself in an interesting mixed situation. Hence, the present sample not only allows for testing the theoretical predictions made here with regard to potential defections by – domestically – pro-welfare parties in France, Germany, the UK and Austria, but to some extent also should depict the other side of the conflict.

Similarly, there is at least some variation when it comes to the type of welfare regime (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990a) prevailing within each of the six. As I point out in more detail in Chapter 4, this might be less important in the sense that presumably more ‘generous’ countries would have more to lose, but rather in terms of national traditions: Parties’ and voters’ general ideas about welfare might partly shape their perception of what is ‘normal’ also with regard to welfare access for migrants. While Esping Andersen (*ibid.*) would consider the UK and Ireland as part of the ‘residual’ world of welfare, Germany, France, Italy, and Austria would be part of the ‘conservative’ type, with the latter approaching the social-democratic one.

Second, concerning CAP, the situation is even clearer, for interestingly enough some of the countries that traditionally have been the main beneficiaries of CAP – and to a considerable extent still benefit from it – do not lie in the poor East. Within the present sample, this clearly applies to France and Ireland, while Austria is a CAP beneficiary only if rural development funds are added to the calculation (Zahrnt 2010). Germany, the UK, and Italy, however, are net payers (*ibid.*). Moreover, net payers and beneficiaries are distributed evenly across the three types of capitalism, which given the implications they have for considering state intervention into the economy as ‘normal’ might be the crucial national traditions in this case.

Third, the sample should dispose of sufficient variation in terms of national interests when it comes to TTIP. This is because it includes countries winning the least (Austria, France) and those winning the most (UK, Ireland) from TTIP according to Felbermayr et al. (2013).¹³ Since various types of capitalism also tend to have implications in terms of openness to trade, they can again be considered as the most relevant national traditions in this respect. In sum, therefore, this selection of countries might not be perfect in every respect or equally ideal with regard to every case, and is certainly not the only one conceivable. Nevertheless, given the various general criteria as well as the fact that identifying such a small number of countries showing equally suitable variation with regard to each of the issues is not easy, it appears that focusing on this sample of countries is adequate in order to approach an answer to the research question.

¹² Noteworthy, Irish emigrants themselves are not allowed to vote from abroad.

¹³ Arguments for using their calculations as a basis are presented in the chapter on TTIP.

Table 4: Selected countries and their characteristics in terms of cross-national distribution and relevant national traditions for each case

| country | welfare | | CAP | | TTIP | |
|---------|--|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| | Distribution: immigration vs. emigration | Tradition: welfare regime | Distribution: net payer / recipient | Tradition: type of capitalism | Distribution: winning more or less (relative) | Tradition: type of capitalism |
| Germany | Immigration | Conservative | payer | Managed | More | Managed |
| Austria | Immigration | Conservative / social democratic | recipient | Managed | Less | Managed |
| UK | Immigration | Liberal | payer | Liberal | More | Liberal |
| Ireland | Emigration | Liberal | recipient | Liberal | More | Liberal |
| France | Immigration | Conservative | recipient | Statist | Less | Statist |
| Italy | immigration/emigration | Conservative / Southern | payer | Statist | More | Statist |

Micro-level: Selecting parties by party family

Noteworthy, for the purposes of this study, not all parties within each of these six countries are equally relevant. The selection again follows a number of general criteria: Firstly and most importantly, in order to examine the role of ideology versus that of nationality, an attempt should be made to display a broad ideological tableau. That is, within each country, the party families that are typically identified in the literature, namely Christian Democrats and Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, far Left/post-Communists, populist and far Right (Detterbeck 2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006; Ware 1996).¹⁴ Secondly, at the same time, it might not be necessary to include all parties, but rather to select one representative per party family, preferably the most influential one. Thirdly, the parties included should be relevant for the European elections 2014, in that they actually competed in the election and could be attributed at least a slight chance of obtaining a seat based on their performance in this and two earlier elections. This explicitly also includes parties that did not have MEPs between 2009 and 2014, since this has a number of advantages: it allows for some degree comparison between parties with and without MEPs, which is interesting given the assumption that MEPs will behave in terms of defection very much as their national parties would, and it completes the ideological range in a number of countries up to a certain point (i.e. actually relevant parties). As a result, for instance, a liberal party (the NEOs) is included for Austria in order to complement the analysis of this family, while an Austrian far Left party of relevance in the present sense simply cannot be included.

Fourthly, what might be called the ‘regionalist’ party family (cf. Ware 1996, 39–40) is excluded from the sample. While this might mean to exclude a set of parties that in some countries constitute relevant competitors, this particular family nevertheless defies any fruitful comparison with regard to the key factors of ideology and national interest. This is because they not only vary significantly regarding the economic component of their ideologies, but also in terms of vote-seeking will be taking orientation from

¹⁴ Relevant members of the ‘agrarian’ party family do not exist in the six countries selected, cf. Ware (1996, 39).

the regional rather than the national interest (Masseti and Schakel 2015). The Italian Lega Nord, for instance, does therefore not form a part of the sample, and neither does the Scottish National Party. Noteworthy, however, the Bavarian Christian Social Union is included as partner of the Christian Democratic Union, as is Sinn Féin in its role of a far Left Irish (not regionalist British) party. Finally, it must be possible to attribute the party more or less clearly to any of the larger party families by using the approaches discussed by Mair and Mudde (1998) or by drawing on extant literature. The electorally most relevant party thereby excluded from the sample is the Italian Five Star Movement. Like the German Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD), it a relatively recent formation. However, whereas the AfD can be rather safely placed within the Right-wing populist family already given its ideology and origin (Decker 2015), and more recently also its transnational links (derStandard.at 2016; Teffer 2016), this does not appear possible for the Five Star Movement (yet) (Conti and Memoli 2015, 531).

In the following I will present the basic ideological tenants of each family at a very general level, noting also longer-term trends and possible internal variation, before pointing out their respective core electorates in the past and present. Noteworthy, more detailed ideological and electoral aspects of relevance for each policy issue will be discussed in the respective substantive chapters. Within the present subsection, arguments are then provided for attributing the various parties to the respective families, for choosing just these as representatives and not others, and for aggregating or separating party families. In these arguments, the approaches discussed by Mair and Mudde (1998) are used in a way that ranks them according to their usefulness for the study.

Transnational links of parties in terms of membership in European Political Groups (EPGs) are of course not generally irrelevant for studying conflict in the EP. Indeed, it has been shown that not only EPGs are cohesive, as was already mentioned, but also that parties choose their EPG mainly according to ideological criteria (Bressanelli 2012). Yet, Bressanelli also shows that ideology is not a deterministic factor for joining a given EPG. Ideology as a system of ideas forming a party's very identity, however, is assumed here to be causally important when it comes to the structure of conflict in EU politics. Hence, the attribution of a party to a particular family must rank ideology in this sense higher than the simple but straightforward criterion of EPG membership. Similarly, the origin of a party in terms of societal cleavages should be used complementarily, as Mair and Mudde (1998) recommend. Nevertheless, since the representation of societal groups divided by these cleavages has more to do with a party's vote-seeking ambitions than with its ideology-driven policy goals, it should also be ranked lower than ideology in the strict sense. Attribution by name may not be as misleading as in some of the examples mentioned by Mair and Mudde (ibid.), and yet especially in Ireland and Italy is often not very helpful. By contrast, party origin and EPG membership might thus be helpful starting points, but even they should be overruled by the ideology approach here.

The first set of parties that I consider as being part of essentially one family constitutes a case in point for the primacy of the ideology approach here: I refer to it as the **family of Christian Democratic and Conservative parties**, or, as a matter of convenience, as the centre-Right. It includes the German

Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU/CSU), Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), the British Conservative Party, the Irish Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), the French Union for a People's Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), and the Italian Forza Italia (FI). Grouping such parties together for cross-national comparison is not a novelty as such (e.g. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 508). Most of the literature on party families, however, treats them as two distinct families (Detterbeck 2011; Marks and Wilson 2000; Ware 1996), whereas some scholars have tended to consider the Christian Democrats a subgroup of Conservative parties (Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 99). It is argued, that in general as well as in particular with regard to the parties belonging to these two families within the countries considered here, separating the two is not necessary any longer, if indeed an ideological approach to party families is given primacy over other criteria.

For admittedly, these parties do not form one group in the EP, with most of them being part of the European People's Party (EPP) group, but the Conservative Party and Fianna Fáil being part of other groups (European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR, and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE, respectively). Nor are they of identical or similar origin in terms of the societal cleavages from which they originated in the first place. Yet, it should be noted with regard to cleavage structures, that the religious cleavage that was crucial to the formation of Christian Democratic parties has considerably lost in importance (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000, 451), such that using this criterion is likely to overestimate potential differences.

Conservative *ideology*, then, has frequently found its expression mainly in opposition to other ideologies and indeed Conservatives themselves have often denied that it constitutes an ideology at all (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 119). However, the preference of stability and moderate change over radical change or revolution can in itself be seen as a Conservative core value (cf. Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 119; Detterbeck 2011, 121; Ware 1996, 32). Along these lines, common sense is preferred over science, hierarchy over equality, traditional values and communities (the family, the nation) are highly appreciated (ibid.). This appreciation of stability in its various expressions is equally found among Christian Democrats. As Detterbeck notes: "As in Conservatism, society is understood as a 'moral unit', which links various parts in a hierarchical order characterised by authority" (ibid., 2011, 122). It can thus be argued, then, that the normative ideological basis of Christian Democrats and Conservative parties has generally been very similar anyway.

With regard to EU politics, Marks and Wilson (2000) argue that Conservative parties value 'the nation' as a community higher than Christian Democrats do, who in line with Catholicism often take a more supranational orientation. Pointing to the German CSU in particular, these same scholars also note, however, that nationalism can also be strong in Christian democratic parties (ibid., 452). Similarly, while Ware denies that Germany has a Conservative party (ibid., 1996, 32), Miliopoulos (2011) does count CDU and CSU among the Conservative parties, and the same point has been made about the Austrian ÖVP (cf. Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 112). Indeed, a closer inspection of the ideology of the CDU would exemplify the aforementioned parallels to Conservatism (Walter, Werwath, and D'Antonio 2014, 21), and

the CSU even defines itself as a Conservative party (Weigl 2013, 508). The case of the French UMP further makes the distinction in terms of a pro-European Christian Democratic family and a Eurosceptic Conservative family difficult, for the UMP and its predecessors have generally been considered Conservative (e.g. Miliopoulos 2011; Ware 1996, 49), but still the UMP is part of the relatively pro-European EPP group rather than of the ECR (Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 108). Drawing any borders between the two families is thus difficult if not impossible, once the criterion of origin (here: the meanwhile irrelevant religious cleavage) is considered secondary.

It is in a similar vein that the Irish Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil can be attributed to the one family of Conservatives and Christian Democrats, as both von Beyme (1985) and Marks and Wilson (2000) do, despite Ware's protest, which indeed is explicitly built on origin-related arguments (ibid. 1996, 23). The fact that Fine Gael has joined the Christian Democratic EPP while Fianna Fáil (until 2014) was part of ALDE has more to do with "the appearance of difference for domestic political competition" than with actual ideological difference, which in general should be "seen as a matter of degree" (Reidy 2009, 517). In fact, while generally more nationalist than the 'Christian Democratic' Fine Gael, the rather 'Conservative' Fianna Fáil left the Union for a Europe of the Nations because it rejected its anti-Europeanism (Hayward and Fallon 2009). In fact, Miliopoulos, for instance, considers both of them as Conservative parties anyway (ibid. 2011, 133). Hence again the possibility of differentiation by the degree of nationalism is limited.

When I have argued that the importance of the Church-State (or 'religious') cleavage, which would have differentiated Christian Democrats and Conservatives, is in decline, I have mainly considered that so far in terms of the 'origin of parties' approach. Moreover, while I have shown some basic similarity on the ideological value dimension of these parties, it could still be noted that the difference in origin has left some kind of lasting ideological difference in some more specific aspects. Indeed, some scholars would hold that Christian Democratic parties would interpret the Christian aspect of their tradition in a way that makes them more open towards regulation of capitalism and towards a more generous social policy in particular (Detterbeck 2011, 122; Ware 1996, 36–37). It must then also be noticed, however, that so-called 'New Right' ideas on economic matters have influenced *both* Conservative and Christian Democratic parties since the 1980s, and the latter even more so (cf. Ware, 1996, 33 & 36-37; Detterbeck, 2011, 122; Festenstein & Kenny, 2005, 119-127).¹⁵ While the inclusion of these ideas is not without contradictions and often leads to internal tensions within such parties, it nevertheless has led both of these parties to change their diagnoses of economic processes and, consequently, their policies towards the economic Right. That is, they now tend to perceive of market intervention as a problem rather than as a solution and hence instead favour free market policies over protectionism. As a result, if a difference once existed on economic matters between Christian Democrats and Conservatives, the adoption of New Right ideas has largely made it shrink or even erode.

¹⁵ Since Nicolas Sarkozy, this applies even to the French UMP, cf. Nielsberg and Sahuc (2006).

Its embrace of this New Right or neoliberal ideas is also one of the ideological features of the Forza Italia (FI) (Newell 2010, 220). Its features as the ‘personal party’ of Silvio Berlusconi notwithstanding (Donovan 2015; Musella 2015), the values this party itself propagates as being its “secular faith” (“credo laico”) very much fit the ideological profile of both Conservative and Christian Democratic parties (Forza Italia). In fact, while Donovan sees the FI as an impediment to the creation of a ‘real’ Conservative party in Italy (ibid. 2015), Miliopoulos holds that it is just that (ibid. 2011, 132–33). FI is further part of the ‘Christian Democratic’ EPP (cf. Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011). Hence, while noting that there are further centre Right parties in Italy which however have been electorally much weaker (considered by Donovan as “small fry”, ibid. 2015, 21), I select the FI as the Italian representative of what is considered *one* Conservative and Christian Democratic family here.

Conservative and Christian Democratic ideology has traditionally been attractive for societal groups on the rural side of the urban-rural cleavage as well as for the employer side of the class cleavage (cf. Detterbeck, 2011, 75-84; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2007, 168–211). While voters remain decreasingly attached to one particular party, this trend should not disguise the fact that these cleavages continue to play an electoral role (cf. ibid.). Hence, in principle, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties risk alienating these groups by defecting from the aforementioned ideological tenets. Taking positions on globalisation and European integration may lead to tensions within these parties as well as amongst their electorates, as business associations and corporations will favour neoliberal economic policies and a certain degree of cosmopolitanism/Europeanism, while especially the latter aspect might not be favoured by the non-business segments within the centre Right’s core electorate (cf. Grande and Kriesi 2012; Marks and Wilson 2000). Whether these parties defect for vote-seeking reasons will thus depend on the exact distributional effects of a policy for all of these groups.

The selection of parties that I attribute to the **family of Social Democratic parties** should be much less controversial and hence necessitates a less extensive justification. This subsample includes the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), the French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS), the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), and the Irish and UK Labour parties. The attribution of these parties to this family is not only straightforward insofar as they are all part of the EPG of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Moreover, in terms of their origin, they are all parties that –in Italy, this applies to the Socialist and Social Democratic parties joining the new PD formation (cf. Newell 2010, 210–48) – were formed with regard to class cleavage, and hence also Marks and Wilson (2000, 442–48) would not distinguish any relevant subgroups in terms of intra-family ideological variation.

This common origin of these parties has directly led to highly similar ideologies. Social Democratic and Socialist ideologies are centred around the normative goals of solidarity and social justice, mainly in terms of greater equality, which includes certain rights for workers, in a spirit of internationalism (Detterbeck 2011, 123; Jun 2011, 71; 2011, 70; Marks and Wilson 2000, 442; Ware 1996, 34). Capitalism was identified as problematic in early Socialist thinking, especially Marxism (Festenstein and Kenny 2005), and was meant to be overcome by means of public ownership and by explicitly redistributive welfare

policies (Detterbeck 2011, 123; Ware, 34-35). Unlike Communists, however, Social Democrats have generally been striving for reform rather than revolution, and over time came to accept liberal democracy and free market economics. Nonetheless, they still perceived unregulated markets as problematic and made arguments in favour of state intervention along the lines of Keynesian economics (ibid.). Hence, Newell summarises modern Social Democracy as “a political outlook that involves a commitment to the reform of capitalism with a view to its regulation, in order to thereby remove its injustices and inefficiencies” (ibid., 2010, 219). In other words, while thus the goals of social justice and equality remained, Social Democrats have been relatively pragmatic in identifying ways of achieving them.

In the course of the last decades, Social Democratic parties have broadened the range of their norms to include so-called postmaterial ideals such as environmental protection, gender equality and peace, into their ideologies (Detterbeck 2011, 124; Inglehart 1984). Several scholars further hold that these parties, too, have been influenced by the rise of New Right ideas (e.g. Ware 1996, 34–35 Detterbeck 2011, 124), a movement often referred to as a ‘Third Way’ (Detterbeck 2011, 123) resulting in the formation of a ‘New Left’ (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). As Ware notes:

The parties moved yet further away from a commitment to public ownership and more towards controlling the excesses of private economic power and to protecting those most vulnerable to economic dislocations *through maintaining state-funded policies that had developed in the post-war years* (ibid. 1996, 35, my emphasis).

Policies now had to serve the overall public good in a manner that was not only ‘fair’, but also efficient (Jun 2011, 79) At the same time, market liberal policies have often been justified by claiming that they were necessary in order to save the welfare state (Jun 2011, 76). To some extent, it would seem then that welfare policies have become a *goal* in themselves rather than a policy to achieve more equality.

Indeed, it also appears that European integration is interpreted along these lines, for Social Democratic parties seem to endorse it as long as it allows for re-regulation at the EU-level rather than forming a threat to past regulatory and welfare achievements (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–48). It is before the background of this shift towards economically centrist positions that it seems appropriate the Italian PD within this group, as Jun (2011) does, albeit it partly also consists of former (though rather leftist) Christian Democrats and Liberals (Newell 2010). In addition, the PD’s collective decision to sit with the S&D group in the EP would seem to underline this categorization (cf. Bressanelli 2012).

On the one hand, postmaterialism and the ‘Third Way’ have made Social Democratic parties attractive to a new set of core voters, namely for what Grande and Kriesi refer to as the “‘social-cultural professional’ middle class” (ibid. 2012, 15; see also Detterbeck 2011, 124). These voters appreciate postmaterial values and policies, and will prefer re-regulation of liberalised markets above the nation-state, “rather than a mere ‘retreat of the state’” (ibid.). Therefore, Social Democrats will continue to compete with neoliberal ideologies (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000, 447), rather than adopting them entirely. On the other hand, however, the decreasing emphasis on strong market intervention and generous welfare risks making Social Democratic parties less attractive for their traditional supporters, i.e. the working class/employees (cf. Ware 1996, 33): The latter often appreciate more traditional social values and in

combination with less Leftist economic policies can hardly be mobilised in favour of Social Democrats on the economic dimension (Grande and Kriesi 2012, 19; Jun 2011, 93). When expressing positions on EU politics, Social Democratic parties will thus have to balance the preferences of these rather diverse core electorates. Indeed, the financial crisis has partly led Social Democratic parties to reconsider the ‘Third Way’ already (Jun 2011, 82–83) – maybe partly as a move not to lose too many of their traditional supporters. In any case, however, these recent developments might indicate that the family’s more traditional values are more lasting than the temporary changes in the age of neoliberalism.

The sample includes only four rather than six **Liberal parties**, because the liberal parties one might have selected for Ireland and Italy do not meet the general criteria. In Ireland, Fianna Fáil, the ALDE group member that Franzmann considers a ‘national liberal’ party (ibid. 2011, 169), is already attributed to the family of Conservative and Christian Democratic parties for good reasons, while the Progressive Democrats, who are considered “economic liberal” by Franzmann (ibid.) and who describe themselves as a liberal party (Progressive Democrats), have dissolved in 2008 (Franzmann 2011, 168; O’Leary 2012, 328). In Italy, where the Radical Party still managed to gain seats in the EP in 2004 (as the ‘Bonino List’), it did not do so in 2009 and in 2014 decided not even to compete (radicali italiani 2014). At the same time, ALDE group member Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori, IdV) was essentially founded in order to “combat illegality and less-than-impartial application of the law” (Newell 2010, 216) and is further a leader-created party (Musella 2015, 233). It is therefore neither a Liberal party by origin, nor would it seem to provide a full-scale Liberal ideology, which is why it is not considered here. By contrast, with the Democratic Mouvement (Mouvement Démocrate, MoDem), I include a French Liberal party that is one of the successors of the Union Démocrate Française (UDF), precisely because it is that part of the UDF that left the close allegiance (Franzmann 2011, 170) with the UMP and became part of ALDE, unlike the ex-UDF members that formed the Nouveau Centre (Litton 2015, 721). Hence, I consider Liberal representatives of the remaining four countries, namely the German Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP), the British Liberal-Democrats, the Austrian NEOs (merger of Liberal Forum and the New Austria, i.e. ‘Neues Österreich’, NEOS), and the aforementioned MoDem.

It is fairly easy to point out the ideological core value and starting point of Liberalism, namely individual freedom in political and economic matters (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 52; Marks and Wilson 2000, 448). Vassallo and Wilcox go further by citing Kirchner and naming “religious tolerance, free inquiry, self-government, and the market economy” as central values common to all Liberal, but even they have to concede that there is cross-country variation within this family as to the relative importance of these elements (ibid. 2006, 419). Marks and Wilson even hold that the liberal one is “the most ideologically diverse” (Marks & Wilson 2000, p. 448) family. Indeed, most scholars distinguish various subgroups within this family. Since agrarian parties, as I noted above, are irrelevant in the countries considered, and since many of the parties that today are still characterised by the predominance of a nationalist wing within the party are better placed elsewhere (cf. Franzmann 2011), I will distinguish just two, namely the Right-wing Liberal (or ‘economic’) and Left-wing Liberal (to include Social Liberal and

Radical Liberal parties). Noteworthy, some Liberal parties might in principle include several ‘wings’, but what is important here is which one should be considered dominant at the moment.

These two do share the goal of individual freedom, but disagree about the best means to achieve it. Apart from the finding that Liberal parties might also have appreciated a certain vagueness over the means for electoral and office purposes (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 419), the main difference consists in perceptions of the appropriate role of the state in the economy. In general, Liberals share a certain scepticism towards the state, and there is much agreement here when it comes to the societal role of the state. By contrast, in economic matters, the state is sometimes perceived as either an obstacle to individual freedom in itself or as a tool to safeguard individual freedom from underregulated markets (Detterbeck 2011, 120; Marks and Wilson 2000, 448–49; Ware 1996, 29–31). In both variants, scepticism towards the state as a collective entity would seem to rule out aggressive nationalism and manifestations of the nation-state that, like national borders, limit individual freedom (Marks and Wilson 2000, 448–49).

Within the present sample, it seems appropriate to attribute the British Liberal Democrats to the subgroup of Left-wing Liberals (see also: Franzmann 2011, 169). Their predecessor, the British Liberal Party has traditionally been categorised in this way due to the fact that they proposed limited forms of state intervention into the economy (Marks and Wilson 2000, 450; Ware 1996, 30–31), and after their fusion with the Social Democratic Party a party itself formed by former Labour members (Russell and Fieldhouse 2005, 30–34), this is unlikely to be less appropriate. One might categorise MoDem in a similar manner: MoDem’s predecessor the UDF, already while still formed by Liberal as well as Christian Democratic elements (Ware 1996, 31), was generally considered to be Left of the UMP in economic matters (Bornschieer and Lachat 2009, 370). Given that those who refused to join MoDem have formed the Nouveau Centre, staying with the UMP and even joining the EPP group together with them, one might expect the remaining MoDem to be less Right-wing Liberal than the UDF and hence to be a true ‘Centrist’ party or even part of the Left-wing Liberal subgroup. Also when categorising the Austrian representative of the Liberal family selected here, namely the NEOS, one should probably take recent mergers into account.¹⁶ The traditional Liberal party of Austria, the Liberal Forum (Liberales Forum, LF) might have been counted among the Left-wing subgroup (cf. Franzmann 2011, 169), and have fused with the NEOS in January 2014 (adopting the latter’s name) (LIF). The NEOS, in turn, were however founded by a member of the ÖVP’s business wing (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014, 645), which might impact on their collective ideology, but it is too early to determine the exact balance. By contrast, the German FDP once had a strong Social-Liberal wing that dominated the party throughout the 1970s and would have made it similar to the Liberal Democrats, and hence most scholars would have rightfully counted it within the Left-wing subgroup (Detterbeck 2011, 120–21; Marks and Wilson 2000, 450). With the chance of the coalition partner in the early 1980s from Social Democrats to Christian Democrats, however, many Social-Liberals have started to leave the party, and throughout the 1990s the party adopted an ever more

¹⁶ The at most ‘national liberal’ Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) should not be counted as a Liberal party any longer, cf. Franzmann (2011, 168).

economic or Right-wing Liberal course (Treibel 2014, 45–83), which is where it is better placed today (see also: Franzmann 2011, 169). In sum, one might thus expect the Liberal Democrats leaning towards the Left ideologically, the FDP towards the Right and the other two somewhere in between. In general, however, the room for manoeuvre that the rather ambiguous concept of individual freedom leaves to these parties without openly betraying their ideology is rather large: Nevertheless, if a Liberal party turns towards Conservative or even Nationalist societal policies or strongly interventionist economic policies with regard to a given issue, defections might still be detected.

Electorally, Liberals depend strongly on middle-class votes, since the appearance of Social Democratic parties has eroded the support among workers they enjoyed in their early years (Ware 1996, 31). They hence rely mainly on the middle-class, especially small entrepreneurs and self-employed, while the general trend towards larger corporations has reduced the number of votes they can obtain in this manner (ibid.). Within the middle-class, however, they compete partly also with Green and Social Democratic parties on questions of social permissiveness (ibid.), which might be particularly important for Left-wing Liberals, whereas one should expect Right-wing Liberals to look more towards big corporations as an additional source of votes.

Identifying the members of the party family that Ware refers to as “the newest” (ibid. 1996, 43), the **Green family**, from the countries considered in this study seems relatively straightforward, once the general criteria named above are taken into consideration: the German Alliance ‘90/The Greens (Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen, B90), the Austrian Greens (Die Grünen), the Irish Green party (also: Comhaontas glas), the Green Party of England and Wales, the French Greens (Verts), and the Italian Greens (I Verdi). On the one hand, in terms of their name, their origin (ecologist social movements of the 1970s) and their international and EP affiliations, there can be no doubt (cf. Bukow and Switek 2011). On the other hand, ideologically, there might be some cross-national variation, but as I will argue in the following, there is an increasing, identifiable core.

Interestingly, while there is consensus that the Greens constitute a party family of their own, some scholars have denied that there was a coherent and independent Green ideology (Beyme 1985; Bukow and Switek 2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). Yet, in their work on political ideologies, Festenstein and Kenny come to the conclusion that ‘ecologism’ should be considered an ideology of its own, while acknowledging the existence of “various antecedents for, and influences upon, this perspective, stretching back to the nineteenth century and beyond” (ibid. 2005, 327). In fact, it might be argued that not having predecessors and not taking up ideas from other ideologies should as such constitute a criterion for considering an ideology as coherent and independent, for as was already noted, Conservative ideology was influenced in the 1980s by neoliberalism, that is, by “a set of views that . . . can be seen as a direct descendant of a main strand of nineteenth-century Liberalism” (Ware 1996, 33). Similarly, Social Democracy was influenced by some postmaterialist ideas, most notably environmentalism, which were brought up by ecologist thinkers in the first place and which continue to form the value basis of Green ideology (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 327–31).

Postmaterialists, by definition, strive for individual and societal goals other than material wealth to be achieved by economic growth (*ibid.*). Next to environmental protection, postmaterialist ideals are peace and a general idea of a ‘uniting of the peoples’ (Bomberg 1998; Bomberg 2002; Bomberg and Carter 2006). Conversely, postmaterialists tend not to be normatively attached to the allegedly too materialist nation-state (Janssen, Joseph I. H. 1991). At the same time, Green parties value international cooperation and European integration for pragmatic reasons, that is, as a means to achieve other, e.g. environmentalist, goals (Ware 1996, 43). This combination has arguably turned the family from Eurosceptics into the most explicit Euroenthusiasts (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Similarly, the family’s stance on social permissiveness might be partly an electoral strategy, as Ware (*ibid.* 1996, 43) argues, but finds its ideological justification in a rejection of the “human invention” of hierarchies (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 330).

The stance on social permissiveness is one aspect that makes this family a part of the Left, and the consolidation of Green ideology in favour of state (or supranational) intervention is another. Following Ware, this has to do with “the logic of state action in the policy areas that are most central to environmentalism” (*ibid.* 1996, 43), in that state intervention would be a necessary means to ecologist ends. As a result, while Green parties might have added several strands to their ecologist basis in the early years, the more Leftist ones are becoming increasingly dominant (*ibid.*). This is in line with the observation in terms of concrete policy preferences voiced by Green parties regarding environmental protection, welfare, multiculturalism, and the market economy, which despite some variation across countries can in most cases be considered on the Left of the spectrum (Bukow and Switek 2011). In fact, while Bukow and Switek would find the Greens to be less cohesive than other families (albeit more cohesive than the Conservatives) based on CMP data (*ibid.* Bukow and Switek 2011, 207), a comparison based on Chapel Hill expert survey data provides the opposite picture (Spier 2011, 233). In sum, while the other three criteria for party family attribution allow for a straightforward identification of Green representatives from the six countries, Green parties in general further seem to share ideological ground sufficient for corroborating this categorisation.

Since the 1980s already, a number of parties that – at least on non-economic matters – have positioned themselves clearly to the Right of Conservatives and Christian Democrats, has celebrated electoral victories (e.g. Eatwell 2000), and, parties such as the French National Front (Front National, FN) 2014 were particularly successful in the elections to the European Parliament (Russo 2014, 184). In his overview of party families, Ware described the difficulties in defining the characteristics of a party family of the far Right as follows: Fascism would constitute “an obvious starting point”, but few parties had been explicitly Fascist in the post-war era (*ibid.* 1996, 42). At the same time, he noted that racism as a feature of Fascism had also been part of the success story of parties such as the FN (*ibid.*). Yet others have argued that it was precisely the FN that was among the forerunners of parties characterised by a new kind of racism (Bornschieer and Lachat 2009, 374), also called neo-racism or ethno-exclusivism, built not on biological but on cultural terms mostly (Mondon 2013, 23–25). Indeed, it appears that much has been and still is in flux on the far Right, so that any categorisation and distinction within the far Right might become

irrelevant at some point. The distinction I intend to make seems worthwhile for the time being, but it might also be the case that, just like Social Democrats have shifted their position on the market economy over the decades, there simply is a process of transformation going on that will eventually lead to just one far Right party family. Meanwhile, however, it seems possible to distinguish two different far Right party families, namely one referred to here as **right-wing populist (RWP) and one extreme Right family**.

Noteworthy, this distinction is entirely in line with the general approach to party families followed here, in that it can be made on purely ideological grounds. Contrasting extreme Right and RWP parties can be done by referring to just a handful of key features used to define Right-wing extremism on the one hand and Right-wing radicalism on the other.¹⁷ The former is defined in a highly similar manner by both Eatwell (2000, 411) and Mudde (1995) as comprising racism, hostility to democracy, a preference for a ‘strong state’ and nationalism. By contrast, RWP according to Mondon (ibid. 2013, 37) includes ethno-exclusivism (see above), a “cautious denunciation of parliamentary democracy (ibid.)” and populism in the sense of “‘the people’ vs. the elites”. If one adds to that the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism and the defence of ‘identity’ not necessarily defined by nationality, but also by religion and culture (cf. Decker and Lewandowsky 2011), this definition is entirely parallel to the ones by Eatwell and Mudde for Right-wing extremism. Hence, it shows exactly where, at least in theory, the line of demarcation lies between the two families. This is not to say, of course, that some parties that one would classify as extremists would not sometimes make use of populist arguments (cf. ibid.), but it is possible to see two independent lines of thought here. Indeed, while ideology as a set of ideas should be the main defining criterion for party families in the context of the present study, it is worth noting that RWP parties are increasingly organising at the transnational level and in doing so try to exclude those parties they consider extremist (Maggini 2014).

In terms of policy, both RWP and extremists parties are clearly critical of immigration and of the EU, which combines a number of features that both families reject, namely (liberal) democracy, cultural diversity, and liberal economics. With regard to the latter, however, it should be noted that some RWP parties partly started out with rather liberal preferences on economics themselves (Ware 1996, 42), but most RWP parties are less neoliberal today and tend to focus on welfare chauvinism and protectionist positions on social security (Decker and Lewandowsky 2011, 276–77; Grande 2012, 281–82). Indeed, it seems that, in a similar manner as the Green party family in its early years, the RWP family might still have to find some kind of consensus or might be on its way in doing so. Maybe, some kind of *Sachlogik* could provide a direction here as well: As Decker and Lewandowsky note, RWP parties often take more economically Leftist positions where cultural and economic protectionism go together (ibid. 2011, 276). In sum, it might partly be an empirical question, in how far there is cohesion on economic issues within the RWP family and in how far its moderated approach to politics also implies moderated policy preferences.

¹⁷ I take Right-wing Radicalism as used by Mondon (2013) and RWP as used by most scholars intuitively to be synonymous.

The core electorate of the far Right families is usually assumed to consist in ‘globalisation losers’, that is, usually relatively unskilled, male voters, who expect their economic prospects to worsen (Decker and Lewandowsky 2011, 272–73; Grande 2012; 2012, 281–82). Noteworthy, however, it has recently been argued that RWP parties are able to also attract votes from more affluent, middle-class voters who mainly perceive their prospects to worsen, and who otherwise vote Conservative (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2012; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 420), whereas extremist and non-strategic extreme Right voters tend to feel betrayed by the Left (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2012). Hence, the vote-seeking calculus for RWP and extreme Right parties will not be completely identical.

In the selection of parties across countries and their categorisation as either RWP or extremist, it partly becomes clear why again the differentiation between the two has been such an issue for academic debates. The aforementioned FN, for instance, is still referred to as extremists by Decker and Lewandowsky (2011). At the same time, the party’s early use of neo-racist arguments (Bornschieer and Lachat 2009, 374) might be part of the reason why, as even Decker and Lewandowsky (2011, 269) acknowledge, it has occasionally referred to as the “father” (ibid.) or “avant-garde” (Bornschieer and Lachat 2009, 374) of the RWP party family. Even if the FN might up to a certain point still have carried traces of extremism, these have been further reduced by a newer generation under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, daughter of the indeed extremist party founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, opening the party up for new voters and making it more successful than ever (Mondon 2014). At the same time, FN’s presence may have prevented any relevant extremist competition. Its RWP competitor Movement for France (Mouvement pour la France, MPF), has never been equally successful and, belonging to the same family, is ignored here.

Noteworthy, Eatwell considers the FN to be itself modelled on the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), a rather neo-fascist party that, after declining in the 1970s, was reborn in 1994 as the moderated National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) (ibid. 2000). Its moderation has not only led it into a centre-Right governing coalition (Eatwell 2000; Newell 2010), but also into the EPP group. AN’s extremist competitor, the Tricoloured Flame (Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore, MS-FT), a party that regards itself as the only true heir of the MSI, after some limited success in earlier EP elections, did not compete in the 2014 elections (Ministero dell’Interno 2014). AN’s RWP competitor, the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) is explicitly not included here due to its regionalist features, including hostility towards the South of Italy (cf. Newell 2010). The AN is thus the only party from the far Right that is part of the sample here. While its heritage is certainly (neo-)fascist and enjoys the respective support among certain voters, it is still considered part of the ideological centre Right today (ibid.).

The Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) is sometimes considered as a ‘transformed established party’ (Grande 2012, 281), which suggests that it has taken a different road than the other parties in the RWP family: from mainstream towards radicalism, rather than from extremism to moderate radicalism. Indeed, some would see it as a former ‘national liberal’ party (Franzmann 2011), but even Franzmann acknowledges that it should now be considered RWP (ibid. 2011, 168), just like its less successful offspring the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ). Indeed

this classification seems confirmed by the literature for both FPÖ and BZÖ (Decker and Lewandowsky 2011; Luther 2001; 2005; 2008). Since the split between FPÖ and BZÖ was about office-seeking issues rather than ideology (Luther 2005), the more successful FPÖ is the party selected as representative of the RWP family for Austria, ignoring the BZÖ.

For the UK, I include the British National Party (BNP) as an extremist and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as an RWP party. The aforementioned study by Ford, Goodwin et al. (2012) would seem to confirm this categorisation, in that the BNP is generally attributed more outright racist features than UKIP. The latter has developed from a single-issue anti-EU party, which as such is perfectly in line with an RWP profile, towards an RWP party with a typical programmatic profile (Mondon 2015). Similarly, for Germany I include the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) and the newly founded Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). For a long time, German far Right parties could not win any seats in the EP, as they did not pass the respective hurdles. The NPD managed to do so in 2014 only because of the removal of the threshold and with that is the only German extreme Right party to ever achieve this (Plescia and Johann 2014). While it has sometimes been counted within the RWP family due to its populism (e.g. Decker and Lewandowsky 2011), it still shows extremist features (Mudde 1995). Despite its newness, the AfD has already been categorised as an RWP party (Decker 2015) and, because of its impressive success in winning of 7 per cent of the votes, it is included here albeit it did not have seats in the EP prior to the election (Plescia and Johann 2014). The present paper thus also provides an opportunity for examining the AfD's ideological profile based on the assumption that it is RWP. In total, this selection of parties on the far Right should allow for within country and cross-country comparison of the – alleged – members of the respective families. Noteworthy, no Irish party is included as a far Right representative. The only 'candidate' for developing such a profile, namely Sinn Féin, did never decide to move into this direction, while at the same time, it has arguably prevented such a party from rising electorally (O'Malley 2008). In fact, this party is now mostly considered a part of the far Left (Maillot 2009; O'Malley 2008; Spier 2011, 229), the final family of parties considered here, to which I turn next.

Indeed, with the notable exception of the aforementioned Sinn Féin, identifying the parties to be selected for a **far Left party family** is relatively straightforward: The German The Left (Die Linke, former Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS), the Italian Lista Tsipras (former Communist Refoundation or Rifondazione Comunista, RC) (Lista Tsipras), and the French Left Front (Front de Gauche, FdG, including the Communist Party of France) all have their roots in traditional Communist parties. While the French Communist Party has changed only slightly towards what is called Eurocommunism (Spier 2011, 228), the larger part of the Communist Party of Italy (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) has turned into the by now rather Social Democratic PD (Spier 2011, 228). This is why in this case, the non-conforming remnants of the PCI, namely the RC, is included as representative of the far Left family (Rifondazione Comunista). Die Linke is successor of the PDS, who in turn succeeded the East German Communist Party (Ware 1996, 39) and was later joined by a smaller party consisting of former Social Democrats disappointed precisely with the integration of neoliberal ideas into the SPD's programme (Coffe and

Plassa 2010). Via different roots, these parties have come to adopt a rather cohesive ideology, as Spier notes, and in combination with their at least partially similar origin and international organisation can be considered as part of the same family (ibid. 2011). Albeit not necessarily all at the same time, have slightly moderated their programme over the years towards the acceptance of liberal democratic institutions (Spier 2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). It is these parties that chose and now partly are defined negatively by their opposition to neoliberal economics even when all most other parties adopted some aspects of it (Spier 2011, 231).

Defined positively, the ideology now shared by these parties is based on the value of social, political, and economic equality in society and in terms of policy seek to “regulate human consumption in an egalitarian manner” by means of increased public ownership, welfare expansion (not retreat!) (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417–18). On the economic L-R dimension, therefore, they still occupy the most Leftist position, constantly and coherently valuing social justice over the free market (Spier 2011, 240). Noteworthy, however, albeit the cohesion is lower on that dimension, far Left parties also support a high degree of social permissiveness (Spier 2011, 240; Ware 1996, 39). In their development towards modern far Left parties, some members of this family have also taken up post-material concerns such as environmentalism and pacifism (Spier 2011, 230; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417; Ware 1996, 39). It is this ideological mix that, as Spier (2011, 237) notes, appeals to three kinds of electorates: First, the classically Communist electorate of low-educated, male manual workers (also those now retired). Second, a Green-Alternative electorate similar to the core electorate of Green parties, with highly educated women working in socio-cultural professions. Third, a rather small, young radical Left electorate with medium to high educational levels.

Noteworthy, far Left parties have never been electorally relevant in Austria and the UK (ibid. 2011, 229), that is, with the exception of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland. The latter is included in this family, for the ideological profile it now displays is most similar to that of the other far Left, like the other three is part of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left (*Gauche Unitaire Européenne/ Nordic Green Left, GUE/NGL*) (Maillot 2009; O'Malley 2008; Spier 2011, 229), and indeed due to its ‘all Ireland’-approach to EU politics (cf. Maillot 2009) might even be counted as representative of the far Left in Ireland and the UK simultaneously.¹⁸ In terms of its core electorate, it is still slightly different, however (Spier 2011, 238). An Austrian representative is not included.

In Section 3.3 I will point out the exact manner in which the preferences and justifications of these parties, or, for the most part, their representatives in the EP will be analysed. Before doing so, however, it must be spelled out what the consequences of this additional narrowing of the sample will mean in terms of research design for the micro-level. This is the purpose of the next subsection.

¹⁸ Were it only for its role in Northern Ireland, it would be excluded as a regional party, of course, hence it is generally considered Irish for analytical purposes.

Table 5: Overview of party selection by country and party family

| | Austria (A) | Germany (D) | France (F) | Ireland (IRE) | Italy (I) | United Kingdom (UK) |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Far Left | - | THE LEFT (DIE LINKE) | Left Front (Front de Gauche) | Ourselves (Sinn Féin) | The Other Europe With Tsipras (L'Altra Europa con Tsipras) | - |
| Greens | The Greens (Die Grünen) | Alliance '90/The Greens (Bündnis '90/Die Grünen) | The Greens (Les Verts) | Green party (Comhaontas glas) | The Greens (I Verdi) | Green Party (of England and Wales) |
| Socialists | Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs) | Social Democratic Party of Germany, (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) | Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) | Labour Party (Ireland) | Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) | Labour Party (UK) |
| Liberals | New Austria (Neues Österreich) | Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) | Democratic Mouvement (Mouvement Démocrate) | - | - | Liberal Democrats |
| Conservatives & Christian Democrats | Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei) | Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union) | Union for a People's Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) | Soldiers of Destiny (Fianna Fáil), Family of the Irish (Fine Gael) | Go Italy! (Forza Italia) | Conservative Party |
| Right-Wing Populists | Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) | Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) | National Front (Front National) | - | National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)/ Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia) | United Kingdom Independence Party |
| Extreme Right | - | National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) | - | - | - | British National Party |

QCA as method of analysis at the micro-level

Narrowing down the focus of the study further in the foregoing manner, one arrives at a sample of 34 national parties and their delegations to the EP in six countries. This results in a maximum of 34 observations of framing strategies per policy issue or 102 such observations across all cases. Before the implications of these numbers of the choice of an analytical strategy are considered further, two caveats should be noted. First, some parties may choose not to express and justify their preferences with regard to each of the selected policy issues, even though these were selected with regard to their politicisation. While this might be a strategic move in itself for these parties, and while thus this finding does not imply 'missing data', it still cannot be interpreted as an instance of defection or ideological loyalty. Second, comparing the results *at party level* across policy issues might not be unproblematic, since the strategic options available may be partly dependent on substantive features of the policy issue (e.g. on the degree of

differentiation of the respective debate). For instance, in the case of CAP, European Commissioners strategically designed new agricultural policy frames so as to allow for compromise between proponents of an interventionist CAP and those pushing for market liberalisation (Rhinard 2010). Had they not done so, an important option for framing the 2013 Reform would be absent, so that a number strategic framing decisions at party level might be slightly different. To some extent, therefore, the observable implications of the ToT at the micro level will be contingent on issue level features (what might be called the discursive infrastructure) that seem impossible to identify *a priori* and hence not comparable across issues. Finally, case knowledge on individual parties will be hard to integrate into such an overall analysis, which would bereave QCA of one of its strengths.

Recall that the goal of the micro-level analysis for the present study essentially is to examine, whether it is indeed those parties that based on the theory of territorialisation are expected to defect actually do so. On the one hand, discussing the strategy of each and every party one by one would not only be tedious to report and read, but would also imply an overload of information with no clear message. On the other hand, limiting the analysis to a raw overview added by some examples entails the risk of cherry-picking those parties who behave in line with the theory. Hence, even the number of 34 parties per issue appears too large for this kind of qualitative analysis. It will thus be necessary to systematically summarise part of the information instead.

In order to do so, I employ what has been referred to as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) or Set-Theoretic Methods (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It has been described by one of its inventors as a tool to “help researchers represent and synthesize what they have learned about their cases” (Ragin 2005, 33–34), which before the background of the aspired familiarity with the various parties in the sample and the intense study of their framing strategies appears as exactly what is needed then. Along these lines, it is not aspired here to use QCA in such a way that the adherence to certain technical rules alone guarantees valid results, but just the modest ambition to systematise a qualitative analysis.

For the present purpose, this approach further appears preferable over quantitative, statistical analysis. One reason for this consists in the number of cases at the micro-level: Hellström (2009a), who in his analysis of party-based Euroscepticism has made an attempt to use QCA and statistical approaches in an analogous manner, finds that a small ‘N’ (5-34 cases) as it is found here per issue is unsuitable for applying statistical methods that, in principle, correspond to QCA. In fact, even with a moderately large number of cases (40 to a few hundred), the application of statistical models with interaction effects meant to replicate what some identify as a main strength of QCA (i.e. accounting for ‘causal complexity’, see Schneider and Wagemann, 78 Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009) can be problematic (Hellström 2009a, 23).¹⁹ Hence, even if the whole number of micro-level observations across issues were analysed statistically here,

¹⁹ There is, in fact, a continuing debate (see the Comparative Political Science Special Issue “Debating Set Theoretic Comparative Methods” 49 (6) of May 2016) as to whether interactions and conjunctural causation actually are equivalent or not, which however cannot be – and, given the other arguments provided here – need not be accounted for here.

the 'N' might still be too small – that is, provided one would want to do so while accounting for 'causal complexity' in the way QCA does.

Yet, causal complexity is arguably involved here, for defection by a national party delegation is likely to be the result of not just one factor at a time, but of various potential combinations (or 'configurations') of conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 276). For instance, at the most basic level, 'defection' will by definition only be observed for a party coming from a country that has a national interest in the policy which is at odds with this party's ideology, so that at least two conditions must be simultaneously involved. At the same time, I might even have underestimated this 'causal complexity'. For instance, it could be that as an additional condition, only those parties will ever defect who due to having their own committee member are informationally independent. In this case, it would then also be preferable to employ a method that takes the assumption of *complexity as a starting point*, rather than leaving it to the researcher, how many interaction terms to include (Hellström 2009a, 6–8). Noteworthy, the latter argument is independent of the number of cases included.

The relatively small number of 34 cases results from the narrowing down the focus of the study, which however was done for good reasons. Yet, if this came at the price of being deprived of some research design options, then one would at least want to make the best of those cases that remain in the sample. Here, QCA might offer an advantage over statistical methods as well, for it guarantees that each single case is taken into account (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 9). In other words, no case ever becomes an 'outlier' that at some point might be hidden behind some number. This is precisely what should be aspired here, since the number of defections will probably be small, so one would want to account for each single defection at least.

Finally, many of the variables (or 'conditions') considered theoretically relevant, such as national tradition (e.g. type of capitalism), government status or committee membership are categorical anyway, so that also in statistical analyses, they would be dichotomized as 'dummy variables'. In the present study, therefore, one of the arguments used against the dichotomisation that some QCA techniques involve (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24–25) would not be as relevant as it might be in other studies. Along these lines, it should be noted that none of the above arguments is meant to establish any general superiority of QCA over alternative techniques, nor even that for the present case it is definitely the one and only solution. Rather, in sum it appears that it does have a number of advantages that fit the overall outline of the study.

Having clarified the choice for QCA, then, the typical steps in a QCA shall briefly be outlined here. Regarding the selected variant of QCA, I intend to refer to what is called "crisp-set QCA" (csQCA) rather than, for instance, "fuzzy-set QCA" (fsQCA) (Rihoux and Meur 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). As is recommended in the QCA-literature, this decision is based on the kinds of concepts and the structure of data potentially used in the course of operationalisation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 277). As I already mentioned, many of the conditions are categorical anyway.

Last but not least, employing QCA for the micro-level analysis means that the analysis will be based on set-theoretic reasoning (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), which seems

helpful insofar as this is also a typical feature of small-N research designs (Goertz and Mahoney 2012), such as the one applied at the macro-level of policy issues. It also means to adopt the respective assumptions regarding the aforementioned causal complexity, but also of causal asymmetry (i.e. the presence and absence of an outcome must be explained independently of each other), and equifinality (several paths might lead to the same outcome) (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 8–10; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 56–90). This is why I have used set-theoretic thinking in the formulation of the theory of territorialisation already.

There are six steps in conducting a csQCA according to Rihoux and de Meur (2009): The first is the aforementioned dichotomisation of the various conditions as well as the outcome. Next this data table is transformed into a so-called ‘Truth Table’ (Step 2). Therein, the cases are grouped together in rows by the various configurations of conditions and the respective outcome. This might at times lead to so-called ‘contradictory configurations’, which means that the same combination of conditions leads to diverging outcomes. The researcher then has a number of options for handling this problem (Step 3) – e.g. adding/removing/replacing conditions, going back to the cases causing the problem, or to consider the cases as ‘unclear’ – all of which must be carefully selected and justified (cf. *ibid.* 2009, 48–56). Thereafter, the information included in the Truth Table can be further summarised by means of Boolean algebra in a so-called ‘Boolean minimisation’, using software such as *Tosmana*, *fsQCA* or the respective R-packages (Step 4). In the course of this process, so-called ‘solutions’, expressed in set-theoretic language, are produced that summarise the configurations of conditions that always lead to the outcome (i.e. they are collectively sufficient) or its absence (the procedure is conducted separately for both). One can then also check for those conditions that are shared by the various solution terms in order to identify possible necessary conditions.

Noteworthy, the default minimisation formula remains at a largely descriptive level, in that it only uses the information provided by the empirically observed cases. It is therefore also referred to as the ‘conservative’ or ‘complex’ solution (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 162). Step 5 thus consists in advancing beyond what is empirically observed and including so-called ‘logical remainders’, that is, non-observed cases corresponding to configurations of conditions that are not found empirically. Software can select a number of such cases inasmuch as they would lead to a simpler solution formula, assuming for the moment that such a case existed – hence they are referred to as ‘simplifying assumptions’. The researcher then has the choice to either include as many of such simplifying assumptions as possible (‘parsimonious solution’) or to restrict their usage to those that would appear plausible based on theoretical and empirical knowledge (‘intermediate solution’). At a minimum, the researcher must ensure that the assumptions included do not contradict each other (Rihoux and Meur 2009, 59–65; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 151–77). While some degree of simplification is thus one of the goals of using QCA, for the present study already the ‘conservative’ solution carries value, for it guarantees a summary of results from which no single case is lost or simply neglected without further justification (i.e. there can be no ‘cherry picking’).

Before interpreting the results (Step 6), the researcher is usually advised to calculate the consistency and coverage of the conditions or combinations of conditions potentially constituting

sufficient or necessary conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 119–50). With regard to sufficient conditions, the notion of ‘consistency’ displays the degree to which contradictions still exist in the Truth Table even after taking measures to resolve them and can be used as a guide for deciding whether a given combination should still be considered a ‘sufficient condition’ (comparable to the ‘fit’ of a model, according to Rihoux and de Meur, 2009, p. 64). Using strict thresholds, it might still be possible to use results produced despite some remaining contradictory configurations, but only after having tried to remove these (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 123). ‘Coverage’ denotes how much of the outcome is explained by a single path to the outcome (‘raw coverage’), uniquely by this particular path (‘unique coverage’) or by the whole solution term (‘solution coverage’). Concerning necessary conditions, consistency measures “the degree to which the empirical information is in line with the statement of necessity, i.e., how far the outcome can be considered a subset of the condition” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 143), whereas the coverage provides an idea of the relevance of the necessary conditions (ibid. 2012, 147). Calculating these parameters for necessary conditions can help to compare the relevance of various causal paths and to avoid wrong interpretations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 231–32). In addition, robustness checks are only helpful for large-N QCA with more than a hundred cases (Grauvogel and Soest 2014, 646). Generally, it should be noted here that the parameters just mentioned are less central when using the – in many ways truly ‘logical’ – csQCA than they are when using fsQCA.

It must be acknowledged that, the advantages of QCA just mentioned notwithstanding, it has been repeatedly argued that QCA does not allow for the testing and potential falsification of hypotheses and theories in the same way statistical techniques do (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 2–3; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 296–305). This is why, in order to avoid misunderstandings, these scholars writing about QCA thus prefer the term ‘theory evaluation’ (ibid.). In this sense, Schneider and Wagemann note, that it is well possible to compare theoretical expectations noted prior to QCA to the results obtained thereby. In highly technical terms, they point out how to create ‘intersections’ between theory written as a Boolean expression and the solution obtained as the result of Boolean minimisation, and they further suggest calculating the consistency and coverage for the solution term (ibid. 2012, 296–305). Less technically, one might simply discuss in how far the solution term produced includes any conditions that one would have expected to drop out or does not include conditions expected to remain relevant.

In fact, however, some degree of theory evaluation should even be possible at an earlier stage, if (cs)QCA is applied in a rather conservative manner: For in fact, inasmuch as a Truth Table including conditions based on a particular theory contains contradictory configurations, this theory – at least in the manner operationalised – obviously cannot account for all cases corresponding to this particular configuration of conditions. Contradictory configurations that cannot be resolved can therefore also be seen as a form of ‘falsification’ according to Rihoux and De Meur (ibid. 2009, 50). Inasmuch as numerical consistency thresholds are used in dealing with contradictory configurations, the occurrence of the latter will not necessarily be considered as problematic, which is arguably why Schneider and Wagemann, who strongly advocate the usage of such parameters (ibid. 2012, 122), do not pay much attention to this rather

straightforward aspect of theory evaluation. Applying such numerical criteria within this study, however, would contradict the argument made earlier that every single case (party) should be accounted for.

Hence, in the present study, csQCA is used for theory evaluation in the following manner. First, a macro level overview is provided to determine the overall structure of conflict (in terms of the ‘index of territorialisation’, see below), followed by a description of frame usage.²⁰ Before this background, it is then possible to reconsider the operationalisation of defection beyond the strictly quantitative criterion indicated below. This act of recalibration based on case knowledge, which might seem arbitrary to readers more familiar with statistical approaches, is in fact common practice in the iterative process of QCA (cf. Rihoux & Meur 2009, p. 49; Schneider & Wagemann 2012, p. 121). The only departure from this common practice here is that, for reasons of presentation, I undertake this step prior to the csQCA, and not only at the point when potentially flawed calibration decisions result in contradictory configurations.

This, then, is followed by the csQCA proper with regard to defection. To a core of rather unspecified conditions of ideology (Left-Right) and national interest (issue-specific), I first of all separately add the conditions considered relevant by extant theories (government participation and committee membership) as well as the theory of territorialisation (more specific conditions related to party families, national traditions). This approach is chosen because it might be difficult to exclude individual conditions simply due to ‘limited diversity’ if all possible conditions were included from the very beginning. Moreover, at this point, it will already show in how far the various theoretical approaches individually entail contradictory configurations, in how far the (complex) solution terms following from the Boolean minimisation can be meaningfully interpreted and in how far, then, they correspond to the observable implications of these theories in terms of the conditions they include or not.

With regard to the theory of territorialisation, an attempt will be made for resolving contradictory configurations while staying within the same theoretical framework, e.g. by specifying conditions further or by qualitatively accounting for individual cases. Noteworthy, it is not possible to apply the same efforts to the other theories, as doing so is not feasible within the scope of this project. After all, some of these theories are not necessarily formulated in set-theoretic terms and difficult to test by means of QCA to the full extent, further data might have to be collected and theoretical arguments extended. At least, however, the key conditions to be added according to these theories will eventually be integrated in one final Truth Table combining the conditions included in the ToT and extant theories, and then subjected to the usual further steps of csQCA outlined above. Thereby, it will be possible to establish, whether any of the conditions turns out to be entirely irrelevant.

This rather extensive analysis of defection is followed by a discussion on the other framing strategies. With regard to blurring, a csQCA is conducted, however including only those conditions considered relevant by the ToT, as the other theories do not contain information on blurring. Even with

²⁰ The theories will already be evaluated at this stage in terms of their observable implications of the overall structure of conflict. Since however there is the possibility of predicting the structure of conflict correctly by chance (it is either ideological or territorial), and since some theories will lead to the same predictions here, the micro-level analysis becomes necessary in the first place.

the ToT, however, it is difficult to predict exactly all the different motivations for blurring in various ways (to avoid defection, to attract more voters outside one's core electorate, to cover up defection etc.), so that the discussion is mainly about broader patterns and does not imply the ambition to resolve all contradictions entirely. The same applies to the csQCA concerning the remaining cases of a prism (uni-dimensional) strategy. With regard to subsuming, the situation is even less predictable. Yet particular attention will be paid to those parties for whom the reliability test involved coding problems, as these might indicate a creative way of recombining or re-contextualizing frames. Finally, it should be noted that, unlike standard practice in QCA would suggest, non-defection, non-blurring etc. are not subjected to separate analyses for the simple fact that unlike earlier theories, the ToT was developed with the explicit purpose of explaining the presence of these outcomes, not their absence. Noteworthy also, the attention paid to explaining the usage of alternative strategies largely covers the explanations for non-defection already.

In sum, this intended application of QCA arguably remains at a rather basic level. Nevertheless, it systematically relates framing analysis back to theoretical reasoning, even though the number of cases is comparatively low. This rather small 'N', in turn, allows for an innovative way of systematically analysing policy frames that is precisely what is needed given the aforementioned deficits of the state of the art in this respect. As a result, while the choice of QCA as such can be justified as above, the present use of QCA is intended here as nothing more than a door-opener.

3.3 Measurement, data and operationalisation

When reviewing the methodological state of the art (see section 3.1), I have pointed to the problems of measuring policy preferences and the resulting structure of conflict in terms of roll-call votes (bias, dichotomy of positioning, no reasons), and have further discussed the disadvantages of extant textual analyses (broad categories for hand-coding, restriction to one language with computerisation), which especially given the need for sources of data on MEPs' communication beyond EP debates is problematic. It is before this background that for the present study, I suggest the application of a method called Policy Frame Analysis (PFA), which fits the concept of policy frames as defined in the preceding chapter. It can be applied across languages and due to human coding, relatively small amounts of data can be validly coded. It thereby clears the way for introducing web-based press releases from national party delegations. The method is shown to be reliable within acceptable ranges. Hence, I then turn to the operationalising the outcomes at macro- and micro-level, i.e. the structure of conflict and parties' framing strategies. Finally, I operationalise the conditions expected to cause these outcomes.

Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as method of measurement

When reviewing the methodological state of the art (see section 3.1), I have pointed to the problems of measuring MEPs' policy preferences by means of roll-call votes (RCV) as biased (given the strategic use of RCV), insufficiently fine-grained (yes/no dichotomy) as well as obviously ignorant of the reasons MEPs provide. As was also noted, however, extant textual analyses do not provide satisfactory measurements either, for hand-coding approaches of texts tend to measure in rather broad categories inapt to the analysis of positions on individual policy issues and computerised ones must be restricted to texts provided in the same language. This is problematic insofar as MEPs will communicate with their electorates in their

respective national language. While translations of EP debates are available, the latter entail problems as a source of data given the combination of institutional constraint and potentially biased self-selection of speakers. There thus is need for methods of measurement and sources of data that have so far been underexplored in research on the European Parliament.

It is before this background that I suggest, for the purposes of this study, the application of a method called Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as developed by Radulova (2011). Before justifying this choice further, its main elements as laid out by Radulova and as elaborated on in the present context shall be introduced here. Since many readers are likely to be familiar with the hand-coding approach used in the CMP, the parallels with this approach shall be noted when introducing PFA.

Recall that policy frames as defined by Radulova – mirroring, however, the widely used definition by Entman (1993) – consist of a normative, a constitutive, a cognitive (together: ‘the justification’) and a policy dimension (for more detail and examples see Chapter 2). Following Radulova, the first step in analysing such policy frames consists in the identification of the various frames within the policy-related discourse, by which she understands basically everything that has ever been said or written on the policy (*ibid.* 2011, 44–46). This can be done, amongst others, by using secondary literature. Similarly, the researchers behind the CMP developed their general Left-Right scale by identifying what could be considered a ‘typical’ Leftist or Rightist statement, using e.g. classic writings by Marx (Left) or Burke (Right) (Budge et al. 2001, 21–24). For the present study, this identification of frames was conducted separately for the three policy issues selected (see Section 3.2). Where possible, a ‘short-cut’ was deployed by drawing on other scholars’ analysis of the respective policy discourse, and thinking them further with regard to the specific issue at hand (e.g. transferring the logic behind the discourses on CAP as identified by Rhinard (2010) to the core issues of the 2013 Reform). Based on the identification of these different frames, I then develop a codebook including the general philosophy behind each policy frame, specifying potential observable instances and concrete examples. The three codebooks thus developed are included in Annex II.

Next, Radulova checks for references to the policy in the data-set of documents and then codes these references according to the pre-identified policy frames, which forms the basis for eventually calculating the relative weight of each policy frame within the document, the overall data-set or subsets thereof (e.g. documents connected with a particular author) (*ibid.* 2011, 44–46). Similarly, the CMP codes statements within the manifestos in order to eventually quantify the results. Noteworthy, for Radulova as well as in the case of the present study, the idea behind quantification is not to measure the salience of the issue for the parties. Rather, the idea is to measure, in how far a party is consistent in its usage of frames and, in case it is not totally consistent, which frame is the one being used predominantly by the party and what other frames it is combined with.

Concerning unitisation, however, PFA as conducted in the present study is closer to the CMP than to Radulova: for rather than just coding each ‘reference’ to a particular policy, the sentences concerned with the policy issue are unitised as something that resembles the CMP’s quasi-sentences. A quasi-sentence in the CMP is defined rather vaguely as “an argument – that is, the verbal expression of

one political idea or issue” (Budge et al. 2001). This implies that several quasi-sentences may be included within the same natural sentence, as well as that the two overlap. Similarly, it is thinkable that one natural sentences (i.e. from period to period) includes statements in line with more than one policy frame or touching upon more than one dimension of the same frame (e.g. it includes a norm and a policy). In such a case, it would be desirable for the purposes of the present study to also subdivide the natural sentence and code the respective parts as instances of the respective frame and its dimension. The exact procedure and examples can be found in Annex I. In any case, this elaboration of Radulova’s coding procedure is meant to, on the one hand, increase precision of the measurement and, on the other hand, make it even more similar to what is common practice in the hand-coding of political texts.

While taking inspiration from the CMP might entail sharing some of the latter’ shortcomings (e.g. Laver and Garry 2000), it also means that one can draw on some of the problem solving strategies that they offer for some of the most common problems in hand-coding (Budge et al. 2001, 170–73). In fact, even its critics still tend to evaluate their eventual results on the basis of the CMP itself (Budge et al. 2001), and at least the validity of computerised techniques is generally tested by comparing it to hand-coding results (e.g. Klüver 2013). That said, since human coding, and the human coding of frames in particular, involves an element of subjective interpretation, it had to be assured that the codebooks used are sufficiently reliable so as to allow for the reproduction of the results obtained.

Hence, it is by now widely agreed that content analyses should be subjected to reliability tests as a matter of good practice (Krippendorff 2004; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 2002; Rustemeyer 1992). The analysis of policy frames as I conduct it here certainly also shares some features with the rather interpretivist tradition of discourse analysis, but it should be precisely at the point of reliability and the possibility of reproducing the findings obtained that it should be closer to classic content analysis. Thus, a reliability test was also conducted for the PFA carried out in this study. Three test coders (BA-level students in political science) were hired and trained (8 hours per coder per codebook, incl. a pilot study), and two rounds of tests performed independently and per codebook, with round 2 being based on clarifications regarding the most common disagreements from round 1.²¹ The test coders’ codings were compared pairwise with the respective codings of the author as the main coder, but not amongst each other. After all, the idea was to test the reliability of the method and coding schemes, not inter-coder reliability to guarantee the comparability of findings across coders. The comparison of codings was conducted at several levels of measurement precision, including the categorisation of quasi-sentences to a policy frame and to a dimension within the policy frame. By doing so, it should ideally be possible to distinguish references to the policy dimension (i.e. expressions of preferences concerning a concrete measure to be adopted) and the justification (i.e. the remaining three dimensions).

At this point, only the results of the test are presented, but further detail is provided in Annex I (e.g. on sample size and composition). There is more agreement on the fact that reliability tests are needed than there is concerning the choice of a respective index of reliability and acceptable levels (Lombard,

²¹ In the case of TTIP, the results of round 1 were already sufficient even by high standards.

Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 2002). Clearly, however, it is not sufficient to report the percentage of codings for which there was agreement. In addition, it is recommended to calculate an index of agreement that takes per-chance-agreement into account (ibid.). While according to Lombard et al. (2002) the percentage agreement is considered ‘too liberal’, other indices might at times be ‘too conservative’. When using a more conservative index such as Cohen’s kappa, it is sometimes considered appropriate to accept lower levels of agreement. For instance, .75+ has been taken to indicate excellent agreement, .40 to .75 fair to good agreement beyond chance and below .40 as poor agreement beyond chance (Neuendorf 2002, 143). Noteworthy, Krippendorff has been critical of some of these recommendations on indices and levels, and suggests Krippendorff’s alpha as a generally applicable index, with thresholds of .8 as appropriate level of agreement and .667 for cautious tentative conclusions (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007; Krippendorff 2004). I thus follow Klüver’s (ibid. 2013, 78) example in calculating both Cohen’s kappa and Krippendorff’s alpha, while taking into account the aforementioned, somewhat diverging recommendations on the acceptable levels.

Table 6: Reliability scores for the three codebooks used for the PFA

| Issue: | Welfare | | | | CAP | | | | TTIP | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Level: | frames | | dimension | | frames | | dimension | | frames | dimension |
| Round: | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| % | 75.30 | 87.50 | 68.24 | 82.50 | 78.43 | 90.43 | 61.89 | 70.33 | 92.88 | 78.08 |
| <i>kappa</i> | <u>0.677</u> | 0.828 | <u>0.606</u> | 0.786 | <u>0.677</u> | 0.861 | <u>0.543</u> | <u>0.642</u> | 0.885 | <u>0.719</u> |
| <i>alpha</i> | <u>0.677</u> | 0.829 | 0.608 | <u>0.787</u> | <u>0.676</u> | 0.882 | 0.541 | 0.642 | 0.885 | <u>0.719</u> |

Table 6 summarises the results of the reliability test. At the level of frames, the reliability score is sufficient for round 2 at the latest. When measuring frame and dimension at the same time, the results are ‘fair to good’ beyond chance in round 2 at the latest, and meet or approach Krippendorff’s standard for tentative results. Given the limited resources available for the test in terms of budget and time, these results are highly satisfying. After all, they allow for the identification of the framing strategies as operationalised below, for which measurement at the level of frames is sufficient, and even for some cautious conclusions when it comes to the distinction between policy and justification. Indeed, given the improvement across codebooks (the tests were conducted one by one, in the order presented in the table), it would seem that with further training, even better results could have been obtained. While it must be noted that the number of categories also decreased across cases (from five policy frames for welfare to three for TTIP), the choice of indices that account for per-chance-agreement still makes the results comparable. It might also be that the students simply got better acquainted with the method as such, and that codebooks with more categories should be used with more training only.

Noteworthy, there was some disagreement in terms of unitisation also. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the use of quasi-sentences in the CMP has been criticised and the use of natural sentences has been suggested and defended instead (Däubler et al. 2012). Disagreement on unitisation can be problematic in two ways mainly. First, coders who disagree on the beginning of a new unit might also disagree on the code to assign (e.g. Rustemeyer 1992, 111). This aspect is already included in the way the above results were obtained, in that codes were generally compared for the same passage of text, always

using the more fine-grained unitisation among the two coders as the base-line. Second, it might lead to disagreement concerning the overall result of a party if, for instance, one coder sub-divides some sentences disproportionately coded into category 1 very often, while another sees more units in a passage consisting of units disproportionately coded into category 2.

The latter problem does not, however, call the appropriateness of PFA as a method of measurement as applied here into question. In fact, codings were compared also at document level so as to identify potential cases where the overall balance was different because of disagreement on unitisation. Noteworthy, coders generally agreed on the most dominant frame in the document and on the mix of frames in it. Moreover, given the operationalisations of the structure of conflict and of party strategies pointed out below, agreement on the predominance of a particular frame and the mix of frames is sufficient. In other words, the PFA results will not be used as a scale variable.

In sum, therefore, PFA appears as an adequate method of measurement for the present purposes. Noteworthy, once the general reliability of the method was demonstrated, disagreements between the main coder and the test coders were not of concern anymore. This is because the codings of the main coder can generally be attributed a greater validity than those of the test coders, based on the main coder's greater expertise in the policy area, higher familiarity with the various policy frames and the method, as well as greater knowledge of the context (i.e. the overall debate on each issue).

Press releases as data and data collection process

Having summarised how PFA works as well as having demonstrated its reliability (with more detail on both aspects in the Annexes), it is now possible to point out its capacities for filling the methodological gap identified before. Firstly and most importantly, the pre-identification of frames allows the researcher, in the present context, to check for overlaps between the highly policy-specific and each party family's main ideological tenets and each country's national traditions. Thereby, a direct link can be made between ideas and framing, which makes it much more straightforward to distinguish ideological similarity from similarity in structural conditions across countries.

In addition, using this method rather than a computerised approach paves the way for analysing different, more suitable kinds of data in terms of MEP-to-voter communication for two main reasons. First, PFA can be applied across languages, because the coder must identify the line of argument behind a frame rather than particular words, which makes it possible to identify a line of thought that is similar to another but slightly modified for a national context, including, for instance, due to references to particular national institutions (e.g.: the acronym NHS for National Health Service). Hence it is possible to analyse texts used by MEPs to directly address the electorate, not just indirect signals in terms of votes or EP debates. Obviously, coders need to be sufficiently fluent in the respective language. Second, even very short statements can be analysed with considerable precision. Computerised methods drawing on statistical correlations between the usage of particular words and only inferring 'meaning' from them usually work best when the data-set is as large as possible. Indeed, at the document level, agreement among coders turned out no less precise for short texts than it was for long ones.

The kind of data that is analysed here by means of PFA is the press releases issued by MEPs. I thereby follow the example of Grimmer (2010), who analyses press releases to study how US senators explain their work to their respective constituents, which is very much what is intended here also. According to Grimmer, this direct channel of communication is relatively underexplored by political scientists so far in spite of knowledge on its importance (*ibid.* 2010, 1–2). Using this source for the present purpose not only appears appropriate for the qualities I point out next as well as an alternative to the definitely imperfect sources used so far (votes, EP debates, manifestos), but also constitutes a rather innovative feature of the present study within political science in general and with regard to the EP in particular.

Nowadays, such press releases tend to be published online (at least in addition to other venues), which makes them directly available for interested voters. Arguably, the more important feature of press releases is included in the term itself, in that they contain those kinds of statement that the author would wish to see distributed via the press. That said, there is of course no guarantee that this actually happens, but at least one might reasonably assume that this possibility is intended and taken into account in the drafting of press releases.

Noteworthy, with regard to manifestos it has been a point of discussion in the literature, what exactly their function really is and, consequently, who the addressee might be: manifestos might be serious promises on which parties might expect to be judged, they might constitute non-binding advertisements or instruments of coordination and conflict resolution within the party (Ray 2007, 16–17). Indeed, it cannot be excluded here that MEPs use press releases as a means of making their own voice heard within the party and/or to report back to their national principals, signalling loyalty and activity. At the same time, if internal communication was their only goal, they might as well use other, non-public channels for doing so and arguably might speak more openly of their dilemmas, for instance. The usage of a channel accessible to the wider public might thus still serve as the basis for assuming that the genuine intention of a press releases remains at least one of its functions.

Press releases leave considerable room for manoeuvre to MEPs. First of all, they do have a choice to issue a press release on an issue or not to do so. Doing so can compensate them for not being given word in the plenary, for instance. Not doing so can help them to keep out of delicate debates, albeit only up to a certain point, as there might be public pressure to take a stand due to politicisation. Even then, they can still have some leeway regarding the timing, length and exact content – including, of course, framing – of the statement. Framing strategies can consequently be much more fruitfully observed in press releases rather than in EP debates or Twitter statements analysed in the extant literature (see Section 3.1), which are subject to much more significant institutional and technical constraints. Moreover, while of course they usually are much shorter than manifestos in total, they still are both more to the point and exhaustive concerning a particular issue.

An appropriate measurement of the framing strategies of national parties and their delegations in the EP by means of PFA might thus be conducted on press releases or a functional equivalent such as a ‘news’ item on a website. Ideally, press releases that are collectively issued by the national delegation

should be collected. Indeed, this was possible for almost half of the parties in the sample. Where this was not possible, alternative data had to be found while trying to arrive at an equivalent of a collective statement by the party delegation. Noteworthy, in using alternative, but roughly equivalent sources of data other than the ideal one this study again follows the example of the CMP: for the CMP, data other than manifesto, e.g. speeches by party leaders, were used whenever there was no manifesto available (Budge et al. 2001, 7-8; 164-165). Due to the manual coding of the texts and due to the fact that the eventual result is only important in relative terms (i.e. identification of the predominant frame and of possible mixtures of frames), the variation in length of the texts or the number of codings per party is not important (cf. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 509). Press releases collectively issued by the national party delegation thus constitute the ‘ideal type’, but the usage of equivalents is neither unusual nor problematic.

For instance, as it can be noted that statements by the national delegation are usually authored by or in the name of the respective policy expert, it should also be acceptable to directly use the expert’s statement. Moreover, one might assume that a delegation leader can be taken as representative of the official delegation. Likewise, press releases authored by MEPs but issued via the national parties are used. In the case of very small parties, another option is to indeed check all members’ press releases and aggregate them. Thereby, almost 80 per cent of all measurements of framing efforts, i.e. the sub-set of data per party per policy issue, were issued directly by MEPs. Since however some parties in the sample did not have MEPs between 2013 and May 2014 yet, in those cases press releases by national parties or manifestos are used. Manifestos are further used as a general tool for triangulation, thereby ensuring that an expert MEP is not a complete outlier, e.g. corrupted by his or her special interests. That said, sometimes there might still be no data, arguably when parties explicitly chose to avoid any positioning via public statements. Noteworthy, in those cases there will still be voting data available, which generally constitutes a further tool for triangulation. (For the exact the composition of the data set, consider the ‘source’ listed among detailed results in Annex III.)

The actual data *collection* was carried out as follows. Since nowadays press releases are generally available on politicians’ websites, these websites can be used to access, collect, and eventually analyse the press releases, and at the same time will often offer alternative but functionally equivalent data (e.g. “news”, see above). As websites are designed differently for each party, they have different structures, so that the data available on these sites, especially the specific data concerned with Europeanised welfare, CAP reform and TTIP, cannot be collected in an entirely uniform manner. Some websites offer quite effective and efficient tools for key word search, others do not. Where such tools are not available, the data have to be downloaded manually one by one, clicking through all the press releases issued in the respective period of time. Indeed, even where search tools are provided, their quality must be checked manually.

Using web-scraping techniques implemented in “R”, it is however possible to collect – amongst others – all press releases provided on a website (Munzert et al. 2015, 228–32). Data downloaded in this manner can then rather easily be searched using standard data explorers. Noteworthy, however, not all websites are designed in such a way that using the technique described by Munzert et al. for the

downloading of press releases can be efficiently and effectively applied, for they would either involve writing more complicated code or would require knowledge and practice in further techniques. In order to collect the press releases forming the overall data set from the various websites, I thus made the choice of collection procedure dependent on the structure of the website, while generally trying to always triangulate the result at least with one other technique. In fact, for those cases where all three techniques – manual collection, website search tool, web-scraping – could be easily applied, it was found that they lead to the same results. The overall data-set is composed of 414 documents, including 5011 units coded by PFA.²²

Operationalisation: The structure of conflict, framing strategies, and controls

By applying Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) to the press releases issued by national party delegations, it should thus be possible to analyse how parties frame the three policy issues selected above. The next step, then, would be to move from coding results to the overall structure of conflict and to individual parties' strategies. How this can be achieved is pointed out in this subsection.

Recall that in the preceding chapter, political conflict was defined as diverging preferences over the right *policy* among actors being subjects of the same polity. By means of a Policy Frame Analysis, in principle such policy preferences are *directly* measured as references to the policy dimension of a frame. On the one hand, it was noted that the distinction between the various dimensions was not as reliably measured as might be desirable. On the other hand, one might still expect at least a minimum degree of consistency in a party's line of argument, as it would not convince anyone if the justifications provided all the time would not link at all with the policies suggested. One might therefore think of the structure of conflict as a pattern in the use of the frames that are predominantly used by the various parties. I consider a party to be 'predominantly' using a given frame if the majority of its quasi-sentences (norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions) have been coded as instances of this frame. In set-theoretic language: the majority of the norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions referred to by a party are members of the set of norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions constituting frame X, which makes the party a member of frame X users.

In fact, most methods of measurement used for textual analysis, such as the hand-coding into categories by the CMP or the Wordfish method (see section 3.1) would not even attempt at distinguishing statements including explicit policy suggestions and their justification, yet would still claim to measure the policy positions of actors. When identifying the predominant frame a party uses, therefore, PFA would already reach a similar level of accuracy concerning the measurement of policy preferences as these methods do, while nobody would criticise if CMP data or Wordfish results were used to determine the structure of conflict. This is even more obvious when a party uses the same frame more or less all the time. When several frames are used in a way that one might speak of 'blurring' in the sense operationalised below, it is then still possible to check whether the policy dimension is particularly strongly used in the

²² Raw data can be provided upon request.

other, secondary frame. Thereby, it can be made sure that the assumption that the predominant usage of a frame points to a particular policy preference is not violated.

The pattern in the predominant usage of frames, taken as a measure of the structure of conflict, can then be analysed further in three ways. First, a simple table is created containing the relative frequencies of each parties frame usage and ordering them according to the frame they use predominantly. Thereby some first impression of how the parties cluster together can already be obtained: if they cluster together mostly within their respective party families, the structure of conflict would seem to be mainly ideological, while if they cluster mostly within their respective countries it would seem to be territorial. When the structure of conflict is rather mixed, however, it would be difficult to describe it as either ideological or territorial and to compare it to the structure of conflict on other issues.

Second, therefore, some complementary quantification for measuring the structure of conflict seems helpful, albeit given the small 'N' it will necessarily be highly sensitive to individual cases. While aware of this limitation, I hence calculate an 'index of territorialisation' that is inspired by the indices of agreement found elsewhere in the literature (Attina 1990; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). In contrast to these indices, what is described by this index is precisely not ideological cohesion, but the degree of party behaviour in line with the national interest as opposed to ideologically consistent behaviour. It is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Index of territorialisation} = \% \text{ of parties framing in line with national interest} - \% \text{ of parties framing in line with ideology}$$

This formula accounts for the possibility of a party behaving in line with both national interest and ideology as well as for the opposite, that is, the possibility that a party – for whatever reason not yet understood – frames an issue in a way that corresponds to neither motive. This is important as some parties will usually find themselves in the lucky situation of overlapping national interests and ideological predilections. What makes the difference is thus whether overall, the larger number of parties can be explained by nationality or ideology. Accordingly, if the structure of conflict is predominantly ideological, the index will be negative, while it will be positive in case of territorialisation.

The third and final element of the macro-level discussion is an examination of patterns of frame usage: it is discussed frame by frame, in how far the parties using it predominantly share particular ideological or territorial feature and in how far this would seem to correspond to theoretical expectations discussed beforehand. As a part of this rather descriptive analysis that remains very close to the individual cases, it is also considered which of the parties who seemingly defect as operationalised in purely numerical terms (see below) should be calibrated as such in the csQCA on party strategies. Thereby, a link is created between the discussion of the discussion of the macro-level pattern and the micro-level analysis to follow.

Once the structure of conflict has been studied as operationalised in the aforementioned ways, the various framing strategies – defection, blurring, prism, subsuming – employed by the parties are analysed. Thereby it will be possible to explore, in how far the micro-level decisions of the parties actually

are in line with the theory of territorialisation, so that the observation concerning the overall pattern which is potentially in line with the theory is not a mere coincidence. As they have been conceptually clarified and visualised in set-theoretic terms in the theoretical framework for this study, the following operationalisations are focused on the measurement related aspects of the strategies.

Defection (as the issue-level counterpart of a two-dimensional strategy) is technically operationalised as the predominant usage of a frame that is not the one identified as the frame that fits the respective party family's ideology best. In other words, the party is defecting if the majority of the norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions it refers to are members of a set of norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions (i.e. a policy frame) that is not in line with the party's ideology, but rather in line with the national interest or tradition. A party will be considered *blurring* if it frames an issue by making use of norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions from at least two different frames, with the framing units attributed to the secondary frame used making up at least 20 per cent of the overall framing efforts of the party. The 20 per cent threshold is chosen so as not to confuse potential measurement error with purposeful blurring. The *prism* strategy (as the issue-level counterpart of a uni-dimensional strategy) is operationalised as the absence of both blurring and defection.

Given that *subsuming* was defined as the rather original and innovative way of framing an issue, it will not be possible to detect it directly by a technique using pre-identified categories. Nevertheless there are ways for a coder to notice subsuming when he or she sees it. Obviously, hand-coding is about actual reading of the texts to be coded, so that the researcher will simply recognize statements that are innovatively framed. Indeed, it turned out that subsuming also tends to lower the reliability measured at the document level, as different coders tend to disagree on how to categorise the innovative elements. As was already expected in the theory chapter, MEPs tend not to be frame entrepreneurs and thus subsuming is a rather rare phenomenon.

For each of the other three strategies, a csQCA will be carried out, with the respective strategy being treated as the outcome to be explained. As for the conditions explaining these outcomes, only the issue-level conditions of uncertainty and politicisation will be held constant, as they apply to all parties equally. The other conditions have to be separately specified for each of the three policy issues, as any more general operationalisation would run counter to the argument made above that national interests cannot be adequately operationalised in terms of such general conceptions as net-payer or net-recipient of the overall EU budget. In terms of national interests induced by cross-national distribution, for instance, it needs to be discussed in context which country can be expected to gain or lose from a given policy. Likewise, national traditions should be identified inasmuch as they are of relevance with regard to a particular issue. In the discussion on case selection at the micro-level (Section 3.2), some key points in this respect have already been made and will be pointed out in the respective chapters on Europeanised welfare, CAP and TTIP.

Similarly, it was argued earlier that ideology operationalised numerically in terms of 'positions' on Left-Right or new politics scales do not capture the actual nature of ideology as a set of ideas shared transnationally within the various party families. That said, in order to keep the solution terms produced

by csQCA parsimonious and interpretable, it might be helpful to summarise the membership of several party families within just one or two conditions, rather than treating (non-)membership in each family as a separate condition. The important difference to extant studies will nevertheless be, that even if such a condition should distinguish rather classically between Left and Right, this operationalisation will be grounded in a case-based argumentation regarding the features shared by ideologies of the Left and Right *as sets of ideas*.

Other conditions that should be included to control for them are government participation, committee membership and regional electoral incentives. The first of these, government participation, is operationalised based on the Political Data Yearbook.²³ In the UK, Austria, France, and Ireland, the parties in government have remained the same for more or less the whole period studied, so that the operationalisation is very straightforward and stays the same for every case. Since the results of the PFA are not differentiated on a time scale, so as to generate enough data for every party, the changes in government cannot be directly taken into account for the remaining two countries, i.e. Germany and Italy.²⁴

In Germany, the CDU/CSU changed its coalition partner from the FDP to the SPD as a result of the elections in September 2013. For the debate on Europeanised welfare as well as for TTIP, the SPD is thus considered a part of the government and the FDP is not, whereas for the CAP, the reverse is coded. This issue-specific difference is due to the slight differences in the timing of the debates despite the already limited time frame selected for the study as a whole: the debate on CAP Reform started in 2010 at the latest and was more or less concluded in December 2013. Hence most statements issued on this debate will be made under the CDU/CSU/FDP government. Since the debate on TTIP as well as on welfare really took off only in the second half of 2013 but lasted into 2014, the opposite is true for those two issues.

Inasmuch as the Italian parties in the sample are concerned, the only question is whether or for which issues the Forza Italia (including under the other party labels such as Popolo della Libertà) should be considered as a part of the government. They entered government in April 2013 and left in February 2014. For CAP and Europeanised welfare, it is therefore considered ‘in’, since the resolution on Europeanised welfare was passed in January 2014 and the CAP reform more or less completed in 2013. All statements that were collected from Forza Italia MEPs regarding TTIP were issued after the party had left government in 2014, which is why it is coded ‘out’ for this issue.

While in the theory of territorialisation (see Chapter 2), committee membership was not expected to influence party’s framing strategies after all with regard to highly politicised issues, it should nevertheless be controlled for. In order to operationalise it, I draw on the list of committees, their

²³ <http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com>

²⁴ In fact, even in the case of CAP Reform, concerning which some first press releases were issued as early as 2009 (which are not in the eventual data-set but were still collected), significant changes in framing over time did not become visible.

members and substitutes, from the European Parliament's official archive.²⁵ Parties will be considered as disposing of the expertise coming with committee membership if they have a member or a substitute member in the committees specialized on the respective issue. These committees are the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) committee regarding the debate on Europeanised welfare, the Agricultural and Rural Development (AGRI) committee in the case of the CAP Reform,²⁶ and the International Trade (INTA) committee in the case of TTIP.

Finally, it was noted that under specific circumstances, national electoral rules might influence MEPs' incentive structures, e.g. if an electoral pay-off could be expected by adhering to a regional, rather than a national interest. While in general all national electoral rules applying to EP elections must eventually respect the principle of proportional representation, Ireland, the UK, France, and Italy divide their territory into several constituencies, while in Germany this applies only to the internal party list of the CDU/CSU (Bux 2015). For several reasons, it would not seem helpful, however, to generally include a condition about 'regional electoral incentives' in the csQCA. First of all, the potential effect of such incentives is already countered whenever the data collected is collectively issued by the national party delegation and thus can be considered representative of the delegation as a whole. Second, this representativeness would also be ensured by triangulation, while parties that explicitly follow a regional interest (with the exception of the CSU) have been excluded from the sample for this very reason in the first place. Hence it seems more advisable to treat this aspect as background knowledge to be put to use, for instance, in order to resolve contradictory configurations.

The solution formulas obtained for the various framing strategies by means of QCA can then be compared to the observable implications derived from the theory of territorialisation with regard to each policy issue. Thereby it can be explored, in how far not only the result for the overall structure of conflict was in line with the theoretical expectations, but also whether it was correct for the right reasons. To the knowledge of the author, it will thus be analysed for the first time, up to which point national party delegations in the EP can actively shape the structure of conflict, rather than simply responding to structural constraints.²⁷ As a final step, the results concerning the structure of conflict and individual party's decisions can then be compared to voting results, while recalling that the latter are subject to very different institutional constraints noted earlier, as well as to results obtained otherwise in the literature.

²⁵ Accessed on 22 May 2016 via <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parlArchives/comArch/com7.do;jsessionid=1BFD87515071B6002395FC1CB1D8ACE8.node1?language=EN>

²⁶ Including further committees for their advisory role here would mean to include so many committees that the condition of expertise might basically become omnipresent.

²⁷ As is argued in Chapter 2, Ringe (2010) simply seems to imply that their capacity to do so is unlimited.

3.4 Conclusion

In this Chapter, two main points were made regarding a suitable approach for addressing the question, under what conditions MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the structure of conflict becomes territorial rather than ideological. First, concerning the choice of a research design, the extant literature relies too much on quantitative methods alone. Their merits notwithstanding, these methods hardly allow for an adequate operationalisation of national interests and ideology, for which a higher degree of familiarity with both policy issues (macro-level) and party (micro-level) would be required. The few cases of qualitative designs applied so far, however, tend not to relate their case studies to any broader concept of national interests and define it entirely on a case-by-case basis. Hence I have argued in favour of a qualitative-comparative research design, to be applied to only three policy issues and a subgroup of parties, yet always with reference to one explicit and shared conception of national interests. The respective case selection was explained then in some detail.

Second, the extant literature on the EP did not provide a method for the analysis of the reasons parties give – conceptualised here as ‘framing’ – that would be applicable to a small but multilingual data-set of texts intended for rather direct communication between MEPs and their voters. I have thus suggested an elaborated version of Radulova’s Policy Frame Analysis (PFA), taking inspiration from the hand-coding of quasi-sentences as applied in the CMP project. This method can then be applied to (web-based) press releases issued by, ideally, national party delegations, even if this means that these press releases are written in the respective native language. Finally, I have pointed out how the measurement results thus obtained and the other conditions not captured by case selection criteria could be operationalised.

In conclusion, it can hence be noted that the various decisions taken in order to resolve the deficits of the extant literature with regard to the purposes of the present project can be justified each on its own grounds. In addition, however, with hindsight it should now also become clear that the various justifications not only are compatible with, but even reinforce each other: For instance, the hand-coding approach chosen to analyse a multilingual data-set of texts would also in turn require a smaller number of policy issues and parties, while restricting the set of countries to the languages sufficiently known to the researcher increases the familiarity with these countries and their respective cultural idiosyncrasies etc. The overall approach presented here therefore appears suitable meaningfully complementing the extant literature by following a different but consistent line of reasoning, apt in particular to address the aforementioned research question, without necessarily questioning the value of prior studies in their own right.

4. The Europeanisation of Welfare

This chapter presents the first case study on conflict in the European Parliament intended for evaluating the theory of territorialisation (ToT) presented earlier and is meant to demonstrate in particular the capacity of parties for avoiding defection under uncertainty. First, some background information on this case, namely the Europeanisation of welfare, is provided, such that its features as a case are fully understood and the justification of its selection is corroborated: most importantly, the issue is characterised by some potential for cross-national distribution, which however was highly uncertain at the time of the public debate. This is followed by the first step of the Policy Frame Analysis conducted to eventually measure the structure of the conflict as well as parties' communication strategies: five possible policy frames on the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants are identified from secondary literature, so as to lay the basis for the codebook applied to the press releases issued by national party delegations to the EP on the issue (Section 2). These frames combine the attitudes on migration as identified by Roos with discourses on welfare, which in turn are inspired by Esping-Andersen's classic typology. The third section then specifies the relationship between the general characteristics of the policy issue for the sample of parties selected. It does so by first pointing out the interests of the parties' countries of origin and then formulates the respective expectations based on classic theories before turning to the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation. Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the PFA with regard to the structure of conflict observed, a descriptive summary of the usage of the various frames and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on the various party strategies (defection, blurring, and subsuming). As it is found, the structure of conflict is overwhelmingly ideological, as the theory of territorialisation would have suggested. At the micro-level, the usage of the various framing strategies largely fits this theoretical framework: parties generally stick with their own ideologies, but in most cases make use of 'blurring' in the wider sense in order to reach out to a larger set of voters, which confirms the role of politicisation assumed in the theory. Unexpectedly, participation in government seems to lead some parties to adopt defection strategies. Noteworthy, however, these choices do not seem to be related to any potential national interest in distributional terms, but rather to the respective parties' roles within the governing coalition in terms of (not) controlling the social affairs ministry. Arguably, these exceptions are due to the technical expertise concerning information on the respective national situation some governing parties have access to, an aspect of the issue that borders on the scope conditions of the ToT. In addition, it is found that far Right parties tend to subsume the problem definitions and causal narratives of other actors deemed unsuspecting of racism under their general, much more radical framing. Most parties generally emphasise the constitutive and cognitive dimensions of policy frames rather than the policy dimension, which further indicates that they are well aware of the risk of scaring off voters by calling for policies that involving outright cross-national distribution. Similarly, roll-call votes on the respective EP resolution also show that the structure of conflict is absolutely ideological, even beyond the six countries covered in the PFA, and further that the most controversial votes concerned those aspects of the resolution concerned with problem definition. Hence, the structure of conflict cannot simply be seen as a result of a blindfold transfer of ideological policy preferences on welfare from domestic politics to the EU-level, but rather that it is indeed uncertainty that allows parties to avoid goal conflict by framing. As it is concluded in Section 5, therefore, MEPs are indeed able and willing to 'relativise' potential or at least alleged national interests under uncertainty. It was not just this general result that can be accounted for by the theoretical framework presented in this study, but also how exactly they are able to make use of the leeway left by uncertainty. Indeed, it could be shown also that this theory of territorialisation provides a more accurate account of the respective causal mechanisms than earlier approaches. Noteworthy, doing so was only possible in this detail by means of a case-study approach at the macro-level and by familiarity with the parties, as well as by analysing conflict by means of Policy Frame Analysis: The theory of territorialisation may, to some extent, have predicted the outcome of the roll-call vote on the resolution on free movement, but the effect of uncertainty would not have been as directly observed as when studying the parties' framing efforts.

4.1 EU social policy and the Europeanisation of national welfare systems

This section provides background information on EU social policy and the Europeanisation of national welfare systems. As it is argued, the limited scope of EU social policy does not mean that, legally speaking, the national welfare systems would not be accessible to intra-EU migrants at all. Before this background, it is then possible to understand the characteristics of the debate on what is pejoratively called ‘welfare tourism’ as a case for this study. The question of welfare access for intra-EU migrations received an enormous public attention (i.e. politicisation) in late 2013, when the restrictions on free movement for citizens of Romania and Bulgaria were about to be lifted for good: with national welfare systems not entirely closed off and a discrepancy in GDP per capita without precedent for countries having joined the EU, the prospect of indirect cross-national distribution appeared theoretically relevant. Since however the exact legal conditions for receiving welfare in a host country are far from entirely certain at this point, and even less so at the time of the debate, and since further it is still a matter of academic debate in how far welfare might act as a pull factor for migrants at all, these distributional effects should be considered as highly uncertain. In addition, the intra-national distributional effects of ‘welfare tourism’ should be considered negligible, since both recipients and contributors to national welfare schemes in the native population stand to lose from it, while the intra-EU migrants themselves could hardly constitute an electoral compensation for national parties engaging in their favour. As I conclude, the debate on Europeanised welfare thus forms an ideal test case for the theory of territorialisation in general and the interplay between structural conditions – here: uncertainty of cross-national distributional effects – and party strategies for avoiding goal conflict in particular. As moreover a brief account of more or less issue-specific extant literature shows, comparable cases have not been studied so far.

The limited meaning of social policy at the EU-level

In order to understand what ‘social policy’ means at the EU-level and what it does not, one must take notice of what European integration has meant for the bigger part of its history, namely the creation of a common market for goods, labour, services, and capital. Before this background, it might not be as ‘paradoxical’ as Falkner (2007, 273) claims, that “the sole explicit Community competence for social policy regulation under the original EC Treaty was not in the part of the Treaty that dealt explicitly with social policy” (ibid.), but rather in the part on free movement of goods, labour, services, and capital. Article 48 of the Treaty provided for non-discrimination of workers on grounds of nationality with regard to employment, wages, and other working conditions. In order to implement the free movement of workers, the Community was given competence to adopt respective measures in the field of social security, and indeed several EC regulations were adopted so as to protect internationally mobile workers and their families (ibid. 2007, 276). Legally speaking, according to Falkner, the common market provisions would have left further room for manoeuvre allowing for harmonization of social policies, yet the fact that unanimity was required in the Council largely prevented it politically (ibid. 2007, 273). At the same time, the principle of non-discrimination for workers and their families, especially as it was further specified in Regulation 1612/68 (cf. Barnard 2007, 286), certainly formed a first towards step the Europeanisation of national welfare systems as it is discussed below.

While the Treaty of Maastricht changed the provisions on social policy, with the UK insisting on an opt-out from the latter, and the number of directives in this area increased rapidly, their scope still mainly includes what at the national level is referred to as ‘labour law’ (ibid. 2007, 275–78): working conditions, equal opportunities in the work sphere, occupational health and safety, social inclusion (see also: Kleinman 2002, 111). As Kleinman consequently notes, what constitutes social welfare policy at the national level is at best sidelined at the EU-level (ibid.). This holds even if the European Social Fund

(ESF) is taken into account. As Falkner argues: “Its aims are narrower than its name suggests as they concern only labour market policy and mostly target specific regions” (ibid. 2007, 280; see also: Kleinman 2002, 85). Noteworthy also, the budget allocated to it was very small compared to that of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Kleinman 2002, 85).²⁸ Nevertheless, the ambition to strengthen what Falkner calls ‘the EU’s social dimension’ as a part of the Maastricht Treaty can be seen as an element of a more general goal, namely “to give integration a more human face” (Kleinman 2002, 86). Another element arguably was the creation of Citizenship of the European Union, which indirectly would prove much more decisive in the kind of Europeanisation of national welfare systems that is of interest here.

The Europeanisation of national welfare states

Nowadays, the concept of Europeanisation is commonly considered to include a bottom-up component, where national actors ‘upload’ their preferences to see them realised at the EU-level, as well as a top-down perspective, where EU-level decisions impact on the national level (cf. Börzel 2005). On the one hand, the aforementioned limitations of EU-level social policy are a consequence of the uploading of the Member States’ preferences for not shifting competences to the EU-level in this field beyond those needed to guarantee the functioning of the common market. On the other hand, national welfare systems are affected in many different ways by EU-level decisions: indirectly, for instance, by the very fact that there is a common market that amongst others allows for the free movement of capital, as well as quite directly as a result of the Crisis, namely when budgetary discipline is enforced. What is meant by Europeanisation of national welfare systems here, however, is much narrower, namely that while the literally *national* welfare systems may not be fused, they nonetheless are partly opened to European non-nationals.

As was mentioned above, a first step into this direction was made with Council Regulation 1612/68/EC, in that workers and their families were given access to national welfare systems so as to foster the free movement of workers provided for in the Treaty. With the Treaty of Maastricht and the resulting establishment of ‘Union citizenship’, however, a gradual process was set in motion, decisively driven via a number of rulings by the European Court of Justice, which has at least partly decoupled the (social) rights of intra-EU migrants from their status as workers (Barnard 2007, 250; Hailbronner 2007b). This process shall be briefly reviewed here, so as to get an idea of the legal status quo at the time the debate on ‘welfare tourism’ started.

What became Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, provided that any citizens of an EU Member State shall likewise be a citizen of the Union. Article 18 then declared the right to free movement for Union citizens, which appeared not to bring much of an innovation (Hailbronner 2007b, p. 314). Noteworthy, this right was subject to limitations given in other Treaty provisions as well as secondary law. As Hailbronner notes, however:

²⁸ In fact, scholars such as Rieger (2005) and Altomonte and Nava (2005) have argued that the Common Agricultural Policy can be seen as a kind of social policy. However, since this is the subject of a later chapter and further has no relevance as background information for the debate on Europeanised welfare, I do not take it into account here.

In a series of decisions, starting with *Sala* and *Grzelczyk*, the Court declared that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Members States’, implying that, in its opinion, the principle of equal treatment extends to all citizens of the Union, subject only to such exceptions as explicitly provided for. (ibid., 2007b, p. 314)

Indeed, in its ruling on *Sala*, the Court granted social rights such as child benefits in Germany to a Portuguese national who in fact did neither qualify as a worker nor possess sufficient resources to be entitled to free movement as a non-economically active EU citizen. In doing so, it further referred to the principle of non-discrimination (Art. 12 EC) for citizens residing legally in another Member State. According to Chalmers et al. (2006, 599), the Court thereby opened the door to welfare tourists.

The Court invoked these principles again in its ruling on *Grzelczyk*, where it also held that the expulsion of citizens could not be an automatic consequence of an EU citizen’s reliance on social benefits in a host Member State. In addition, however, the *Grzelczyk* ruling contained the criterion that a Union citizen searching for a job would be entitled to unemployment benefits in the host Member State if there exists a ‘genuine link’ between the EU citizen and the country in question (Hailbronner 2007a, 316–17). Before this background, Hailbronner (ibid.) notes that the Court has never denied that there might be limitations and sometimes established new ones itself, such as the ‘genuine link’.

Similarly, Barnard has interpreted the ‘genuine link’ condition as well as the requirement of a certain period of residence in the host country as applied in the *Bidar* case as indications of the Court’s ‘awareness of the sensitivities of the issue, in particular concerns about ‘benefit tourism’” (ibid. 2007, 458). This awareness might be further demonstrated by the fact that the Court has taken up the latter term explicitly in its judgement on the *Trojani* case and in its Opinion on *Bidar* as “moving to a Member State with a more congenial social security environment” (ibid. 2007, 458). Other scholars, however, have read these rulings in a rather contrary manner.

Chalmers et al., for instance, interpret the *Bidar* ruling quite differently, namely as “the most extraordinary example of judicial activism” and as an instance of “[t]he insistence by the Court of Justice that any citizen lawfully resident in another Member State has a right to the same social benefits as the state’s own nationals”, leading to a ‘nested social citizenship’ (ibid. 2006, 600–601). Similarly, Hailbronner (2007a) holds:

The most remarkable feature of the Court’s reasoning is that it seems to have no hesitation in attributing to Community law a different meaning from the one that would follow from an interpretation on the basis of the objective wording of the provision, its systematic context and its purpose. (ibid. 2007a, 319)

He also concludes that the Court has established a kind of social citizenship for intra-EU migrants (ibid. 2007a, 317). In fact, the rulings mentioned above have not only at times run counter to earlier ones, but also to secondary law (ibid. 2007a, 315–16). Directive 2004/38/EC, adopted under the co-decision procedure (i.e. with the EP as a veto-player), was meant to clarify the situation by turning case law into statute law.

The main elements of this Directive, also known as the Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD) can be easily summarised: within the first three months of their stay, all Union citizens have the right of residence. After that, however, citizens who are not economically active must be able to sustain

themselves and have health insurance. After five years, they obtain the right to permanent residence (Hailbronner 2007a, 320). During the first three months, the host Member State is not “obliged to extend social assistance . . . generally, or, where appropriate, for the longer period in which those seeking employment are entitled to remain, as long as they are continuing to look for work and have a genuine chance of being engaged” (ibid. 2007a, 322). Seemingly, the result should be that no redistribution would result from EU citizens’ enjoyment of free movement, as they either would not be entitled to assistance in the beginning of their stay or thereafter would have to fulfil conditions that meant to prevent reliance on assistance.

However, the CRD takes up the jurisprudence of the Court that was summarised above, and often does so word-for-word (Hailbronner 2007a, 322) – and thus remains equally unclear. This applies, for instance, to the concept of an ‘unreasonable burden’: If a Union citizen, allowed to reside in a host country during the first three months does not fulfil the conditions of being able to sustain himself or herself in the ways foreseen (employment, self-employment, sufficient means), he or she can thereafter not be expelled simply on the grounds of requiring welfare benefits, but only if he or she becomes an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the host social system. As Hailbronner points out, proving an individual citizen to be an unreasonable burden will be difficult in practice (ibid. 2007a, 322–23). He even holds: “In case of disputes, courts, however, are unlikely to have many choices other than granting a residence right to a Union citizen who is for one reason or another dependent upon social welfare” (ibid. 2007a, 323). The possibility of ‘welfare tourism’, therefore, cannot be totally ruled out on legal ground so far. Similarly, Chalmers et al. conclude:

As the sources of entitlements are many, with each responding to developments prompted by the other, it is impossible to point out an overall ideology defining which social entitlements should be granted to EU citizens. And this, in many ways, is EU citizenship’s greatest weakness. In return for the grant of citizens’ rights to non-nationals, it has sacrificed any kind of overall scheme or programme that could act as a totem or symbol informing the Union’s citizens how the Union enfranchises them and why it does so. (ibid. 2006, 602)

This also shows that, from the citizens’ point of view, it will be hard to determine their chances of receiving benefits.

On top of this, by the end of 2008, when the transposition period for the CRD was officially over, the Commission noted that no Member State had implemented the CRD effectively, and nowhere was transposition entirely correct. A number of legal proceedings followed (Ferrera 2012, pp. 268-269). The correct implementation of national measures to prevent welfare tourism in particular has long been a matter of public as well as expert discussions. It was only in May 2014 that the Advocate General of the Court of Justice issued an opinion saying that Member States can deny benefits to welfare tourists (Pop 2014), which was later confirmed by the Court’s official ruling (Kröger 2014). This has not, however, prevented further legal proceedings against national authorities (bos/tbw/Reuters 2015), nor experts calling the conformity of specific measures with European law into question (e.g. O’Brien 2015). As a result, it can be safely argued that at the time the debate started and throughout the period studied here (i.e. until the European elections held in May 2014), there was a considerable degree of legal uncertainty

surrounding the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants. While there might have been differences in implementation across countries, none of them, it would seem, could be sure to have adopted measures sufficient to prevent welfare tourism without constituting a breach of EU law.

Welfare as an economic incentive for intra-EU migration?

In federal systems such as Belgium and Canada, social policy – and welfare in particular – is a regular issue of contention, not least because of its openly redistributive effects (Béland and Lecours 2005; Béland and Lecours 2007). While the EU is considered a quasi-federal entity by some (Börzel and Hosli 2002), it was pointed out above that there is no common welfare policy at the EU-level that political actors from richer Member States could denounce as ‘excessive’ in the way actors from the – wealthy – Belgian region of Flanders do (Béland and Lecours 2005, 684; Cantillon, Mussche, and Popelier 2011). At the same time, due to the Europeanisation of national welfare systems, the latter are not completely closed off either. Noteworthy, while in systems with federal welfare the inhabitants of poorer states can rather easily receive benefits that are disproportionately financed by the citizens of other the wealthier state(s), there are considerable hurdles here in the EU. Whereas the exact nature of these hurdles may be legally uncertain, as I have shown above, migration to a wealthier Member State is an obvious requirement.²⁹ Hence, cross-national distribution due to welfare tourism will only occur to the extent that potential tourists are willing to make the effort.

In how far, then, do welfare prospects actually attract migrants? Barrett and McCarthy (2008) review a number of studies on this question, some of which have included theoretical models arguing that more generous welfare systems might be highly attractive directions for migrants, and for the low-skilled ones in particular. While such effects were found in all three studies under review, they tended to be very small, statistically not significant or barely so. Indeed, it would appear that other factors such as the existence of ethnic networks in the recipient country are more important, as the authors of the review argue. It should also be noted that the effect of wages on location choice was shown to be ten times higher than that of welfare (ibid. 2008, 545). Given this latter aspect in particular, it would seem only straightforward that several studies have found migrants to contribute more to national welfare systems than they take out: this has been argued for migrants in general for the case of Germany (Bonin 2014), for the specific case of Central and Eastern European intra-EU migrants in the UK (Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls 2009; Springford 2013) and for intra-EU migrants in the EU as a whole (Juravle et al. 2013). While of course this does not mean that there is no welfare tourism at all, intra-EU migration could not be shown to harm national welfare systems, but instead were beneficial to them. Noteworthy, however, these studies were consciously chosen here as studies relying (for obvious reasons given their publication dates) on pre-2014 data. I thus explicitly ignore any later studies so as to identify what political actors and

²⁹ Even in order to receive family allowances at least one member of the family would have to migrate.

citizens could know by referring to the economic state of the art at the time of the 2013 debate on welfare tourism.

The reason for doing so is, that the knowledge gained in this manner might not be perfectly transferable to the situation when Romanian and Bulgarian citizens were given the full right to free movement in January 2014. This is because this situation, to some extent, constituted a precedent. Romania and Bulgaria are poorer than the rest of the EU, but this is not the main point: At several instances throughout its history, the European Community (later European Union (EU)) has been joined by countries that were poorer than the average of the existing membership. Of the nine countries that joined the EU prior to the Eastern enlargement, Ireland (accession in 1973), Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (both 1986) have been entitled to Cohesion Funds, available for states with a per capita GDP of less than 90 per cent of the EU average (Bourne 2007, p. 295). When however the first cohort of Central and Eastern European countries joined in 2004, *all of them* would have been entitled to the maximum of structural funding in addition to similarly voluminous payments from the Common Agricultural Policy (ibid.). In the past, some alleviation was achieved by means of such subsidies, yet while the challenges have been growing with each accession, levels of Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds have been dropping (cf. ibid. 2007, p. 296). Indeed, considering the current situation of budgetary austerity throughout Europe, an increase in the near future seems highly unlikely.

Given the lack of alleviation of poverty by means of EU policy *within* these countries, citizens of these countries might in principle be motivated to make use of their right to free movement to escape poverty. In order to limit the scale of this phenomenon, interim restrictions on free movement for some of these countries were implemented by a number of existing Member States, primarily intended for preventing labour market distortions due to wage differences. Indeed, by the time these final restrictions were removed, the 2004-accession countries concerned had considerably caught up. While similar restrictions had been imposed for Romania and Bulgaria (accession in 2007) until January 2014, by 2012 these countries had reached a level of GDP per capita that was barely half of the EU28-average (Eurostat 2016b). Due to these discrepancies, politically influential economists such as the German Hans-Werner Sinn have pointed out that a life on welfare payments in one of the rich countries may yield two to three times the average employment-generated income in the Romania or Bulgaria (Sinn 2013). He predicted that this would necessarily lead to a mass immigration from these states into Germany, ‘eroding’ the latter’s welfare system (ibid. 2013). While of course these predictions might have taken the specific economic features of Romania and Bulgaria into account, they were essentially theoretical predictions that at the point of their publication could not be tested directly by empirical means.

Case characteristics of the debate on ‘welfare tourism’

Given that the general link between welfare and territorial identity can be easily used for purposes of political mobilization (Béland and Lecours 2005), and given that due to the Crisis, not only a general awareness of EU politics but also of identity issues within the EU was fostered, it should not come as a surprise to find that the debate on welfare tourism became so highly politicised in late 2013, in that it was

turned into a major campaigning issue (Debating Europe 2013; European Parliament 2014), and was picked up regularly even by the yellow press (e.g. Hoeren 2014). Its status as a campaigning issue might not have been the only reason the EP adopted a resolution on the matter in January 2014 (European Parliament 2014): After all, the EP had been a full co-legislator concerning the Citizens' Rights Directive, and could hence be expected to be involved in any future changes to the CRD. The debate on welfare access for intra-EU migrants thus fulfils the criteria in terms of conditions to be held constant for the cases of policy issues under study here in terms of politicisation, timing, and EP competence.

Whereas I have made these points on politicisation, timing, and EP competence in Chapter 3 already, in the present chapter I have provided background information on the legal and economic perspectives on welfare tourism that can be summarised as follows. Arguably, since legally speaking, national welfare systems are not entirely closed to intra-EU migrants, and since economic incentives for (at least some of) them can be identified for trying to receive welfare payments in a richer host country, there is potential for cross-national distribution here. Accordingly, one might make arguments about the national interests of host countries in particular, and to some extent also about those of emigrant countries concerned. Importantly, however, these distributional effects are characterised further by what is in fact a dual uncertainty: First, it is legally uncertain both in how far migrants have access to national welfare systems of other countries without having contributed to them earlier as well as in how far Member States are able to deny them welfare entitlements by means of national legislation given the current EU-level legal framework. Second, it is economically uncertain in how far individual migrants, especially those from Romania and Bulgaria, are actually aware of and motivated by the prospect of welfare benefits abroad and in how far the full accession of these countries to the Schengen area might alter the prior net contribution of all intra-EU migrants. This dual uncertainty should provide the right kind of leeway to political parties for sticking with their respective ideology even in the face of potentially cross-national distribution.

An interesting additional feature of this policy issue is, however, that its intra-national distributional effects are negligible. It is true, of course, that social policy in general and welfare in particular tends to involve intra-national distribution and for the way it does so constitute a typical case of Left-Right contestation at the domestic level (Treib 2010). This does not, however, apply to the issue of welfare tourism: On the one hand, those native citizens who do or at some point might depend on welfare spending would more or less directly find (or perceive they do) themselves in competition with the welfare tourists, especially in times of tight public budgets. On the other hand, those native citizens who contribute to the welfare system will be unwilling to contribute an even bigger portion of their income. Hence, the two blocs that usually struggle over the right amount of welfare spending might in this case agree that sharing it with migrants – especially with those who have never contributed. That is, provided that there is something like welfare tourism indeed and provided that the overall balance of intra-EU migration regarding the welfare state turns out negatively as a result. Inasmuch as migrants contribute more than they take, of course, both native recipients of and contributors to national welfare systems should approve of intra-EU migration.

Nevertheless, it might be argued that the distribution between the native population and the migrants already living in a host country is, in fact, intra-national and will have the respective political consequences, because some parties within the host countries have closer electoral ties to migrants than others. After all, it has been shown that immigrant parties in many countries, including four that the present studies is focussed on, that migrants regularly favour Left-wing parties over Right-wing parties (Wüst 2011a). Indeed, in European elections, EU citizens residing in another Member State are generally allowed to vote there (Bux 2015). At the same time, this needs to be qualified by a number of figures: In 2012, only 2.7 per cent of the citizens residing in the Member States of the EU where living in a Member State that was not their home Member State (Eurostat 2013). In Germany, for instance, about 4.4 per cent of persons entitled to vote in the 2014 European elections were citizens of other EU Member States, which – for most of them – meant that they had the choice of voting either in Germany or in their country of origin (Egeler 2014). While it is difficult to obtain data on the number of non-nationals actually voting, Diehl and Wüst note that in the 2004 European elections, only 7 per cent of non-Germans entitled to vote did actually register for the election in Germany (2011, 49), albeit the German deadline for registration is comparatively lenient on a European scale (European Parliament). If this is transferred to the 4.4 per cent allowed to vote in the 2014 European elections, it sums up a total of 0.3 per cent of the electorate that could potentially be attracted by positions in favour of intra-EU migrants. Not all of those will, of course, be equally interested in the issue of welfare access.

Moreover, even the party family that is most successful in attracting migrant votes will not be able to obtain all of these votes. As Jenny (2011) notes for the case of Austria, while the Greens are the most pro-immigrant party, it is the Social Democratic party who tends to get by far the biggest share of the immigrant vote, namely 41 per cent, while the Greens obtain only 19 per cent. While it may be safely assumed that Green parties in other European countries are also the most immigrant friendly parties in the system, the members of the Social Democratic family tend to obtain the highest vote-shares among immigrants in Germany (Wüst 2011b), the UK (Saalfeld 2011), and France (Tiberj 2011) as well. In other words, the most pro-immigrant stances do not even result in the maximum electoral pay-off among the immigrant electorate.

Ironically, while Social Democrats are apparently highly popular among immigrants, Alonso and da Fonseca (2012) have argued, that pro-immigrant positions are likely to appeal to at best the liberal-minded, socio-cultural elite within their core electorate, whereas such positions might not resonate well with its working class voters. They further find that Social Democratic parties might thus become more anti-immigrant for vote-seeking reasons, especially if there is competition from the far Right (*ibid.*) – which is the case in all countries under study here. Inasmuch as welfare tourism actually threatens the welfare state, one might expect this effect to be even stronger. In sum, only very few additional votes could be gained from immigrant voters at all, and these would most likely come at the much higher price of losing native working class voters.

Consequently, inasmuch as they exist at all, intra-national distributional effects could hardly be the cause of an ideologically structured conflict in the present case. Instead, given the cross-national

distribution potentially resulting from welfare tourism, ideologically structured conflict over Europeanised welfare would arguably be the result of the dual uncertainty characterising the issue. It is this uncertainty which according to the theory of territorialisation could provide the MEPs in their respective national delegations with the necessary leeway for avoiding territorialisation by means of strategic framing. This is what makes this case particularly interesting for testing the value of the aforementioned theory.

Extant research on conflict over EU social policy and migration

The extant literature on conflict in EU politics has, to the knowledge of the author, not examined the issue of welfare access for intra-EU migrants as a case in its own right. On the one hand, Treib (2010) has studied determinants of conflict concerning social policy among the actors – national governments, MEPs, national parliamentarians – involved in the Convention on the future of Europe taking place in the early 2000s. He finds that party ideology is the most important factor in shaping cleavages on social policy, followed by national interests in terms of the regulatory status quo and the related national traditions and potential adaptation costs, and that such national interests are represented mainly by actors adhering to government parties (independent of their role as parliamentarians or governments). His results are, however, not directly comparable, precisely because the debate on social policy *at large* includes regulatory standards, which are not as openly redistributive as welfare in the strict sense, tend to be less politicised (especially prior to the Crisis) and, inasmuch as they do involve distributional effects, these will be intra-national as well (e.g. between employers and employees).

On the other hand, Hix and Noury (2007) have studied the voting behaviour of MEPs on migration policy in the fifth EP (1999-2004), finding that political factors and party ideology in particular are most decisive, while economic interests are less important. Nevertheless, since their study is focussed on legislation that a. addresses migration by third country nationals, b. was not explicitly redistributive in the sense welfare is, and c. was passed before the Crisis, their results cannot be easily interpreted as predicting the structure of conflict on welfare access for intra-EU migrants. The analysis of this particular case is thus also a substantive contribution to the literature on these policy areas.

4.2 Identification of possible policy frames

This section points out how the possible policy frames were identified, namely by complementing Gosta Esping-Andersen's well-known typology of welfare by considerations on their implications for migrants' access to the respective entitlements. The five frames identified in this manner are then briefly presented: Two rather extreme ones, excluding any or including all welfare rights for intra-EU migrants simply by their conceptions of nationality, and three more moderate frames that differ by their ideas of welfare policy in general, while not questioning the nation-state. They form the basis for the codebook used for the Policy Frame Analysis on the MEPs' press releases. Their presentation at this point is further a necessary condition for formulating the observable implications of the present theoretical framework.

How the policy frames were identified

An inductive identification of policy frames would seem difficult to reconcile with the goal of theory evaluation, as a bias introduced in the identification of frames would risk translating into biased overall results. At the same time, it will hardly be possible to identify the frames used in the 2013 debate on welfare tourism from extant literature one to one, given that the analysis was conducted so shortly after the time period studied. Hence, it will be necessary to integrate the lines of thought on both policy fields affected, namely welfare and migration. Thus, in order to identify the kinds of policy frames that might be used by parties for position taking on the question of welfare for migrants, this paper first and foremost draws on the work by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990a). This is done not only because this work was absolutely seminal for the field of comparative welfare research. More importantly for the purpose of frame identification, Esping-Andersen's categorisation includes detailed arguments on the logic behind the respective welfare regimes, helpful in identifying the normative, constitutive and cognitive dimensions of possible policy frames on welfare for migrants. In order to make these even more explicit, the paper further takes orientation from George and Wilding's (1985) work on ideology and welfare, as there is a considerable ideational overlap between the logics of Esping-Andersen's liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes on the one hand, and George and Wilding's anti-collectivist, reluctant collectivist and Fabian socialist approaches to welfare, on the other hand.

Esping-Andersen's welfare regimes are an ideal starting point for the identification of frames since the different welfare regime types carry the labels of party political ideologies, while these labels are used to characterise welfare regimes prevailing in clusters of states. Identifying policy frames on this basis should thus be unbiased with regard to the question, whether ideological or territorial conflict is observable concerning the question of welfare for migrants, but should simply lead to a list of ways in which welfare policy can be thought. For instance, it would appear that, *a priori*, it is totally up to the German Social Democratic MEPs whether they decide to use the policy frame corresponding to the logic behind the social democratic welfare regime, thereby following their policy-seeking goals, or whether they will make use of the frame mirroring the logic of the conservative welfare regime prevailing in Germany, in doing so justifying restrictions on free movement so as to their vote-seeking interests.

Esping-Andersen's welfare regime types vary not only by their degree of de-commodification, i.e. the degree to which they make citizens independent from the market as the sole source of income, but also by their role in social stratification. The stratifying features of welfare may be of particular importance for migrants, as for instance policies following a conservative logic may disadvantage migrants considerably, precisely because conservative welfare tends to be generous towards those who 'deserve' it based on prior contributions. Yet the degree to which migrants are entitled to the same rights as nationals is only one feature of migration policy, the second policy area that matters for the issue at hand.

In fact, as Roos notes, migration policy is first about admission to a potential host country, then about the rights of admitted migrants (ibid. 2013, 43–47). After all, if migrants are not even allowed to enter a country, the question of welfare access for them does not even arise. Vice versa, if nation-states

and national citizenship are not considered relevant any longer, any restrictions would seem unjustified. Not surprisingly then, the debate on ‘welfare tourism’ has arisen in the shadow of the fading out of restrictions on admission for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. In order to capture the migration policy aspects of ‘welfare tourism’, therefore, Roos’s detailed work on policy preferences in the area of migration policy forms another source for identifying policy frames on welfare tourism. By complementing the logics of welfare policy behind Esping-Andersen’s typology with the relevant migration policy aspects, then, it should be possible to identify the frames used on welfare tourism *a priori*. As for the order in which these frames are presented and eventually numbered, it should be noted that ordering them from Left to Right or permissiveness to strictness is consciously avoided, since they are meant to constitute independent, policy-specific lines of thought. Instead, I will first present the two extreme frames, which simply by their understanding of migration pre-empt any discussion on welfare access, before turning to the adapted Esping-Andersen-based frames on national welfare for migrants.

The possible policy frames on ‘welfare tourism’

A first possible frame would not even require a consideration of migrants’ social rights, but would simply stop admission of migrants completely. This frame may be used by those actors who consider immigration as a problem as such, because they are normatively attached to an exclusionary concept of national culture and identity. Open borders as they are aimed for within the Schengen area, obviously allow for immigration and might thus be identified as the source of the ‘immigration problem’ (Frame F1). At the other extreme, any treatment of individuals grounded in nationality may be labelled as an act of discrimination, running counter to human rights and/or EU fundamental rights. Thinking in terms of nation-states is at the root of such problematic policies, and should be abandoned for the sake of full equality of rights for nationals and (intra-EU) migrants. The first of these two frames justifies a policy that includes neither admission nor equal treatment for migrants, while the second demands both maximum admission and rights (Frame F2). In between these two extreme poles one might find three alternative policy frames corresponding to the logics of Esping-Andersen’s world of welfare, leading to five possible policy frames in total.

Taking orientation from the liberal welfare regime, a third frame is built normatively speaking on maximum individual freedom. Hence, migration is not a problem from this perspective, as free movement across national borders quite obviously increases individual freedom. Moreover, it has the capacity to increase efficiency by improving the allocation of labour. Welfare schemes, by contrast, may easily lead to inefficiency if designed in a too generous fashion prone to decreasing incentives for taking up work. Next to the pragmatic consideration of efficiency, generous welfare requires high taxation, which in turn encroaches upon individual freedom. Welfare is thus almost a problem as such, while welfare for migrants may additionally turn the virtues of migration into a vice: migrants might then choose to migrate for the wrong reasons, thereby increasing the inefficiency of the welfare state. Such ‘welfare tourism’ would thus be a problem from this liberal perspective, and should be addressed by curbing welfare for migrants (if not in general). In order to reap the benefits of open borders, however, restrictions on

admission, for instance by changing the rules of the Schengen area, are rejected (Frame F3 or ‘liberal’ frame).

From a conservative point of view (i.e. not necessarily referring to Conservative parties), ‘welfare tourism’ constitutes an even bigger problem: It imposes a threat to the existing social order – valued as such by conservatives – in several ways. First, immigration may not be a problem as such, but is considered as a potential threat to order if occurring on a large scale. The prospect of becoming a welfare tourist might induce too many people to migrate. Second, if welfare payments can be obtained ‘undeserved’, that is without having contributed to the scheme, this also threatens the existing economic order and might have redistributive implications generally avoided in conservative welfare regimes. Third, welfare tourism, if permitted, not only constitutes an equalization of workers and non-workers, but further of nationals and non-nationals, thereby questioning the concept of the nation-state and nationality as such. It is important to note here, that it is thus not necessarily the *financial* costs that welfare tourism might involve, and hence not necessarily the scale of welfare tourism, but its sheer existence that is problematic. Since it is the combination of open borders as well as the principle of non-discrimination that lead to ‘welfare tourism’, and since neither policy would appear worth protecting as such to a conservative, both limits on admission of intra-EU migrants as well as on their rights appear as legitimate policies from this perspective (Frame F4).

It might seem at first sight, that a frame in line with the social democratic welfare state would be equivalent to the cosmopolitan frame F2, at least if the idea of ‘universal’ access to welfare is taken literally. As however considerable progress in terms of equality and solidarity have been achieved at least to some extent *by means of* the national welfare state, the latter may now also be considered here as *an end as such*. Immigration would only be a problem in itself if it led to unfair competition, which however can be avoided by granting equal social rights to migrants. Welfare for migrants may in parts have a similar effect, and hence is welcome, also as an aspect of international solidarity. The limits of this solidarity might only become visible if welfare for migrants would threaten the welfare state as a whole. As long as this is not observed, e.g. because migration also increases the number of contributors to the welfare system, there would not be a problem in granting welfare to migrants. This differentiates this policy frame from the liberal and conservative ones, where already some ‘welfare tourism’ would be considered problematic. If anything, rather than limiting admission or cutting welfare for migrants, the welfare state is to be strengthened so as to cope with the new challenges (Frame F5).

The logics behind these five policy frames form the basis for the codebook provided in the Annex II. Their presentation at this point is further a necessary condition for formulating the observable implications of the present theoretical framework. Table 7 provides an overview of their key features on the four dimensions that are part of every policy frame.

Table 7: Overview of possible policy frames on welfare access for intra-EU migrants

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| Nationalist (F1) | National identity and community | Immigration as the influx of 'others' | Free movement policy | Stop immigration |
| Cosmopolitan (F2) | Fundamental Rights, equality | discrimination | Nationalism, thinking in terms of nation-states | No more discrimination based on nationality |
| Liberal (F3) | Individual freedom | Inefficient welfare arrangements increase tax burden | Unconditional welfare for migrants sets the wrong incentives | Allow free movement for efficient allocation of resources, restrict welfare |
| Conservative (F4) | Stability, order, tradition | welfare tourism as a real concern (redistributive potential, mass immigration, elimination of status national/non-national) | Loss of control over migrant rights | Restrict welfare for migrants and/or restrict migration |
| Social democratic (F5) | Solidarity and equality, as embodied in the (national) welfare state | There is no problem if or as long as there is no threat to the historical achievement of the welfare state | Migrants potentially contribute to the social system | Strengthen welfare authorities were necessary, otherwise no need for action |

4.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case

This section first specifies the case characteristics for the sample of countries on which this study is focussed, namely Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the UK and Ireland. As I argue, four of these countries might potentially become 'host countries' for welfare tourists, given that they already are attractive migratory destinations at the outset of the debate. By contrast, I hold, Ireland and to a lesser extent Italy might have incentives to favour full welfare access for migrants, given not only their history as emigrant countries but more importantly recent trends in these countries net emigration rates since the beginning of the Crisis. Moreover, it will be argued in some detail, why a further distinction according to welfare generosity is hardly possible given the complexity of national welfare provisions and not actually desirable given legal uncertainty of restrictions on welfare for migrants. At the same time, welfare regimes can be considered relevant national traditions that might potentially shape perceptions of the adequate welfare access for migrants, independent of what is actually the status quo in the country or the EU in general. Therefore, the six countries can be categorised as 'host' and 'tourist' countries and by the welfare regime they represent (following Esping-Andersen's typology). The subsection then points out what the various extant theories discussed in Chapter 2 would expect with regard to the structure of conflict and which causal narrative they include in this respect. It starts with those theories predicting the most parsimonious outcome in terms of a completely ideological or territorial structure of conflict, for once these extreme scenarios have been pointed out in detail, it is easier to contrast them with the more nuanced ones. While some of the extant theories would, in fact, predict the same overall structure of conflict and two of them would even relate it to uncertainty, the third subsection then points out how the theory of territorialisation (ToT) differs from these theories in terms of the exact causal narrative. Most importantly, the ToT expects uncertainty to provide the kind of leeway parties can exploit by framing, in that they evaluate the uncertain phenomenon in their own way and focus on the justification rather than concrete policy suggestions. In addition, in the face of politicisation, parties are expected to blur their own ideological frames with ideologically similar ones to broaden their electoral appeal, rather than blindly sticking to their own limited logics.

Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries

As I have explained in Chapter 3, this study is focussed on national parties and their delegations to the EP from just six countries only, namely Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, France, and Italy. Covering all countries would not be feasible, nor would the inclusion of the so-called New Member States from Central and Eastern Europe seem advisable due to a lack of comparability of their party families. For the present case study, this means that Romania and Bulgaria are not included, albeit it is citizens of these countries that are expected to increasingly become ‘welfare tourists’ after January 2014. Hence, it must be acknowledged that the set of countries that this study focuses on does not offer maximum variation with regard to potential winners and losers from welfare tourism.




Figure 9: Net emigration as percentage of the overall population in the respective year. Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that this selection of countries displays no variation at all in this respect. The remaining variation can be understood as a consequence of the Crisis that hit the EU as of 2010. It is visualised in Figure 9 in terms of net emigration data, set in relation to the size of the respective overall population. Greece is included for illustration purposes here, as the country hit hardest by the Crisis, as well as Romania, whose citizens are expected to become welfare tourists after January 2014. As can be noted, then, the Crisis has affected the attractiveness of the various Member States, with some become more attractive migratory destinations, while others not only losing attractiveness for immigrants but even being left by considerable numbers of their own nationals. Whereas Germany and Austria have seen massive decreases in net emigration due to an increasing influx of immigrants, net emigration has remained rather stable in the UK and France, albeit in case of the former, it has been constantly and significantly negative. By contrast, net emigration from Ireland, a country hit directly by the Crisis, exhibits a sharp increase in its already positive net emigration. Similarly, while still experiencing more immigration than emigration, net emigration has been on the rise in Italy. Whereas this country did not have to be bailed out by the other members of the Eurozone, it still suffered from a rather slacking economy in these

years. Finally, it is worthwhile noting that a massively decreasing number of Romanians have been leaving their country, at least prior to January 2014.

Based on these data it might be argued, that Ireland and Italy have much less or even no reason to denounce ‘welfare tourism’ as a problem and to curb welfare access for migrants compared to the other four countries in the sample for two reasons. First, they have become much less attractive apparently for migrants in general (not only from within the EU) than the other four (NB: In France, both emigration and immigration have been increasing). Second, due to the rather sharp increases in emigration by their own nationals, they might have an increasing interest in the eligibility of these migrants for other countries’ welfare programmes, rather than having these emigrants return in case of e.g. unemployment and relying on their home welfare system. In fact, while net emigration in Italy may still be much lower than in Ireland, the destinations of Italian citizens are primarily other European countries such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland and France (ISTAT 2013). For reasons of completeness, however, it must be noted that in the case of Ireland, the second aspect of this potential national interest cannot directly translate into a vote-seeking incentive, since Irish citizens residing outside their country are not allowed to vote in Ireland during European elections (Bux 2015). This does not lessen the potential effect of the first argument, nor does it preclude indirect effects of either friends and relatives taking emigrants’ interests into account or politicians portraying themselves as generally ‘fighting for our people abroad’.

While thus there is at least some variation in terms of potential ‘welfare hosts’ and ‘welfare tourists’, it might further be considered, in how far there are differences between the host countries due to the varying degrees of ‘generosity’ of their welfare systems. As I point out with regard to some possible ways of operationalising this generosity, however, the complexity of national welfare systems means that such differences can hardly be operationalised in a valid manner. Given this complexity, such differences in generosity arguably *should not* be taken into account, because neither voters, nor welfare tourists, nor, for the most part, political actors will actually be able to estimate exactly how generous any national system really is. This is all the more true since the aforementioned legal uncertainty hovers above any national measure meant to reduce the risk of welfare tourism.

Arguably, the easiest measure of generosity would consist in the proportion of the GDP spent on social protection. Following Eurostat, the list for 2011 would be led by Denmark, followed by France, the Netherlands, Belgium and – surprisingly – Greece, with Sweden following only considerably later, and the UK somewhat below the EU average. Noteworthy, for 2010 (when the crisis started in Greece), the list would have looked rather different, however, except for the two leading positions (Eurostat 2016a). It thus appears that this measure is very much subject to economic cycles, rather than being a good indication of generosity of welfare systems.

Indeed, Gosta Esping-Andersen in his seminal work on “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990b) has already criticised the then widespread usage of social expenditure statistics as a measure of welfare generosity, as this measure hardly contains any indication of the quality of the welfare provided. Instead, he categorised welfare systems by their degree of providing de-commodification and social stratification. The former concept refers to the capacity of welfare systems to make citizens

independent of market-based income, while the latter captures the extent to which welfare regimes serve as a tool for redistribution. With regard to the generosity of welfare systems, the former measure is certainly more revealing. Based on data from the 1980s, he arrived at the de-commodification ranking displayed in Table 8.

Table 8: De-commodification scores according to Esping-Andersen (EU only)

| country | pensions | sickness | unemployment | overall score |
|----------------|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|
| Ireland | 6,7 | 8,3 | 8,3 | 23,3 |
| United Kingdom | 8,5 | 7,7 | 7,2 | 23,4 |
| Italy | 9,6 | 9,4 | 5,1 | 24,1 |
| France | 12 | 9,2 | 6,3 | 27,5 |
| Germany | 8,5 | 11,3 | 7,9 | 27,7 |
| Finland | 14 | 10 | 5,2 | 29,2 |
| Austria | 11,9 | 12,5 | 6,7 | 31,1 |
| Belgium | 15 | 8,8 | 8,6 | 32,4 |
| Netherlands | 10,8 | 10,5 | 11,1 | 32,4 |
| Denmark | 15 | 15 | 8,1 | 38,1 |
| Sweden | 17 | 15 | 7,1 | 39,1 |
| Mean | 10,7 | 9,2 | 7,1 | 27,2 |
| S.D. | 3,4 | 4 | 1,9 | 7,7 |

Among the Member States of the EU, the UK and Ireland would be classified as ‘liberal’ welfare regimes, Italy, France and Germany would be considered as examples of the ‘conservative’ type, Denmark and Sweden as ‘social democratic’, whereas Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria would fall in-between the last two types. Following this approach, there would be quite some variation among the six countries listed above, albeit arguably there could be more of it if one of the Scandinavian countries were included.

While this variation in the type of welfare regime is important in terms of national traditions that might still shape what is perceived ‘normal’ in a given country, there is a problem with using Esping-Andersen’s concept of de-commodification with regard to welfare generosity *for migrants*, as is noted by Morissens and Sainsbury (2005): Migrants usually have not been part of the labour force before arriving in a host country. The concept of de-commodification as used by Esping-Andersen, however, also takes into account the generosity towards those who, after a long period of employment (and thus often contributions to an insurance scheme) only then become unemployed. Yet to those who have not paid into the system, often only the non-contributory social minimum income schemes are available. If these are compared across Europe, then the UK – as a liberal country – scores remarkably high, second only to Luxemburg, while Sweden as a social democratic case is only about half as generous (cf. Giorgi and Pellizzari 2006, Table A3).

Morissens and Sainsbury, in their own work, measure generosity in terms of the effectiveness of welfare states for migrants, that is, they compare the percentages of migrants living above and below the poverty line. Based on data from the Luxemburg Income Study, Sweden should be most attractive to

migrants, as 88.2 per cent of them live above the poverty line there, compared to only 62.4 per cent in the United States. However, the United Kingdom would again appear as a rather generous welfare destination, while Denmark with 63.6 per cent does only slightly better than the US (ibid., 2005, p. 644). The problem with using this indicator is, however, that it does not say anything about welfare access, especially not for intra-EU migrants.

A study conducted by request of the European Commission by Juravle et al. (2013) aimed at “fact finding” with regard to the possibilities for and experiences with welfare tourism in the Member States. Since it was focused on economically non-active intra-EU migrants and their chances of obtaining healthcare as well as so-called special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCB), it might appear closer to what would be needed in order to classify the various Member States in the sample by their ‘generosity’ in the present context. Their findings suggest, for example, that Austria spends only relatively small amounts on SNCBs for intra-EU migrants.

Indeed, the study is certainly *closer* to what would be required for the present purposes, but it is eventually insufficient for a number of reasons. First of all, the data on intra-EU migrants actually receiving SNCBs is characterised by many gaps, and numbers are lacking for the UK, for instance (Juravle et al. 2013, 81–83), not to mention comparable data on the money actually spent on these purposes. Second, the study focuses on SNCBs as listed in EU legislation (Annex of Regulation 883/2004/EC and Regulation 465/2012/EU), falling into the wider categories of old-age, unemployment and disability benefits (ibid. 2013, 3–7). It is not easy to see, for instance, why the Austrian *Mindestsicherung* (basic subsistence) (see European Commission) is not included, albeit it would seem subject to similar conditions as the German “basic subsistence costs jobseekers [sic]”, for instance. This also means that the *Mindestsicherung* payments are not included in the numbers for Austrian SNCB recipients. Third, the focus on SNCBs for economically non-active migrants is a rather narrow focus that includes only the most obvious forms of what might indeed be called welfare tourism. Payments like the Austrian *Mindestsicherung* or its German counterpart can, however, also be received by migrants having just a very low income, which means that they might well be working but will not be contributing to the system. The same applies to migrants having worked for a short period of time only that would not suffice to make contributions equalling later benefits. It also means that more sophisticated forms of welfare tourism are not accounted for. In sum, therefore, it would not seem reasonable to rank the countries in the sample based on this study, neither on the data they provide in terms of numbers of SNCB-receiving intra-EU migrants nor based on an index one might construct based on the availability of the various kinds of SNCBs.

Beyond the aforementioned study, Austria may again serve as a case in point for the general arguments made earlier in terms of legal uncertainty applying even where national governments have tried to tighten the rules on welfare access for intra-EU migrants already before January 2014. Indeed, Austria had changed some rules on welfare eligibility, which is why it is frequently reported by the Austrian media that welfare tourism is not possible in Austria, especially with regard to the *Mindestsicherung* scheme mentioned above (Hierländer and Böhm 2014; Oswald 2014). It has also been noted by the Austrian Court of Auditors, for instance, that the actual implementation of these rules is fraud with difficulty due to

its complexity (Ettinger 2014). In addition, the stricter rules on a particular Austrian pensions scheme (“Ausgleichszulage”) meant to guarantee a minimum standard of living in old-age and in principle also to be added on top of non-Austrian pensions, were challenged before the European Court of Justice. The Court decided in its judgement on the *Brey* case, that it would first have to be proven that the payment constituted an ‘unreasonable burden’ (Kommenda and Ettinger 2013). In other words, sustaining just the kind of legal uncertainty mentioned earlier and, as some commentators saw it, calling into question the whole package meant to avoid welfare tourism (Kommenda and Ettinger 2013).

By way of concluding this subsection, it can thus be argued that the only meaningful classification of the countries in the sample is

- a. by their status as potential host countries for intra-EU migrants requesting welfare on the one hand, or as less attractive destinations and countries of origin of intra-EU migrants on the other hand and
- b. by their welfare regime as identified by Esping-Andersen, but mainly in terms of a national tradition shaping citizens’ perceptions of the welfare right kind of welfare policy, rather than as indications of their generosity.

Table 9 summarises the respective classification.

Table 9: Overview of country selection and case-related characteristics

| country | welfare regime | host or tourist country |
|---------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| Germany | conservative | host |
| Austria | (quasi-)social democratic | host |
| France | conservative | host |
| Italy | conservative | mixed |
| UK | liberal | host |
| Ireland | liberal | mixed |

Observable implications of earlier theoretical approaches

Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I will first discuss which predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties’ framing strategies based on the extant theoretical literature I have reviewed in detail in the same chapter. I will start with the more general theories of conflict in EU politics, before turning to the EP-specific ones and eventually to the explanations provided by Treib on conflict concerning EU social policy.

Marks and Wilson’s (2000) **cleavage approach** would assume that the national parties – as represented in the EP here – would simply stick with their ideological ‘prism’, as they consider voter preferences on European integration to be insufficiently specified. From this rather straightforward perspective, what would the consequences look like at macro- and micro-level? Logically, if all parties acted according to their respective ideological ‘prism’, the overall structure of conflict would be expected to be ideological. Before the background of the ideological profiles of the various party families, it is now

possible to identify the links between these ideologies and the five frames identified above: Given the reference to national identity and the general anti-immigrant tone of frame F1, this would be the choice for extreme Right parties in the sample. RWP parties would also make use of this frame, but even more so of the other frames involving restrictions on migrants, so as to avoid any appearance of outright racism. F4 would serve them to warn of ‘mass immigration’, while F3 would provide a tool for economic reasoning against welfare for migrants. Unsurprisingly, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties would equally identify welfare tourism and mass immigration as a problem, due to the challenges it poses to the existing social order, which would make them call for restrictions of various kinds. Hence, conservative frame F4 would clearly suit them best. Liberals should frame the issue mainly in terms of F3, arguably mixed with some F5 reasoning where they are generally open to welfare spending (as e.g. in case of the Liberal Democrats). Even the more Right-leaning Liberal parties should not be expected to make use of frame F4, to the contrary: numerical restrictions on free movement run counter to individual freedom and do not follow from economic reasoning. Social Democratic ideology might have changed in the last decades, but even New Left policies were still based on the normative claim of saving the welfare state as a whole. As long as this is not threatened by free movement including welfare for migrants, they will not see a problem, and hence they would use frame F5. By contrast, post-nationalist Greens should favour frame F2 as a way of opposing discrimination based on nationality, as should far Left parties due to their lasting preference for welfare extension and international solidarity. In terms of framing strategies, parties would be expected to favour a uni-dimensional, or, as I have renamed it based with reference to exactly this cleavage approach, ‘prism’ strategy.

An opposite prediction would be made based on Marks’s (2004) **distribution model**. According to this model, the main determinant of the structure of conflict are distributional effects that can be either intra- or cross-national. In the present case, there could potentially be cross-national distribution but arguably no intra-national one. Hence, one would expect the structure of conflict to be entirely territorial. Consequently, parties from Ireland and Italy to call for non-discrimination and full access to welfare for (not least their) EU citizens abroad (frame F2), whereas parties from Germany, Austria, the UK, and France should deny welfare access to migrants while making use of their contributions as workers (frame F3), or at least should in some way or another avoid any instances of welfare tourism by restricting migrants’ rights and/or access to their countries (frame F4 or F1). Strategically, this means that parties will defect from their respective ideology if this ideology contrasts with the national interest in terms of cross-national distribution.

Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) is often cited as theory stressing the predominance of domestically formed, national interests in EU politics. As I have noted earlier (see Chapter 2), Moravcsik’s theory is actually more nuanced, acknowledging that uncertainty of distributional effects allows governments to follow their ideological predilections. Noteworthy, by ideology he mainly means nationalist vs. federalist thinking as captured by frames F1 and F2. The more nuanced accounts included in frame F3 and F5 in particular would be of little importance. Similarly, **postfunctionalism** (Hooghe and Marks 2009) would see uncertainty at work. According to this theory, uncertainty would

allow RWP parties in particular to make the issue a matter of ‘identity’ by means of cues and frames. Once more, it would be difficult to predict the differences between parties building their arguments on so-called inclusive national identities, that is, conceptions of identity that are neither pan-European nor exclusively national.

Among the EP-specific theories, the **3G2P theory** (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) would probably expect the structure of conflict to be ideological due to the high cohesion of EPGs, which in turn is mainly the result of MEPs’ EP-internal office-seeking efforts. Since EPGs are largely ideology-based, the usage of frames would be very much as predicted also by the cleavage approach, for instance. Defections would be few, but most likely wherever there is strong control by the national party. From Ringe’s (2010) **PPC approach** it would follow that experts in the EP’s committees are able to shape the structure of conflict, which at times might mean that they respond to constituency pressures (i.e. national interest). A prediction for the structure of conflict will be difficult to make based on case characteristics. At any case, however, it should make a difference whether a party disposes of an own expert welfare for migrants or not. By contrast, the **bicameral theory** (Costello and Thomson 2014) would argue that, on a salient matter such as welfare tourism, national governments will lobby their home country MEPs to favour policies in line with the national interest and to defect from the EPG line if applicable. Accordingly, one should expect a territorialised structure of conflict on the issue, with frames used by parties in the same way as predicted by the distribution model.

For his theoretical argument on cleavage structures concerning **EU social policy**, Treib (2010) draws on a bunch of theories, many of which are included above. Thereby, he arrives at the expectation that the conflict on EU social policy will be primarily but not exclusively ideological. His reasoning is that parties behave in line with their ideology mainly due to intra-national distributional effects of social policy (at large). At the same time, actors that are linked to the national governments (including MEPs from the respective parties) will be more strongly focusing on the national interest, due to their stronger exposure in terms of electoral performance.

Table 10: Overview of expectations and causal narratives based on extant theories

| Theory | Predicted structure of conflict | Causal narrative |
|--|--|--|
| <u>General theories on conflict in EU politics</u> | | |
| Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 2000) | ideological | Parties' domestic habits, lack of citizen preferences on EU issues |
| Distribution model (Marks 2004) | territorial | Distributional effects (here: cross-national only) |
| Liberal intergovernmentalism | ideological (pro/anti-EU) | Uncertainty allowing for ideological leeway |
| Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009) | ideological (pro/anti-EU) | Uncertainty allowing for identity-based cueing and framing |
| <u>EP-specific theories</u> | | |
| 3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 2007) | predominantly ideological (by EPG) | Office-seeking within the EP, some defection due to vote-seeking |
| PPC approach (Ringe 2010) | ? | Expertise within EP committees |
| bicameral theory (Costello & Thomson 2014) | territorial | Lobbying by national governments in line with national interests |
| <u>Policy-specific theoretical arguments</u> | | |
| Treib 2010 | predominantly ideological, some territorialisation | Domestic Left-Right tradition on social policy, Government parties representing national interest more strongly due to stronger vote-seeking pressures |

Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation

According to the theory of territorialisation, the structure of conflict regarding the issue of welfare access for intra-EU migrants would be expected to be predominantly ideological. This contrasts with some of the extant approaches, but overlaps with others. Yet, even with regard to those theories equally predicting an ideological structure of conflict, there are differences in the micro-level reasoning that can be contrasted and will have slightly diverging observable implications in terms of framing. In other words, due to the usage of Policy Frame Analysis, it will be possible not only to distinguish the causal narratives included in the theory of territorialisation from the extant approaches, but also to formulate diverging observable implications.

First of all, unlike the cleavage approach, the theory of territorialisation (ToT) holds that the reason for the ideological structure of conflict is *not* uncertainty over citizens' preferences on EU matters, because to a considerable extent, these are known meanwhile due to politicisation: at the most basic level, it would seem certain that most citizens would reject a policy that runs counter to 'the' national interest. Second, unlike Treib (2010) the ideological structure can still be accounted for by the ToT, even if there are no intra-national distributional effects worth mentioning. Rather, in line with liberal intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism, the ToT would expect uncertainty to provide the leeway to frame the issue in ideological terms. At the same time, the ToT expects the role of ideology under uncertainty to be more complex than one of simply dividing actors in terms of pro- or anti-Europeanism.

What does this mean in observable terms? At a broad level, each party will choose the frame that fits the core tenets of its respective ideology best, in the same manner as was pointed out for the cleavage approach. The difference between the line of argument of the ToT and the cleavage approach

will become apparent in two ways, however: first, due to issue-related uncertainty, much of the debate will be centred on problem definition rather than policy preferences. This will be particularly pronounced for the parties struggling to avoid a potential goal conflict. In the present case, this essentially concerns the parties of the Left in the countries potentially ‘hosting’ welfare tourists. For on the one hand, the policies limiting welfare access for migrants in some way or another (included in F1, F3, F4) would seem to serve the potential national interest in case welfare tourism led to substantial cross-national distribution, hence would be promising in terms of vote-seeking. On the other hand, the respective justifications behind these policies are at odds with the norms of Left-wing parties’ ideologies. Uncertainty over outcomes allows these parties, however, to challenge the problem definition and causal narratives in those frames, without necessarily spelling out the policy consequences of their own ideology-driven reasoning. In sum, what will be observed is that these parties in goal conflict will use the frame that overlaps most with their ideology, but will disproportionately refer to the constitutive and cognitive dimensions of these frames and less so to the policy dimension. Noteworthy, there would be no goal conflict and hence no need for framing the issue in exactly this manner if either citizens would still be indifferent to EU politics (i.e. if there was no politicisation as assumed in the cleavage approach) or if EU social policy was all about intra-national distribution as a matter of principle (as assumed by Treib). Second, rather than referring to one frame only, most parties will moderately mix their lines of argument in such a way as to reach out to a larger electorate. In other words, the widespread use of blurring strategies might be an additional indication of parties’ vote-seeking efforts, something which the cleavage approach would not expect.

In contrast to the 3G2P approach, the ToT will expect parties to use the same or similar frames independent of their EPG membership. For example, the UK Conservatives in the ECR should use the same line of argument as the German CDU/CSU and other members of the EPP. Contrasting the ToT with Ringe’s PPC is more difficult, since almost all of the parties in the sample are represented in at least one of the EP committees for civil liberties (LIBE) and employment and social affairs (EMPL) and accordingly might possess some degree of in-house expertise on Europeanised welfare. Unlike the bicameral theory, the ToT would not expect any national party delegation whose home party is not part of the government to give in to governmental lobbying (and to defect as a result), as there is no causal link between these lobbying efforts and the three party goals on which the ToT is built. Consequently, one should not expect national party delegations who are in opposition at home to fall in line with their government.

A possible reason for territorial influences might in principle be the type of welfare regime prevailing in a country. According to the ToT, this has less to do with adaptation costs (as Treib would argue) and more with the welfare regime acting as a kind of ‘national tradition’ that shapes peoples’ ways of thinking about an issue beyond its actual distributional effects. Since in the present case, however, the various ideologies show rather clear overlaps with the respective policy frames, there is little reason to assume that the parties give up their policy-seeking goals for the sake of national traditions. Any influence of welfare regime types on framing is thus expected at the margins at most, in the sense that the regimes considered particular generous (social democratic) or strict (liberal) might shape perceptions.

4.4 Results and discussion

This section presents the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) and discusses them with regard to the extant theories and the theory of territorialisation (ToT) contrasted above. It can be shown that the structure of conflict, as expressed numerically in the territorialisation index, is mainly ideological indeed. This would seem to support the ToT rather than the distribution model. However, Irish and Italian parties were found to behave rather passively, i.e. barely issuing any statements on the issue. The few parties from these countries participating in the debate, however, choose to frame the issue in just the same manner as their ideological counterparts abroad. Since frame choice seems related to ideology rather than to EPG membership, the ToT appears more accurate here than the 3G2P approach. Moreover, the debate appears to evolve in a much more differentiated fashion than in terms of pro- vs. anti-EU attitudes, especially since the allegedly Eurosceptic far Left is the main defender of non-discrimination, which speaks against liberal intergovernmental or postfunctional lines of argument. At the micro-level, two defections are noted which are hard to account for theoretically – both using extant theories and the ToT alike. A closer look at these two individual cases reveals, however, that this might be due to a partial violation of one of the scope conditions of the ToT. Nonetheless, all other micro-level results can be explained in detail by the ToT. For example, the widespread use of blurring in terms mixing several frames, in combination with emphases on frame dimensions forming the justification, appear to indicate that MEPs are aware of politicisation of the issue and the resulting vote-seeking pressures. Regarding subsuming, it can be noted that parties belonging to the far Right like to quote other actors arguing against welfare tourism for their own purposes, choosing actors who are comparatively unsuspecting in terms of racism (Conservatives, economists, migrants). A comparison of these results to the recorded votes on the free movement resolution passed in January 2014 shows very similar lines of conflict, but also shows how majority requirements and related tactical considerations may shape ‘conflict’ as expressed in votes. It further lends external validity to the idea that the passivity of Irish and Italian parties in the debate is not an indication of a hidden territorial conflict.

Case-specific data-set and reliability

For the sake of analysing the framing efforts of national party delegations from the six focus countries, 66 press releases or other passages of text (e.g. manifestos) could be collected, resulting in 919 codings in terms of quasi-sentences attributed to a particular frame dimension. 24 parties or their delegations decided to express and justify their policy preferences via these channels, out of 34 parties whose websites were scraped manually or automatically. Accordingly, the parties issued 2.75 press releases on the issue on average including an average amount of 38.3 codings per party. The reliability test conducted on the case-specific codebook (based on the above identification of five policy frames) produced results ranging from acceptable to excellent for both the distinction between frames and between dimensions (see Table 11). At the same time, it must be noted that the reliability scores for this codebook were inferior to those achieved for the other two codebooks employed in this study. This might be due to a general training effect among the coders across cases, but also to a potential overspecification of categories (frames): If coders would have had to distinguish only those frames expressing a certain lenience towards migrants and those implying more restrictive approaches, the reliability score in terms of Krippendorff's *alpha* is 0.844 in test round 1 already. It should further be noted that disagreements among coders were strongest for the press releases of the Front National and UKIP included in the test sample, which might be an indication of subsuming, that is, a party using arguments from the pre-identified frames in innovative ways. This first hint at subsuming is discussed further below.

Table 11: Reliability scores for the codebook on Europeanised welfare

| Level: Round: | frames | | dimension | |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| % | 75.30 | 87.50 | 68.24 | 82.50 |
| <i>kappa</i> | <u>0.677</u> | 0.828 | <u>0.606</u> | 0.786 |
| <i>alpha</i> | <u>0.677</u> | 0.829 | 0.608 | <u>0.787</u> |

Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage

Table 12: Percentage of each party's statements per code (frame)

| Party | nationalist (Frame 1) | cosmopolitan (Frame 2) | liberal (Frame 3) | conservative (Frame 4) | social democratic (Frame 5) |
|------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| UK BNP | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F FN | 77.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22.6 | 0.0 |
| D NPD | 50.5 | 0.0 | 20.6 | 29.0 | 0.0 |
| F FdG | 0.0 | 97.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.2 |
| D LINKE | 0.0 | 93.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.7 |
| F Verts | 0.0 | 92.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.7 |
| IRE Greens | 0.0 | 83.3 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| UK Greens | 0.0 | 67.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 32.2 |
| D B90 | 0.0 | 61.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 38.5 |
| A SPÖ | 0.0 | 57.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 42.9 |
| D FDP | 0.0 | 15.6 | 84.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| D AfD | 0.0 | 0.0 | 51.1 | 48.9 | 0.0 |
| F UMP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| A FPÖ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| I AN | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| UK Cons | 0.0 | 2.3 | 4.5 | 93.2 | 0.0 |
| D CDU/CSU | 0.0 | 17.2 | 3.4 | 65.5 | 13.8 |
| UKIP | 25.0 | 0.0 | 31.5 | 43.5 | 0.0 |
| A ÖVP | 0.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 38.5 | 38.5 |
| UK Lib | 0.0 | 7.5 | 31.8 | 37.3 | 23.4 |
| UK Lab | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| D SPD | 0.0 | 17.9 | 0.0 | 5.1 | 76.9 |
| F PS | 0.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 75.0 |
| A Grüne | 0.0 | 31.3 | 0.0 | 6.3 | 62.5 |

Already a very brief look at the results of the Policy Frame Analysis as displayed in Table 12 seems to suggest that the overall structure of conflict is ideological: ordered according to the frame they use the most, parties from the same party family seem to cluster together. Indeed, looking closer, it turns out that 20 out of 24 parties issuing press releases (or other texts) on the question of welfare for intra-EU migrants choose frames that fit their respective ideology, while only 12 exclusively or simultaneously choose to frame in line with their supposed national interest. This results in a score of -33.33 per cent on the territorialisation index defined earlier, indicating that the structure of conflict is overwhelmingly but not

purely ideological. This overall picture largely corresponds to most of the theories discussed above, including the ToT developed in the present study, while it seems to expose the deficits of the distribution model (neglecting uncertainty) and partly already questions the power of national governments over their MEPs as expected by the bicameral theory.

Table 13: The structure of conflict on Europeanised welfare in numbers

| Parties framing in line with... | ...ideology: | ...'national interest': |
|--|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Absolute number: | 20 | 12 |
| Percentage: | 83.3 | 50 |
| Index of territorialisation: | | -33.3 |

Another striking finding in terms of broader patterns is that almost no statements on the issue could be found that were issued by Irish or Italian party delegations. In fact, the two parties whose framing strategies could be analysed, namely the Irish Green Party and the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, did only very shortly refer to the issue of free movement and welfare for migrants in their manifestos rather than in specifically issued press releases. At this point, however, any conclusion on these apparent silences would seem premature.

Zooming in closer by analysing how the parties cluster together according to their preferred frames, one finds that frame F1 is indeed used by the two extreme Right parties in the sample, namely the BNP and the NPD. Somewhat surprisingly, the Front National – which I have classified as RWP rather than extreme Right – also uses this frame frequently, even more so than the NPD. This should not, however, be calibrated as a defection for the below QCA, since I have noted that the distinction within the far Right between extremists and Right-Wing Populist families would still have to prove its empirical use. At the other end of the spectrum, namely on the far Left, frame F2 is preferred. In fact, both far Left parties making a statement on the issue (Sinn Féin and the Lista Tsipras did not) use this frame almost exclusively. So do most, but not all, Green parties: The Austrian Greens only use it in about one third of its quasi-sentences. Noteworthy, instead the Austrian Social Democrats use frame F2 predominantly, albeit not that much more than they use frame F5.

Frame F3 is used mostly by two German parties, namely the Liberal FDP and the RWP AfD. In the latter case, this is not exactly what one would expect, yet it should be noted that the AfD uses the more restrictive frame F4 almost equally often. The fact that just these two cluster together here might be due to the AfD, in its early months, was trying to establish itself as an alternative to the FDP and therefore was still relying on economic arguments included in frame F3, only slowly moving to more explicit anti-migrants stances. More surprising is the fact that the British Liberal Democrats use frame F4 predominantly rather than F3, a result which would neither seem to fit its ideology nor the type of welfare regime. This defection arguably requires further explanation.

As expected, frame F4 is used by all Conservative and Christian Democratic parties. Similarly, one would expect RWP parties to draw on this frame rather than the more openly anti-immigrant frame F1, which holds for most of them, with the notable aforementioned exception of the FN. Interestingly,

the Italian Alleanza Nazionale is making use of this frame as well, although a purely distributional account of conflict in European politics would have expected this party to be less strict on welfare access for migrants. In fact, while the respective passage of its manifesto is very brief, it says quite clearly that the Citizens' Rights Directive should be interpreted as harshly as possible, such that those who after three months of residence do not dispose of an employment contract are to be expelled immediately³⁰ – although the same fate might in principle await Italian emigrants. However, it must be noted also that the Austrian ÖVP uses frame F5 exactly as much as it uses frame F4, and since it adds to that the even more migrant-friendly frame F2, it should be considered defecting from the rest of its party family even. Frame F5 otherwise is the expected main choice of most Social Democratic parties, except for the Austrian member of this family, who as was mentioned already, is replaced here by the Green party from this country.

In sum, at the macro-level of the structure of conflict, the results of the PFA seem to fit the theoretical framework of the present study quite well. This even applies to the parties from Italy and Ireland, albeit most of them do not take a position on the issue, which is why this aspect should be taken up again when comparing the results of the PFA to the roll-call votes on the resolution on free movement from January 2014. In general, however, not only do most parties cluster together ideologically, they also use the exact same frames that would seem to fit their respective ideology best.

Nevertheless, albeit the observable expectations for the RWP and extreme Right parties was left rather unspecified for reasons related to the current dynamics within this part of the ideological spectrum, some findings for these parties certainly deserve particular notice with regard to the discussion on their strategies. More importantly, four parties did not primarily use the frame most in line with their ideology: The Austrian Greens, the Austrian Social Democrats, the Austrian Christian Democrats, and the British Liberal Democrats. Moving beyond the strictly numerical criterion for operationalisation, it shall be briefly discussed in how far these four should be considered 'defecting'.

In case of the former two, namely the SPÖ and the Austrian Greens, it might seem overrated to speak of defection: After all, those two parties are using just those two frames that are generally highly prominent on the centre Left and are combined there in various fashions, with Green parties usually favouring the rather generous frame F2 and the Social Democrats the at least rather lenient frame F5. In other words, regarding the Austrian Left, the only difference is that the roles are reversed. In case of the latter two, namely the LibDems and the ÖVP, one might argue that the degree of their defection, at least in quantitative terms, is not as high either. Inasmuch as these two were considered 'defecting', the deviance from the theory of territorialisation is still limited. Nevertheless, since it is quite surprising to find the British Liberal Democrats arguing for restrictions on immigration and the Austrian ÖVP much more

³⁰ "Fratelli d'Italia –Alleanza Nazionale chiede inoltre la piena applicazione della direttiva 38/2004 che prevede l'espulsione degli immigrati comunitari, nomadi compresi, che entro tre mesi dal loro arrivo in uno Stato membro non siano in grado di dimostrare di avere un regolare contratto di lavoro e risorse lecite sufficienti per il proprio sostentamento."

lax in its analysis of the situation than its sister parties abroad, the defection of these two parties certainly deserves further investigation.

Micro-level: Analysis of defection

Based on the foregoing results of the PFA and their discussion at the macro level, it was argued that only two parties out of 24 should be considered defecting. This very small degree of variation in terms of the outcome is, of course, not an ideal starting point for a QCA. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here to examine, whether the defection by these two parties still follows a common pattern that could be explained by any of the extant theories mentioned earlier or by the ToT.

Clearly, very simple explanations, relying national interest or ideology only, do not apply, nor do combinations of the two: While the national interests of Austria and the UK might be similar – given their potential role as ‘host’ countries for welfare tourists – no other party from these and other host countries defects. As for ideology, defined as sets of ideas shared by the *familles spirituelles*, it seems appropriate regarding this particular issue to merely distinguish party families by their categorisation as Left or Right. After all, those parties considering ‘welfare tourism’ as a problem will do so because they ideologically consider either welfare spending or immigration as problematic (or both) – i.e. the Right, and only those who favour both will not see a problem – i.e. the Left. In this respect, Liberal Democrats and ÖVP would even be counted in different camps, as one can attribute the Liberal Democrats to the ‘Left’ based on their pro-immigration and pro-welfare stances, while the ÖVP should generally be considered a party of the Right.

As a first extension to a basic explanation founded on national interest and ideology alone, one might add the condition of government participation, given that some of the extant theories discussed before consider it relevant: governments are taken to be the representatives of ‘the’ national interest. Indeed, both the ÖVP and the LibDems did participate in the respective national governments at the time. Nevertheless, as it stands, the condition of government participation (“gov”) does not help to explain the defections, but rather involves contradictory configurations, as the following Truth Table shows. In fact, there is nothing to minimise even, that is, there is no possibility of identifying one or even separate but consistent paths towards defection before this background. Being part of the government could, at best, be considered a necessary condition for defection, since this is a feature both defecting parties share. Yet, this statement should be taken with a pinch of salt, because due to the relation of the number of defecting parties and the number of parties in government, the coverage of this necessary condition is quite low (0.286).

Table 14: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + 'gov' condition, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case id |
|------------|-------------|-----|-----------|---|
| Left | hostCountry | gov | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP, A FPOE, UKIP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, UK Greens, D B90, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | C | A SPOE, UK Lib, D SPD, F PS |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | UK Cons, D CDU/CSU, A OEVV |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |

One might argue, that it might not necessarily be the party delegation leading the national government who defect themselves, but rather other parties from the same country who are lobbied by them, as the bicameral theory by Costello and Thomson (see above) holds. Clearly this does not apply to all parties in Austria or the UK. Inductively, one might still take note of the fact that both the LibDems and the ÖVP are junior partners in a coalition, who might hence be pressured by the larger partner. As the below Truth Table shows, however, a contradictory configuration would still remain due to the non-defection of the German SPD, so that the complex solution derived is merely a description of the ÖVP.

Table 15: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + 'gov' condition refined, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|--|
| Left | hostCountry | coalition_jun | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP, A FPOE, UK Cons, D CDU/CSU, UKIP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, UK Greens, D B90, A SPOE, UK Lab, F PS, A Gruene |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A OEVV |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | C | UK Lib, D SPD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |

Table 16: Complex solution Europeanised welfare; basic + 'gov' refined, outcome: defection

| Complex solution | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Solution terms ³¹ | Cases covered |
| left * HOSTCOUNTRY * COALITION_JUN | A OEVV |

If any concrete hypothesis concerning defection can be derived from Ringe's PPC approach at all, then one would argue that disposing of an expert MEP who sits in the committee responsible is a necessary

³¹ Upper-case/lower-case notation is used throughout for the presentation of solutions terms, with the upper-case letters indicating presence, lower-case letters indication the absence of a condition. As usual, '*' stands for the logical AND, '+' for the logical OR, cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012, 42-55.

condition for making the independent decision of defecting as a national party delegation. With regard to welfare tourism, expertise might be found in the committees for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and for Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). This also means, however, that almost all parties in the sample (inasmuch as they already had seats in the EP) have access to such expertise. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the coverage of the expertise condition (“expert”) is even lower than that of government participation (0.100), and adding the condition of expertise in general does not produce any solution formula either. In fact, the inconsistencies are even more significant here.

Table 17: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + ‘expert’, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|-------------|--------|-----------|--|
| Left | hostCountry | expert | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, D NPD, D AfD |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | F FN, D FDP, F UMP, A FPOE, UK Cons, D CDU/CSU, UKIP, A OEVP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | C | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, UK Greens, D B90, A SPOE, UK Lib, UK Lab, D SPD, F PS, A Gruene |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | I AN |

What could be explained by means of the Theory of Territorialisation, however, is defection along the lines of national traditions such as welfare regimes, especially under uncertainty. Indeed, the parties defecting do not come from countries with the conservative type of welfare, which might be considered either as the middle ground between two more extreme poles in terms of welfare generosity in general or as the potentially most restrictive type when it comes welfare for migrants. Inductively, the former would seem to matter more here, since the LibDems from the UK with its liberal welfare regime are more restrictive, whilst the ÖVP from Austria with its quasi-social democratic welfare regime are more generous than their sister parties. Since, however, none of the other parties from these countries defects, contradictory configurations remain equally problematic as with the extant approaches here. The national tradition (“WoWNotCons”) also fares badly in terms of coverage as a necessary condition (0.182).

Table 18: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT based conditions, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|--|
| Left | hostCountry | WoWNotCons | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | UK BNP, A FPOE, UK Cons, UKIP, A OEVP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP, D CDU/CSU |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90, D SPD, F PS |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | C | UK Greens, A SPOE, UK Lib, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |

Even if all conditions are added simultaneously, which dramatically increases the number of configurations covering just one or a few cases as well as the number of missing but logically possible combinations, contradictory configurations remain. In sum, the ToT does neither seem to provide a better account of the two defections nor does it do worse.

Table 19: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|----------------|-------------|-----|--------|-----------|---|
| Left | WoW NotCons | hostCountry | gov | expert | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN, D FDP, F UMP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D NPD, D AfD |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK Greens, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | C | A SPOE, UK Lib |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A FPOE, UKIP |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | C | UK Cons, A OEVP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | I AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D SPD, F PS |

At this point, therefore, the following interpretation of the PFA results seems appropriate. On the one hand, one might defend the ToT based on the results as they are, arguing that the defections were not as

harsh, since both LibDems and ÖVP use the frames they are supposed to use for ideological reasons almost equally often as they use the ones at odds with their ideology. Hence one could conclude that the ToT not only explained the overall structure of conflict rather well, but also accounted for the micro-level decisions in terms of defection, as there were no ‘real’ defections. The analysis of the further framing strategies might then lend additional support. Alternatively, one might turn to a purely qualitative analysis of the cases left unaccounted. This seems appropriate not only because none of the other theories would seem to offer a better explanation, but also because handling just two unexplained cases in this manner appears feasible.

Going back to the data itself, it turns out that the defections at least in these cases can be related back to the parties’ participation in government – albeit, as I argue, in a manner that is still compatible with the ToT. Concerning the Liberal Democrats, it can then be noted that most of the codings attributed to the Conservative frame F4 (and hence not in line with the LibDem ideology) resulted from the fact that a Liberal Democratic MEP cited a speech by Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister at the time, in one of his press releases. In this speech, Clegg defended the government’s new immigration policy, that is, the policy of the coalition with the Conservative Party. All other press releases were dominated by the Liberal frame (F3), mixed with the Social Democratic frame (F5), which is exactly what would be expected from a comparatively Left-leaning Liberal party in ideological terms. This clearly puts the ‘defection’ in a different light.

The ÖVP recognises that welfare tourism may be a problem in principle (F4), but will not be in Austria given that the measures in place will be sufficient (F5) – measures which the coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ has passed together in 2011. Noteworthy, the Austrian ministry for social affairs, which arguably has the best insight into actual data as well as national-level legal expertise concerning welfare spending for intra-EU migrants, is controlled by the Social Democrats. In this respect, the case of welfare tourism might then be bordering the scope conditions of the ToT, in that the technical expertise on national welfare residing with national governments would explain the impact of the government participation condition. Indeed, this explanation could be extended partly also to the Liberal Democrats, in that they did not control the ministry of social affairs either. Consequently, one might now integrate this insight back into the QCA by adding a condition capturing the expertise within the EP with national-level expertise possessed by national administrations (“socaffairscontrol”). In fact, it would make sense to replace the condition on expertise within the EP by this condition, as more or less all parties in the sample have access to and that might not be of help regarding the adequacy of specific national regulations for addressing ‘welfare tourism’.

Table 20: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|----------------|-------------|-----|--------------------------|-----------|--|
| Left | WoW NotCons | hostCountry | gov | socialaffairsc ontrol | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, A FPOE, UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UK Greens, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | A OEVP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UK Lib |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D SPD, F PS |

Table 21: Complex solution Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|----------------|
| WOWNOTCONS * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * scaffairscontrol | A OEVP, UK Lib |

Integrating this condition resolves the contradiction, and it further produces a solution term that covers both defecting parties. Moreover, it is possible to interpret this formula plausibly along the lines of the ToT and its scope conditions: to the extent that technical expertise on national welfare legislation is needed and can serve to replace a merely ideological judgement under uncertainty, parties who find themselves in a governing coalition with a partner who controls this information are inclined to follow the partner and thereby ‘defect’. Indeed, if technical expertise from national administrations makes the difference, as the effect of adding the “scaffairscontrol” condition suggests, ideology should not matter – which is why the non-technical nature of policy issues is a scope condition for the ToT in the first place. One might argue further that, as the ToT would provide, this step is eased by the national tradition on welfare that might be potentially more or less generous (as a state of mind), since after all the Conservative ÖVP becomes more lenient in line with Austria’s quasi-social democratic welfare regime, while the Liberal Democrats become less generous in line with the UK’s liberal or ‘residual’ welfare regime. The latter aspect of the interpretation should be taken with a pinch of salt, however, given that the Liberal Democrats become stricter on immigration, but not so much on welfare.

In the parsimonious solution (Table 22), another of the five conditions drops out, namely the “host country” condition, provided one assumes that parties from tourist countries would behave similarly in this particular constellation of conditions. Dropping the host country condition is not entirely implausible, if social affairs expertise in these countries refers to the number of national citizens depending on the welfare within one’s own borders. Noteworthy also, among the four candidates for necessary conditions in terms of software output, the host country condition scores lowest Table 23.

Table 22: Parsimonious solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|-----------------|
| WOWNOTCONS * GOV * socaffairscontrol | A O EVP, UK Lib |
| Simplifying assumptions: Left _{0} WoWNotCons _{1} hostCountry _{0} gov _{1} socaffairscontrol _{0} + Left _{1} WoWNotCons _{1} hostCountry _{0} gov _{1} socaffairscontrol _{0} | |

Table 23: Analysis of Necessity Europeanised Welfare (inclusion score = 1.0), outcome: defection

| Condition(s) | Coverage |
|----------------------|----------|
| socialaffairscontrol | 0.100 |
| GOV | 0.286 |
| WOWNOTCONS | 0.182 |
| HOSTCOUNTRY | 0.091 |

Alternatively, one might produce an intermediate solution, using so-called direction expectations indicating indifference regarding ideology, but still assuming the host country status to matter in this constellation. Yet, unsurprisingly, there is no reduction of complexity compared to the conservative solution. As a result, then, the interpretation of the results based on the conservative solution arguably remains the most appropriate one.

Table 24: Intermediate solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|-----------------|
| WOWNOTCONS * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * socaffairscontrol | A O EVP+ UK Lib |

In sum, therefore, it can be understood why there are defections where as such the theory of territorialisation would not have expected any: Apparently, the issue of Europeanised welfare touches upon a scope condition of this theory in terms of technical expertise available in national administrations used by parties in government to make sense of the situation for themselves and to convince possible coalition partners that do not have the same information. Within its scope, however, the ToT remains valid and can account for defection at least equally well as competing theories. In addition, however, the ToT makes predictions regarding alternative strategies, whose plausibility vis-à-vis the PFA results are discussed in the next subsection.

Micro-level: further framing strategies

Starting with blurring, I now turn to further framing strategies that the various national party delegations apply when talking about welfare access for intra-EU migrants. When blurring is defined in the widest sense, i.e. just as any mixing of frames, it becomes clear that this strategy is used by a lot of parties, which is an important finding as such: This, as was argued above, might well indicate the impact of politicisation, as parties might try to appeal to a wider range of voters or at least make sure to cover all components of their core electorate, by including various ideological and territorial focal points.

However, when making the first analytical step in a QCA, namely producing a Truth Table, the result includes no less than five contradictions. Arguably, reducing them by changing the number of conditions does not appear very promising, since it would shift the balance of logically possible combinations in such a way that any reduction would require an unacceptable number of simplifying assumptions. The same would apply to shifting towards a multi-value QCA: while it would allow for distinguishing the various party families beyond dichotomisation, its potential for minimisation is generally limited (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlusser 2009), so that the result would hardly be more than a description. In this case, one might just as well look at some general, albeit non-deterministic patterns on blurring in the wider sense by means of Table 25 including the raw results first, and then solve the contradictions by considering blurring in a stricter sense, i.e. combining frames that cross the potential distributional line between ‘hosts and tourists’.

Table 25: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: blurring (wide definition)

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|----------------|-------------|-----|--------------------------|-------------------|--|
| Left | WoW NotCons | hostCountry | gov | socialaffairsc ontrol | blurring _wide | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK BNP, A FPOE, UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK Greens, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | A OEVp |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UK Lib |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | C | D SPD, F PS |

First of all, it can be noted then that there is a lot of blurring, apparently, on the far Right, with the British National Party forming an exception with its purely nationalistic stance. Another pattern is arguably found among Green and Socialist parties, who mix the frames F2 and F5 to varying degrees, which was used as an argument earlier for considering the Austrian parties of the centre Left as not defecting. Moreover, the defecting parties, the Liberal Democrats and the ÖVP, still partly use the frames they would prefer ideologically speaking.

Focusing only on blurring that cuts across the potential distributional line between ‘hosts and tourists’, there is just one national party delegation that is found doing so without going as far as defecting, namely the German CDU/CSU. Next to the expected frame F4, the party makes use of the frames F2 and F5. Interestingly, no contradictory configurations appear if blurring is defined in this strict sense and if the same conditions are used to explain it (see Table 26). Arguably, the fact that the German Social Democrats hold the social affairs ministry within this coalition has influenced the CDU/CSU, but since there is no national tradition to ease a defection, and since in addition the SPD is only the junior partner, the party limits itself to blurring.

Table 26: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: blurring (strict definition)

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|----------------|-------------|-----|--------------------------|---------------------|--|
| Left | WoW NotCons | hostCountry | gov | socialaffairsc ontrol | blurring _strict | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK BNP, A FPOE, UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK Greens, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | A OEVP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UK Lib |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | C | D SPD, F PS |

Table 27: Complex solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: blurring (strict definition)

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|---------------|
| left * wownotcons * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * socaffairscontrol | D CDU/CSU |

Uni-dimensional framing is most systematically found on the fringes, namely with the aforementioned BNP and the far Left parties in the sample. This does not, however, serve as a general piece of evidence for niche party arguments, since many Green parties and RWP parties are not as radical and ‘pure’ in their line of argument. The fringe parties might not want to lose the more radical ones of their supporters, and in this sense might be reluctant to blur their position. The German NPD, however, does not follow this pattern. Finally, there is no discernible difference between ‘host’ and ‘tourist’ countries, even though the two parties from tourist countries (the Irish Greens and the Italian Alleanza Nazionale) both use uni-dimensional strategies. After all, the Austrian FPÖ or the French Greens frame the issue in just the same manner as their counterparts from ‘tourist’ countries.

Table 28: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: uni-dimensional ‘prism’

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------|----------------|-------------|-----|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| Left | WoW NotCons | hostCountry | gov | socialaffairsc ontrol | Uni- dimensional ,prism‘ | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK BNP, A FPOE, UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FN, D NPD, D FDP, D AfD, F UMP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, D B90 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | IRE Greens |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | UK Greens, UK Lab, A Gruene |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | UK Cons |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A OEVp |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK Lib |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | I AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | C | D SPD, F PS |

The analysis of subsuming cannot be based on pre-defined coding schemes, since the rather innovative aspects of changing or re-framing arguments cannot be foreseen. Because the PFA is a hand-coding procedure, however, acts of subsuming can still be noticed directly, and they further tend to find their expression in the disagreements among coders during the reliability test. In the present case, taking subsuming into account helps to complete the picture by understanding the large variation on the far Right: In fact, these parties often quite explicitly quote arguments made by actors known for their Conservatism or their economic expertise, adding only some arguments in line with their anti-immigrant ideologies. Usually, the latter involves crediting the actors quoted with adequate analyses or policy suggestions, but doubting their willingness to act accordingly. Along these lines, the FPÖ refers to the

policy suggestions of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron; the NPD quotes the economist Hans-Werner Sinn and thanks the General Secretary of the Conservative CSU, Andreas Scheuer for putting the issue of welfare tourism on the agenda; the AfD quotes the Advocate General of the Court of Justice where it suits them; the Front National interprets the words of the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls; and UKIP refers to Bulgarian politicians or personal encounters with Bulgarian citizens. Since these parties quote whatever outside source not easily accused of racism, it is clear that also their overall lines of argument will be diverse. All that unites these quotes is that they will be used for justifying restrictions vis-à-vis intra-EU migrants, which is why they vary but will remain within the range of frame F3 or F4.

As a final indicator of the role played by uncertainty, the theory of territorialisation suggests that parties, in particular those arguing against what might become a potential national interest, will concentrate on the justification part of policy frames rather than on suggesting policies. Indeed, it seems that policies implying restrictions on welfare migration (code: F4 pol) are called for much more intensively than policies calling for equal treatment or just inaction (code F5 pol) (see Table 29). Parties using frame F2 or F5 rather tend to focus on the constitutive dimension, that is, they deny the existence of welfare tourism or denounce the remaining discrimination. Hence, it appears that parties are aware of the vote-seeking dimension of their statements and are therefore avoiding open calls for cross-national distribution, rather than simply doing ideological business as usual.

Table 29: Distribution of codings across dimensions. * = Relative to all codings for all frames

| | Frame F4 | | Frame F5 | | total | |
|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| | absolute | percentage | absolute | percentage | absolute | percentage |
| Frame total | 322 | 35* | 160 | 17,4* | 919 | 100* |
| norm | 41 | 12,7 | 4 | 2,5 | 152 | 16,5 |
| cons | 99 | 30,7 | 91 | 56,9 | 327 | 35,6 |
| cogn | 55 | 17,1 | 48 | 30 | 193 | 21 |
| pol | 127 | 39,4 | 17 | 10,6 | 247 | 26,9 |

Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings

The European Parliament resolution on “respect for the fundamental right of free movement on the EU (2013/2960(RSP)” was passed in mid-January 2014, when the debate on the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants had reached its peak. The remaining restrictions on free movement for Romania and Bulgaria had been abolished by then, but arguably it was still too early to judge the existence and degree of any resulting welfare tourism. It called upon the Member States to respect the right of free movement very much along the lines of frame F2, referred to empirical evidence on the contribution of mobile workers in terms of frame F5 and merely “Reminds the Member States of their social responsibility to tackle misuse of their social welfare systems, regardless of whether it is committed by their own citizens or by citizens of other Member States; calls on the Member States to comply with the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC and to address possible abuses” as a mild reference to frame F3 and F4. The resolution eventually passed

was a joint one, sponsored by all EPGs except the Conservative ECR and the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD).

At first sight, it might seem here that the EPP was more in line with the other groups than with the ECR, for why else would it have joined its resolution with S&D, ALDE, GUE/NGL and Verts/ALE rather than with the ECR? This, in turn, might be interpreted as counter to the idea that the members of the EPP and ECR actually form an ideological family and that this common family membership is somehow meaningful. Such EPG cohesion rather than ideological cohesion in the strict sense would seem to support the 3G2P approach at the expense of the theory of territorialisation. A closer inspection, however, reveals that the matter was more complex than this and shows that the votes were in many ways in line with the results of the PFA.

At the same time, differences between voting records and the framing analysis might not necessarily prove the latter wrong or meaningless in its own right. This is all the more so given the flaws of RCV and the fact that voting is much more bound by institutional rules than press releases are. For instance, the resolution required a single majority. Achieving a majority without the groups it eventually cooperated with would have been difficult if not impossible for the EPP. After all, even if an agreement with the ECR had been reached, the EFD might not have constituted a reliable, cohesive partner, might not have followed as a matter of principle, or might have made suggestions that could have been too radical for the EPP. Even so these three groups would not have achieved a majority on their own, which becomes clear by looking at the more controversial vote on particular amendments to which I return below. The EPP thus only had the choice to either cooperate with groups to its Left or remain without any influence on the resolution. What it achieved by cooperation was the inclusion of the aforementioned element, that was originally a part of the EPP's own – already rather lenient – resolution, but arguably the one that was most in line with frame F4. The reason for the divide in terms of votes might thus have had to do more with majority requirements than with ideological differences on this particular issue.

This becomes even more obvious when looking at the most controversial parts of the resolution. On both of these votes, the EPP voted cohesively against the Leftist groups, while now the ECR was split. The first of these two votes concerned the question, whether the abuse of social security systems by mobile workers referred to in §7 was to be considered 'alleged' or not (i.e. as a fact). The second concerned the question, whether it was in fact a 'social' responsibility of the Member States to address abuse as provided by §10. There was no RCV on the second one, but the number of votes in favour, against, and of abstentions was almost exactly the same so that it may be assumed that it followed the same pattern. The former vote at least concerns a core element of the conservative frame F4: The constitutive dimension of this frame holds that welfare tourism is a real problem, hence the EPP (cohesively) and the British Conservatives (as part of the ECR) took issue with the word 'alleged'. At the same time, the word 'alleged' captures the constitutive dimension of frame F5. In other words, this is precisely the distinction between the migrant-friendly and the restrictive frames on intra-EU migrants' access to welfare abroad. But just as the analysis of frames revealed, this conflict evolves along ideological, not territorial lines.

The fact that this vote was not mainly about a split between the ECR and the EPP was also documented by some of the other votes, when individual members of the French UMP, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale and the Italian Forza Italia defected from the EPP and voted with the British Conservatives and non-attached Eurosceptics from FPÖ, BNP and the Front National. The vote concerned §2 of the resolution, and by voting against this paragraph these MEPs supported the position taken by some national governments who had been thinking aloud about possible restrictions to free movement. This is particularly interesting with regard to the Italian Right parties, as they are just not defecting to foster the interests of their emigrants but rather favour a much more restrictive course as the AN did in its manifesto.

The Irish parties vote along with their respective party group, even on the most controversial votes. Noteworthy, this also implies that Fianna Fáil votes with the ALDE, while Fine Gael votes with the EPP. Rather than indicating an ideological split between these two parties, the roll call data also confirm the *passive* behaviour of most of the Irish political parties established earlier in terms of press releases, instead of revealing a formerly hidden but strong preference. Noteworthy, rather than supporting welfare tourism, Irish politicians from various parties have begun – albeit mainly at a later point in time – to actively promote the return of their own emigrants (Boland 2015; Green 2014; Socialist Party 2013).

Finally, two remaining caveats in terms of the country selection can now be set aside for good. Before taking the voting records into account, it might have been argued, that with Italy still being a destination for immigration and Irish voters not being allowed to vote from abroad, the selection of countries was unsuited for identifying a potential territorial structure of conflict, with parties from these countries having no incentive for defending the interests of their emigrants abroad. Noteworthy, however, the Irish Green party still did so, and thereby it is acting just like its party family members abroad, while also the Italian Right behaved along ideological lines. In addition, the silence of the other parties might have been considered as an indication of the relevance of territory. The voting results show, however, that had these parties expressed their opinion by means of press releases, their framing would probably not have been different from that of their respective counterparts abroad. In fact, beyond that, the fact that in the RCV data on the resolution *all* Member States were covered but the structure of conflict even on the most controversial votes still remained ideological, should remove any final doubt on the selection of countries. At the same time, focusing on just some countries in order to conduct a framing analysis could further show the exact role played by uncertainty, which indeed was specified much more explicitly by the theory of territorialisation compared to extant theories, yet was largely confirmed.

4.5 Conclusion on Europeanised welfare

This first case study has demonstrated, that under the increased politicisation of EU politics, parties and their representatives in the EP are in principle aware of vote-seeking pressures and potentially relevant national interests, but remain reluctant to defect. Indeed, under uncertainty, they rather use the remaining

room for (rhetorical) manoeuvre by framing the issue in primarily ideological terms. As a result, the case study generally seems to corroborate the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2.

Simultaneously, however, it demonstrates the appropriateness of the approach taken in terms of research design and methods, as only this approach could prove the value added of the ToT. That the present case of Europeanised welfare is characterised by uncertainty of potential cross-national distribution could only be shown by an extensive discussion of the legal and economic aspects of the issue, which would hardly have been possible in a large-N design. Similarly, only a Policy Frame Analysis could reveal the degree of precision with which the ToT accounts for micro-level processes. First, the identification of policy frames demonstrates in the first place, that there is not just one simple way of perceiving the issue and the distributional effects of various policy options. Second, the fact that parties use their room for manoeuvre by focussing more on justifications in order to avoid goal conflict could only be shown if a method is used that allows for such differentiation. Third, the PFA uncover how parties under uncertainty abstain from defection, while trying to broaden their electoral appeal by using strategies of blurring (while remaining close to their own line of argument) and subsuming (especially on the far Right). Last but not least, using a method of analysis at the micro-level that, at least in the conservative manner it was applied here, does not allow for glossing over ‘outliers’, has shown the – expectable – limitations of the ToT.

The case study following in the next chapter will demonstrate in particular the limits MEPs’ ability and willingness regarding the avoidance of defection. These limits, it will be argued, are set by the certainty of cross-national distribution. Further research on the present case of Europeanised welfare might extend the time frame of the study, so as to fill the gap between these two instances of (un)certainty. Thereby, the question might be addressed, how exactly certainty is established and at what point parties start to lose their leeway.

5. The 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

This chapter presents the second case study on conflict in the European Parliament intended for evaluating the theory of territorialisation presented earlier and is meant to demonstrate in particular the limits of parties' ability and willingness for avoiding defection given certainty of cross-national distribution. First, some background information on this case, namely the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), is provided, such that its features as a case are fully understood and the justification of its section is corroborated. Most importantly, the policy issue is characterised by a relatively high degree of cross-national distributional effects, which at the same time are rather certain. Earlier research has therefore been quick to invoke CAP more generally as a typical case involving 'national interests' and increasing rates of defection. Interestingly, however, it also involves considerable intra-national distribution, namely between farmers and the rest of society, which may not erase but relativise incentives for defection depending on the core electorate of a given party. Before the observable implications of extant theories and the theory of territorialisation can be contrasted, the policy frames that the various national parties represented in the EP might use to take positions on the reform are identified (Section 2). Four such frames are identified in total by complementing policy frames on CAP as identified by Mark Rhinard with more topical arguments used in the literature (mostly consisting in think tank publications at the time of writing) on the latest reform. The third section then breaks down the specific implications of the reform for the parties in the sample. It does so by first pointing out the interests of the countries selected and then formulates the respective expectations in terms of structure of conflict and framing strategies for the various parties in the sample based on extant theoretical approaches and the theory of territorialisation on the other hand. Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) with regard to the structure of conflict observed, a descriptive summary of the usage of the various frames and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on defection and other framing strategies (blurring, subsuming). As it is found, the structure of conflict is *considerably but not entirely* territorialised, as the theory of territorialisation would have suggested. At the micro-level, the usage of the various framing strategies equally fits this theoretical framework, as in the face of certain cross-national distributional effects, some parties are indeed led to give in to their vote-seeking goals by defecting from their ideology-driven policy-seeking. Parties who cannot expect their defection to be electorally rewarded, however, prefer blurring over outright defection. Interestingly, vote-seeking interests seem to reach beyond a purely distributional logic and towards national traditions, as is indicated by the behaviour of Italian national delegations in the sample. Subsuming again appears as a prominent strategy among far Right parties, who instead of blindly arguing for decentralisation of the policy try to bring this in line with more broadly accepted values and causal narratives. In contrast to the debate on 'welfare tourism', however, the policy dimensions of the various frames are referred to much more frequently, which seems to follow the 'leeway' argument on certainty and framing. While a relation between the PFA results and voting data can be established in terms of external validation, this case also demonstrates in how far voting records are shaped by negotiation dynamics rather than a reflection of the underlying conflict. In sum, Section 5 concludes, the conflict on the reform of the CAP demonstrates that, while the EP is not immune to national interests when these can be identified easily, it still remains a highly sophisticated channel of representation, in that the intra-national distributional aspects of a policy still find their expression in the limits of territorialisation. This is in line with the theory of territorialisation, in that national party delegations are expected to carefully weigh their various party goals against each other, so that defection as a temporary surrender of policy-seeking will only be considered where compensation is to be expected in terms of votes gained.

5.1 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 2013 Reform

In this section, some background information on the CAP prior to the 2013 Reform and on the major proposals included in the debate on the latter are provided. Most importantly, it will be shown how the CAP became as relevant in budgetary terms as it still is (to a lesser extent) today, how it was slowly but steadily transformed away from away from interventionism to more market orientation, and how it was added by new policies in terms of rural development and environmental protection. These trends are partly continued in the 2013 Reform, with the abolition of remaining production quotas and the ‘greening’ of farmers’ income support, but have been partly reversed at the same time by the continuing existence of so-called ‘coupled’ payments and the new ‘safety net’. Based on this information, it is possible to further corroborate the classification of the 2013 Reform as a case (high politicisation, post-Lisbon, post-Crisis, cross-national as well as intra-national distributional effects of high certainty) and to eventually understand the logics behind the various frames identified in the second section. Before the start of the latter, however, I briefly review the extant literature on the structure of conflict concerning CAP (without striving for completeness, though), showing that there are policy-specific open questions making this case study worthwhile beyond its function within the present research design.

The ‘old’ CAP and its legacies

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been described as the only policy that has ever reached a level of integration that, according to Elmar Rieger could be considered ‘federal’, in that decisions were not only made, but also implemented at the EU level (ibid. 2005, 164). In addition to being one of the most integrated policies, the CAP is also one of the oldest policies of what today is called the European Union. Its foundations were laid already in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, and, in contrast to other policies, it was put into practice within the next five years (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 254). The fact that the CAP was created at the time and the way in which it was done has often been interpreted as a *quid pro quo* between France and Germany, with the latter’s industry benefitting disproportionately from the customs union, while the former’s huge farming sector would be compensated by the created of the CAP. Ackrill discusses this question in some detail, but eventually comes to the conclusion that “[t]he full story of why the CAP exists, however, goes well beyond the simple quid pro quo for Germany’s industrial exports to France” (ibid. 2000, 39–41). With reference to a number of historians, Rieger agrees that this account of the creation of CAP should be “laid to rest” (ibid. 2005, 164). To a certain extent, this may be read as a warning of post-rationalization when it comes to alleged log-rolling, which in turn supports the issue-by-issue approach taken in this dissertation project. At the same time, this is not to deny the existence and relevance of log-rolling in EU politics *per se*. Within the European Council in particular, compromises are certainly reached frequently in this manner. However, given the high degree of specialization within the EP, this is less likely to occur in this legislative’s daily business. More importantly, log-rolls matter when a conflict is obvious already – not at the stage of position taking during which the structure of conflict is shaped in the first place.

The foregoing claim that CAP was more than a *quid pro quo* between France and Germany rests essentially on the fact that Germany and other countries accepted the *principle* of CAP (Ackrill 2000, 41). This was because, as Rieger points out, in all of the countries involved farmers played an important role, both in terms of their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product of these countries and their share of the electorate (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 255; Rieger 2005, 168). The first of these facts had contributed

to the creation of national agricultural policies that served the interests of farmers: In France, the government had installed a price-support scheme and subsidized mechanization with a view to increase output and farming incomes, and had imposed quantitative restrictions on agricultural imports. In West Germany, Import and Storage Boards intervened in markets so as to maintain prices and farmers incomes, thereby incentivising an expansion of output. Even in Italy, where the government partly tried to create incentives for labour to leave agriculture, the government intervened, for instance, into wheat crops in order to stabilize prices (Ackrill 2000, 25–28). It was also due to the second fact, the electoral weight of farmers, Rieger argues, that agricultural policy was communitarised, thereby winning over this part of the population for the project of European integration (*ibid.* 2005, 168). In this sense, the creation of the CAP may have contributed, if not to enthusiasm for integration among the rural population, then at least to acceptance; in other words to the (in)famous permissive consensus.

Market intervention for price stabilization, which according to Ackrill (2000) was the most common approach to national agricultural policy, also turned out to be a key feature of the early CAP. Of the instruments chosen to achieve this, the guarantee or target price is certainly the most essential element, whereas the others are more or less supporting the feasibility of its application. By fixing prices, the uncertainty confronting farmers under market conditions is considerably reduced, and they now have an incentive to produce sufficient amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of increasing production, as the target price is set above the market price) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). Tariffs are set on agricultural products entering the common market in order to avoid an influx of cheap food from outside, thereby serving the principle of Community preference (*ibid.* 2005, p. 258; Fouilleux 2013, 310). While prices could be kept at the target level by buying up and storing surpluses (Fouilleux 2013, 310), the surpluses could also be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. making European food competitive on a global level) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). By shifting these policies – which in more or less similar manner had already been applied nationally – to the EU-level, it was possible to create a common market for agricultural goods while not exposing farmers to the associated risks (*ibid.* 2005, 255). Next to this unified market and the principle of Community preference (EU agricultural products are to be preferred over imported ones), the principle of financial solidarity was established. The latter meant that all expenses on agricultural policy had to be financed from the Community budget (*ibid.* 2005, 257). Since moreover the CAP was directly resulting from the Treaties, agricultural spending was considered part of the ‘compulsory’ expenditure (Ackrill 2000, 79). This combination had important consequences for the CAP and its distributional effects, which in many ways last to the present day, and hence shall be discussed in turn.

On the one hand, the distinction between compulsory expenditure and non-compulsory expenditure was used in the past in order to limit the influence of the European Parliament on the EU expenditure (Ackrill 2000, 79). This matters for the present project in so far as the EP was able to formally and significantly influence CAP for the first time with the 2013 Reform, given its new rights under the Treaty of Lisbon (cf. Fouilleux 2013, 310). On the other hand, ‘compulsory expenditure’ meant that, while there was leeway concerning the instruments of the CAP, the resulting costs would definitely have to be

covered by the EU budget – in contrast to the non-compulsory expenditure, for which the total amount was limited both for each year as such and with regard to possible increases (Ackrill 2000, 79). Again, such limitations did not exist regarding the CAP.

As Ackrill (2000) notes, the CAP was meant to be financed by the ‘own resources’ of the EU (EC), most notably by the revenue gained from the common external tariff. Yet, because of the overproduction that the policies constituting CAP caused at the time, the related expenditure increased continually. Additional ‘own resources’ were created based on Value Added Tax (VAT) contributions from the Member States, but even these were soon insufficient to cover the costs of CAP. Hence, further contributions from the Member States, calculated on the basis for the Gross National Product (GNP), had to be mobilised (*ibid.* 2000, 77–79). First ideas on how to reduce spending on CAP nonetheless were provided by the Commission already a decade after its creation, but this did not change one fact: The EU’s budget was effectively out of control because of CAP (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 264–66). Noteworthy, while the CAP became the main component of the EU expenditure to which all countries had to contribute in more or less proportionate amounts, the returns they received varied disproportionately.

This seems easy to understand, as one might assume of course resources allocated to food production will end up mostly in those countries with substantial farming sectors. Indeed, France has classically received the largest chunk from the CAP budget, even beyond its share of the overall budget, while the UK has received less from the CAP than it has contributed. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the UK has always pushed for reforming the CAP soon after it joined the EU in 1973 (Ackrill 2000, 52). But while preferences concerning the degree and direction of reform may have varied across countries, the UK was not alone in this struggle, as a number of factors functioned as pressures for reform.

First, while European post-war economies had been characterised by a rather high degree of state intervention in the economy, the 1980s saw the general rise of an ideational framework geared towards liberalisation and deregulation, and the strongly interventionist CAP appeared as a relic of the past that did not sit well with such ideas (Rhinard 2010, 81). Second, while the UK was particularly negatively affected by the extent of the CAP expenditure, the steady increase of the latter posed a problem to the rest of the EU as well, as it meant that resources could not be freed for other purposes. Third, international trade agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in particular, collided with the protectionist elements of the CAP and led to conflict within international fora, risking to harm European countries – Germany in particular (*ibid.* 2010, 97) – in other trading sectors. Fourth, the rising tide of environmentalist actors was highly critical of the agricultural practices fostered by the CAP (for a detailed account of reform pressures, see Ackrill 2000, 77–114 Rhinard 2010, 79–85 and Altomonte and Nava 2005, 264–75). Finally, as Rhinard (2010, 93) notes, as the prevalence of small-scale, inefficient farming practices in Germany were one reason why the country had joined France earlier in preventing reform, the fact that the average farm size in Germany more than double with reunification (Ackrill 2000, 20) will have contributed to a change in the German position towards increased openness to reform. Given Germany’s political weight in the EU-9 and later EU-12, this change of mind will certainly have

constitute an important “crack in the armour” (Rhinard 2010) of the old CAP, which then could no longer resist the pressures for reform.

Shortly before German reunification, in 1988, Commission President Jacques Delors had made an effort to reform the CAP, introducing further cuts in target prices and introducing production quotas (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 264–67). However, like the Mansholt Plan of 1968, the Delors Reform only addressed some symptoms of the issues of the classic CAP without changing the general approach to the policy area. On the one hand, with the Delors Reform, the expansion of the CAP expenditure came to a halt. On the other hand, the innovative element of the reform – the quota system – tends to create a feeling of injustice among the countries concerned, which Altomonte and Nava consider almost “inevitable” (ibid. 2005, 266–67). In addition, the budgetary impact of the CAP was just one of the aforementioned pressures for reform, while all others, most notably the associated problems with international trade agreements, remained (ibid. 2005, 269). It was only with the adoption of another reform, designed under the Irish Commissioner for Agriculture Ray MacSharry, that CAP changed fundamentally.

In fact, the changes introduced with the MacSharry Reform were quite literally fundamental, in the sense that the reforms that followed – the Agenda 2000, the 2003 Reform and the Health Check of 2008 – more or less were built on what was started in 1992. Like previous reforms, the MacSharry Reform reduced target prices, but it did so drastically and in turn introduced so-called direct payments to compensate for the losses incurred by farmers (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 268–70). This was the start of a process referred to as ‘decoupling’, which means that the subsidies available are no longer coupled to the amount of food produced by the farmers, but are paid directly to the farmers. The important implication is that thereby, the link between increases in production and agricultural expenditure is broken (Rhinard 2010, 98; Rieger 2005, 178).

Next to ending ‘automatic’ increases in spending, decoupling has another effect, namely that farmers have less incentives to exploit the land they cultivate ever more recklessly, which is arguably conducive to the environment. However, the MacSharry Reform also directly introduced environmental concerns into the policy area, by allocating subsidies for so-called agri-environmental measures (AEMs), which included, for instance, measures to reduce the usage of fertilizers, and to support organic farming, extensive production, reduced stock densities, maintenance of the countryside, upkeep of abandoned woodland, set aside farmland. At the time, the measures covered made up about 2-3% of agricultural spending (Rhinard 2010, 101). Yet, Rhinard argues, the agri-environmental measures “would have prove to have a significant effect on future policymaking” (ibid. 2010, 101).

Indeed, with the further reform of the CAP that was decided as part of the EU’s Agenda 2000, it became evident that the CAP expenditure was resting now on two ‘pillars’ (Fouilleux 2013, 314–15; Rhinard 2010, 132). The first pillar consists of the money allocated to the direct payments and are drawn from the ‘guarantee’ section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), while the second pillar, funded respectively from the ‘guidance’ section, is consists in more structural support in terms of rural development (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 270–73). Noteworthy, the Agenda

2000 reform widened the scope of agricultural spending that was not for income recompensation: Next to the aforementioned agri-environmental measures, pillar 2 fosters investments in farm business (reduction of production costs, environmental protection, quality improvements), the entry of young farmers and retirements of older ones, farming in Least Favoured Areas (LFAs; e.g. mountainous areas), forestry, processing and marketing of agricultural products, and general rural development in terms of basic services for rural communities, rural heritage, economic diversification, infrastructure, and even tourism (cf. Rhinard 2010, 132–33). Direct payments, which now came to replace even bigger portions of price support, partly became ‘national envelopes’ distributed by the Member States (Fouilleux 2013, 318).

The 2003 Reform then again continued this trend aiming for complete decoupling by the creation of the so-called Single-Farm-Payment (SFP) (Fouilleux 2013, 315–16; Rieger 2005, 177). These unique direct payments were made subject to what is known as ‘cross-compliance’, that is, conditioned on the adherence to environmental, food safety, animal welfare, health and occupational safety standards and on keeping farmland in a generally good condition (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 274). Since the 2003 reform, Member States can transfer part of their national envelope dedicated to direct payments to the second pillar, a process referred to as ‘modulation’, which has been continued in the 2008 Health Check (3 per cent available for modulation after 2003, 10 per cent after 2008). The latter reform also introduced further modulation of 4 per cent on individual direct payments above 300,000€ (Fouilleux 2013, 315–18). Since these changes were minor, the 2008 Health check is usually not considered a ‘major reform’ (Mahé 2012, 255), but it does certainly not break with the trend started in the MacSharry Reform, which generally can be summarised as follows:

- replacement of market management (from 90 % in 1992 to 5% in 2013) with direct payments (‘decoupling’) (94% in 2013) (cf. European Commission 2013e, 4)
- an increased number of rationales for agricultural policy spending via pillar 2
- ever-increasing environmental awareness
- a certain degree of decentralisation in terms of implementation and targeting of spending at the national level

Yet, in spite of these gradual but fundamental changes, there are some legacies of the ‘old’ CAP that had lasting and considerable distributional consequences.

While the introduction of direct payments led to a decoupling of production and income support, the level of support prior to decoupling continued to be relevant in a number of ways. First, direct payments were considered as a means to close a gap in farming incomes, just like price support had done before (Rieger 2005, 179). At the time of their introduction, therefore, the level of direct payments was determined with regard to a reference period (2000-2002). More precisely: “When the Single Farm Payment was introduced in 2003, the money that was freed up by removing subsidies that had hitherto been coupled to production was transferred to national Single Farm Payment envelopes in accordance with Member States’ previous receipts of coupled subsidies” (Zahrnt 2009). The direct payments per farm could be based on a. a ‘historic’ model, which meant that entitlements per farm would be calculated on the

basis of the amount of payments received by that farm during the reference period or b. a regional model, which included a flat rate payment per hectare based on the amount of payments received in a region in relation to the total number of eligible hectares within that region (d'Oultremont 2011, 2; Jomini et al. 2010, 9). Given these path dependencies, it would seem unsurprising that the overall level of agricultural support still remained largely unchanged to the present day (Mahé 2012, 1).

In fact, however, hidden behind this observation of crude numbers lies what has been referred to as “the single largest reduction of CAP support ever agreed by the member states in the history of the Union” (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 174). After all, while overall support has remained constant, the same amount of subsidies is to be shared by what are now 28 instead of 15 Member States of the EU. This could only be achieved because the 2002 Brussels European Council simply decided that support levels of 2006 should serve as the overall ceiling for the CAP budget until 2013 (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 273–74). The direct payments for the new Member States should only slowly be ‘phased in’. Hence, with a view to the approaching enlargement, the Brussels European Council of 2002 decided that the levels of direct payments in the new Member States would equal 25 per cent of the level in the EU15 in 2004, 30 per cent in 2005, 35 per cent in 2006, 40 per cent in 2007, 50 per cent in 2008 and thereafter would rise annually by 10 per cent until reaching the same level of support across the EU in 2013 (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 273–74). Until then, the governments of the new Member States would be allowed to top-up the direct payments by the remaining percentages (Jomini et al. 2010, 9). In sum, support levels prior to the introduction of decoupling have remained relevant even in an enlarged EU, and still, the average of support per farm was reduced.

One should be cautious, however, not to confuse the idea of ‘phasing in’ with total equity among farmers across Member States. This is because of the second way in which pre-decoupling support levels have remained relevant: Most of the old Member States had chosen the historic model for the introduction of direct payments (cf. Jomini et al. 2010, 9), whereas -due to the absence of the respective references – only two of the new Member States (Malta and Slovenia) chose the regional model, while the rest opted for the Single Area Payments Scheme (SAPS) as a transitional measure. As the Commission formulates it on its website:

Due to limited administrative capacities and the absence of historical data, new member states (i.e. those that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007) were granted the possibility of applying the single area payment scheme instead of applying the standard direct payment schemes. The single area payment scheme provides a flat-rate decoupled area payment paid for eligible agricultural land and replaces almost all payments granted in other than new member states. (DG Agriculture and Rural Development 2016)

It is argued, that the retention of historic output references has contributed to a situation where a Dutch farmer receives €458 of direct payments per hectare, while his Latvian colleague only receives €95 (d'Oultremont 2011, 4; 2012, 6–8; European Commission 2013e, 8; Matthews 2011, 52).

Finally, the legacies of the old CAP, again in terms of historic references, also influence the distribution between farmers: Large farms who had produced more during the reference period and, besides, maybe would not actually need support, would also received higher amounts of direct payments (80% of payments go to 20% of farms) (cf. d'Oultremont 2011, 2), while small farms, which in principle

might not be able to survive under market conditions and would thus really depend on support, would continue to be structurally disadvantaged (d'Oultremont 2012, 12; Rieger 2005, 179). Noteworthy, this distributional issue is not just an intra-national one. As Mahé notes: “The capping of direct aid per farm has always been a bone of contention between member states, for some very large ones [i.e. farms] are concentrated in the UK, in the north of Germany and in certain Central and Eastern European states” (ibid. 2012, 21).

In sum, because of historical legacies, a number of pressures remain for further reform. First, the budget was and still is the single largest chunk of the EU’s expenditure and for this reason alone, it can be expected that in times of budgetary discipline such as these, it remains under pressure (Mahé 2012, 2; Zahrt 2010, 2). Noteworthy, the Crisis in particular may lead to reform pressure on the part of the ‘donors’, while those hit by the Crisis but benefitting from CAP will cling all the more to it. More generally, pressure for reform that continues the aforementioned trends towards decoupling and greening may be met with resistance from those who, not appreciating this trend anyway, want to turn back the clock. Decoupling as the shift to direct payments has further made the distributional effects within and across countries more visible, making them appear even bigger than they once were (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 271; Fouilleux 2013, 321–22; Rhinard 2010, 100). Based on the knowledge about the past of the CAP, it is now possible to understand the measures discussed in the debate on the CAP post-2013.

The 2013 Reform of the CAP...

In the following I shall concentrate on the concrete proposals for the 2013 Reform of the CAP as they were forwarded by the Commission. It would probably fill more than one book to consider all other suggestions for reform by all other participants in the debate. At the same time, it should be clear also that of course there was a certain corridor for each and every proposal as regards the direction, scope and extent of change. Thus, before introducing the main suggestions made for the 2013 Reform of the CAP, I shall briefly discuss the different roads leading away from the crossroad at which European policy-makers found themselves at the time of reform. First, one might consider the most general trends in the preceding reforms, namely the *de facto* reduction in the overall budget (given enlargement) and the increased focus on public goods related to agriculture rather than food production itself. Certainly, the CAP could be even more focused on public goods production, so that there is room to simply move further along exactly this line. Some might also have interpreted earlier reforms as a move away from state intervention, and, consequently, towards liberalisation of the CAP. Total liberalisation certainly would constitute a more radical step than the continuation of the concentration on public goods. That said, there is arguably no automaticity in the reforms, in that it might in principle also be considered to reverse previous reforms. Finally, compared to the times of the old CAP, agricultural policy the prior to the reform was certainly less ‘Common’ than it once had been, and further decentralisation in principle constitutes another broad direction for further reform.

While these might be the broad directions towards which some actors might push in terms of policy change, it is clear from the preceding discussion that there is a strong status quo bias concerning the

overall design of the CAP. As has been shown above, direct payments under pillar 1 have become the main instrument of the CAP. It is not surprising, that hence the liveliest discussions on the CAP reform concern changes to the allocation of direct payments, albeit just one of the four main legal proposals that make up the reform is dedicated to them (cf. Matthews 2011, 1). These discussions can be summarised under the notions of ‘greening’, ‘targeting’, ‘capping’, and ‘convergence’ and shall be discussed here in turn.

With regard to the ‘greening’, d’Oultremont holds: “The most important and innovative change proposed by the Commission is the green payment, making 30% of the CAP’s direct payments national envelope conditional on three ‘greening’ measures” (ibid. 2011, 6; Mahé 2012, 13). In fact, from the foregoing section it should become clear that earlier reforms have also aimed at ‘greening’ the CAP: direct payments can be considered greener than price support, as they limit environmentally harmful overproduction. They have further been made subject to cross compliance, i.e. amongst others, the adherence to environmental minimum standards. Moreover, those farmers that went beyond these minimum standards could become eligible for support under pillar 2.

Rieger holds, however, that these measures, the Agri-Environmental Measures (AEMs) in particular, had produced very limited results other than channelling additional money to farmers by being misused (ibid. 2005, 179). Noteworthy, the AEMs were voluntary, so that, Mahé argues, greening of the first pillar effectively adds another layer to cross-compliance. In fact, he notes, “Greening consists of the split of the bulk of the payment between a basic payment and an environmental bonus”, the latter being paid for measures involving crop diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland, ecological focus areas (7%) (ibid. 2012, 6). Moreover, organic farms automatically qualify for the green payment (ibid. 2012, 6, 29). By making 30 per cent of direct payments conditional on environmental friendly measures, even those states who according to Mahé have been least capable of organizing voluntary greening would now be forced to participate (ibid. 2012, 28). Comparing only the Commission Memos on the 2013 Reform from 2011 (launching of the proposals) and 2013 (political agreement), respectively one can hardly fail to notice the introduction of the notion of ‘Greening Equivalence’ (European Commission 2013c, 4). Behind this, there is the idea of taking existing greening efforts under e.g. AEMs into account when calculating the 30 per cent (ibid.). Arguably, this implies that the additional effect of greening direct payments is considerably limited.

It is almost a logical consequence of the concept of ‘targeting’ that several different policy suggestions go under this heading. First, similar to the greening albeit not in extent, a mandatory share of 2 per cent of the national envelopes shall be used to top-up direct payments for young farmers (<40 years of age) for the first five years after installation (European Commission 2011a, 2). Second, 5 per cent of national envelopes for direct payments *may* be allocated (i.e. voluntary if Member States so decide) to areas with natural constraints, also called Least Favoured Areas (LFAs) as defined and subsidized to some extent already under pillar 2 (ibid. 2011a, 2; European Commission, 3). Third, a certain percentage (varying between 5 and 13 between) of the national envelope for direct payments may be paid as coupled support linked to specific products (ibid.) Fourth, payments shall be limited to ‘active farmers’, that is,

those enterprises whose primary business is indeed of agricultural nature, thereby excluding some businesses also based on a ‘negative list’ (e.g. airports) from CAP funding (European Commission 2011a, 3; 2013e, 4). Fifth, money can be shifted from pillar 1 to pillar 2 and vice versa to a certain degree (differing by the stage of negotiation, but never higher than 15% of the national envelope) (European Commission 2013a, 4; European Commission 2011a, 2). Sixth, Member States may opt for introducing a Small Farmers Scheme, which allocates participating farmers a rather low amount of direct payments at a rate fixed per Member States (but ranging between €500 and €1250), while exempting these business from greening as well as some of the cross-compliance requirements (European Commission 2011a, 2; 2013c, 3). In principle, ‘targeting’ could also mean that support is reduced for those who do not really need it for economic survival or is allocated based on the production of public goods, which usually does not rise proportionally to farm size. Yet, this shall be explained here under the heading of ‘internal convergence’.

The debate on the 2013 Reform again saw the return of the idea of capping, which so far had been introduced very moderately under modulation. While from the start this was not meant to lead to cross-national redistribution, it would have implied, as formulated by the Commission in 2011, that direct payments would be limited to a maximum of €300000 per year, while stepwise reducing direct payments as off a total of €150000 (European Commission 2011a, 3). By 2013, it had been agreed, however, that capping should be compulsory only to a limited degree as off €150000 per year, making the maximum of €300000 optional, and always now taking salary costs into account (European Commission 2013c, 2). Member States should have the right to redistribute up to 30 per cent of their national envelope to farmers on their first 30 hectares (ibid.). At a more general level, internal convergence also means that by 2019, direct payments *per hectare* of cultivated land should become more equal: ‘uniform’ it says in the 2011 proposals (European Commission 2011a, 1); reducing the difference between those below 90 per cent of the regional or national average and the national/regional average by one third in 2013 while proportionally decreasing the amounts for those above average (European Commission 2013c, 2). Thereby, effectively, historic references for countries under the Single Payment Scheme shall be abolished, and the part of direct payments not subject to greening shall be called Basic Payment Scheme.

As was already noted, historic references and pre-enlargement legacies had not only led to high internal variance within the Member States, but also to a high degree of variance across Member States, especially when average amounts of direct payments per hectare are considered. Many of the new Member States therefore particularly asked for total external convergence (d'Oultremont 2011, 3). The Commission reports to have examined prospects for basing the allocation of direct payments across Member States on so-called ‘objective criteria’, but because of the massive distributional effects resulting from these criteria opted for a ‘pragmatic’ approach (d'Oultremont 2011, 3; Matthews 2011, 5): quite in analogy to the process of internal convergence, the gap between the Member States with average direct payments per hectare below 90 per cent of the EU average should be closed by one third, financed by those Member States currently above these 90 per cent (d'Oultremont 2011, 3; European Commission 2011a, 1; 2013c, 2; Matthews 2011, 5). Arguably, with regard to this particular aspect of cross-national distribution, one of the potentially most controversial items was already off the table by early 2013.

An orientation towards more ‘objective criteria’ was also suggested regarding pillar 2 national allocations (European Commission 2011a, 4), but eventually, via a ‘discretionary payment’ agreed in the European Council its distributional effects were largely contained or even reversed (Matthews 2013). Also with regard to pillar 2, it was agreed that 30 per cent of Rural Development (RD) spending would be devoted to environmental friendly measures (including e.g. organic farming) (European Commission 2013c, 6). More generally, some conceptual changes were made concerning pillar 2 spending, which as a result shall allow Member States greater freedom in setting priorities (ibid.).

Most of these measures can be considered as a continuation of earlier reform trends and, as will be shown in the next section, follow a similar logic which is distinct from the one that underpinned the old CAP. Arguably, some of the measures discussed under targeting increase the flexibility of Member States (cf. European Commission 2013e, 5) and in that sense might be the beginning of a new trend towards decentralisation. Yet, in the debate on the 2013 Reform of the CAP, there was not just continuation of old policy trends or the start of a new one. While both the Commission as well as commentators conclude that the trend towards market orientation is eventually continued (European Commission 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 9), there have also been “some calls from quarters for a reversal of this process, and for the reintroduction of high support prices underpinned if necessary by supply control measures such as quotas” (Matthews 2011, 9). Indeed, quota regimes were set to expire. And yet, the Regulation on the Single Common Market Organisation (CMO) provides that common rules shall be introduced covering all sectors of agricultural production that would recognize Producer Organisations (POs) who amongst others would strengthen producers vis-à-vis other actors in the food chain (European Commission 2011a, 4; 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 10).

More importantly, the proposal on the CMO regulation introduces a general, harmonized ‘safety net’ in terms of public intervention possibilities, albeit at a lower level than traditional target prices, suggests that farmers should be eligible for receiving assistance from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGAF), and calls for the creation of a ‘crisis reserve’ of a yearly maximum of €500 million (European Commission 2011a, 3; 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 10). The final political agreement has it, that the crisis reserve should be financed by reducing direct payments in turn (European Commission 2013c, 5). It should be noted, however, that this was not what was provided for in the original proposal, which provided that pillar I and II should be *complemented by* the crisis reserve and the EGAF money *from outside* the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) (European Commission 2011b, 7). Based on this proposal, Mahé actually calls these reformed market measures as “forerunners to a third CAP pillar” (ibid. 2012, 43). As a discussion evolved around the sufficiency of this safety net (d'Oultremont 2011, 10), one might wonder whether the old CAP has re-entered through the backdoor with the 2013 Reform. At the very least, it seems, this return to the past has been attempted by some actors.

... and its characteristics as a case

Based on this background information, it is now possible to discuss in more detail than it was possible in Chapter 3, what exactly makes the 2013 Reform of the CAP an interesting case for the present study. In

doing so, I start with those features of this case that should be similar across cases studied here, namely politicisation, EP competence and timing of the debate. Only then will I turn to the characteristics that make CAP special within the sample of policy issues in terms of distributional effects, their direction and certainty.

The politicisation of the CAP is arguably not a result of the Crisis, but has a much longer history. One starting point might be seen in the UK's calling into question of the cross-national distributional effects of the CAP, which subsequently induced other Member States to draw up similar calculations (Olper 2008, 85), with Thatcher's call for getting "her money back" still being quoted in public debates on the EU (e.g. Freund and Schwarzer). Noteworthy, however, it was not just the directly financial component of CAP that has been politicised: As Olper (2008, 89) notes, the food scares of the 1990s have caught the interest of a wider public and, albeit not necessarily a result of CAP, influenced politicians thinking about its reform. Indeed, the food scares of the 1990s have not been the last, and the so-called 'horse-meat scandal' was actively taken up by some political actors commenting on the 2013 reform. Generally, food and food production seem to catch the attention of an increasing number of people, given, for instance, the fact that meanwhile almost 400,000 people visit the 'Green week' (Grüne Woche) in Berlin, an event initiated by the German food producers' associations (Messe Berlin GmbH). Moreover, farmers all over Europe may have been shrinking in numbers, but are still very good at mobilizing and at providing the media with impressive images (e.g. Eckinger 2016). It is thus also not surprising that the 2013 Reform of the CAP received media coverage across Europe (Le Monde 2013; vks/fdi/dpa 2013). In general, commentators on the CAP tend to agree that the legitimacy of the policy is a major issue and that the pressure for justification is (Bianchi 2011) and remains (Moehler 2015) high. Finally, with the 2013 Reform taking place during the Crisis, it was also considered as a potential strain on (or source of) European solidarity. It can be safely assumed, then, that political actors involved in the Reform were aware of its potentially politicised nature.

An additional increase in politicisation might result from the direct involvement of the EP in the reform process, since this is generally thought to increase the transparency of the process at least to the extent that at various instances, the proposals on the table would have to be made publicly available (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015a, 15). Noteworthy, this involvement of the CAP was a novelty introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, which made the EP a co-legislator in this policy area (Swinnen, Johan F. M and Knops 2012). At the same time, the fact that the empowerment of the EP in this area is still not unlimited indirectly leads this case to fulfil the timing requirements for this study in terms of the legislative and electoral cycle: given the budgetary relevance of the CAP, the months after the agreement on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) had been achieved (March 2013) proved to be decisive (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015b, 9). The formal adoption of the respective legislative package was then achieved in late 2013, leaving open only some technical implementation details in terms of delegated acts (ibid. 2015b, 2). Thus, the critical phase of the reform overlaps with the run-up to the elections in 2014, and was situated rather late in the legislative circle. Noteworthy, the fact that the MFF agreement was awaited first does not mean that MEPs did not comment on it, not to speak of voicing their opinion of how to spend the money

allocated for CAP. As I have noted above already, the so-called ‘safety net’ would not even be part of the MFF and hence not constrained by the decisions made there.

In the preceding subsection, it was already mentioned how decoupling as the shift to direct payments has further made the distributional effects within and across countries more visible, making them appear even bigger than they once were (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 271; Fouilleux 2013, 321–22; Rhinard 2010, 100). In order to understand 2013 Reform as a case, it is necessary to consider the direction and certainty of these distributional effects. First, generally, if public money is spent to increase or at least support the income of farmers, it is taxpayers and consumers (if support is achieved by target prices) that have to finance these subsidies. In other words, there is an obvious intra-national distribution between farmers and the rest of society resulting from CAP spending. While Eurobarometer surveys (albeit clearly framed in a pro-CAP manner) show that many citizens do not perceive CAP spending as beneficial for farmers only (European Commission 2014a, 37), the balance between that part of CAP spending that most directly benefits farmers at the expense of other members of society and those parts that, in terms of rural development or environmental public goods, benefit society at large was at stake in the 2013 Reform. At the broadest level, this concerns the question of the size of the CAP budget, but also the distribution between the two pillars (income support vs. rural development). More concretely, if direct income support is further made conditional on the provision of environmental public goods in terms of ‘greening’, this involves costs for farmers at the benefit of the rest of society (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015b, 6–7). Similarly but more indirectly, quota regulations involve intra-national distribution by artificially increasing prices (cf. e.g. Altomonte and Nava 2005), so that their abolition under the heading of ‘market orientation’ also should be relevant in this respect. As has further been noted, a considerable part of the 2013 Reform was the distribution of CAP spending between farmers, especially between small and large farmers. This concerns the ‘first hectare’ payments and the ‘capping’, for instance, but indirectly also greening, since the latter benefits farmers applying higher standards already (e.g. by subscribing to organic farming).

As was noted already, the CAP has always been and continues to be financed via the common EU budget. Member State contributions are crucial to this budget and are mostly based proportionately on a countries economic strength. Given that, as was just noted with regard to intra-national distribution, CAP mainly serves farmers at the expense of the rest of society, it is logical that what countries can get out of the commonly financed CAP depends on their farming sectors. This, in turn, leads some countries to contribute more than they receive from CAP and vice versa, since the farming sector of a country is often not proportionate to its overall economic weight. Therefore, some countries turn out to be net payers in terms of CAP, while others are net recipients (cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013; Zahrnt 2010). While before the reforms of the 1990s the CAP used to constitute 70 per cent of the EU budget, before the 2013 Reform it still made up almost 40 per cent (European Commission 2013a). In sum, therefore, not only does the CAP have cross-national distributional effects, but there is also no other single policy that shifts similar amounts of money between the Member States.

In the 2013 Reform debate, there were several elements affecting this general cross-national distributional pattern. First of all, each reform of course offers the opportunity to change the general

direction of the CAP, e.g. towards market orientation or back towards more intervention. Market orientation generally would mean lower amounts of subsidies, and accordingly less cross-national distribution. Beyond such general features of CAP reform debates, a more concrete one concerning the 2013 Reform was the Crisis-context and the strain it exerted on national budgets and economies across the EU (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015b, 9). Accordingly, the size of CAP budget within the MFF was an important element in the debate on the CAP, given the need for justification (Matthews 2015). Even more specifically, the suggestions for ‘external convergence’ would clearly involve cross-national distribution, aiming at the removal of perceived injustices in the distribution of CAP spending across countries. In sum, then, the cross-national distributional effects of CAP were relevant to the 2013 Reform debate.

What makes the CAP particularly interesting, however, is not simply the extent of the cross-national distributional effects, but also their certainty. To some extent, this certainty results from the decades of experience with this policy. In addition, however, they result from the fact that CAP spending as a part of the EU budget is so highly visible and the data accessible, such that it is rather easy to calculate, who wins and who loses from the policy (cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013; Zahrnt 2010). These figures leave relatively little room for rhetorical manoeuvre, and they do not require elaborate causal narratives, so that also the effects of potential changes as part of a reform can be judged rather easily.

Extant research on conflict over CAP

Given the highly visible nature of these distributional effects across countries, it should not come as a surprise that the CAP is often invoked as an example of a policy area involving and being shaped by national interests in the extant literature (e.g. Fouilleux 2013). While Noury (2002) only suspected that on issues such as CAP conflict in the EP might diverge from the typical Left-Right pattern he (as well as others before and thereafter) discovered, Faas (2003) was indeed able to detect higher probabilities of defection in this policy area. To the knowledge of the author, the idea of CAP (and other issues involving cross-national distribution) as an exception to the rule (i.e. ideologically structured conflict in the EP) has never been questioned.³²

Nevertheless, it can be argued that studying the conflict on the 2013 Reform of CAP, especially in the manner intended here, is worthwhile beyond the purpose of comparison with the other two policy issues in the sample, in that it promises additional insights to some open questions also with regard to this particular policy area. First, Fouilleux notes that “CAP is also an excellent example of what happens when there is no real link between the EU institutions and the EU’s citizens”, in that Member States could often use the Commission as a scapegoat in this policy area (ibid. 2013, 312). With the combined effects of general politicisation and the involvement of the EP, voters’ preferences might play a more important role and might act counter to a potential producer bias, for instance.

³² Studies on the 2013 Reform itself, inasmuch as they existed at the time of writing, will be considered in Section 5.4 as a part of the external validity of the findings produced in the present study.

Second, Bailer et al. (2015) find that national interests as ‘objective’ as those established in the domain of agriculture considerably shape the conflict in the Council of the EU, while for instance the Left-Right orientation of governments does not do so at all. At the same time, Fouilleux notes that even farmers themselves, as the party most directly concerned by CAP’s distributional effects, often have preferences that cannot be reduced to their economic interests alone: For instance, they prefer price support over direct payments for reasons of professional ethics, albeit the former leave them financially worse off (ibid. 2013, 312). To some extent, then, the role of and relation between ideas and interests is still open even when it comes to this seemingly well researched policy area.

The theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2 suggested answers to both of these open questions, which will be contrasted with extant theoretical approaches in Section 3 of the present chapter. In addition, the highly qualitative research design used here will not only be able to detect, whether the number of defections is higher regarding CAP than it is for the debate on Europeanised welfare, for instance, but will further avoid the motives of individual parties being hidden behind overall probabilities. Thereby, the difference between position taking that is driven by ideas rather than interests should become visible where applicable. At the level of measurement, the Policy Frame Analysis conducted on the 2013 Reform of the CAP will establish in how far the arguments used to justify a particular direction of CAP reform are instrumental to the pursuit of national interests or to those of particular societal groups within the country, or whether they correspond to a party’s genuine ideology or a national ideational tradition of market intervention. As a first step in this analysis, the next section presents the possible policy frames on the reform as identified based on secondary literature mostly, which then serves as the basis for the respective codebook (see Annex II) and allows for the formulation of observable implications of the various theoretical approaches.

5.2 Identification of possible policy frames

In this section, the possible policy frames identified with regard to the 2013 Reform of the CAP are identified by complementing and updating frames policy frames on CAP employed by the European Commission as analysed by Rhinard with secondary literature and expert commentaries on the Reform. Four frames are identified in this manner: First, a ‘classic’ frame addressing primarily the needs of farmers, given the ‘special’ nature of agriculture, by means of strongly interventionist and cost-intensive policies. Second, a ‘liberalisation’ frame that challenges the classic frame in basically all respects by treating agriculture like any another economic sector and by demonstrating in terms of classic economics the social cost of the respective subsidies. Third, a ‘multifunctionality’ frame acknowledging the particularities of farming, albeit mainly in terms of the public goods it provides, which in turn calls for a different sort of income support. Fourth, an anti-centralisation frame centred on the causal narrative that the heterogeneity of European landscapes defies the effectiveness of a common agricultural policy.

How the policy frames were identified

The preceding section focused on policies that have been adopted or discussed with regard to European agriculture. In doing so, I have tried to avoid inasmuch as possible any reference to the ‘reasons’ either in terms of what has caused a certain policy or what has justified it, with the notable exception of general pressures for reform. This was done so as to make it easier to perceive of these justifications as separate

and more or less independent logics, which together with the policies they address form the policy frames that have been and are used with regard to European agricultural policy. This section, then, presents these logics that were identified using secondary literature. As a starting point for doing so, the work by Mark Rhinard (2010) on the policy framing strategies of the European Commission has been particularly helpful. He has identified what he calls the ‘classic’ frame on CAP, two further frames used to drive the MacSharry and Fischler reforms that (with more historical hindsight) I found helpful to fuse into one, as well as the basics of a ‘liberalisation’ meta frame that I have further specified for CAP. These starting points allowed for finding examples and ‘updates’ of these frames in further secondary literature, mostly think tank publications making sense of the 2013 Reform proposals in a kind of pioneering role.

Most of the policy proposals included in the 2013 Reform package as well as arguments in favour of or against them in the expert debate could be straightforwardly linked back to the frames identified by Rhinard. Noteworthy, Erjavec et al. (2015) identify a very similar set of discourses (or frames) – a productivist, neoliberal, and a multifunctional one – that dominated the debate on the 2013 Reform, which corroborates the identification of frames as a part of the present study that had to be completed prior to the publication of Erjavec et al.’s work.³³ A fourth and final possible frame was constructed by combining arguments in favour of de-centralisation found in various academic and expert publications. Noteworthy, the description of the frames does not draw in any way on the data used in the empirical analysis.

The possible policy frames on CAP reform

The **first frame** identified has dominated the Common Agricultural Policy for the first three decades of its existence and is thus referred to by Rhinard (2010) as the ‘**classic**’ frame, a label that is adopted for here the further discussion of policy frames on CAP. While this frame was created in particular historical conditions which have contributed to its dominance, this does not necessarily mean that all actors involved in negotiating CAP or affected by the negotiated outcomes have been equally pleased with the moves away from the classic frame. In fact, commentators on the 2013 reform have used (or invoked?) the legitimacy crisis of the CAP for reviving what they called “The Forgotten Ideas” (Bréhon 2011, 8).

As Rhinard points out – and explains before the historical background of the post-war era – food security was the central rationale of this frame (ibid. 2010, 70). The link of food security to the well-being of farmers is mainly historical: at a time when farmers’ well-being mattered for the economic rationale of food-security, it also carried a considerable political importance, as farmers made up a central political force (percentage of the population, capacity for mobilization) as well. Nonetheless, the logical overlap between these two aims consists in attributing the status of an end in itself to the act of producing food. In recent years, the issue of food security has seen a twofold update: On the one hand, a globalized

³³ The main difference appears to be that they attributed the idea of ‘public money for public goods’ to a neoliberal line of thought. In the present study, this line of reasoning is attributed instead to the multifunctionality frame, given the strong link between multifunctionality and the provision of environmental public goods, for instance.

perspective on agriculture challenges the self-evident way in which food security is considered in Europe today (Bréhon 2011, 7–8). In this context, it has also been pointed out that the alternative, food dependence, is morally problematic: in the case of global shortages, rich European countries would still be able to import food at the expense of poorer regions (ibid. 2011, 7). On the other hand, food security is now also framed in qualitative terms rather than quantitative terms (ibid. 2011, 9). Thereby also the act of producing food obtains renewed prestige. At the same time, alternative value bases for CAP such as ‘multifunctionality’ (see below), ecological aspects of it in particular, as well as competitiveness are rejected as secondary or too complex for achieving popular support (ibid. 2011, 7–11).

Anything that impinges on the production of food *as such* as well as on farmers as the actors entrusted with the honourable task of producing food is therefore perceived as problematic within this frame. Noteworthy, such problems are inherent to agricultural production. In this sense, agriculture has been considered as an industry apart, with ‘special’ needs (cf. Rhinard 2010, 70). After all, agriculture is subject to *force majeure* in terms of weather conditions, which confronts producers with considerable uncertainty about production conditions. For instance, in a recent volume of ‘The European Union Explained’ issued by the European Commission, this classic frame stressing the uncertainty as a problem particular to agriculture and explaining it by reference to climate- and weather-dependency is still cited (European Commission 2014b, 7). While uncertainty may affect other industries as well, farmers further need to plan production very much in advance. At the same time, demand for food tends to remain rather stable, so that even if prices drop, consumers will not buy more food while farmers cannot reduce production quickly enough (Ackrill 2000, 20–21; Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258). If left to itself, agriculture may hence be much less attractive than other professional activities, which means that without intervention, jobs in (European) agriculture may get replaced (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258). Logically, if too few people decide in favour of an occupation in agriculture, food production in Europe would be threatened.

While these problem definitions and causal narratives have a long tradition, recent developments in world markets seem to provide them with new relevance in that price volatility is expected to develop into “an increasingly regular phenomenon” (Bianchi 2011, 164; d'Oultremont 2011, 10; Mahé 2012, 3), partly due to financial speculation (Bianchi 2011, 16). The crises in the dairy sector are cited as an example from which ‘lessons’ should be learned (ibid. 2011, 14). In sum, this frame is arguably far from dead, although it has lost its former dominance in shaping policy.

Classically, three policy solutions are suggested by advocates of this frame, grouped under the heading of Common Market Organization (CMO): guarantee prices, tariffs, quotas and export subsidies. Of these, the guarantee or target price is certainly the most essential element, whereas the others are more or less supporting the feasibility of its application. By fixing prices, the uncertainty confronting farmers under market conditions is considerably reduced, and farmers then have an incentive to produce sufficient amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of increasing production, as the target price is set above the market price) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). Tariffs are set on agricultural products entering the common market in order to avoid an influx of cheap food from outside, thereby serving the principle of

Community preference (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258; Fouilleux 2013, 310). While prices can be kept at the target level by buying up and storing surpluses (Fouilleux 2013, 310), the surpluses can alternatively or additionally be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. making European food competitive on a global level) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259; Matthews 2011, 10). Quotas may not be attractive within this frame (if compared to target prices), given that while they also lead to higher prices, they limit production quantities by definition and thus eventually limit farmers' incomes indirectly. At the same time, if compared to a completely liberalised market, where goods can be sold only at world market prices, quotas might still seem attractive and act as a safeguard for farmers' economic existence (e.g. Barnes 2015). Accordingly, their abolition for the sake of liberalisation will be opposed by proponents of this frame.

The 'classic' CAP policy instruments have been under massive critique for decades due to the burdens they impose on consumers and tax payers (who have to pay directly or indirectly for target prices), on non-EU countries (not least on developing ones who are hampered massively in their development due to the fact their only competitive sectors are effectively hampered from exporting to the EU) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 260), and on the environment (Rhinard 2010, 71–73). Nevertheless, in the debate on the 2013 Reform, they have seen a revival in the form of a 'safety net' consisting mainly of a new Special Reserve for market interventions in times of food crises (d'Oultremont 2011, 10; Mahé 2012, 35–37). As a whole, the values, reasoning, and the policy solutions of this frame appear to carry relevance beyond the history books. Just because the reforms so far have indicated a move away from this frame, this does not mean that it continues to shape the conceptions of the CAP in the hearts and minds of some actors.

At the same time, even the most ardent supporters of this frame will not necessarily limit themselves to suggesting a return to the 'old' CAP. Next to a probably extensive 'safety net', they are likely to generally support a 'strong' CAP, rejecting budgetary cuts. On the one hand, some proponents of this frame in the literature, most notably Bréhon (2011), seem to consider the current way of justifying and applying direct payments as somehow 'unworthy' of the noble task of food production. That is because such direct payments are consciously 'decoupled' from food production, not actually rewarding this activity.

Along these lines, one might attribute the 2013 Reform proposal for limiting direct payments to 'active farmers' to this first frame. On the other hand, however, within the current system they are likely to prefer what is referred to as 'Pillar I' over 'Pillar II', as the latter has always been meant to fund those aspects of farming that go beyond food production, which means that from the perspective of the classic frame, it lacks legitimacy and diverts resources from where they should actually be allocated. By contrast, direct payments under the first pillar have replaced price support, and so the minimum supporters of the classic frame would want to achieve is there subsistence, preferably historical levels. Among the more fine-grained measures, the specific support for young farmers fits the general logic of this frame, as it serves to sustain farming as a profession in Europe based on the normative idea that this profession is valuable as such. Needless to say, market liberalisation should be rejected from this perspective, as should 'greening',

because it imposes costs on farmers and might be considered too intrusive to the food production process.

In his work on strategic framing by the Commission, Rhinard (2010) discusses three frames on CAP that have been promoted by the Commission at different points in time, of which the ‘classic frame’ discussed above is one. In explaining frame change away from the classic frame, Rhinard also mentions a ‘market liberalisation meta-frame’ that was particularly strong in the 1980s and is said to have shaped the Single Market agenda (ibid. 2010, 81). It is not clear, however, why liberalisation policies should be pushed by means of a frame that is necessarily of some kind of ‘higher order’. Instead, if the classic frame mainly considers agriculture as a policy apart, a CAP-specific version of the supposed meta-frame may challenge exactly this by evaluating, analyzing and treating CAP like any other policy. Before this background, it seems plausible to consider works comparing policies and policy-making in the EU (Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005) and on the economics of these policies in particular (Altomonte and Nava 2005) in order to distil a ‘**liberalisation frame**’ specifically regarding CAP.

Indeed, when introducing CAP as an EU policy, Elmar Rieger makes great effort to stress its anti-market and anti-liberal foundations (ibid. 2005, 162, 196). As he points out:

Unlike other welfare-state institutions, agricultural measures typically fuse production – that is, output-increasing- with income-related goals, making it hard to separate distributive and regulatory dimensions, and in ways that defy the application of *normal economic efficiency criteria*. This is still true for the new regime of ‘decoupled’ farm aid. (ibid. 2005, 164, my emphasis)

The idea of ‘normal economic efficiency criteria’ can accordingly be considered as the normative foundation of the liberalisation frame before which the CAP is to be evaluated and on which the right kind of CAP would have to be founded. In other words, the problem with CAP consists in the policies adopted in this policy area, especially under the classic frame, which do not follow ‘normal economic efficiency criteria’ and hence entails social costs that are unacceptably high.

So what, according to this frame, has caused this problem? One more time, Rieger’s work, consciously or not, quite obviously exemplifies this frame:

CAP planning is premised on a view of a ‘general’ European interest and notions of a basic incentive structure common to all farmers. It shares this feature with state socialism, where the diversity of interests, not properly taken into account in the planning process, spontaneously makes itself felt when individual farmers make decisions most convenient for them. CAP decisions have been made as if these objective economic laws did not apply in agriculture. Therefore, ‘post-decision surprises’ are a constant feature, because economic laws continue to function. (ibid. 2005, 176)

In order to complement this causal narrative, one has to be familiar with these ‘objective economic laws’, usually elaborated in a classic social cost analysis using a supply and demand curve (cf. Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258). The argument is that classic CAP policies place a burden on consumers who pay the “difference between the smaller quantity actually consumed at the politically determined domestic target price (P_T) and the higher quantity eventually available for consumption without price intervention, at price P_0 or, without tariff protection, at price P_W .”, while on top of that taxpayers have to pay for the export subsidies (ibid.). In addition, these export subsidies and tariffs harm third-country producers and eventually hamper free trade, causing further indirect harm to efficiency. Direct payments, the policy

suggested by the multifunctionality frame discussed below, are more efficient and hence preferred over market interventions. Nevertheless, direct payments may keep farm business in the market that would otherwise not be economically viable, that is, which are inefficient (d'Oultremont 2012, 15; Mahé 2012, 30–31; Rieger 2005, 172). What is implied here is that a farm which is not working efficiently is also not worth supporting. Obviously, these causal narratives are not always told in all detail in political statements; yet, references to the ‘wrong incentives’ set by existing policies in terms of public spending may be seen as instances of the cognitive dimension of this frame.

On the policy dimension, subsidies of any kind – even direct payments – must therefore be cut and eventually abolished, as they are considered problematic with regard to ‘normal’ economic efficiency criteria (Rieger 2005, 166). Such a policy of budgetary discipline has coincided in time with the rise of the liberalisation frame (Ackrill 2000, 87), but further would be valuable regarding efficiency. After all, all government spending must be based on taxes, which in turn, are likely to hamper the Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Of the other policy tools considered in CAP, and with regard to the 2013 Reform in particular, the so-called ‘greening’ is probably not endorsed – at least not actively promoted – by proponents of this frame. (Politically determined) environmental objectives of the CAP might be considered at odds with efficiency: they limit the free choice of the farmer-entrepreneur to allocate resources in a market-oriented – and hence efficient – manner. In order to avoid coding ambiguities, however, active opposition to ‘greening’ will be attributed to the classic frame. After all, ‘greening’ of direct payments would be out of question anyway if direct payments were abolished.

Inasmuch as the ‘capping’ is concerned, large farms are often considered more efficient (Mahé 2012, 30–31), so that capping might punish exactly those enterprise that do their job ‘best’. At the same time, it could be argued that efficient farms do not need any further support, so that if they receive direct payments they do not need, the support system would be inefficient (d'Oultremont 2012, 15). This contradiction, however, only exists as direct payments are not a policy of choice for proponent of the liberalisation frame anyway. Indeed, further market orientation is the general line of policy following from this frame. During the debate on the 2013 Reform, advocates of the liberalisation frame will thus call for a further reduction in direct payments, will support the expiry of the quota system and will fight the creation of a ‘safety net’ and of Producer Organisations (cf. d'Oultremont 2011, 9–10). Finally, it must be noted, that the liberalisation frame does not reject *all* of the features of CAP: after all, free trade in agricultural goods as provided for in the Single Market project would appear desirable.

When identifying policy frames, it is important not to confuse the temporal appearance, rise to dominance and decline of a frame with its genuine logic. As for what is referred to here as the ‘**multifunctionality frame**’ it might be argued that it replaced the classic frame as the dominant frame for policy-making on CAP mainly because of pressures that were part of a climate of liberalisation. Ackrill, for instance, identifies the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the “main motivation” behind the 1992 MacSharry Reform which marked the decline of the classic frame (ibid. 2000, 67). Supporters of the liberalisation frame may have used GATT as an argument for reforms of the CAP, while supporters of the classic frame might have struggled to at least substitute for key aspects (e.g. some form of income

support for farmers) of the classic frame. The rise of the multifunctionality frame may thus have been the result of the compromise between these two more extreme camps. Such explanations notwithstanding, the multifunctionality frame does follow a logic of its own, and this logic may then become a tool in the hands of political actors involved in the 2013 Reform. With some historical hindsight, it also seems appropriate to abandon Rhinard's distinction between the Rural World frame on which the MacSharry Reform was based and the multifunctionality frame that served as the basis for the 2003 (or 'Fischler') Reform by considering the latter as an extension of the former.

The multifunctionality frame and the classic frame have in common that they both value farming. Yet, while in the classic frame the act of farming is valuable *as such*, i.e. as food production, the multifunctionality frame values farming as a means for the production not just of food but also of other, public goods. These consist in the maintenance of the countryside, including both rural traditions but also the preservation of the natural environment (Rhinard 2010, 71–75). Farming techniques meant to aim at the production of these public goods by definition, such as organic farming, would thus appear particularly valuable. However, often there is not only a shortage of positive externalities of farming, but farming may even harm the environment (negative externalities). If farming is not seen as a value as such but should actually produce public goods rather than reducing them, this is obviously problematic. Advocates of the multifunctionality frame argue, that overly intensive farming practices are the cause of the negative externalities of farming (ibid. 2010, 71). Noteworthy, as was argued above, intensive farming was precisely what the classic instruments of CAP were meant to achieve. At the same time, the multifunctionality frame recognizes that the farmers have “special needs” (ibid. 2010, 75), i.e. they require public funding to survive – which they deserve provided that they produce the desired public goods in addition to food itself.

From a multifunctionality perspective, therefore, simply abolishing all subsidies and leaving farmers to free competition is not the solution, since the market does not pay for the desired public goods (cf. European Commission 2014b, 4). In order to produce the desired public goods, farming must be subsidized – without, however, fostering the negative externalities resulting from excessive production. Hence, the multifunctionality frame propagates the concept of ‘decoupling’, that is, of paying farmers directly, independent of the amount of food they produce. From the perspective of this frame, ‘decoupling’ does not mean, what Rieger takes it to mean, namely that “farmers obtain payments irrespective of what – and how much – they produce” (ibid. 2005, 178). Following a multifunctional logic, farmers are actually paid for what they produce, namely public goods next to food. In order to obtain direct payments, farmers have to comply with environmental, food quality and animal welfare standards.

As was mentioned before, the direct payments constitute the so-called ‘pillar 1’ of the CAP. Under the old system of the Single Payment Scheme, however, direct payments were still largely a reward for earlier food production records and at best indirectly related to public goods production. Hence, the structural funds forming ‘pillar 2’ of the CAP are even more central to this frame, as these funds were more targeted at the multiple other functions of agriculture. More recently, the proposals for the 2013 Reform have somewhat blurred the borders between the two pillars (cf. Mahé 2012), as a ‘greening’ of the

first pillar was suggested, which meant that 30 per cent of the national envelopes would have to be directly made conditional on even stricter environmental conditions. With ‘greening’ adopted, direct payments would be more in line with the logic of this frame, because they would directly be related to the production of environmental public goods. In fact, the more and the stricter ‘greening’ is introduced, the more desirable it would seem for proponents of this frame.

Many other innovations of the 2013 Reform are also very much in line with the idea of multifunctionality. The so-called internal convergence – implied in ‘capping’ and the small-farmers scheme – mentioned above makes sense insofar as the production of the desired public goods would not seem to grow proportionally to the size of a farm business. Similarly, the concept of ‘equity’ with regard to the Single Farm Payments (i.e. the ‘ungreened’, standard part of the direct payments) makes sense within this frame: so far, the SFPs are lower in some member states than they are in others (most importantly in the new member states). However, one might argue that the production of the agriculture-related public goods should be equally valued in all parts of the EU (d’Oultremont 2011, 2; 2012, 15). By contrast, from a classic frame perspective, historic production accounts may be considered a fair basis for the distribution of payments both across and within countries. From a liberalisation perspective, direct payments should be abolished anyway, and yet if they persist, they should arguably not distort competition and should thence be the same across countries (d’Oultremont 2012, 15). In sum, while the multifunctionality frame may have started as a lowest common denominator between two older frames, it has become a logic of its own, and it has dominated the 2013 Reform agenda. Obviously, that does not mean that all actors are equally supportive of it.

Setting CAP on the normative foundation of public goods while making the respective policies more compatible with market dynamics might have saved the CAP since the 1990s decades. In fact, however, what could eventually kill the CAP as an EU policy is precisely what has so far contributed to its survival – this, at least, might be the impression created by some commentators on CAP and on the 2013 Reform. The line of argument outlined only tentatively by these scholars might form the basis for a fourth frame. This **anti-centralisation frame** is not among the frames identified by Rhinard (2010), but shall still be outlined here, as it is plausible that some actors within the EP will forward it in the debate on the 2013 Reform.

Like the multifunctionality frame, the anti-centralisation frame would be based on the value of farming in terms of public goods. While there is some variation regarding the extent to which the following applies, however, several scholars argue that (some of) these public goods are much more local in nature than they are European (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 272; Mahé 2012, 48–50; Rieger 2005, 174–75). This implies that also the demand for these public goods would be local, and hence arguably dependent on local circumstances of local farmers and rural populations. It is the specific needs of ‘our’ farmers and rural areas, then, which forms the normative basis of this frame.

Following this logic, the EU might not be able to foster the provision of these public goods in the best possible manner. In other words, there might be a problem in terms of a mismatch between the level of public goods provision, a ‘distance’ between ‘Brussels’ and the respective localities would exist. This

distance could then lead to a gap in terms of local knowledge about the special needs of the local farming population, and would imply a long chain of top-down delegation open to mismanagement and intransparent channels of subsidy allocation (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 276; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-175). As a result, the justification for steering direct payments from the EU-level is undermined (Mahé, 2012, pp. 48-50; Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 272; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-175).

In policy terms, the consequence would accordingly be partial or even total re-nationalisation of agricultural policy, more indirectly referred to as ‘flexibility’. Provided that this does not entail the abolition of all subsidies, however, this might in turn lead to serious distortions of competition on the common market for food; for after all, different member states might not want or not be able to grant the same amounts of subsidies to their respective farming communities. Hence, giving up EU-financing of the CAP also means to give up an important element of the Single Market, and, eventually, of European integration (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 3; European Commission 2014b, p. 6). Noteworthy, this frame is partly already reflected, it seems, in the 2013 Reform itself, for even the Commission makes use of it when proclaiming the new CAP after 2013:

There is new flexibility for Member States in the budgeting and implementation of first Pillar instruments, acknowledging the wide diversity of agriculture, agronomic production potential and climatic, environmental as well as socio-economic conditions and needs across the EU. (European Commission 2013e, p. 5)

Not surprisingly, however, the Commission makes use of this frame only scarcely, and to the foregoing statement immediately adds: “This flexibility will however be framed by well-defined regulatory and budgetary limits in order to ensure a level-playing field at European level and that common objectives are met” (ibid.). Yet, during the debate on the Reform, there most likely have been actors using this frame much more eagerly.

At this point, the general policy trajectories for CAP – return to market intervention, liberalisation, greening and convergence, decentralisation – have been linked to a particular policy frame with norms, labels for problematisation and causal narratives. This also holds for most of the more specific policy measures discussed as part of the 2013 Reform, that is, they can be analysed as parts of wider ideational frameworks (for an overview see Table 30 below). As the individual policies belong to a particular frame for a reason and can be traced back to a similar value system, they also tend to be similar in their distributional effects. For instance, policies belonging to the policy dimension of the classic frame all tend to be primarily beneficial for farmers, and indirectly for those countries with substantial farming sectors. Hence, it should now be possible to derive from extant theories as well as from the theory of territorialisation, which national party delegations from which countries can be expected to make use of a particular frame predominantly, whether they will thereby defect from their respective ideology and what this means for the resulting structure of conflict. Precise guidelines for coding statements on the 2013 Reform, including typical examples, as well as more specific instructions on such difficult choices shall be provided in a codebook as part of Annex II.

Table 30: Overview of policy frames on CAP and the 2013 Reform

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| classic (F1) | Food production, food safety → farming as an end in itself | Economic uncertainty of farming, nowadays in the form of extreme price volatility | Farming is special, an industry apart that cannot be made subject to market laws because of weather conditions and rigidity of demand; food speculation enhances the problem | Market intervention or at least generous recompensation in terms of direct payments; safety net as third pillar; extra support for young farmers; 'active farmers' condition |
| Liberalisation (F2) | efficiency | Market distortions and their social cost | Market intervention (including direct payments, which keep unprofitable businesses in the market) of any kind reduces efficiency | Liberalisation, i.e. more market orientation, no more subsidies (at least cut CAP budget) |
| Multi-functionality (F3) | Environment; social justice; development; equity → farming as a means for public goods | Farming externalities (too many negative ones, while the positive ones remain unrewarded) | Caused by: wrong subsidies BUT ALSO market failure | Direct payments and Pillar 2 → greening → capping → Pillar 2 rather than Pillar 1 → convergence (internal & external) |
| Anti-centralisation (F4) | The specific needs of 'our' farmers – local public goods | CAP as a European policy | The EU cannot get things right because it is 'too far off', does not know local circumstances | Nationalisation of subsidies, flexibility in implementation |

5.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case

This first of all specifies the characteristics of the case with regard to the six countries whose MEPs the present study is focused on. As is argued, this selection of countries is almost ideally balanced in terms of net payers and net recipients (i.e. national interests), as well as in terms of the types of capitalism (i.e. national traditions). The limitation to Western Europe is not a problem either, since the more specific distributional effects of 'external convergence' did barely become the object of conflict in the debate. Next, the observable implications of extant theories on conflict in the EU at large and in the EP in particular are formulated for this case and set of countries/parties, in order to be subsequently contrasted with those based on the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2. Several of the extant approaches would expect some but not total territorialisation of conflict regarding the 2013 Reform of CAP. This would apply to the theory of territorialisation as well. However, where the extant theories fail to specify the exact manner in which distributional effects translate into actor behaviour or are built on pre-Crisis assumptions, the theory of territorialisation provides more precise and up-to-date accounts. Accordingly, Christian Democratic and Conservative parties from net-recipient countries (Ireland, France, Austria) are expected to defect, as are other Right-wing parties from state capitalist countries (France), as they are forced trade-off policy-seeking for vote-seeking due to structural conditions (certainty of distributional effects). By contrast, Left-wing parties from net-paying countries will resort to a blurring strategy at most, given that their voters can be catered in terms of policies corresponding to centre-Left ideology anyway, while at the same time serving their distributional interests within the countries.

Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries

As was pointed out in Chapter 3, for reasons of feasibility and comparability, this study is limited to national parties and their delegations to the EP from six Member States only, namely Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, France, and Italy. Before the observable implications of both extant theories as well as the present theoretical framework can be formulated, it is helpful to specify the implications of the policy issue for this particular set of Member States. Thereby, it can be examined, in how far exactly this selection of countries covers both sides of a potential cross-national distribution, but also in how far national traditions can be controlled for.

Given the certainty of cross-national distribution and the straightforward manner in which net payers and net recipients of the CAP can be identified, it can be shown in a quick and uncontroversial manner, that this selection of countries is very well balanced: it includes three countries who can be considered net payers to the CAP budget, namely Germany, the UK, and Italy, as well as three net recipients, namely France, Ireland, and Austria (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013, 36–55; Zahrnt 2010). The concept of *net* payers and *net* recipients, respectively, is quite important here, because a classification of the countries simply by the absolute amounts they receive or contribute is just likely to reflect their size. A country such as Ireland, for instance, does not even receive a third of the amounts Germany receives, but it also only contributes about a tenth of the amount Germany pays. At the same time, Ireland receives about twice as much as it contributes itself, and thus would have a much bigger interest in keeping CAP a well-funded EU-level policy than Germany does.

This aspect is particularly important with regard to Italy, for one might otherwise easily associate it with a stereotype of ‘Southern’ countries characterised by large and productive agricultural sectors and hence with a ‘national interest’ in a strong CAP. In fact, however, the country would be better off if it had to finance its own farmers only. Noteworthy also, the UK and Germany rank among the countries getting most out of the CAP in absolute terms, but are generally not suspected as typical supporters of CAP.

The six countries selected cover rather extreme cases of net recipients and net payers, but with Austria also include a country that, while still counting as a net recipient, is situated somewhere in the middle. More important than the differences in amounts of net payments/ receipts is the fact that Austria only becomes a net recipient of the CAP if pillar 2 payments are included (cf. Zahrnt 2010). In other words, if direct payments to farmers alone are considered, it contributes more than it receives, but overcompensates for that by the amount of rural development spending. Its ‘objective’ national interests should thus be different from those of net payers, but also from those of other net recipients. In the next subsections, it will be discussed how exactly this should be observable in terms of frame usage.

Does this imply, then, that with regard to cross-national distributional effects of CAP and the 2013 Reform, the selection of countries is ideal? So far, only the overall budgetary implications of CAP have been evaluated in this respect, and they certainly do figure in the debate on the 2013 Reform, not least because of the Crisis context in which it would take. It might be argued, however, that one of the

more concrete proposals of the 2013 Reform, namely external convergence, also had potential to shift the net balance of CAP payments, and hence deserves particular attention.

As this distribution would occur mainly between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, the selection of countries would seem to lack representatives of the new Member States. As Swinnen notes, however, this particular aspect of the Reform “played less of a role in the debates than one would have expected” (ibid. 2015b, 16), an impression that was more than confirmed during the coding process for the purposes of this study. Swinnen (ibid.) lists no less than four possible explanations for this lack of controversy on external convergence, none of which contradicts the general idea that distributional effects matter for the structure of conflict. For example, it is possible that the new Member States “were more focused on lobbying for the maintenance of the overall DP [i.e. direct payments] budget” (ibid.). This, in fact, would not seem to set them apart from net recipients included in the sample. As a result, the six countries selected should cover the distributional aspects of the conflict on the 2013 Reform of CAP adequately indeed.

In addition, this set of countries accounts for the hypothetical possibility that policy preferences on CAP are not exclusively shaped by distributional concerns. This is because it includes ‘Northern’ as well as ‘Southern’ countries, but more importantly, countries that vary with regard to their respective type of capitalism (e.g. Schmidt 2005). The type of capitalism, in turn, might function as what I have referred to by the notion of ‘national tradition’ and thereby shape perceptions on the appropriateness of state intervention in the economy. As should be clear by now, controversies on the CAP as well as its reforms have been precisely about the question of the appropriate degree of state intervention into this particular branch of the economy. The statist type of capitalism would seem to resonate well with CAP, and with the ‘classic’ CAP in particular, while these same policies might be more critically reviewed in countries where state intervention is considered less ‘normal’. Hence, the set of countries should include net payers and net recipients from the various types of capitalism. Fortunately, this is the case here, in that there is one net recipient and one net payer per type of capitalism. In sum, therefore, inasmuch as country-level conditions in terms of national interests or traditions shape the structure of conflict on CAP and its 2013 Reform, the selection of countries should adequately reflect such a pattern.

Table 31: Country-level conditions of relevance for CAP specified for the six countries

| country | Type of capitalism | Net payer |
|---------|--------------------|-----------|
| Germany | managed | yes |
| Austria | managed | no |
| Italy | statist | yes |
| France | statist | no |
| UK | liberal | yes |
| Ireland | liberal | no |

Observable implications of earlier approaches

Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I will first discuss which predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties’ framing strategies

based on the extant theoretical literature reviewed in detail in the same chapter. I will start with the more general theories of conflict in EU politics, before turning to the EP-specific ones and eventually to the explanations provided by Bailer et al. (2015) on conflict involving ‘objective’ national interests as in the case of CAP.

The ‘**cleavage approach**’ (Marks and Wilson 2000) would assume that CAP is interpreted by the national parties represented in the EP through their respective ideological lens, attributing no role to national interests induced by cross-national distributional effects. Consequently, the structure of conflict would also be ideological. It seems worthwhile spelling out here, which frames the members of the various party families would use accordingly, because this very clear-cut picture can then be contrasted with more nuanced predictions later. This is done here by moving from the far Right to the far Left.

Extreme Right parties such as the BNP and the NPD should clearly prefer the anti-centralisation frame (F4) as an expression of their nationalism and principled Euroscepticism, and the same holds for Right-Wing Populist parties, inasmuch as these parties can be said to employ an established ideology yet. Conservative and Christian Democratic parties have strong *electoral* ties to the farming world, resulting historically from the so-called rural-urban cleavage but persisting to some extent to the present day for the respective parties in the sample (in general and with special reference to France see Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2007, 173 for the former Italian Christian Democrats, whose ‘heirs’ are both Forza Italia and the Partito Democratico, see Donovan 1994, 80 for Austria, see Müller and Steininger 1994, 93 for Germany see Walter, Werwath, and D’Antonio 2014 and Weigl 2013; for Ireland see Holmes 1996; for the UK see Brannen 2015). That said, with the change of Conservative/Christian Democratic ideology towards the inclusion of neoclassical economic ideas that took place in the 1980s (cf. Chapter 3 also), the overlap between rural/farmers’ interests might persist in some policy areas, but not regarding an economic policy such as CAP. Rather, one would expect Conservative and Christian Democratic parties to adopt the liberalisation rhetoric (here: frame F2) they have adopted in all other policy areas since the 1980s.³⁴

Liberal ideology clearly corresponds to the kinds of arguments included in frame F2, which these parties should use predominantly, strictly opposing the ‘old’ CAP and its legacies. Social Democratic parties generally favour market intervention, albeit the efficiency of such measures has become a concern for these parties in recent years. Ideologically speaking, they should therefore prefer a CAP that corrects market failures but is centred on the efficient provision of public goods by means of public money, which corresponds to the multifunctional frame (F3). This frame should clearly also be preferred by Green parties due to its strong emphasis on environmental public goods and environmental protection policies.

³⁴ Of course one might argue also, that ‘agricultural exceptionalism’ is itself an element of Conservative/ Christian Democratic ideology. Considering ideology as a set of ideas rather than the sum of expressed policy positions, however, there is nothing really in Conservative (cf. Festenstein and Kenny (2005)) or Christian Democratic (cf. Dierickx (1994)) ideology that would directly imply the special treatment of farmers. In fact, in this case those Conservative and Christian Democratic who then call for market orientation would be defecting, which eventually will not make much of a difference concerning the role of distributional effects provided by some theories, including the theory of territorialisation.

Far Left parties should prefer the classic frame (F1), for exactly the kind of ‘socialist’ elements of the old CAP that have been subject to critique in each reform debate (see above).

By contrast, a liberal intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik 1998) approach (if extended to the parliamentary setting of the EP, of course) would provide that in a policy area such as CAP, nationally based producer interests shape the structure of conflict into a strictly territorial direction. Where these producer interests – here: farmers – are strong, governments – here: MEPs – will conform to them, whereas if they are weaker, they will prefer liberalisation over a potentially failing EU-level policy (ibid. 1998, 495). Arguably, one might use the balance between contributions to the CAP budget (based on economic strength in general) and the receipts (still based more or less on the size of the farming sector) as a proxy for identifying the frames national delegations should use. Accordingly, agricultural producers will get their way in France and Ireland, so that parties from these countries use the frame F1 predominantly. By contrast, in Germany, the UK, and Italy, they should not be able to convince parties of the necessity of a strong CAP, so that parties from these countries should use frames calling for liberalisation or decentralisation of the policy (frames F2 and F4, respectively). Similarly, Austrian parties should use frame F3 mostly, because the country does not benefit disproportionately from direct payments to its farmers (see above). Noteworthy, even if the above proxy regarding the strength of farmers’ interests were incorrect, the structure of conflict here would still be territorial as a whole. After all, Moravcsik seems to expect that under certainty, all governments or parliamentary elites are more or less equally affected by producer pressures, independent of their respective ideology.

The ‘distribution model’ (Marks 2004) and the postfunctionalist theory (Hooghe and Marks 2009) building on it – the postfunctional extension in terms of uncertainty and identity should not matter here – would both predict that the simultaneous presence of intra- and cross-national distributional effects would produce a mixed or ‘territorialised’ structure of conflict, but not full-scale territorialisation. Moreover, given that the EP is a parliamentary setting, they would expect it to be slightly biased towards ideology. As I have criticised earlier, however, they do not point out the exact degree or mechanism via which distributional effects are translated into defection and eventual territorialisation.

Party goals in terms of office, votes, or policy might help to fill this gap, and this is what the 3G2P approach by Hix and others is built on. While office and, to a lesser extent, policy-seeking would normally lead to Left-Right contestation in the EP according to this approach, ‘national interests’ might lead national parties to pressure MEPs towards defection. Which parties defect exactly would largely be influenced by institutional parameters here, such as EPG membership (leading to a goal conflict with office-seeking) and control mechanisms available to the national party, rather than the interplay between the exact issue characteristics and party goals. Territorialisation would be limited by the goal conflict between intra-EP office-seeking and re-election seeking, which in their pre-Crisis account means being nominated again by the national party rather than the national party winning votes in the first place.

Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach equally expects ideologically structured conflict as a default which is only rarely abandoned, namely when ‘national interests’ in the form of ‘constituency interests’ are involved, which by all accounts is the case for CAP and CAP reform. Following Ringe, expert MEPs

might give in to such interests and might then be unable to come an agreement within their respective EPG, while the non-expert members national party delegations will trust their own experts (here: members of the agricultural committee, COMAGRI) or those from the same EPG. Consequently, one would expect some territorialisation from this perspective, and it would seem that national party delegations disposing of an expert of their own are more likely to defect from the party group rather than being guided by an expert from sister party.

According to the ‘bicameral theory’ (Costello and Thomson 2014) of conflict in the EP, lobbying by national governments is the main source of defection. It will occur in the presence of national interest, especially if these are salient and if a government finds itself isolated in the Council. Given its budgetary implications, the salience of the national interests on CAP is beyond doubt, so that lobbying by national governments should be massive with regard to the 2013 Reform. Noteworthy, Costello and Thomson seem to consider all parties equally receptive towards such governmental lobbying, so that even a complete territorialisation would seem plausible. Frames would thus be used in the same manner as predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism. According to Swinbank (2015), the United Kingdom was particularly isolated in Brussels, so that parties from this country would be particularly likely to defect, given the combination of national interests, their salience and isolation.

Transferring the line of argument by Bailer et al. (2015) from the Council to the EP, ‘objective’ national interests in terms of cross-national distribution should be highly relevant in a case such as CAP, rather than party ideology or alternative geographical patterns. At the same time, parties are not expected to give in to producer interests only, but also to consider the policy preferences of the electorate at large. Accordingly, one might expect rather far-reaching territorialisation along the lines of net payments rather than absolute receipts per country, and one should neither expect ideology to matter beyond representation of particular voter groups, nor should nationality play a role beyond hard, distributional logic. Frames should thus be used in line with the status as net payers and recipients as pointed out earlier.

Table 32: Overview of expectations and causal narratives based on extant theories

| Theory | Predicted structure of conflict | Causal narrative |
|--|---------------------------------|---|
| <u>General theories on conflict in EU politics</u> | | |
| Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 2000) | ideological | parties' domestic habits, lack of citizen preferences on EU issues |
| Distribution model (Marks 2004) | territorialised | distributional effects are both cross- and intra-national |
| Liberal intergovernmentalism | territorial | producer bias |
| Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009) | territorialised | distributional effects are both cross- and intra-national |
| <u>EP-specific theories</u> | | |
| 3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 2007) | territorialised (limited) | Some defection due to re-election seeking (i.e. being nominated by the national party), but countered by office-seeking |
| PPC approach (Ringe 2010) | territorialised? | Expert MEPs give in to constituency interests, others just follow experts |
| bicameral theory (Costello & Thomson 2014) | territorial | Lobbying by national governments in line with national interests |
| <u>Policy-specific theoretical arguments</u> | | |
| Bailer et al. 2015 | territorial | 'Objective' national interests in terms of distributional effects, but no producer bias |

Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation

The theory of territorialisation (ToT) provides that, given the politicisation of a post-Crisis EU, policy issues characterised by cross-national distributional effects lead to a territorial structure of conflict, provided that these cross-national distributional effects can be established with certainty. All of these conditions apply to the 2013 Reform of the CAP. In addition, however, there is a considerable degree of intra-national distribution involved. Therefore, the ToT would predict partial territorialisation of conflict only, and in this sense would resemble some of the extant theoretical approaches. What is special about the ToT, however, is its capacity for pointing out in detail, which parties exactly can be expected to defect from their ideological convictions, because it combines the idea of simultaneously aspired party goals with framing strategies available to parties under particular structural conditions.

National parties represented by their delegations in the EP are generally assumed to be simultaneously pursuing three goals, namely policy, votes, and, to an almost negligible extent, office (office-seeking within the EP is not rational, as Ringe points out, while office-seeking with regard to national governments is only indirectly affected). As the ToT holds, policy-seeking is driven by a party's ideology, while vote-seeking in EU politics is bound to a particular national territory. If parties followed their policy-seeking goal only, they would thus behave very much as predicted by the cleavage approach (see above). In a politicised EU, however, they cannot necessarily do so any longer, at least not when cross-national distributional effects are present and certain, without risking the attainment of their vote-seeking goals, which in turn are instrumental to the achievement of policy. Since policy-seeking is considered as the intrinsic motivation of these parties, they will, however, trade it in favour of vote-seeking only if this 'defection' is worth it. Outright electoral opportunism is not a viable strategy, because

it is not only detrimental to policy-seeking, but also to vote-seeking itself in the long run due to a loss of credibility. Parties will thus defect only if they can be rather sure that their action is not perceived as inappropriate by the electorate. Since most EU citizens – voters – identify more strongly with their nation-state than they do with Europe, defection for the sake of a certain national interest should be accepted usually. In addition, framing an issue in a way that people are used to from the national level (i.e. in line with a relevant national tradition) should not put a party's credibility at risk.

Parties on the Right should be ideologically opposed to an interventionist CAP (along the lines of frame F1 or F3), albeit for reasons that vary in importance across the party families of the Right, namely opposition to market intervention, regulation, and supranationalism. Accordingly, some (Conservatives, Liberals, partly RWP parties) should prefer frame F2 (liberalisation), and others should prefer frame F4 (extreme Right and RWP parties). However, for net recipients of the CAP, there is a highly certain and visible national interest for an interventionist CAP (frame F1 or at least F3 in the case of Austria), which would mean that Right-wing parties in such countries would be acting against this national interest if they stuck to their ideologically preferred frames. Clearly, however, a party that normally denounces the downsides of state intervention or of EU centralisation risks losing credibility if it suddenly becomes an advocate of EU-level interventionism. This risk will only be acceptable under two conditions. First, the party is sure to otherwise lose part of its core electorate, because this core electorate includes farmers, which first and foremost still applies to Christian Democratic and Conservative parties in the sample (see above for the important distinction between ideological and electoral links in this regard). Second, the party can be sure that its defection is in line with a pre-existing national tradition in terms of interventionism (applies to parties from France and Italy).

By contrast, Left-wing parties should favour some form of market intervention from an ideological point of view and agriculture should not form an exception to this. Clearly, net paying countries might have an interest in a less interventionist CAP. However, the goal conflict for Left-wing parties is not symmetrical to that faced by Right-wing parties from net receiving countries. This is because, first, the majority of citizens do not generally perceive of agricultural subsidies as an outright loss, as is documented by Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2014a). Second, parties whose ideology is in line with the multifunctional frame F3 anyway can direct attention to environmental and other public goods, to which the working class part of their core electorates contributes disproportionately via taxes and the postmaterialist part of their core electorate is willing to pay more. For Social Democratic parties from net-paying countries, it may be sufficient to include some calls for further market orientation by way of 'blurring', rather than risking long-term credibility by making themselves the champions of liberalisation. In fact, Green parties do not even have an incentive for blurring, since their electorates tend to be postmaterialist and identify with Europe more strongly, while not be the champions of 'greening' (frame F3) would put their credibility as environmentalists at risk.

While thus Left-wing parties (across families) from net-paying countries are not pushed towards defection in the way Right-wing parties from net-recipient or state-capitalist countries are, some Left-wing parties might be more interventionist than one would expect from a purely ideological perspective. This is

the case for those Left-wing parties that do not have their origins in a strong, urbanised labour movement, which applies to Irish Labour (cf. Holmes 1996) as well as to the Italian Partito Democratico, which is partly a creation of former Christian Democrats. These parties risk losing votes by advocating a policy that runs counter to their directly concerned farming electorates, while not risking punishment by the rest of their voters, since they come from countries benefitting massively from CAP (Ireland) or characterised by an interventionist tradition.

The ToT thus provides the basis for a highly differentiated expectation concerning the frame usage that will be observed, the strategic considerations behind and the overall structure of conflict resulting from it. In that sense, it is different from the overly simplifying predictions of the cleavage approach or liberal intergovernmentalism. At the same time, it limits itself to the interaction between structural conditions, strategic options and party goals. Government participation at the national level should not matter for framing considerations on CAP, since coalition partners do neither depend on uncertainty reduction via national administrations to the same extent due to the certainty of distributional effects. Opposition parties should be influenced by the lobbying efforts of their respective national governments even less – unlike the bicameral theory would predict. For the same reason, the ToT would not expect COMAGRI membership to matter beyond underlying self-selection for membership that however coincides with party goals, which contrasts with Ringe's PPC. While objective national interests are expected to play a role, as Bailer et al. predict, it is their interplay with ideology and national traditions that should prove decisive for defection according to the ToT.

Arguably, the overlap of the observable implications of the ToT with extant theories is biggest – for this case – with the 3G2P approach, as both the overall result (considerable but not total territorialisation) as well as the explanation (party goals) appear similar. However, the ToT does not assume that office-seeking plays an important role. This can be tested based on the impact on frame usage of, on the one hand, EPG membership as the basis for intra-EP office-seeking, and, on the other hand, party family membership as the basis of policy-seeking. The assumption that vote-seeking matters due to politicisation would be supported, amongst others, if parties put generally more emphasis on the policy-dimension compared to the debate on Europeanised welfare. This is because certainty of distributional effects implies that justifications are less important than policy suggestions, because voters know already which policies deliver for them and do not depend as much on the provision of causal narratives in order to identify their own preferences. It should thus still be possible to establish, even among those seemingly similar approaches, which one provides the better explanation of the PFA results discussed in the next section.

5.4 Results and discussion

In this section, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are presented and discussed with regard to the theoretical expectations specified in the preceding one. It is found that, when all case knowledge is taken into account and the caveats of equating territory-bound behaviour with national interests in purely distributional terms are corrected, the structure of conflict is more territorial than ideological. While this could be expected based on several extant theories as well, the csQCA conducted on the micro-level in terms of framing strategies shows that no single condition can explain defection, and that neither government participation at the national level nor COMAGRI membership appear decisive for the decision to defect. Instead, as was expected according to the theoretical framework developed specifically in Chapter 2, it is mainly Right-wing parties from net recipient and state capitalist countries who defect, rather than Left-wing parties from net-paying countries. Exceptions in the latter regard confirm the rule, namely that defection is the strategy of choice only if there is electoral pressure for the temporary surrender of policy-seeking, in that only centre-Left parties having electoral ties to the farming world (due to national or party-specific historical developments) opt for defection. Other parties can just stick to their ideological predilections or limit themselves to blurring regarding the cross-national distribution, depending on the degree of nationalism in their core electorates. Noteworthy, however, the role played by national traditions in terms of the type of capitalism is stronger than expected, as the behaviour of Italian parties demonstrates: it even appears to partly replace that of more objective national interests. Finally, the comparison of the PFA with roll-call data shows that, if taking into account the precise *de facto* subject and timing of a vote, the PFA results are corroborated. This comparison hence also shows, however, that voting data do not represent the underlying structure of conflict in an ideal manner. Voting data, secondary literature and survey data suggest, however, that there is something special about Italy and its citizens concerning agricultural policy indeed, of which the type of capitalism is likely to be at least one component.

Case-specific data-set and reliability

For the purpose of analysing how national party delegations express and justify their policy preferences on the 2013 Reform of the CAP, 157 press releases or other forms of text (e.g. manifesto passages) issued by 34 parties could be collected, resulting in 2,292 codings in terms of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames and their dimensions. Accordingly, the parties issued an average number of about 4.6 press releases on the issue, containing an average number of about 67.4 codings per party. The reliability test conducted on the case-specific codebook (based on the above identification of four CAP-related policy frames) produced results ranging from acceptable to excellent by all standards at the level of frames (see Table 33) – indeed better than for Europeanised welfare, while the more fine-grained measurement at the level of dimensions within these frames should be viewed with some caution. Thus, the finding that the policy dimension is referred to most frequently by the MEPs (see Table 34) would be in line with the argument that certainty of distributional effects decreases the effectiveness of the other dimensions for convincing voters, but should not be overrated.

Table 33: Reliability scores for the codebook on the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

| Level: Round: | frames | | dimensions | |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| % | 78.43 | 90.43 | 61.89 | 70.33 |
| <i>kappa</i> | <u>0.677</u> | 0.861 | <u>0.543</u> | <u>0.642</u> |
| <i>alpha</i> | <u>0.676</u> | 0.882 | 0.541 | 0.642 |

Table 34: distribution of codings across dimensions

| | F1 | % | F2 | % | F3 | % | F4 | % | total | % |
|-------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|---------------|--------------|
| norm | 296,0 | 35,0 | 48,0 | 21,1 | 305,0 | 28,6 | 49,0 | <u>32,2</u> | 698,0 | 30,5 |
| cons | 148,0 | 17,5 | 55,0 | 24,1 | 85,0 | 8,0 | 32,0 | 21,1 | 320,0 | 14,0 |
| cogn | 45,0 | 5,3 | 29,0 | 12,7 | 76,0 | 7,1 | 34,0 | 22,4 | 184,0 | 8,0 |
| pol | 350,0 | <u>41,4</u> | 96,0 | <u>42,1</u> | 607,0 | <u>56,2</u> | 37,0 | 24,3 | 1090,0 | 47,6 |
| total | 839,0 | 99,3 | 228,0 | 100,0 | 1073,0 | 100,6 | 152,0 | 100,0 | 2292,0 | 100,0 |

At the same time, it should be recalled that the reliability test itself was merely a rough indication of the reproducibility of the findings produced by means of PFA with rather limited resources. More specifically, with regard to CAP it should be noted that one coder has reported difficulties in understanding the substantive aspects of agricultural economics underpinning the various frames as a source of uncertainty in terms of coding. This problem was not, however, present for the other two coders, who in fact achieved better reliability scores for both frames and dimensions. It could be noted that disagreements among coders were comparatively high with regard to press releases issued by UKIP as well as generally with regard to those issued by Irish parties. These systematic disagreements might be a first indication of a subsuming strategy on the part of these actors and should therefore be further examined below.

Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage

Table 35: Percentage of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames within each party's statements

| Party | classic (Frame 1) | liberalisation (Frame 2) | multifunctionality (Frame 3) | anti-centralisation (Frame 4) |
|------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| F UMP | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| I PD | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F FN | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F MoDem | 87.5 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 |
| IRE SF | 84.4 | 0.0 | 6.3 | 9.4 |
| IRE FG | 72.2 | 0.4 | 21.7 | 5.7 |
| F FdG | 69.9 | 0.0 | 29.4 | 0.6 |
| D CDU/CSU | 68.4 | 2.6 | 23.7 | 5.3 |
| IRE Lab | 65.0 | 5.0 | 30 | 0.0 |
| IRE FF | 57.6 | 0.0 | 9.1 | 33.3 |
| I FdI/AN | 56.7 | 0.7 | 6.0 | 36.6 |
| I FI | 53.8 | 0.0 | 42.3 | 3.8 |
| I Tsipras | 50.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 |
| A NEOs | 0.0 | 75.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 |
| D FDP | 7.6 | 74.6 | 10.2 | 7.6 |
| UK Cons | 5.4 | 69.0 | 11.6 | 14.0 |
| D AfD | 7.7 | 46.2 | 30.8 | 15.4 |
| I Verdi | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100 | 0.0 |
| D B90 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 94.9 | 0.0 |
| A Gruene | 6.1 | 0.0 | 93.9 | 0.0 |
| F Verts | 5.3 | 0.9 | 93.9 | 0.0 |
| UK Greens | 10.0 | 0.0 | 90.0 | 0.0 |
| A SPOE | 3.4 | 6.9 | 89.7 | 0.0 |
| D LINKE | 7.9 | 2.6 | 89.5 | 0.0 |
| D SPD | 0.0 | 11.9 | 88.1 | 0.0 |
| F PS | 32.0 | 1.0 | 65.5 | 1.5 |
| UK LibDem | 25.0 | 12.5 | 62.5 | 0.0 |
| A OEVp | 33.3 | 5.6 | 61.1 | 0.0 |
| UK Lab | 0.0 | 47.4 | 52.6 | 0.0 |
| IRE Greens | 41.7 | 0.0 | 50 | 8.3 |
| total | 36.9 | 9.9 | 46.6 | 6.6 |
| D NPD | 22.2 | 0.0 | 44.4 | 33.3 |
| A FPOE | 19.2 | 0.0 | 26.9 | 53.8 |
| UKIP | 3.8 | 3.8 | 19.2 | 73.1 |
| UK BNP | 0.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 75.0 |

At first sight, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) seem to confirm the expectation that the overall structure of conflict is mixed, in that Irish, French, and Italian parties seem to cluster together, while most Social Democratic, Green and far Right parties also do. If the index of territorialisation is calculated as defined earlier, based on who acts exactly in line with one's ideology as defined by party family membership (see Chapter 3) and objective national interests (here: net payers vs net recipients), the

result would be just slightly more territorialised in comparison to Europeanised welfare, namely -11.7 (welfare: -33.3), and thus would still be more ideological than territorial. As a closer inspection of the frame usage by each party will show, however, this result deserves some reconsideration: it supports the theory of territorialisation, but arguably questions the operationalisation of the index of territorialisation.

By considering who uses frame F1, for instance, it becomes clear that, as one would expect, most French and Irish parties – with the notable exception of the Greens in both cases, and French Socialists – use this frame predominantly. This is precisely what one might expect, given that both countries are net recipients of the CAP, and that in the Irish case, also ‘working class’ parties might be inclined to compete for the votes of farmers and the rural population.³⁵ Rather surprisingly, however, all Italian parties (except the Greens) prefer this frame. This rather clearly would seem to express a territorial pattern, albeit one which is not captured by the current operationalisation of parties behaving according to their objective national interest, since Italy is a net payer to the CAP. The fact that the German CDU/CSU uses the classic frame and thereby defects from the ideologically more consistent liberalisation frame can be understood as the expression of a territorial interest, but as a regional one: all press releases issued in 2013 by the CDU/CSU delegation were written by (or in the name of) CSU-member Albert Deß. This branch of the German centre-Right can only be voted for in Bavaria, the region that is the biggest agricultural producer within Germany. Hence, liberalisation cannot be in the territorial interest of the CSU, while its defection to frame F1 should be seen as an expression of this territorial interest. Comparing the manifestos of the nation-wide CDU with that of the CSU and with its press releases, it is indeed confirmed that the CDU puts much more emphasis on market orientation (frame F2), just as would be expected. Noteworthy, in the case of Italy, the support for a classic CAP does not appear as an expression of a regional – Southern – interest, in that even the regionalist Lega Nord (not in the sample but considered for triangulation here) uses this frame predominantly.

The usage of frame F2 by the German Liberals and the British Conservatives is in line with both their ideology and nationality, while in the case of the Austrian Liberals (NEOs) only the former applies. Both frames F2 and F4 correspond to a German national interest as a net payer, but still the Right-wing populist AfD has opted in favour of frame F2, although the anti-centralisation frame F4 would seem to fit its ideology better. At the same time, considering this as an instance of defection from an ideological family might seem exaggerated. Rather, it seems that the AfD, meanwhile to be classified as an RWP party, might not yet have developed this profile in 2013, but rather presented itself as a Liberal alternative to the FDP.

The multifunctionality frame (F3), with its call for a ‘greening’ of the CAP amongst others, is used by literally all Green parties in the sample, as was expected due to the absence of a goal conflict for these parties. Moreover, the Austrian Christian Democrats make use of this frame rather than the ideologically consistent frame F2, which however is in line with the peculiar Austrian national interest (i.e. net beneficiary only due to multifunctional orientation of the CAP). Furthermore, Social Democratic

³⁵ This is due to the aforementioned belated industrialisation of Ireland, cf. Holmes (1996).

parties from both net recipient and net paying countries use this frame, with the exception of those two members of this family which I have attributed a ‘farming electorate’ for reasons explained earlier.

Noteworthy, the British Liberal Democrats make use of this frame predominantly, too, which would seem to contradict both their Liberal ideology (in line with frame F2 rather) and the British national interest. Taking into account, however, that George Lyon, the author of the respective press releases, is a farmer and Scotsman, the picture is different: There is evidence that the Scottish ‘national’ interest in the 2013 Reform stood against further liberalisation (Swinbank 2015), and Scotland constitutes a separate electoral district within the UK concerning European elections. Lyon’s defection may thus be considered an expression of the Scottish rather than the British national interest, but is in line with the theory of territorialisation.

Surprisingly also, the German extreme Right party, the NPD, also uses the multifunctionality frame (F3) rather frequently. Since this party often uses the anti-centralisation frame (F4) in line with its ideology as well, and since in fact all policy dimension statements made by this party call for less centralisation, I will not consider it as defecting, but as acting both in line with the German national interest *and* its far Right ideology. Indeed, all far Right parties not mentioned this far mainly use frame F4, while no other party uses this frame predominantly.

‘Correcting’ the territorialisation score in line with the foregoing considerations on regional interests in combination with electoral incentives and the territorial pattern in the framing efforts of Italian parties is not arbitrary, but indeed is making the best of a small-N research design. Accordingly, the territorialisation score for the 2013 Reform of CAP should be set to 8.8, with the positive amount indicating that the structure of conflict is more territorial than ideological (see Table 36). These considerations are therefore also taken into account in the following discussion of framing strategies.

Table 36: The structure of conflict on CAP in numbers (*=corrected for case knowledge)

| Parties framing in line with... | ...ideology: | ... territory: |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Absolute number | 20 | 16 |
| Percentage | 58.8 | 47.1 |
| Index of territorialisation | | -11.7 |
| Parties framing in line with... | ...ideology: | ...territory* |
| Absolute number | 20 | 23 |
| Percentage | 58.8 | 67.6 |
| Index of territorialisation* | | 8.8 |

Micro-level: analysis of defection

As is implied in the degree of territorialisation discussed above, defections in the case of CAP are much more numerous than they were in the case of Europeanised welfare. Thus, even if the pattern could be explained by national interests or ideology in simple terms or a combination of the two, it would be difficult to grasp this by eyesight alone. Looking at the Truth Table below, which includes only the conditions national interest (“netpayer_adapted”, taking into account the special cases of Bavaria and

Scotland) and ideology as a general Left-Right scheme (“Left”), it becomes clear that more precise approaches will be needed: none of the four possible configurations is free of contradictions. This basic model should thus be extended by conditions considered relevant by extant theoretical approaches and eventually, those considered relevant by the ToT.

Table 37: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|-----------|--|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | C | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A NEOs, UK LibDem, A OEVP, A FPOE |
| 1 | 1 | C | I PD, I Tsipras, I Verdi, D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |
| 0 | 1 | C | IRE SF, F FdG, IRE Lab, A Gruene, F Verts, A SPOE, F PS, IRE Greens |
| 1 | 0 | C | I FdI/AN, I FI, D FDP, UK Cons, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |

The bicameral theory, for instance, considers governmental lobbying as decisive for defection in line with the national interest. While clearly the fact that literally no country is entirely united indicates that no national government manages to convince all parties of defection in line with the national interest, one might expect that at least the governing parties defect (if for reasons of ideology they do not act in line with the national interest per chance already). Thereby, however, a large number of cases is still not accounted for. Moreover, the solution term can hardly be interpreted plausibly: the defection by the Italian Partito Democratico, as a governing party, towards a more interventionist frame would not make sense, as the country is a net payer.

Table 38: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + 'gov', outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|-----|-----------|---|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | gov | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | C | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, IRE FF, A NEOs, A FPOE |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, F FdG, A Gruene, F Verts, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, UK LibDem, A OEVp |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | IRE Lab, A SPOE, F PS |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | C | I FdI/AN, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | C | I FI, D FDP, UK Cons |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | C | I Tsipras, I Verdi, D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |

Table 39: Complex solution CAP; conditions: basic + 'gov', outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| NETPAYER_ADAPTED * LEFT * GOV | I PD |
| +netpayer_adapted * left * GOV | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, UK LibDem, A OEVp |

The literature on EP committees suggests that some committees, especially the agricultural committee COMAGRI, is a venue for special interests. If this is combined with Ringe's PPC theory, according to which MEPs depend on their respective experts in the committee, national party delegations who have a representative in COMAGRI might be more easily led towards supporting farmers' interests and defect accordingly. Hence, one might also include COMAGRI membership ("comagri_any") as further condition, rather than government participation, to complete the picture. Thereby, however, none of the defections is consistently explained.

Table 40: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|-------------|-----------|---|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | COMAGRI_any | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | C | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, UK LibDem, A OeVP, A FPOE |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | C | I PD, D B90, D SPD, UK Lab |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A Gruene, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | F FdG, IRE Lab, F Verts, A SPOE, F PS |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | C | I FdI/AN, I FI, D FDP, UK Cons, UKIP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | C | I Tsipras, I Verdi, UK Greens, D LINKE |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A NEOs |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D AfD, D NPD, UK BNP |

Marks's distributional model would suggest, that the intra-national distributional effects matter, so that one might exchange the simple ideological Left-Right with a more nuanced distinction of parties serving farming interests versus those who do not. This model would further suggest controlling for national traditions such as the type of capitalism. While arguably this model fares better than the others, four contradictory Truth Table rows remain. At least, however, the solution term produced seems interpretable, in that the parties covered would defect if they are framing parties AND a. act in line with an interventionist tradition or b. the national interest as net recipients of the CAP.

Table 41: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + ‘state capitalism’, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------|---|
| netpayer_adapted | farming electorate | state capitalism | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD, I FI |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | C | F FN, F MoDem, F FdG, F Verts, F PS |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | C | IRE SF, A NEOs, A Gruene, A SPOE, UK LibDem, IRE Greens, A FPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE Lab, IRE FF, A O EVP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | C | I FdI/AN, I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | C | D FDP, D AfD, D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK Cons |

Table 42: Complex solution CAP; conditions: distribution model, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|---|
| FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, I PD, I FI |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE | F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE Lab, IRE FF, A O EVP |

However, this should not come as a surprise. For what I have argued when reviewing this theoretical approach in detail in Chapter 2 was not that the distributional model is ‘wrong’, but simply that it is incomplete and must be added by a more precise micro-level explanation to become really accurate. Similarly, this truth table is further insightful with regard to the argument by Bailer et al. about ‘objective’ national interests concerning conflict in the Council: clearly, objective interests do seem to matter, but an accurate account of defection in the EP requires the inclusion of some not so objective elements such as national traditions or ideologies for their own sake (policy-seeking). At the same time, the theory of territorialisation foresees that indeed, national traditions might make the step towards defection easier because it reduces the risk of credibility loss for a party. Admittedly, however, the fact that the effect of national traditions could be strong enough to replace an objective national interest is rather surprising. In any case, this combination of conditions still leaves more cases unexplained than it can account for.

Hence, in line with the theory of territorialisation, it seems worthwhile including a condition that takes into account that parties weight their various policy goals against each other. Along these lines, then, one or more ideological conditions should be included that operationalise the value of ideology for its own sake (rather than in purely distributional terms). In order not to inflate the overall number of

conditions, I reintroduce the simple Left-Right distinction here first. This reduction seems appropriate in the present context, because Right-wing opposition to CAP can be both related to its interventionism or its supranationalism and the absence of a Left-wing ideology ('Left') should thus cover both centre-Right and far Right parties' ideological motives for acting against CAP.

Table 43: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|--------------------|------------------|-----------|--|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | farming electorate | state capitalism | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A Gruene, A SPOE, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVV |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FdG, F Verts, F PS |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | A NEOs, UK LibDem, A FPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |

Table 44: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--|
| left * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP+F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM | I PD, I FI |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVV, IRE Lab |

This step halves the number of contradictory configurations. It further produces a new solution term that is absolutely in line with the theory of territorialisation: Only Right-wing parties from countries with interventionist traditions decide to defect in order not to brake too far away from what their voters might perceive of as 'normal', while Left-wing parties do not defect since for ideological reasons they already

favour at least some intervention (frame F1 or F3) anyway. Nevertheless, two contradictory truth table rows remain, which can be interpreted in two different ways and treated accordingly.

A first possibility is that the theory of territorialisation, which would consider just national interests, national traditions, policy-seeking (ideology) and vote-seeking (here: farming electorate) as sufficient for explaining defection on CAP, is incomplete and should be added by further conditions, such as those already mentioned (government participation, COMAGRI membership). The following three Truth Tables do so, first adding only government participation, then COMAGRI membership and finally both of them.

Table 45: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + gov, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----|-----------|--|
| netpayer _adapted | Left | farming electorate | state capitalism | gov | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A Gruene, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OeVP |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | F FdG, F Verts |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | IRE FF |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A NEOs, A FPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | D FDP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F PS |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | UK LibDem |

Table 46: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + gov, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| netpayer_adapted * left * FARMING ELECTORATE * gov | F UMP, IRE FF |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM * GOV | I PD, I FI |
| + left * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM * gov | F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism * GOV | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEV, IRE Lab |
| + netpayer_adapted * left * state capitalism * GOV | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEV, UK LibDem |

Table 47: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|--------------------|------------------|-------------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | farming electorate | state capitalism | COMAGRI_any | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A Gruene, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEV |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F FdG, F Verts, F PS |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A NEOs |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | D FDP, UKIP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D AfD, D NPD, UK BNP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | D B90, D SPD, UK Lab |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | UK Greens, D LINKE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | C | UK LibDem, A FPOE |

Table 48: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--|
| left * STATE CAPITALISM * COMAGRI_ANY | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM * COMAGRI_ANY | I PD, I FI |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism * COMAGRI_ANY | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab |

Table 49: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + gov + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|--------------------|------------------|-----|----------|-----------|------------------------------------|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | farming electorate | state capitalism | gov | AGRI_any | defection | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A Gruene, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FdG, F Verts |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | IRE FF |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A NEOs |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D FDP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D AfD, D NPD, UK BNP |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | D B90, D SPD, UK Lab |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | UK Greens, D LINKE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A SPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F PS |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | UK LibDem |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UKIP |

Table 50: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| netpayer_adapted * left * FARMING ELECTORATE * gov * COMAGRI_ANY | F UMP, IRE FF |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM * GOV * COMAGRI_ANY | I PD, I FI |
| + left * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM * gov * COMAGRI_ANY | F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism * GOV * COMAGRI_ANY | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEV, IRE Lab |
| + netpayer_adapted * left * state capitalism * GOV * COMAGRI_ANY | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEV, UK LibDem |

As can be seen by adding conditions separately at first, the COMAGRI condition does not help to reduce the number of contradictory configurations at all, while the government participation condition reduces but one. More importantly, however, this effect is not plausible in terms of its interpretation at all: the Liberal Democrats, who defect while the Austrian NEOs and FPÖ, similar in conditions, did not, are now part of a separate configuration due to their participation in the UK government. If it was indeed government participation that leads the LibDems to defect, why then do they defect away from their coalition partner (the Conservatives), and away from a frame (liberalisation) that actually meets their ideological predilections AND the (overall) British national interest? This argument can then equally be applied to the fact that adding both these conditions has the same effect as just adding the “gov” condition.

As the analysis of necessity suggests, none of the conditions included is individually necessary.³⁶ This also applies to the COMAGRI condition, albeit according to Ringe’s PPC approach, committee expertise is what allows parties to defect in the first place, because only in this way they can make their own, independent judgement. The theory of territorialisation, by contrast, provides that distributional effects of policies such as CAP are so certain and hence obvious, that expertise is less required here since both MEPs and citizens can be expected to have clear policy preferences. In sum, all that is achieved by adding these conditions of relevance according to theories other than the ToT itself, therefore, is an ever more complex solution term, and configurations that in ever more cases describe just one party.

Fortunately, then, there is a second way for explaining and, subsequently, handling the remaining contradictory configurations, even if only those conditions expected to matter according to the theory of territorialisation are included. This alternative explanation for the remaining contradictions is that the conditions included are simply not sufficiently fine-grained in their operationalisation. Rather than splitting up these conditions further, I prefer to account for the contradictions individually, while for the computerised analysis I code them as ‘0’ (‘good practice’ no. 5 and 7 regarding contradictory

³⁶ DIE LINKE defects without having a COMAGRI member, a fact which because of the contradictory configuration is not depicted in the solution term.

configurations according to Rihoux and Meur (2009, 49)), and then move on to the simplification of the solution that was obtained nonetheless.

The first contradictory truth table row, as was already mentioned, includes the Austrian FPÖ and NEOs (not defecting) and the British Liberal Democrats (defecting). Arguably, the lack of defection on the part of FPÖ and NEOs could be due to the fact that Austria is not a net recipient because of the direct payments (pillar 1) to farmers it receives, but only (and barely so) due to the regional development funds (pillar 2). The Austrian national interest would thus correspond to frame F3 (multifunctionality), not F1 (classic). NEOs and FPÖ, ideologically preferring frame F2 (liberalisation) and F4 (anti-centralisation), respectively, might stick to their respective frames and just blur with frame F3, because the substantive gap between these frames and F3 is not as big as between F1 – interventionism and supranationalism – on the one hand and F2 and F4 on the other hand. Indeed, in their turn, the LibDems do not defect to frame F1 outright, but to frame F3, which might be seen as a party internal compromise between Scottish pro-farming interests (represented by their expert George Lyon) and their Liberal ideology.

As for the second contradiction between the defection of DIE LINKE on the one hand and the non-defection of German and British Greens and Social Democrats, the problem might be that the ideological condition ('Left') does not differentiate sufficiently between the different party families and their ideological predilections. After all, Greens and Social Democrats should ideologically prefer the multifunctional frame F3, which at least provides environmental and other public goods for their core electorates, even if they might lose out in cross-national terms. If DIE LINKE stuck to frame F1, however, it would not offer its core electorate anything in distributional terms, while the farmers in Germany will not even consider voting for them anyway – at least not as long as the CDU/CSU caters them, that is. The defection of a *far* Left party from a non-interventionist, net paying country thus becomes understandable for vote-seeking reasons, in line with the theory of territorialisation.

With the contradictory configurations being accounted for individually and in line with the theory of territorialisation, I can thus turn to the prospects of simplifying the complex solution following the theory of territorialisation, without adding further conditions. This simplification is achieved by including so-called logical remainders as 'simplifying assumptions', a classic and important feature of (cs)QCA (Rihoux and Meur 2009, 59–65; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 151–77). Logical remainders are to those logically possible combinations of conditions that are not covered by the data and which, if excluded, limit the potential for Boolean minimisation (and vice versa). Note, however, that by restricting the analysis to four dichotomous conditions concerning 34 cases, the number for such remainders is relatively small, as only 16 (i.e. 2^4) are logically possible anyway.

To repeat, the so-called complex or conservative solution (because it sticks to observed data only) obtained above was:

Table 51: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--|
| left * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM | I PD, I FI |
| + netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab |

By having the software (Tosmana, R-package QCA) include any logical remainders that could work as simplifying assumptions, the so-called ‘parsimonious’ solutions are produced:

Table 52: Parsimonious solution CAP (1); conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|---|
| netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE | F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab |
| + left * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI |
| + LEFT * FARMING ELECTORATE | I PD, IRE Lab |
| Simplifying assumptions: netpayer_adapted{0}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{1} + netpayer_adapted{1}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{0} | |

Table 53: Parsimonious solution CAP (2); conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|---|
| netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE | F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab |
| + left * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI |
| + FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, I PD, I FI |
| Simplifying assumptions: netpayer_adapted{0}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{1} | |

The software suggests minimizing the complex solution formula by making either one or two simplifying assumptions (i.e. assuming that either one or two additional cases were observed), arriving at two different simplified solution formulas. Both of these solutions involve substantial simplification, in that each part of the solution now only requires two conditions to explain the presence of the outcome. It is now up to the researcher to decide, in how far these simplifying assumptions are plausible and in how far it should be necessary to restrict their selection based on theoretical arguments so as to create the so-called ‘intermediate’ solution.

The first of the simplifying assumptions, which in fact is included in both possible versions of the parsimonious solution, would imply the existence of a party characterised by an origin in a net-recipient state, Left-wing ideology, a farming electorate and an interventionist national background, which would then decide to defect. Assuming that such a party were, for instance, a centre-Left party defecting from F3 to F1, does seem quite plausible in theory, and in practice there might even be such a case in one

of the other net recipient countries. This assumption, therefore, does not seem far-fetched and might in principle be used to reduce the complexity of the conservative solution.

The second of the simplifying assumptions, which is included in just one version of the parsimonious solution, would imply the existence of a party characterised by an origin in a net-paying state, Left-wing ideology, a farming electorate and an non-interventionist national background, which would then decide to defect. This, however, seems barely plausible already by itself: If such a party existed and would want to do a service to its farming electorate, by defecting it would risk acting against both the national interest and the national tradition, or vice versa acting in line with the latter but against the former. It is hard to imagine how such party would react, and this assumption should therefore not be adopted blindly, nor should the corresponding first version of the parsimonious solution. In fact, this first couple of simplifying assumptions would lead us to conclude that their Left-wing ideology is a key element in the defection of Irish Labour and the Partito Democratico, which does not really make sense.

By contrast, the second couple of simplifying assumptions can do with just one – plausible – simplifying assumption, leading to a solution that makes perfect theoretical sense: parties would accordingly defect if they have reason do so based on both cross- as well as intra-national distributional effects (which would cover the majority of cases), if they are Right-wing parties from state capitalist countries who do not wish to act against a national tradition too much, or if both intra-national distribution (farming electorate) and national tradition point towards advocating a strong CAP. Indeed, this is the same result as when making the following directional expectations to arrive at an intermediate solution, namely that the conditions net-recipient, Right-wing, farming electorate, and state capitalism are conducive to defection. To this solution, one should then add the individual explanations for DIE LINKE and the Liberal Democrats, namely that a. a far Left party from a net-paying country would also defect (e.g. if the UK had a relevant party of this sort, it would probably use F3 rather than F1), and that b. a Right-wing party without a farming electorate from non-interventionist but net recipient country will not defect to frame F1, but only make the step to F3.

All of this would then still be covered by the theory of territorialisation, with a minor caveat, however: The ToT did not predict that the national tradition in terms of the type of capitalism could have an effect that basically equals that of the national interest, which is also expressed by the fact that net-payer or net-recipient status is not a necessary condition. Since this effect is driven mainly by the Italian parties, I will take up this point again in the discussion of external evidence. Noteworthy, however, none of the extant theories did expect this to be the case either. Hence, when it comes to defection, the theory of territorialisation still seems to provide the most accurate account of what is observed.

Micro-level: further framing strategies

I now turn to the other framing strategies, especially those which often might be used to avoid outright defection or to keep one's credibility while defecting nonetheless, namely 'blurring' and 'subsuming'. Since these strategies would not seem to constitute an equally dramatic step as defection does, they are more difficult to predict *a priori*, so that it might already be a considerable achievement if at least some broader

patterns can be understood by the same theoretical framework. In principle, one might expect similar conditions to play a role when it comes to blurring, for instance, but that the presence of fewer conditions is required to make the step. Yet, if one leaves it at the four conditions used to explain defection, the number of contradictory configurations is relatively high.

Table 54: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|---|
| netpayer_adapted | Left | farming electorate | state capitalism | blurring_wide | party |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F UMP |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | IRE SF, A Gruene, A SPOE, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A O EVP |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | C | F FdG, F Verts, F PS |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | C | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A NEOs, UK LibDem, A FPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | D B90, UK Greens, D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |

This might be read as an indication that the theory of territorialisation is weaker for explaining blurring than it is for explaining defection, which, given the nature of blurring I just described, would not be surprising. Noteworthy, however, all of the contradictory truth table rows involve Green parties. Indeed, I have noted above already that Green parties might be special among the parties of the Left. This is because the Social Democrats and far Left parties also have working class voters with rather nationalist to think about, which this does not apply to Green parties, who have the most postmaterialist and postnationalist electorate. It might thus be worthwhile specifying the membership in the Green party family as a separate condition for blurring:

Table 55: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: blurring_wide

| Conditions | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|-------|------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|---|
| netpayer_adapted | Green | Left | farming_electorate | state_capitalism | blurring_wide | party |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F UMP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN, F MoDem |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE SF, A SPOE |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVV |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F FdG, F PS |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | IRE Lab |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | I FdI/AN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | I FI |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | I Tsipras |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A NEOs, UK LibDem, A FPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UK Cons |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | I Verdi |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D B90, UK Greens |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | A Gruene, IRE Greens |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F Verts |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | D LINKE, D SPD, UK Lab |

By doing so, the number of contradictions is reduced by its half, leaving only two. These contradictions can be rather easily made sense of, however. In the case of the truth table row including DIE LINKE, the German SPD and UK Labour, the argument would reflect the earlier one about the special status of the far Left. Recall, that DIE LINKE already defected to F3 in order to offer at least something to its electorate. If, as a far Left party, it now blurred its own framing with liberalisation arguments (F2), however, it would put its credibility at considerable risk. By contrast, for New Left parties from net paying countries, such as the SPD and UK Labour, making *some* liberalisation arguments to please those voters inclined to be upset about money flows to Brussels makes perfect sense. Hence, if the operationalisation Left-wing ideology is refined even further, the theory of territorialisation still applies. As for the contradictory configuration including the Austrian and Irish Greens, the exception might confirm the rule: While all Green parties have been assumed to be quite pro-European, the Irish Greens are known to be comparatively Eurosceptic within this family (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002, 984). It might therefore

be the case that they also want to offer something in terms of the Irish national interest, and hence blur with frame F1.

Looking at the complex solutions based on this Truth Table for blurring or its absence, some patterns can indeed be derived:

Table 56: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: blurring_wide

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--|
| green * left * state capitalism | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, A NEOs, UK LibDem, A FPOE, D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP, UK Cons |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * green * left | I FdI/AN, I FI, D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP, UK Cons |
| + netpayer_adapted * green * FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism | IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab |
| + green * LEFT * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM | F FdG, F PS, I Tsipras |

Table 57: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: NOT blurring

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|---------------------------|
| netpayer_adapted * green * left * STATE CAPITALISM | F UMP, F FN, F MoDem |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * GREEN * LEFT * farming electorate | I Verdi, D B90, UK Greens |
| + GREEN * LEFT * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM | I Verdi, F Verts |
| + NETPAYER_ADAPTED * green * LEFT * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM | I PD |
| + netpayer_adapted * green * LEFT * farming electorate * state capitalism | IRE SF, A SPOE |

Firstly and most clearly, Green parties refrain from blurring indeed, choosing a uni-dimensional strategy instead. By contrast, those centre-Left parties who do not defect rather add some elements of other frames to their ideologically preferred frame F3, choosing this in line with their national interest. Thus, as was already mentioned, SPD³⁷ and Labour (UK) add some liberalisation arguments, the French PS some classic CAP rhetoric, and the Austrian SPÖ does not blur because F3 is also in line with its national interest. On the far Left, most parties blur with frame F3, indicating that while in favour of market intervention, they are not careless about the environmental consequences of the classic CAP. Concerning the far Right, it seems that their ideologically preferred frame F4 (anti-centralisation) is complemented with other frames, so as to broaden their arguments substantively towards something more ‘positive’ than just anti-EU sentiments.

In terms of territorial patterns, it can be noted that the defecting Italian Right still blurs its F1 framing with F3 (the Centre-Right Forza Italia) or F4 (the RWP Alleanza Nazionale), while the French Right does defect to F1 full scale. This might be explained by the fact that both countries are shaped by

³⁷ Numerically, the SPD does not reach the 20 per cent threshold for a blurring strategy. Its statements on cutting direct payments do offer arguments for calibrating this case in this manner.

state capitalist tradition, but one (Italy) is a net payer, while the other (France) is a net recipient. Where national interest and tradition overlap, as in the French case, there is no need for blurring. This finding relativises the surprising strength of the effect national traditions seemed to have on defection in a manner that brings it even closer to the theory of territorialisation.

Since making simplifying assumptions without disposing of a sufficiently precise theoretical argument on blurring would not seem worthwhile, I now turn to the observation of the final strategy, namely subsuming, instead. While this is even harder to predict as it is built on parties' creativity, some first inductive hunch could be derived from lower reliability scores regarding UKIP in particular and Irish parties more generally. Concerning UKIP, it can indeed be noted that it argues against EU membership generally and against the *Common* Agricultural Policy in particular, but then suggests a number of policies that, apart from the level of governance, are in line with frame F3 (direct payments, environmental public goods). This act of subsuming has been the source of disagreement among coders. As for Irish parties, it can generally be noted that their framing often normatively draws on the 'Irish farming family', which – especially in context – could be coded as a reference to almost all of the frames except frame F2. This is because it touches upon some sense of nationalism, farming as such but also farming on a small scale. This arguably very comprehensive normative basis does not, however, change the fact that in terms of policy in particular, all Irish parties are indeed favouring a strong, Europeanised CAP in line with the countries objective national interest.

Inasmuch as patterns are discernible, then, the analysis of blurring in particular confirms the theory of territorialisation, as the conditions identified according to it can account for these patterns. The true significance of blurring as a means or relativising national interests, as it was used most clearly by Social Democratic parties, will become even clearer when comparing it to the voting results on CAP reform as a source of external validity. This is the task of the next subsection.

Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings

It would be beyond the scope of this study to analyse all votes ever recorded in the process of the negotiations on the CAP. There are, however, at least three research projects (Hix 2013; Nissen 2014; Olper and Pacca 2015) including processed roll-call data. Two of these (Hix 2013; Nissen 2014) include votes on resolutions determining the EP's position more or less on the overall reform package, while third is focused on the aspect of Common Market Organisation (Olper and Pacca 2015). The study by Hix has the further advantage of disaggregating the votes by national party delegations, while the one by Olper and Pacca at least analyses EPG cohesion and country cohesion.

Table 58: Decision on the Opening of, and Mandate for, Interinstitutional negotiations on Financing, Management and Monitoring of the CAP. Motion for a resolution. Vote: proposal for decision. Own compilation based on Hix (2013, pp. 27-36)

| | Germany | Austria | UK | Ireland | France | Italy |
|------------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| GUE/NGL | - | NA | - ³⁸ | - ³⁹ | - | NA |
| Greens/EFA | - | - | - | NA | - | NA |
| S&D | - | - | - | + | + | + |
| ALDE | + | NA | + | + | + | + ⁴⁰ |
| EPP | + | + | NA | + | + | + |
| ECR | NA | NA | + | NA | NA | + ⁴¹ |
| EFD | NA | NA | - | NA | 0 ⁴² | -/+ ⁴³ |
| NI | NA | - ⁴⁴ | 0 ⁴⁵ | NA | - ⁴⁶ | NA |




Figure 10: Graphical illustration of votes on CAP the Decision on the Opening of, and Mandate for, Interinstitutional negotiations on Financing, Management and Monitoring of the CAP by EPG. Source: Hix 2013, 19.

At first sight, it might seem at odds with the results of the PFA, that cohesion within the centre-Right is so much higher than within the S&D group, and that the far Left GUE/NGL should be against the majority of the EPP also they were both found to use frame F1 predominantly and especially that the ECR, dominated by the British Conservatives should be in agreement with the rather pro-CAP EPP. This difference between the RCV data and the PFA only lasts as long as one does not take into account that in their press releases, manifestos etc. subjected to the PFA, parties were free to comment on whatever aspect of the CAP and that the whole end phase of the CAP negotiations was included, with all kinds of decisions being up for comments, while the vote on the resolution was taken at a particular point in time and referred to a particular negotiated outcome.

³⁸ Sinn Féin

³⁹ Socialist party

⁴⁰ Italia dei Valori, not in the sample for PFA.

⁴¹ Conservatori e Social Riformatori, not in the sample for PFA.

⁴² Mouvement pour la France, not in the sample for PFA.

⁴³ "Io amo Italia" and Lega Nord, both not in the sample for PFA.

⁴⁴ FPÖ

⁴⁵ BNP

⁴⁶ Front National

This particular negotiated outcome did not include a position the budget – already decided elsewhere – and mainly focused on changes related to those policies attributed to the policy dimension of the multifunctional frame F3, most notably ‘greening’. The majority in the EP, however, had agreed on a substantial watering down of the earlier ‘greening’ provisions right before the vote analysed by Hix (cf. Erjavec, Lovec, and Erjavec 2015, 226; Gravey 2015). This vote, therefore, must be understood in its precise institutional and temporal context, much unlike the press releases analysed by PFA. Doing so would mean to consider it as a vote on the watering down of the greening to the benefit of farmers.

Accordingly, the more a party was in favour of greening even at the expense of farmers, the more it would vote against the resolution. This is why all Green parties vote against it, first of all. The far Left GUE/NGL would be expected to be in favour of market regulation, albeit not as a favour towards farmers particularly and, as was noted in the analysis of blurring, would want to achieve greening *at the same time*. The S&D ‘rebels’ are precisely those parties from net-paying and non-statist capitalism countries that would place much more emphasis on greening and would rather see markets liberalised a bit more (from the UK, Germany, Austria). On the other side of the political spectrum, most Right-wing parties – including the British Conservatives – can at least agree on their opposition to greening, while the far Right agrees simply on opposition to everything when it comes to votes. What the comparison of the PFA with this particular voting result shows, then, is two points: First, once the vote is put in its more precise context, it corroborates the results of the textual analysis. Second, it therefore also shows why votes are to be considered inferior to textual analysis as a measure of the structure of conflict, because rather than depicting the conflict underlying the whole policy issue, they already internalise institutional parameters and negotiated outcomes (cf. Chapter 3).

The EPG and country cohesion scores computed by Olper and Pacca (2015, 371–72) based on data from VoteWatch.eu for the aspect Common Market Organisation can, in fact, be more directly compared to the PFA results, because they specifically refer to one particular aspect captured mainly by support for or opposition to policies from frame F1, namely market intervention. It is in line with the findings of the PFA, at the macro-level, that country cohesion is found to be slightly higher on average than EPG cohesion (0.68 to 0.64 on Hix et al.’s agreement index) and eventually also with theory of territorialisation, that the two families found to use this classic frame mostly, namely the pro-farming EPP and the pro-interventionist GUE/NGL should be the most cohesive groups on these issues – the former for vote-seeking reasons, the latter for policy-seeking reasons, while the S&D would be highly split across net paying/ recipient or (not-)state capitalist countries. The scores for country cohesion also confirm the PFA results, with the strongly interventionist Italy and France, as well as the generally anti-interventionist UK display the highest cohesion, while Germany or Austria turn out to be highly split, as is also the net recipient but liberal capitalist Ireland.

Erjavec et al. (2015, 226) further lend empirical support to the country-level preferences on the CAP budget. As they note:

Net contributors such as Germany and the UK wanted to see the CAP budget significantly curbed. Germany and the UK also opposed capping. Conservative member states such as France, Italy and Spain

were strongly against any reduction in the CAP budget. Member states that traditionally received larger amounts of rural development supports, such as Austria, were worried that Pillar II would be sacrificed during the negotiations.

The interesting point is, however, that while most of these preferences correspond to objective national interests in terms of budgetary redistribution, this does not apply to Italy, as I have already noted above.

A final issue to be addressed here by means of external evidence, therefore, is whether the idea of ‘objective’ national interests determined by budgetary redistribution was flawed. One argument could be that it is still more or less in Italy’s objective national interest to have a strongly interventionist CAP, because 51 per cent of its 1,620,900 farm holdings have less than 2 hectares (DG Agriculture and Rural Development 2014, 5), and hence might not be able to survive without market intervention. Still, provided farming subsidies in whatever form were still allowed at the national level, Italy would be financially better off from a decentralised CAP (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013, 49). Yet another explanation might see corruption, clientelism or at least strong lobbyism at work.

It does not seem, however, that Italian politicians are acting against public opinion in Italy when advocating a strong CAP, to the contrary: support for CAP spending is consistently high in Italy, whereas outright critique of it is conspicuously low according to Eurobarometer data, lower even than it is in France (European Commission 2010; 2014a). Given the comparison with France, however, the type of capitalism alone would also not quite seem to account for the Italian attitude towards CAP. Arguably, it is small farm sizes, and hence a widespread knowledge that farmers are in need of public support to survive, in conjunction with a public preference for market intervention due to a respective national tradition that lead to this result. In any case, the measurement by means of PFA regarding Italian parties is confirmed, as are, by and large, the theoretical arguments made in this respect.

5.5 Conclusion on the 2013 Reform of the CAP

Across the decades of European integration, the Common Agricultural Policy has involved the most large-scale cross-national redistribution – at least until the Crisis, and this distribution has become increasingly visible and foreseeable (i.e. certain). Hence, if the theory of territorialisation holds, the latest reform of the CAP should demonstrate the limits of parties’ ability and willingness for avoiding defection. That said, the CAP involves considerable distribution also between the shrinking group of farmers on the one hand, and the rest of society on the other hand. The theory of territorialisation does not just provide, then, that defection concerning CAP reform will be ‘more likely’ than it is for other cases. Instead, it stipulates much more precisely, which parties will defect, as well as which parties can rely on other framing strategies to avoid defection.

Like the preceding chapter, the present one confirms both the theoretical expectations as well as the usefulness of the approach taken for evaluating them. First of all, the detailed description of the characteristics of CAP as a case shows that national interests are at stake indeed, but that there is more at stake intra-nationally as well, and how difficult it is to frame around the existence of these distributional

effects. Second, the identification of policy frames on CAP demonstrates, how much more complex the debate on CAP is then just about the question of spending more or less on farming subsidies. Only in this manner is it possible to precisely account for parties' strategies. Third, the impact of (un)certainty becomes visible in the distribution of statements across frame dimensions, with concrete policy suggestions featuring much more prominently in the debate. Fourth, the theory of territorialisation can do more than correctly predicting the territorialised structure of conflict over CAP, but it takes the PFA in combination with the conceptions of framing strategies (rather than 'positions') to show the value added in terms of increased precision of micro-level explanations: as was expected based on the ToT, parties from net-recipient countries, who further have a farming electorate to cater, decide in favour of defection, while others use the simultaneous presence of intra-national distribution by limiting themselves to blurring, whereas Green parties, due to the specific combination of postmaterialism and postnationalism within their core electorate, can apply their ideological prism. Interestingly, vote-seeking interests seem to reach beyond a purely distributional logic and towards national traditions, as is indicated by the behaviour of Italian national delegations in the sample. Subsuming again appears as a prominent strategy among far Right parties, who instead of blindly arguing for decentralisation of the policy try to bring this in line with more broadly accepted values and causal narratives. Fifth, the comparison of the PFA results shows in how far voting records are shaped by negotiation dynamics rather than a reflection of the underlying conflict, which in turn underlines Bailer et al.'s (2015) critique of aggregating voting records within or even across policy areas.

With regard to the societal rationale behind the present study, namely the question, in how far the EP is 'immune' to national interests so that strengthening it can address the EU's dual crisis of legitimacy, the glass is both half empty and half full. It is half empty because the EP is not entirely immune to national interests. In fact, even national traditions that are not based on similarly rational considerations as net payments to the CAP budget, might induce MEPs to leave their transnational ideologies behind temporarily. It is half full also, however, because as soon as there are intra-national distributional effects, these are likely to find their expression as well. With politicisation and the involvement of the EP in the policy area, however, it thus also does not appear any longer that the CAP is shaped by farmers' special interests alone.

6. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

This chapter presents the third and final case study on conflict in the Post-Crisis European Parliament intended for evaluating the theory of territorialisation (ToT) presented earlier and is meant in particular to contrast the impact of presumably 'national' interests with that of the factual presence of intra-national distribution. First, some background information on the content and conduct of EU trade policy in general, the so-called Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and then more specifically on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is provided, focusing on the most controversial elements of the latter. Thereby, it will be possible to understand its features as a case and corroborate its earlier classification as part of the case selection in Chapter 3. Most importantly, it is shown that this issue is characterised mainly by intra-national distributional effects, while cross-national distribution is deemed absent, albeit trade policy has traditionally been thought of as a policy area where 'national interests' are crucial. Before precise observational implications derived from extant theories and the ToT can be contrasted, the policy frames that might be used by the various national party delegations are identified (Section 2). Three such frames – a neoliberal, a protectionist, and an anti-globalisation frame – are identified by drawing on extant discourse analyses on globalisation and EU trade policy. The third section then first specifies the impact of TTIP for the sample of parties at the country level, before then spelling out the observable implications derived from extant theories and the ToT. Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) conducted on the basis of the pre-identified frames in terms of the emerging structure of conflict and individual parties framing strategies (defection, blurring, subsuming). As it is found, the structure of conflict is first and foremost ideological, just as it would be expected based on the ToT. In fact, the ToT also seems to provide the most consistent approach for explaining individual parties' behaviour in terms of defection, not to mention other framing strategies concerning which extant theories would remain silent. Empirically, this means that producer-friendly parties on the Right will defect from their neoliberal ideologies in case the gains expected at country-level are comparatively low. Their defection appears to take the direction of the respective national tradition, which seems to be of even greater importance for understanding the behaviour of Right-wing populists. By contrast, parties of the Left as well as of the extreme Right tend to stick to their ideologies, since the predominance of intra-national distribution in this policy area spares them any major goal conflict between policy and votes. While the results of the PFA at this point are largely in line with the roll-call votes so far, only the vote on the eventually negotiated outcome will show whether the rhetorical defection by Austrian and French centre Right parties was merely cheap talk. As is concluded in Section 5, the case of TTIP shows, that even policy issues classically associated with national interests are not territorialised in the EP; provided that intra-national distributional effects resulting from them are mainly intra-national and barely cross-national. On top of this, national traditions, while explicitly part of the theory of territorialisation, once more seem to be quite significant, albeit not dominant, even after decades of European integration and decades of a Common Commercial Policy. Amongst others, this has also led to the fact that classic protectionist ideas are still firmly rooted in the minds of some countries' populations and their representatives. In this sense, then, TTIP might not have changed trade policy forever, as some commentators claim, while their argument that trade policy has become much more politicised would seem to be supported. In fact, the involvement of the EP in this policy area certainly reinforces this trend, as it allows for more differentiated representation that also depicts disagreement within countries.

6.1 The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and TTIP

In this section, background information on the EU's trade policy is provided, covering the development of trade policy towards the inclusion of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade and investment related aspects in terms of content, as well as the new role for the EP under the Lisbon Treaty, demonstrated by the experience with ACTA in terms of conduct. Next, the key elements of TTIP are briefly summarised, focusing on the most controversial points in terms of remaining agricultural tariffs, convergence of regulatory standards, public procurement and investor protection. Thereafter, the earlier classification of TTIP is reconfirmed, namely as a case characterised by high politicisation, pre-election timing, rather high – albeit partly 'created' – certainty of distributional effects, which are essentially intra-national rather than cross-national. Finally, I shortly review the issue-specific literature on conflict over trade policy, which traditionally has considered it as a non-politicised conflict between liberals and protectionists, while newer research has often observed a turn towards more ideological, consumer-vs.-producer kinds of conflict followed closely by civil society.

Content and conduct of the CCP in general

While put into practice only by the late 1960s, the trade policy of the EU – referred to as the Common Commercial Policy – was established already with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It can be seen as a consequence of the customs union, which itself relates to the removal of intra-European tariffs. Smith (2007) distinguishes two aspects of the CCP, namely trade promotion and trade defence. The former includes the numerous trade agreements the EU has concluded, which can be bilateral (e.g. with Russia), interregional (e.g. with ASEAN) or multilateral in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The latter, trade defence, enables the EU to address whatever it perceives as 'unfair' trade practices such as dumping or barriers to EU exports. To address such issues, the EU frequently works through the dispute settlement of WTO. However, as Smith notes: "Trade and partnership agreements also include procedures for dealing with trade disputes, as a matter of routine, and sometimes linkages are made with other areas of external policy such as those on human rights and development policy" (ibid., 2007, 228). While so-called Investor-State-Dispute-Settlements (ISDS) as a feature of trade policy might thus be less of a novelty than it might appear to some in the debate on TTIP, there are two more general kinds of trends in EU trade policy, one in terms of content and the other in terms of conduct, that must be briefly discussed here in order to prepare the ground for understanding TTIP.

Before doing so, however, it might be worth noting that yet another trend, expected and frequently feared by observers, has not been realized after all: the development of a so-called 'Fortress Europe' (Hanson 1998). This concept captures the concept of a number of commentators in the early 1990s that the completion of the European Single Market within the EU would lead to less openness towards the rest of the world (ibid. 1998, 56). As Hanson notes, however, "fortress Europe has not been built" (ibid.). Instead, he argues, further integration has rather achieved the opposite because of an institutional bias towards liberalisation (ibid.). Similar fears of a protectionist backlash were voiced again in the context of the global financial crisis (Siles-Brügge 2013), yet once more the actual development rather went into the opposite direction, as the new wave of trade agreement initiatives triggered by the Commission's 2006 Global Europe communication has by no means been stopped by the crisis (Siles-

Brügge 2013; Ville and Orbie 2014). Instead, the number of free trade agreements concluded by the EU continuously expanded.

In fact, alongside their number, it was also the scope of free trade agreements that was expanded, making external trade arrangements more similar to what the Single Market was internally: Just like the Single Market is more than a classic Free Trade Area (FTA) that simply abolishes tariffs on goods, international trade agreements as concluded by the EU increasingly also tend to include not just trade in goods but also in services, just as they increasingly address so-called non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) resulting also from differences in regulatory standards, e.g. environmental legislation or from failure to protect intellectual property rights (Husted and Melvin 2007, 181-196, 224-230; Smith 2007, 228–29). It is this change in scope which can have important consequences for the structure of conflict, which is exemplified by the case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

ACTA was meant to address infringements of intellectual property rights (IPR) in terms of counterfeit goods and online piracy more effectively, which had not been achieved within the WTO framework (Dür and Mateo 2014; Matthews 2012). Yet, ACTA eventually failed as it was rejected by a large majority of the EP (*ibid.*). This appears astonishing to academic observers, as business groups had had signalled outright support for the agreement from the very beginning. However, a strong anti-ACTA campaign was organized by a number of social movements, claiming that ACTA favoured copyright holders – producers – massively over citizens, or consumers (Dür and Mateo 2014, 1202). Apparently, MEPs were influenced by this public campaign. Chen (2015) finds that, in accordance with the producer-versus-consumers character of the conflict, ideological orientations became the most important determinant of MEP voting behaviour on the issue, rather than national economic interests. ACTA thus is a case in point against the long-standing picture of trade policy as being dominated by national *economic* interests of no importance to the wider society, as traditional accounts of trade policy would have assumed (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 488–91; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 12, 133), and likewise against the accordingly predicted outcome of a territorially structure conflict over trade policy issues.

Noteworthy, this is not to say that territorial interests would not influence MEPs on trade policy issues at all. Kleinmann, for instance, finds them to be a crucial determinant of MEP positions on the 2011 trade agreement with Korea (*ibid.* 2011, 21–24). Indeed, it would run counter to the theoretical framework presented here, if the conflict regarding a particular trade agreement were ideologically structured in the face of definite and obvious cross-national distribution. Yet, in order to predict the structure of conflict regarding a particular trade agreement such as TTIP, it needs to be considered, in how far cross-national distribution among Member States and/or intra-national distribution e.g. between consumers and producers will result from the implementation of this particular agreement.

Before taking a closer look at TTIP, however, ACTA should be considered here again as an example of recent developments in EU trade policy, this time not regarding the changing content of trade policy, but regarding its conduct. For in fact, the failure of ACTA was not only about the controversy over the content of the agreement, successfully shaped by citizen groups (cf. Dür and Mateo 2014). First, obviously, the fact that the EP struck down ACTA was preconditioned by the fact that it had the power

to do so. This, in turn, was due to the legal changes on trade policy-making brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 207 and 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in particular).

These provisions still make trade policy an exclusive competence of the EU and attribute a strong role to the Commission, namely that of negotiating on behalf of all Member States. It is thus up to the Council to provide the Commission with an official mandate for the negotiations. What has changed, however, is that the EU can now also adopt autonomous acts on trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual property, and foreign direct investment, as well as that trade in cultural/audiovisual, educational and social/health services can now be part of EU trade agreements. The latter services are subject to unanimity voting in the Council, and thus have only partly been removed from Member State control. More important from the perspective of this paper, however, is that all trade agreements now need to be ratified by the European Parliament, and the Commission is obliged to keep the EP informed by reporting to it and by transferring documents (for a step-by-step overview of the procedure as well as of the Treaty changes, see European Commission DG Trade 2011 and European Commission DG Trade 2013, respectively). What the failure of ACTA shows, then, is not only that the EP is aware of its powers and willing to use them. It further becomes clear that it is ready to use these formal powers to extend its *de facto* influence: the EP complained about not being properly informed in the course of the ACTA negotiations and demanded a stronger role for MEPs in the process, or otherwise it would not give its consent (cf. Matthews 2012). In other words, it used its new formal role as a veto-player in order to informally and indirectly obtain a seat at the negotiation table.

In sum, there seem to be two main lessons to be learned from recent developments in EU trade policy which might be meaningful with regard to TTIP. First, of course, as for the CAP, inter-institutional power games might at times be involved. Yet, on the one hand, ACTA already served the EP for flexing its muscles, so that this might play less of a role for TTIP. On the other hand, by focussing explicitly on policy-related statements via the coding scheme to be developed, it should be possible to distinguish inter-institutional from intra-institutional contestation. Second, there were indeed instances of politicisation in trade policy that would seem to contradict classic assumptions on societal mobilisation in this policy area. This seems to apply more to a case like ACTA, where fundamental rights of citizens were pitched against economic interests leading to a largely ideologically structured conflict, and less to a case like the EU-Korea FTA, where some classically some industries won at the expense of others involving ‘national interests’. In order to gradually explain what the *intra*-institutional conflict over TTIP is like, then, the next subsection discusses, what is at stake in TTIP.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership...

In the preceding subsection, it was already pointed out that the concept of ‘trade policy’ nowadays goes way beyond the question of raising or removing tariffs by increasingly including so-called NTBs (see also: Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 3–5). Already the titling of TTIP seems to suggest that this is yet another step, albeit in the same direction, as the terms of ‘investment’ and ‘partnership’, seem to carry much more far-reaching implications than the once discussed Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). Indeed,

DeVille and Siles-Brügge argue: “What is novel about TTIP is the *degree* of ‘deep liberalisation’ being sought. Negotiators are *explicitly* seeking to align EU and US regulatory policies as much as possible” (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 5 my emphases). Similarly, the Congressional Research Service points out that the negotiators “seek new or expanded commitments in areas such as regulatory coherence and ‘21st century issues’, including state-owned enterprises – issues either not discussed or only modestly discussed in prior FTAs” (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 3). In this subsection, it is discussed what is on the TTIP agenda, focusing on those points that are most controversial and/or relevant.

While there is some variation when it comes to attributing more concrete elements to each of them, three broad areas or ‘pillars’ of TTIP are commonly listed, namely ‘market access’, ‘regulatory issues’ and ‘trade-related rules’ (cf. Akhtar and Jones; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 7–8). Next to tariffs, the area of ‘market access’ includes the further opening of government procurement markets, which indirectly also limit market access, as well as issues of data privacy and cross-border data flows (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 6). ‘Regulatory issues’ concern the removal of NTBs arising from differences in regulatory standards (ibid. 2014, 7). The third area, trade-related rules, most notably covers the aspects of entry conditions for investors, the protection of their investment, and the settlement of potential investor-state disputes (Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ISDS) as well as Intellectual Property Rights (ibid. 2014, 8–10). Whereas the TTIP agenda might be summarised as briefly as this, in practice there is, of course, an immense amount of detail behind this, so in the following I focus on what is generally considered controversial.

On average, tariffs between the EU and the US are negligible, with a few but not unimportant ‘peaks’ in the domain of agriculture. They are thus frequently considered a ‘low-hanging fruit’ in these negotiations (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 6). This does not mean, however, that market access is generally an easy matter for the negotiators, as government procurement for instance in the area of audiovisual industries – the famous ‘cultural exception’ – is quite sensitive (ibid.). Indeed, this is arguably the reason why this particular sector has been outside the EU’s competence in trade policy prior to the Lisbon Treaty and even now remains subject to unanimity voting in the Council, as was pointed out above.

In the area of regulatory cooperation, one finds the much repeated examples on car safety regulations, which by and large lead to similarly high standards but do so by different means and thus imply ‘unnecessary costs’ for producers (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 8). Yet, there frequently are diverging public preferences when it comes to regulatory standards on both sides of the Atlantic, embodied in the EU’s precautionary principle that contrast with a science-based, cost-benefit approach to risk management on the US side (ibid. 2014, 7).⁴⁷ Prominent examples such as the regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) – largely banned within the EU, or hormone-treated beef, are again to be found in the domain of agriculture but are not limited to it, as the case of ‘fracking’ shows (ibid.). In fact, some have argued that even the variation in car safety standards actually reflects deeper divergence in public

⁴⁷ The precautionary principle holds that regulators must protect citizens from potentially adverse effects of a product, even if these effects have not yet been scientifically proven Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015, 44–45).

preferences (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 79–80). While on a global scale, standards in the EU and the US might be generally – albeit not equally – high (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 7), the devil is obviously in the detail.

The same holds for trade-related rules. For while both the EU and the US have rather open investment regimes, there is disagreement regarding the shape of a ‘neutral’ forum for Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The controversy culminated in the ‘pause’ announced by the European Commission with regard to this aspect of the negotiations, with a view to holding a public consultation first (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). Similarly, both parties to the agreement insist on the protection of intellectual property rights, but for the EU this includes so-called geographical indications (GIs) (e.g. only Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma may receive this label), protected ‘only’ under trademark law in the US. Otherwise, the US argue, GIs lead to “national treatment issues and adversely affects trademarks and widely accepted generic products” (ibid. 2014, 9–10). None of the three areas, therefore, is free from controversy.

On top of this, there is the issue of data privacy, which arguably cuts across the three pillars just discussed. This issue became more prominent even than it had been at the time of ACTA, ever since the event referred to by the Congressional Research Service as “the unauthorized disclosure of classified information related to National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance activity since June 2013” (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 6), better known in Europe as the ‘Snowden Affair’ or ‘NSA Affair’. The latter may have strengthened the tendency of national governments towards requirements for on-shore data-processing or locating the respective physical infrastructure on national territory, thereby impinging on market access (ibid.); but it might further weaken all arguments build on the ‘sameness’ of EU and US values (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 44–51). Given that apparently there is sufficient potential for conflict in TTIP, it is considered next, in how far this potential can be thought of in terms of the conditions based on which this case was selected.

... and its characteristics as a case

One of these conditions for case selection at the macro-level of policy issues was that the issues selected all are of interest not just for political elites, but also for the broader masses of citizens (i.e. politicisation), for only then would the vote-seeking assumption made with regard to a post-Crisis EP apply. TTIP, clearly, is politicised in this sense, which is why it was selected by Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014), respectively, as one of the ‘key votes’ of the legislative period. Indeed, the “strong public interest” in the issue was one of the reasons for the European Commission to launch a public consultation on TTIP with a special focus on ISDS as early as March 2014, in which close to 150,000 people took part (DG Trade 2014). Meanwhile, the ‘Stop TTIP’-Initiative claims to have gathered no less than 3,284,289 signatures, originally intended for a European Citizens’ Initiative, against TTIP (Stop TTIP). In sum, there can hardly be any doubt that TTIP is one of the most politicised policy issues in the history of the EU.

TTIP also fits the other two conditions to be held constant for the purposes of the present study. First, in terms of timing, the debate on TTIP started in the run-up to the 2014 European elections:

In February 2013, EU and US presidents announced the launch of negotiations in a joint announcement, with EU Member States agreeing to their start in June 2013, and the first five negotiation rounds (out of thirteen so far) took place before the election (DG Trade 2016). For its part, the EP adopted a resolution supporting the opening of the negotiations in May 2013 (Nissen 2014, 36), showing thereby that it would take its new role under the new Lisbon Treaty rules seriously again, as it already did in the case of ACTA (see above). Thereby, then, also the condition of EP competence is fulfilled.

TTIP was selected as a case, because next to these constant criteria, it was said to be characterised by high intra-national and low cross-national distributional effects of rather high certainty, thereby meaningfully completing the selection of policy issues. Obviously, TTIP is not a scheme for direct redistribution among Member States or nationals of Member States such as the preceding cases of Europeanised welfare and the Common Agricultural Policy. There is no immediate budgetary implication. Nevertheless, theoretically, it is of course possible that only some Member States benefit from a trade agreement, while others would incur losses. This is not true, however, for TTIP, at least not according to the economic studies trying to predict its impact. According to Felbermayr, Heid et al., for instance, all countries would benefit in terms of increases in real GDP per capita, independent of the exact shape of the eventual agreement (tariff abolition only or ‘deep’ liberalisation) (ibid. 2013, 21–26). This finding is confirmed also by country-level studies (for the present sample of countries; see Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013 for the UK; Felbermayr et al. 2013b for Germany; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013 for France; Thelle et al. 2015 for Ireland; Della Rocca et al. 2013 for Italy; Francois and Pindyuk 2013 for Austria). Moreover, Felbermayr, Heid et al. conclude that TTIP would not foster divergence in terms of real income among the Member States. In other words, no country would lose at the aggregate level.

These findings notwithstanding, it seems worth noting that some countries gain more than others. Using the Felbermayr, Heid et al. data again, the following picture emerges: At the upper end of the scale, there are countries such as the Ireland or the UK, with predicted per capita increases in real income of 6.93 and 9.70 per cent, respectively, with the UK being second only to Luxemburg. At the lower end of the scale, there are France and Austria, with predicted per capita increase in real income of merely 2.64 and 2.71 per cent, respectively, with only the Czech Republic gaining even less out of TTIP. Germany and Italy can each expect gains of 4.68 and 4.92 per cent, in this order (ibid. 2013, 24). Felbermayr, Heid et al. literally draw a line between the countries gaining disproportionately from TTIP in terms of status quo income per capita in relation to increases in trade. They conclude that, since rich countries (high income per capita) gain relatively little compared to poorer countries, TTIP leads to convergence within the EU. Thus, what might be good news for the cohesion of the EU as a whole can be considered as a moderate kind of cross-country redistribution. Within the present sample of countries France and Austria fall below this line, the others remain above it (ibid. 2013, 23). They note, however, that even in the case of France, gains should be “clearly notable” (ibid. 2013, 25). Thus, all countries in the EU as well as in the present sample will be TTIP-winners, and so cross-national distribution resulting from TTIP in this sense should not be as decisive as in the case of CAP.

From this purely economic perspective, then, there should be no aggregate and literally *national* interest against TTIP anywhere in the EU. This does not exclude, of course, the possibility of creating winners and losers *within* the countries. Classically, one would think here of various sectors of the economy. In the case of TTIP, there indeed seems to be variation in the evaluation of TTIP across sectors (e.g. European Commission 2013b, 37–39). First, one might try to figure out in how far the broader sectors – agriculture, industry, and services – are affected. Here, a study by Fontagné et al. predicts gains for the latter two, whereas agriculture will be negatively affected (Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 11). This holds both for the EU as a whole as well as for the ‘big three’, i.e. France, Germany and the UK. In fact, France, traditionally considered a protectionist player especially because of its agricultural sector, would lose much less than the other two, while at the same time, the French industry stands to gain more (ibid. 2013, 10–11). Even within one of these overarching sectors, some particular industries might gain while others lose: In Ireland, for instance, the dairy sector is considered as a winner from TTIP, while the beef sector will lose out, resulting in a very slim loss for Irish agriculture overall (Thelle et al. 2015). At the EU level, a similar picture emerges for the industrial sector, where motor vehicles stand to gain at the expense of electrical machinery (European Commission 2013b, 40–41). The numbers concerning the expected growth due to TTIP within each country may, therefore, be considered as a rough indication regarding the ratio (in terms of economic weight) between economic winners and losers from TTIP.

While distributional effects between economic sectors might be of particular relevance with regard to trade policy, usually one would think here of conflicts between classes in terms of capital versus labour, or, along the lines of ‘new politics’, consumer versus producers (cf. Marks 2004). With regard to the former, it is worth noting that the EU and the US are comparatively similarly in terms of labour costs and productivity, as Felbermayr, Larch et al. point out, so that they do not expect strong effects in terms of wage competition (ibid., 2013a, 10). This arguably reduces part of the potential for conflict between capital and labour when it comes to TTIP. Moreover, TTIP is predicted to lead to an increase in employment also, which largely parallels the increases in GDP, and these jobs shall be better paid (Felbermayr et al. 2013a, 17; Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 34–41). These arguments notwithstanding, labour standards and labour rights might indirectly come under pressure as a result of TTIP, for instance as the US have not signed a number of conventions in the International Labour Organisation framework (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 144–45). At this point, an overlap exists between the dimensions of capital versus labour and consumers versus producers, to which I now turn.

It was already mentioned that the area of ‘regulatory cooperation’ is a highly controversial field. What is more, however, is that this is considered by practically all studies providing an outlook on the potential costs and benefits as the key element of TTIP (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013; Della Rocca et al. 2013, 5; Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 42; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 1; Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012, 1–2). Hence, Akhtar and Jones report: “Regulatory issues are widely regarded by many stakeholders as the core of the T-TIP negotiations, potentially ‘making or breaking’ the agreement” (ibid. 2014, 7). While the question of regulatory issues thus seems to be the central aspect for shaping the structure of conflict on TTIP, the question is how exactly it will do so.

A Swedish study points out what exactly the dilemma is here: “Although these rules are in place for good reasons, such as protecting consumers’ health, the environment, or national security, they can create unnecessary barriers to trade” (Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012, 2). Whereas the authors of the study are optimistic that these barriers can be reduced so as to reap the benefits of more trade without giving up their original purpose (*ibid.*), it becomes clear from this statement that those who would benefit economically from the reduction in NTBs stand opposed to those who so far were either directly protected by the particular standard in question or at the very least have been part of a collective decision to set up these standards in accordance with a very particular public preference or commonly held value (cf. also Akhtar and Jones 2014, 7). These standards, as was already mentioned, differ on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet of course also within each of the trading blocks, those parties representing producer groups will have a positive opinion on reducing NTBs and will thus face opposition from those who represent consumers, environmental interests etc. Indeed, this is precisely what is found by De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015), and it is a pattern that extends to most of the other contentious areas such as regulation in services, public procurement and investment/investor protection. The links between those aspects of the producer versus consumer conflict will be pointed out in more detail when discussing the policy frames on TTIP, but it already becomes clear here that the side one takes with regard to this cleavage will shape the structure of conflict in decisive ways.

Before this background, De Ville and Siles-Brügge argue that the conflict on TTIP, in contrast to earlier conflicts over trade policy, is not a distributive conflict, but a normative one (*ibid.*, 2015, 132–36). It might appear, then, that such a normative conflict is outside the theoretical framework provided in the present study, as this is built largely on the concept of distributional effects. There is, however, a twofold answer to this concern. On a conceptual level, it must be noted that the definition of what constitutes a distributional conflict used by Gary Marks, on whose work much of the present study is built, is wide enough to consider the conflict on regulatory cooperation in TTIP as a distributive one. As Marks points out: “Distribution (or allocation) of values involves who is allowed to do what as well as who gets what” (*ibid.*, 2004, 248). Regulatory standards obviously *are* about who is allowed to do what.

Moreover, on a substantive level, it also becomes clear that regulatory standards are about costs and benefits and thus also involve the question of who gets what. If, for instance, producers of food products containing Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) indeed were granted market access in the EU, consumers preferring GMO-free food products would have information costs when trying to avoid GMOs. Similarly, the debate on ISDS is not just about who is allowed to do what (Is the investor no longer allowed to carry out a certain way of production because of a new regulation or is the state in question violating the rights of this investor?) but eventually also about who gets what (Does the investor have to bear the cost resulting from the new regulation or does the state have to compensate the losses incurred by the investor?). As a result, the fact that the conflict over TTIP is centred on the question of regulatory standards does not mean that the present theoretical framework does not capture this, as in terms of its *effects*, this conflict is still about distribution.

At the same time, the following section identifying the policy frames on TTIP demonstrates exactly what DeVille and Siles-Brügge mean here: for whereas the main difference between what I refer to as the ‘neoliberal’ frame and the ‘protectionist’ frame lies in the causal narratives they include regarding the consequences of free trade for the national economy (which for both is normatively what trade policy should be about), the main difference between the neoliberal frame and the ‘anti-globalisation’ frame is found on the normative dimension: while anti-globalists may not necessarily deny the growth potential on TTIP, they disagree that this is what trade policy should be all about in the first place.

Based on the above considerations, then, it would seem that it was appropriate to attribute low cross-national but high cross-national distributional effects to this case. Yet, as has been shown in the chapter on ‘welfare tourism’, the mere potential of distributional effects may not have the same effect as these distributional effects can have if they are certain. As the certainty of distributional effects resulting from TTIP was considered to be ‘high’ in the discussion of case selection at the macro level (see Chapter 3), this should be reviewed here in some more detail as well.

After all, TTIP is not in place yet. Hence, firstly, one might question of course whether the pessimistic visions of, amongst others, pro-consumer NGOs will actually come true. This will depend on the outcome of the political process and that indeed can hardly be foreseen at this point. This ‘political’ uncertainty, however, would be part of every political debate to some extent, as the whole point of arguing in favour or against a certain policy is that it changes this outcome. Importantly, this is different from the debate on Europeanised welfare, because in this case, there was legal (what are the rights of migrants and which kinds of national-level restrictions are allowed?) and economic (in how far does welfare act as an incentive for intra-EU migrations?) uncertainty *in addition*.

Legal uncertainty is less of a concern for TTIP arguably, since the framework of the CCP is not new and the competences of the EU and the Member States in this field are rather clear, which since ACTA would also seem to apply to the role of the EP. It must be noted here, however, that the certainty of distributional effects resulting from TTIP in economic terms has been called into question: In fact, predicting the benefits of TTIP has been referred to as an exercise in “managing fictional expectations” by DeVille and Siles Brügge (2015, 17–37). They heavily criticise the way that so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, used in almost all of the predictive studies cited above, reduce the actual complexity concerning the impact of trade agreements and point to one alternative study that comes to very different results, while acknowledging that this one might be exaggerating in its own turn. Clearly, inasmuch as these predictions should be considered as uncertain, so should be the distributional effects in terms of varying amount of gains from TTIP within and across countries.

Before this background, four points concerning the studies predicting TTIP impacts deserve notice. First, economists have become increasingly aware of the critique of CGE modelling and have reacted to the critique, for instance in the studies by the ifo institute and the one by the Bertelsmann Stiftung already cited (Felbermayr et al. 2013a and Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, respectively). Their results might thus be somewhat more trustworthy, which is another reason for using the Bertelsmann study for drawing a line between winners and ‘losers’ (i.e. those who do not gain as much)

from TTIP. Second, an Italian study that explicitly does not use CGE modelling comes arrives at results that do not differ decisively from those studies that do (Della Rocca et al. 2013). Third, there arguably is a mainstream consensus here that TTIP will benefit all parties involved and that CGE modelling adequately demonstrates this. The Commission thus is arguably right when they argue that CGE modelling as used for the impact assessment it has conducted is “state of the art” (quoted in Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 34). This differs from the debate on welfare tourism, where it was neither clear, in how far welfare payments actually act as a pull factor for migrants, nor what the overall effect of migration on national welfare systems is or could be. Fourth and related, the studies cited almost all are commissioned by national governments, as apparently it is the best guess available in order to *create* some degree of certainty. As a result, anyone who at least puts some faith in mainstream – albeit neoliberal – economics and its established ways of creating certainty would have to take the predictions they make as a basis for framing policy preferences on TTIP. In sum, not only does it still seem appropriate to consider the distributional effects of TTIP as mainly intra-rather cross-national, but also as rather certain.

Extant research on CCP and TTIP

The aforementioned characteristics make TTIP valuable as a case within the overall study on conflict in a post-Crisis European Parliament. In addition, however, TTIP is quite clearly also an interesting case for its own sake within the literature on EU trade policy, which I shall briefly review here without claiming completeness. Classic trade theories are usually summarised as expecting a conflict between protectionist (those who expect to lose from trade) and liberal (those who expect to win) forces, with protectionist forces always having the stronger motive to mobilise and hence more impact (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 488–91 Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 12, 133). Yet, as was already mentioned, Hanson (1998) generally finds protectionist forces much weaker in their policy impact than classic theories would expect them to be, which he attributes to an EU institutional contexts creating a pro-liberalisation bias. While Moravcsik (1993; 1998) would not necessarily expect the same policy outcome as these classic theories, he would expect a similar line of conflict, the exact shape of which would be determined by domestic producers directing their national governments. Kleinmann (2011) indeed points to the relevance of such producer interests becoming national interests and thereby changing the outcome in the EU-Korea trade agreement, towards a less radically liberal one. By contrast, Siles-Brügge suggest a constructivist explanation for what he considers a very neoliberal EU-Korea trade agreement, in that neoliberal ideas prevailing in the EU are said to have overruled the very same (automobile) producer interests that Kleinmann finds to shape the agreement.

Interestingly, while all of these studies still mainly suggest a conflict between protectionists and liberals, conflict on the new generation of trade agreements is often found to be less territorial – given, arguably, the intra-national distributional effects – and along a different line, namely between pro-industry and pro-consumer/citizen parties. This was observed for the case of ACTA, as was already noted above (Chen 2015; Dür and Mateo 2014). A recent publication by deVille and Siles-Brügge (2015) on TTIP itself comes to a similar conclusion, arguing even that the face of trade policy and, with it, conflicts over trade

policy have generally changed. The present study may thus either corroborate these findings or serve to call them into question, and thereby speaks to the wider literature on EU trade policy. In fact, its main asset for doing so could consist in a much more explicit methodological approach than it was used by deVille and Siles-Brügge. Amongst others, this approach might help to uncover what could be called protectionism in disguise, which uses pro-consumer arguments to hide protectionist motivations: As Kleinmann notes, opposition to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), for instance, could potentially constitute such a case and be driven either by genuine concern for consumer interests or agricultural protectionism (ibid. 2011, 26). The difference between the two will become clear the next subsection, when the first step in analysing the policy frames used in the TTIP debate is made by identifying the policy frames available.

6.2 Identification of possible policy frames on TTIP

In this section, the possible policy frames to be used by the MEPs on TTIP are identified, so that they can serve as the basis for the coding step of the Policy Frame Analysis. This identification of frames could, at the time, not be based on already existing discourse analyses on TTIP, but rather had to be built on discourse analysis of globalisation supporters and opponents in general, as well as specifically for EU trade policy. These were then thought further with regard to the controversial items of TTIP presented earlier. Three possible frames were identified in this manner. The first one would generally be considered as ‘neoliberal’, stressing the need – and TTIP’s potential – for economic growth, hampered so far by barriers of trade of all kinds, and calling for quick and deep liberalisation. The second policy frame consists of classic protectionist arguments, with a normative focus on the national, viewing trade as a zero-sum game and hence doubting the causal narratives of classic economics, and hence suggests exemptions from liberalisation for strategically selected sectors. The third frame would usually be referred to as ‘anti-globalisation’, while more positively it might also be called ‘consumerist’, in that it values consumer protection and other regulatory standards above economic growth, and perceives of the regulatory convergence intended by modern trade agreements as a threat. In its moderate version, it hence calls for democratic safeguards on trade negotiations, and only conditionally approves of TTIP, whereas the radical version calls for a total abandonment of the whole project.

How the policy frames were identified

The preceding section has shown that a “Fortress Europe”, i.e. an internally liberal but externally protectionist EU, has never been created (Hanson 1998, 56). Instead, the EU has concluded a number of bilateral trade agreements since the 1990s. In fact, even in times of the economic crisis that struck Europe around the turn of the last decade, the EU has rather opened its markets and engaged in ever more free trade agreements. However, this does of course not mean that FTAs have gone uncontested. In order to prepare the analysis of the structure of conflict over TTIP, this section will thus contrast the various policy suggestions and their respective justifications – i.e. the policy frames – that are usually provided with regard to EU FTAs and hence are likely to be made with regard to TTIP as well.

In order to identify possible frames used on TTIP *a priori*, I proceed as follows. First, as for the other cases, it is helpful to draw on existing literature from the domain of discourse analysis. Free trade is a key feature of what is usually referred to as ‘globalisation’, a domain in which numerous discourse analyses have been undertaken. What is of interest here is not so much the question, what the concept of globalisation means to various actors, but rather what various actors think of it in terms of support or

resistance. In this sense, the works of Hay and Rosamond (2002) as well as Hay and Smith (2010; 2005) provide some first insights.

When it comes to moving closer to the more specific issue of free trade in order to eventually arrive at more concrete policy frames used regarding TTIP, more targeted discourse analyses are considered. Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, it turns out that the dominant, pro-free trade discourse has been studied and deconstructed in much more detail than its counterparts. The works of scholars such as Siles-Brügge (2013) or De Ville and Orbie (2014) are thus interesting here with regard to what is commonly referred as ‘neoliberalism’, but do not devote a similar degree of attention to its discursive opponents.⁴⁸ Together with textbooks on basic international economics they can thus provide a good idea of the dominant free trade frame but not more.

The ideational archenemy of neoliberalism, namely protectionism, may nowadays not be part of the political mainstream in many countries any longer, but this does not mean that this is equally the case everywhere and for everyone (cf. Hanson 1998, 66). Given its age, the school of thought behind protectionism has been the subject of works on the history of economic thought (e.g. Brue and Grant 2007), which can thus be used as a starting point. Husted and Melvin (2007, 196–212) provide a rather up-to-date overview of protectionist arguments, while distinguishing between “valid” and “invalid” ones. While their representation of modern protectionist thought must be taken with a pinch of salt, their work forms the basis of what I refer to as the ‘protectionist’ frame.

Actual, openly advocated protectionism may appear anachronistic or naïve to many, given the seemingly irreversible nature of economic globalisation. In addition, an important portion of potential free-trade opponents are unlikely to sign up to its nationalist underpinnings. The new opponents of what they refer to as ‘neoliberalism’ often choose not to follow the classic paths of representative democracy and instead formed the so-called anti-globalisation movement. Their arguments can be found mostly in the part of the social movement literature devoted to this particular movement. This does not mean, however, that their arguments would not be known and hence available for adoption and adaptation by classic political parties. In order to reflect the heterogeneity of the movement and its arguments, I distinguish between a moderate and a radical version of what I call the anti-globalisation frame(s). This line is drawn based on the degree of belief in representative democracy (cf. Sporer 2009), be it national or supranational and on the partly related degree of optimism concerning the contingency of globalisation (Hay and Rosamond 2002). While the literature on the social movement usually finds a resounding silence on the part of the movement of concrete policies, this will be different once the focus is on a particular policy such as TTIP.

Of course it also needs to be discussed here, in how far the fact that TTIP is not any FTA but one between the EU on the one hand and the US on the other hand impacts on the ways actors argue about it. This, in turn, hinges on the question, in how far EU-US relations as a matter of foreign policy

⁴⁸ The piece written by Siles-Brügge and De Ville (2015) specifically on TTIP was not available yet at the time of writing this section and developing the respective codebook yet.

proper can be linked with trade policy. In the past, for instance, the EU has been known to make trade agreements with developing countries dependent on human rights, good governance and similar conditions (cf. Manners 2002). It might seem far-fetched to expect a similar conditionality vis-à-vis the much more democratic United States. Yet, I point out below that the public debate triggered by Edward Snowden with regard to ‘Prism’ and other spying activities offers at least some potential for issue linkage which I shall discuss with regard to each free trade frame.

Possible policy frames on TTIP

What is referred to as **‘neoliberalism’** today is, in fact, “a more radical and more policy-oriented form of classic liberalism” as it was represented by John Locke and Adam Smith (Schröder 2015, 22). This classic reasoning was taken up, in theoretical terms, by economists such as von Hayek, von Mises and Friedman, and in political practice by the Conservative politicians Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, contrasting equally with Keynesian theory and practice (ibid.). This usage of the term ‘neoliberal’ must be distinguished from the line of thought forwarded by those economists who referred to themselves as ‘neoliberals’ such as Rüstow, Eucken or Röpke and who, in contrast to the foregoing economists and politicians, call for a strong state able to organize markets (ibid.). Since the usage of the label in the first manner is much more common and is used in the literature on the respective discourse (Siles-Brügge 2013; Ville and Orbie 2014; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015), it is taken up here to describe the dominant frame on trade policy. Defining ‘neoliberalism’ as an updated classic liberalism is not only a conceptual clarification, but also helps to identify those aspects of the frame that are often taken for granted but must be spelled out in order to sort descriptions of a neoliberal trade discourse into the various dimensions of a possible neoliberal frame on TTIP.

The most genuine source of neoliberal thought, namely the central piece by Adam Smith, is entitled “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” and quite clearly points to the normative basis of this frame as the goal of policy-making, namely the accumulation of (material) wealth. As a theory of economic growth and development (Brue and Grant 2007, 79), Smith’s work in large parts also still influences the causal narratives and policy suggestions behind the neoliberal frame. Before discussing these, it is noted here that indeed those who are considered as proponents of a neoliberal frame on trade policy, such as the EU Commissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, define the goal of trade policy as follows:

In times like these, trade policy ... has an even bigger role to play. It must be an engine of economic growth and job creation and a driver for economic reforms to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency. (quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 10)

In addition to growth and labour effects, free trade is assigned the capacity of leading to ‘consumer benefits’ in terms of lower prices and product choice, resulting in ‘triple benefit’ (cf. Siles-Brügge 2013, 605). Often literally linked to this triple benefit is the goal of ‘competitiveness’, which, while arguably also a cause of growth, job creation and consumer benefits, frequently becomes an end in itself (ibid. 2013,

610). Before discussing the other dimensions, it is briefly considered here, what this set of goals means with regard to alternative normative considerations.

Some have argued that neoliberals ignore the pursuit of collective goals as a public task (cf. Ville and Orbie 2014, 3). This, however, appears only partially appropriate. After all, a key notion in (neo)liberal thought is the Smithean idea of a harmony of interests, according to which the simple pursuit of self-interest in a free market is the best way towards achieving the collective social good of economic growth (Brue and Grant 2007, 68). In other words, *within* the neoliberal frame, there is no contradiction between the individual and the collective here, so that indeed protecting the individual's self-interest is the same as pursuing the collective good. The precondition is simply that the prioritized common good is economic growth.

Clearly, then, a lack of growth as observed – by definition – in times of economic recession or crisis, would be problematic. Indeed, this is also how Commissioner De Gucht, cited earlier as a neoliberal, describes the EU's current situation: “These are challenging economic times for Europe with low growth, high unemployment and gaping deficits in Member States’ public finances.” Similarly, he has spoken of a “double economic challenge” and has argued “We have, on the one hand, to address our structural weaknesses on the supply side in order to increase our growth potential and, on the other hand . . . to consolidate our public finances” (as quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 10–11). Noteworthy, he points here to the Member States’ fiscal situation, thereby excluding the classic, Keynesian answer to a lack of growth. Moreover, he does not speak of, for instance, a double challenge in terms of climate change and economic recession, or of rising inequality.

As Grant and Brue efficiently summarise it, the aforementioned idea of ‘harmony of interests’ “implies that intrusion by government into the economy is unneeded and undesirable” (ibid., 2007, 68), from Smith’s perspective. In fact, he considers market intervention an act of presumption on the part of the governing. Smith himself already extended this conclusion to international trade by rejecting any domestic monopoly building and arguing instead: “If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage” (Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, pp. 354–355, quoted in Brue and Grant 2007, 69). Similarly, another classical proponent of free trade, David Ricardo assumes in his famous theory of comparative advantage, that the labour units ‘freed’ in the comparatively inefficient domestic sector can be put to use more efficiently in the sector where the country in question enjoys a comparative (in Smith case: absolute) advantage (Brue and Grant 2007, 114–16). Without going into the details of the neoliberal causal narrative, it thus already becomes clear why even the harm done to less competitive sectors within the EU would *not* constitute a problem for the advocates of the neoliberal frame on trade (Ville and Orbie 2014, 3). Nonetheless, while policy-makers often take for granted the exact causal relations behind growth and free trade on the one hand and lack of growth and protectionism on the other, they shall briefly be summarised in the following paragraph.

In very simple terms, the idea behind Smith’s theory of absolute advantage and Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage can be brought down to the notion of division of labour: just like increases in

productivity achieved by specialisation lead to economic growth within a country, so specialisation of countries in certain sectors will lead to economic growth for both trading partners under free trade. Each country will be able to produce more at lower costs, will be able to sell surpluses abroad and will have access to cheap imports of those products for which it is not specialised (Brue and Grant 2007, 79-81, 114-116). Note that this perspective considers the outcome as a win-win situation, since all countries participating in free trade enjoy these advantages, which is perfectly in line with the ‘harmony of interests’ within countries. The flipside of this argument is that any impediment to free markets both within and across countries makes nations forego these advantages, so that instead of growth they will face continued recession.

Indeed, modern advocates of free trade argue exactly along these lines. Siles-Brügge finds references to the concept of ‘comparative advantage’ in strategy papers of DG Trade (ibid., 2013, 604). The idea is that market access quickens necessary adaptation needed sooner or later anyway (ibid., 2013, 604; see also Hay and Rosamond 2002, 13), increasing ‘competitiveness’ of European firms (Ville and Orbie 2014, 4). Thereby, free trade will lead to growth, job creation and consumer benefits as stated already in the foregoing quotes by Commissioner De Gucht. Two quotes by Catherine Ashton not only include the aforementioned flipside argument but also shows the degree of self-evidence with which this causal narrative is presented: “[w]e all know that protectionism makes recovery harder” and, in another speech: “[a] protectionist backlash, as part of a rescue package or otherwise, could potentially worsen this downturn” (quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 8). Noteworthy, the classic underlying theories are formulated as economic laws – and hence should be universally applicable, irrespective of the trading partner in question.

By now it should be obvious that the neoliberal frame is the frame that most outspokenly favours TTIP. Not only will both sides always win from free trade anyway, however small these gains may be, given the already low tariffs between the EU and the US. It is also the fact that this frame likewise rejects what it considers ‘murky’ behind-the-border policies that nevertheless inhibit trade (Siles-Brügge 2013, 605). As I have argued in the preceding section, TTIP indeed is mainly about the removal of so-called Non-Tariff-Barriers (NTBs), which from a neo-liberal free market perspective are harmful. Within this frame, the otherwise controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) would appear absolutely appropriate as a tool against future protectionism – even of the more subtle kind – and may be understood as a further element of “protection of traders from the arbitrary exercise of state power” (Lang quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 3).

The ‘prism’ affair and its successors are unlikely to dampen the support for TTIP in any way for the simple fact that those values which might be threatened in the Snowden affair – be they data protection ideals or national security – are in no way linked to the neoliberal frame *on trade*. Some neoliberals might indeed reject US spying against EU citizens and firms, but they will not change their mind on TTIP because of it. As I will show in due turn, this might be different for the other frames.

While (neo)liberals condemn **protectionism** as the source of all evil, protectionism itself was itself partly a reaction to classic liberalism represented by Smith and Ricardo. Like (neo)liberalism,

protectionism as a line of thought can be traced back to a school of economists and one scholar in particular, namely the so-called German Historical School more generally and Friedrich List, in person. List generally challenged the universal applicability of liberal economic theories, advocating an alternative course of trade policy for Germany. As Grant and Brue note, however, his ideas were better received in the US than in Germany (ibid., 2007, 198), while nowadays France is considered as the final stronghold of protectionist thought (Hanson 1998, 66). Nevertheless, his criticism of liberalism reaches beyond the level of eventual policy suggestions.

First, on the normative dimension, List challenges the notion of ‘harmony of interests’, arguing instead that “the immediate private interests of certain members of the community do not necessarily lead to the highest good of the whole”, as Grant and Brue note (ibid. 2007, 199). Noteworthy, the good of the nation was ranked above that of the individual (ibid.). As soon as the harmony of interests is dissolved in favour of the collective, however, the automatism proclaimed by liberal theory disappear – and the good of ‘the nation’ has to be defined other than by the individual pursuit of wealth.

This view leads to a much more strategic perspective on trade. Indeed, List had criticised Smith and other classic liberals for ignoring politics. For instance, he argued that it may be worthwhile giving up ‘value’ in the short term, in terms of foregoing cheap imports due to tariffs, with the long-term goal of building up its own manufacturing industry. This, in turn, “not only secures to the nation an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also industrial independence in case of war” (List quoted in Brue and Grant 2007, 200). In other words, it matters to have *your own* manufacturing industry within the confines of *your* nation state.

Arguably, the discussion on TTIP is hardly about having manufacturing industries, as the respective participating countries on both sides of the Atlantic have long since left the pre-industrial stage of economic development. Nevertheless, it might still be desirable to keep certain sectors of the economy in a state that are of wider political relevance. A military industry constitutes the most obvious example, and one which, according to Husted and Melvin, would even be accepted by Smith (ibid., 2007, 202). Yet the discussion on the CAP has shown that also self-sufficiency in food supplies can be a political objective that might involve trade policy instruments for its achievement. More recently even, the absence of a European alternative to Google, Facebook etc. has been deplored (cf. Rahn, Mawad, and Rach 2013). With Airbus, a historical precedent of a European effort for breaking an American monopoly exists (Husted and Melvin 2007, 210). In principle, however, the range of sectors that should be kept within the country for political reasons is open to discussion, so that the protectionist normative dimension might have bias towards securing existing jobs rather than aiming for the creation of new ones. Indeed, employment more generally in terms of existing jobs is a value regularly evoked also by modern protectionists, as is the general spirit of patriotism or, rather, nationalism included in List’s work (Husted and Melvin 2007, 197). While the goal of keeping certain domestic industries mainly relates to the *disharmony* of interests between nations, the potential *disharmony within* nations is another aspect worth considering in the discussion of protectionism’s normative dimension. Yet, politically defined national goals such as a ‘fair’ distribution of income might be thinkable as well (Husted and Melvin 2007, 201).

Before this background, unfettered competition can be problematic, as it may involve the loss of certain industries which the nation as a whole might have a certain interest of keeping and the loss of attached, existing jobs. Such competition may be considered harmful and threatening.

For protectionists, it is the unqualified application of the liberal free trade doctrine – e.g. an all-encompassing version of TTIP – that leads to this harmful or unfair competition, as it disregards not only the political dimension of trade but also the fact that different nations have different starting conditions: in the historical example of List's analysis of economic development in Germany, for instance, it may well be that Germany would *in principle* be capable of developing its own manufacturing industry, but will only very slowly or never achieve this under conditions of free trade (Brue and Grant 2007, 198–200). It is this inequality in starting conditions that justifies the label of 'unfair' competition. That said, even in sectors where a nation is not likely to ever catch up with potential trading partners, national strategic interests would normatively justify protection.

To a certain extent, then, comparative advantages are not given but contingent upon certain political decisions. Only a country that already has reached the desired level of competitiveness, such as Britain at the time, will argue in favour of unfettered free trade (Brue and Grant 2007, 198–99). Otherwise, a nation should prefer protection, at least in selected sectors. Regarding TTIP, protectionists will thus call for a number of exemptions, that is, for the exclusion of certain sectors from the agreement. They might not, however, necessarily oppose TTIP *per se*. Exemptions may refer to the abolition of tariffs, but also to other means of protecting key sectors such as subsidies. However, it must be noted here that NTBs in the form of regulatory standards may have an effect that resembles the effect of a tariff or government subsidy, but that the introduction of such regulatory standards is highly unlikely to be justified by means of a protectionist frame. This is because it would rhetorically be much more efficient to consider such standards as worthwhile in itself, as I shall demonstrate below when discussing the anti-globalisation frame.

Before doing so, however, the particular application of protectionism vis-à-vis the United States needs to be discussed. More generally, it might be argued that some of the strategic aims of protectionism could be of lesser importance here, as both the US and most EU Member States are joined in the NATO defence community. At the same time, this has traditionally not prevented some states such as France from striving for a certain degree of independence in defence matters. In case of the US, however, strategic considerations have reached beyond the military sector, as for instance also cultural independence (normative) from US 'cultural imperialism' (constitutive) has been called for (Hay and Rosamond 2002). The US cultural dominance would arguably be eased by the removal of current barriers to trade in this sector (be they tariffs or supply-side subsidies), and indeed it would seem plausible to argue that starting conditions are hardly the same here (cognitive) (see also: Akhtar and Jones 2014). More recently, the 'prism' scandal might be used in order to justify not necessarily opposition to TTIP as such, but instead the strategic goal of building up European alternatives to Google etc., which consequently would necessitate exemptions from TTIP in this particular area (see also: Akhtar and Jones 2014).

Finally, agriculture might constitute a field for protectionist exemptions. In general, the removal of trade barriers contrasts to some extent with existing policy within the EU: it becomes more important to subsidise an uncompetitive sector that is exposed to competition than one that is not (cf. Husted and Melvin 2007, 206–7, who discuss this for the US case). More specifically, the widespread application of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food production constitutes a field where, the EU is not on a par with the US, so that ‘unfair’ competition is likely to be bemoaned here. Doing so would constitute an instance of protectionist framing, if and only if this is done in terms of the harm it does to the EU’s agricultural industry. Noteworthy, there is a thin – and mainly analytical – line here between GMO-opposition for protectionist reasons and the rejection of GMO-food as such, which would be part of the anti-globalisation frame(s) to be discussed in the next subsection.⁴⁹

Tariffs may constitute the most obvious form of protectionism, while regulatory standards as in the case of GMOs may constitute a hidden but factual form of protectionism. ‘Hidden’ protectionism, however, implies that the insistence on certain regulatory standards is framed in non-protectionist terms and thus by definition is not considered to be part of the protectionist frame just outlined. In between the open protectionism in terms of tariffs and hidden, regulatory protectionism the – at least in the EU – increasingly popular practice of geographical indications (GIs) is situated, a well-known example being Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). While such labels are used in the US might just be common food names, their usage is regulated in the EU (cf. *ibid.*). At a national level, ‘made in’ labels perform a similar function: they do not financially discourage consumers from buying cheaper, imported products, as tariffs would, but constitute a justification for potentially higher prices in terms of an appeal to patriotism or, at least, to non-rational images and connotations (cf. Husted and Melvin 2007, 197). Husted and Melvin count such labels among protectionist policies (*ibid.*), and this be extended to GIs here.

It is true, of course, that GIs share some features with regulatory standards. Moreover, they are commonly justified as bits of information to the consumer. Nonetheless, they should be counted as protectionist policies for two reasons. Firstly, the actual benefit arising from them to consumers is itself debatable, since they do not necessarily imply better quality or safety, while their benefit to *the existing domestic industry* is beyond doubt (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). Yet, in contrast to hidden protectionism, it is not only their effect that justifies their categorization as protectionist. It is, secondly, their link to nationalist-protectionist norms that makes work: the individual is implicitly asked to forgo a cheaper price in the short run for the greater good of the nation, just as List would have postulated.

As with the notion of ‘neoliberalism’, the label ‘**anti-globalisation** movement’ was put on the participants by others rather than the name they chose for themselves. The imposed label is misleading, as in fact the anti-globalisation movement and those who take up its ideas in representative politics are not against globalisation in principle (Ayres 2004, 22). Moreover, as the ‘anti-globalisation’ label stresses the opposition of the movement to something, it has a pejorative and slightly negative touch to it. It may

⁴⁹ In practice, this may be a typical instance of hiding protectionist motivations behind anti-globalist framing.

indeed be true that the policy dimension of the frame(s) going under this label here is mainly defined by its opposition to, in this case, TTIP. Yet, the discussion of the normative dimension shared by both the moderate and the radical version of the frame shows that proponents of the frame are certainly in favour of something.

As Ayres (2004) notes by analyzing how the movement frames its critique of neoliberal globalisation, what the movement turns against is “the current WTO-dominated rules-based system that focused mostly on promoting trade and investment liberalisation, while remaining silent on consumer, labor, environmental or human rights concerns” (ibid., 2004, 22). Similarly, Sporer (2009) notes that key actors within the movement such as Attac call for “a global trade regime that prioritizes the interests of developing countries, socially disadvantaged and the environment” (ibid., 2009, 44). Much rather than constituting direct policy suggestions, these statements summarise the values of the movement.

These values can now be contrasted with those of the preceding frames: in contrast to protectionism, on the one hand, the focus is not on the well-being of one particular nation here, as in fact the well-being of e.g. developing countries is explicitly included. Moreover, priority is clearly given to consumers, whose interests are clearly ranked above those of domestic producers even, while protectionism may involve short-term sacrifices on the part of consumers. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, aims for consumer benefits just as much as for the well-being of producers (‘harmony of interests’), yet it is limited to the economic, material well-being in terms of cheap prices and product choice.

This is not to say that the anti-globalisation movement totally disregards material conditions. Yet, for the case of TTIP, post-material aspects such as consumer safety and human rights are likely to take centre stage for proponents of the anti-globalisation frame, where current standards will determine the perceptions of potential costs of liberalisation (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 10): With regard to consumer safety standards, proponents of this frame will stress the European distinctiveness in terms of the so-called precautionary principle, which for instance is behind the widespread rejection of GMOs in Europe. Stretching the concept of human rights, proponents of the frame will stress differences in attitudes on data protection, using the ‘prism’-affair as an illustration. Similarly, rights to provision of certain public services, such as water supply as in the ‘Right to water’ campaign might be demanded. That said, it is of course possible that other standards are invoked as well, whether they are actually higher than the US counterparts or not.

In general, of course, any threat to the aforementioned standards or to the future capacity of setting such standards constitutes a problem. Such a problem might be referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’ (cf. Ayres 2004; Sporer 2009). As was already noted, globalisation and even free trade may not necessarily be a problem in this sense, but the current way most trade agreements are conceptualized (including the WTO regime) is (cf. Ayres 2004). A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is not a problem as such either. They are *potentially* problematic inasmuch as they disregard importance of social, environmental, consumer safety and human rights concerns, which is the reason why – a certain general heterogeneity within the movement notwithstanding – ‘neoliberalism’ is univocally considered problematic from an anti-globalisation perspective (Ayres 2004, 15–18; Schröder 2015, 21–23). Indeed, the above

discussion of neoliberalism as a policy frame on free trade in general and TTIP in particular helps to understand this opposition: not only are these values at best secondary from a neoliberal perspective, but what may constitute a valuable regulatory standard for critics of globalisation is precisely what for neoliberals may constitute a ‘non-tariff barrier’ to trade (NTB). The removal of such NTBs is what, in fact, is the core of TTIP, much rather than the abolition of the few remaining tariffs (Akhtar and Jones 2014; Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012). Those who particularly appreciate the regulatory status quo are likely to perceive this as a risk: At best, they lose the kind of standard they consider ideal and are used to (such as, for instance, the precautionary principle). This, of course, is a judgement that is independent of the factual effectiveness of standards. At worst, they face a lower level of standards as a kind of lowest common denominator. Any such risk will be denied by neoliberals, as they might not consider the same issues as valuable standards, but simply as non-tariff barriers to trade.

For judging whether a problem arises in the context of the TTIP negotiations, two lines of argument from an anti-globalisation perspective are thinkable, a moderate and a radical one. The distinction between the two hinges on the question, in how far the representative institutions of nation-states or even the supranational EU, in combination with civil society, are capable of securing such regulatory standards in a globalised economy or not. This categorization reflects earlier analyses of the anti-globalisation movement that have pointed to varying degrees of radicalism within the movement (Ayres 2004, 27; Eschle 2004; Starr and Adams 2003, 20) and related variation in the degree of optimism and pessimism concerning the capacity of the state and politics more generally to control globalised capitalism (Ayres 2004, 27; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Sporer 2009, 10–52).

From a moderate perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP will arise if a. representative institutions such as the EP and civil society are not sufficiently involved in the process of negotiation, for if they were, they would represent consumer interests and consequently would keep regulatory standards safe and b. if the agreement itself provided for a future weakening of democratic institutions, e.g. by installing a non-democratic, private Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). From a radical perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP will arise even if producers cannot prevent Member States or the EU from regulating on legal grounds, since the way free trade agreements are negotiated is always disadvantageous to consumers, so that standards definitely will be lost along the way and since a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ might lead to a *de facto* democratic deficit in the long run.

Both moderate and radical critics of globalisation would agree that the existing standards as well as the capacity of setting new ones must be upheld – but as I already argued, this is essentially a value commitment without any particular policy implication concerning TTIP. Given the difference in terms of the causal narratives just presented, the concrete policy suggestions from moderates and radicals also differ. Moderates will oppose certain aspects of TTIP such as secret Commission mandates, private ISDS or the abolition of a particular standard but will conditionally support it (logically, if e.g. there are no private ISDS). Radicals, by contrast, sure of the loss it involves, will unconditionally oppose TTIP.

The fact that TTIP is not about any FTA but about an FTA with the US is likely to be of particular relevance to critics of globalisation, since they consider the US as a hegemonic power in global

politics and economics, spreading and enforcing neoliberal policies globally (Schröder 2015, 23–24). In general, TTIP may thus be considered as an attempt to further impose neoliberal policies on Europe, first by directly addressing certain standards and by impeding future regulation by means of private ISDS, before which powerful US companies might outperform European states. As was already mentioned, the ‘prism’ scandal might not only be considered as a proof of differing values on the other side of Atlantic. For radicals, it will constitute another argument for stopping the negotiations on TTIP immediately. Moderates, by contrast, might want to use TTIP to achieve general concessions in the realm of data protection. As economic growth is not their value priority but standards such as data protection are, the link is easily made, as both the scandal and TTIP – the latter at least potentially – are problematic for similar reasons.

Noteworthy, the frames thus identified largely correspond to the discourses on TTIP as analysed by Ferdi DeVilje and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2015), but are derived from earlier literature. That said, the argument made by some proponents of TTIP that TTIP will help to set global standards in the future (*ibid.*, 2015, 38–61) was subsumed later under the neoliberal frame, as it did not seem to follow its own logic theoretically and empirically coincided with frame F1 being used. An advantage of an open-minded and deductive approach (insofar as it was not derived from the exact matter to be studied) to frames on trade policy was the explicit inclusion of the possibility that also classic protectionist arguments might be made with regard to TTIP. As is shown in the next section, this was important with regard to the observable implications of the various theoretical approaches. Table 59 summarises the policy frames thus derived, while a detailed codebook including the observable instances typical for each frame is found in Annex II.

Table 59: Summary of possible policy frames on TTIP

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Neoliberalism, Frame 1 | Economic growth, job creation | Double crisis: economic stagnation and public deficits | Protectionism makes economic recovery harder, while free trade is the only policy that does not increase debt | TTIP as soon and as 'ambitious' as possible |
| Protectionism, Frame2 | Existing jobs in domestic industries; patriotism and national/European interests | Unlimited free trade threatens certain domestic industries | Unfair competition | Exemption of certain sectors; geographical indications |
| Anti-Globalisation, Frame 3(A&B) | High standards for environmental protection, consumer safety and human rights | TTIP might reduce the level of standards | A: secret negotiations inhibit democratic control needed to protect standards; ISDS inhibit future regulation B: TTIP negotiations are beyond democratic control anyway; once it is there, race to the bottom | A: conditional approval of TTIP – EP and civil society involvement, no ISDS B: no TTIP! |

6.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case

In this section, the observable implications of extant theories vis-à-vis those of the theory of territorialisation (ToT) are spelled out. In order to prepare this, however, it is first of all necessary to specify what the case characteristics of TTIP mean for the sample of parties at the country level, thereby demonstrating also that there is sufficient variation in this regard: Among the six countries selected, there are those who, compared to the EU as a whole, can expect average (Germany and Italy) or even high economic gains from TTIP (Ireland and the UK), but also those who expected to gain very little (France and Austria). In addition, there is variation in national traditions of capitalism, which can be expected to influence perceptions of what is 'normal' in trade agreements. Before this background, theories coming from a more International Relations perspective on trade would expect a territorial structure of conflict between TTIP winners and 'losers' (in relative terms), whereas those from a Comparative Politics tradition as well as EP-specific ones (with the exception of the Council-focussed bicameral approach) would predict a territorial structure of conflict. The latter also applies to the ToT, while it is built on different and usually more specific assumptions about the goals and framing strategies of national party delegations. According to this theory, only French and Austrian parties from the Conservative/Christian Democratic and the Liberal family will have incentives to defect, since substantial parts of their electorate stand to lose from the intra-national distributional effects of TTIP, whereas all other parties have largely overlapping ideological and vote-seeking reasons to be sceptical or supportive of TTIP due to the predominance of intra-national distribution.

Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries

Since this study merely covers six out of (meanwhile and so far still) 28 EU Member States, and in order to prepare the ground for spelling out the observable implications of the various theoretical approaches discussed next, it is necessary here specify the case characteristics for the six countries selected, i.e. Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the UK and Ireland. Before this background, it will then also be possible

to assure that both sides of a potential cross-national distribution are represented. While in the present case cross-national distribution is not to be expected, there still is some variation here in terms of how much each country might gain from TTIP, which might influence the balance of intra-national distribution, and national traditions in economic policy, namely the type of capitalism, might also play a role.

In order to establish the variation in the degree of TTIP gains, I will draw on the study by Felbermayr, Heid et al. (2013) already mentioned above. There are at least two reasons for doing so. First, as they provide country-level predictions for each and every Member State based on the same model, they are more comparable than country-level data drawn from different studies, using various definitions of what constitutes an ‘ambitious’ or ‘modest’ scenario for TTIP in terms of negotiation outcomes, i.e. the exact extent to which tariffs will be abolished or in how far TTIP will go beyond tariffs and will also remove NTBs. Second, while lacking deeper knowledge of economic modelling the quality of such predictions is difficult to judge, Felbermayr, Heid et al. at least demonstrate awareness of the general difficulties associated with the conventional ‘computable general equilibrium’ (CGE) modelling (Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 5), i.e. the approach criticised by de Ville and Siles-Brügge (ibid. 2015, 21). Yet, it is still possible to consider in more detail potentially contradictory findings with regard to individual countries when pointing out the exact observable implications later, at a point when it can also be discussed in how far this will indeed make a difference in terms of frame choice.

In fact, however, most country-specific studies come to qualitatively similar results (e.g. Della Rocca et al. 2013; Francois and Pindyuk 2013; Thelle et al. 2015), with one exception: a study commissioned by the UK governments holds: “The EU as a whole is expected to benefit more from liberalisation since the removable barriers are higher” (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013, 31). In other words, it appears from this study that the UK gains comparatively little from TTIP, in contrast to the finding of the Bertelsmann study. Nevertheless, it still seems safe to assume here that, if British parties were guided exclusively by the national interest in terms of TTIP-driven economic growth for their country, they would still favour the neoliberal frame F1: on the one hand, other studies including predictions for the UK would consider the UK among the main winners from TTIP (Della Rocca et al. 2013; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013). On the other hand, it must be noted that the same study concludes:

For the UK, national income and GDP are expected to increase by between £4 and £10 billion annually, depending on the scenarios, with the highest increase taking place under the most ambitious scenario, which incorporates the highest reduction in NTBs . . . The primary message is that NTBs are critical to UK gains. . . Overall, the scope for benefits for the UK hinges on the level of ambition. A more ambitious agreements yields greater gains in terms of output, wages, and investment. (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013, 47)

An ‘ambitious agreement’ is precisely what is called for on the policy dimension of frame F1, which is also what UK MEPs were expected to use if they were driven by the assumption that their country were among those countries gaining the most from TTIP. Hence, even if the UK-specific study were considered more trustworthy for some reason, any expectation concerning frame choice based on the

economic impact of TTIP should be the same for the UK. Inasmuch as the study by Felbermayr, Haid et al. is considered, then, there seems to be ideal variation within the selection of countries, in that there are two countries in the sample that are ranked at the top end (UK, Ireland), two in the middle and close to the EU average (Germany, Italy) and two countries at the bottom end winning the least from TTIP (Austria, France).

A similarly high degree of variation is found with regard to the type of capitalism, as was mentioned earlier already and as is recalled again in Table 60. This national tradition could be relevant with regard to TTIP in the sense that those economies where the state usually interferes the most are least apt to liberalisation and vice versa. In fact, the two kinds of possible country-level influences also vary with each other to some extent, albeit the expected top winners from TTIP are both liberal capitalist countries. If there is any territorial pattern related either to the degree of gains resulting from TTIP or the type of capitalism, then, it should still be possible to recognise this focussing on national party delegations from this set of countries only.

Table 60: Gains from TTIP per country (Source: Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013) and the type of capitalism prevailing in the country (Source: Schmidt 2005)

| country | Expected percentage increase in real income per capita | Relatively high or low gains from TTIP ⁵⁰ | Type of capitalism |
|---------|--|--|--------------------|
| UK | 9.70 | High | Liberal |
| Ireland | 6.93 | High | Liberal |
| Italy | 4.92 | High | Statist |
| Germany | 4.68 | High | Managed |
| Austria | 2.71 | Low | Managed |
| France | 2.64 | Low | Statist |
| EU27 | 4.95 | N.A. | N.A. |

Observable implications of earlier approaches

Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I will first discuss the predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties' framing strategies based on the extant theoretical literature reviewed in detail in the same chapter. Before turning to the EP-specific ones and eventually to the explanations common in the area of trade policy generally and with regard to TTIP in particular, I will start with the more general theories of conflict in EU politics, because these usually offer rather clear cut predictions with which the other theories can be contrasted easily.

Independent of the issue actually, the **cleavage approach** by Marks and Wilson would imply an ideological structure of conflict, not affected by any particular distributional effect changing any party's vote-seeking considerations. Accordingly, at one extreme pole, namely fully in support of TTIP and hence using frame F1 predominantly, one would expect to find party families who occupy the economic Right on the classic Left-Right scale, because a general belief in the forces of the free market and everything

⁵⁰ For an explanation of this categorisation, see section 2.

which follows from it in terms of policies such as free trade fits this frame perfectly. This applies to Christian Democratic Conservative parties since the 1980s as well as Christian Democratic parties (cf. Festenstein and Kenny 2005). In fact, it seems plausible to draw on an analogy here between support for European integration when it was still very much a market-building project and was strongest within this party family, and the creation of a Transatlantic market (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000). It further applies, of course, to parties from the Liberal family.

At the other extreme pole, one would expect to find those parties who do not *value* at all the main promise made by TTIP, namely economic growth. This applies to parties characterised by what is called a ‘post-materialist’ ideology, and parties belonging to the family of Green parties usually do so (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 327–31). Since on the one hand, these parties do not appreciate what TTIP shall do according to its proponents while on the other hand, they are the ones who simultaneously put the strongest normative emphasis on health and environmental standards presumably threatened by the agreement, resistance to TTIP should be rather strong among Green parties. Accordingly, they will use the anti-globalisation frame F3 and potentially even its radical variant. Finally, as pacifists and critics of global inequality, they are arguably sceptical of new forms of Transatlantic cooperation, which even according to its supporters is directed against other regions in the world.

The latter point – a sceptical attitude towards Transatlanticism – also might be made with regard to former Communist parties on the far Left of the political spectrum, and such parties likewise place great emphasis on regulation of consumption (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417–18). Noteworthy also, when trying to characterise the lines of thought behind anti-globalisation movements, the notion of ‘neo-marxism’ is regularly used (e.g. Ayres 2004; Eschle 2004). Thus, frame F3 should also offer fitting lines of argument to the far Left, also or even especially in its radical form, since they might not fully trust existing institutions to steer TTIP appropriately. By contrast, frame F1 is certainly not an option for far Left parties, as it implies too much of a stretch for these parties if they suddenly started praising the blessings of the free market. The protectionist frame F2 is also not as compatible with far Left ideology as frame F3 is. On the one hand, the far Left will arguably be sceptical of free trade as a win-win for everyone and as an automatic creator of jobs, and thus they might make use of the cognitive dimension of frame F2 (unfair competition etc.) and even aspects the normative one (loss of jobs). On the other hand, however, frame F2 implies a nationalist attitude that is as such not compatible with leftist internationalism, and the emphasis on the protection of national industries, i.e. producers, would also be at odds with such parties’ general ideas of friends and foes.

On the non-centrist Right, one would surprisingly expect to find a similar mix of frames, namely a combination of anti-globalist and protectionist arguments. While the far Right and far Left might, by definition, be thought of as very much opposed, it is not uncommon to find these ‘strange bedfellows’ when it comes to issues of globalisation (cf. e.g. Leggewie 2003, 54-58). However, the exact focal points between the respective ideology and the frames are different. Extreme Right parties will, for instance, reject TTIP simply because they want to shut off their country from the rest of the world. To this end, they would point to the risks TTIP might imply for the national economy and national interests and thus

would emphasise precisely those elements of a frame F2 line of argument that the far Left will neglect. In addition, they would simply and totally reject TTIP, which corresponds to the policy dimension of the radical version of frame F3.

Those parties referred to here as populist Right might be nationalist in the sense that they emphasise national identity, as Vassallo and Wilcox point out (*ibid.*, 2006, 419). They also note, however, that such parties have tried to widen their programmatic portfolio by taking a more Right-wing position on economic issues than nationalist (or even national*socialist*) parties usually do or did (*ibid.*, 2006, 420). While classic protectionism might be less prominent among these parties compared to the extreme Right, then, frame F1 should not be the frame of choice either, as it involves too much internationalism. Rather, a pattern discovered earlier with regard to European integration as a project of market making would seem to be mirrored here, as Hooghe Marks and Wilson argue that the far Right opposes it because of the loss of sovereignty (TTIP: loss of regulatory capacity) (2002, 976–77). Concerning TTIP, far Right (including populist) parties could link to frame F3 by stressing the distinctiveness of European values or by lamenting an alleged loss of regulatory sovereignty given the removal of NTBs and private ISDS.

By contrast, the trust in existing institutions should be much higher on the centre Left, i.e. among Socialists and Social Democrats. Moreover, they have come to accept the core principles of the market economy, albeit the move towards the centre on the economic Left-Right might have been more pronounced in some countries, notably Germany and the UK, than it has been in others (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 418). Indeed, a Green critique of these parties has often been that they are still materialist, as they do not totally reject economic growth (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 331). At the same time, Socialists take up some elements of post-materialism (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 418). The expectation, from a purely ideological perspective, is thus that they should adhere to the moderate version of frame F3, which does not reject TTIP totally but is sceptical of some of its features that do not fit well with regulated capitalism preferred by the centre-Left. This would repeat once again an old pattern: Socialists and Social Democrats equally opposed European integration at a time when it seemed to lead to liberalisation only, but came to actually appreciate it when it started to involve the possibility of re-regulation (Marks and Wilson 2000). Thus, they should not approve of TTIP if it involves a weakening of existing regulation by means of democratic institutions or might impede it in the future.

As Moravcsik (1993; 1998) would assume a producer bias on issues such as trade policy, and since further he would not expect governments – or, in this case, MEPs – to differ in their reaction to industry pressure along party lines, **liberal intergovernmentalism** would expect the structure of conflict over TTIP to be territorial. That said, the question is how the potential disagreement among some producer groups will play out within the countries in the sample. If those producers have a chance of dominating the domestic preference formation anywhere, this only applies to those countries where the minority of losers is comparatively large. Accordingly, MEPs from the UK, Ireland, Italy, and Germany should definitely be convinced by the pro-TTIP producer groups and should use frame F1 primarily, while only in France and Austria there is a possibility that anti-TTIP producers can convince MEPs to argue against TTIP. Noteworthy, the main issue in TTIP, namely regulatory cooperation, would not play

any role for the structure of conflict, as producer interests would be assumed to outweigh the more diffused societal interests on trade issues. Hence the frame of choice for Austrian and French MEPs would be the protectionist frame F2, but not the pro-consumer frame F3.

Both the **distribution model** (Marks 2004) as well as **postfunctional theory** (Hooghe and Marks 2009) as its extension would imply an ideologically structured conflict on TTIP, with parties framing choices being similar to what I have pointed out for the cleavage approach. In these cases, however, the driving force behind the structure of conflict would consist in the direction of distributional effects (i.e. intra-national), reinforced respectively by the bias towards ideologically structured conflict in parliamentary arenas. A more fine-grained prediction concerning individual parties is not possible based on these theories, since the exact mechanism by which distributional effects translate into policy preferences expressed by political actors is not provided.

Given that there is no national interest in the strict sense here (unlike in the case of CAP), the 3G2P approach (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) could be interpreted as expecting that MEPs, for reasons of intra-EP office-seeking, would rather vote with their EPG rather than defecting along national lines. Hence, the structure of conflict would be ideological, albeit EPG membership should be more decisive than ideology, that is, inasmuch as these two do not coincide anyway. The PPC approach (Ringe 2010) would expect an ideologically structured conflict as well, since MEPs are generally taken to have little incentive for defection and will rely on the information provided by expert MEPs, which in this case should be the members of the INTA committee responsible for trade policy. At most, those national party delegations who have an expert of their own in the INTA committee who further gives in to ‘constituency interests’ could be expected to defect.

By contrast, the final of the EP-specific approaches, the bicameral theory (Costello and Thomson 2014), would expect MEPs to give in to lobbying by national governments as representatives of ‘the’ national interest, when such interests are salient and the government isolated in the Council of the EU. Accordingly, the structure of conflict should be rather territorial here, since the French government in particular has always been rather isolated on the question of audio-visual industries in the EU’s trade policy (see above). French parties should thus be particularly prone to defection, using frame F2 as an argument.

Finally, as was already mentioned, there are contrasting expectations with regard to more trade-policy specific accounts of conflict. Classic trade theories would expect protectionists to oppose liberals (frame F1 vs frame F2), whereas DeVille and Siles-Brügge (2015) would claim that TTIP as an instance of a new kind of trade policy is not about protectionism or liberalisation anymore, but about more ‘normative’ issues such as consumer protection vs. economic growth (frame F1 vs. frame F3). Noteworthy, the latter is not really an explicitly formulated theory, but still the explanation for their findings on TTIP. Table 61 below summarises these observable implications found in the extant literature, which can then be contrasted with the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2.

Table 61: Observable implications of extant (theoretical) approaches, applied to TTIP

| Theory | Predicted structure of conflict | Causal narrative |
|--|---------------------------------|--|
| <u>General theories on conflict in EU politics</u> | | |
| Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 2000) | ideological | parties' domestic habits, lack of citizen preferences on EU issues |
| Distribution model (Marks 2004) | ideological | distributional effects are intra-national |
| Liberal intergovernmentalism | territorial | producer bias |
| Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009) | ideological | distributional effects are intra-national |
| <u>EP-specific theories</u> | | |
| 3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 2007) | ideological | Office-seeking within the EP |
| PPC approach (Ringe 2010) | ideological | Defection only with INTA member: Expert MEPs give in to constituency interests, others just follow experts |
| bicameral theory (Costello & Thomson 2014) | territorial | Lobbying by national governments in line with national interests |
| <u>Policy-specific theoretical arguments</u> | | |
| Classic trade theories | territorial | Losers from TTIP are louder, manage to convince 'their' MEPs |
| De Ville & Siles-Brügge (2015) | ideological (no F2) | Trade policy – and hence conflict in this area – is about values |

Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation

Like most, but clearly not all, of the above theories, the theory of territorialisation (ToT) would expect the conflict on TTIP to be ideologically structured. In case of the ToT, this expectation is based on the idea that national party delegations to the EP as representatives of their respective national parties will wage their various goals against each other. Their policy-seeking goals would be met best by framing the issue in the manner predicted also by the cleavage approach. Unlike the cleavage approach, however, the ToT would also expect them to take their vote-seeking goals into account as well, due to politicisation. Vote-seeking in EU politics is always bound to a particular national electorate, but since the distributional effects in the present case are primarily intra-national, there is not much room for territorialisation: parties are much more likely to disagree *within* each country along similar lines, namely with parties drawing on support from those voters valuing the material benefits expected from TTIP – mostly producers – versus those drawing on support mostly from those fearing the not directly material costs of 'regulatory convergence' – mostly consumers.

In Chapter 3 I have noted the ideological main tenets of each party family as well as their core electorates inasmuch as such core electorates still exist (cf. also Detterbeck 2011, 75–82). Accordingly, for most parties there should not be a goal conflict between policy and votes here, since the parties ideologically in favour of free markets and free trade, namely the so-called economic Right consisting of the Christian Democratic and Conservative family, the Liberal family and the some extend the RWP family, tend to attract the votes of producers and materialists, while those on the economic Left favouring consumer protection and market intervention for ideological reasons also tend to attract the votes of

consumers and post-materialists. Without such goal conflict, there is no incentive for ‘defection’, so that the structure of conflict will be ideological indeed, with most parties using the frames most in line with their respective ideology (as was pointed out in detail in the foregoing discussion of the cleavage approach).

The observable implications based on the ToT will thus contrast with those approaches predicting a territorial structure of conflict. In addition, however, they differ from those simply predicting a generally ideological structure, in that the exceptions to this rule can be rather concretely specified *a priori*. For in some cases, there will be a goal conflict between policy- and vote-seeking. This is because parties on the economic Right will usually not thrive on the votes of producers alone, while they would not give up on their support without need for doing so. When discussing the distributional effects of TTIP, it was noted not only that there will be distribution between consumers and producers, but also between various sectors of the economy or particular industries. The fact that (parts of) the agricultural in Europe is expected to be disadvantaged by TTIP may still be acknowledged by pro-farming parties by blurring their ideologically preferred F1 framing with some agricultural protectionism – either openly or indirectly. Yet, the smaller the number of producers gaining from TTIP becomes in comparison to those who lose from it, the more attractive defection will be for parties of the economic Right. Thereby, they could then appeal to voter groups beyond producers as well as to the losing producers, while blurring in the opposite direction. Moreover, since there are various frames in which to express and justify their scepticism on TTIP, they could choose the one most likely to resonate with voters due to its overlap with national traditions. Noteworthy, the goal conflict regarding TTIP is not ‘symmetric’, as the economic Left parties do not face the same conflict in countries gaining a lot from TTIP. This because their core electorates – consumers and postmaterialists – might suffer losses from an F1-version of TTIP anyway, so that defection would not pay-off electorally.

Concretely, this would mean that defections could be expected on the part of the members of the economic Right party families from those countries barely gaining from TTIP overall, i.e. Austria and France. In the latter case, framing in line with the national tradition would mean making use of the protectionist frame F2 mostly, while in the former case frame F3 should be preferred as it does not challenge the *economic* advantages of free trade as much. This would distinguish the observable implications of the ToT from those approaches expecting a conflict between protectionists and liberals, as well as from those who consider classic protectionism dead. Moreover, cohesion would thus neither be a matter of EPG membership, as the 3G2P theory would suggest indirectly, nor would it be pre-conditioned by INTA access: after all, most of the studies concerning the economic impact of TTIP were published in 2013 already, which should be just one illustration of the fact that information on TTIP is easily accessible outside the respective EP committee. Given that hence the predictions based on the ToT can be rather clearly contrasted at the micro-level even with those theories predicting the same or a similar overall structure of conflict at the macro-level, it should now be possible to evaluate the ToT against these extant approaches in the following section.

6.4 Results and discussion

In this section, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are presented and discussed with regard to the theoretical expectations specified before. It is found that the structure of conflict is indeed mostly ideological, while some defections are observed nonetheless. The systematic analysis of these defections by means of csQCA lends further support to the theory of territorialisation (ToT) at the micro-level, in that with one exception, only the parties expected to defect actually do so. Yet, this unexpected defection by UKIP is accounted for at least partly by the national tradition condition suggested by the ToT, a condition that also explains the direction of defection for the other parties. By contrast, the extant theoretical approaches, even where they cannot be rejected right away, generally leave a number of questions open. This pattern applies all the more to the analysis of blurring and subsuming strategies, which the extant approaches, developed for and tested by analysis of roll-call votes, do not consider at all. While the analysis of blurring generally supports the role of the various conditions in relation to vote-seeking as provided for by the ToT, the finding that UKIP further makes use of a subsuming strategy to avoid any goal conflict further eliminates the explanatory gap left by the analysis of defection for good. Finally, external validity of these findings is provided in various ways. First, the identification of frames and the broader structure of conflict are largely confirmed by literature on TTIP published meanwhile. Moreover, voting results also show an ideological structure of conflict. Noteworthy, while defections in terms of voting are still missing even from those parties expected to defect by the ToT, this difference can be understood based on the fact that a defection *in voting* by the French and Austrian centre Right would only make sense once there is a final outcome of the negotiations. By contrast, since specific votes on the matter of ISDS have already been held, the meaning of conditional support on the part of the S&D group becomes clear and is in line with the findings of the PFA.

Case-specific data-set and reliability

For the purpose of analyzing how national party delegations express and justify their policy preferences on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 191 press releases and other forms of text (e.g. manifestos) issued by 33 parties⁵¹ could be collected, resulting in no less than 1,800 codings in terms of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames and their dimensions. Accordingly, the parties have issued an average number of about 5.8 press releases on the issue in the time frame considered, containing an average number of about 52.9 codings per party.⁵² Compared to the case of CAP, more press releases thus contained statements related to TTIP, but often only a few sentences were dedicated to the issue, which is arguably due to the wide range of topics that can be somehow linked to TTIP and its effects. The reliability test conducted on the issue-specific codebook (itself based on the above identification of the three TTIP-related policy frames) produced excellent results by all standards at the level of frames as well as acceptable results at the level of dimensions within these frames already in the first round after the general training (see Table 62). Since Cohen's *kappa* as well as Krippendorff's *alpha* account for agreement beyond chance, these very good results cannot be due to the increased chances of agreement for a smaller number of frames identified. Rather, this improvement would seem to demonstrate the fact that three frames with four dimensions each (i.e. 12 different codes in total) were easier to memorize and apply correctly for the student assistants employed as additional coders for the test. Noteworthy, the high

⁵¹ The MEPs of the Italian Right-Wing Populist Fratelli d'Italia/Alleanza Nazionale did not issue press releases on the issue nor did they mention it in their manifesto, nor could any other statement from a comparable source be found that would have been published prior or at least shortly after the 2014 European elections.

⁵² In the cases of UK Labour and the Italian Partito Democratico, press releases issued after the election were used due to inaccessibility of the respective websites at the time of data collection, while triangulating them with pre-election national-level sources and the manifestos no relevant differences in framing could be noticed.

reliability scores throughout do not seem to provide first (numerical) indications in terms of which parties might be ‘subsuming’, i.e. creatively re-inventing existing frames or developing new ones.

Table 62: Reliability scores for the codebook on TTIP

| Level | frames | dimension |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Round | 1 | 1 |
| % | 92.88 | 78.08 |
| <i>kappa</i> | 0.885 | <u>0.719</u> |
| <i>alpha</i> | 0.885 | <u>0.719</u> |

Unlike in the case of CAP, then, the results of the PFA can also be interpreted at the level of dimensions within the frames. On average, the numbers show that the policy dimension was referred to most, which indicates that parties devoted most attention to expressing their policy preferences directly and comparatively less attention to justifying it. Interestingly, however, parties using frame F1 mostly stress the potential benefits of TTIP (F1 norm) and the causal narrative behind it more often than their support for an ‘ambitious’ agreement, which might indicate that they felt a greater need to justify their policy preference and/or were less keen on stressing the details of the policy itself (e.g. support for ISDS). As a whole, the idea that the conflict on TTIP was primarily of a ‘normative’ nature does not receive support by the results of the PFA in terms of the distribution of codings across dimensions.

Table 63: Distribution of codings across dimensions of the policy frames

| dimension | F1 | % | F2 | % | F3 | % | total | % |
|-----------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------------|--------------|
| norm | <u>139.0</u> | 41.2 | 73.0 | 26.5 | 186.00 | 15.7 | 398.0 | 22.1 |
| cons | 21.0 | 6.2 | 59.0 | 21.5 | 266.00 | 22.4 | 346.0 | 19.2 |
| cogn | 96.0 | 28.5 | 34.0 | 12.4 | 267.0 | 22.5 | 397.0 | 22.1 |
| pol | 81.0 | 24.0 | <u>109.0</u> | 39.6 | <u>469.0</u> | 39.5 | 659.0 | 36.6 |
| total | 337.0 | 100.0 | 275.0 | 100.0 | 1188.0 | 100.0 | 1800.0 | 100.0 |

Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage

Table 64: Percentage of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames within each party's statements

| code/party | F1: neoliberalism | F2: protectionism | F3: anti-globalisation |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| UK LibDem | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| UKIP | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| UK Cons | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| D FDP | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| IRE FG | 94.2 | 1.9 | 3.8 |
| D CDU/CSU | 69.4 | 11.1 | 19.4 |
| IRE FF | 65.0 | 5.0 | 30.0 |
| I FI | 55.2 | 44.8 | 0.0 |
| F FN | 0.0 | 75.0 | 25.0 |
| F PS | 0.0 | 58.6 | 41.4 |
| F UMP | 37.7 | 50.0 | 12.3 |
| IRE Lab | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| I Tsipras | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| A Grüne | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| UK Greens | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| UK BNP | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| I Verdi | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| D SPD | 1.4 | 2.1 | 96.6 |
| A SPÖ | 4.8 | 0.0 | 95.2 |
| F FdG | 0.0 | 6.9 | 93.1 |
| D B90 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 92.5 |
| UK Lab | 10.1 | 0.0 | 89.9 |
| A FPÖ | 0.0 | 13.9 | 86.1 |
| F Verts | 0.0 | 15.4 | 84.6 |
| IRE Greens | 1.3 | 15.6 | 83.1 |
| I PD | 13.0 | 8.7 | 78.3 |
| D AfD | 25.0 | 0.0 | 75.0 |
| IRE SF | 0.0 | 29.6 | 70.4 |
| A NEOs | 20.7 | 10.3 | 69.0 |
| D NPD | 0.0 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| D LINKE | 0.0 | 34.0 | 66.0 |
| A ÖVP | 32.8 | 11.8 | 55.5 |
| F MoDem | 2.8 | 44.4 | 52.8 |

As can be quickly discovered by looking at the above table on frame usage, it is indeed only parties that can be counted among the economic Right that use frame F1, the frame calling for and justifying a quick and ambitious EU-US trade agreement. Since it is further only French parties that make use of frame F2, there also appears to be at least some territorial element involved. It can thus also be held at this point, that classic protectionism as expressed by this frame is not entirely absent from the debate, which contrasts with the findings by De Ville and Siles-Brügge discussed earlier. The score of -27.27 on the

territorialisation index confirms this impression of a largely ideological conflict (see Table 65). At the same time, there must accordingly be five parties that do not frame in line with their ideology.

Table 65: The structure of conflict on TTIP in numbers

| Parties framing in line with... | ...ideology | ...territory |
|---------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Absolute number | 28 | 19 |
| Index of territorialisation: | | -27.27 |

Staying at the descriptive level but zooming in closer, it becomes clear that, while only parties from families attributed to the economic Right make use of frame F1, but not all of them do. Moreover, the British representative of the RWP family, UKIP, uses frame F1 not just predominantly, but exclusively. This should be considered as an instance of defection at this point, because it does not seem to involve any element of nationalism in protectionist or identity terms.

By contrast, the fact that the French Parti Socialiste is among the parties mainly using frame F2 might not be considered as a defection. After all, protectionism does not generally collide with Socialist ideology as much as e.g. neoliberalism (frame F1) would, and French and Belgian French-speaking Socialists are generally considered as “traditionally the most protectionist among all S&D members” (Frantescu 2015), so that this may count as historically-grown, intra-ideological variation. In addition, the party uses the expected frame F3 quite often, and indeed calls for F2 policies only in the context of a special role for the audio-visual sector, which indeed borders the frame F3 also qualitatively. It must be noted, however, that *if* one considered the PS to be defecting, this ‘most likely case’ for the bicameral theory – MEPs of a governing party defecting on an issue of high salience regarding which the national government is isolated in the Council – would be in line with this theory. Below I will discuss, in how far the bicameral theory can be said to hold beyond this most likely case and explain other defections as well.

The French Liberal party MoDem, however, exclusively uses frames that seem to contradict a Liberal ideology and barely refers to the neoliberal frame F1 and should hence be considered defecting rather clearly. Similarly, albeit not to the same extent, it seems to contradict the ideological outlook of the French UMP, as well as the Austrian ÖVP (Christian Democratic / Conservative) and the Liberal NEOs that they use the neoliberal frame F1 only secondarily, while devoting more than half of their statements to those frames expressing some reservations regarding TTIP. In addition, the anti-globalisation frame F3 is used by all Green, Social Democratic, far Left and far Right (RWP and extreme) parties. Finally, it should be noted at least at the descriptive level, that the radical version of frame F3 is never used by Social Democratic parties, but is used by most Green, far Left and far Right parties.

Micro-level: analysis of defection

The fact that there are defections – 5 out of 33 parties defect – already shows that the structure is not simply ideological, as some of the above theories would expect. It is further not really territorialised, otherwise the index of territorialisation would be positive. This point is further supported by the analysis

of defection. At least three conditions need to be included in order to demonstrate this, namely one for the relative amount of gains expected from TTIP and at least two for distinguishing the various party families and their ideologies concerning this issue: Unlike for Europeanised welfare and CAP, a simple Left-Right distinction will not do, since not only interventionism, but also nationalism are at odds with the kind of globalisation TTIP stands for (cf. Kriesi 2012, 20–22). A csQCA including these three conditions, then, leads to the following Truth Table and complex solution (see Table 66).

Table 66: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--|
| countryTTIPloser | econRight | nationalist | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK LibDem, UK Cons, D FDP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, I FI |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | C | UKIP, D AfD |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | F PS, A Gruene, A SPOE, F FdG, F Verts |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Lab, I Tsipras, UK Greens, I Verdi, D SPD, D B90, UK Lab, IRE Greens, I PD, IRE SF, D LINKE |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK BNP, D NPD |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A FPOE |

Table 67: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPLoser * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |

First, it should be noted that Left-wing parties, even from those countries gaining a lot, do not defect. This is why the structure of conflict is not as territorialised as some theories would suggest. For instance, following Moravcsik's idea of a producer bias, Left-wing parties should have listened to their producers, especially in the UK (expected to gain the most). Second, only the centre-Right from 'losing' countries defects clearly (i.e. without contradictions). This is what the theory of territorialisation would provide, for only those parties have a sufficient vote-seeking incentive for defection due to their particular core electorate. Third, however, one contradictory configuration remains, namely between two RWP parties, the German AfD and the British UKIP, both of which come from countries that are expected to gain a lot from TTIP. UKIP; however, defected from an ideological course that, due to its nationalist aspects, would generally be less enthusiastic about free trade than UKIP's line of argument of TTIP seems to be. Unless this contradiction is due to the process of dichotomising the conditions used thus far – a point to

which I shall return below – it would thus appear that theories considering distributional effects and ideology only cannot fully account for defection here.

One way ahead would thus consist in considering slightly more sophisticated accounts of defection involving the addition for further conditions. Indeed, there are at least three approaches noted above, namely the bicameral, the PPC, and the theory of territorialisation, that would provide for such additional conditions. Hence, these three will be discussed here one after another first, before finally discussing the usefulness of integrating them into one model (i.e. the so-called ‘perspectives approach’, cf. Berg-Schlosser and Meur 2009a, 25–28).

The bicameral approach seems to imply that national governments are the actual defenders of national interest and lobby MEPs from their own and other parties on issues salient to them, especially if further they are isolated in the Council. One might therefore argue, that – at the very least – the governing parties themselves might defect from their ideology for the sake of the national interest. If the condition of government participation is added, however, the contradictory configuration does not disappear. Logically, since neither UKIP nor the AfD is part of the government, adding this condition cannot remove the contradiction in their behaviour. What is more, government participation does not seem to play any explanatory role, not even in the complex solution:

Table 68: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic + gov, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|-----------|-------------|-----|-----------|---|
| country TTIPloser | econRight | nationalist | gov | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK LibDem, UK Cons, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | C | UKIP, D AfD |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D FDP, IRE FF, I FI |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F PS, A SPOE |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | F UMP, A NEOs, F MoDem |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | IRE Lab, D SPD, I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, UK Greens, I Verdi, D B90, UK Lab, IRE Greens, IRE SF, D LINKE |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A Gruene, F FdG, F Verts |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, D NPD |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | A OEVP |

Table 69: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic + gov, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |

Nevertheless, it could still be the case that the defecting parties, while (apart from the ÖVP) not in government themselves, give in to the lobbying by their respective national governments, led by Social Democratic parties (PS and SPÖ, respectively). Indeed, the protectionism the UMP and the Front National subscribe to is also found in the rhetoric of the PS on TTIP, and literally all Austrian parties use frame F3 mostly, the frame preferred by the SPÖ. Similarly, UKIP could be taken to follow the government led by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, both of which prefer frame F1.

While noting just briefly again that there is hardly a conceivable reason why MEPs should actually give in to the lobbying by their national governments rather than challenging them, there are country-specific empirical counterarguments as well: First, while the French Greens (Verts) and the Front de Gauche by far prefer F3-based arguments over protectionist (F2) ones and thus remain in line with their respective ideologies, the defecting UMP and the FN surpass the PS in their protectionism: The UMP, for instance, wants to exempt the military industry from TTIP as well, not just audio-visuals, while the FN wants to exempt everything from TTIP (i.e. unconditionally rejects it) and wants a full-scale return to a protectionist trade policy. Second, as for the defecting Austrian parties, it mainly does not make sense to assume that the NEOs were lobbied by the SPÖ government, since at the time of analysis they did not even have MEPs yet but were simply campaigning. Third, if it were not for other conditions rather than governmental lobbying, why would the UK government manage to win UKIP over in favour of TTIP, but would fail to do so regarding Labour and the Greens, for instance? In sum, therefore, the bicameral theory does not seem to be supported by the empirical facts either: Rather than governmental lobbying acting as an independent force, it seems that exactly those parties are successfully lobbied towards defection by the national governments who have other reasons to defect anyway.

Next, one might wonder in how far the role of expert MEPs had an influence on the prospects for defection. This, at least, would be one way of interpreting the Perceived Preferences Coherence approach developed by Ringe (for a detailed discussion and critique, see Chapter 2). Having access to the expert committee – here: INTA – would thus be necessary in order to defect, for otherwise parties would tend to rely on the information provided by the expert MEPs from the same EPG rather than from the same country.

Table 70: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic + INTA, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|-----------|-------------|------|-----------|--|
| country TTIPloser | econRight | nationalist | INTA | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK LibDem, UK Cons, D FDP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, I FI |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | UKIP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F PS, A Gruene, A SPOE, F FdG, F Verts |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F UMP, A OEVP, F MoDem |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | IRE Lab, D SPD, D B90, UK Lab, I PD, D LINKE |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, UK Greens, I Verdi, IRE Greens, IRE SF |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP, D NPD |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D AfD |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A NEOs |

Table 71: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic + INTA, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPLoser * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |
| + countryttiploser * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA | UKIP |

Indeed, the contradictory configuration can be resolved in this manner, since the AfD did not have an INTA member at the time (in fact, it did not even have MEPs yet), while UKIP had access to expert information. Nevertheless, a number of points against the plausibility of this explanation can be made. First of all, INTA membership is not a necessary condition for defection. While four of the five parties defecting did have a member in the INTA committee, the Austrian NEOs defected without such privileged access, indeed even without having any MEP yet. Second, it is not as surprising that the NEOs – apparently – were still able to make their own expertise-based judgement on TTIP, since, amongst others, scientific studies on the potential impact of TTIP were already available at the time. Third, the fact that so many of the defecting parties had their own INTA member may well be due to the self-selection among committee members I have discussed earlier, in that parties of the economic Right might generally be very interested in having a member in this committee that is so important to their core electorate of producers. At the same time, 23 out of 33 parties in the sample had some connection to INTA (i.e.

members or substitute members), so that in fact it is highly likely to have one for any party. Interestingly, while this ratio would make INTA a good candidate for a trivial necessary condition (i.e. the fact that the condition is always present when defection occurs is simply due to it being present all the time, cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144–48), it is indeed necessary for explaining UKIP only, while from the causal path regarding the other parties it can be removed by Boolean minimisation even in the complex solution. Finally, the fact that parties such as UK Labour or Irish Labour do not defect – despite having access to the same expertise, and despite the high gains to be expected in both countries – is hard to explain without a more sophisticated account of ‘constituency interests’ than the one offered by the PPC.

In general, the theory of territorialisation does offer such an account, and with regard to the set of relevant conditions, it holds that national traditions – here: the type of capitalism – should be taken into account, as such traditions might explain intra-ideological variation and might reduce the loss of credibility that might otherwise come with defection. In the present case, it seems helpful to distinguish countries with a liberal type of capitalism from those with statist or managed capitalism, since the openness towards free trade is strongest in the former and the preference for market regulation stronger in the latter two.

Table 72: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--|
| country TTIPloser | liberal. capitalism | econRight | nationalist | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK LibDem, UK Cons, IRE FG, IRE FF |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D FDP, D CDU/CSU, I FI |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | F PS, A Gruene, A SPOE, F FdG, F Verts |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | IRE Lab, UK Greens, UK Lab, IRE Greens, IRE SF |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi, D SPD, D B90, I PD, D LINKE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D AfD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | D NPD |

Table 73: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--------------------------------|
| countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST | UKIP |
| COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |

If a condition capturing the type of capitalism in this manner is added, the contradiction between the AfD and UKIP is resolved: UKIP would now be defecting because the liberal national tradition would provide the another argument for defection: it would thus in the economic interest of the country – after all, the gains expected for UK are particularly high – while suggesting a course that is in line with the national tradition softens the move away from more exclusive forms of nationalism. Moreover, within the UK, the fact that Labour and the Greens are neither nationalist nor part of the economic Right would explain the difference in behaviour. Furthermore, outside the UK, the type of capitalism also guides the defection of the other four parties: given that part of their core electorate – the louder one – will suffer from TTIP and their respective national tradition is statist (France) or managed (Austria) capitalism, they move away from frame F1 towards the protectionist frame F2 in the case of France, expressing scepticism of free trade and free markets, or towards frame F3 in the case of Austria, expressing not so much doubts about free trade in terms of the economic causal narratives behind it but about the new generation of trade agreements with their focus on regulatory convergence. In sum, the theory of territorialisation does not only offer a solution terms free of contradictions, but also a convincing account once the qualitative details on the defecting and non-defecting parties are taken into account.

Noteworthy also, the theory of territorialisation applies to all parties, irrespective of their EPG, in that the Austrian NEOs – *ceteris paribus* – behave no different from Liberal parties already part of ALDE within the EP, for instance, while the difference between AfD (not in EP) and UKIP (EFD) could hardly be due to differences in EPG membership. This can be seen as an argument against the 3G2P approach, where intra-EP office-seeking should make EPG membership a key factor.

Before concluding this subsection, it seems worthwhile checking in how far the various theoretical approaches discussed separately above might speak to each other, that is, if government participation, INTA membership and type of capitalism complement each other or in how far one or two can be taken out of the solution. As one might expect, a Truth Table including all of these conditions does not include any contradictory configurations. Noteworthy, however, the inclusion of six conditions means that there will be $2^6=64$ logically possible combinations of conditions, which clearly cannot be covered empirically with 33 cases.

Table 74: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Conditions | | | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------|-------------|------|-----|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| country TTIPloser | liberal. capitalism | econRight | nationalist | INTA | gov | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UK LibDem, UK Cons, IRE FG |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D FDP, I FI |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D CDU/CSU |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | IRE FF |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | F PS, A SPOE |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F UMP, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | IRE Lab |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | I Tsipras, I Verdi |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A Gruene, F FdG, F Verts |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UK Greens, IRE Greens, IRE SF |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | UK BNP |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | D SPD, I PD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | D B90, D LINKE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | UK Lab |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D AfD |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A NEOs |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | D NPD |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | A O EVP |

The analysis of necessity reveals that there is only one single condition that consistently is present for all instances of defection, namely the “economic Right” condition Table 75.

Table 75: Analysis of Necessity TTIP (inclusion score = 1.0), outcome: defection

| Condition(s) | Coverage |
|------------------|----------|
| ECONRIGHT | 0.357 |
| INTA+gov | 0.152 |
| nationalist+gov | 0.152 |
| nationalist+INTA | 0.172 |

Its relevance expressed in terms of coverage, however, is rather low, which generally is considered as an indication of trivialness of necessary conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144–48). Noteworthy, however, this might also just be due to the fact that simply there are not many cases of defection (5) in the overall set, so that the number of parties having an ideology that is generally attributed to the economic Right (14) is necessarily rather high by comparison. Not overrating this numerical criterion, therefore, the

fact remains that all defecting parties share this feature. The disjunction INTA+gov also consistently covers all cases of defection, but given that INTA alone is present for 23 out of 33 cases, its relevance can be deemed definitely low.

Before this background, it does not seem surprising that the complex solution for this Truth Table is indeed quite complex: Where before there was one term for four of the five parties, there are now two possible paths, combining economic gains, type of capitalism, ideology with *either* national opposition *or* INTA membership, and one additional path explaining only UKIP by including all conditions (see Table 76). In fact, there is some overlap between the first two expressions, so that the solution can be rewritten (see Table 77).

Table 76: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPILOSER * liberal.capitalism * ECONRIGHT * nationalist * gov | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs |
| COUNTRYTTIPILOSER * liberal.capitalism * ECONRIGHT * nationalist * INTA | F UMP, F MoDem, A OEVP |
| countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA * gov | UKIP |

Table 77: Complex solution TTIP rewritten; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPILOSER * liberal.capitalism * ECONRIGHT * nationalist * (gov+INTA) | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA * gov | UKIP |

This – factually identical – way of writing it shows more clearly that the main part corresponding most clearly to the theory of territorialisation remains decisive and still covers most cases. Whether the addition of (gov+INTA) is indeed necessary can be questioned, given the foregoing analysis of their relevance.

Given that 43 of the 64 logically possible combinations of conditions cannot be covered by the 33 parties in the sample, the inclusion of logical remainders might be useful. The most parsimonious solution possible (i.e. the one that includes whatever logical remainder that, if an empirical case, would allow for a shorter solution term) reads as follows:

Table 78: Parsimonious solution TTIP (1), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| countryttiploser * NATIONALIST * INTA | UKIP |
| COUNTRYTTIPLoser * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| Simplifying assumptions: countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} | |
| Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 | |

Table 79: Parsimonious solution TTIP (2), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPLoser * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST | UKIP |
| Simplifying assumptions: countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPlouser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} | |
| Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 | |

Table 80: Parsimonious solution TTIP (3), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPILOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * NATIONALIST * INTA | UKIP |
| Simplifying assumptions: countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} | |
| Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 | |

Table 81: Parsimonious solution TTIP (4), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|---|--------------------------------|
| COUNTRYTTIPILOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA | UKIP |
| Simplifying assumptions: countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + countryTTIPIloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} | |
| Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 | |

In practice, then, there are four equally parsimonious solutions, each of which would require 12 simplifying assumptions. It can be noted that indeed one term has been one identified earlier, which covers the centre Right parties from France and Austria, while there is variation only concerning the right path for explaining UKIP: it is either explained in line with the PPC – with INTA membership as the decisive element next to ‘econRight’ and ‘nationalism’ – or in line with the ToT, with liberal capitalism playing the same role.

Noteworthy, however, some of the simplifying assumptions would seem to run counter to the main finding of the analysis of necessity, namely that being part of the economic Right is a necessary condition for defection. In order to exclude this and other theoretically implausible simplifying

assumptions, it is helpful to incorporate so-called ‘directional expectations’ into the computerised analysis and arrive at what is called an ‘intermediate solution’. Here, I indicate that

- generally, the country being a TTIP loser is conducive to defection,
- as is being part of the economic Right,
- parties from non-liberal capitalist countries are more likely to defect,
- nationalist parties generally will not defect,
- INTA membership is conducive to defection (in line with PPC),
- Governing parties in general are more prone to defection.

The resulting intermediate solution reads as follows:

Table 82: Intermediate solution TTIP, conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--------------------------------|
| CONTRYPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP |
| LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA | UKIP |

This is very close the solution obtained in the analysis of the conditions considered based on the ToT only. However, in the case of UKIP, committee membership would still be considered a part of the explanation, this time next to the type of capitalism. In sum, then, the ToT certainly explains the biggest part and does not leave and contradictory configurations. Nevertheless, some elements of PPC cannot be ruled out *technically* here, albeit considered on its own, Ringe’s PPC approach leaves many more open questions than the ToT did.

While exact predictions regarding the other strategies for resolving goal conflict, namely blurring and subsuming, are more difficult to predict, analyzing them in the next subsection might complete the picture. The analysis of the broader patterns in blurring, for instance, can provide some indications regarding the role played of the various conditions. As for subsuming, it should be noted that UKIP – amongst others – has been found to apply this strategy extensively regarding the other issues analysed so far, the same party that in this case would appear as rather special. Accordingly, one might check for acts of subsuming on the part of UKIP that could foster the understanding of this case of defection.⁵³

Micro-level: Analysis of further framing strategies

Indeed, while it is generally not easy to predict blurring and even more so subsuming, it is close to impossible based on the theories other than the ToT: On the one hand, the vote-seeking element in the ToT would make such nuanced framing entirely plausible. On the other hand, arguing that access to expert knowledge leads a party to let just some of its statements point in a different (or even contradictory) direction, or that governmental lobbying does only partly influence the way a party

⁵³ In practice, of course, the subsuming strategy applied by UKIP was also clearly visible during the process of hand-coding.

expresses and justifies its policy preferences, does not make much sense without the idea of simultaneously pursued party goals. Hence, I limit the analysis to the conditions included in the ToT and thereby evaluate the plausibility of its underlying assumptions.

Table 83: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide

| Conditions | | | | Outcome | Case ID |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--|
| country TTIPloser | liberal. capitalism | econRight | nationalist | defection | party |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | C | UK LibDem, UK Cons, IRE FG, IRE FF |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | UKIP |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | C | D FDP, D CDU/CSU, I FI |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | F FN |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | F PS, A Gruene, A SPOE, F FdG, F Verts |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | C | IRE Lab, UK Greens, UK Lab, IRE Greens, IRE SF |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | C | I Tsipras, I Verdi, D SPD, D B90, I PD, D LINKE |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | UK BNP |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A FPOE |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | D AfD |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | D NPD |

Table 84: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide

| Solution terms | Cases covered |
|--|--------------------------------|
| liberal.capitalism * econright * NATIONALIST | F FN, D NPD |
| countryttiploser * liberal.capitalism * NATIONALIST | D AfD, D NPD |
| COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * ECONRIGHT * nationalist | F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem |

The above TruthTable including the conditions from the ToT and the outcome of 'blurring' in the widest sense (i.e. mixing statements from various frames) includes a number of contradictory configurations. It can be argued, however, that these are not due to a lack of explanatory capacity on the part of the theory, but due to the rather rough operationalisation at this point. Rather than, however, blowing up the model by including refined conditions or turning to multi-value QCA (cf. Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009), I will first explain the pattern identified by excluding any contradictory configurations and then to qualitatively account for the latter.

First, it appears that extreme Right parties from non-liberal countries blur their frames by mixing anti-globalisation and protectionist statements, which makes perfect sense in that they would ideologically be expected to reject TTIP for both its cosmopolitan and its market liberal aspects. Noteworthy, the fact that the UK BNP does not make protectionist argument further supports the idea that the type of capitalism is influential in terms of the nuances of supporting or rejecting TTIP: In fact, protectionism thus seems as an absolute taboo in the liberal UK.

Second, blurring seems to serve the nationalist Right in non-liberal countries to differentiate their opposition to TTIP: the RWP AfD mixes frame F3 with elements of frame F1, acknowledging the idea of free trade in principle, but disapproving of TTIP, while the extremist NPD rejects TTIP for both protectionist and anti-globalist reasons. In other words, the nationalist element that unites both is the reason for eventually rejecting TTIP, while their stances on market intervention are different.

A third group of blurring parties consists of those centre Right parties found to be defection earlier. By means of blurring, they apparently try to please those parts of their electorate set to win from TTIP after all, and at least partly they follow their ideology by doing so. Again, it might be argued that this behaviour can only be understood by referring to conflicting goals.

The first two contradictions can be resolved, albeit not completely, once the centre Right is differentiated further, in that the Irish Fianna Fáil is found to express some reluctance towards TTIP in terms of GMOs and hormone treated beef along the lines, however, of frame F3. Similarly, the CDU/CSU insists on keeping up EU standards on foodstuffs. It thus seems that these parties take up the case of agricultural protectionism, albeit disguising it as pro-consumerism, which makes sense vote-seeking wise for parties with a farming electorate losing from TTIP, but accordingly not for Liberal parties.

The fact that, unlike the parties in the same configuration (or the same row of the TruthTable), the French PS mixes F3 framing with a considerable degree of frame F2 becomes understandable as a result of the type of capitalism and the concrete threat to the French audio-visual sector, whose protection is not the same as that of, say, the arms industry. This is because one would expect people involved in the cultural sector to vote for a Left-wing party such as the PS. This Left-wing case of protectionism might thus be an exception, but one which confirms the general rule that vote-seeking causes parties to deviate – in this case not too far – from their ideology, especially if such a step is in line with a given national tradition.

Finally, the last two contradictions again do follow more of a pattern than it appears in the first place, because both are due to the framing of two far Left parties from non-state capitalist countries (the LINKE and Sinn Féin) being more protectionist than that of Greens, Social Democrats and the far Left from countries with a state capitalist tradition. Here, the fact that these parties differ from the centre Left is easily understandable: The far Left logically is more sceptical of markets than the centre Left, especially since New Left ideas took hold within Social Democracy. Moreover, in contrast to the Greens, the far Left might also try to attract some more materialist voters. It might be argued, however, that the Lista Tsipras (usually under the label of the Rifondazione Commuista) from state capitalist Italy should be at

least as protectionist, but it sticks to frame F3 only. Unless this is seen as the odd one out here, one might argue that the LINKE and Sinn Féin simply saw more of a need to directly question the economic causal narrative on TTIP, coming from countries that are usually not protectionist and that stand to gain considerably from the agreement.

In sum, blurring can be understood largely in terms of vote-seeking: parties blur when they want to remain attractive to voters having distributional interests that differ from the ones they cater with their predominant frame, or to attract votes from those adhering to a particular national tradition. Vote-seeking is, however, not a part of the theories of conflict in EU politics developed prior to the Crisis, but a core component of the theory of territorialisation developed here.

The analysis of subsuming, at last, solves the final puzzle that even the theory of territorialisation could only partly account for, namely the apparent defection of UKIP. This defection, albeit partly understandable given the high expected gains for UK producers and the liberal type of capitalism, would nevertheless appear as a rather crude step. This is because using the neoliberal, pro-TTIP frame F1 might yet scare off a good number of UKIP's core electorate that tends to lose from or feel threatened by globalisation projects such as TTIP, as well as by European integration.

Since the press releases on TTIP were hand-coded, however, it also could be noted that, while UKIP's statements resemble the neoliberal frame best, they were still set in a larger context and thereby subsumed under UKIP's general, RWP/Eurosceptic agenda, captured amongst others in the following excerpt by its MEP Roger Helmer on the delegation's website:

There is, of course, the issue of the various trade deals that the EU has struck, and in which we participate as members. When we leave, will we still have a free trade deal with, say, Korea? What about the Transatlantic free-trade deal with the USA, currently in the early stages of negotiation? But we can credibly argue that outside the EU we might have had a free trade deal with the States twenty years ago – and on terms that would not be biased to account for French protectionism.

Thereby, they present themselves as the guardians of supposed British economic interests as well as of a British national tradition of free trade, packed into a critique of the EU to please their nationalist voters at the same time. By means of this creative act of subsuming, therefore, they are able to remove any traces of goal conflict. Noteworthy, the MEP issuing the two press releases considered for analysis here has not been a member of INTA since 2004, which again confirms the idea that access to information needed for taking differentiated positions on politicised and certain issues such as TTIP is not contained in expert committees alone and is therefore not a necessary condition for defection.

Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings

The work by De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015), published only in October 2015, focuses on the arguments made by TTIP supporters and opponents, and the analysis of these arguments largely supports the selection of policy frames identified for the purpose of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA). What is more, however, it also confirms the importance of a neoliberal (here: F1) and an anti-globalisation or pro-‘standards’ frame (here: F3) as opposed to classic protectionism. At the same time, it must be noted that

the more systematic analysis of selected parties across six countries reveals that classic protectionism is not entirely out of the debate. Moreover, it could be shown here how protectionism can still find its way into the debate in a hidden form, namely in terms of pro-consumerist arguments eventually serving to protect a particular industry through the backdoor.




Figure 11: Voting results on the resolution 23rd May 2013 to start the negotiations (all MEPs). Source: Hix 2013, 26.

The results of the vote regarding an EP resolution on the start of trade and investment negotiations with the US show that only Green parties, far Left and far Right parties voted against TTIP from the start, i.e. unconditionally, and that overall, EPGs voted cohesively and hence ideologically rather than territorially. This result corresponds to the more detailed results of the PFA presented in Annex III, which show that the radical version of frame F3 (F3B) is used by parties from these families only, but not by the Socialists. Unlike a ‘yes’ vote might seem to imply, however, the S&D group was thus not simply ‘in favour’ of TTIP. Considering more carefully the content of the vote, namely the starting of negotiations, it should be seen as support for just that. This, then, would correspond to the usage of frame F3A as found by the PFA.

Indeed, the debate on ISDS further demonstrates the conditions attached by the S&D/ Socialist party family. After all, this party family and the EPG founded from it voted against ISDS as provided for in the early stages of the negotiation, and made its support for TTIP conditional on such changes (Robert 2015). If meanwhile there are some internal divisions within the S&D group on the sufficiency of the changes to the ISDS suggested so far (*ibid.*), this should be seen as the result of a strategic move from the camp of TTIP supporters rather than as an expression of the underlying structure of conflict. Quotes by Conservative and Christian Democratic MEPs further show that these parties are quite in favour of not only TTIP but also of ISDS in principle (Levy-Abegnoli 2015), which confirms the importance of ideological divisions within the EP. It further demonstrates that, just because there was a majority against the earlier form of ISDS, this does not mean that there was resistance from ‘the’ EP as a noble ‘advocate of the citizens’.

Table 85: Voting results on the resolution of 23rd May 2013 to start the negotiations, sample of parties only, based on Hix (2013, 27–36)

| | Germany | Austria | UK | Ireland | France | Italy |
|------------|---------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| GUE/NGL | - | NA | ⁵⁴ | - ⁵⁵ | - | NA |
| Greens/EFA | - | - | - ⁵⁶ | NA | - | NA |
| S&D | + | + | + | + | 0 | + |
| ALDE | + | NA | + | + | 0 | + ⁵⁷ |
| EPP | + | + | NA | + | + | + ⁵⁸ |
| ECR | NA | NA | + | NA | NA | + ⁵⁹ |
| EFD | NA | NA | 0 ⁶⁰ | NA | n/a ⁶¹ | -/+ ⁶² |
| NI | NA | - ⁶³ | n/a ⁶⁴ | NA | - ⁶⁵ | NA |

A closer look at the more detailed voting results by national party delegations regarding the resolution from May 2013 further demonstrates that, where F3A arguments are added by protectionism, as in the case of the PS and MoDem, scepticism of TTIP is also higher, leading these parties to abstain from the vote. Voting records also show that the Alleanza Nazionale, the one party from which I could not find press releases or other textual statements on the issue from 2013 to May 2014, did not take part in the vote, which might indicate that they either had not found a position on the issue or did not find it important. Meanwhile, however, they frame the issue very much like the ToT would expect it from an RWP party from a state capitalist country, i.e. mixing anti-globalisation rhetoric and protectionism (Alleanza Nazionale/ Fratelli d'Italia 2016).

There is, however, one aspect of the vote on the resolution as well as on later votes – including that on ISDS – that at first sight seems to fit neither the ToT, nor the results obtained by PFA, namely the votes by the ÖVP and the UMP. After all, these were parties expected (by the ToT) and found (by PFA) to defect from the EPP. Regarding the vote on the starting of the negotiations, one might argue that neither of these parties has reason to vote against TTIP unconditionally – after all, the UMP just calls for the exemption of some sectors from the agreement, and the ÖVP just wants to draw some ‘red lines’. Moreover, it has been noted in various news outlets that resistance against TTIP does exist within both parties (for the UMP, see Ulrich 2014; for the ÖVP, see apa / ep 2015; red / APA 2015). As one journalistic commentator notes, the UMP votes in favour of TTIP – but “discretely” so (Clavel 2014). In fact, while some Austrian and French producers being part of the UMP’s and the ÖVP’s core electorate stand to win from TTIP and the losses of the others will depend on the exact outcome of the

⁵⁴ Sinn Féin

⁵⁵ Socialist party

⁵⁶ Green party only, SNP and Plaid Cymru not considered here.

⁵⁷ Italia dei Valori, not in the sample for PFA.

⁵⁸ Only Forza Italia (Popolo della Libertà); n/a for FdI/AN!

⁵⁹ Conservatori e Social Riformatori, not in the sample for PFA.

⁶⁰ UKIP

⁶¹ Mouvement pour la France, not in the sample for PFA.

⁶² “Io amo Italia” and Lega Nord, both not in the sample for PFA.

⁶³ FPÖ

⁶⁴ BNP

⁶⁵ Front National

negotiations, there is no reason for these parties to *vote* against TTIP yet. Instead, they can just blur their position in the way they do, namely by acknowledging TTIP's positive potential (frame F1) while devoting a lot of attention to potential problems with the agreement. At this stage, therefore, 'yes'-votes do not contradict the finding of the PFA or the assumptions of the ToT. If, however, a negotiated outcome is achieved that does not take up these concerns at all, and if they still voted in favour of TTIP then, this would be more difficult to explain based on the ToT.

6.5 Conclusion

As the case of TTIP shows, even policy issues classically associated with national interests are not territorialised in the EP; provided that intra-national distributional effects resulting from them are mainly intra-national. Yet, the case also shows how even certainty – one might say socially constructed – can impact on party's cost-benefit calculations regarding defection. For although the eventual distributional effects of TTIP are not empirically known yet, actors appear to behave as though the standardized economic predictions were certain. On top of this, national traditions, while explicitly part of the theory of territorialisation, once more seem to be quite significant – even after decades of European integration and decades of a Common Commercial Policy. Amongst others, this has also led to the fact that classic protectionist ideas are still firmly rooted in the minds of some countries' populations and their representatives. In this sense, then, TTIP might not have changed trade policy for good, as some commentators claim, while their argument that trade policy has become much more politicised would seem to be supported.

Also this final case study thus corresponds to the expectations for structure of conflict based on the theory of territorialisation. Indeed, the ToT is supported also at the micro-level of party delegations, in that only those parties really defect that would be expected to do so. The exception of UKIP confirms the rule rather than contradicting it, given its complementary subsuming strategy. The finding that this party uses this strategy was preconditioned not only on the conceptual tool in terms of framing strategies included in the theory, but also again by the methodological decisions – here: hand-coding – made for this study. Similarly, the fact that the ToT was supported as much at the micro-level regarding the defection strategies is largely based on the highly nuanced textual analysis capturing the differences between conditional and definite approval (and rejection). At least the early roll-call votes on TTIP seem to present a rather different picture at first sight and may thus be misleading if used as the sole source of data. In fact, however, the most rational strategy for parties ideologically in favour of TTIP while trying to protect their core electorate from some negative effects may not be to vote against the opening of negotiations, but rather to achieve exemptions at a later stage before their conclusion. This example would seem to demonstrate, then, that while roll-call votes are a preferred source of data for large-N studies, contextual knowledge of the political process might be even more needed for their correct interpretation with regard to certain questions.

Regarding the societal rationale of the present study, one might argue that the case of TTIP shows in particular the much more differentiated way of interest representation via the EP. For what might feature as ‘the’ British national interest in the Council, for instance, actually might be rejected by a considerable number of UK citizens nonetheless. In the Council, their voices go unheard, whereas in the EP they can be expressed by certain party delegations and, as the vote on ISDS shows, might become an important part of majority eventually. The respective citizens are effectively represented here as consumers, rather being ignored as British nationals. It might have been appropriate that national governments listened primarily to producers on trade policy issues when most citizens were indifferent about them. Representation via the EP not only allows more citizens to be represented effectively (notwithstanding, of course, the possibility of being outvoted), but it also reinforces the politicisation of trade policy issues and potentially other issues, since it means that parties not relying on producers’ support as much will publicly appeal to further groups of citizens. Last but not least, it seems that a conflict that is not about ‘national’ interests in the strict sense is not presented as one. Instead, groups of Europeans might feel on the same side as consumers or producers transnationally.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Research question, theory and approach

The point of departure for the present study was the societal rationale of a quest for better European governance in the face of multiple crises the European Union (EU) faces today, in particular the suggestion to strengthen the role of supranational parliamentary institutions such as the European Parliament (EP) in it. This suggestion was based on the widely spread narrative that ‘national interests’ regularly hamper effective decision-making, because national policy-makers talking to national electorates in these terms would hardly have a chance to compromise and focus on common European solutions. Such national interests are generally supposed to be of lesser importance or ‘relativised’ in the EP, which on top of this is considered more legitimate in terms of democratic input.

Before this background, the academic rationale for the present study could be identified, in that the normative argument for a strengthening of the EP to some extent lacks a solid empirical basis. For it is rather well established that, first of all, conflict in the EP is largely structured along ideological, not national (or: territorial) lines, while it is precisely the aforementioned national interests that occasionally – yet not necessarily – reduce the ideological cohesion on certain issues. Accordingly, the exact combinations of conditions under which such ‘defection’ eventually happens could be considered unclear, even more so since some of the general conditions under which the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) make their decisions have been changing in recent years due to socio-economic (the eurozone crisis, here: the Crisis) and constitutional (the Lisbon Treaty) developments.

These developments have reinforced a process of politicisation of EU politics that arguably started in the early 1990s, with the end of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’. Since then, political representatives concerned with EU politics are increasingly forced to justify their policy preferences on European integration and EU politics vis-à-vis a growing number of more or less informed, but generally interested, citizens. While the political communication of national political actors in terms of national interests is criticised, little is known about the way in which MEPs give reasons for their decisions, especially after the Crisis. In sum, therefore, the question *under what conditions exactly MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a Post-Crisis EP is territorial rather than ideological* was considered to deserve further attention.

Looking first for EP-specific theoretical explanations apt for addressing this research question in the extant literature, it was found that these explanations suffered from a number of shared shortcomings – in addition to those specific to each of them – when it comes to this question in particular. First of all, these theories, especially the most established ones, were developed to explain the usual picture of ideologically structured conflict. By contrast, they may not be entirely silent on exceptions to the rule, but they still are much less elaborate and precise in this respect. Second, they were largely built on pre-Crisis assumptions in terms of a *lack of* politicisation, so that vote-seeking would barely play a role.

Third, they tended to work with rather vague notions of ‘national interests’, which often were not precisely defined and might include strictly materialist, rational aspects of a policy in terms of distributional effects as well as the regulatory status quo or national traditions. Finally and arguably related, they were not suited for explaining the manner in which MEPs communicate with their voters and how they ‘give reasons’ for their decisions. Hence, it was argued that in order to address the present research question, a new theoretical framework should be developed.

What I referred to as a ‘theory of territorialisation’ (ToT) then defined territorialisation of conflict as the macro-level result of individual actors’ ‘defection’, i.e. a behaviour that is at odds with one’s ideological convictions for the sake of national motivations (interests, traditions). Concerning the EP, defection was considered at the level of national party delegations, which are assumed to act cohesively and as ‘true’ representatives of their respective national parties. While these assumptions have a rather solid empirical foundation in the literature, they had the further advantage that the theory to be developed could be built on a reconfiguration of extant theories on political parties and their goals, national parties and European integration, as well as on theories of parties’ strategic communication in two-dimensional spaces (Left-Right and territorial).

What this theory holds then, in a nutshell, is the following. First, national party delegations in the EP are assumed to be intrinsically motivated for policy-seeking in line with the general convictions they share, i.e. ideology, while electoral success (vote-seeking) is instrumental to policy. They thus constantly weigh the two goals against each other and will defect (i.e. discard ideology-based policy-seeking) only if vote-seeking pressure is considerable. Since votes are always territorially bound in EU politics, high cross-national distributional effects as the basis of any ‘objective’ national interest may *in principle* constitute such vote-seeking pressure, as most voters will rather want their own country to win from EU policies than subduing to a common European cause. Defection will be eased by national traditions pointing in the same direction as the national interest, since they reduce the risk of losing credibility when ‘betraying’ one’s ideological convictions by hiding the instrumental character of defection. However, vote-seeking pressure is preconditioned by politicisation – if voters are not interested, their views need not be taken into account. Also, if distributional effects are uncertain, parties can safely present competing, ideologically shaped interpretations of ‘the’ national interest. Finally, intra-national distribution can be stressed in order to divert from cross-national effects, depending on how the former affect specific core electorates. The fact that, in a next step, the ToT points out how exactly parties can use this freedom and play a rather active role in structuring the conflict is one of the strengths of this theory.

Second, then, the ToT points out how national party delegations might try to *convince* voters of their ideologically determined policy preferences, rather than simply responding to the preferences of voters. In doing so, they will generally frame the policy issue by means of so-called policy frames consisting of four dimensions, namely norms and goals, problem definitions and labels, causal narratives, and suggestions for policies as a ‘solution’ to the problem. Under uncertainty, they can focus on the first three dimensions in terms of an ideologically inspired justification and use this to suggest the kind of policy they prefer for ideological reasons anyway (uni-dimensional or ‘prism’ strategy). This is because

under uncertainty, causal narratives in particular cannot be empirically evaluated by affected voters yet, hence they compete on rather equal par with each other, and so will the according policy ‘solutions’.

By contrast, under certainty, high cross-national distribution makes some policy suggestions much less appealing to the electorate, so that parties might give in and defect for the sake of national interests. Intra-national distributional effects usually reinforce patterns that have shaped party systems at the domestic level, so that parties do not face goal conflict: producer interests a party represents, for instance, mostly overlap with a preference for free markets. This also means, however, that as soon as cross- and intra-national distributional effects are simultaneously present, goal conflict will not concern all parties equally: some might avoid all too harsh electoral pressures by focusing on ‘their’ share of the electorate in terms of intra-national distribution, provided this part is less directly concerned by the cross-national aspect. In order not to lose the other part entirely, they may then opt for a so-called ‘blurring’ strategy, where they acknowledge some of the arguments belonging to policy frames in line with the national interest rather than their ideology, while still emphasising another, ideologically compatible frame.

Blurring can also be used in a less easily predictable manner to generally broaden a party’s electoral appeal beyond the core electorate, if for instance it takes up the frame in line with a national tradition – giving voters something they are used to – or to cover up one’s defection by including at least some arguments in line with the ideology without using them predominantly. In a manner that is even less foreseeable, parties might ‘subsume’ some arguments clearly belonging to a particular frame under a higher-order logic or creatively recombine arguments. Noteworthy, however, while the creativity required for applying this strategy makes its usage hard to predict, it also requires effort on the part of its users and hence will not be applied on a broad scale.

Third, the theory acknowledges that various institutional variables might intervene with defection in principle, but in the particular context of the usually work in the same direction as the general goals of MEP’s national parties. That is, as long as some scope conditions such as politicisation and timing (within the legislative and electoral circle) are considered. It also means, however, that the core of the ToT as developed based on assumptions about national parties can in principle be applied to other EU institutional settings.

The third chapter of the study then reviewed possible ways of evaluating this theoretical framework as used in the extant literature. It was noted that most of the extant literature tends to a. analyse large numbers of policy issues at the macro-level, b. more or less artificially creates large numbers of observations at the micro-level by analysing the behaviour of individual MEPs rather than the extremely cohesive national delegations, and c. if at all, uses large amounts of textual data to be feasibly analysed only with computerised techniques. If however the present research question is to be answered adequately, the focus should rather a. lie on just a handful of policy issues promising to provide insights to the exceptional cases of defection/territorialisation due to their reputation of involving ‘national interests’ allowing for the latter to be operationalised and empirically identified in a valid manner, b. on national party delegations as cohesive entities whose general goals can be theorised and whose various characteristics in terms of ideology, country interests and traditions, can be known precisely, and c. on a

small sample of texts that can be analysed by means of hand-coding, which will allow for direct comparison across languages that in turn comes with the focus on direct MEP-to-voter communication.

The rest of the chapter thus presented concrete decisions for the present study in terms of research design, case and data selection. First it was argued, that a selection of just three policy issues, namely the debate on welfare access for intra-EU migrants, the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would allow for in-depth knowledge of the substantive background for these cases required for the valid identification of possible national interests and traditions, while covering the kinds of issues offering the highest potential for insights on the rather exceptional phenomena of defection/territorialisation: While these issues share a general reputation of involving ‘national interests’, a high degree of politicisation, took place in the run-up to the 2014 European elections and in policy areas where the EP will have an actual say eventually due to the Treaty of Lisbon, they vary with regard to their scope, direction and certainty of distributional effects identified earlier as structural conditions shaping conflict in European politics. Second, the focus on national party delegations from all party families (if available) but from just six countries – Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, Italy, and France – was meant to guarantee feasibility (acquiring case knowledge, language proficiency), while at the same time including diverging distributional interests regarding the three issues as well as displaying variation in the relevant national traditions. Parties of relevance in the 2014 European elections from these countries were then attributed to the various ideological families based on a rather detailed consideration of their ideological core beliefs rather than labels, EPG membership or historical origins, because only in this manner would policy-seeking be distinguishable from serving core electorates or national traditions later. Given the rather small-N number of cases also at the micro-level (34 parties) in combination with assumptions of causal complexity inherent to the ToT (e.g. defection is always expected to be based on the presence/absence of more than one country- or party-level condition), I have further suggested to evaluate the micro-level aspects of the ToT (i.e. expectations concerning party strategies) by means of a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). In order to, finally, measure the framing strategies of the parties in the sample I have argued for a Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) of the press releases issued by the national party delegations to the EP (whenever possible) as a most direct way of measuring the reasons MEPs give vis-à-vis their electorates.

The following three case study chapters (4, 5, 6) then implemented these design decisions: First, the characteristics of the case in question were discussed in some detail, so as to corroborate the earlier classification based on which the case was selected. Thereafter, the possible policy frames that might be used were identified based on secondary literature. Before this background, it was then possible to formulate observable expectations as to who would use which frame to what extent and what this would mean for the overall structure of conflict, contrasting extant theories with the ToT developed in Chapter 2. The fourth section of each case study chapter then included the results of the PFA, described first at the macro-level and then analysed in detail in terms of QCA at the micro-level, while discussing them with regard to the foregoing observable implications. Next, the results of the PFA were compared to external evidence, i.e. vote-seeking evidence in particular, while taking into account the differences between the

kinds of data. This was followed by a conclusion concerning the role of the case within the overall study as well as within the issue-specific literature.

7.2 Main findings: Differentiated representation rather than territorialisation

Starting with the case study on Europeanised welfare, it was found that uncertainty indeed allows parties to mainly focus on the justification aspect of the policy frames in line with their respective ideologies, although there at least was potential for cross-national distribution. This was shown, on the one hand, by the fact that almost all parties used exactly the frame they were expected to use from an ideological perspective. On the other hand, it was shown by the distinction at the level of frame dimensions, that is, with the policy dimension of each frame being referred to comparatively less frequently than the other dimensions. While the latter result as such had to be taken with a pinch of salt given rather low reliability scores at this level of measurement, it was externally supported by the fact that the most controversial votes on the respective EP resolution were held on the question, whether the abuse of welfare systems by intra-EU migrants was ‘alleged’ or not. This also demonstrates that, unlike some theories would claim, this finding was not simply due to the fact that this particular policy issue fitted into general attitudes on welfare or migration; rather, national party delegations – especially on the centre Left – would actually be very careful about how far exactly they go when calling for a measure that *according to some* might run counter to the national interest.

Some defections were noted nonetheless, albeit not to be expected by the ToT *a priori*: national delegations from parties who take part in national governments as junior coalition partners, who do not control the social affairs ministry, and who have a national tradition in terms of social democratic or liberal welfare were found to defect. Interestingly, these parties defected towards the ideological position of the coalition partner, rather than towards any potential national interest based on cross-national distribution. At least in this sense, then, these exceptions confirm the rule, while none of the other theories would have expected this precise result either. Instead, at least half of the extant theories may have guessed the overall result – ideologically structured conflict – correctly, but would have failed to produce similarly precise and empirically supported expectations concerning the way it comes about.

With regard to the 2013 Reform of the CAP, the ToT also provided a more accurate explanation than its competitors, in the sense of naming exactly who would give in to the national interest and who would resist. Here, the high and certain cross-national distribution meant that some parties, especially those counting farmers among their core electorates, opted for defection by framing the issue in a way that would policy-wise bring the highest amount of subsidies to their home country. Given the simultaneous presence of intra-national distribution, however, parties of the Left mostly could focus on the public goods farming subsidies might help to provide if targeted accordingly, merely ‘blurring’ in terms of the respective national interest. The fact that Green parties relied on the most environmentalist frame

exclusively across all countries simply underlines this general picture, since they have not only the most post-materialist but also a post-nationalist electorate.

At the same time, it had to be noted that Italian parties seemed to act counter to the country's role as a net-payer on CAP, in that they all called for a 'strong' CAP (with the notable exception of the Greens). While certainly the many small Italian farm holdings imply that a rather large number of voters is dependent on subsidies, this alone does not explain support for this form of interventionism. Rather, it would seem that in this particular case, the statist type of capitalism prevailing in Italy strongly shapes perceptions. This is not entirely at odds with the ToT, but it is different from the expectations in terms of degree. Noteworthy, most extant theories – including policy specific ones – would not account for this behaviour even remotely, in that they tend to focus on the distributional aspect alone. Hence, once more the ToT might not be the only theory accounting for the overall structure of conflict, which in this case is rather territorial than ideological, but it does so more precisely regarding the details.

Concerning the case of TTIP, it could be shown that MEPs are neither *per se* noble advocates of consumers or even 'ordinary citizens', nor are they generally subject to a 'producer bias'. Rather, the intra-national distribution between consumers and producers expected as a result of the removal of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade leads parties to fall into well-known cleavages mirroring domestic politics. Only where even the benefits to producers are comparatively small will producer-friendly parties replace the neoliberal frame in line with their ideologies by a frame expressing scepticism of TTIP in a way that fits the respective national tradition on trade policy. It is due to these traditions also that classic protectionism still exists in countries such as France or Italy, and only where it never was as prominent is it replaced by its new, 'hidden' forms. Clearly, however, trade policy today is not about *national* interests in the strict sense necessarily, and if this is accounted for in terms of identifying distributional effects correctly, the ToT will be able to explain for the resulting structure of conflict and micro-level strategies in detail.

Nevertheless, one observation on TTIP, namely the unexpected framing strategy of UKIP, at first seemed to demonstrate the importance of national traditions as a sufficient condition for defection in their own right, rather than simply 'easing' or 'directing' defection caused by distributional effects in the first place. At the same time, the fact that this party was found to be once more making use of a subsuming strategy by contextualising a TTIP-specific frame so as to attract globalisation losers and free trade supporters alike would not even have been conceptually captured by extant theories of conflict in the EP. This strategy, which has barely been mentioned in the summary of the findings so far, will be considered in some detail now, thereby introducing the list of findings across all three cases.

For indeed, across cases, UKIP and other parties on the far Right (Right-Wing Populists and extreme Right) appeared as the 'masters of subsuming', in that this group of parties (and their MEPs where applicable) most creatively combined existing frames or put them into a new, often broader context. Thereby, they would then generally focus on lines of argument that are widely accepted – often because they corresponded to prevailing national traditions – rather than making the kinds of arguments one would typically associate with nationalism. Interestingly, this might even mean that they forward arguments that at times would seem stand against the material interests of their core electorates, e.g. in the

case of CAP. In this sense, national traditions might serve as an alternative kind of ‘cue’ for the least informed segments of the electorate, suggesting that the best policy is the way ‘we’ always used to handle things.

As for the usefulness of distinguishing RWP and extreme Right parties, it can be noted that subsuming is used by both, but even more extensively so by RWP parties. The extreme Right BNP still seems focussed on catering an extremist electorate, whereas the presumably equally extreme NPD also tries sending out broader appeals. In Germany and the UK, the direct comparison between RWP and extreme Right often shows RWP parties as more economically liberal, whereas the French FN and the Italian AN more frequently seem to make interventionist arguments in line with their national tradition of state capitalism. That said, the public discussion on the AfD website with regard to TTIP by means of ‘open letters’ among the members shows the difficulty of combining nationalism and economic liberalism on some issues. In sum, identifying subsuming as a strategy used extensively by these parties certainly helps to understand the recent successes of RWP parties across Europe. At the same time, it might just temporarily cover some inner contradictions within these parties as well as hiding difficulties of demarcation towards the extreme Right, so that it might also be expected the ideological basis of the far Right as a whole remains very much in flux.

Taken together, the three case studies also provide ample empirical evidence that the basic assumption of politicisation causing vote-seeking to enter MEPs’ calculation is largely corroborated: it seems to be reflected in the decision whether to defect or not, in the way MEPs make very nuanced arguments in terms of blurring or subsuming to achieve wider acceptance, and the way in which they distribute their arguments across the dimensions of frames. While this assumption more or less constitutes a scope condition for the ToT, the latter’s further causal narratives seem to hold as well: MEPs in their national party delegations behave as actors, who are not just passively adapting to alleged preferences of voters, but rather try to shape them as much as possible, and who how to frame policy issues in such a way that they can pursue their policy-seeking goals without losing votes, and, finally, are rational enough to give preference to vote-seeking when it seems unavoidable. In doing so, they seem to behave as true representatives of their national parties, as triangulation of press releases with manifestos did not show any major differences, nor did the framing strategies parties not yet in the EP require different explanations from those already in.

It might be argued, of course, that this vote-seeking only applies to direct textual communication but eventually is nothing but ‘cheap talk’. In reply, one might point to anecdotal evidence in terms of the ÖVP delegation exposing an SPÖ MEP right away when she – allegedly – voted against the greening provisions she had supported verbally earlier. Indeed, due to institutions such as VoteWatch.eu, MEPs engaging in cheap talk of such kind risk making themselves an easy target. More generally, however, it could be shown that MEPs generally do vote the way they talk – provided, however, that each vote is understood for what it is: it often concerns just one aspect of the policy issue, it is always about a negotiated outcome that can be supported or not, a compromise often just crafted with the purpose of achieving some kind of majority. In fact, rather than supporting potential ‘cheap talk’ as an

argument against textual analysis, the direct comparison between voting data and textual data would seem to highlight the shortcomings of the former beyond the well-known strategic bias. For the outcome of single votes requires much more detailed knowledge of the policy process than the analysis of the underlying structure of conflict, only to then reduce the eventual measurement to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

Roll-call analysis applied across votes also involves the reduction political behaviour to *positions*, a path generally avoided in the present study and exchanged for the measurement of framing *strategies*. A blurring strategy, for instance, might still be noticed even if aggregated into a position, but it might be taken for a policy preference that constitutes a compromise. Instead, however, rather than compromising in concrete policy terms, a blurring strategy often just means to generally acknowledge a number of norms in order to please certain voters. Such differences matter, for it is the analysis of these strategies that actually help to explain the predominance of ideology in the EP and the resulting, highly differentiated ways of representation. Due to these strategies, then, the EP may not be entirely immune to national interests, but at least defection or even full-scale territorialisation should remain rare even after the Crisis: MEPs will express and justify their policy preferences in manner that overall leads to a territorial structure of conflict, if the issue in question is politicised, distributional effects are cross-national but not intra-national and if these effects can be estimated with certainty.

7.3 Wider contribution and limitations of this study, call for further research

The theory of territorialisation (ToT) was developed with a view to theoretically addressing the research question identified in the Introduction. On the one hand, the results discussed in the empirical chapters suggest that this goal was largely achieved, the desirability of further tests notwithstanding. On the other hand, however, the concrete empirical results have raised further questions. Some of these questions shall be discussed here.

First, with regard to the case study on Europeanised welfare, it has been argued that the uncertainty consists partly in a lack of concrete empirical knowledge regarding the scope of the problem of ‘welfare tourism’ perceived by some. This begs the question, in how far it is possible to achieve certainty over time, whether this is equally possible for all kinds of policy issues / actors, and whether it can be created willingly. A first indication concerning the latter aspect might be found within the third case study (i.e. TTIP), where scientific estimations on winners and losers seem to carry explanatory potential for the structure of conflict. Another question is, then, in how far a gradual creation of certainty influences the structure of conflict over time. Do actors change their frames accordingly, for instance, in case ‘welfare tourism’ should eventually outweigh the benefits of migration for welfare systems? Finally, one might ask, whether it is equally possible to create *uncertainty*, for instance by challenging a potential scientific consensus. Further research should try to address these questions conceptually as well as empirically. For a start, it might extend the time frame of the study on welfare tourism beyond the present scope.

Second, the findings on CAP, regarding Italian parties and citizens in particular, raise questions about the exact role of national traditions as opposed to much more material national interests. By separating the two at least conceptually, the present study has attempted to clarify this relationship in principle, but in its exact observable implications has only partly been correct. In terms of theory, one might thus rethink the notion of national interests in connection to distribution, as it has partly been done here already with regard to the intra-national distribution resulting from TTIP (corporate profits vs. consumer protection). Maybe, for instance, the distinction between material national interests and non-material traditions is less necessary than expected. If this is the case, then operationalisation in terms of net-payers and net-recipients also regarding other policies or the EU budget at large is even more problematic than I have argued Chapter 2 anyway. Alternatively, one might suggest further small-N studies, e.g. involving process tracing, on selected cases allowing for a separation of interests and tradition.

Noteworthy, not only the theoretical answer to the research question was limited, but also the research design and methods employed to evaluate it. The justifications behind most of the research design, methodological and data selection decisions made for the present study were often intertwined with each other, while a common thread was to contrast with the extant state of the art – many issues, many parties, huge data sets of roll-call votes. Thereby, it was possible amongst others to show how important it is to correctly identify national interests if one is to distinguish them from national traditions, which in turn requires focusing a small number of policy issues or to demonstrate the availability and richness of textual data included in press releases. In sum, the common goal of contrasting with the extant literature was not pursued because the insights gained in the state of the art should be generally discarded, but so as to produce added value as efficiently as possible by complementing these approaches.

Consequently, further research might then also bridge the findings of the present study and the extant literature by, for instance, comparing voting behaviour and content of press releases for a larger number of issues, provided the latter are issued within the same language and hence can be analysed by means of computerised textual analysis. However, a qualitative-comparative design or the usage of Policy Frame Analysis cannot be recommended *per se*. After all, as I have discussed in the respective chapter, each individual decision usually came with a number of trade-offs, yet it was with regard to the purposes of the present study that these trade-offs could be reasonably compensated.

While thus the present study can merely provide a tentative and limited answer to the research question, it has also delivered results that might be of interest beyond this narrow question. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, for example, a theory of territorialisation based on national parties as key actors in principle can be applied to, or could at least constitute a starting point for, the study of conflict in other EU institutions, since national parties also provide the respective staff and hence wield influence there. Nevertheless, researchers doing so should consider, in how far these institutional environments – unlike the EP – provide incentives for agency drift rather than loyalty, and whether accordingly the ToT as developed here applies or can be fruitfully extended.

Apart from literature on other EU institutions, the insights gained here could feed back into the literature on political parties. One contribution of the study could be found in the manner of studying part

positions on very concrete issues in EU politics rather than ‘European integration’ as an overall package, as it was often done in the respective literature so far. In this manner, for instance, it was shown that far Left parties often considered ‘Euro-sceptic’ in the this literature, may on some issues make very constructive and, more interestingly, pro-European policy suggestions (e.g. non-discrimination in welfare matters), while they seem to oppose primarily those EU policies that they would oppose also if these were national level policies (e.g. TTIP). This contrasts with the calls on the far Right for policies that either involve disintegration or national concerns in an opportunistic manner (other insights on the far Right were already discussed above).

Even beyond the area of EU politics, the transfer of concepts used to study party strategies in two-dimensional spaces to the level of framing of individual policy issues might feed back into the Comparative Politics literature it came from, in terms of the question in how far the structural conditions identified as relevant in EU politics also interact with party strategies in these policy spaces. The empirical findings produced might further be used as a starting point for studies measuring the effectiveness of framing, as part of a research agenda on which there is an emerging body of literature already.

7.4 A final chance?

What conclusions, then, can be drawn from these empirical findings with regard to the goal of improving European governance by means of strengthening the role of the European Parliament? On the one hand, it might indeed be argued that the EP is apt to relativise national interests in various ways. On the other hand, it is definitely not immune against their impact. Indeed, to some extent it does not even take more or less objective – i.e. distributional – interests for territorialisation, as already national traditions partly may split ideological families. Given that vote-seeking seems to matter, a change in electoral rules towards European lists might appear as a necessary additional condition for banning national interests from the EP. At the same time, the example of Belgium suggests, that a lack of identification with a certain level of government will still lead to territorialisation and grid-lock eventually. Changing identification, however, does not appear as an easy task. Indeed, it took nation-states taken for granted to today a lot of time and effort to achieve this, and it often required means that would not seem to sit well with liberal democracy.

Admittedly also, the absence of territorialisation does not imply absence of conflict. Accordingly, while national interests are often identified as a source of gridlock, it cannot be guaranteed based on the present study that their absence guarantees absence of gridlock. In the United States, for instance, gridlock is regularly caused on more or less ideological grounds between different institutions dominated by different parties respectively. If avoiding gridlock is the goal, it will thus be necessary to further take into account the overall institutional constellation of the EU, an aspect that the present study has neglected. There is, however, a difference between ideologically and territorially induced gridlock: the former does not question the very existence of the polity.

Hence, I argue, the insights gained by the present study in principle provide arguments for increasing the role of the EP at the expense of intergovernmental institutions. First of all, the fact that the representation of European citizens via the EP is so highly differentiated seems desirable. On the one hand, the fact that it mirrors potential disagreement within countries means that, unlike in the (European) Council with country's being represented as a collective actor, in the EP it is not falsely suggested that there is but one French, German, or Italian position. Thereby, one source of reproduction of national identities is reduced, which might help identification with the EU in the long run. On the other hand, however, as long as most Europeans strongly identify with their nation-state, it would seem legitimate that on issues including high cross-national distributional effects or touching strongly on particular national traditions, these are actually represented to exactly the degree they deserve. The representation in the EP as it is thus would seem to correspond well to the complexity of conflict in EU politics.

Even if, however, the increase of EP competences seems desirable, it is quite another question whether it is politically feasible at all. After all, could it not be that Europe is long since past the point when the strengthening of the EU's supranational institutions was supported, or at least would have been tolerated, by its citizens? Indeed, while it might be argued that representation via the EP is highly differentiated, thereby respecting national interests and traditions where appropriate, citizens will hardly be convinced by this and other complex arguments – the 'Brexit' debate is a case in point. Noteworthy, what the 'Leave' campaign in this debate was particularly good at, was framing: Creatively recombining classic Left-wing value (the National Health Service) with a Right-wing diagnosis and policy (costs of EU membership, Brexit) has arguably turned out as a winning formula. Nevertheless, creative framing need not be the monopoly of the Eurosceptics. In fact, the pro-active development of the 'multifunctionality' frame in the domain of the Common Agricultural Policy shows how creativity in terms of framing can also work even in the presence of pro-territorialisation incentives. It is this kind of creativity that advocates of European integration have been lacking in recent years, but which might be even more urgently needed than institutional adaptations.

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Annex I

I.1 General coding instructions

The general coding procedure

The definition of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) considers a quasi-sentence as “an argument – that is, the verbal expression of one political idea or issue” (Budge et al. 2001). In order to both adapt the definition for the purpose of analysing policy frames and to specify what is actually a very vague idea, quasi-sentences shall be defined here – corresponding to the four dimensions of a policy frame – as the verbal expression of either a normative commitment, a problematisation, a causal narrative or a policy suggestion.

For the CMP, a quasi-sentence may be identical with a natural sentence, but does not necessarily have to, in which case the natural sentence has to be broken up (ibid. 2001, 165-167). Consider first the CMP example:

“Because we want freedom, we need strong military forces.”

Now consider the explanation in line with the CMP’s definition of a quasi sentence: “These are two quasi-sentences, because there are two political goals, that is, freedom and strength of military forces, which can be transformed into two quasi-sentences” (ibid. 2001, 167). Also following the definition used in the present paper, one might count two units here, as the statement includes both a normative commitment (freedom) and a policy suggestion (strong military forces). Thus the natural sentence would be coded as two observations of a hypothetical militarist frame F_x , subdivided into one observation of the latter’s normative dimension and one of its policy dimension. What is missing here of the frame would be the constitutive and cognitive dimensions, but they could be easily imagined so as to complete the example:

“The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a whole. If the Western world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of freedom. Had the Western powers not weakened their military capacities under budgetary constraints, it would have kept Russia at bay. In fact, we need strong military forces more than ever now.”

Breaking these up into quasi-sentences as defined above would lead to the following categorisation:

“The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a whole.”
→ *constitutive dimension*

While the reference to “freedom” certainly alludes to the normative dimension of this hypothetical frame, what is stressed here is the fact that this is threatened by Russian forces. Dividing this sentence further would also make it grammatically incomplete. Under such circumstances, a sentence that as a whole belongs to one and the same frame should not be subdivided and instead be attributed to the dimension that forms the bigger part of the sentence. By contrast, the following is a purely normative commitment:

“If the Western world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of freedom.”

→ *normative dimension*

“Had the Western powers not weakened their military capacities under budgetary constraints, it would have kept Russia at bay.”

→ *cognitive dimension*

Here now, a policy element might seem *implicit* in the sentence, but since it stays within the same frame and since the bigger part of the sentence *explicitly* provides a causal narrative, it makes more sense to code it all as an instance of the cognitive dimension of Fx.

“In fact, we need strong military forces more than ever now.”

→ *policy dimension*

At the same time, however, it is important to stress here that, as soon as an actor switches to another frame within one sentence, this must necessarily be separated and coded as two quasi-sentences. In deciding which frame to choose, it is always more important to focus on what is made explicit and corresponds to the observable instances of a frame listed in the codebook rather than interpreting whether there implicitly is an allusion to another frame.

The classification procedure of quasi-sentences is conducted analogous to the CMP in most respects (as pointed out in Budge et al. 2001, 168-173). Most importantly, just as the CMP provides ‘definitions’ for each category, codebooks are provided for policy frames on welfare tourism, CAP, and TTIP respectively, which include an explanation of the logic of each frame, observable instances and concrete examples with regard to each dimension of each frame. Moreover, it seems advisable to proceed paragraph by paragraph, after having read through the press release in total.

When dealing with problems and difficulties, it likewise seems advisable to benefit from the CMP’s decades of experience (cf. *ibid.* 2001, 170-173):

- In general, all quasi-sentences should be coded, even more so if they seem to include some kind of positioning aspects. Then it should be checked, which category (here: frame and dimension), and its observable instances as explicitly listed in particular, is the one that the sentence in question seems to fit best given the alternatives.
- Only if indeed two categories seem to fit equally well should context be taken into account, and only thereafter should other more ‘interpretative’ approaches be considered.
- Yet, some quasi-sentences may not fit *any* category more than any other. They should be coded as “off-topic/non-substantial”. This may be the case, for instance
 - ➔ if a press release refers to several topics, or – regarding the case of Europeanized welfare – if a press release refers to immigration or even welfare for migrants, but would rather seem to apply to third country (i.e. non-EU) nationals. Similarly, statements on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) may be connected to the issue of agriculture, but since GMOs are regulated via legislative processes independent from

the legislative proposals on CAP reform made by Commissioner Ciolos, statements on GMOs are “off-topic”

- ➔ if a political actor is only describing the procedure (e.g. informing the reader of the next session of the committee), without making any indication regarding his or her position on the substance of the meeting
- ➔ if a political actor is merely trying to discredit the political opponent without positioning himself or herself in doing so with regard to the substantive issue at stake (e.g. “The [opponent] should not be trusted, because he is married for the second time already.”)
- ➔ Usually, quasi-sentences considered “off-topic/non-substantial” by the main coder have been set to italics in the data-set prepared for the reliability test. Coders should read these lines nonetheless for contextualization purposes as well as to ignore his categorization in case of strong disagreement.
- If, however, a political actor only cites an opponent’s framing in order to express his or her discontent, such sentences should be coded as instances of the frame that the code uses himself, if opposition to such framing is not already explicitly attributed to any other frame anyway. In this sense, the basic rule of coding primarily by using matching texts to the codebook rather than using context or interpretation does not apply.
- If more than one category might apply even after having checked the codebook thoroughly, contextual features such as the heading might be taken into consideration, most notably the sentences to follow.
- Policy Frame Analysis might be described as a method situated between classic content analysis and discourse analysis. Yet, “interpretation” should only be applied as a means of last resort, filling the gap between the observed reality and the codebook. This is to say that, whenever the codebook instructions offer a category that is closer to the observed text than any other, this is the category of choice – not the one that the actor in question “actually means”.
- Similarly, it is not for the individual coder to interpret, whether the quasi-sentence in question really constitutes a normative statement or causal narrative as such; instead, he or she should rely on the codebook for this purpose, and should categorise the quasi-sentence according to the “observable instances” indicated therein.
- The coding of the frame is always more important than the coding of the dimension.
- If – and only if – none of the above rules help to arrive at a situation where a quasi-sentence fits one category (Frame+Dimension) better than any of the others, it should be coded as “unclear”. Sentences coded temporarily as “unclear” should be returned to at the end of the process of coding the respective press release, and again at the end of the coding process.

The Coding Sheet

Below, it is shown how the aforementioned example would be coded in the provided coding forms⁶⁶:

- Quasi-sentences are separated by “//”
- At the margin, the codes corresponding to the quasi-sentences in the respective line of text are listed, in the order of their appearance, and separated by a comma.
- Coders are asked to indicate what they consider to be the predominant frame used at the level of the press releases by impression and by number. These might differ from each other in cases where a lot of text was devoted to an aspect that at the same time did not appear as the most decisive parts.
- Coders can and should not any problems and uncertainties underneath the table.

Table 86: Illustration of a coding sheet used in the reliability test

| | |
|---|--|
| Coder (name): | |
| 1 | |
| Text: | Coding (frame + dimension) |
| “The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a whole. // If the Western world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of freedom // Had the Western powers not weakened their military capacities under budgetary constraints, it would have kept Russia at bay. // In fact, we need strong military forces more than ever now. // <i>The Parliament will vote on the issue by September 2020.</i> ” | Fx cons Fx norm Fx cogn Fx pol non-substantial |
| Predominant / secondary frame by impression | Fx / none |
| Predominant / secondary frame by number | Fx /none |
| Problems: ... | |

I.2 Reliability test: procedure

There is general agreement in the literature, that content analyses should be subjected to reliability tests as a matter of good practice (Krippendorff 2004; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 2002; Rustemeyer 1992). The analysis of policy frames as I conduct it here certainly also shares some features with the rather interpretivist tradition of discourse analysis, but it should be precisely at the point of reliability and the possibility of reproducing the findings obtained that it should be closer to such classic content analysis. Large research projects often include inter-coder reliability tests in the sense that it must be assured that the various coders involved apply the codebook in a reliably similar manner, so that

⁶⁶ Such forms were used for the purposes of the reliability test. The main analysis was done, however, using the software MaxQDA for practical reasons.

the eventual results – e.g. across countries – are actually comparable. By contrast, all coding results were produced by one and the same coder as the author of the study, and the reliability test conducted was meant to only make sure the method applied is reliable to the point that the results could be reproduced by other scholars using the same codebook after the receiving training.

Hence, it was necessary to hire additional coders (3 BA-level students in political science, hired based on language proficiency where applicable), otherwise not involved in the research project, by means of workshops, to introduce them to the method of Policy Frame Analysis in general (4 hours) as well as to the respective substantive backgrounds and codebooks in theory and practice, i.e. in a pilot study (7-7.5 hours per case study), and to have them code a sample of texts (2.5-5 hours per coder per case). The limited number of hours available for each codebook was due to budgetary and, to a lesser extent, time constraints. Thus, the sample of texts had to be as small as possible, which as a general rule of thumb means 10 per cent of the overall data set (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002). At the same time, it had to be assured that the sample would be representative of the overall data-set.

The only reasonable way for sampling in this case was at the level of documents rather than coding units, because the context of a quasi-sentence matters in content analysis. At the same time, it seemed reasonable to distribute the work rather equally across coders and cases for practical reasons, to include documents covering all languages (four in total), all countries (six) and the whole breadth of the ideological spectrum. Given the rather small number of documents per case study and codebook (66 for Europeanized welfare, 157 for CAP, 191 for TTIP), drawing a 10 per cent random sample would not have guaranteed fulfilling all of these criteria, and might have included documents with very few codable units. Instead, therefore, 4 documents were selected per country, always including the main parties of the Left and Right plus some further parties on the fringes (where, for instance, a far Left party was included from Germany, a far Right party would be included from Austria, a Green one from Ireland and a Liberal one from the UK etc.). In order to avoid cherry-picking in the selection process (in the sense of choosing only those texts that were ‘easy’ to code), I always selected the document per party that included the highest number of coded units. This would not simply constitute a clear-cut criterion, but would also guarantee that a sample constituting 10 per cent of the overall data set at the level of documents would definitely correspond to at least 10 per cent of all codings.

The sample of documents used for the pilot study (during the workshop) were selected according to similar criteria, with the difference that the documents selected per party were those with the second highest number of codings, thereby keeping the sample for the pilot and the eventual test separate. In addition, any party or country information were removed from the documents used for the pilot study, so that a discussion of the pilot results as a part of the workshop would not allow coders to willingly or unwillingly memorize how to ‘correctly’ code the statements of a given party.

For Round 1 of the actual reliability test, then, each coder had to code 8 documents from 8 different parties, covering at least 2 languages and 2 countries, resulting in a sample of 24 documents per case study/codebook and corresponding to about 36 per cent of the overall data set on welfare, about 15 per cent for CAP and 12 per cent for TTIP. As for the codebooks on welfare and CAP, the reliability

scores were not yet satisfying after Round 1, one coder (for practical reasons) was asked to code another set of texts in addition, which in Round 1 had been given to one or both of the other two coders. For this Round 2 of the test, the respective coder would receive further training and an up-dated codebook based on his own Round 1 results, without, of course, being provided with any information as to his/her colleague had coded the respective texts in Round 1. The test had to be ended after Round 2 for budgetary reasons. Noteworthy, conducting several rounds of tests with further training and codebook revisions is common practice in content analysis, and indeed the advice is to continue testing and revising the codebook until acceptable levels of reliability are reached (Neuendorf 2002, 133–34). In the present case by and large, this applied after Round 2, in the case of TTIP even after Round 1.

The coders were asked to code the documents in their respective sample in line with the general coding instructions as well as the respective case-specific codebook (see above and Annex II, respectively) document by document. Most importantly, they had to assign the quasi-sentences corresponding to the frames and their dimensions to the respective codes (e.g. F1norm). In addition, they were asked to calculate the predominant and secondary frame used in the document as well as to assign the document as a whole to a particular frame based on their overall impression. In order to calculate reliability scores, the codings assigned to a respective passage of text by the main coder (i.e. the author of the study) and the respective assistant coder were compared pair wise. This was done at the level of frames (Do both coders attribute the statement to the same policy frames?) as well as at the level of dimensions of these frames (Do they *also* agree on the dimension?). By comparing the result for each document as a whole (at the level of frames only), it was assured that potential disagreements on unitisation would not be as significant as to change the overall balance in terms of the predominant and secondary frame used by a party.

Reliability scores were first calculated, in terms of percentage agreement only, for each document included in the test sample. Thereby, it could be checked whether there were substantial differences agreement scores for one particular party, party family or country. Where, for instance, disagreements were particularly high, this might be used as a first indication of a subsuming strategy, because the creative recombination or re-contextualisation of a particular line of argument that characterises this framing strategy would necessarily make coder disagreement more likely. Thereafter, I calculated the agreement indices ‘Cohen’s *kappa*’ and ‘Krippendorff’s *alpha*’ for each assistant coder vis-à-vis the main coder by means of the respective STATA commands (‘kap’ and ‘krippalpha’), so as to identify potential problems related to just one coder, before calculating these indices for the whole sample per case/codebook. The test results and their interpretation regarding the thresholds for each index are presented in Chapter 3.

Annex II

II.1 Codebook: frames on Europeanised welfare

| <i>Frame F1</i> | | | |
|---|--|---|--|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| Normative (Why is it a problem?) F1 norm | National identity and national culture are goods worth protecting as such. There is a national community whose value is above the individual's. | References to national identity and community National identity and community as something to be vulnerable, worth protecting NB: social order ("Sozialer Friede") should be coded F4 norm | "Je crois que le Front National est le meilleur défenseur de l'identité française et de tous les peuples. » (transl. : « I think that the Front National is the best defender of the French identity and of all peoples ») |
| Constitutive (What is the problem?) F1 cons | Welfare, as such, is not a problem from this perspective, as it is acceptable to share within the national community (although there might be reasons to exclude some unworthy of the community). Immigration, however, is a problem AS SUCH. It would change national culture and identity, even beyond material facts. | Immigration as bad <i>as such</i> → subcode: warning that Roma are allowed to access NB: as soon as it is only about a "too much" of immigration (numbers, masses etc.), F4 cons should be used Threat to jobs for nationals, 'stealing' of jobs, links between a negative job-market situation and migration Immigration brings criminals into the country Cultural diversity as s.th. undesirable, warning of differences in lifestyle | "The migration problem is an EU problem." „Die Vorhut einer, vor allem von Roma geprägten, rumänisch-bulgarischen Zuwandererwelle stellt zahlreiche [Adj.anderesLand2] Kommunen bereits heute vor größte Probleme.“ „With one million young people unemployed and public services stretched to the limit...“ „...// und offen die Nöte der von nicht integrierbaren Zuwandererströmen betroffenen Mittelund Westeuropäer anspricht, die längst nicht beim Verdrängungswettbewerb auf dem Arbeitsmarkt enden.“ "Notwithstanding the rhetoric of our elected politicians who wax lyrical about the "enrichment" that immigration has bestowed upon Britain and the British people, the British public are painfully aware of the negative reality of enforced multiculturalism." |

| <i>Frame F1</i> | | | |
|--|--|---|---|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| Cognitive (What causes the problem?) F1 cogn | The source of the problem is the access of immigrants due to open borders and free movement, which so far are imposed necessarily by EU membership. | Free movement (indirectly: EU membership)/ open borders as the cause of the immigration problem NB: as soon as free movement is not identified as a cause of the problem as such, but just its “wrong handling”, use F4 cogn | „Mit der vollen Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit für Bürger dieser Staaten, die mit Jänner 2014 in Kraft tritt, // <i>wird sich diese Problemlage dramatisch verschärfen.</i> “ “..., due to our membership of the EU, we cannot even deport those who are convicted.” |
| Policy (What should be done?) F1 pol | The policy from this perspective is: stop immigration, deny access. (Of course immigrants also do not have the same rights, but this is secondary here.) | Stop immigration TOTALLY , not just a bit Self-portrait as an anti-immigration party In short: no access, no rights for migrants NB: any qualified opposition to immigration should be coded F4 pol | “The British National Party says that immigration to the UK should be stopped, full stop.” „Wir bedanken uns bei Herrn Scheuer für die Bereitung des politischen Bodens, auf dem am 25. Mai außerhalb Bayerns die NPD als einzige authentische Anti-Zuwanderungspartei ernten wird.“ |

| <i>Frame F2</i> | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| Normative (Why is it a problem?) F2 norm | All humans are – or should be- totally equal. This is embodied in EU citizenship and the principle of non-discrimination. | Reference to free movement as a fundamental right Reference to fundamental rights more generally Reference to legal principles, rights, values of the EU | "Das heißt, der freie Personenverkehr ist nicht nur ein Grundrecht, . . ." „Freizügigkeit ist ein grundsätzliches Recht für die Bürger der Europäischen Union, für das ich von Anbeginn gekämpft habe.“ “Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit ist ein Grundrecht und geht in zwei Richtungen: . . .” „Es ist völlig klar, dass eine Diskriminierung der Bürger anderer EU-Länder nicht erlaubt sein darf, // dies würde gegen europäisches Recht und europäische Prinzipien verstossen.“ „Das ist ein rechtliches Grundprinzip, das natürlich auch hier gilt“, so [Person] weiter.“ |
| Constitutive (What is the problem?) F2 cons | Discrimination is a problem, because it denies the above rights. | Discrimination on the basis of nationality as a problem → subcode: discrimination of Roma restrictions on free movement in any way (admission & rights), or even <i>discussing</i> welfare tourism as an act of discrimination | "Heute haben wir eindeutig klargestellt, dass eine diskriminierende Einschränkung des Rechts auf Freizügigkeit, wie sie Cameron oder Seehofer fordern, mit dem Europaparlament nicht zu machen ist.“ |
| Cognitive (What causes the problem?) F2 cogn | The source of discrimination is nationalism, racism, xenophobia. | Nationalism, racism, xenophobia lead to discrimination Reference to right-wing party discourse as nationalist, populist, vote-seeking opportunist NB: only if the right-wing, populist, nationalist etc. origins are spelled out, F2 cogn. Otherwise F5 cons. | “Die Mitgliedstaaten sind einem populistischen Reflex erlegen.“ „//. . . die die populistische Debatte um Freizügigkeit in der EU, wie sie von [anderePerson] und der [anderePartei] angestoßen wurde, // verurteilt.“ „Mit hysterischen Parolen am rechten Rand nach Wählerstimmen zu fischen, hilft hier niemanden“, so [Person] und [Person] abschließend.“ |
| Policy (What should be done?) | There should be both unlimited | ‘No’ to restrictions on free movement | „Ich rufe die Kommission auf, sich die Umsetzung der Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie in den einzelnen Staaten noch |

Frame F2

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|------------------|---------------------------------|---|--|
| F2 pol | access and rights for migrants. | <p>No discrimination</p> <p>checking welfare entitlements <i>individually</i></p> <p>Treating EU-migrants as nationals</p> <p>In short: no limits on access, no limits on rights for migrants</p> <p>Free movement must be respected by everyone</p> <p>Free movement must be enforced by the COM</p> | <p>einmal genau anzusehen // und falls nötig konsequent Vertragsverletzungsverfahren einzuleiten."</p> <p>"... and to make clear that no opt-out, or derogation, from the EU's commitment to freedom of movement is possible."</p> |

Frame F3

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|--|---|--|--|
| <p>Normative (Why is it a problem?)</p> <p>F3 norm</p> | <p>Individuals should enjoy as much freedom as possible, which is usually achieved by the market rather than the state. Markets are valued also for their efficiency. The single market for labour is worth protecting, therefore.</p> | <p>Economic efficiency</p> <p>Personal economic gains</p> <p>NB: as soon as this is about rights in any way, use F2 norm</p> <p><i>General</i> economic gains of the internal market, e.g. in terms of growth</p> <p>NB: as soon as there is a link to the welfare state, the social system: use F5 norm; for UK sources, note that fiscal system and welfare systems are identical!</p> | <p>“We have an open and liberal jobs market in Britain - which the Conservatives used to believe in.”</p> <p>“Die Europäische Union soll den Menschen eine Perspektive bieten, die die Chancen des europäischen Binnen- und Arbeitsmarkt nutzen wollen.”</p> <p>„. . . sondern kurbelt auch die Wirtschaft an und spült Geld in die Staatskassen“, so [Person].“</p> |
| <p>Constitutive (What is the problem?)</p> <p>F3 cons</p> | <p>Welfare states entail inefficiency, because too much welfare acts as a disincentive for taking up employment. Moreover, generous welfare must be financed by high taxes, which reduces individual freedom. ‘Welfare tourism’ means inefficiency.</p> | <p>Problematising quite explicitly the additional welfare spending</p> <p>NB: <i>any more general problematisation</i> using concepts such as “welfare tourism”, “benefits tourism” “mass immigration” or “Armutsmigration” should be coded F4; in other words: if the insistence on the existence of a problem is rather diffuse, use F4</p> <p>Stressing the burden on tax payers and the general budget</p> | <p>“Gauland wörtlich: „Bereits jetzt steigt die Einwanderung in unsere Sozialsysteme”</p> <p>“But it is important, with budgets under strain...”</p> |
| <p>Cognitive (What causes the problem?)</p> <p>F3 cogn</p> | <p>Too generous welfare arrangements (in general and for migrants) sets the wrong incentives.</p> | <p>The prospect of receiving welfare in a host member state is a (wrong) incentive for migration</p> <p>NB: by contrast, <i>F4 should be used whenever the cause of the problem is not framed in economic terms</i>, but rather legal terms: the cause of the</p> | <p>“Einen sicheren Anspruch auf die, im europäischen Vergleich relativ hohe deutsche Sozialhilfe zu haben, stelle einen ungeheuren Anreiz für bedürftige Bürger der gesamten EU dar, so der stellvertretende AfD-Sprecher weiter.“</p> <p>„It is important we ensure that people who go to other EU states do so for the right reasons – that is, to work.”</p> |

Frame F3

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
|--|---|--|---|
| | | <p>problem is then that states or the EU do not regulate the issue</p> | <p>"We must co-operate to address the key factors that drive people to abuse the system –"</p> <p>"It is in the words of immigration specialists a significant pull factor."</p> |
| <p>Policy (What should be done?) F3 pol</p> | <p>Hence, if it occurs, it is welfare for migrants that must be limited, not migration. If welfare cannot be reduced in general, then it should be at least welfare <i>for migrants</i> which is curtailed.</p> | <p>Free movement of labour, market-based</p> <p>Restrictions on welfare entitlements</p> <p>NB: going beyond status quo in doing so, otherwise F5 cogn</p> <p>No change in the rules of Schengen or restrictions on admission</p> <p>In short: access yes, rights no</p> <p>NB: as above, in relation to F4: as soon as the policy to prevent "welfare tourism" is rather unspecified and hence either explicitly includes or at least does not exclude restriction of access (e.g. in terms of deporting people, prohibiting access), use F4 rather than F3</p> | <p>„Freizügigkeit soll der Öffnung des Arbeitsmarkts für EU-Bürgern dienen und nicht den Sozialtourismus fördern.“</p> <p>"Wie in [anderesLand] sollte es auch in [Land] Unterstützungsleistungen wie Arbeitslosengeld für EU-Ausländer erst nach drei Monaten geben", hielt [Person] fest.“</p> <p>“... or that these announcements should be a precursor of changes in the freedom of movement of labour, which is fundamental to the single market.”</p> |

| Frame F4 | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
| Normative (Why is it a problem?) F4 norm | Order matters. In general, too much change is a potential threat to order. Tradition is preferable over change, therefore. Rewards must be built on past achievements. | (social) order, "sozialer Friede" Public confidence in the existing order | ". . . die den sozialen Frieden in Europa nachhaltig gefährden könnte." "Not least because abuse erodes public confidence." |
| Constitutive (What is the problem?) F4 cons | Too much of poverty is a threat to order. Hence, welfare is acceptable. But it must not be redistributive, otherwise it would change the existing order. Migration brings change, hence it is viewed with some suspicion. Welfare migration is problem if it means too much migration and redistribution. Welfare benefits for migrants are problematic because they blur the lines between nationals and non-nationals, questioning the nation-state as the dominant mode of social order. | Welfare for migrants as undeserved, unjustified Mass immigration puts stress on society, is a 'challenge' → subcode: mass immigration of Roma NB: contrast to F1: it is the <i>number</i> that makes it a problem Welfare tourism as a 'real' concern There <i>is</i> a problem with welfare tourism (Sozialtourismus, Armutsmigration) that cannot be ignored NB: this may be largely unspecified here, whereas for F3 it would be focused on the welfare aspect Disregard of those who deny the existence of the problem | „. . . dann ist mit einem drastischen Anstieg der Zuwanderung von Roma aus diesen beiden Ländern zu rechnen", warnte [Person].“ „Dabei wies der [Partei] Europaabgeordnete darauf hin, dass es falsch sei, das Problem des Sozialtourismus aus Gründen der politischen Korrektheit, weil es sich bei den Betroffenen um Roma handle, zu leugnen. //“ „This initiative shows that Conservatives are working on a range of fronts to address people's real concerns over migration and benefits tourism." "Die aktuelle Diskussion in Europa über Armutseinwanderung ist notwendig.“ |
| Cognitive (What causes the problem?) F4 cogn | Open borders (access) and de-stratification (equal rights) can be causes of welfare migration if handled unwisely. | Totally unrestricted or insufficiently controlled free movement in terms of admission and rights a wrong way of handling free | „Und wenn mit 1. Jänner 2014 die Übergangsfristen für rumänische und bulgarische Staatsangehörige fallen, // dann ist mit einem drastischen Anstieg der Zuwanderung von Roma aus diesen beiden Ländern zu rechnen", warnte [Person].“ |

| <i>Frame F4</i> | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| | | <p>movement leads to welfare tourism and mass immigration</p> <p>A “lax” approach to free movement leads to welfare tourism and abuse → subcode: especially attractive for Roma</p> <p>NB: free movement does not necessarily lead to problems, that would have to be coded F1 cogn</p> | <p>“Conservatives are concerned that the inflexible approach could be used to restrict Britain's right to set its own rules on key aspects such as access to benefits, healthcare and housing.“</p> <p>“. . . et une gauche laxiste qui participe activement à faire de l'Europe une Passoire.”</p> |
| <p>Policy (What should be done?)</p> <p>F4 pol</p> <p>F4 pol</p> | <p>Both restrictions on free movement or stratification measures might thus be thinkable to address welfare migration.</p> | <p>Fight welfare tourism (without further specification)</p> <p>prevent full access for Romania and Bulgaria before it starts</p> <p>An end to “uncontrolled” immigration, e.g. by limiting numbers</p> <p>NB: Unlike F1 pol, always only qualified opposition to immigration</p> <p>changes to existing legislation in the form of further restrictions of free movement – including access to countries – must be <i>considered</i></p> <p>openness to “reform” and stricter legislation</p> <p>Member States <i>must</i> be given the possibility to address the problem and <i>must</i> use this potential to the full, e.g.</p> | <p>„Die [Land] Bundesregierung müsse dem Beispiel des [anderePerson, anderesLand] folgen und Maßnahmen gegen den Sozialtourismus aus anderen EU-Staaten ergreifen, forderte der [Partei] Delegationsleiter im Europäischen Parlament, [Person].“</p> <p>"Freedom of movement is an important principle, // which is why it cannot be a completely unqualified one.</p> <p>“But a complete halt to migration within the EU is not the answer either.”</p> <p>“. . . muss auch darüber debattiert werden, wir dies verhindert werden kann.”</p> <p>„Es ist sicherlich richtig, dass Sozialmissbrauch in [Land] viel strenger geahndet werden muss.“</p> |

Frame F4

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|------------------|--------------|---|--|
| | | <p>by interpreting Directive 2004/38 in the strictest way possible</p> <p>Use existing legislation in order to deport those who “abuse” the system, deny them re-entry</p> <p>NB: F5 cogn just says that existing laws suffice to prevent abuse</p> <p>Sub-code: solve Roma-problem elsewhere, not here</p> <p>In short: both limitations on access and on rights are thinkable and asked for</p> | <p>„Denn eines muss klar sein: Das Roma-Problem an die wohlhabenden Mitgliedstaaten wie [Land] abzuschieben, kann keine Lösung sein“, schloss [Person], der kürzlich diesbezügliche Anfragen an die EU-Kommission gestellt hat.“</p> |

| Frame F5 | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
| Normative (Why is it a problem?) F5 norm | Solidarity and equality as incorporated in the welfare state | The welfare state's functioning | „Gesundheitssystem, Krankenhäuser und Pflege würden ohne Zuwanderer von einem Tag auf den anderen nicht mehr funktionieren“, erinnert [Person].“ |
| Constitutive (What is the problem?) F5 cons | Welfare can lead to more equality (also materially), is based on solidarity. Welfare thus is almost a value as such. Immigration as such is not opposed. Welfare for immigrants is even desirable in the name of solidarity and universalism. Welfare migration would only be a problem, if it meant a threat to the welfare state or social standards in general. | Welfare tourism as a ‘myth’, and those who talk about it are just trying to provoke panic Reference to “so-called”, “alleged” (angeblich) welfare tourism Welfare tourism is not a problem ‘Stay calm’, factual approach to the issue | "Wir brauchen Informationen statt Panikmache." „This contradicts the common perception promoted by some politicians and newspapers. //” „Deshalb gibt es in [Land] kein wesentliches Problem mit 'Sozialtourismus'.“ “This has polarised views unnecessarily and led to a debate based on supposition rather than fact.” |
| Cognitive (What causes the problem?) F5 cogn F5 cogn | Migrants, however, also tend to contribute to the welfare states as a whole, and therefore there is not a problem. | Migrants make a net contribution to the welfare system Stressing benefits of migration for the welfare state NB: F3 if the <i>general</i> economic or financial gain of migration is stressed, without any reference to the welfare state; for UK sources, note that fiscal system and welfare systems are identical! Existing EU law is sufficient; Member States <i>are</i> given the possibility to address outright abuse and <i>can</i> use this potential | "Die Statistik zeigt deutlich, dass Ausländer mehr ins [Adj.Land] Sozialsystem einzahlen als sie daraus erhalten.“ „Unter dem Strich profitiert das [Adj.Land] Sozialsystem sogar von Zuwanderern //; nicht nur durch die Einzahlungen, sondern auch durch die vielen Sozial- und Pflegedienstleistenden““ „He also highlights the finding that EU migrants actually pay more in taxes than they cost in benefits, . . .” “Man müsse anerkennen, dass “mobile Arbeitnehmer zum Wirtschaftswachstum beitragen und Nettozahler in den Sozialsystemen sind”, betont die Europaparlamentarierin.“ „Das EU-Recht ermöglicht aber nicht nur die Freizügigkeit, sondern auch die Verhinderung von Missbrauch.“ |

| <i>Frame F5</i> | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| | | NB: as soon as the usage of these laws is specified beyond “preventing abuse” towards limiting access for migrants (deportation, denial of re-entry etc.) – F4 pol! | „Die Mitgliedstaaten könnten nach europäischem Freizügigkeitsrecht durchaus den Zugang zu Sozialhilfen beschränken, damit Leistungen nicht unangemessen in Anspruch genommen würden.“ |
| Policy (What should be done?) F5 pol | As long as there is no threat to the welfare state, some welfare tourism is acceptable. Before limiting access or cutting welfare, welfare states should be strengthened to cope with welfare tourism. | No need for enhanced EU legislation <i>Help</i> local authorities who are confronted with large-scale immigration, using existing or even additional financial means NB: F4 pol if the idea is to help them to punish “abusers” | “Dort wo einige wenige Städte besonders belastet sind, weil die Zuwanderung ärmerer Menschen sich konzentriert, ist es an den Mitgliedsstaaten den betroffenen Menschen und den Kommunen mit Geldern aus den EU-Strukturfonds und von nationaler Ebene zu helfen.“ “Es ist der Bund, der Ländern und Gemeinden bei der Bewältigung aktueller Probleme unter die Arme greifen und gleichzeitig EU-übergreifend aktiv werden muss“, meint Schwentner.“ |

Off-topic for welfare

The following topics are sometimes discussed in the same press release, but should in general be disregarded:

- migration from outside the EU, i.e. third countries;
- the referendum in Switzerland
- posted workers (Entsendung von Arbeitnehmer, travailleurs détachés)

Short version:

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|-------|--|---|---|---|
| F1 | National identity and community | Immigration as the influx of 'others' is a problem as such | Free movement policy | <i>Stop</i> immigration |
| F2 | Fundamental Rights, equality | Discrimination is the actual problem | Nationalism, thinking in terms of nation-states, populism, xenophobia | <i>No more discrimination</i> based on nationality |
| F3 | Individual freedom | Inefficient welfare arrangements increase tax burden | Unconditional welfare sets the wrong incentives | <i>Allow</i> free movement for efficient allocation of resources, <i>restrict</i> welfare |
| F4 | Stability, order, tradition | welfare tourism is a real concern as it questions existing social order (redistributive potential, elimination of status national/non-national) | Loss of control over migrant rights | <i>Restrict</i> welfare for migrants and/or restrict migration |
| F5 | Solidarity and equality, as embodied in the (national) welfare state | Fundamental threats to the historical achievement of the welfare state – as this is not happening, there is no problem! | Migrants may contribute to the social system | Strengthen local authorities were necessary, otherwise <i>no need for action</i> |

II.2 Codebook: frames on 2013 Reform of the CAP

| <i>Frame F1: Classic frame</i> | | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>Examples</u> |
| <p>Normative (Why is it a problem?)</p> <p>F1 norm</p> | <p>As Rhinard points out – and explains before the historical background of the post-war era – food security was the central rationale of this frame (p. 70). The link of food security to the well-being of farmers is more historical than logical: at a time when farmers’ well-being mattered for the economic rationale of food-security, it also carried a considerable political importance, as farmers made up a central political force (percentage of the population, capacity for mobilization) as well (Rhinard and other references, basically every reference that says something on early CAP history). Nonetheless, the logical overlap between these two aims consists in attributing the status of an end in itself to the act of producing food. In recent years, issue of food security has seen a twofold update: On the one hand, a globalized perspective on agriculture challenges the self-evident way in which food security is considered in Europe today (Bréhon, 2011, pp. 7-8) In this context, it has also been pointed out that the alternative, food dependence, is morally problematic: in the case of global shortages, rich European countries would still be able to import food at the expense of poorer regions (Bréhon, 2011, p. 7). On the other hand, food security is now also framed in qualitative terms rather than quantitative terms (Bréhon, 2011, p. 9). Thereby also the act of producing food obtains renewed prestige. At the same time, alternative value bases for CAP such as ‘multifunctionality’ (see below), ecological aspects of it in particular, as well as competitiveness are rejected as secondary or too complex for achieving popular support (Bréhon, 2011, pp. 7-11).</p> | <p>Food, food production and farmers’ well-being as central to agricultural policy, ranked above other considerations</p> <p>CAP is made for farmers</p> <p>Farmers’ well-being and incomes</p> <p>NB: stressing the needs of #national# AND European farmers or farmers in general (F4: <i>only national</i>)</p> <p>NB: rural communities = F3!</p> <p>Stressing food security, food safety</p> <p>Stressing self sufficiency in terms of food supply, independence from global markets</p> <p>New: global food supply</p> <p>Policy must work in daily practice, on the ground; „praxisorientiert“ (as farmers are the practitioners)</p> | <p>“The commission needs to be more mindful of the effects of dipping into the Agricultural Budget, // the reality is that any measures <i>which impact on the incomes of farmers // or reduces the stability of the agricultural sector //</i> has wider implications for the local communities and rural economy, // <i>of which farmers are the backbone. //</i>”</p> <p>« <i>Die Landwirte in der EU brauchen klare Regeln und verlässliche Rahmenbedingungen für eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben für die Gesellschaft - bei einer nachhaltigen Landbewirtschaftung die Ernährung für über 500 Millionen Verbraucher in der Europäischen Union zu sichern.</i>“</p> <p>„<i>This refocusing of policy needs to be carefully monitored and is subject to a mid-term review to ensure that at farm level the measures are workable // and that they deliver for the environment and the climate,</i>” she said. //”</p> |
| Constitutive | Anything that impinges on the production of food <i>as such</i> as | Farmers are in trouble | |

Frame F1: Classic frame

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>Examples</u> |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p>(What is the problem?)</p> <p>F1 cons</p> <p>F1 cons</p> | <p>well as on farmers as the actors entrusted with the honorable task of producing food, in either quantity or quality, is therefore problematic. Bréhon, for instance, deploras what he calls “The almost total abandonment of food” (2011, p. 8) in describing the situation prior to the 2013 Reform.</p> | <p>Challenges to /demands on farmers are stressed → economic → administrative</p> <p>Challenges to the profession (also: lack of people entering the job)</p> | <p>„Das Parlament hat sich für eine gerechte // und praxisorientierte Agrarreform ausgesprochen, // die die europäische und deutsche Landwirtschaft fit für die Zukunft macht // und den neuen Herausforderungen gerecht wird.“</p> <p>“The current agreement is overly complex, administratively cumbersome // and it will lead to upheaval such as remapping // for very little environmental gain. //</p> <p>“The CAP agreement reached today between the European Parliament, Council and Commission will remove uncertainty for farmers, according to [person], [region], MEP, one of the key negotiators in the reform talks. //”</p> <p>« . . . and will help to address the persistent problem of too few young people in farming,” she said.”</p> |
| <p>Cognitive (What causes the problem?)</p> <p>F1 cogn</p> | <p>Noteworthy, such problems are inherent in agricultural production. In that sense, agriculture has been considered as an industry apart, with ‘special’ needs (cf. Rhinard, 2010, p. 70). After all, agriculture is subject to <i>force majeure</i> in terms of weather conditions, which confronts producers with considerable uncertainty about production conditions. While uncertainty may affect other industries as well, farmers further need to plan production very much in advance. At the same time, demand for food tends to remain rather stable, so that even if prices drop, consumers will not buy more food while farmers cannot reduce production quickly enough (Ackrill, 2000, pp. 20-21; Altomonte & Nava, 2005,</p> | <p>Agriculture is exposed to force majeure, and, nowadays, speculation</p> <p>Farming is special, a particularly demanding profession</p> <p>Insecurity of farming lies in the problem of planning ahead given particular factors such as the weather</p> <p>or, nowadays, price volatility on global markets, caused e.g. by financial speculation on food</p> | <p>“... it is the responsibility of the EU to act collectively rather than targeting the Budget of one particular sector such as agriculture, particularly <i>as it is a sector vulnerable to market conditions.</i>”</p> |

Frame F1: Classic frame

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | Examples |
|--|---|--|--|
| | <p>p. 258). If left to itself, agriculture may hence be much less attractive than other professional activities, which means that without intervention, jobs in (European) agriculture may get replaced (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 258). Logically, if too few people decide in favour of an occupation in agriculture, food production in Europe would be threatened. While these causal narratives have a long tradition, recent developments in world markets seem to provide them with new relevance in that price volatility is expected to develop into “an increasingly regular phenomenon” (d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 10; cf. also Bianchi, 2011, p. 16; Mahé, 2012, p.3), partly due to financial speculation (Bianchi 2011, p. 16). The crises in the dairy sector are cited as an example from which ‘lessons’ should be learned (ibid., p. 14). Indeed, in a recent volume of ‘The European Union Explained’ issued by the European Commission, this classic frame stressing the uncertainty as a problem particular to agriculture and explaining it by reference to climate- and weather-dependency is still cited (European Commission 2014b, p. 7). Hence, this frame is arguably far from dead, although it has lost its former dominance in shaping policy.</p> | | <p>“This reserve was put in place for a reason - namely to provide security for farmers across the EU // <i>and there is very real concern that issues such as the price volatility in the beef sector and dairy sector in particular may create issues for farmers // who may need these funds next year. //</i>”</p> |
| <p>Policy (What should be done?) F1 pol</p> | <p>Classically, three policy solutions are suggested by advocates of this frame, grouped under the heading of Common Market Organizations (CMOs): guarantee prices, tariffs, quotas and export subsidies. Of these, the guarantee or target price is certainly the most essential element, whereas the others are more or less supporting the feasibility of its application. By fixing prices, the uncertainty confronting farmers under market conditions is considerably reduced, and they now have an incentive to produce sufficient amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of increasing production, as the target price is set above the market price) (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 259). Tariffs are set on agricultural products entering the common market in order to avoid an influx of cheap food from outside, thereby</p> | <p>Generally strong CAP, coupled payments, tariffs, quotas or at least high direct payments</p> <p>Strong CAP</p> <p>Opposition to budget cuts → includes downplaying current amounts of spending</p> <p>Opposition to liberalisation</p> <p>Support of quotas, tariffs, export subsidies (at least prolong their use) → <i>all</i> quotas supposed to end 2015 according to</p> | <p>“... <i>it is the responsibility of the EU to act collectively rather than targeting the Budget of one particular sector such as agriculture, particularly as it is a sector vulnerable to market conditions.</i>”</p> |

Frame F1: Classic frame

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | Examples |
|-----------|---|--|--|
| F1 pol | <p>serving the principle of Community preference (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 258; Fouilleux, 2013, p. 310). While prices could be kept at the target level by buying up and storing surpluses (Fouilleux, 2013, p. 310), the surpluses could also be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. making European food competitive on a global level) (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 259; Matthews, 2011; p. 10). These instruments have been under massive critique for decades due to the burdens they impose on consumers and tax payers (who have to pay directly or indirectly for target prices), on non-EU countries (not least on developing ones who are hampered massively in their development due to the fact their only competitive sectors are effectively hampered from exporting to the EU) (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 260), and on the environment (Rhinard, 2010, pp. 71-73). Nevertheless, in the debate on the 2013 Reform, they have seen a revival in the form of a 'safety net' consisting mainly of a new Special Reserve for market interventions in times of food crises (d'Oultremont, 2011, p. 10; Mahé, 2012, p. 3, pp. 35-37). As a whole, both the values and the reasoning as well as the policy solutions of this frame appear to carry relevance beyond the history books. Just because the reforms so far have indicated a move away from this frame, this does not mean that it continues to shape the conceptions of the CAP in the hearts and minds of some actors. At the same time, even the most ardent supporters of this frame will not necessarily suggest a return to the 'old' CAP. Next to a probably extensive 'safety net', they are likely to generally support a 'strong' CAP, rejecting budgetary cuts. On the one hand, some proponents of this frame in the literature, most notably Bréhon (2011), seem to consider the current way of justifying and applying direct payments as somehow 'unworthy' of the noble task of food production. That is because such direct payments are consciously 'decoupled' from food production, not actually rewarding this activity.</p> | <p>COM; 2017 eventually – achieved by F1 supporters</p> <p>Support of market intervention of any kind, i.e. support of CMO</p> <p>Pro historic references or at least slow transitions → i.e. opposition to flat rate area payment</p> <p>protecting farmers: from too harsh demands, e.g. in terms of greening, from world markets NB: opposition to equal application of greening <i>across countries</i> should be coded F4</p> <p>call for delays on and exceptions from greening</p> <p>what farmers have done so far for the environment – under pillar 2 – should be taken into account for greening obligations</p> <p>support of the “safety net” / Crisis mechanism, make it as strong and applicable as possible</p> <p>support of “young farmers” scheme</p> <p>support of “active farmers”</p> <p>actively foster innovation / modernisation in farming technology NB: of course statements that are more extreme but share the same spirit – e.g. not just suggesting to delay the abolition of quotas, but not to abolish them – is also F1 pol</p> | <p>„We are also unhappy with the introduction of an additional 'greening penalty' in the Horizontal Regulation for those who do not carrying out their 'greening' requirements under pillar 1.”</p> <p>“Although we did manage to delay this penalty for the first two years, we were not able to prevent an eventual 25% penalty.”</p> <p>„Bedauerlich ist, dass die [andere Parteien] die Anrechnung der Agrarumweltmaßnahmen in der 2. Säule abgelehnt haben“</p> <p>“The MEP said she was particularly pleased that support for young farmers has been strengthened during the talks.”</p> |

Frame F1: Classic frame

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>Examples</u> |
|------------------|---|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| | <p>Along these lines, one might attribute the 2013 Reform proposal for limiting direct payments to ‘active farmers’ to this first frame. On the other hand, however, within the current system they are likely to prefer what is referred to as ‘Pillar I’ over ‘Pillar II’, as the latter has always been meant to fund those aspects of farming that go beyond food production, which means that from the perspective of the classic frame, it lacks legitimacy and diverts resources from where they should actually be allocated. By contrast, direct payments under the first pillar have replaced price support, and so the minimum supporters of the classic frame would want to achieve is there subsistence, preferably historical levels.</p> | | |

Frame F2: Liberalisation

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p>Normative (Why is it a problem?)</p> <p>F2 norm</p> | <p>If the classic frame mainly considers agriculture as a policy apart, a CAP-specific version of the supposed meta-frame may challenge exactly this by evaluating, analyzing and treating CAP like any other policy. Before this background, it seems plausible to consider works comparing policies and policy-making in the EU (Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005) and on the economics of these policies in particular (Altomonte & Nava, 2005) in order to distill a 'liberalisation frame' specifically regarding CAP. Indeed, when introducing CAP as an EU policy, Elmar Rieger (in: Wallace et al. (2005)) makes great effort to stress its anti-marketness and anti-liberal foundations (ibid., pp. 162, 196, respectively). As he points out:</p> <p>Unlike other welfare-state institutions, agricultural measures typically fuse production – that is, output-increasing- with income-related goals, making it hard to separate distributive and regulatory dimensions, and in ways that defy the application of <i>normal economic efficiency criteria</i>. This is still true for the new regime of 'decoupled' farm aid. (ibid., p. 164; emphasis by the author)</p> <p>The idea of 'normal economic efficiency criteria' can accordingly be considered as the normative foundation of the liberalisation frame before which the CAP is to be evaluated and on which the right kind of CAP would have to be founded.</p> | <p>References to efficiency as the goal of agricultural policy</p> <p>farmers as entrepreneurs</p> <p>big farms are better (because they are more efficient)</p> | <p>„Die GAP soll auf diesem Wege effizienter werden im Hinblick // auf eine wettbewerbsfähige // und nachhaltige Landwirtschaft und // einem lebendigen ländlichen Raum. //“</p> <p>„Die Wirtschaftlichkeit eines Betriebs muss künftig stärker in den Vordergrund gestellt werden“</p> |
| <p>Constitutive (What is the problem?)</p> <p>F2 cons</p> | <p>In order to capture the constitutive dimension of this frame, one might re-cite a quote from The Economist (29 September 1990) that describes the CAP as 'the single most idiotic system of economic mismanagement that the rich western countries have ever devised'. In other words, the problem with CAP consists in the policies adopted in this policy area, especially under the classic frame, which do not follow 'normal economic efficiency criteria' and hence entails social costs that are unacceptably high.</p> | <p>Complaints about 'waste' of public money and market distortions</p> <p>wasteful subsidies</p> <p>overproduction</p> <p>waste of taxpayers' money</p> <p>artificially high consumer prices</p> | <p>„The Commission has failed to get to grips with inefficient farming methods in other EU countries // and many wasteful subsidies, including those to “tobacco growers” still remain”</p> |
| <p>Cognitive (What causes</p> | <p>So what, according to this frame, has caused this problem? One more time, Rieger's work, actually more of a textbook kind, quite obviously exemplifies this frame:</p> | <p>References to the laws of supply and demand</p> | |

Frame F2: Liberalisation

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p>the problem?)</p> <p>F2 cogn</p> <p>F2 cogn</p> | <p>CAP planning is premised on a view of a ‘general’ European interest and notions of a basic incentive structure common to all farmers. It shares this feature with state socialism, where the diversity of interests, not properly taken into account in the planning process, spontaneously makes itself felt when individual farmers make decisions most convenient for them. CAP decisions have been made as if these objective economic laws did not apply in agriculture. Therefore, ‘post-decision surprises’ are a constant feature, because economic laws continue to function. (ibid., p. 176)</p> <p>In order to complement this causal narrative, one has to be familiar with these ‘objective economic laws’, usually elaborated in a classic social cost analysis using a supply and demand curve (cf. Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 258). The argument is that classic CAP policies place a burden on consumers who pay the “difference between the smaller quantity actually consumed at the politically determined domestic target price (P_T) and the higher quantity eventually available for consumption without price intervention, at price P_0 or, without tariff protection, at price P_W”, while on top of that taxpayers have to pay for the export subsidies (ibid.). In addition, these export subsidies and tariffs harm third-country producers and eventually hamper free trade, causing further indirect harm to efficiency. Direct payments, the policy suggested by the multifunctionality frame discussed below, are more efficient and hence preferred over market interventions. Nevertheless, direct payments may keep farm business in the market that would otherwise not be economically viable, that is, which are inefficient (Rieger, 2005, p. 172; Mahé, 2011, pp. 30-31; d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). What is implied here is that a farm which is not working efficiently is also not worth supporting. Obviously, these causal narratives are not always told in all detail in political statements; yet, references to the ‘wrong incentives’ set by existing policies in terms of public spending may be seen as instances of the cognitive dimension of this frame.</p> | <p>‘butter mountains’ talk</p> <p>subsidies lead to overproduction</p> | <p>“The continuation of coupled payments is regrettable <i>as these lead to over production which is not related to market demand.</i>”</p> |
| <p>Policy (What should be done?)</p> <p>F2 pol</p> | <p>On the policy dimension, subsidies of any kind – even direct payments – must therefore eventually be abolished, and even direct payments are considered problematic with regard to ‘normal’ economic efficiency criteria (Rieger, 2005, p. 166). Such a policy of budgetary discipline has coincided in time with the rise of the liberalisation frame (Ackrill, 2000, p. 87), but further would be valuable regarding efficiency, as all government spending must be based on taxes, which in turn, are likely to hamper the Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Of the other policy tools considered in CAP, and with regard to the 2013 Reform in particular, the so-called ‘greening’ is probably not endorsed – at least not actively promoted – by proponents of this</p> | <p>Reduce subsidies / CAP budget</p> <p>reduce budget, especially for pillar 1</p> <p>private money for agricultural investment</p> | <p>„// auch könnte das EU-Budget drastisch gekürzt // und nicht zuletzt ein wichtiger Beitrag zum Abbau der Brüsseler Zentralbürokratie geleistet werden“, schloss [Person].“</p> |

Frame F2: Liberalisation

| Dimension | Logic | Observable instances | examples |
|-----------|--|--|---|
| F2 pol | <p>frame. Environmental objectives of the CAP might be considered at odds with efficiency: After all, they limit the free choice of the farmer-entrepreneur to allocate resources in a market-oriented – and hence efficient – manner. Inasmuch as the ‘capping’ is concerned, large farms are often considered more efficient (cf. Mahé, 2011, pp. 30-31), so that capping might punish exactly those enterprise that do their job ‘best’. At the same time, it could be argued that efficient farms do not need any further support, so that if they receive direct payments they do not need, the support system would be inefficient (d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). This contradiction, however, only exists as direct payments are not a policy of choice for proponent of the liberalisation frame anyway. Indeed, further market orientation is the general line of policy following from this frame. During the debate on the 2013 Reform, advocates of the liberalisation frame will thus call for a further reduction in direct payments, will support the expiry of the quota system and will fight the creation of a ‘safety net’ and of Producer Organisations (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, pp. 9-10). Finally, it must be noted, that the liberalisation frame does not reject <i>all</i> of the features of CAP: after all, free trade in agricultural goods as provided for in the Single Market project would appear desirable.</p> | <p>instead of public money</p> <p>opposition to and complaints about protectionist and interventionist measures</p> <p>critical of any kind of Common Organisation of Markets, CMO → against target prices, quotas, export subsidies etc. → against Producer Organisations</p> <p>NB: opposition to intervention in terms of e.g. environmental regulation = F1 poll</p> <p>In favour of a CAP that is “market oriented”, free market CAP</p> <p>opposition to capping</p> <p>opposition to “double funding”</p> | <p>“The continuation of coupled payments is regrettable...”</p> <p>“But that cannot disguise the fact that what is left is still not good - a backwards step in many ways to interventionism and statism.”</p> <p><i>„Irritiert durch die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise greift man aus Angst vor der Zukunft in die Mottenkiste alter Agrarmaßnahmen und glaubt, // dass man aus Brüssel mit planwirtschaftlichen Mitteln wie Interventionen und öffentlicher Lagerhaltung in der Lage wäre, // bei Krisen den gesamten Weltmarkt beeinflussen zu können.“</i></p> <p><i>„Wir können und wollen die geplante Rückkehr zu einer Landwirtschaft mit verfehlten Produktionsanreizen, Quotensystemen und übertriebener Absicherung durch den Staat nicht mittragen.“</i></p> <p>“Exportsubventionen sind ein völlig veraltetes Instrument der GAP und dürfen auf keinen Fall - auch nicht bei fallenden Agrarpreisen – wieder eingeführt werden; //“</p> <p><i>„Der Ansatz zur gemeinsamen Marktorganisation ist zu protektionistisch gefasst // und läuft dem marktorientierten Ansatz der letzten Agrarreform zuwider; //“</i></p> |

Frame F2: Liberalisation

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | | | “It would be a huge step backwards for the process of gradually reforming the CAP towards a market-based system.” |

Frame F3: Multifunctionality

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|---|--|--|---|
| <p>Normative (Why is it a problem?)</p> <p>F3 norm</p> | <p>The multifunctionality frame and the classic frame have in common that they both value farming. Yet, while in the classic frame the act of farming is valuable <i>as such</i>, i.e. as food production, the multifunctionality frame values farming as a means for the production not just of food but also of other, public goods. These consist in the maintenance of the countryside, including both rural traditions but also the preservation of the natural environment (Rhinard, 2010, pp. 71-75).</p> | <p>Emphasis on the environment, fairness, public goods</p> <p>‘public money for public goods’ talk</p> <p>in contrast to F1: well-being of rural areas rather than farmers themselves</p> <p>transparency of payments</p> <p>(a safe) environment as a public good</p> <p>Fairness, equality</p> <p>Environmental sustainability</p> <p>Organic farming as valuable</p> <p><i>Small farmers better</i> than big ones NB: farmers more generally: F1 norm! NB: small farmers still not to be exempted from greening, see F3 pol!</p> | <p>„Wir [Partei] haben immer deutlich gemacht, dass ein Paradigmenwechsel, der die Vergabe von Subventionen <i>für den Schutz und den Erhalt von Umwelt, Natur und anderer öffentlicher Güter</i>, das sogenannte "Greening", wichtig ist.“</p> <p>“Wenn wir schon so viel öffentliches Geld in die Landwirtschaft stecken, dann können wir auch eine gewisse nachhaltige Entwicklung für den ländlichen Raum verlangen.“</p> <p>„protection of rural communities, in the EU and elsewhere in the world, //”</p> <p>“[Person] ist stolz darauf, dass [Land] EU-Spitzenreiter in der Bio-Produktion ist.“</p> <p>„Direktzahlungen dürfen nicht bloß eine Einkommensunterstützung für die Betriebe sein, // sondern müssen vor allem an soziale und ökologische Ziele geknüpft werden.“</p> |
| <p>Constitutive (What is the problem?)</p> <p>F3 cons</p> | <p>However, often there is not only a shortage of these positive externalities of farming, but farming may even harm the environment (negative externalities). If farming is not a value as such but should actually produce public goods rather than reducing them, this is obviously problematic.</p> | <p>Emphasis on pollution caused by farming</p> <p>current farming practice as destructive, non-sustainable (also outside Europe)</p> <p>current agricultural policy is not fair among farmers, inequality (references to new/old Member States in particular) NB: “unfairness” regarding own country’s farmers (only) should be coded F4</p> | <p>“At the moment, our agricultural systems are degrading the natural resource base of soil water and biodiversity”</p> <p>“The status quo, industrial scale monocultures and intensive production systems, result in huge external costs relating to our health and the environment – this must be changed. //”</p> |
| <p>Cognitive (What</p> | <p>Advocates of the multifunctionality frame argue that overly intensive farming practices are the cause of the negative externalities</p> | <p>Market pressure or misled subsidies</p> | |

Frame F3: Multifunctionality

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|---|--|--|--|
| causes the problem?) F3 cogn | of farming (ibid., p. 71). Yet, as was argued above, intensive farming was precisely what the classic instruments of CAP were meant to achieve. At the same time, the multifunctionality frame recognizes that the farmers have “special needs” (ibid., p. 75), i.e. they require public funding to survive – which they deserve provided that they produce the desired public goods in addition to food itself. | farmers need some public support to deliver the public goods they produce which the market does not reward big farms need less support, because it is easier for them to survive while producing public goods | “Das muss durch besondere Förderung auch so bleiben, // denn die Marktpreise spiegeln die wahren Kosten nicht wieder.“ „Economies of scale mean bigger farms need less support so we need to target public funds to where they are needed.” |
| Policy (What should be done?) F3 pol | From a multifunctionality perspective, however, simply abolishing all subsidies and leaving farmers to free competition is not the solution, since the market does not pay for the desired public goods, it may be argued (European Commission, 2014, p. 4). In order to produce the desired public goods, farming must be subsidized – without, however, fostering the negative externalities resulting from excessive production. Hence, the multifunctionality frame propagates the concept of ‘decoupling’, that is, of paying farmers directly, independent of the food they produce. From the perspective of this frame ‘decoupling’ does not mean, what Rieger (2005) takes it to mean, namely that “farmers obtain payments irrespective of what – and how much – they produce” (ibid., p. 178) – for farmers are actually paid for what they produce, namely public goods next to food. In order to obtain direct payments, farmers have to comply with environmental, food quality and animal welfare standards. As was mentioned before, the direct payments constitute the so-called ‘pillar 1’ of the CAP. Under the old system of the Single Payment Scheme, however, direct payments were still largely a reward for earlier food production records and at best indirectly related to public good. Hence, the structural funds forming ‘pillar 2’ of the CAP are even more central to this frame, as these funds were more targeted at the multiple other functions of agriculture. More recently, the proposals for the 2013 Reform have somewhat blurred the borders between the two pillars, (cf. Mahé, 2012), as a ‘greening’ of the first pillar was suggested, which meant that 30 per cent of the national envelopes would have to be directly made conditional on even stricter environmental conditions. As a consequence, direct payments would be more in line with the logic of this frame. Most | Greening, (financially) strong pillar 2, capping, convergence pro convergence in terms of direct payments per hectare across and within countries, → hence also for abolishing historic references quickly → pro small farmers’ scheme etc., pro capping NB: support for small farmers does not mean that they can be exempted from greening NB: please always code internal and external convergence as two separate policies! direct payments only on conditions, esp. greening calls for “real” greening opposition to all kinds of “watering down” the greening suggestions → no exceptions – apart from organic farming (“Bio”), which should be greening by definition calls for specific elements of greening such as crop diversification/rotation, etc. publish records of payments, call for “transparency” | “We think money should be more fairly distributed within // but also between Member States. //” “Mein Fazit lautet: Zwar haben wir den Fuß in der Tür für eine umweltgerechtere Landwirtschaft, aber von einem echten Greening sind wir noch meilenweit entfernt“ “As part of our work on CAP reform, the [EPG] group have been stressing the need for these greening measures to be mandatory, as opposed to some of the other political groups who are calling for voluntary measures only, via a menu approach.” „Leider sind die ursprünglichen Ziele des so genannten Greenings wie schon im Parlament so auch in den Beschlüssen der Agrarminister der EU nur noch als Überschrift erhalten geblieben.“ „Die von uns [Partei]-Europaabgeordneten geforderte Maximalfördersumme pro Betrieb von 100.000 Euro wurde leider nicht angenommen, hier hat sich die Agrarindustrielobby durchgesetzt” |

Frame F3: Multifunctionality

| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
|------------------|--|---|--|
| F3 pol | <p>other innovations of the 2013 Reform, next to those discussed already in the discussion of the classic frame, are also very much in line with the idea of multifunctionality. The so-called internal convergence – implied in ‘capping’ and the small-farmers scheme – mentioned above makes sense insofar as the production of the desired public goods would not seem to grow proportionally to the size of a farm business. Similarly, the concept of ‘equity’ with regard to the Single Farm Payments (i.e. the ‘ungreened’, standard part of the direct payments) makes sense within this frame: so far, the SFPs are lower in some member states than they are in others (most importantly in the new member states). However, one might argue that the production of the agriculture-related public goods should be equally valued in all parts of the EU (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 2; d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). By contrast, from a classic frame perspective, historic production accounts may be considered a fair basis for the distribution of payments both across and within countries. From a liberalisation perspective, direct payments should be abolished anyway, and yet if they persist, they should arguably not distort competition and should thence be the same across countries (cf. d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). In sum, while the multifunctionality frame that may have started as a lowest common denominator, it has become a logic of its own, and it has dominated the 2013 Reform agenda. Noteworthy, that does not mean that all actors are equally supportive of it.</p> | <p>less support for bigger farms, i.e. capping</p> <p>opposition to re-nationalisation and to flexibility at the national level</p> | <p>„Auch Kleinlandwirte dürfen nicht von diesen Mindeststandards befreit sein, wenn sie Beihilfen erhalten wollen. //“</p> |

| <i>Frame F4: Anti-Centralisation</i> | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| <u>Dimension</u> | <u>Logic</u> | <u>Observable instances</u> | <u>examples</u> |
| | | | Fehlentwicklungen ist die Landwirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union schlichtweg unreformierbar.“ |
| Policy (What should be done?) F4 pol | In policy terms, the consequence would accordingly be partial or even total re-nationalization of agricultural policy, more indirectly referred to as ‘flexibility’. Provided that this does not entail the abolition of all subsidies, however, this might in turn lead to serious distortions of competition on the common market for food; for after all, different member states might not want or not be able to grant the same amounts of subsidies to their respective farming communities. Hence, giving up EU-financing of the CAP also means to give up an important element of the Single Market, and, eventually, of European integration (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 3; European Commission 2014b, p. 6). | Re-nationalization, ‘flexibility’, reduction of centralization - re-nationalization of agricultural policy, also indirectly by leaving EU - e.g. <i>territorially</i> “flexible” approach to greening NB: general opposition to (strict) greening should be coded F1 pol favouring country-level solutions | “Deshalb müssen neue Wege eingeschlagen werden, weshalb die Verantwortung für diesen Bereich wieder in die Hände der Mitgliedstaaten zu legen ist”, betonte [Person]. //“ „Somit trete immer deutlicher zutage, wie dringend eine Renationalisierung der Agrarpolitik sei, so der [Partei] EU-Mandatar.“ |

Off topic:

- statements on (admission of) genetically modified organisms (GMOs); this is a different issue, with different characteristics and a distinct set of legislation
→ GMOs not to be confused with German acronym for Common Market Organisation (Gemeinsame Marktordnung)
- statements on the new status of the European Parliament as a co-legislator on CAP or the conflict/power balance between EP and Council
- procedural statements

Short version:

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| classic (F1) | Food production, food safety, farming as an end in itself, farmers well-being | Economic uncertainty of farming, nowadays in the form of extreme price volatility | Farming is special, an industry apart that cannot be made subject to market laws because of weather conditions and rigidity of demand; food speculation enhances the problem | Market intervention or at least generous recompensation in terms of direct payments; safety net as third pillar; extra support for young farmers; 'active farmers' condition |
| Liberalisation (F2) | efficiency | Market distortions and their social cost | Market intervention (including direct payments, which keep unprofitable businesses in the market) of any kind reduces efficiency | Liberalisation, no more subsidies (cut CAP budget down to zero) |
| Multi-functionality (F3) | Environment; social justice; development; equity → farming as a means for public goods | Farming externalities (too many negative ones, while the positive ones remain unrewarded) | Caused by: wrong subsidies BUT ALSO market failure, as markets do not pay for public goods such as the environment | Direct payments and Pillar 2 → greening → capping → convergence (internal & external) |
| Anti-centralisation (F4) | The specific needs of 'our' farmers – local public goods | CAP as a pan-European policy | The EU cannot get things right; reason: because it does not know local circumstances | Nationalisation of subsidies, flexibility |

II.3 Codebook: frames on TTIP

| <i>Frame 1: neoliberalism</i> | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|--|---|
| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
| Normative F1 norm | <p>The most genuine source of neoliberal thought, namely the central piece by Adam Smith, is entitled “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” and quite clearly points to the normative basis of this frame as the goal of policy-making, namely the accumulation of (material) wealth. At the centre of Smith’s work is thus a theory of economic growth and development (Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 79), which in large parts also still influence the causal narratives and policy suggestions behind the neoliberal frame. Before discussing these, it is noted here that indeed those who are considered as proponents of a neoliberal frame on trade policy, such as the EU Commissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, has defined the goal of trade policy as follows:</p> <p>“In times like these, trade policy ... has an even bigger role to play. It must be an engine of economic growth and job creation and a driver for economic reforms to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency.” (quoted in De Ville and Orbie, 2013, p. 10)</p> <p>In addition to growth and labour effects, free trade is assigned the capacity of leading to ‘consumer benefits’ in terms of lower prices and product choice, resulting in ‘triple benefit’ (cf. Siles-Brügge, 2013, p. 605). Often literally linked to this triple benefit is the goal of ‘competitiveness’, which, while arguably a cause of growth, job creation and consumer benefits, occasionally becomes an end in itself (ibid., p. 610). Before discussing the other dimensions, it is briefly considered here, what this set of goals means with regard to alternative normative considerations.</p> <p>Some have argued that neoliberals ignore the pursuit of collective goals as a public task (cf. De Ville & Orbie, 2013, p. 3). This, however, appears only partially appropriate. After all, a key notion in (neo)liberal thought is the Smithean idea of a harmony of interests, according to which the simple pursuit of self-interest in a free market is the best way towards achieving the collective social good of economic growth (Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 68). In other words,</p> | <p>Stressing that TTIP will lead to more jobs and economic growth</p> <p>Stressing advantages for industry/producers, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs)</p> <p>Emphasizing consumer benefits in terms of lower prices and choice</p> <p>Emphasizing property rights, rights of investors</p> | <p>“In times like these, trade policy ... has an even bigger role to play. It must be an engine of economic growth and job creation and a driver for economic reforms to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency.”</p> <p>“[Person], [party] MEP for [region], has called for a strong harmonisation of business regulations to be prioritised in the ongoing EU-US trade or Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) negotiations, // in order to boost SME growth. //”</p> <p>“In einer mit 23 Ja-Stimmen gegen nur 5 Nein-Stimmen (eine Enthaltung) angenommenen Resolution gaben die Europaabgeordneten ihre Unterstützung für ein "umfassendes" Handels- und Investitionsabkommen mit den USA, // das neue Arbeitsplätze schaffen und vor allem kleinen und mittelständischen Unternehmen zugute kommen soll. //“</p> <p>„TTIP could lead to a €250 billion or 2 percent increase in EU GDP - equating to an annual extra €500 per European family, and the creation of over 2 million jobs across Europe.”</p> |

Frame 1: neoliberalism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--------------------------------|--|---|--|
| F1 norm | within the neoliberal frame, there is no contradiction between the individual and the collective here, so that indeed protecting the individual's self-interest is the same as pursuing the collective good. The precondition is simply that the prioritized common good is economic growth. | | |
| Constitutive F1 cons | Clearly, then, a lack of growth as observed – by definition – in times of economic recession or crisis, would be problematic. Indeed, this is also how Commissioner De Gucht, cited earlier as a neoliberal, describes the EU's current situation: "These are challenging economic times for Europe with low growth, high unemployment and gaping deficits in Member States' public finances." Similarly, he has spoken of a "double economic challenge" and has argued "We have, on the one hand, to address our structural weaknesses on the supply side in order to increase our growth potential and, on the other hand . . . to consolidate our public finances" (as quoted in De Ville & Orbie, 2013, pp. 10 & 11). Noteworthy, he points here to the Member States' fiscal situation, thereby excluding the classic, Keynesian answer to a lack of growth. Moreover, he does not speak of, for instance, a double challenge in terms of climate change and economic recession, or of rising inequality. | <p>(Economic crisis as) lack of growth</p> <p>Double crisis: economic stagnation and public deficits</p> <p>Europe falling behind by international comparison</p> <p>Denying that TTIP is about abolishing standards: it is about removing (harmful) NTBs</p> <p>others are just trying to discredit this promising project, thereby risking growth</p> <p>Ridiculing particular regulatory standards</p> <p>References to the absence of growth in the Crisis</p> <p>Harm to less competitive sectors is not problematic</p> <p>ISDS are not a problem</p> <p>US spying: → the problem consists in others using this against TTIP, thereby risking growth → insisting that the two issues are separate</p> | <p>"New economic forces such as China and India continue to grow, increasing world competition and shaping the world economy."</p> |

Frame 1: neoliberalism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|----------------|---|--|---|
| F1 cons | | (spying might be a problem, TTIP is not) | |
| F1 cogn | As Grant and Brue efficiently summarise it, the aforementioned idea of 'harmony of interests' "implies that intrusion by government into the economy is unneeded and undesirable" (ibid., 2007, p. 68), from Smith's perspective. In fact, he considers market intervention an act of presumption on the part of the governing. Smith himself already extended to international trade by rejecting any domestic monopoly building and arguing instead: "If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage" (Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 354-355, quoted in Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 69). Smith assumes here, as does another classical proponent of free trade, David Ricardo, in his famous theory of comparative advantage, that the labour units 'freed' in the comparatively inefficient domestic sector can be put to use more efficiently in the sector where the country in question enjoys a comparative (in Smith case: absolute) advantage (ibid., pp. 114-116). Without going into the details of the neoliberal causal narrative, it thus already becomes clear why even the harm done to less competitive sectors within the EU would <i>not</i> constitute a problem for the advocates of the neoliberal frame on trade (DeVilje & Orbie, 2013, p. 3). Nonetheless, while policy-makers often take for granted the exact causal relations behind growth and free trade on the one hand and lack of growth and protectionism on the other, they shall briefly be summarised in the following paragraph. In very simple terms, the idea behind Smith's theory of absolute advantage and Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage can be brought down to the notion of division of labour: just like increases in productivity achieved by specialisation lead to economic growth within a country, so specialisation of countries in certain sectors will lead to economic growth for both trading partners under free trade. Each country will be able to produce more at lower costs, will be able to sell surpluses abroad and will have access to cheap imports of those products for which it is not specialised (Grant & Brue, 2007, pp. 79-81; pp. 114-116). Note, that this perspective considers the outcome as a win-win situation, since all countries participating in free trade enjoy these advantages, which is perfectly in line with the 'harmony of interests' within | <p>Stressing necessity of TTIP for getting out of the recession and making the most of 'unused' potential</p> <p>TTIP makes EU more competitive</p> <p>Stressing the helpfulness of adaptive pressures</p> <p>uselessness of protectionism (setting wrong incentives)</p> <p>explaining lack of growth / growth potential from TTIP by pointing to useless NTBs</p> <p>regulation as 'obstacles'</p> <p>Stressing the importance of trade and exports for the EU or individual Member States</p> <p>TTIP as a policy 'for free', without costs (especially in fiscal terms, hence helping to solve the public debt aspect of the crisis)</p> <p>Emphasizing the current trade volume and potential volume of the newly created market</p> <p>In contrast to normative dimension: not just stressing the benefits, but also HOW these will be created by TTIP</p> <p>ISDS as common practice / pointing to</p> | <p>"We all know that protectionism makes recovery harder."</p> <p><i>"Trade is a vital element of our economic recovery // and TTIP can begin to set high global trading standards, beyond those which countries such as China would advocate."</i></p> <p>"It is not enough to simply resist protectionism: we must also continue to open up markets to trade and investment."</p> <p>„Der Außenhandelsausschuss, der dem endgültigen Abkommen seine Zustimmung erteilen muss, bevor dieses in Kraft treten kann, unterstrich, dass ein Freihandelsabkommen für die EU und die USA unerlässlich sei, // um das bisher brachliegende Potential eines integrierten transatlantischen Marktes zu nutzen."</p> <p>„[Land] ist eine Exportnation.“</p> <p>„Alle Verzögerungen würden Europas Wachstumspotential schaden.“</p> <p>„Die Abschaffung von Zöllen und nicht-tarifären Handelsschranken ist ein Programm für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze, // das uns so gut wie nichts kostet!, so [Person] und [Person].“</p> <p>„Wir haben die historische Möglichkeit,</p> |
| F1 cogn | | | |

Frame 1: neoliberalism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|----------------|--|---|---|
| | <p>countries. The flipside of this argument is that any impediment to free markets both within and across countries makes nations forego these advantages, so that instead of growth they will face continued recession.</p> <p>Indeed, modern advocates of free trade argue exactly along these lines. Siles-Brügge finds references to the concept of ‘comparative advantage’ in strategy papers of DG Trade (ibid., 2013, p. 604). The idea is that market access quickens necessary adaptation needed sooner or later anyway (ibid., p. 604; see also Hay & Rosamond, year, p. 13), increasing ‘competitiveness’ of European firms (DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 4). Thereby, free trade will lead to growth, job creation and consumer benefits as stated already in the foregoing quotes by Commissioner De Gucht. Two quotes by Catherine Ashton, not only includes the aforementioned flipside argument but also shows the degree of self-evidence with which this causal narrative is presented: “[w]e all know that protectionism makes recovery harder” and, in another speech: “[a] protectionist backlash, as part of a rescue package or otherwise, could potentially worsen this downturn” (quoted in DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 8). Noteworthy, the classic underlying theories are formulated as economic laws – and hence should be universally applicable, irrespective of the trading partner in question.</p> | <p>experience with ISDS in other trade agreements</p> <p>TTIP as a precedent for future (even more) trade agreements and global trading rules</p> | <p>einen Milliarden-Markt zu schaffen.“</p> <p>“However, for SMEs currently trading with the US, complying with technical rules and regulations is cited as the most pressing concern, followed by the lack of regulatory information. // Differences in US States’ regulation, customs rules and limited market access are all greatly limiting factors for European and [national] businesses. //</p> <p>“However, the limitations imposed on our companies due to the lack of regulatory convergence are far too great.”</p> <p>„Den größten Gewinn erhoffen sich die Verhandlungsparteien allerdings durch die Abschaffung nicht-tarifärer Handelshemmnisse und der Angleichung technischer Normen.“</p> <p>“An EU-US trade deal would be a unique opportunity to stimulate the [country] economy and create thousands of jobs // without spending a penny of taxpayers’ money.”//”</p> <p>„The reduction of non-tariff barriers and the cutting of red tape, for example, will enable our businesses to grow and become stronger players on the highly competitive global stage. //”</p> |
| F1 cogn | | | |
| Policy | Hence, it should be obvious now that the neoliberal frame is the frame that | | |

Frame 1: neoliberalism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|---------------|---|--|--|
| F1 pol | <p>most outspokenly favours TTIP. Not only that both sides always win from free trade anyway, however small these gains may be, given the already low tariffs between the EU and the US. It is also the fact that this frame likewise rejects what it considers ‘murky’ behind-the-border policies that nevertheless inhibit trade (Siles-Brügge, 2013, p. 605). As I have argued in the preceding section, TTIP indeed is mainly about the removal of so-called Non-Tariff-Barriers (NTBs), which from a neo-liberal free market perspective are harmful. Within this frame, the otherwise controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) are absolutely appropriate as a tool against future protectionism – even of the more subtle kind – and may be understood as a further element of “protection of traders from the arbitrary exercise of state power” (Lang quoted in DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 3).</p> <p>The ‘prism’ affair and its successors are unlikely to dampen the support for TTIP in any way. This is not only because they are so much in favour of the project itself. Nor is the argument that the United States of America, generally viewed with a certain degree of scepticism by the opponents of neoliberalism, will by contrast be considered an ideational partner by neoliberals the only reason. It is also the simple fact that those values which might be threatened in the Snowden affair – be they data protection ideals or national security – are in any way linked to the neoliberal frame on trade. Some neoliberals might indeed reject US spying against EU citizens and firms, but they will not change their mind on TTIP because of it. As I will show in due turn, this might be different for the other frames.</p> | <p>General support for TTIP/ free trade in general, unqualified</p> <p>Support for TTIP even if US does not prove “friendly” on other issues</p> <p>Emphasis on an ambitious, comprehensive agreement</p> <p>Calls for signing TTIP quickly → no delays, .e.g. due to ‘unrelated’ spying scandal</p> <p>Supporting a TTIP that includes ISDS</p> | <p>“[Party] MEPs have welcomed the launch of negotiations over a comprehensive trade deal between the EU and US earlier today. //”</p> <p>„Die Abgeordneten betonten, ein Abkommen müsse "ambitioniert" und für beide Seiten bindend sein.“</p> <p>„Die Verhandlungen müssen nun so schnell wie möglich beginnen.“</p> |

Frame 2: Protectionism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|
| Normative F2 norm | <p>First, on the normative dimension, List challenges the notion of ‘harmony of interests’, arguing instead that “the immediate private interests of certain members of the community do not necessarily lead to the highest good of the whole”, as Grant and Brue note (ibid., 2007, p. 199). Noteworthy, the good of the nation was ranked above that of the individual (ibid.). As soon as the harmony of interests is dissolved in favour of the collective, however, the automatism proclaimed by liberal theory disappear – and the good of ‘the nation’ has to be defined other than by the individual pursuit of wealth. This view leads to a much more strategic perspective on trade. Indeed, List had criticised Smith and other classic liberals for ignoring politics. List, for instance, argued that it may be worthwhile giving up ‘value’ in the short term, in terms of foregoing cheap imports due to tariffs, with the long-term goal of building up its own manufacturing industry. This, in turn, “not only secures to the nation an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also industrial independence in case of war” (List quoted in Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 200). In other words, it matters to have your own manufacturing industry within the confines of your nation state.</p> <p>Arguably, the discussion on TTIP is hardly about having manufacturing industries, as the respective participating countries on both sides of the Atlantic have long since left the pre-industrial stage of economic development. Nevertheless, it might still be desirable to keep certain sectors of the economy in a state that are of wider political relevance. A military industry constitutes the most obvious example, and one which, according to Husted and Melvin, would even be accepted by Smith (ibid., 2007, p. 202). Yet the discussion on the CAP has shown that also self-sufficiency in food supplies can be a political objective that might involve trade policy instruments for its achievement. More recently even, the absence of a European alternative to Google, Facebook etc. has been deplored (reference). With Airbus, a historical precedent of a European effort for breaking an American monopoly exists (Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 210). In principle, however, the range of sectors that should be kept within the country for political reasons is open to discussion, so that the protectionist normative dimension might have bias towards securing existing jobs rather than aiming for the creation of new ones. Indeed, employment more generally in terms of existing jobs is a value regularly evoked also by</p> | <p>References to national/European <i>interests</i> NB: <i>values</i> are F3 norm!</p> <p>The well-being of domestic economy/producers (including the cultural industry/services, artists) NB: valuing culture <i>as such</i> (not its producers) is F3 norm!</p> <p>Protect jobs that exist rather than risk them with the uncertain prospect of creating new ones</p> <p>Be independent in some sectors rather than depending on trade</p> <p>Patriotism</p> <p>It is better to consume domestic goods than foreign ones</p> <p>Domestic producers should be preferred</p> <p>NB: the concept of the nation here can be extended to include the supranational Europe</p> | <p>“Ziel der EU muss aber sein, die europäische Wirtschaft gegenüber unlauterer Konkurrenz zu schützen, // auch wenn dies den Dogmen eines ungehinderten Freihandels widerspricht“, betonte [Person]. //“</p> <p>“Die EU wird insbesondere zu klären haben, ob eine transatlantische Freihandelszone überhaupt im Interesse Europas liegt.“</p> <p>"Anders als in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik hat sich Brüssel bisher nicht gescheut, in Wirtschaftsfragen europäische Interessen, // etwa durch Verhängung von Schutzzöllen, // zu verteidigen.“</p> |

Frame 2: Protectionism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|
| F2 norm | modern protectionists, as is the general spirit of patriotism or, rather, nationalism included in List's work (Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 197). While the goal of keeping certain domestic industries mainly relates to the disharmony of interests between nations, the potential disharmony within nations is another aspect worth considering in the discussion of protectionisms normative dimension. Yet, politically defined national goals such as a 'fair' distribution of income might be thinkable as well (Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 201). | | |
| Constitutive F2 cons | Before this background, unfettered competition can be problematic, as it may involve the loss of certain industries which the nation as a whole might have a certain interest of keeping and the loss of attached, existing jobs. Such competition may be considered harmful and threatening then. | <p>Free trade is a threat to "the nation", its 'interest' → US: EU and US interest are not identical NB: conflict (US) producers and (EU) consumers is F3!</p> <p>Free trade as a threat to jobs</p> <p>Threat to (sectors of) domestic industry by imported goods Threat to EU agricultural sector by American GMO-friendly producers NB: simply allowing GMOs to be sold is F3 cons; F2 cons only if it is explicitly termed as a threat to domestic <i>industry/producers</i></p> <p>Imports risking to replace domestic goods</p> <p>US: spying is economically motivated (German: "Wirtschaftsspionage")</p> | <p>„Daß es der US-Regierung ausschließlich um eigene Interessen geht, sollte spätestens die NSA-Affäre verdeutlicht haben, // der zufolge mit dem geplanten Freihandelsabkommen Wirtschaftsspionage in noch größerem Ausmaß möglich wäre.“</p> <p>“[Party] [person] said this morning he is concerned about the loss of [national] jobs if a European free trade treaty is agreed with the US. //”</p> <p>“Jobs could be lost as a result of these proposals . . . “</p> <p>“This could put [national] farmers out of business // as a result of food being imported from industrial and intensive US farms. //”</p> <p>„Daß es der US-Regierung ausschließlich um</p> |

| <i>Frame 2: Protectionism</i> | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
| F2 cons | | | eigene Interessen geht, sollte spätestens die NSA-Affäre verdeutlicht haben, // der zufolge mit dem geplanten Freihandelsabkommen Wirtschaftspionage in noch größerem Ausmaß möglich wäre.“ |
| Cognitive F2 cogn | It is the unqualified application of the liberal free trade doctrine – e.g. an all-encompassing version of TTIP – that leads to this harmful or unfair competition, as it disregards not only the political dimension of trade but also the fact that different nations have different starting conditions: in the historical example of List’s analysis of economic development in Germany, for instance, it may well be that Germany would in principle be able of developing its own manufacturing industry, but will only very slowly or never achieve this under conditions of free trade (Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 198-200). It is this inequality in starting conditions that justifies the label of ‘unfair’ competition. That said, even in sectors where a nation is not likely to ever catch up with potential trading partners, national strategic interests would normatively justify protection. To a certain extent, then, comparative advantages are not given but contingent upon certain political decisions. Only a country that already has reached the desired level of competitiveness, such as Britain at the time, will argue in favour of unfettered free trade (Grant & Brue, 2007, pp. 198-199). Otherwise, a nation should prefer protection, at least in selected sectors. | Foreign producers do not play fair; unfair competition → e.g. due to the fact that American agricultural producers use GMOs and overly intensive production methods → they use technologies that should not be used | “This could put [national] farmers out of business // as a result of food being imported from industrial and intensive US farms. //” |
| Policy F2 pol | Regarding TTIP, protectionists will thus call for a number of exemptions, that is, for the exclusion of certain sectors from the agreement. They will not, however, necessarily oppose it. Exemptions may refer to the abolition of tariffs, but also to other means of protecting key sectors such as subsidies. However, it must be noted here that NTBs in the form of regulatory standards may have an effect that resembles the effect of a tariff or government subsidy, but that the introduction of such regulatory standards is highly unlikely to be justified by means of a protectionist frame. This is because it would | Keep tariffs Exempt certain sectors/industries/services of the economy from TTIP → e.g. agriculture, audiovisual sector, military industry NB: exemption for the health sector in terms | "Anders als in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik hat sich Brüssel bisher nicht |

Frame 2: Protectionism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--------|--|--|---|
| F2 pol | <p>rhetorically be much more efficient to consider such standards as worthwhile in itself, as I shall demonstrate below when discussing the anti-globalisation frame.</p> <p>Before doing so, however, the particular application of protectionism vis-à-vis the United States needs to be discussed. More generally, it might be argued that some of the strategic aims of protectionism could be of lesser importance here, as both the US and most EU Member States are joined in the NATO defense community. At the same time, this has traditionally not prevented some states such as France from striving for a certain degree of independence in defense matters. In case of the US, however, strategic considerations have reached beyond the military sector, as for instance also one's own cultural industry (normative) has received particular protection (Hay & Rosamond, year, p.). The US cultural sector would arguably benefit from the removal of current barriers to trade in this sector (be they tariffs or supply-side subsidies), and indeed it would seem plausible to argue that starting conditions are hardly the same here (cognitive) (see also: Congressional Research Service, 2014).</p> <p>More recently, the 'prism' scandal might be used in order to justify not necessarily opposition to TTIP as such, but instead the strategic goal of building up European alternatives to Google etc., which consequently would necessitate exemptions from TTIP in this particular area (see also: Congressional Research Service, 2014).</p> <p>Finally, agriculture might constitute a field for protectionist exemptions. In general, the removal of trade barriers contrasts to some extent with existing policy within the EU: it becomes more important to subsidise an uncompetitive sector that is exposed to competition than one that is not (cf. Husted & Melvin, 2007, pp. 206-207, who discuss this for the US case). More specifically, the widespread application of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food production constitutes a field where, the EU is not on a par with the US, so that 'unfair' competition is likely to be bemoaned here. Doing so would constitute an instance of protectionist framing, if and only if this is done in terms of the harm it does to the EU's agricultural industry.</p> <p>Noteworthy, there is a thin – and mainly analytical – line here between GMO-opposition for protectionist reasons and the rejection of GMO-food as such, which would be part of the anti-globalisation frame(s) to be discussed in the</p> | <p>of the UK NHS are part of F3</p> <p>Support for geographic indications, 'made in' etc.; origin of goods needs to be clear</p> | <p>gescheut, in Wirtschaftsfragen europäische Interessen, // etwa durch Verhängung von Schutzzöllen, // zu verteidigen.“</p> |

Frame 2: Protectionism

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--------|---|----------------------|----------|
| F2 pol | <p>next subsection.</p> <p>Tariffs may constitute the most obvious form of protectionism, while regulatory standards as in the case of GMOs may constitute a hidden but factual form of protectionism. ‘Hidden’ protectionism, however, implies that the insistence on certain regulatory standards is framed in non-protectionist terms and thus by definition is not considered to be part of the protectionist frame just outlined. In between the open protectionism in terms of tariffs and hidden, regulatory protectionism the – at least in the EU – increasingly popular practice of geographical indications (GIs) is situated, a well-known example being Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma (cf. Congressional research service, 2014, p. 9). While such labels are used in the US might just be common food names, their usage is regulated in the EU (cf. <i>ibid</i>). At a national level, ‘made in’ labels perform a similar function: they do not financially discourage consumers from buying cheaper, imported products, as tariffs would, but constitute a justification for potentially higher prices in terms of an appeal to patriotism or, at least, to non-rational images and connotations (cf. Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 197). Husted and Melvin count such labels among protectionist policies (<i>ibid.</i>), and this be extended to GIs here.</p> <p>It is true, of course, that GIs share some features with regulatory standards. Moreover, they are commonly justified as bits of information to the consumer. Nonetheless, they should be counted as protectionist policies for two reasons. Firstly, the actual benefit arising from them to consumers is itself debatable, since they do not necessarily imply better quality or safety, while their benefit to the existing domestic industry is beyond doubt (cf. Congressional research service, 2014, p. 9). Yet, in contrast to hidden protectionism, it is not only their effect that justifies their categorization as protectionist. It is, secondly, their link to nationalist-protectionist norms that makes work: the individual is implicitly asked to forgo a cheaper price in the short run for the greater good of the nation, just as List would have postulated.</p> | | |

Frame 3: Anti-Globalisation (A: moderate, B: radical)

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--|--|--|---|
| <p>Normative</p> <p>F3 norm</p> | <p>As with the notion of ‘neoliberalism’, the label ‘anti-globalisation movement’ was put on the participants by others rather than the name they chose for themselves (references). The imposed label is misleading, as in fact the anti-globalisation movement and those who take up its ideas in representative politics are not against globalisation in principle (Ayres, year, p. 22). Moreover, as the ‘anti-globalisation’ label stresses the opposition of the movement to something, it has a pejorative and slightly negative touch to it. It may indeed be true that the policy dimension of the frame(s) going under this label here is mainly defined by its opposition to, in this case, TTIP. Yet, the discussion of the normative dimension shared by both the moderate and the radical version of the frame shows that proponents of the frame are certainly in favour of something.</p> <p>As Ayres (2004) notes by analyzing how the movement frames its critique of globalisation, which in fact is a critique of neoliberalism, what the movement turns against is “the current WTO-dominated rules-based system that focused mostly on promoting trade and investment liberalisation, while remaining silent on consumer, labor, environmental or human rights concerns” (ibid, p. 22). Similarly, Sporer (2009) notes that key actors within the movement such as Attac call for “a global trade regime that prioritizes the interests of developing countries, socially disadvantaged and the environment” (ibid., p. 44). Much rather than constituting direct policy suggestions, these statements summarise the values of the movement.</p> <p>These values can now be contrasted with those of the preceding frames: in contrast to protectionism, on the one hand, the focus is not on the well-being of one particular nation here, as in fact the well-being of e.g. developing countries is explicitly included. Moreover, priority is clearly given to consumers, whose interests are clearly ranked above those of domestic producers even, while protectionism may involve short-term sacrifices on the part of consumers. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, aims for consumer benefits just as much as for the well-being of producers (‘harmony of interests’), yet it is limited to the economic, material well-being in terms of cheap prices and product choice.</p> <p>This is not to say that the anti-globalisation movement totally disregards material conditions. Yet, for the case of TTIP, post-material aspects such as consumer safety and human rights are likely to take centre stage for</p> | <p>National and European regulatory standards (“NTBs”), including public ownership Environmental protection Consumer safety Human rights / fundamental rights</p> <p>Culture and cultural diversity as such NB: the producers of cultural goods, i.e. the respective sector, industry, artists etc. are not named under F3 norm; if they are, the statement should be coded F2 norm</p> <p>Consumers’/citizens’ well-being first, priority over producers/industry/’the economy’)</p> <p>US: Stressing distinctiveness of European values/ differences between EU and US standards NB: European interests or conflicting EU/US interests – as countries, not as producers vs. consumers – should be coded F2</p> | <p>„Essenziell für ein Freihandelsabkommen der Europäischen Union mit den USA sei, dass die europäischen Standards vor allem bei der Produktsicherheit sowie beim Verbraucher- und Tierschutz gesichert sein müssen.“</p> <p>„But I have strong demands including the protection of public services and EU environmental and food safety standards.“</p> <p>“Wir [Partei] waren und sind Garant dafür, dass sich die BürgerInnen-Interessen gegenüber jenen der Konzerne durchsetzen.“</p> <p>“It will be crucial that we bring prosperity back to Europe, ensure new prospects for both workers and consumers, // <i>whilst simultaneously preserving our European values.</i>”</p> |

Frame 3: Anti-Globalisation (A: moderate, B: radical)

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---|
| F3 norm | proponents of the anti-globalisation frame, where current standards will determine the perceptions of potential costs of liberalisation (Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 10): With regard to consumer safety standards, proponents of this frame will stress the European distinctiveness in terms of the so-called precautionary principle, which for instance is behind the widespread rejection of GMOs in Europe. Stretching the concept of human rights, proponents of the frame will stress differences in attitudes on data protection, using the ‘prism’-affair as an illustration. Similarly, rights to provision of certain public services, such as water supply as in the ‘Right to water’ campaign might be evoked. That said, it is of course possible that other standards are invoked as well, whether they are actually higher than the US counterparts or not. | | |
| Constitutive F3 cons | In general, of course, any threat to the aforementioned standards (and obviously the values these standards are meant to protect) or to the future capacity of setting such standards constitutes a problem. Such a problem might be referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’ (cf. Ayres, 2004, Sporer, 2009). As was already noted, globalisation and even free trade may not necessarily be a problem in this sense, but the current way most trade agreements are conceptualized (including the WTO regime) is (cf. Ayres, 2004, p. ?). A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is not a problem as such either. They are potentially problematic inasmuch as they disregard importance of social, environmental, consumer safety and human rights concerns, which is the reason why – a certain general heterogeneity within the movement notwithstanding – ‘neoliberalism’ is univocally considered problematic from an anti-globalisation perspective (Ayres, 2004, pp. 15-18; Schröder, 2015, pp. 21-23). Indeed, the above discussion of neoliberalism as a policy frame on free trade in general and TTIP in particular helps to understand this opposition: not only are these values at best secondary from a neoliberal perspective, but what may constitute a valuable regulatory standard for critics of globalisation is precisely what for neoliberals may constitute a ‘non-tariff barrier’ to trade (NTB). The removal of such NTBs is what, in fact, is the core of TTIP, much rather than the abolition of the few remaining tariffs (Congressional Research Service, 2014; Swedish study). Those who particularly appreciate the regulatory status quo are likely to perceive this as a risk: At best, they lose the kind of standard they consider ideal and are used to (such as, for instance, the | <p>Critique of current free trade practice, including WTO rules</p> <p>Declaring removal of standards as the ‘real’ purpose of TTIP</p> <p>TTIP as a threat for the environment / environmental standards → e.g. it brings fracking to Europe</p> <p>TTIP as a threat to consumer safety → e.g. it brings Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) to Europe NB: here, the simple fact that GMOs will be allowed is enough; if however this is specified as a problem for agricultural producers, it is to be coded F2!</p> <p>TTIP as a threat to human/fundamental rights → e.g. data protection → UK: threat to NHS (National Health</p> | <p>“This treaty would remove those protections.”</p> <p>“In reality, these negotiations are not about free trade, but they are about removing and undermining much-needed regulations, // which serves public policy goals // and corrects market failures.”</p> <p>“Jobs could be lost as a result of these proposals // and the environmental impact could be devastating,” said the Deputy Chair of the Assembly’s Enterprise, Trade & Investment Committee. //”</p> <p>“Another worrying aspects of this agreement, would be to allow the European market to be flooded with genetically modified (GM) foods imported from the US.”</p> <p>„Das geplante transatlantische Freihandelsabkommen bringt enorme Risiken mit sich – und nützt letztlich</p> |
| F3 cons | | | |

Frame 3: Anti-Globalisation (A: moderate, B: radical)

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|---|--|---|---|
| | <p>precautionary principle). This, of course, is a judgement that is independent of the factual effectiveness of standards. At worst, they face a lower level of standards as a kind of lowest common denominator. Any such risk will be denied by neoliberals, as they might not consider the same issues as valuable standards, but simply as non-tariff barriers to trade.</p> <p>To be added: threat to the UK's National Health Service (privatization pressures); the NHS is a public health care system that guarantees free medical treatment to everyone within the UK; this is about a right/social standard much more than keeping a health industry within the UK, hence F3 rather than F2</p> | <p>Service)</p> <p>TTIP as a threat to cultural diversity / as cultural homogenization</p> <p>TTIP <i>only</i> good for producers</p> <p>TTIP as an economic version of NATO, directed against the rest of the world → to the detriment of less developed countries</p> <p>US: complains about neoliberal/US - hegemony in global economics / international politics</p> <p>US: Prism/Snowden affair as a threat to European values (fundamental rights) is related to TTIP</p> | <p>ausschließlich den Konzernen.“</p> <p>“[Person] said: “Today’s talks were deigned to cement further the role of US firms in providing public services across the EU – // and help develop a deal that could mean an end to most environmental, health, and safety regulations across the EU. //”</p> <p>„Washington geht es darum, das Modell einer globalisierten Wirtschaft nach US-Vorstellungen auch in Europa durchzusetzen.“</p> |
| <p>Cognitive</p> <p>F3A cogn</p> | <p>For judging whether a problem arises in the context of the TTIP negotiations, two lines of argument from an anti-globalisation perspective are thinkable, a moderate and a radical one. The distinction between the two hinges on the question, in how far the representative institutions of nation-states or even the supranational EU in combination with civil society are capable of securing such regulatory standards in a globalised economy or not. This categorization reflects earlier analyses of the anti-globalisation movement that have pointed to varying degrees of radicalism within the movement (Ayres, 2004, p. 27; Eschle, year; Starr & Adams, year, p. 20) and related variation in the degree of optimism and pessimism concerning the capacity of the state and politics more generally to control globalised capitalism (Ayres, 2004, p. 27; Hay & Rosamond, year; Sporer, 2009, pp. 10-52). The shared causal narrative is that a democratic deficit leads to the aforementioned problem of lower regulatory standards.</p> <p>Yet, from a moderate perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP exists if a. representative institutions such as the EP and civil society are not</p> | <p>A:</p> <p>the nation state or other, supranational institutions of representative democracy – parliaments in particular – are or (with TTIP) will be hampered in their regulatory activity → e.g. because US rules apply to EU automatically</p> <p>Belief in democratic institutions</p> <p>Secretive, intergovernmental bargaining leads to the problem during the negotiation; complaints about secrecy NB: the call/strife for transparency instead is F3A pol!</p> | <p>A:</p> <p>“This agreement would stipulate that any US regulations would be sufficient for the European market and as such, // any additional European regulations would be sidestepped. //”</p> <p><i>Allein schon die Tatsache, daß die Verhandlungen zwischen US-Regierung und EU-Kommission hinter verschlossenen Türen wenig transparent durchgeführt wurden, // läßt den Verdacht wachsen, daß hier europäische Standards im Verbraucher- und Umweltschutz, im Bereich der Lebensmittelsicherheit sowie bei</i></p> |

Frame 3: Anti-Globalisation (A: moderate, B: radical)

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|----------|---|--|---|
| F3B cogn | <p>sufficiently involved in the process of negotiation, for if they were, they would represent consumer interests and consequently would keep regulatory standards safe and b. if the agreement itself provided for a future weakening of democratic institutions, e.g. by installing a non-democratic, private Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). From a radical perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP exists even if producers cannot prevent Member States or the EU from regulating on legal grounds. It is simply the idea that free trade agreements are always disadvantageous to consumers, as standards are definitely lost along the way and since a regulatory 'race to the bottom' follows afterwards anyway.</p> | <p>ISDS lead to the problem after the negotiation → they would allow firms to sue governments, thereby limiting the range of possible regulation/new standards</p> <p>Optimism: if formal representative institutions are involved, there is no problem – not for consumers, not for investors</p> <p>B: Problem is caused even if formal institutions are involved The reason is that even TTIP itself, by its own nature, will remove standards (NTBs) due to US and corporate supremacy. Once TTIP is concluded, there will be a race to the bottom in terms of regulation that is driven by market forces and cannot be stopped.</p> | <p>Arbeitnehmerrechten gekippt werden sollen. //</p> <p>„Es würde sich um ein System handeln, welches Unternehmen ermöglicht, den Staat auf Schadensersatz zu verklagen, wenn dieser zum Beispiel aufgrund gesundheitspolitischer Gegebenheiten gesetzliche Rahmenbedingungen verändert und dadurch dem besagten Unternehmen Einbußen entstehen.“</p> <p>„Wir haben bisher in keinem Freihandelsabkommen eine solche Regelung gebraucht, wir werden es auch hier nicht benötigen“, so [Person],// "denn wir haben einen Rechtsstaat".“</p> <p>B:</p> |

Frame 3: Anti-Globalisation (A: moderate, B: radical)

| | Logic | Observable Instances | Examples |
|----------------|--|--|--|
| Policy | Both moderate and radical critics of globalisation would agree that the existing standards as well as the capacity of setting new ones must be upheld – but as I already argued, this is essentially a value commitment without any particular policy implication concerning TTIP. Given the difference in terms of the causal narratives just presented, the concrete policy suggestions from moderates and radicals also differ. Moderates will oppose certain aspects of TTIP such as secret Commission mandates, private ISDS or the abolition of a particular standard but will conditionally support it (logically, if e.g. there are no private ISDS). Radicals, by contrast, sure of the loss it involves, will unconditionally oppose TTIP. | General: <i>change</i> WTO practice and rules | A: |
| F3A pol | The fact that TTIP is not about any FTA but about an FTA with the US is likely to be of particular relevance to critics of globalisation, since they consider the US as a hegemonic power in global politics and economics, spreading and enforcing neoliberal policies globally (Schröder, 2015, pp. 23-24). In general, TTIP may thus be considered as an attempt to further impose neoliberal policies on Europe, first by directly addressing certain standards and by impeding future regulation by means of private ISDS, before which powerful US companies might outperform European states. As was already mentioned, the ‘prism’ scandal might not only be considered as a proof of differing values on the other side of Atlantic. For radicals, it will constitute another argument for stopping the negotiations on TTIP immediately. Moderates, by contrast, might want to use TTIP to achieve general concessions in the realm of data protection. As economic growth is not their value priority but standards such as data protection are, the link is easily made, as both the scandal and TTIP – the latter at least potentially – are problematic for similar reasons. | A: Conditional support for TTIP depending on the procedure (incl.: not now/ like this) | Das bedeutet auch, dass die [Partei] im Europaparlament einem Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA nur dann zustimmen wird, wenn unsere Bedingungen erfüllt sind ", betont der Vizepräsident des Europaparlaments, [Person]. |
| F3B pol | | No to (private) ISDS | „Das sind unsere klaren roten Linien , die nicht überschritten werden dürfen", stellt [Person] klar, // der sich für transparente Verhandlungen einsetzt.“ |
| | | Call for parliamentary involvement early on | “Ein Schiedsgericht für Investor-Staats-Klagen ist für ein Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der EU und den USA nicht notwendig", betont der [Partei]-Spitzenkandidat und Vizepräsident des Europaparlaments, [Person].“ |
| | | Calls for involvement of citizens and civil society | „Ein Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA muss aber auf Augenhöhe passieren“ |
| | | Call for transparency and publication of mandate | „Derzeit kann es daher für das geplante Freihandelsabkommen von [A]jd.Partei Seite keine Zustimmung geben“, so der [Partei]-Europaabgeordnete.“ |
| | | Insisting on negotiations on equal par (“auf Augenhöhe”) | B: „Mit uns [Partei] ist dieses Freihandelsabkommen nicht zu machen!“ |
| | | US: use TTIP negotiation as a tool in order to achieve e.g. data protection more generally | |
| | | B: No to TTIP | |
| | | US: stop TTIP anyway, but definitely now that yet another scandal (Snowden, Prism) has become public | |

Off-topic:

- UK: remarks on costs/benefits of EU membership that do *not* involve a position on TTIP as good or bad
- Example (statements to be coded in bold):
 “**With such benefits on offer**, // this is hardly the time for the UK to exclude itself from EU leadership.”// “The Obama administration has already been clear that it wants to see a strong British voice in the EU. // Now is the time for maximum British influence in the EU// , **to ensure openness and resist protectionism.**”
 → the passages that are not bold only deal with UK-EU relations, but do not include any information on free trade or TTIP
- Remarks on US spying regarding the spying scandal itself and how to deal with it if this is not set in a direct relation to TTIP

Short version:

| frame | What sort of values do you need in order to see this as a problem? (Normative dimension) | What is the problem? (Constitutive dimension) | What has led to the problem? (Cognitive dimension) | What should be done about the problem? (Policy dimension) |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Neoliberalism, Frame 1 | Economic growth, job creation | Double crisis: economic stagnation and public deficits | Protectionism makes economic recovery harder, while free trade is the only policy that does not increase debt | TTIP as soon and as ‘ambitious’ as possible |
| Protectionism, Frame2 | Existing jobs in domestic industries; patriotism and national/European interests | Unlimited free trade threatens certain domestic industries | Unfair competition | Exemption of certain sectors; geographical indications |
| Anti-Globalisation, Frame 3(A&B) | High standards for environmental protection, consumer safety and human rights | TTIP might reduce the level of standards | A: secret negotiations inhibit democratic control needed to protect standards; ISDS inhibit future regulation B: TTIP negotiations are beyond democratic control anyway; once it is there, race to the bottom | A: conditional approval of TTIP – EP and civil society involvement, no ISDS B: no TTIP! |

Annex III

III.1 Detailed results on Europeanised welfare

Austria

| Code | A SPÖ | % A SPÖ | A ÖVP | % A ÖVP | A FPÖ | % A FPÖ | A Grüne | % A Grüne |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|------------------|---------|---------------------|-----------|
| Frame 1 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 2 | 8.0 | 57.1 | 3.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 31.3 |
| F2 norm | 4.0 | 28.6 | 3.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 12.5 |
| F2 cons | 1.0 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 18.8 |
| F2 pol | 3.0 | 21.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 38.5 | 58.0 | 100.0 | 1.0 | 6.3 |
| F4 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 33.0 | 56.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 17.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 23.1 | 9.0 | 15.5 | 1.0 | 6.3 |
| Frame 5 | 6.0 | 42.9 | 5.0 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 62.5 |
| F5 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cons | 2.0 | 14.3 | 5.0 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 43.8 |
| F5 cogn | 2.0 | 14.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 12.5 |
| F5 pol | 2.0 | 14.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.3 |
| total | 14.0 | 100.0 | 13.0 | 100.0 | 58.0 | 100.0 | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts source | 1 delegation | | 1 delegation | | 14 Indiv.MEPs | | 2 MEPvianational | |

Germany

| Code | D SPD | % D SPD | D CDU/ CSU | % D CDU/ CSU | D NPD | % D NPD | D AfD | % D AfD | D LINKE | % D LINKE | D B90 | % D B90 | D FDP | % D FDP |
|-----------|------------|---------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|---------------|---------|------------|--------------|------------|---------|------------------------------------|---------|
| Frame 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 54.0 | 50.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 27.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 15.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 2 | 7.0 | 17.9 | 5.0 | 17.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 93.3 | 8.0 | 61.5 | 5.0 | 15.6 |
| F2 norm | 3.0 | 7.7 | 3.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 26.7 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 33.3 | 3.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 1.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.7 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 5.0 | 15.6 |
| F2 pol | 3.0 | 7.7 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 26.7 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 22.0 | 20.6 | 23.0 | 51.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 27.0 | 84.4 |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 3.0 | 6.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 31.3 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 13.1 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 15.6 |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 15.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 15.6 |
| F3 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 24.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 21.9 |
| Frame 4 | 2.0 | 5.1 | 19.0 | 65.5 | 31.0 | 29.0 | 22.0 | 48.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 24.1 | 26.0 | 24.3 | 8.0 | 17.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 2.0 | 5.1 | 9.0 | 31.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 12.0 | 26.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 5 | 30.0 | 76.9 | 4.0 | 13.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.7 | 5.0 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 norm | 1.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cons | 24.0 | 61.5 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.7 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 pol | 5.0 | 12.8 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 39.0 | 100.0 | 29.0 | 100.0 | 107.0 | 100.0 | 45.0 | 100.0 | 15.0 | 100.0 | 13.0 | 100.0 | 32.0 | 100.0 |
| No. texts | 2 | | 2 | | 5 | | 6 | | 2 | | 1 | | 4 | |
| Source: | delegation | | delegation | | nationalbydef | | nationalbydef | | delegation | | delegation | | delegation (expert in practice) | |

France

| Code | F PS | % F PS | F UMP | % F UMP | F FdG | % F FdG | F Verts | % F Verts | F FN | % F FN | F MoDem | %F MoDem | |
|--------------|------------|--------|------------------|---------|-----------|---------|------------|-----------|-----------|--------|---|----------|-------|
| Frame 1 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 24.0 | 11.9 | 0.0 | |
| F1 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | |
| F1 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | |
| F1 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | |
| F1 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | |
| Frame 2 | | 4.0 | 30.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 88.0 | 366.7 | 12.0 | 27.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F2 norm | | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 50.0 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 44.0 | 183.3 | 6.0 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 62.5 | 5.0 | 11.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 70.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| Frame 3 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 83.3 |
| F3 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F3 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| Frame 4 | | 1.0 | 7.7 | 30.0 | 93.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 3.5 | | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 15.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 31.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 9.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | | 1.0 | 7.7 | 12.0 | 37.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | | 0.0 |
| Frame 5 | | 15.0 | 115.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 8.3 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F5 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F5 cons | | 10.0 | 76.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F5 cogn | | 3.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F5 pol | | 2.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| total | | 20.0 | 153.8 | 30.0 | 93.8 | 90.0 | 375.0 | 13.0 | 29.5 | 31.0 | 15.4 | 6.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 1 | | 1 | | 9 | | 1 | | 4 | | 0 | | |
| source | delegation | | quasi-delegation | | expertMEP | | delegation | | indivMEPs | | 2 only on: travailleurs détachés; Suisse | | |

*Ireland and Italy*⁶⁷

| Code | IAN | % IAN | IRE Greens | %IRE Greens | |
|----------------------------------|-----|-----------|------------|-------------|-------|
| Frame 1 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 2 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 83.3 |
| F2 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F2 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F2 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 50.0 |
| Frame 3 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F3 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 16.7 |
| F3 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 4 | | 1.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | | 1.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 5 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | | 1.0 | 100.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 |
| number of press releases / texts | | 1 | | 1 | |
| source | | manifesto | | manifesto | |

⁶⁷ Most parties from these countries did not issue statements on the issue.

United Kingdom

| Code | UK Lab | % UK Lab | UK Cons | % UK Cons | UK Lib | % UK Lib | UK Greens | % UK Greens | UKIP | % UKIP | UK BNP | % UK BNP | |
|--------------|------------|----------|------------|-----------|---|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|----------------|----------|-------|
| Frame 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 25.0 | 29.0 | 100.0 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 13.0 | 44.8 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 17.2 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 11.0 | 37.9 |
| Frame 2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 15.0 | 7.5 | 40.0 | 67.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 6.0 | 10.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 4.5 | 21.0 | 35.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 8.0 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 5.0 | 8.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 64.0 | 31.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 31.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 4.5 | 32.0 | 15.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.0 | 20.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.0 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 41.0 | 93.2 | 75.0 | 37.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 40.0 | 43.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 13.6 | 17.0 | 8.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 22.7 | 12.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 15.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 22.7 | 18.0 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 7.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 34.1 | 28.0 | 13.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 18.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Frame 5 | 24.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 47.0 | 23.4 | 19.0 | 32.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cons | 12.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22.0 | 10.9 | 8.0 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 cogn | 11.0 | 45.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 11.4 | 10.0 | 16.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F5 pol | 1.0 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 24.0 | 100.0 | 44.0 | 100.0 | 201.0 | 100.0 | 59.0 | 100.0 | 92.0 | 100.0 | 29.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 2 | | 2 | | 7 | | 5 | | 5 | | 3 | | |
| source | delegation | | delegation | | indivMEPs crosschecked with delegation | | indivMEPs | | delegation | | MEPviaNational | | |

III.2 Detailed results on the 2013 Reform of the CAP

Austria

| Code | ÖVP | %ÖVP | SPÖ | %SPÖ | A Grüne | %A Grüne | A FPÖ | %A FPÖ | A NEOs | %A NEOs | |
|--------------------------|-----|------|-------------|---------------------|---------|----------|-------------|-----------|--------|-----------|-------|
| classic (F1) | | 6.0 | 33.3 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 19.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | | 2.0 | 11.1 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 2.0 | 6.1 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | | 3.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 11.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | | 1.0 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| liberalisation (F2) | | 1.0 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 75.0 |
| F2 norm | | 1.0 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F2 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 50.0 |
| multifunctionality (F3) | | 11.0 | 61.1 | 78.0 | 89.7 | 31.0 | 93.9 | 7.0 | 26.9 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F3 norm | | 5.0 | 27.8 | 22.0 | 25.3 | 3.0 | 9.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F3 cons | | 1.0 | 5.6 | 12.0 | 13.8 | 2.0 | 6.1 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | | 5.0 | 27.8 | 40.0 | 46.0 | 25.0 | 75.8 | 5.0 | 19.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 53.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 26.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | | 18.0 | 100.0 | 87.0 | 100.0 | 33.0 | 100.0 | 26.0 | 100.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | | 2 | | 10 | | 2 | | 3 | | 1 | |
| source | | MEP | viaNational | national delegation | | MEP | viaNational | leaderMEP | | manifesto | |

Germany

| Code | CDU/ CSU | %CDU/ CSU | SPD | %SPD | D B90 | %D B90 | D FDP | %D FDP | D LINKE | %D LINKE | D AfD | %D AfD | D NPD | %D NPD |
|--------------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|--------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| classic (F1) | 26.0 | 68.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 5.1 | 9.0 | 7.6 | 3.0 | 7.9 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 2.0 | 22.2 |
| F1 norm | 7.0 | 18.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 3.8 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F1 cons | 2.0 | 5.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 17.0 | 44.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 5.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| liberalisation (F2) | 1.0 | 2.6 | 16.0 | 11.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 88.0 | 74.6 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 6.0 | 46.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 1.0 | 2.6 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 26.0 | 22.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 10.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 14.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 33.0 | 28.0 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| multifunctionality (F3) | 9.0 | 23.7 | 119.0 | 88.1 | 222.0 | 94.9 | 12.0 | 10.2 | 34.0 | 89.5 | 4.0 | 30.8 | 4.0 | 44.4 |
| F3 norm | 2.0 | 5.3 | 22.0 | 16.3 | 49.0 | 20.9 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 11.0 | 28.9 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 2.0 | 22.2 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 17.0 | 7.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 19.0 | 8.1 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 10.5 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F3 pol | 7.0 | 18.4 | 83.0 | 61.5 | 137.0 | 58.5 | 5.0 | 4.2 | 18.0 | 47.4 | 1.0 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | 2.0 | 5.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 7.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 3.0 | 33.3 |
| F4 norm | 1.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 1.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 15.4 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| total | 38.0 | 100.0 | 135.0 | 100.0 | 234.0 | 100.0 | 118.0 | 100.0 | 38.0 | 100.0 | 13.0 | 100.0 | 9.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 6 | | 8 | | 15 | | 16 | | 3 | | 1 | | 2 | |
| source | national delegation | | national delegation | | national delegation | | expertMEP | | national delegation | | manifesto | | nationalbydef | |

France

| Code | UMP | | PS | | F MoDem | | %F MoDem | | F FN | | %F FN | | F Verts | | %F Verts | | F FdG | | %F FdG | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|----------|----------------------------|----------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|---------|----------|----------|----------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | %UMP | | %PS | | %F MoDem | | %F MoDem | | %F FN | | %F FN | | %F Verts | | %F Verts | | %F FdG | | %F FdG |
| non-substantial | 3.0 | 0.0 | 31.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| classic (F1) | 4.0 | 100.0 | 64.0 | 32.0 | 7.0 | 87.5 | 5.0 | 100.0 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 328.0 | 69.9 | | | | | | | | |
| F1 norm | 1.0 | 25.0 | 8.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 37.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 97.0 | 20.7 | | | | | | | | |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 3.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 77.0 | 16.4 | | | | | | | | |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 29.0 | 6.2 | | | | | | | | |
| F1 pol | 3.0 | 75.0 | 49.0 | 24.5 | 3.0 | 37.5 | 2.0 | 40.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 125.0 | 26.7 | | | | | | | | |
| liberalisation (F2) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| multifunctionality (F3) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 131.0 | 65.5 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 107.0 | 93.9 | 138.0 | 29.4 | | | | | | | | |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 18.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 10.5 | 54.0 | 11.5 | | | | | | | | |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23.0 | 20.2 | 6.0 | 1.3 | | | | | | | | |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 8.8 | 5.0 | 1.1 | | | | | | | | |
| F3 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 89.0 | 44.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 62.0 | 54.4 | 73.0 | 15.6 | | | | | | | | |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.6 | | | | | | | | |
| F4 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | | | | | | | |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | |
| F4 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | |
| total | 4.0 | 100.0 | 200.0 | 100.0 | 8.0 | 100.0 | 5.0 | 100.0 | 114.0 | 100.0 | 469.0 | 100.0 | | | | | | | | |
| No. of texts | 2 | | 13 | | 2 | | 1 | | 8 | | 14 | | | | | | | | | |
| source | national delegation | | national delegation | | national delegation | | (expert)MEP viaNational | | national delegation | | expertMEP | | | | | | | | | |

Ireland

| Code | IRE FF | %IRE FF | IRE FG | %IRE FG | Labour IRE | %Labour | | IRE SF | %IRE SF | IRE Greens | %IRE | |
|--------------------------|----------------|---------|-----------|---------|------------|---------|----------------|--------|-----------|------------|--------|--------|
| | | | | | | IRE | IRE | | | | Greens | Greens |
| classic (F1) | 19.0 | 57.6 | 166.0 | 72.2 | 13.0 | | 65.0 | 27.0 | 84.4 | 5.0 | | 41.7 |
| F1 norm | 10.0 | 30.3 | 68.0 | 29.6 | 8.0 | | 40.0 | 13.0 | 40.6 | 2.0 | | 16.7 |
| F1 cons | 5.0 | 15.2 | 34.0 | 14.8 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 4.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 1.0 | 3.0 | 8.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 2.0 | 6.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 3.0 | 9.1 | 56.0 | 24.3 | 5.0 | | 25.0 | 8.0 | 25.0 | 3.0 | | 25.0 |
| liberalisation (F2) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 1.0 | | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 1.0 | | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| multifunctionality (F3) | 3.0 | 9.1 | 50.0 | 21.7 | 6.0 | | 30.0 | 2.0 | 6.3 | 6.0 | | 50.0 |
| F3 norm | 1.0 | 3.0 | 29.0 | 12.6 | 6.0 | | 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | | 8.3 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | 2.0 | 6.1 | 9.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.1 | 5.0 | | 41.7 |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | 11.0 | 33.3 | 13.0 | 5.7 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 3.0 | 9.4 | 1.0 | | 8.3 |
| F4 norm | 6.0 | 18.2 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 2.0 | 6.3 | 1.0 | | 8.3 |
| F4 cons | 2.0 | 6.1 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | 3.0 | 9.1 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| total | 33.0 | 100.0 | 230.0 | 100.0 | 20.0 | | 100.0 | 32.0 | 100.0 | 12.0 | | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 3 | | 9 | | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | | | |
| source | MEPviaNational | | expertMEP | | manifesto | | MEPviaNational | | manifesto | | | |

Italy

| Code | I FI | %I FI | I PD | %I PD | I FdI/AN | %I FdI/AN | I Verdi | % I Verdi | I Tspiras | %I Tsipras |
|--------------------------|-----------|-------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| classic (F1) | 28.0 | 53.8 | 2.0 | 100.0 | 76.0 | 56.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 50.0 |
| F1 norm | 14.0 | 26.9 | 2.0 | 100.0 | 16.0 | 11.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 43.8 |
| F1 cons | 5.0 | 9.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 9.0 | 17.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 56.0 | 41.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.3 |
| liberalisation (F2) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| multifunctionality (F3) | 22.0 | 42.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 | 8.0 | 50.0 |
| F3 norm | 12.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 50.0 | 4.0 | 25.0 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 6.3 |
| F3 cogn | 3.0 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | 7.0 | 13.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 3.0 | 50.0 | 3.0 | 18.8 |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | 2.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 49.0 | 36.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 norm | 2.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.0 | 18.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 52.0 | 100.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 | 134.0 | 100.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 | 16.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 4 | | 1 | | 13 | | 1 | | 2 | |
| source | expertMEP | | national delagation | | expertMEP | | manifesto | | manifesto-like | |

United Kingdom

| Code | Cons | %Cons | Labour UK | %Labour UK | UK LibDem | %UK LibDem | UKIP | %UKIP | UK Greens | %UK Greens | UK BNP | %UK BNP |
|---|--------------------------|-------|----------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|-------|--------------|------------|---------------------|---------|
| classic (F1) | 7.0 | 5.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 25.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 2.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | 6.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| liberalisation (F2) | 89.0 | 69.0 | 9.0 | 47.4 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F2 norm | 6.0 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 15.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 38.0 | 29.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F2 cogn | 5.0 | 3.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 40.0 | 31.0 | 6.0 | 31.6 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| multifunctionality (F3) | 15.0 | 11.6 | 10.0 | 52.6 | 5.0 | 62.5 | 5.0 | 19.2 | 18.0 | 90.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 norm | 8.0 | 6.2 | 3.0 | 15.8 | 3.0 | 37.5 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 8.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cons | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 15.8 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cogn | 3.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 pol | 1.0 | 0.8 | 4.0 | 21.1 | 1.0 | 12.5 | 4.0 | 15.4 | 9.0 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| anti-centralisation (F4) | 18.0 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.0 | 73.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 75.0 |
| F4 norm | 2.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F4 cons | 6.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| F4 cogn | 4.0 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 23.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F4 pol | 6.0 | 4.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 26.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 25.0 |
| total | 129.0 | 100.0 | 19.0 | 100.0 | 8.0 | 100.0 | 26.0 | 100.0 | 20.0 | 100.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| number of press releases / texts source | 5 national delegation | | 1 leaderMEP | | 1 national delegation | | 1 national delegation | | 2 allMEPs | | 1 MEPviaNational | |

III.3 Detailed results on TTIP

Austria

| code/party | A SPÖ | %A SPÖ | A ÖVP | %A ÖVP | A NEOs | %A NEOs | A Grüne | %A Grüne | A FPÖ | %A FPÖ |
|------------------------|---------------------|--------|----------------|--------|--|---------|---------------------|----------|----------------|--------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 3.0 | 4.8 | 39.0 | 32.7 | 6.0 | 20.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | 2.0 | 3.2 | 15.0 | 12.6 | 3.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 1.0 | 1.6 | 12.0 | 10.0 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 10.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2: protectionism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 11.7 | 3.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.0 | 13.8 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.8 | 3.0 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 5.5 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 2.7 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 59.0 | 95.1 | 66.0 | 55.4 | 20.0 | 68.9 | 102.0 | 100.0 | 93.0 | 86.1 |
| F3 norm | 7.0 | 11.2 | 24.0 | 20.1 | 5.0 | 17.2 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| F3 cons | 9.0 | 14.5 | 9.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.0 | 15.6 | 22.0 | 20.3 |
| F3A cogn | 12.0 | 19.3 | 9.0 | 7.5 | 2.0 | 6.9 | 29.0 | 28.4 | 27.0 | 25.0 |
| F3A pol | 31.0 | 50.0 | 24.0 | 20.1 | 12.0 | 41.3 | 47.0 | 46.0 | 26.0 | 24.0 |
| F3B cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 6.0 | 5.5 |
| F3B pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 7.0 | 6.4 |
| total | 62.0 | 100.0 | 119.0 | 100.0 | 29.0 | 100.0 | 102.0 | 100.0 | 108.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 13 | | 11 | | 2 | | 11 | | 15 | |
| source | national delegation | | MEPviaNational | | national delegation (not yet elected at the time) | | national delegation | | MEPviaNational | |

Germany

| code/party | D SPD | %D SPD | D NPD | %D NPD | D LINKE | %D LINKE | D FDP | %D FDP | D CDU/ CSU | %D CDU/ CSU | D B90 | %D B90 | D AfD | %D AfD |
|------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|---------------------|----------|-----------|--------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|--------|-----------|--------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 2.0 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 100.0 | 50.0 | 69.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 25.0 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 27.3 | 16.0 | 22.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 27.3 | 12.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 |
| F1 pol | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 36.4 | 13.0 | 18.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2: protectionism | 3.0 | 2.1 | 14.0 | 33.3 | 18.0 | 34.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 11.1 | 5.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 1.0 | 0.7 | 3.0 | 7.1 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 16.7 | 8.0 | 15.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 7.1 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 7.0 | 13.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 140.0 | 96.6 | 28.0 | 66.7 | 35.0 | 66.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 19.4 | 62.0 | 92.5 | 6.0 | 75.0 |
| F3 norm | 24.0 | 16.6 | 2.0 | 4.8 | 3.0 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 15.3 | 6.0 | 9.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cons | 14.0 | 9.7 | 17.0 | 40.5 | 20.0 | 37.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 6.0 | 9.0 | 2.0 | 25.0 |
| F3A cogn | 31.0 | 21.4 | 5.0 | 11.9 | 6.0 | 11.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 17.9 | 3.0 | 37.5 |
| F3A pol | 71.0 | 49.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 38.0 | 56.7 | 1.0 | 12.5 |
| F3B cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3B pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 7.1 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 145.0 | 100.0 | 42.0 | 100.0 | 53.0 | 100.0 | 11.0 | 100.0 | 72.0 | 100.0 | 67.0 | 100.0 | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 16 | | 2 | | 5 | | 2 | | 8 | | 10 | | 1 | |
| source | national delegation | | nationalpartybydef | | national delegation | | expertMEP | | national delegation | | national delegation | | manifesto | |

France

| code/party | F Verts | %F Verts | F UMP | %F UMP | F PS | %F PS | F MoDem | %F MoDem | F FN | %F FN | F FdG | %F FdG |
|------------------------|---------------------|----------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|----------|-----------|-------|-----------|--------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 46.0 | 37.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.0 | 20.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 10.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2: protectionism | 14.0 | 15.4 | 61.0 | 50.0 | 41.0 | 58.6 | 16.0 | 44.4 | 21.0 | 75.0 | 5.0 | 6.9 |
| F2 norm | 3.0 | 3.3 | 23.0 | 18.9 | 9.0 | 12.9 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 2.0 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 5.0 | 5.5 | 9.0 | 7.4 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 8.3 | 5.0 | 17.9 | 1.0 | 1.4 |
| F2 cogn | 2.0 | 2.2 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 3.0 | 10.7 | 3.0 | 4.2 |
| F2 pol | 4.0 | 4.4 | 24.0 | 19.7 | 30.0 | 42.9 | 5.0 | 13.9 | 11.0 | 39.3 | 1.0 | 1.4 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 77.0 | 84.6 | 15.0 | 12.3 | 29.0 | 41.4 | 19.0 | 52.8 | 7.0 | 25.0 | 67.0 | 93.1 |
| F3 norm | 2.0 | 2.2 | 12.0 | 9.8 | 11.0 | 15.7 | 7.0 | 19.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.8 |
| F3 cons | 39.0 | 42.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 6.0 | 8.6 | 2.0 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 14.3 | 21.0 | 29.2 |
| F3A cogn | 21.0 | 23.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 13.9 |
| F3A pol | 3.0 | 3.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 10.0 | 14.3 | 6.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.6 |
| F3B cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3B pol | 12.0 | 13.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 7.1 | 30.0 | 41.7 |
| total | 91.0 | 100.0 | 122.0 | 100.0 | 70.0 | 100.0 | 36.0 | 100.0 | 28.0 | 100.0 | 72.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 8.0 | | 8.0 | | 10.0 | | 5.0 | | 5.0 | | 11.0 | |
| source | national delegation | | national delegation | | national delegation | | national delegation | | expertMEP | | leaderMEP | |

Ireland

| code/party | IRE SF | %IRE SF | IRE Lab | %IRE Lab | IRE Greens | %IRE Greens | IRE FG | %IRE FG | IRE FF | %IRE FF |
|------------------------|----------------|---------|----------------|----------|------------|-------------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 49.0 | 94.2 | 13.0 | 65.0 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 19.0 | 36.5 | 10.0 | 50.0 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 17.0 | 32.7 | 2.0 | 10.0 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 19.2 | 1.0 | 5.0 |
| F2: protectionism | 8.0 | 29.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 15.6 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 5.0 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 5.0 | 18.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 3.0 | 11.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 5.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 19.0 | 70.4 | 2.0 | 100.0 | 64.0 | 83.1 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 6.0 | 30.0 |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 50.0 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3 cons | 8.0 | 29.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 25.0 | 32.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 |
| F3A cogn | 7.0 | 25.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 14.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 |
| F3A pol | 2.0 | 7.4 | 1.0 | 50.0 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 |
| F3B cogn | 2.0 | 7.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 11.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3B pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.0 | 14.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 27.0 | 100.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 | 77.0 | 100.0 | 52.0 | 100.0 | 20.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | | 4 | | 2 | |
| source | MEPviaNational | | MEPviaNational | | manifesto | | MEPviaNational | | MEPviaNational | |

*Italy*⁶⁸

| code/party | I Verdi | %I Verdi | I Tsipras | %I Tsipras | I PD | %I PD | I FI | %I FI | |
|------------------------|-----------|----------|----------------|------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 13.0 | 16.0 | 55.2 |
| F1 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 8.7 | 8.0 | 27.6 |
| F1 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 7.0 | 24.1 |
| F1 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.4 |
| F2: protectionism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 8.7 | 13.0 | 44.8 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 6.9 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 6.9 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 9.0 | 31.0 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 3.0 | 100.0 | 20.0 | 100.0 | 18.0 | 78.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3 norm | 1.0 | 33.3 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 17.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3 cons | 1.0 | 33.3 | 8.0 | 40.0 | 2.0 | 8.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3A cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 20.0 | 4.0 | 17.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3A pol | 1.0 | 33.3 | 1.0 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 34.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3B cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| F3B pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| total | 3.0 | 100.0 | 20.0 | 100.0 | 23.0 | 100.0 | 29.0 | 100.0 | |
| No. of texts | 1 | | 2 | | 2 | | 4 | | |
| source | manifesto | | manifesto-like | | national delegation | | expertMEP | | |

⁶⁸ The Alleanza Nazionale did not issue statements on TTIP during the time frame observed.

United Kingdom

| code/party | UKIP | %UKIP | UK LibDem | %UK LibDem | UK Lab post-election | %UK Lab post-election | UK Lab manifesto | %UK Lab manifesto | UK Greens | %UK Greens | UK Cons | %UK Cons | UK BNP | %UK BNP |
|------------------------|---------------------|-------|---------------------|------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|---------------------|----------|---------------|---------|
| F1: neoliberalism | 13.0 | 100.0 | 22.0 | 100.0 | 18.0 | 10.1 | 6.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 norm | 1.0 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 36.4 | 9.0 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cons | 1.0 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 cogn | 6.0 | 46.2 | 11.0 | 50.0 | 9.0 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F1 pol | 5.0 | 38.5 | 3.0 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 38.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2: protectionism | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F2 pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3: anti-globalisation | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 160.0 | 89.9 | 4.0 | 40.0 | 42.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 100.0 |
| F3 norm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 39.0 | 21.9 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 3.0 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 22.2 |
| F3 cons | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 7.3 | 2.0 | 20.0 | 14.0 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 33.3 |
| F3A cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22.0 | 12.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 11.1 |
| F3A pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 86.0 | 48.3 | 1.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| F3B cogn | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 13.0 | 31.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 33.3 |
| F3B pol | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.0 | 21.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| total | 13.0 | 100.0 | 22.0 | 100.0 | 178.0 | 100.0 | 10.0 | 100.0 | 42.0 | 100.0 | 36.0 | 100.0 | 9.0 | 100.0 |
| No. of texts source | 2 | | 2 | | 15 | | 1 | | 5 | | 4 | | 1 | |
| | national delegation | | national delegation | | expertMEP, leaderMEP | | manifesto | | allMEPs | | national delegation | | nationalparty | |

Raw data can be provided upon request.